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Author SHA1 Message Date
74cf0d89cc Fix iOS BLE mesh authentication issues in BLEService (#998)
* Fix iOS BLE mesh authentication bypass chain in BLEService

- Bind sender IDs to BLE connection UUIDs for peripherals and centrals to prevent spoofing
- Enforce explicit RSR request/response validation and remove legacy TTL==0 RSR path
- Remove TTL==0 unconditional acceptance for messages and file transfers
- Ensure gossip sync caching only occurs after a packet is accepted
- Preserve self‑sync TTL==0 dedup exception without weakening authentication

* fix: toctou in boundPeerID identified by codex

* fix: Remove unused variable and bump version to 1.5.1

- Remove unused messageType variable (compiler warning fix)
- Bump marketing version to 1.5.1

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <212554440+jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-28 12:07:24 -10:00
GitHub Action b4b6aa5ca6 Automated update of relay data - Sun Jan 25 06:05:14 UTC 2026 2026-01-25 06:05:14 +00:00
GitHub Action 1e5a52f39f Automated update of relay data - Sun Jan 18 06:05:08 UTC 2026 2026-01-18 06:05:08 +00:00
3fc64f6168 feat: Implement Request Sync Manager (V2 Sync) (#965)
* feat: Implement Request Sync Manager (V2 Sync)

- Add RequestSyncManager to track and attribute sync requests
- Update BitchatPacket and BinaryProtocol to support IS_RSR flag (0x10)
- Update RequestSyncPacket with new TLV fields (sinceTimestamp, fragmentIdFilter)
- Update GossipSyncManager to use unicast sync requests and mark responses as RSR
- Update BLEService to enforce timestamp validation for normal packets and exempt valid RSRs
- Add documentation for the new sync manager mechanism

* fix: Resolve compilation errors in V2 Sync implementation

- Remove duplicate restartGossipManager in BLEService
- Add missing TransportConfig constants for sync
- Add 'sync' log category to BitLogger
- Add missing BitLogger import in GossipSyncManager

* fix: Update tests for V2 Sync changes

- Add requestSyncManager parameter to GossipSyncManager init in tests
- Implement getConnectedPeers stub in RecordingDelegate
- Remove unused variable warning in SubscriptionRateLimitTests

---------

Co-authored-by: a1denvalu3 <>
Co-authored-by: jack <212554440+jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-01-17 07:43:02 -10:00
9964710de2 Improve BLE mesh reliability for large transfers (#964)
* Improve BLE mesh reliability for large transfers

Major reliability improvements for fragment-based transfers (photos, files):

**Notification Queue Fixes**
- Fix silent packet loss when notification queue is full - now queues for retry
- Fix retry queue bug where remaining items were lost when one retry failed
- Add periodic drain mechanism as backup (every 5 seconds)

**Write Queue Fixes**
- Fix drainPendingWrites to use atomic take-send-requeue pattern
- Add logging when peripheral is ready for more writes
- Add periodic drain for pending writes as backup

**Fragment Pacing**
- Increase fragment spacing from 4-5ms to 25-30ms to prevent buffer overflow
- Conservative pacing prevents packet loss on congested BLE connections

**Thread Safety**
- Fix race conditions in stopServices() and emergencyDisconnectAll()
- Synchronize access to peripherals/centrals dictionaries during cleanup
- Clear pending message queues in emergencyDisconnectAll()

**Error Recovery**
- Add handlers for all BLE state transitions (poweredOff, unauthorized, etc.)
- Clear Noise session and re-initiate handshake on decryption failure
- Queue ACKs/receipts for delivery after handshake instead of dropping
- Re-queue failed pending messages for retry

**Other Improvements**
- Add route freshness validation in MeshTopologyTracker (60s threshold)
- Add TTL (24h) and size limits (100 per peer) for MessageRouter outbox
- Fix connection timeout to check peripheral.state before canceling
- Add NoiseEncryptionService.clearSession(for:) method

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix race condition and increase test timeouts

- Fix race in sendNoisePayload: use sync barrier instead of async
  to ensure payload is queued before initiating handshake
  (addresses Codex review feedback)

- Increase BLEServiceTests sleep from 0.5s to 1.0s for CI reliability

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-17 07:39:31 -10:00
806c420313 Add comprehensive test coverage for ChatViewModel and BLEService (#962)
* Add comprehensive test coverage for ChatViewModel and BLEService

This commit adds 14 new tests to improve the safety net for future
refactoring of ChatViewModel and BLEService:

New test files:
- ChatViewModelTorTests: Tor lifecycle notification handlers (8 tests)
- ChatViewModelDeliveryStatusTests: Delivery status state machine (6 tests)
- ChatViewModelRefactoringTests: Command routing and message handling (4 tests)
- BLEServiceCoreTests: Packet deduplication and stale broadcast filtering (2 tests)
- PublicMessagePipelineTests: Message ordering and deduplication (4 tests)
- MessageRouterTests: Transport selection and outbox behavior (4 tests)
- PrivateChatManagerTests: Chat selection and read receipts (2 tests)
- UnifiedPeerServiceTests: Fingerprint resolution and blocking (2 tests)
- RelayControllerTests: TTL, handshake, and fragment relay logic (4 tests)

Modified files:
- MockTransport: Added peer snapshot publishing on connect/disconnect
- TestHelpers: Added waitUntil polling helper for async tests
- MockIdentityManager: Extended for new test scenarios

Total: 454 tests across 64 suites (was 440)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix flaky test by using waitUntil instead of fixed sleep

Replace fixed 200ms sleep with waitUntil helper for more reliable
async assertion in routing tests. This prevents timing issues on CI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-16 16:02:13 -10:00
jackandGitHub 194dedac43 Merge pull request #961 from permissionlesstech/chore/cleanup-dead-code
Remove dead code and stabilize tests
2026-01-16 08:42:10 -10:00
jack 9af46a9ff8 Normalize Cashu chip URLs 2026-01-15 09:57:40 -10:00
jack da3fcd5a21 Remove dead code and stabilize tests 2026-01-15 09:46:35 -10:00
jackandGitHub b282536080 Merge pull request #960 from permissionlesstech/cleanup/dead-code-and-helpers
Remove dead code and extract helper methods
2026-01-15 07:18:06 -10:00
jackandGitHub e156356c71 Update README.md 2026-01-14 14:39:39 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 81a6e18d04 Remove dead code and extract helper methods
- Delete LocalizationCatalogTests.swift (530 lines entirely commented out)
- Remove unused nilIfEmpty String extension
- Remove backward-compat aliases from CommandProcessor
- Extract reachableTransport/connectedTransport helpers in MessageRouter
- Extract npubToHex/sendWrappedMessage helpers in NostrTransport
- Refactor 7 message sending methods to use shared helpers

Net reduction: ~590 lines

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-14 14:09:58 -10:00
jackandGitHub 4fbbd24021 Merge pull request #959 from permissionlesstech/fix/tor-foreground-restart-delay
Remove dormant wake attempt on Tor foreground restart
2026-01-14 12:04:10 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 ec54877140 Remove dormant wake attempt on Tor foreground restart
Arti's dormant/wake FFI functions are no-op stubs that don't actually
implement dormant mode. The app was wasting 2.5-12 seconds trying to
wake from a dormant state that doesn't exist before falling back to
a full restart.

This change:
- Removes wakeFromDormant() call and function
- Simplifies goDormantOnBackground() to just mark state as not ready
- Goes straight to restartArti() on foreground, eliminating the delay

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-14 10:59:24 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 293d627c28 Fix compiler warning: use let for reference type array
BitchatMessage is a class, so modifying its properties through an array
reference doesn't mutate the array itself. Changed var to let binding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-14 10:18:16 -10:00
jackandGitHub 0c3f84224c Merge pull request #958 from permissionlesstech/feature/arti-tor-replacement
Replace C Tor with Rust Arti
2026-01-14 10:15:16 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 7323c0b96c Fix SPM package path for Arti
Update root Package.swift to reference localPackages/Arti instead of
the removed localPackages/Tor directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-13 16:39:46 -10:00
jack 7bb835ffc9 Merge main into feature/arti-tor-replacement 2026-01-13 16:27:30 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 23d63ab4df Replace C Tor with Rust Arti for Tor integration
- Replace C Tor (0.4.8.21) with Rust Arti (1.9.0/arti-client 0.38)
- 70% smaller binary: 21MB xcframework vs 67MB (6.9MB vs 14MB per slice)
- Memory-safe Rust implementation with modern async (tokio)
- Same SOCKS5 proxy interface at 127.0.0.1:39050 for drop-in compatibility
- FFI wrapper (arti-bitchat crate) with C-compatible exports
- Swift TorManager maintains identical public API
- Aggressive size optimization: opt-level=z, lto=fat, panic=abort, strip
- Supports iOS device, iOS simulator (Apple Silicon), and macOS

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-13 16:18:00 -10:00
jackandGitHub fa3c74f941 Merge pull request #957 from permissionlesstech/fix/noise-protocol-compatibility 2026-01-13 13:07:49 -10:00
callebtc 9bac52051a Revert Noise nonce size to 4 bytes for backward compatibility
This change reverts the nonce size increase introduced in f41a390 ('BCH-01-010: Noise Protocol spec compliance improvements').

While 8-byte nonces are recommended by the Noise specification, increasing the size from 4 bytes broke wire compatibility with existing clients. This caused all encrypted DMs to fail between updated and non-updated clients.

Changes:
- Revert NONCE_SIZE_BYTES to 4.
- Restore 4-byte nonce extraction logic in extractNonceFromCiphertextPayload.
- Restore 4-byte nonce serialization in nonceToBytes.
- Restore UInt32.max overflow check in encrypt.

Note: Other improvements from BCH-01-010 (constant-time comparisons, safe arithmetic in replay window, sensitive data clearing) are preserved.
2026-01-14 05:41:26 +07:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 7b9ffe464a Add Tor build script to repository for reproducibility
Include the build-minimal.sh script alongside BITCHAT_TOR.md so future
rebuilds can be done directly from the bitchat repo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 21:46:48 -10:00
jackandGitHub 7b940485d9 Merge pull request #956 from permissionlesstech/tor-size-optimization
Update Tor to 0.4.8.21 with size optimization
2026-01-12 21:44:23 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 5a87ee3e62 Update Tor to 0.4.8.21 with aggressive size optimization
- Update Tor from 0.4.8.17 to 0.4.8.21
- Update OpenSSL from 3.5.1 to 3.6.0
- Aggressive OpenSSL trimming to reduce binary size:
  - Remove post-quantum crypto (ML-DSA, ML-KEM, SLH-DSA, LMS)
  - Remove legacy ciphers (DES, RC2, RC4, RC5, IDEA, SEED, etc.)
  - Remove unused hashes (MD4, MDC2, Whirlpool, RIPEMD160)
  - Remove Chinese standards (SM2, SM3, SM4)
  - Remove certificate features (CMP, CT, RFC3779)
  - Remove GOST, binary EC curves, and other unused features
- Add --disable-module-pow to Tor configure
- Add -Wl,-dead_strip linker flag

Binary size reduction:
- iOS arm64: 17 MB → 14.2 MB (-16%)
- iOS simulator: 16 MB → 13.8 MB (-14%)
- macOS arm64: 16 MB → 13.8 MB (-14%)

Build script at ~/Documents/vibe/Tor.framework-build/build-minimal.sh

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 21:31:10 -10:00
jackandGitHub 342eabbc00 Merge pull request #955 from permissionlesstech/fix/topology-update-after-verification
Fix topology update running before announce verification
2026-01-12 18:39:56 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 241ce2d52c Fix topology update running before announce verification
Move updateNeighbors call to after signature verification passes,
preventing spoofed or stale announces from injecting bad routing data.
Also reset isNewPeer/isReconnectedPeer flags on verification failure
to prevent spurious peer connection notifications.

Addresses review feedback from PR #938.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 18:34:59 -10:00
jackandGitHub 18b56e7393 Merge pull request #954 from permissionlesstech/fix/read-receipt-status-update
Fix READ receipt status not updating to blue checks
2026-01-12 18:28:20 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 beb04fc887 Fix READ receipt status not updating to blue checks
- Add findMessageIndex helper to handle peer ID format mismatch
  (short 16-hex vs long 64-hex noise key)
- Prevent DELIVERED acks from downgrading .read status back to .delivered
  (fixes race condition where late-arriving delivery acks overwrote read status)
- Use incoming peerID for READ receipts instead of creating new ID from noise key
- Explicitly re-assign messages array to trigger @Published setter

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 18:23:56 -10:00
jackandGitHub 5fcffefa28 Merge pull request #953 from permissionlesstech/remove-security-warning-appinfo
Remove security warning from AppInfo view
2026-01-12 16:25:34 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 46ae039587 Remove security warning from AppInfo view
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 16:24:51 -10:00
jackandGitHub 917f7ebe5f Merge pull request #952 from permissionlesstech/fix/file-transfer-peerid-normalization
Fix asymmetric voice/media delivery in private chats
2026-01-12 16:23:12 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 b47fb736f4 Fix asymmetric voice/media delivery in private chats
When selectedPrivateChatPeer was migrated to a 64-hex stable Noise key
after session establishment, file transfers would silently fail because:

1. Sender used raw 64-hex key, truncated to first 8 bytes by BinaryProtocol
2. Receiver's myPeerID is SHA256-fingerprint-derived (different value)
3. Recipient check failed, causing silent packet drop

The fix normalizes peerID to short form (SHA256-derived 16-hex) in
sendFilePrivate before constructing recipientData, ensuring the wire
format matches what receivers expect.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 16:17:50 -10:00
jackandGitHub ebb5bb6558 Merge pull request #951 from permissionlesstech/fix/main-actor-isolation-snapshots
Fix main actor isolation error in clearAppSwitcherSnapshots
2026-01-12 16:11:40 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 7cfdcfe174 Fix main actor isolation error in clearAppSwitcherSnapshots
Add `nonisolated` to the static method since it only performs
thread-safe FileManager operations and is called from Task.detached.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 16:04:12 -10:00
jackandGitHub 21e0cbc607 Merge pull request #950 from permissionlesstech/fix/var-to-let-warnings
Fix compiler warnings for unmutated variables in BLEService
2026-01-12 15:53:25 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 1b439a543e Fix compiler warnings for unmutated variables in BLEService
Change var to let for packet variables that are never mutated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 15:44:24 -10:00
jackandGitHub d30a3b14cf Merge pull request #949 from a1denvalu3/main
fix: update georelays weekly workflow
2026-01-12 15:37:14 -10:00
jackandGitHub d03128612d Merge pull request #948 from permissionlesstech/fix/BCH-01-010-noise-protocol-spec-compliance
BCH-01-010: Noise Protocol spec compliance improvements
2026-01-12 15:36:45 -10:00
jackandGitHub ae294aab6d Merge pull request #947 from permissionlesstech/fix/BCH-01-013-clear-snapshots-on-reset
fix(security): clear iOS app switcher snapshots on panic reset [BCH-01-013]
2026-01-12 15:36:01 -10:00
jackandGitHub 07b0e146f2 Merge pull request #946 from permissionlesstech/fix/BCH-01-012-notification-blocking-bypass
fix(security): prevent notifications from blocked users [BCH-01-012]
2026-01-12 15:35:29 -10:00
jackandGitHub cc5939cb13 Merge pull request #945 from permissionlesstech/fix/BCH-01-009-keychain-error-handling
fix(security): improve keychain error handling [BCH-01-009]
2026-01-12 15:34:47 -10:00
jackandGitHub cada784844 Merge pull request #944 from permissionlesstech/fix/BCH-01-011-timestamp-validation
fix(security): reduce timestamp validation window to ±5 minutes [BCH-01-011]
2026-01-12 15:33:38 -10:00
jackandGitHub b1aeb931bc Merge pull request #943 from permissionlesstech/fix/BCH-01-004-fingerprinting-disclosure
fix BCH-01-004: rate-limit subscription-triggered announces
2026-01-12 15:30:15 -10:00
jackandGitHub b675738664 Merge pull request #942 from permissionlesstech/fix/BCH-01-002-file-storage-dos
fix BCH-01-002: prevent DoS via file storage exhaustion
2026-01-12 15:27:51 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 4091a30f10 BCH-01-002: Switch from pending files to disk quota management
The original PR introduced a PendingFileManager that held incoming files
in memory until user acceptance. However, this approach had issues:
1. No UI was implemented for users to accept/decline files
2. Files would expire after 5 minutes, losing legitimate transfers
3. The app only allows specific media types (photos, audio) that users
   explicitly choose to send, so manual acceptance adds friction

This commit replaces the pending file system with disk quota management:
- Auto-save files immediately (preserving original UX)
- Enforce 100 MB storage quota for incoming files
- Auto-delete oldest files when quota is exceeded
- Logs cleanup activity for visibility

This directly addresses the DoS vulnerability (disk exhaustion from
file spam) while maintaining good UX for legitimate transfers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 15:17:09 -10:00
a1denvalu3anda1denvalu3 238311aefb fix typo 2026-01-13 00:57:20 +01:00
a1denvalu3anda1denvalu3 6defae71c6 fetch georelays working workflow 2026-01-13 00:27:10 +01:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 b533d9560d Fix: Capture handshake hash before split() clears symmetric state
Addresses Codex review feedback on PR #948: the getTransportCiphers()
method now returns the handshake hash as part of its return tuple,
capturing it BEFORE split() calls clearSensitiveData().

Previously, calling getHandshakeHash() after getTransportCiphers()
would return an all-zero value since split() clears the symmetric
state. This broke channel binding functionality.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 11:32:17 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 f41a390a94 BCH-01-010: Noise Protocol spec compliance improvements
This addresses the Cure53 audit finding BCH-01-010 which identified several
implementation deviations from the Noise Protocol Framework specification.

Changes:
- Expand nonce from 4-byte to 8-byte transmission per spec guidance
  This provides 2^64 nonce space instead of the limited 2^32 space
- Fix integer overflow in replay window check using safe arithmetic
- Add constant-time comparison functions for key validation to prevent
  timing side-channel attacks
- Add clearSensitiveData() method to NoiseSymmetricState that clears
  chaining key and hash after split() operation
- Document atomic nonce state updates in decryption

Security improvements:
- Constant-time operations prevent information leakage via timing analysis
- Proper cleanup of symmetric state after handshake completion
- Safer arithmetic prevents potential integer overflow issues

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 11:23:31 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 f83316bd1f fix(security): clear iOS app switcher snapshots on panic reset [BCH-01-013]
Add code to clear iOS app switcher snapshot cache during panic mode.
iOS automatically captures screenshots for the app switcher, which could
reveal sensitive message content visible at the time.

Changes:
- Add clearAppSwitcherSnapshots() helper function (iOS only)
- Call it from panicClearAllData() during file cleanup phase
- Clears all files in Library/Caches/Snapshots/ directory

Security: Sensitive information visible in the app when it entered
background will no longer be recoverable from snapshot cache after
panic reset.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 11:10:34 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 09818a02ed fix(security): prevent notifications from blocked users [BCH-01-012]
Block notifications from bypassing the user blocking feature on iOS.

Vulnerabilities fixed:
1. Nostr public messages: checkForMentions() was called regardless of
   blocking status, allowing blocked users to trigger mention notifications
2. Noise-encrypted DMs: didReceiveNoisePayload() didn't check blocking
   before calling handlePrivateMessage(), allowing DM notifications

Changes:
- ChatViewModel+Nostr.swift: Add blocking check before checkForMentions()
  and sendHapticFeedback() in subscribeNostrEvent
- ChatViewModel.swift: Add isPeerBlocked() check in didReceiveNoisePayload
  before processing private messages
- Add NotificationBlockingTests.swift with 5 tests for blocking behavior

Security: Blocked users can no longer trigger notifications through any
message path (Nostr public, Nostr DM, or BLE Noise DM).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 11:08:09 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 9cd955ae2f fix: extend backoff window on blocked attempts (Codex P2 feedback)
Update lastAnnounceTime to 'now' when rate-limiting subscription attempts.
This ensures each blocked attempt extends the suppression window, preventing
attackers from waiting out the backoff while continuously spamming attempts.

Previously, the backoff timer was only based on the last successful announce,
allowing attackers to receive an announce as soon as the initial backoff
expired regardless of how many blocked attempts occurred in between.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 11:00:36 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 49b1413d85 fix: address Codex review feedback for BCH-01-002
P1: Wire didReceivePendingFileTransfer into ChatViewModel
- Add implementation that creates system message for pending files
- Route to appropriate chat (public/private)
- Send local notification for incoming files
- Auto-decline files from blocked users

P2: Keep pending files in queue if save fails
- Only remove file from pendingFiles after successful save
- Allows user to retry accept if initial save failed

Also adds test for save failure scenario.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 10:58:02 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 31be6b83a7 fix(security): improve keychain error handling [BCH-01-009]
Add proper error classification to distinguish expected states (item not
found) from critical failures (access denied, storage full) and
recoverable errors (device locked, auth failed).

Changes:
- Add KeychainReadResult and KeychainSaveResult enums with error types
- Add getIdentityKeyWithResult/saveIdentityKeyWithResult protocol methods
- Implement retry logic with exponential backoff for transient errors
- Add consistent SecureLogger logging for all keychain operations
- Update NoiseEncryptionService identity loading to handle errors gracefully
- Update MockKeychain and TrackingMockKeychain with error simulation
- Add comprehensive KeychainErrorHandlingTests (18 new tests)

Security: Applications can now properly detect and respond to critical
keychain failures, improving resilience during device lock states and
providing actionable diagnostics for access issues.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 10:53:02 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 1563209797 fix(security): reduce timestamp validation window to ±5 minutes
BCH-01-011: Reduces replay attack window from ±1 hour to ±5 minutes.

The previous 1-hour window allowed extended replay attacks. A 5-minute
window is industry standard for replay protection while accommodating
reasonable clock drift.

- Updated InputValidator.validateTimestamp to use 300-second window
- Updated tests to verify new boundary conditions

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 10:46:34 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 99896bcded fix BCH-01-004: rate-limit subscription-triggered announces
Adds rate-limiting to prevent device enumeration attacks via rapid
subscription/disconnect cycles. Without this fix, an attacker could
enumerate ~120 bitchat devices per minute by connecting, subscribing,
capturing the announce packet, then disconnecting and moving to the next.

Key changes:
- Add per-central rate-limit tracking with exponential backoff
- Minimum 2-second interval between announces per central
- Exponential backoff (2x) up to 30 seconds for rapid reconnects
- After 5 rapid attempts, suppress announces entirely (likely attack)
- Clean up stale rate-limit entries after 60-second window
- Clear rate-limit state during panic mode

Configuration:
- bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds: 2.0
- bleSubscriptionRateLimitBackoffFactor: 2.0
- bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds: 30.0
- bleSubscriptionRateLimitWindowSeconds: 60.0
- bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxAttempts: 5

Security audit reference: Cure53 BCH-01-004 (Medium severity)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 10:43:36 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 4b3077169a fix BCH-01-002: prevent DoS via file storage exhaustion
Incoming files are now held in memory via PendingFileManager instead of
being auto-saved to disk. Users must explicitly accept files before they
are written. This prevents attackers from exhausting device storage.

Key changes:
- Add PendingFileManager with configurable limits (max 10 files, 5MB total)
- Files auto-expire after 5 minutes if not accepted
- LRU eviction when limits are exceeded
- Pending files cleared during panic mode (emergencyDisconnectAll)
- Add didReceivePendingFileTransfer delegate method
- Add acceptPendingFile/declinePendingFile to Transport protocol

Security audit reference: Cure53 BCH-01-002 (Medium severity)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 10:39:19 -10:00
jackandGitHub b84c36c6fa Merge pull request #934 from 21-DOT-DEV/P256K-VERSION-LOCK
chore: pin swift-secp256k1 to exact version 0.21.1
2026-01-12 10:24:02 -10:00
jackandGitHub 3eac5858e4 Merge pull request #938 from permissionlesstech/source-routing-packet-format
feat: Source routing v2
2026-01-12 10:21:28 -10:00
jackandGitHub 10b7c1fd80 Merge branch 'main' into source-routing-packet-format 2026-01-12 10:09:29 -10:00
jackandGitHub bf3249aef7 Merge pull request #940 from permissionlesstech/geohash-presence-events
Implement Geohash Presence (Heartbeats)
2026-01-12 10:05:51 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 95a6ec7315 add tests for geohash presence feature
34 tests covering:
- NostrProtocol presence event creation
- NostrFilter kind filtering
- ChatViewModel presence handling
- Privacy precision restrictions
- Display logic for "? people"
- Participant tracker integration

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-12 09:56:51 -10:00
callebtc 74864472c7 fix relay 2026-01-12 17:04:17 +07:00
callebtc 9404c03477 fix doc 2026-01-12 16:56:45 +07:00
callebtc 6faa46a22f increase limit to 1000 2026-01-12 16:41:37 +07:00
callebtc e02f4327c0 move block up 2026-01-12 14:57:25 +07:00
callebtc ce31d85323 record participant count before self-suppression 2026-01-12 14:33:21 +07:00
callebtc b6d8a5b758 update UI on new data 2026-01-12 14:14:34 +07:00
callebtc 6630f5a792 start the service 2026-01-12 14:13:24 +07:00
callebtc 0f5299a0f5 announce and read presence 2026-01-12 14:12:49 +07:00
callebtc eb3bbfd861 source routing v2 2026-01-12 10:18:04 +07:00
callebtc a37243e780 min chunk size 2026-01-10 17:23:52 +07:00
callebtc 90b134186b dynamic fragmentation 2026-01-09 22:54:03 +07:00
callebtc 3c7e14f49d fixes 2026-01-09 16:03:17 +07:00
callebtc 31275856dd resign packet 2026-01-08 16:04:40 +07:00
callebtc b6cf44a824 centralize apply route 2026-01-07 19:16:18 +07:00
callebtc b6ae08be60 route length is part of header length now 2026-01-07 16:08:02 +07:00
callebtc d469704c34 wip: SBR only for v2 2026-01-07 15:11:46 +07:00
csjones c975abf2ff chore: pin swift-secp256k1 to exact version 0.21.1 2026-01-05 15:28:26 -08:00
jackandGitHub aff700a15e Merge pull request #931 from permissionlesstech/fix/flaky-fragmentation-tests
fix: eliminate flaky FragmentationTests with proper async synchronization
2026-01-04 14:25:07 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 869d766f8d fix: address race condition in continuation-based waiting
Add recheck of message count after acquiring lock and before storing
continuation to prevent race where message arrives between initial
count check and continuation install.

Addresses Codex review feedback on PR #931.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-04 14:18:40 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 1b4f120014 fix: eliminate flaky FragmentationTests with proper async synchronization
Replace timing-based sleep() synchronization with continuation-based waiting
in FragmentationTests to fix intermittent failures.

Changes:
- Add thread-safe CaptureDelegate with NSLock for array access
- Add waitForPublicMessages/waitForReceivedMessages using CheckedContinuation
- Update reassemblyFromFragmentsDeliversPublicMessage to use proper waiting
- Update duplicateFragmentDoesNotBreakReassembly to use proper waiting
- Remove fire-and-forget Task blocks that caused race conditions

Root cause: Tests used fire-and-forget Tasks with sleep(0.5) but delegate
callbacks go through notifyUI() which spawns another MainActor Task.
The sleep didn't guarantee callback completion.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-04 14:13:32 -10:00
jackandGitHub bc312e4aef Merge pull request #929 from permissionlesstech/fix/nostr-transport-thread-safety
fix: add thread safety to NostrTransport read receipt queue
2026-01-04 13:56:17 -10:00
jackandGitHub 6e7509f2be Merge branch 'main' into fix/nostr-transport-thread-safety 2026-01-04 13:52:31 -10:00
jackandGitHub ca06f4d51d Merge pull request #928 from permissionlesstech/fix/noise-dh-secret-clearing
fix: clear DH shared secrets after Noise handshake operations
2026-01-04 13:52:14 -10:00
jackandGitHub 04f57e8713 Merge branch 'main' into fix/nostr-transport-thread-safety 2026-01-04 13:41:53 -10:00
jackandGitHub 59c3c4e236 Merge branch 'main' into fix/noise-dh-secret-clearing 2026-01-04 13:41:38 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 e887e04f40 fix: add thread safety to NostrTransport read receipt queue
Synchronized access to readQueue and isSendingReadAcks using the
existing concurrent DispatchQueue with barrier flags:

- sendReadReceipt(): wrap enqueue in barrier async
- processReadQueueIfNeeded(): extract item within barrier context
- scheduleNextReadAck(): wrap callback in barrier async

This fixes race conditions where concurrent calls could corrupt the
read queue or cause check-then-act bugs on isSendingReadAcks.

Also adds thread safety tests:
- concurrentReadReceiptEnqueue: 100 concurrent enqueue operations
- readQueueProcessingUnderLoad: concurrent enqueue during processing
- isPeerReachableThreadSafety: concurrent read access test

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-04 13:29:20 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 151b68a497 fix: clear DH shared secrets after Noise handshake operations
Added secureClear() calls for all 6 DH operations in NoiseProtocol.swift
to properly clear sensitive shared secrets from memory after use:

- writeMessage(): .es initiator/responder, .se initiator/responder
- performDHOperation(): .ee and .ss operations

This fixes a forward secrecy vulnerability where shared secrets could
persist in memory after handshake completion.

Also adds:
- TrackingMockKeychain to count secureClear calls in tests
- 3 new tests verifying secureClear is called during handshake

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-04 13:28:55 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 b4a3ee5777 fix: add @MainActor to MessageDeduplicationService for thread safety
Added @MainActor annotation to both LRUDeduplicationCache and
MessageDeduplicationService classes. This provides compile-time
enforcement of thread safety since all callers (ChatViewModel,
NostrRelayManager) are already on MainActor.

Benefits:
- Compile-time enforcement prevents future misuse
- Simpler than internal locking mechanisms
- Consistent with existing patterns in codebase

Also adds:
- @MainActor annotation to existing test suites
- 5 new concurrency tests verifying thread safety behavior

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-04 13:25:43 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 8d19d6d62c fix: add thread safety to NostrTransport read receipt queue
Synchronized access to readQueue and isSendingReadAcks using the
existing concurrent DispatchQueue with barrier flags:

- sendReadReceipt(): wrap enqueue in barrier async
- processReadQueueIfNeeded(): extract item within barrier context
- scheduleNextReadAck(): wrap callback in barrier async

This fixes race conditions where concurrent calls could corrupt the
read queue or cause check-then-act bugs on isSendingReadAcks.

Also adds thread safety tests:
- concurrentReadReceiptEnqueue: 100 concurrent enqueue operations
- readQueueProcessingUnderLoad: concurrent enqueue during processing
- isPeerReachableThreadSafety: concurrent read access test

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-04 13:23:32 -10:00
jackandClaude Opus 4.5 84fd92ef4b fix: clear DH shared secrets after Noise handshake operations
Added secureClear() calls for all 6 DH operations in NoiseProtocol.swift
to properly clear sensitive shared secrets from memory after use:

- writeMessage(): .es initiator/responder, .se initiator/responder
- performDHOperation(): .ee and .ss operations

This fixes a forward secrecy vulnerability where shared secrets could
persist in memory after handshake completion.

Also adds:
- TrackingMockKeychain to count secureClear calls in tests
- 3 new tests verifying secureClear is called during handshake

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-04 13:21:01 -10:00
jackandGitHub f71bd506fd Merge pull request #920 from malkovitc/feat/472-optimize-message-deduplicator
perf: optimize MessageDeduplicator performance
2026-01-04 12:41:48 -10:00
jackandGitHub ddd7ef5668 Merge branch 'main' into feat/472-optimize-message-deduplicator 2026-01-04 12:37:01 -10:00
jackandGitHub 548a20e77d Merge pull request #919 from malkovitc/fix/646-harden-hex-parsing
fix: harden hex string parsing
2026-01-04 12:33:16 -10:00
jackandGitHub 6e231d10c5 Merge branch 'main' into fix/646-harden-hex-parsing 2026-01-04 12:28:39 -10:00
jackandGitHub 4c9f6e689e Merge pull request #918 from malkovitc/fix/voice-recorder-simulator-build
fix(build): exclude allowBluetoothHFP on iOS Simulator
2026-01-04 12:25:11 -10:00
jackandGitHub 7e73b65240 Merge branch 'main' into fix/voice-recorder-simulator-build 2026-01-04 12:19:52 -10:00
jackandGitHub f5e5f7b98e Merge pull request #916 from malkovitc/fix/797-consolidate-keychain
refactor: consolidate KeychainHelper into KeychainManager
2026-01-04 12:13:15 -10:00
evgeniy.chernomortsev b15d92ebb5 perf: optimize MessageDeduplicator performance (#472)
- Make Entry struct Equatable for better testability
- Remove down to 75% of maxCount instead of fixed 100 items for better
  amortization of cleanup cost
- Reuse Date instance to reduce allocations in isDuplicate()
- Add documentation comments for public methods
- Improve memory capacity management in cleanup()
2025-12-09 18:48:14 +04:00
evgeniy.chernomortsev 6efe9d02fb fix: harden hex string parsing (#646)
Improve Data(hexString:) to handle edge cases:
- Reject odd-length strings (return nil)
- Support optional 0x/0X prefix
- Trim leading/trailing whitespace
- Handle empty strings correctly

Add comprehensive unit tests for hex parsing.
2025-12-09 15:01:59 +04:00
evgeniy.chernomortsev 5a66f03400 fix(build): exclude allowBluetoothHFP on iOS Simulator
allowBluetoothHFP is not available on iOS Simulator, causing build
failures. Use conditional compilation to exclude this option when
building for simulator while keeping it for device builds.
2025-12-09 14:50:34 +04:00
evgeniy.chernomortsevandClaude Opus 4.5 a221b22691 refactor: consolidate KeychainHelper into KeychainManager (#797)
Merge KeychainHelper functionality into KeychainManager to provide
a single, unified API for all keychain operations.

- Remove KeychainHelper.swift and KeychainHelperProtocol
- Add generic save/load/delete methods to KeychainManagerProtocol
- Update NostrIdentityBridge to use KeychainManagerProtocol
- Update FavoritesPersistenceService to use KeychainManagerProtocol
- Update PreviewKeychainManager with new methods
- Update MockKeychain and add MockKeychainHelper typealias for backwards compatibility

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-12-09 14:42:55 +04:00
2366 changed files with 13288 additions and 357181 deletions
+12 -41
View File
@@ -25,47 +25,18 @@ jobs:
wget -q https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv
mv nostr_relays.csv ./relays/online_relays_gps.csv
- name: Configure git
- name: Check for changes
id: git-check
run: |
git config user.email "action@github.com"
git config user.name "GitHub Action"
- name: Create update branch if changes
id: create_branch
git diff --exit-code || echo "changes=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Commit and push changes
if: steps.git-check.outputs.changes == 'true'
run: |
# exit early if no changes
if git diff --quiet --relays/online_relays_gps.csv; then
echo "changed=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
exit 0
fi
# branch name with timestamp
BRANCH="update-georelays-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
git checkout -b "$BRANCH"
git config --local user.email "action@github.com"
git config --local user.name "GitHub Action"
git add relays/online_relays_gps.csv
git commit -m "Automated update of relay data - $(date -u --rfc-3339=seconds)"
echo "changed=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "branch=$BRANCH" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Push branch
if: steps.create_branch.outputs.changed == 'true'
run: |
git push --set-upstream origin "${{ steps.create_branch.outputs.branch }}"
- name: Create pull request
if: steps.create_branch.outputs.changed == 'true'
uses: peter-evans/create-pull-request@v5
with:
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
commit-message: Automated update of relay data
branch: ${{ steps.create_branch.outputs.branch }}
base: main
title: Automated update of relay data
body: |
This PR was created automatically by the scheduled workflow. It updates relays/online_relays_gps.csv from the GeoRelays source.
labels: automated, georelays
- name: No changes
if: steps.create_branch.outputs.changed != 'true'
run: echo "No changes to relays/online_relays_gps.csv"
git commit -m "Automated update of relay data - $(date -u)"
git push
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.0
MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.1
CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION = 1
IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = 16.0
+2 -2
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ let package = Package(
),
],
dependencies:[
.package(path: "localPackages/Tor"),
.package(path: "localPackages/Arti"),
.package(path: "localPackages/BitLogger"),
.package(url: "https://github.com/21-DOT-DEV/swift-secp256k1", exact: "0.21.1")
],
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ let package = Package(
dependencies: [
.product(name: "P256K", package: "swift-secp256k1"),
.product(name: "BitLogger", package: "BitLogger"),
.product(name: "Tor", package: "Tor")
.product(name: "Tor", package: "Arti")
],
path: "bitchat",
exclude: [
-3
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,6 @@ A decentralized peer-to-peer messaging app with dual transport architecture: loc
📲 [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/bitchat-mesh/id6748219622)
> [!WARNING]
> Private messages have not received external security review and may contain vulnerabilities. Do not use for sensitive use cases, and do not rely on its security until it has been reviewed. Now uses the [Noise Protocol](https://www.noiseprotocol.org) for identity and encryption. Public local chat (the main feature) has no security concerns.
## License
This project is released into the public domain. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.
+5 -7
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
A6E3E5722E7703760032EA8A /* BitLogger in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3E5712E7703760032EA8A /* BitLogger */; };
A6E3EA7F2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3EA7E2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor */; };
A6E3EA812E7706A80032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3EA802E7706A80032EA8A /* Tor */; };
A6F183FD2E948783006A9046 /* tor-nolzma.xcframework in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = A6F183FC2E948783006A9046 /* tor-nolzma.xcframework */; };
E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678D /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678A /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv */; };
E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678E /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678A /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv */; };
/* End PBXBuildFile section */
@@ -162,7 +161,6 @@
B5A5CC493FFB3D8966548140 /* Frameworks */ = {
isa = PBXFrameworksBuildPhase;
files = (
A6F183FD2E948783006A9046 /* tor-nolzma.xcframework in Frameworks */,
A6E3E5702E77036A0032EA8A /* BitLogger in Frameworks */,
885BBED78092484A5B069461 /* P256K in Frameworks */,
A6E3EA7F2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */,
@@ -345,7 +343,7 @@
packageReferences = (
B8C407587481BBB190741C93 /* XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference "swift-secp256k1" */,
A6E3E56E2E77036A0032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/BitLogger" */,
A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Tor" */,
A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Arti" */,
);
preferredProjectObjectVersion = 90;
projectDirPath = "";
@@ -913,9 +911,9 @@
isa = XCLocalSwiftPackageReference;
relativePath = localPackages/BitLogger;
};
A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Tor" */ = {
A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Arti" */ = {
isa = XCLocalSwiftPackageReference;
relativePath = localPackages/Tor;
relativePath = localPackages/Arti;
};
/* End XCLocalSwiftPackageReference section */
@@ -924,8 +922,8 @@
isa = XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference;
repositoryURL = "https://github.com/21-DOT-DEV/swift-secp256k1";
requirement = {
kind = upToNextMajorVersion;
minimumVersion = 0.21.1;
kind = exactVersion;
version = 0.21.1;
};
};
/* End XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference section */
+4 -5
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ struct BitchatApp: App {
// Initialize network activation policy; will start Tor/Nostr only when allowed
NetworkActivationService.shared.start()
// Start presence service (will wait for Tor readiness)
GeohashPresenceService.shared.start()
// Check for shared content
checkForSharedContent()
}
@@ -275,8 +279,3 @@ final class NotificationDelegate: NSObject, UNUserNotificationCenterDelegate {
}
}
extension String {
var nilIfEmpty: String? {
self.isEmpty ? nil : self
}
}
@@ -58,11 +58,20 @@ final class VoiceRecorder: NSObject, AVAudioRecorderDelegate {
guard session.recordPermission == .granted else {
throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied
}
#if targetEnvironment(simulator)
// allowBluetoothHFP is not available on iOS Simulator
try session.setCategory(
.playAndRecord,
mode: .default,
options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP]
)
#else
try session.setCategory(
.playAndRecord,
mode: .default,
options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP, .allowBluetoothHFP]
)
#endif
try session.setActive(true, options: .notifyOthersOnDeactivation)
#endif
#if os(macOS)
+7 -3
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ struct BitchatPacket: Codable {
var signature: Data?
var ttl: UInt8
var route: [Data]?
var isRSR: Bool
init(type: UInt8, senderID: Data, recipientID: Data?, timestamp: UInt64, payload: Data, signature: Data?, ttl: UInt8, version: UInt8 = 1, route: [Data]? = nil) {
init(type: UInt8, senderID: Data, recipientID: Data?, timestamp: UInt64, payload: Data, signature: Data?, ttl: UInt8, version: UInt8 = 1, route: [Data]? = nil, isRSR: Bool = false) {
self.version = version
self.type = type
self.senderID = senderID
@@ -33,10 +34,11 @@ struct BitchatPacket: Codable {
self.signature = signature
self.ttl = ttl
self.route = route
self.isRSR = isRSR
}
// Convenience initializer for new binary format
init(type: UInt8, ttl: UInt8, senderID: PeerID, payload: Data) {
init(type: UInt8, ttl: UInt8, senderID: PeerID, payload: Data, isRSR: Bool = false) {
self.version = 1
self.type = type
// Convert hex string peer ID to binary data (8 bytes)
@@ -56,6 +58,7 @@ struct BitchatPacket: Codable {
self.signature = nil
self.ttl = ttl
self.route = nil
self.isRSR = isRSR
}
var data: Data? {
@@ -85,7 +88,8 @@ struct BitchatPacket: Codable {
signature: nil, // Remove signature for signing
ttl: 0, // Use fixed TTL=0 for signing to ensure relay compatibility
version: version,
route: route
route: route,
isRSR: false // RSR flag is mutable and not part of the signature
)
return BinaryProtocol.encode(unsignedPacket)
}
+26 -3
View File
@@ -9,12 +9,16 @@ struct RequestSyncPacket {
let m: UInt32
let data: Data
let types: SyncTypeFlags?
let sinceTimestamp: UInt64?
let fragmentIdFilter: String?
init(p: Int, m: UInt32, data: Data, types: SyncTypeFlags? = nil) {
init(p: Int, m: UInt32, data: Data, types: SyncTypeFlags? = nil, sinceTimestamp: UInt64? = nil, fragmentIdFilter: String? = nil) {
self.p = p
self.m = m
self.data = data
self.types = types
self.sinceTimestamp = sinceTimestamp
self.fragmentIdFilter = fragmentIdFilter
}
func encode() -> Data {
@@ -36,15 +40,24 @@ struct RequestSyncPacket {
if let typesData = types?.toData() {
putTLV(0x04, typesData)
}
if let ts = sinceTimestamp {
var tsBE = ts.bigEndian
putTLV(0x05, withUnsafeBytes(of: &tsBE) { Data($0) })
}
if let fid = fragmentIdFilter, let fidData = fid.data(using: .utf8) {
putTLV(0x06, fidData)
}
return out
}
static func decode(from data: Data, maxAcceptBytes: Int = 1024) -> RequestSyncPacket? {
var off = 0
var p: Int? = nil
var m: UInt32? = nil
var payload: Data? = nil
var types: SyncTypeFlags? = nil
var sinceTimestamp: UInt64? = nil
var fragmentIdFilter: String? = nil
while off + 3 <= data.count {
let t = Int(data[off]); off += 1
@@ -68,12 +81,22 @@ struct RequestSyncPacket {
if let decoded = SyncTypeFlags.decode(v) {
types = decoded
}
case 0x05:
if v.count == 8 {
var ts: UInt64 = 0
for b in v { ts = (ts << 8) | UInt64(b) }
sinceTimestamp = ts
}
case 0x06:
if let fid = String(data: v, encoding: .utf8) {
fragmentIdFilter = fid
}
default:
break // forward compatible; ignore unknown TLVs
}
}
guard let pp = p, let mm = m, let dd = payload, pp >= 1, mm > 0 else { return nil }
return RequestSyncPacket(p: pp, m: mm, data: dd, types: types)
return RequestSyncPacket(p: pp, m: mm, data: dd, types: types, sinceTimestamp: sinceTimestamp, fragmentIdFilter: fragmentIdFilter)
}
}
+116 -30
View File
@@ -165,19 +165,23 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
// MARK: - Sliding Window Replay Protection
/// Check if nonce is valid for replay protection
/// BCH-01-010: Use safe arithmetic to prevent integer overflow
private func isValidNonce(_ receivedNonce: UInt64) -> Bool {
if receivedNonce + UInt64(Self.REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE) <= highestReceivedNonce {
// Safe overflow check: instead of (receivedNonce + WINDOW_SIZE <= highest)
// use (highest >= WINDOW_SIZE && receivedNonce <= highest - WINDOW_SIZE)
let windowSize = UInt64(Self.REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE)
if highestReceivedNonce >= windowSize && receivedNonce <= highestReceivedNonce - windowSize {
return false // Too old, outside window
}
if receivedNonce > highestReceivedNonce {
return true // Always accept newer nonces
}
let offset = Int(highestReceivedNonce - receivedNonce)
let byteIndex = offset / 8
let bitIndex = offset % 8
return (replayWindow[byteIndex] & (1 << bitIndex)) == 0 // Not yet seen
}
@@ -347,16 +351,20 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
do {
let plaintext = try ChaChaPoly.open(sealedBox, using: key, authenticating: associatedData)
// BCH-01-010: Atomic nonce state update
// Both replay window marking and nonce increment must complete together
// to prevent state desynchronization. We perform both after successful
// decryption only, ensuring state consistency on any failure path.
if useExtractedNonce {
// Mark nonce as seen after successful decryption
markNonceAsSeen(decryptionNonce)
}
nonce += 1
return plaintext
} catch {
// Decryption failed - nonce state remains unchanged (atomic rollback)
SecureLogger.debug("Decrypt failed: \(error) for nonce \(decryptionNonce)")
// Log authentication failures with nonce info
SecureLogger.error("Decryption failed at nonce \(decryptionNonce)", category: .encryption)
throw error
}
@@ -455,13 +463,36 @@ final class NoiseSymmetricState {
let output = hkdf(chainingKey: chainingKey, inputKeyMaterial: Data(), numOutputs: 2)
let tempKey1 = SymmetricKey(data: output[0])
let tempKey2 = SymmetricKey(data: output[1])
let c1 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey1, useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
let c2 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey2, useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
// BCH-01-010: Clear symmetric state after split per Noise spec
// The chaining key and hash should not be retained after handshake completes
clearSensitiveData()
return (c1, c2)
}
/// BCH-01-010: Securely clear sensitive cryptographic state
/// Called after split() to clear chaining key and hash per Noise spec
func clearSensitiveData() {
// Clear chaining key by overwriting with zeros
let chainingKeyCount = chainingKey.count
chainingKey = Data(repeating: 0, count: chainingKeyCount)
// Clear hash by overwriting with zeros
let hashCount = hash.count
hash = Data(repeating: 0, count: hashCount)
// Clear the internal cipher state
cipherState.clearSensitiveData()
}
deinit {
clearSensitiveData()
}
// HKDF implementation
private func hkdf(chainingKey: Data, inputKeyMaterial: Data, numOutputs: Int) -> [Data] {
let tempKey = HMAC<SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: inputKeyMaterial, using: SymmetricKey(data: chainingKey))
@@ -610,14 +641,20 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localEphemeral.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteStatic)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
} else {
guard let localStatic = localStaticPrivate,
let remoteEphemeral = remoteEphemeralPublic else {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localStatic.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteEphemeral)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
}
case .se:
@@ -628,14 +665,20 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localStatic.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteEphemeral)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
} else {
guard let localEphemeral = localEphemeralPrivate,
let remoteStatic = remoteStaticPublic else {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localEphemeral.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteStatic)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
}
case .ss:
@@ -724,8 +767,11 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localEphemeral.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteEphemeral)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
case .es:
if role == .initiator {
guard let localEphemeral = localEphemeralPrivate,
@@ -778,8 +824,11 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localStatic.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteStatic)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
case .e, .s:
break
}
@@ -789,16 +838,20 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
return currentPattern >= messagePatterns.count
}
func getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: Bool) throws -> (send: NoiseCipherState, receive: NoiseCipherState) {
func getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: Bool) throws -> (send: NoiseCipherState, receive: NoiseCipherState, handshakeHash: Data) {
guard isHandshakeComplete() else {
throw NoiseError.handshakeNotComplete
}
// BCH-01-010: Capture handshake hash BEFORE split() clears symmetric state
let finalHandshakeHash = symmetricState.getHandshakeHash()
let (c1, c2) = symmetricState.split(useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
// Initiator uses c1 for sending, c2 for receiving
// Responder uses c2 for sending, c1 for receiving
return role == .initiator ? (c1, c2) : (c2, c1)
let ciphers = role == .initiator ? (c1, c2) : (c2, c1)
return (send: ciphers.0, receive: ciphers.1, handshakeHash: finalHandshakeHash)
}
func getRemoteStaticPublicKey() -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? {
@@ -859,22 +912,47 @@ enum NoiseError: Error {
case nonceExceeded
}
// MARK: - Constant-Time Operations
/// BCH-01-010: Constant-time comparison to prevent timing side-channel attacks
/// This function compares two Data objects in constant time, preventing
/// information leakage via timing analysis.
private func constantTimeCompare(_ a: Data, _ b: Data) -> Bool {
guard a.count == b.count else { return false }
var result: UInt8 = 0
for i in 0..<a.count {
result |= a[a.startIndex.advanced(by: i)] ^ b[b.startIndex.advanced(by: i)]
}
return result == 0
}
/// BCH-01-010: Constant-time check if all bytes are zero
private func constantTimeIsZero(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
var result: UInt8 = 0
for byte in data {
result |= byte
}
return result == 0
}
// MARK: - Key Validation
extension NoiseHandshakeState {
/// Validate a Curve25519 public key
/// Checks for weak/invalid keys that could compromise security
/// BCH-01-010: Uses constant-time operations to prevent timing side-channels
static func validatePublicKey(_ keyData: Data) throws -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey {
// Check key length
guard keyData.count == 32 else {
throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
}
// Check for all-zero key (point at infinity)
if keyData.allSatisfy({ $0 == 0 }) {
// BCH-01-010: Constant-time check for all-zero key (point at infinity)
if constantTimeIsZero(keyData) {
throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
}
// Check for low-order points that could enable small subgroup attacks
// These are the known bad points for Curve25519
let lowOrderPoints: [Data] = [
@@ -895,13 +973,21 @@ extension NoiseHandshakeState {
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff]) // Another bad point
]
// Check against known bad points
if lowOrderPoints.contains(keyData) {
// BCH-01-010: Constant-time check against known bad points
// We check all points and accumulate matches to avoid early exit timing leaks
var foundBadPoint = false
for badPoint in lowOrderPoints {
if constantTimeCompare(keyData, badPoint) {
foundBadPoint = true
}
}
if foundBadPoint {
SecureLogger.warning("Low-order point detected", category: .security)
throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
}
// Try to create the key - CryptoKit will validate curve points internally
do {
let publicKey = try Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey(rawRepresentation: keyData)
+15 -15
View File
@@ -102,23 +102,23 @@ class NoiseSession {
// Check if handshake is complete
if handshake.isHandshakeComplete() {
// Get transport ciphers
let (send, receive) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
// Get transport ciphers and handshake hash (hash captured before split clears state)
let (send, receive, hash) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
sendCipher = send
receiveCipher = receive
// Store remote static key
remoteStaticPublicKey = handshake.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
// Store handshake hash for channel binding
handshakeHash = handshake.getHandshakeHash()
handshakeHash = hash
state = .established
handshakeState = nil // Clear handshake state
SecureLogger.debug("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Handshake complete (no response needed), transitioning to established")
SecureLogger.info(.handshakeCompleted(peerID: peerID.id))
return nil
} else {
// Generate response
@@ -128,20 +128,20 @@ class NoiseSession {
// Check if handshake is complete after writing
if handshake.isHandshakeComplete() {
// Get transport ciphers
let (send, receive) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
// Get transport ciphers and handshake hash (hash captured before split clears state)
let (send, receive, hash) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
sendCipher = send
receiveCipher = receive
// Store remote static key
remoteStaticPublicKey = handshake.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
// Store handshake hash for channel binding
handshakeHash = handshake.getHandshakeHash()
handshakeHash = hash
state = .established
handshakeState = nil // Clear handshake state
SecureLogger.debug("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Handshake complete after writing response, transitioning to established")
SecureLogger.info(.handshakeCompleted(peerID: peerID.id))
}
-50
View File
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
protocol KeychainHelperProtocol {
func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString?)
func load(key: String, service: String) -> Data?
func delete(key: String, service: String)
}
/// Keychain helper for secure storage
struct KeychainHelper: KeychainHelperProtocol {
func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString? = nil) {
var query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecValueData as String: data
]
if let accessible = accessible {
query[kSecAttrAccessible as String] = accessible
}
SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
}
func load(key: String, service: String) -> Data? {
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecReturnData as String: true
]
var result: AnyObject?
let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
guard status == errSecSuccess else { return nil }
return result as? Data
}
func delete(key: String, service: String) {
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key
]
SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ final class NostrIdentityBridge {
private var derivedIdentityCache: [String: NostrIdentity] = [:]
private let cacheLock = NSLock()
private let keychain: KeychainHelperProtocol
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
init(keychain: KeychainHelperProtocol = KeychainHelper()) {
init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager()) {
self.keychain = keychain
}
+19
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
case seal = 13 // NIP-17 sealed event
case giftWrap = 1059 // NIP-59 gift wrap
case ephemeralEvent = 20000
case geohashPresence = 20001
}
/// Create a NIP-17 private message
@@ -125,6 +126,24 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
}
/// Create a geohash presence heartbeat (kind 20001)
/// Must contain empty content and NO nickname tag
static func createGeohashPresenceEvent(
geohash: String,
senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
) throws -> NostrEvent {
let tags = [["g", geohash]]
let event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .geohashPresence,
tags: tags,
content: ""
)
let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
}
/// Create a persistent location note (kind 1: text note) tagged to a street-level geohash.
static func createGeohashTextNote(
content: String,
+3 -6
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
private var messageQueue: [PendingSend] = []
private let messageQueueLock = NSLock()
private let encoder = JSONEncoder()
private let decoder = JSONDecoder()
private var networkService: NetworkActivationService { NetworkActivationService.shared }
private var shouldUseTor: Bool { networkService.userTorEnabled }
@@ -79,8 +78,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
private let backoffMultiplier: Double = TransportConfig.nostrRelayBackoffMultiplier
private let maxReconnectAttempts = TransportConfig.nostrRelayMaxReconnectAttempts
// Reconnection timer
private var reconnectionTimer: Timer?
// Bump generation to invalidate scheduled reconnects when we reset/disconnect
private var connectionGeneration: Int = 0
@@ -887,10 +884,10 @@ struct NostrFilter: Encodable {
return filter
}
// For location channels: geohash-scoped ephemeral events (kind 20000)
static func geohashEphemeral(_ geohash: String, since: Date? = nil, limit: Int = 200) -> NostrFilter {
// For location channels: geohash-scoped ephemeral events (kind 20000) and presence (kind 20001)
static func geohashEphemeral(_ geohash: String, since: Date? = nil, limit: Int = 1000) -> NostrFilter {
var filter = NostrFilter()
filter.kinds = [20000]
filter.kinds = [20000, 20001]
filter.since = since?.timeIntervalSince1970.toInt()
filter.tagFilters = ["g": [geohash]]
filter.limit = limit
+28 -6
View File
@@ -23,20 +23,42 @@ extension Data {
return digest.map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
}
/// Initialize Data from a hex string.
/// - Parameter hexString: A hex string, optionally prefixed with "0x" or "0X".
/// Whitespace is trimmed. Must have even length after prefix removal.
/// - Returns: nil if the string has odd length or contains invalid hex characters.
init?(hexString: String) {
let len = hexString.count / 2
var hex = hexString.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespaces)
// Remove optional 0x prefix
if hex.hasPrefix("0x") || hex.hasPrefix("0X") {
hex = String(hex.dropFirst(2))
}
// Reject odd-length strings
guard hex.count % 2 == 0 else {
return nil
}
// Reject empty strings
guard !hex.isEmpty else {
self = Data()
return
}
let len = hex.count / 2
var data = Data(capacity: len)
var index = hexString.startIndex
var index = hex.startIndex
for _ in 0..<len {
let nextIndex = hexString.index(index, offsetBy: 2)
guard let byte = UInt8(String(hexString[index..<nextIndex]), radix: 16) else {
let nextIndex = hex.index(index, offsetBy: 2)
guard let byte = UInt8(String(hex[index..<nextIndex]), radix: 16) else {
return nil
}
data.append(byte)
index = nextIndex
}
self = data
}
}
+25 -22
View File
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
static let hasSignature: UInt8 = 0x02
static let isCompressed: UInt8 = 0x04
static let hasRoute: UInt8 = 0x08
static let isRSR: UInt8 = 0x10
}
// Encode BitchatPacket to binary format
@@ -161,7 +162,9 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
}
let lengthFieldBytes = lengthFieldSize(for: version)
let originalRoute = packet.route ?? []
// Route is only supported for v2+ packets (per SOURCE_ROUTING.md spec)
let originalRoute = (version >= 2) ? (packet.route ?? []) : []
if originalRoute.contains(where: { $0.isEmpty }) { return nil }
let sanitizedRoute: [Data] = originalRoute.map { hop in
if hop.count == senderIDSize { return hop }
@@ -175,13 +178,14 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
let hasRoute = !sanitizedRoute.isEmpty
let routeLength = hasRoute ? 1 + sanitizedRoute.count * senderIDSize : 0
let originalSizeFieldBytes = isCompressed ? lengthFieldBytes : 0
let payloadDataSize = routeLength + payload.count + originalSizeFieldBytes
// payloadLength in header is payload-only (does NOT include route bytes)
let payloadDataSize = payload.count + originalSizeFieldBytes
if version == 1 && payloadDataSize > Int(UInt16.max) { return nil }
if version == 2 && payloadDataSize > Int(UInt32.max) { return nil }
guard let headerSize = headerSize(for: version) else { return nil }
let estimatedHeader = headerSize + senderIDSize + (packet.recipientID == nil ? 0 : recipientIDSize)
let estimatedHeader = headerSize + senderIDSize + (packet.recipientID == nil ? 0 : recipientIDSize) + routeLength
let estimatedPayload = payloadDataSize
let estimatedSignature = (packet.signature == nil ? 0 : signatureSize)
var data = Data()
@@ -199,9 +203,11 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
if packet.recipientID != nil { flags |= Flags.hasRecipient }
if packet.signature != nil { flags |= Flags.hasSignature }
if isCompressed { flags |= Flags.isCompressed }
if hasRoute { flags |= Flags.hasRoute }
// HAS_ROUTE is only valid for v2+ packets
if hasRoute && version >= 2 { flags |= Flags.hasRoute }
if packet.isRSR { flags |= Flags.isRSR }
data.append(flags)
if version == 2 {
let length = UInt32(payloadDataSize)
for shift in stride(from: 24, through: 0, by: -8) {
@@ -323,7 +329,10 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
let hasRecipient = (flags & Flags.hasRecipient) != 0
let hasSignature = (flags & Flags.hasSignature) != 0
let isCompressed = (flags & Flags.isCompressed) != 0
// HAS_ROUTE is only valid for v2+ packets; ignore the flag for v1
let hasRoute = (version >= 2) && (flags & Flags.hasRoute) != 0
let isRSR = (flags & Flags.isRSR) != 0
let payloadLength: Int
if version == 2 {
guard let len = read32() else { return nil }
@@ -343,27 +352,24 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
if recipientID == nil { return nil }
}
// Route (optional, v2+ only): route bytes are NOT included in payloadLength
var route: [Data]? = nil
var remainingPayloadBytes = payloadLength
if (flags & Flags.hasRoute) != 0 {
guard remainingPayloadBytes >= 1, let routeCount = read8() else { return nil }
remainingPayloadBytes -= 1
if hasRoute {
guard let routeCount = read8() else { return nil }
if routeCount > 0 {
var hops: [Data] = []
for _ in 0..<Int(routeCount) {
guard remainingPayloadBytes >= senderIDSize,
let hop = readData(senderIDSize) else { return nil }
remainingPayloadBytes -= senderIDSize
guard let hop = readData(senderIDSize) else { return nil }
hops.append(hop)
}
route = hops
}
}
// Payload: payloadLength is exactly the payload size (+ compression preamble if compressed)
let payload: Data
if isCompressed {
guard remainingPayloadBytes >= lengthFieldBytes else { return nil }
guard payloadLength >= lengthFieldBytes else { return nil }
let originalSize: Int
if version == 2 {
guard let rawSize = read32() else { return nil }
@@ -372,11 +378,9 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
guard let rawSize = read16() else { return nil }
originalSize = Int(rawSize)
}
remainingPayloadBytes -= lengthFieldBytes
guard originalSize >= 0 && originalSize <= FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes else { return nil }
let compressedSize = remainingPayloadBytes
let compressedSize = payloadLength - lengthFieldBytes
guard compressedSize > 0, let compressed = readData(compressedSize) else { return nil }
remainingPayloadBytes = 0
let compressionRatio = Double(originalSize) / Double(compressedSize)
guard compressionRatio <= 50_000.0 else {
@@ -388,9 +392,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
decompressed.count == originalSize else { return nil }
payload = decompressed
} else {
guard remainingPayloadBytes >= 0,
let rawPayload = readData(remainingPayloadBytes) else { return nil }
remainingPayloadBytes = 0
guard let rawPayload = readData(payloadLength) else { return nil }
payload = rawPayload
}
@@ -411,7 +413,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
signature: signature,
ttl: ttl,
version: version,
route: route
route: route,
isRSR: isRSR
)
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-11
View File
@@ -59,22 +59,11 @@ final class CommandProcessor {
weak var meshService: Transport?
private let identityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol
/// Backward-compatible property for existing code
weak var chatViewModel: CommandContextProvider? {
get { contextProvider }
set { contextProvider = newValue }
}
init(contextProvider: CommandContextProvider? = nil, meshService: Transport? = nil, identityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol) {
self.contextProvider = contextProvider
self.meshService = meshService
self.identityManager = identityManager
}
/// Backward-compatible initializer
convenience init(chatViewModel: ChatViewModel? = nil, meshService: Transport? = nil, identityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol) {
self.init(contextProvider: chatViewModel, meshService: meshService, identityManager: identityManager)
}
/// Process a command string
@MainActor
@@ -26,17 +26,14 @@ final class FavoritesPersistenceService: ObservableObject {
private static let storageKey = "chat.bitchat.favorites"
private static let keychainService = "chat.bitchat.favorites"
private let keychain: KeychainHelperProtocol
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
@Published private(set) var favorites: [Data: FavoriteRelationship] = [:] // Noise pubkey -> relationship
@Published private(set) var mutualFavorites: Set<Data> = []
private let userDefaults = UserDefaults.standard
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
static let shared = FavoritesPersistenceService()
init(keychain: KeychainHelperProtocol = KeychainHelper()) {
init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager()) {
self.keychain = keychain
loadFavorites()
@@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ public final class GeohashParticipantTracker: ObservableObject {
var map = participants[geohash] ?? [:]
map[key] = Date()
participants[geohash] = map
// Always notify observers that state has changed so counts in UI update
objectWillChange.send()
// Only refresh visible list if this geohash is currently active
if activeGeohash == geohash {
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
//
// GeohashPresenceService.swift
// bitchat
//
// Manages the broadcasting of ephemeral presence heartbeats (Kind 20001)
// to geohash location channels.
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
//
import Foundation
import Combine
import BitLogger
import Tor
/// Service that coordinates the broadcasting of presence heartbeats.
///
/// Behavior:
/// - Monitors location changes via LocationStateManager
/// - Broadcasts Kind 20001 events to low-precision geohash channels
/// - Uses randomized timing (40-80s loop) and decorrelated bursts
/// - Respects privacy by NOT broadcasting to Neighborhood/Block/Building levels
@MainActor
final class GeohashPresenceService: ObservableObject {
static let shared = GeohashPresenceService()
private var subscriptions = Set<AnyCancellable>()
private var heartbeatTimer: Timer?
private let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge()
// MARK: - Constants
// Loop interval range in seconds
private let loopMinInterval: TimeInterval = 40.0
private let loopMaxInterval: TimeInterval = 80.0
// Per-broadcast decorrelation delay range in seconds
private let burstMinDelay: TimeInterval = 2.0
private let burstMaxDelay: TimeInterval = 5.0
// Privacy: Only broadcast to these levels
private let allowedPrecisions: Set<Int> = [
GeohashChannelLevel.region.precision, // 2
GeohashChannelLevel.province.precision, // 4
GeohashChannelLevel.city.precision // 5
]
private init() {
setupObservers()
}
/// Start the service (safe to call multiple times)
func start() {
SecureLogger.info("Presence: service starting...", category: .session)
scheduleNextHeartbeat()
}
private func setupObservers() {
// Monitor location channel changes
LocationStateManager.shared.$availableChannels
.dropFirst()
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.handleLocationChange()
}
.store(in: &subscriptions)
// Monitor Tor readiness to kick off heartbeat if it was stalled
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorDidBecomeReady)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.handleConnectivityChange()
}
.store(in: &subscriptions)
}
private func handleLocationChange() {
// When location changes, we trigger an immediate (but slightly delayed) heartbeat
// to announce presence in the new zone, then reset the loop.
SecureLogger.debug("Presence: location changed, scheduling update", category: .session)
heartbeatTimer?.invalidate()
// Small delay to allow location state to settle
heartbeatTimer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: 5.0, repeats: false) { [weak self] _ in
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
self?.performHeartbeat()
}
}
}
private func handleConnectivityChange() {
SecureLogger.debug("Presence: connectivity restored, triggering heartbeat", category: .session)
// If we were waiting for network, do it now
if heartbeatTimer == nil || !heartbeatTimer!.isValid {
scheduleNextHeartbeat()
}
}
private func scheduleNextHeartbeat() {
heartbeatTimer?.invalidate()
let interval = TimeInterval.random(in: loopMinInterval...loopMaxInterval)
heartbeatTimer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: interval, repeats: false) { [weak self] _ in
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
self?.performHeartbeat()
}
}
}
private func performHeartbeat() {
// Always schedule next loop first ensures continuity even if this one fails/skips
defer { scheduleNextHeartbeat() }
// 1. Check preconditions
guard TorManager.shared.isReady else {
SecureLogger.debug("Presence: skipping heartbeat (Tor not ready)", category: .session)
return
}
// App must be active (or at least we shouldn't broadcast if in background, usually)
if !TorManager.shared.isForeground() {
return
}
// 2. Get channels
let channels = LocationStateManager.shared.availableChannels
guard !channels.isEmpty else { return }
// 3. Filter and broadcast
// We use Task + sleep for decorrelation to allow the main runloop to proceed
for channel in channels {
// Check privacy restriction
if !self.allowedPrecisions.contains(channel.geohash.count) {
continue
}
// Launch independent task for each channel's delay
Task { @MainActor in
// Random delay for decorrelation
let delay = TimeInterval.random(in: self.burstMinDelay...self.burstMaxDelay)
let nanoseconds = UInt64(delay * 1_000_000_000)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: nanoseconds)
self.broadcastPresence(for: channel.geohash)
}
}
}
private func broadcastPresence(for geohash: String) {
do {
guard let identity = try? idBridge.deriveIdentity(forGeohash: geohash) else {
return
}
let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
geohash: geohash,
senderIdentity: identity
)
// Send via RelayManager
let targetRelays = GeoRelayDirectory.shared.closestRelays(
toGeohash: geohash,
count: TransportConfig.nostrGeoRelayCount
)
if !targetRelays.isEmpty {
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event, to: targetRelays)
SecureLogger.debug("Presence: sent heartbeat for \(geohash) (pub=\(identity.publicKeyHex.prefix(6))...)", category: .session)
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Presence: failed to create event for \(geohash): \(error)", category: .session)
}
}
}
+278 -4
View File
@@ -10,16 +10,71 @@ import BitLogger
import Foundation
import Security
// MARK: - Keychain Error Types
// BCH-01-009: Proper error classification to distinguish expected states from critical failures
/// Result of a keychain read operation with proper error classification
enum KeychainReadResult {
case success(Data)
case itemNotFound // Expected: key doesn't exist yet
case accessDenied // Critical: app lacks keychain access
case deviceLocked // Recoverable: device is locked
case authenticationFailed // Recoverable: biometric/passcode failed
case otherError(OSStatus) // Unexpected error
var isRecoverableError: Bool {
switch self {
case .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
}
/// Result of a keychain save operation with proper error classification
enum KeychainSaveResult {
case success
case duplicateItem // Can retry with update
case accessDenied // Critical: app lacks keychain access
case deviceLocked // Recoverable: device is locked
case storageFull // Critical: no space available
case otherError(OSStatus)
var isRecoverableError: Bool {
switch self {
case .duplicateItem, .deviceLocked:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
}
protocol KeychainManagerProtocol {
func saveIdentityKey(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> Bool
func getIdentityKey(forKey key: String) -> Data?
func deleteIdentityKey(forKey key: String) -> Bool
func deleteAllKeychainData() -> Bool
func secureClear(_ data: inout Data)
func secureClear(_ string: inout String)
func verifyIdentityKeyExists() -> Bool
// BCH-01-009: Methods with proper error classification
/// Get identity key with detailed result for error handling
func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult
/// Save identity key with detailed result for error handling
func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult
// MARK: - Generic Data Storage (consolidated from KeychainHelper)
/// Save data with a custom service name
func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString?)
/// Load data from a custom service
func load(key: String, service: String) -> Data?
/// Delete data from a custom service
func delete(key: String, service: String)
}
final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
@@ -46,7 +101,181 @@ final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.delete, keyType: key, success: result)
return result
}
// MARK: - BCH-01-009: Methods with Proper Error Classification
/// Get identity key with detailed result for proper error handling
/// Distinguishes between missing keys (expected) and critical failures
func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
let fullKey = "identity_\(key)"
return retrieveDataWithResult(forKey: fullKey)
}
/// Save identity key with detailed result and retry logic for transient errors
func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult {
let fullKey = "identity_\(key)"
return saveDataWithResult(keyData, forKey: fullKey)
}
/// Internal method to save data with detailed result and retry for transient errors
private func saveDataWithResult(_ data: Data, forKey key: String, retryCount: Int = 2) -> KeychainSaveResult {
// Delete any existing item first to ensure clean state
_ = delete(forKey: key)
// Build base query
var base: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecValueData as String: data,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecAttrAccessible as String: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked,
kSecAttrLabel as String: "bitchat-\(key)"
]
#if os(macOS)
base[kSecAttrSynchronizable as String] = false
#endif
func attempt(addAccessGroup: Bool) -> OSStatus {
var query = base
if addAccessGroup { query[kSecAttrAccessGroup as String] = appGroup }
return SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
}
#if os(iOS)
var status = attempt(addAccessGroup: true)
if status == -34018 { // Missing entitlement, retry without access group
status = attempt(addAccessGroup: false)
}
#else
let status = attempt(addAccessGroup: false)
#endif
// Classify the result
let result = classifySaveStatus(status)
// Log all outcomes consistently
switch result {
case .success:
SecureLogger.debug("Keychain save succeeded for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
case .duplicateItem:
SecureLogger.warning("Keychain save found duplicate for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
case .accessDenied:
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
context: "Keychain access denied for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
case .deviceLocked:
SecureLogger.warning("Device locked during keychain save for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
case .storageFull:
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
context: "Keychain storage full for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
case .otherError(let code):
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(code)),
context: "Keychain save failed for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
}
// Retry transient errors with exponential backoff
if result.isRecoverableError && retryCount > 0 {
let delayMs = UInt32((3 - retryCount) * 100) // 100ms, 200ms backoff
usleep(delayMs * 1000)
SecureLogger.debug("Retrying keychain save for key: \(key), attempts remaining: \(retryCount)", category: .keychain)
return saveDataWithResult(data, forKey: key, retryCount: retryCount - 1)
}
return result
}
/// Internal method to retrieve data with detailed result
private func retrieveDataWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
let base: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecReturnData as String: true,
kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitOne
]
var result: AnyObject?
func attempt(withAccessGroup: Bool) -> OSStatus {
var q = base
if withAccessGroup { q[kSecAttrAccessGroup as String] = appGroup }
return SecItemCopyMatching(q as CFDictionary, &result)
}
#if os(iOS)
var status = attempt(withAccessGroup: true)
if status == -34018 { status = attempt(withAccessGroup: false) }
#else
let status = attempt(withAccessGroup: false)
#endif
// Classify the result
let readResult = classifyReadStatus(status, data: result as? Data)
// Log all outcomes consistently
switch readResult {
case .success:
SecureLogger.debug("Keychain read succeeded for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
case .itemNotFound:
// Expected case - no logging needed for missing keys
break
case .accessDenied:
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
context: "Keychain access denied for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
case .deviceLocked:
SecureLogger.warning("Device locked during keychain read for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
case .authenticationFailed:
SecureLogger.warning("Authentication failed for keychain read of key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
case .otherError(let code):
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(code)),
context: "Keychain read failed for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
}
return readResult
}
/// Classify keychain read status into meaningful categories
private func classifyReadStatus(_ status: OSStatus, data: Data?) -> KeychainReadResult {
switch status {
case errSecSuccess:
if let data = data {
return .success(data)
}
return .otherError(status)
case errSecItemNotFound:
return .itemNotFound
case errSecInteractionNotAllowed:
// Device is locked or in a state that doesn't allow keychain access
return .deviceLocked
case errSecAuthFailed:
return .authenticationFailed
case -34018: // errSecMissingEntitlement
return .accessDenied
case errSecNotAvailable:
return .accessDenied
default:
return .otherError(status)
}
}
/// Classify keychain save status into meaningful categories
private func classifySaveStatus(_ status: OSStatus) -> KeychainSaveResult {
switch status {
case errSecSuccess:
return .success
case errSecDuplicateItem:
return .duplicateItem
case errSecInteractionNotAllowed:
return .deviceLocked
case -34018: // errSecMissingEntitlement
return .accessDenied
case errSecNotAvailable:
return .accessDenied
case errSecDiskFull:
return .storageFull
default:
return .otherError(status)
}
}
// MARK: - Generic Operations
private func save(_ value: String, forKey key: String) -> Bool {
@@ -309,9 +538,54 @@ final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
}
// MARK: - Debug
func verifyIdentityKeyExists() -> Bool {
let key = "identity_noiseStaticKey"
return retrieveData(forKey: key) != nil
}
// MARK: - Generic Data Storage (consolidated from KeychainHelper)
/// Save data with a custom service name
func save(key: String, data: Data, service customService: String, accessible: CFString?) {
var query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: customService,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecValueData as String: data
]
if let accessible = accessible {
query[kSecAttrAccessible as String] = accessible
}
SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
}
/// Load data from a custom service
func load(key: String, service customService: String) -> Data? {
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: customService,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecReturnData as String: true
]
var result: AnyObject?
let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
guard status == errSecSuccess else { return nil }
return result as? Data
}
/// Delete data from a custom service
func delete(key: String, service customService: String) {
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: customService,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key
]
SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
}
}
+79 -69
View File
@@ -6,104 +6,114 @@ final class MeshTopologyTracker {
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "mesh.topology", attributes: .concurrent)
private let hopSize = 8
private var adjacency: [RoutingID: Set<RoutingID>] = [:]
// Directed claims: Key claims to see Value (neighbors)
private var claims: [RoutingID: Set<RoutingID>] = [:]
// Last time we received an update from a node
private var lastSeen: [RoutingID: Date] = [:]
// Maximum age for topology claims to be considered fresh for routing
// Routes computed using stale topology can fail when the network has changed
private static let routeFreshnessThreshold: TimeInterval = 60 // 60 seconds
func reset() {
queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
self.adjacency.removeAll()
self.claims.removeAll()
self.lastSeen.removeAll()
}
}
func recordDirectLink(between a: Data?, and b: Data?) {
guard let left = sanitize(a), let right = sanitize(b), left != right else { return }
/// Update the topology with a node's self-reported neighbor list
func updateNeighbors(for sourceData: Data?, neighbors: [Data]) {
guard let source = sanitize(sourceData) else { return }
// Sanitize neighbors and exclude self-loops
let validNeighbors = Set(neighbors.compactMap { sanitize($0) }).subtracting([source])
queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
var setA = self.adjacency[left] ?? []
setA.insert(right)
self.adjacency[left] = setA
var setB = self.adjacency[right] ?? []
setB.insert(left)
self.adjacency[right] = setB
}
}
func removeDirectLink(between a: Data?, and b: Data?) {
guard let left = sanitize(a), let right = sanitize(b), left != right else { return }
queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
if var setA = self.adjacency[left] {
setA.remove(right)
self.adjacency[left] = setA.isEmpty ? nil : setA
}
if var setB = self.adjacency[right] {
setB.remove(left)
self.adjacency[right] = setB.isEmpty ? nil : setB
}
self.claims[source] = validNeighbors
self.lastSeen[source] = Date()
}
}
func removePeer(_ data: Data?) {
guard let peer = sanitize(data) else { return }
queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
guard let neighbors = self.adjacency.removeValue(forKey: peer) else { return }
for neighbor in neighbors {
if var set = self.adjacency[neighbor] {
set.remove(peer)
self.adjacency[neighbor] = set.isEmpty ? nil : set
}
}
self.claims.removeValue(forKey: peer)
self.lastSeen.removeValue(forKey: peer)
}
}
func recordRoute(_ hops: [Data]) {
let sanitized = hops.compactMap { sanitize($0) }
guard sanitized.count >= 2 else { return }
/// Prune nodes that haven't updated their topology in `age` seconds
func prune(olderThan age: TimeInterval) {
let deadline = Date().addingTimeInterval(-age)
queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
for idx in 0..<(sanitized.count - 1) {
let left = sanitized[idx]
let right = sanitized[idx + 1]
guard left != right else { continue }
var setA = self.adjacency[left] ?? []
setA.insert(right)
self.adjacency[left] = setA
var setB = self.adjacency[right] ?? []
setB.insert(left)
self.adjacency[right] = setB
let stale = self.lastSeen.filter { $0.value < deadline }
for (peer, _) in stale {
self.claims.removeValue(forKey: peer)
self.lastSeen.removeValue(forKey: peer)
}
}
}
func computeRoute(from start: Data?, to goal: Data?, maxHops: Int = 255) -> [Data]? {
func computeRoute(from start: Data?, to goal: Data?, maxHops: Int = 10) -> [Data]? {
guard let source = sanitize(start), let target = sanitize(goal) else { return nil }
if source == target { return [source] }
if source == target { return [] } // Direct connection, no intermediate hops
let graph = queue.sync { adjacency }
guard graph[source] != nil, graph[target] != nil else { return nil }
return queue.sync {
let now = Date()
let freshnessDeadline = now.addingTimeInterval(-Self.routeFreshnessThreshold)
var visited: Set<RoutingID> = [source]
var queuePaths: [[RoutingID]] = [[source]]
var index = 0
// BFS
var visited: Set<RoutingID> = [source]
// Queue stores paths: [Start, Hop1, Hop2, ..., Current]
var queuePaths: [[RoutingID]] = [[source]]
while index < queuePaths.count {
let path = queuePaths[index]
index += 1
guard path.count <= maxHops else { continue }
guard let last = path.last, let neighbors = graph[last] else { continue }
while !queuePaths.isEmpty {
let path = queuePaths.removeFirst()
// Limit path length (path contains source + maxHops + target) -> maxHops intermediate
// If maxHops = 10, max edges = 11, max nodes = 12.
if path.count > maxHops + 1 { continue }
for neighbor in neighbors {
if visited.contains(neighbor) { continue }
var nextPath = path
nextPath.append(neighbor)
if neighbor == target { return nextPath }
if nextPath.count <= maxHops {
guard let last = path.last else { continue }
// Get neighbors that 'last' claims to see
guard let neighbors = claims[last] else { continue }
// Check if 'last' node's topology info is fresh
guard let lastSeenTime = lastSeen[last], lastSeenTime > freshnessDeadline else {
continue // Skip stale nodes
}
for neighbor in neighbors {
if visited.contains(neighbor) { continue }
// CONFIRMED EDGE CHECK:
// 'last' claims 'neighbor' (checked above)
// Does 'neighbor' claim 'last'?
guard let neighborClaims = claims[neighbor],
neighborClaims.contains(last) else {
continue
}
// Check if 'neighbor' node's topology info is fresh
guard let neighborSeenTime = lastSeen[neighbor], neighborSeenTime > freshnessDeadline else {
continue // Skip edges to stale nodes
}
var nextPath = path
nextPath.append(neighbor)
if neighbor == target {
// Return only intermediate hops
// Path: [Source, I1, I2, Target] -> [I1, I2]
return Array(nextPath.dropFirst().dropLast())
}
visited.insert(neighbor)
queuePaths.append(nextPath)
}
visited.insert(neighbor)
}
return nil
}
return nil
}
// MARK: - Helpers
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ import Foundation
/// Generic LRU (Least Recently Used) cache for deduplication.
/// Uses an efficient O(1) lookup with periodic compaction.
/// Thread-safe via @MainActor - all callers are already on main actor.
@MainActor
final class LRUDeduplicationCache<Value> {
private var map: [String: Value] = [:]
private var order: [String] = []
@@ -157,6 +159,8 @@ enum ContentNormalizer {
/// Service that manages message deduplication using LRU caches.
/// Provides separate caches for content-based dedup and Nostr event ID dedup.
/// Thread-safe via @MainActor - all callers are already on main actor.
@MainActor
final class MessageDeduplicationService {
/// Cache for content-based near-duplicate detection
+71 -31
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,20 @@ import Foundation
@MainActor
final class MessageRouter {
private let transports: [Transport]
private var outbox: [PeerID: [(content: String, nickname: String, messageID: String)]] = [:] // peerID -> queued messages
// Outbox entry with timestamp for TTL-based eviction
private struct QueuedMessage {
let content: String
let nickname: String
let messageID: String
let timestamp: Date
}
private var outbox: [PeerID: [QueuedMessage]] = [:]
// Outbox limits to prevent unbounded memory growth
private static let maxMessagesPerPeer = 100
private static let messageTTLSeconds: TimeInterval = 24 * 60 * 60 // 24 hours
init(transports: [Transport]) {
self.transports = transports
@@ -34,52 +47,60 @@ final class MessageRouter {
}
}
// MARK: - Transport Selection
private func reachableTransport(for peerID: PeerID) -> Transport? {
transports.first { $0.isPeerReachable(peerID) }
}
private func connectedTransport(for peerID: PeerID) -> Transport? {
transports.first { $0.isPeerConnected(peerID) }
}
// MARK: - Message Sending
func sendPrivate(_ content: String, to peerID: PeerID, recipientNickname: String, messageID: String) {
// Try to find a reachable transport
if let transport = transports.first(where: { $0.isPeerReachable(peerID) }) {
if let transport = reachableTransport(for: peerID) {
SecureLogger.debug("Routing PM via \(type(of: transport)) to \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… id=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
transport.sendPrivateMessage(content, to: peerID, recipientNickname: recipientNickname, messageID: messageID)
} else {
// Queue for later
// Queue for later with timestamp for TTL tracking
if outbox[peerID] == nil { outbox[peerID] = [] }
outbox[peerID]?.append((content, recipientNickname, messageID))
SecureLogger.debug("Queued PM for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… (no reachable transport) id=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
let message = QueuedMessage(content: content, nickname: recipientNickname, messageID: messageID, timestamp: Date())
outbox[peerID]?.append(message)
// Enforce per-peer size limit with FIFO eviction
if let count = outbox[peerID]?.count, count > Self.maxMessagesPerPeer {
let evicted = outbox[peerID]?.removeFirst()
SecureLogger.warning("📤 Outbox overflow for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… - evicted oldest message: \(evicted?.messageID.prefix(8) ?? "?")", category: .session)
}
SecureLogger.debug("Queued PM for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… (no reachable transport) id=\(messageID.prefix(8))… queue=\(outbox[peerID]?.count ?? 0)", category: .session)
}
}
func sendReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID) {
if let transport = transports.first(where: { $0.isPeerReachable(peerID) }) {
if let transport = reachableTransport(for: peerID) {
SecureLogger.debug("Routing READ ack via \(type(of: transport)) to \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… id=\(receipt.originalMessageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
transport.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: peerID)
} else if !transports.isEmpty {
// Fallback to last transport (usually Nostr) if neither is explicitly reachable?
// Or better: just try the first one that supports it?
// Existing logic preferred mesh, then nostr.
// If neither reachable, existing logic queued it (via mesh usually) or sent via nostr.
// Let's stick to "try reachable". If none, maybe pick the first one to queue?
// Actually, for READ receipts, we might want to just fire-and-forget on the "best effort" transport.
// But let's stick to the reachable check.
SecureLogger.debug("No reachable transport for READ ack to \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .session)
}
}
func sendDeliveryAck(_ messageID: String, to peerID: PeerID) {
if let transport = transports.first(where: { $0.isPeerReachable(peerID) }) {
if let transport = reachableTransport(for: peerID) {
SecureLogger.debug("Routing DELIVERED ack via \(type(of: transport)) to \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… id=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
transport.sendDeliveryAck(for: messageID, to: peerID)
}
}
func sendFavoriteNotification(to peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool) {
if let transport = transports.first(where: { $0.isPeerConnected(peerID) }) {
if let transport = connectedTransport(for: peerID) {
transport.sendFavoriteNotification(to: peerID, isFavorite: isFavorite)
} else if let transport = reachableTransport(for: peerID) {
transport.sendFavoriteNotification(to: peerID, isFavorite: isFavorite)
} else if let transport = transports.first(where: { $0.isPeerReachable(peerID) }) {
transport.sendFavoriteNotification(to: peerID, isFavorite: isFavorite)
} else {
// Fallback: try all? or just the last one?
// Old logic: if mesh connected, mesh. Else nostr.
// Note: NostrTransport.isPeerReachable now returns true if mapped.
// If not mapped, we can't send via Nostr anyway.
}
}
@@ -88,17 +109,25 @@ final class MessageRouter {
func flushOutbox(for peerID: PeerID) {
guard let queued = outbox[peerID], !queued.isEmpty else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("Flushing outbox for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… count=\(queued.count)", category: .session)
var remaining: [(content: String, nickname: String, messageID: String)] = []
for (content, nickname, messageID) in queued {
if let transport = transports.first(where: { $0.isPeerReachable(peerID) }) {
SecureLogger.debug("Outbox -> \(type(of: transport)) for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… id=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
transport.sendPrivateMessage(content, to: peerID, recipientNickname: nickname, messageID: messageID)
let now = Date()
var remaining: [QueuedMessage] = []
for message in queued {
// Skip expired messages (TTL exceeded)
if now.timeIntervalSince(message.timestamp) > Self.messageTTLSeconds {
SecureLogger.debug("⏰ Expired queued message for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… id=\(message.messageID.prefix(8))… (age: \(Int(now.timeIntervalSince(message.timestamp)))s)", category: .session)
continue
}
if let transport = reachableTransport(for: peerID) {
SecureLogger.debug("Outbox -> \(type(of: transport)) for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… id=\(message.messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
transport.sendPrivateMessage(message.content, to: peerID, recipientNickname: message.nickname, messageID: message.messageID)
} else {
remaining.append((content, nickname, messageID))
remaining.append(message)
}
}
if remaining.isEmpty {
outbox.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
} else {
@@ -109,4 +138,15 @@ final class MessageRouter {
func flushAllOutbox() {
for key in Array(outbox.keys) { flushOutbox(for: key) }
}
/// Periodically clean up expired messages from all outboxes
func cleanupExpiredMessages() {
let now = Date()
for peerID in Array(outbox.keys) {
outbox[peerID]?.removeAll { now.timeIntervalSince($0.timestamp) > Self.messageTTLSeconds }
if outbox[peerID]?.isEmpty == true {
outbox.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
}
}
}
+137 -37
View File
@@ -199,64 +199,153 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
self.keychain = keychain
// Load or create static identity key (ONLY from keychain)
// BCH-01-009: Load or create static identity key with proper error handling
let loadedKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey
// Try to load from keychain
if let identityData = keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: "noiseStaticKey"),
let key = try? Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: identityData) {
loadedKey = key
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: true)
}
// If no identity exists, create new one
else {
// Try to load from keychain with proper error classification
let noiseKeyResult = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
switch noiseKeyResult {
case .success(let identityData):
if let key = try? Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: identityData) {
loadedKey = key
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: true)
} else {
// Data corrupted, regenerate
SecureLogger.warning("Noise static key data corrupted, regenerating", category: .keychain)
loadedKey = Self.generateAndSaveNoiseKey(keychain: keychain)
}
case .itemNotFound:
// Expected case: no key exists yet, create new one
loadedKey = Self.generateAndSaveNoiseKey(keychain: keychain)
case .accessDenied:
// Critical error - log but proceed with ephemeral key (will be lost on restart)
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: -1),
context: "Keychain access denied - using ephemeral identity", category: .keychain)
loadedKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
case .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed:
// Recoverable error - use ephemeral key and warn
SecureLogger.warning("Device locked or auth failed - using ephemeral identity until unlocked", category: .keychain)
loadedKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
case .otherError(let status):
// Unexpected error - log and use ephemeral key
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
context: "Unexpected keychain error - using ephemeral identity", category: .keychain)
loadedKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
let keyData = loadedKey.rawRepresentation
// Save to keychain
let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.create, keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: saved)
}
// Now assign the final value
self.staticIdentityKey = loadedKey
self.staticIdentityPublicKey = staticIdentityKey.publicKey
// Load or create signing key pair
// BCH-01-009: Load or create signing key pair with proper error handling
let loadedSigningKey: Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey
// Try to load from keychain
if let signingData = keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: "ed25519SigningKey"),
let key = try? Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: signingData) {
loadedSigningKey = key
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: true)
}
// If no signing key exists, create new one
else {
let signingKeyResult = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "ed25519SigningKey")
switch signingKeyResult {
case .success(let signingData):
if let key = try? Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: signingData) {
loadedSigningKey = key
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: true)
} else {
// Data corrupted, regenerate
SecureLogger.warning("Ed25519 signing key data corrupted, regenerating", category: .keychain)
loadedSigningKey = Self.generateAndSaveSigningKey(keychain: keychain)
}
case .itemNotFound:
// Expected case: no key exists yet, create new one
loadedSigningKey = Self.generateAndSaveSigningKey(keychain: keychain)
case .accessDenied:
// Critical error - log but proceed with ephemeral key
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: -1),
context: "Keychain access denied - using ephemeral signing key", category: .keychain)
loadedSigningKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
case .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed:
// Recoverable error - use ephemeral key and warn
SecureLogger.warning("Device locked or auth failed - using ephemeral signing key until unlocked", category: .keychain)
loadedSigningKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
case .otherError(let status):
// Unexpected error - log and use ephemeral key
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
context: "Unexpected keychain error - using ephemeral signing key", category: .keychain)
loadedSigningKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
let keyData = loadedSigningKey.rawRepresentation
// Save to keychain
let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: "ed25519SigningKey")
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.create, keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: saved)
}
// Now assign the signing keys
self.signingKey = loadedSigningKey
self.signingPublicKey = signingKey.publicKey
// Initialize session manager
self.sessionManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: staticIdentityKey, keychain: keychain)
// Set up session callbacks
sessionManager.onSessionEstablished = { [weak self] peerID, remoteStaticKey in
self?.handleSessionEstablished(peerID: peerID, remoteStaticKey: remoteStaticKey)
}
// Start session maintenance timer
startRekeyTimer()
}
// MARK: - BCH-01-009: Key Generation Helpers with Save Verification
/// Generate and save a new Noise static key, verifying the save succeeds
private static func generateAndSaveNoiseKey(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey {
let newKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
let keyData = newKey.rawRepresentation
// Save to keychain and verify success
let saveResult = keychain.saveIdentityKeyWithResult(keyData, forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
switch saveResult {
case .success:
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.create, keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: true)
case .duplicateItem:
// This shouldn't happen since we just tried to load, but handle it
SecureLogger.warning("Noise key already exists (race condition?)", category: .keychain)
default:
// Save failed - log but continue with the key (it will be ephemeral)
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: -1),
context: "Failed to persist noise static key - identity will be lost on restart",
category: .keychain)
}
return newKey
}
/// Generate and save a new Ed25519 signing key, verifying the save succeeds
private static func generateAndSaveSigningKey(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) -> Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey {
let newKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
let keyData = newKey.rawRepresentation
// Save to keychain and verify success
let saveResult = keychain.saveIdentityKeyWithResult(keyData, forKey: "ed25519SigningKey")
switch saveResult {
case .success:
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.create, keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: true)
case .duplicateItem:
// This shouldn't happen since we just tried to load, but handle it
SecureLogger.warning("Signing key already exists (race condition?)", category: .keychain)
default:
// Save failed - log but continue with the key (it will be ephemeral)
SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: -1),
context: "Failed to persist signing key - identity will be lost on restart",
category: .keychain)
}
return newKey
}
// MARK: - Public Interface
@@ -527,6 +616,17 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
}
rateLimiter.resetAll()
}
/// Clear session for a specific peer (e.g., on decryption failure to allow re-handshake)
func clearSession(for peerID: PeerID) {
sessionManager.removeSession(for: peerID)
serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
if let fingerprint = peerFingerprints.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
fingerprintToPeerID.removeValue(forKey: fingerprint)
}
}
SecureLogger.debug("🔓 Cleared Noise session for \(peerID)", category: .session)
}
// MARK: - Private Helpers
+67 -106
View File
@@ -118,95 +118,54 @@ final class NostrTransport: Transport, @unchecked Sendable {
func sendPrivateMessage(_ content: String, to peerID: PeerID, recipientNickname: String, messageID: String) {
Task { @MainActor in
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID) else { return }
guard let senderIdentity = try? idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity() else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing PM to \(recipientNpub.prefix(16))… for peerID \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… id=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
// Convert recipient npub -> hex (x-only)
let recipientHex: String
do {
let (hrp, data) = try Bech32.decode(recipientNpub)
guard hrp == "npub" else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: recipient key not npub (hrp=\(hrp))", category: .session)
return
}
recipientHex = data.hexEncodedString()
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to decode npub -> hex: \(error)", category: .session)
return
}
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID),
let recipientHex = npubToHex(recipientNpub),
let senderIdentity = try? idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity() else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing PM to \(recipientNpub.prefix(16))… id=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodePMForNostr(content: content, messageID: messageID, recipientPeerID: peerID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed PM packet", category: .session)
return
}
guard let event = try? NostrProtocol.createPrivateMessage(content: embedded, recipientPubkey: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to build Nostr event for PM", category: .session)
return
}
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: sending PM giftWrap id=\(event.id.prefix(16))", category: .session)
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event)
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity)
}
}
func sendReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID) {
// Enqueue and process with throttling to avoid relay rate limits
readQueue.append(QueuedRead(receipt: receipt, peerID: peerID))
processReadQueueIfNeeded()
// Use barrier to synchronize access to readQueue
queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
self?.readQueue.append(QueuedRead(receipt: receipt, peerID: peerID))
self?.processReadQueueIfNeeded()
}
}
func sendFavoriteNotification(to peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool) {
Task { @MainActor in
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID) else { return }
guard let senderIdentity = try? idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity() else { return }
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID),
let recipientHex = npubToHex(recipientNpub),
let senderIdentity = try? idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity() else { return }
let content = isFavorite ? "[FAVORITED]:\(senderIdentity.npub)" : "[UNFAVORITED]:\(senderIdentity.npub)"
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing FAVORITE(\(isFavorite)) to \(recipientNpub.prefix(16))", category: .session)
// Convert recipient npub -> hex
let recipientHex: String
do {
let (hrp, data) = try Bech32.decode(recipientNpub)
guard hrp == "npub" else { return }
recipientHex = data.hexEncodedString()
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to decode recipient npub for favorite notification: \(error.localizedDescription)", category: .session)
return
}
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodePMForNostr(content: content, messageID: UUID().uuidString, recipientPeerID: peerID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed favorite notification", category: .session)
return
}
guard let event = try? NostrProtocol.createPrivateMessage(content: embedded, recipientPubkey: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to build Nostr event for favorite notification", category: .session)
return
}
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: sending favorite giftWrap id=\(event.id.prefix(16))", category: .session)
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event)
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity)
}
}
func sendBroadcastAnnounce() { /* no-op for Nostr */ }
func sendDeliveryAck(for messageID: String, to peerID: PeerID) {
Task { @MainActor in
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID) else { return }
guard let senderIdentity = try? idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity() else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing DELIVERED ack for id=\(messageID.prefix(8))… to \(recipientNpub.prefix(16))", category: .session)
let recipientHex: String
do {
let (hrp, data) = try Bech32.decode(recipientNpub)
guard hrp == "npub" else { return }
recipientHex = data.hexEncodedString()
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to decode recipient npub for delivery ack: \(error.localizedDescription)", category: .session)
return
}
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID),
let recipientHex = npubToHex(recipientNpub),
let senderIdentity = try? idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity() else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing DELIVERED ack id=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
guard let ack = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodeAckForNostr(type: .delivered, messageID: messageID, recipientPeerID: peerID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed DELIVERED ack", category: .session)
return
}
guard let event = try? NostrProtocol.createPrivateMessage(content: ack, recipientPubkey: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to build Nostr event for DELIVERED ack", category: .session)
return
}
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: sending DELIVERED ack giftWrap id=\(event.id.prefix(16))", category: .session)
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event)
sendWrappedMessage(content: ack, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity)
}
}
}
@@ -218,21 +177,17 @@ extension NostrTransport {
// MARK: Geohash ACK helpers
func sendDeliveryAckGeohash(for messageID: String, toRecipientHex recipientHex: String, from identity: NostrIdentity) {
Task { @MainActor in
SecureLogger.debug("GeoDM: send DELIVERED -> recip=\(recipientHex.prefix(8))… mid=\(messageID.prefix(8))… from=\(identity.publicKeyHex.prefix(8))", category: .session)
SecureLogger.debug("GeoDM: send DELIVERED mid=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodeAckForNostrNoRecipient(type: .delivered, messageID: messageID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else { return }
guard let event = try? NostrProtocol.createPrivateMessage(content: embedded, recipientPubkey: recipientHex, senderIdentity: identity) else { return }
NostrRelayManager.registerPendingGiftWrap(id: event.id)
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event)
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: identity, registerPending: true)
}
}
func sendReadReceiptGeohash(_ messageID: String, toRecipientHex recipientHex: String, from identity: NostrIdentity) {
Task { @MainActor in
SecureLogger.debug("GeoDM: send READ -> recip=\(recipientHex.prefix(8))… mid=\(messageID.prefix(8))… from=\(identity.publicKeyHex.prefix(8))", category: .session)
SecureLogger.debug("GeoDM: send READ mid=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodeAckForNostrNoRecipient(type: .readReceipt, messageID: messageID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else { return }
guard let event = try? NostrProtocol.createPrivateMessage(content: embedded, recipientPubkey: recipientHex, senderIdentity: identity) else { return }
NostrRelayManager.registerPendingGiftWrap(id: event.id)
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event)
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: identity, registerPending: true)
}
}
@@ -240,19 +195,12 @@ extension NostrTransport {
func sendPrivateMessageGeohash(content: String, toRecipientHex recipientHex: String, from identity: NostrIdentity, messageID: String) {
Task { @MainActor in
guard !recipientHex.isEmpty else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("GeoDM: send PM -> recip=\(recipientHex.prefix(8))… mid=\(messageID.prefix(8))… from=\(identity.publicKeyHex.prefix(8))", category: .session)
// Build embedded BitChat packet without recipient peer ID
SecureLogger.debug("GeoDM: send PM mid=\(messageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodePMForNostrNoRecipient(content: content, messageID: messageID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed geohash PM packet", category: .session)
return
}
guard let event = try? NostrProtocol.createPrivateMessage(content: embedded, recipientPubkey: recipientHex, senderIdentity: identity) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to build Nostr event for geohash PM", category: .session)
return
}
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: sending geohash PM giftWrap id=\(event.id.prefix(16))", category: .session)
NostrRelayManager.registerPendingGiftWrap(id: event.id)
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event)
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: identity, registerPending: true)
}
}
}
@@ -260,50 +208,63 @@ extension NostrTransport {
// MARK: - Private Helpers
extension NostrTransport {
/// Converts npub bech32 string to hex pubkey
@MainActor
private func npubToHex(_ npub: String) -> String? {
do {
let (hrp, data) = try Bech32.decode(npub)
guard hrp == "npub" else { return nil }
return data.hexEncodedString()
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to decode npub -> hex: \(error)", category: .session)
return nil
}
}
/// Creates and sends a gift-wrapped private message event
@MainActor
private func sendWrappedMessage(content: String, recipientHex: String, senderIdentity: NostrIdentity, registerPending: Bool = false) {
guard let event = try? NostrProtocol.createPrivateMessage(content: content, recipientPubkey: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to build Nostr event", category: .session)
return
}
if registerPending {
NostrRelayManager.registerPendingGiftWrap(id: event.id)
}
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event)
}
/// Must be called within a barrier on `queue`
private func processReadQueueIfNeeded() {
guard !isSendingReadAcks else { return }
guard !readQueue.isEmpty else { return }
isSendingReadAcks = true
sendNextReadAck()
let item = readQueue.removeFirst()
sendReadAckItem(item)
}
private func sendNextReadAck() {
guard !readQueue.isEmpty else { isSendingReadAcks = false; return }
let item = readQueue.removeFirst()
/// Sends a single read ack item (called after extraction from queue within barrier)
private func sendReadAckItem(_ item: QueuedRead) {
Task { @MainActor in
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: item.peerID) else { scheduleNextReadAck(); return }
guard let senderIdentity = try? idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity() else { scheduleNextReadAck(); return }
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing READ ack for id=\(item.receipt.originalMessageID.prefix(8))… to \(recipientNpub.prefix(16))", category: .session)
// Convert recipient npub -> hex
let recipientHex: String
do {
let (hrp, data) = try Bech32.decode(recipientNpub)
guard hrp == "npub" else { scheduleNextReadAck(); return }
recipientHex = data.hexEncodedString()
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to decode recipient npub for read ack: \(error.localizedDescription)", category: .session)
scheduleNextReadAck()
return
}
defer { scheduleNextReadAck() }
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: item.peerID),
let recipientHex = npubToHex(recipientNpub),
let senderIdentity = try? idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity() else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing READ ack id=\(item.receipt.originalMessageID.prefix(8))", category: .session)
guard let ack = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodeAckForNostr(type: .readReceipt, messageID: item.receipt.originalMessageID, recipientPeerID: item.peerID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed READ ack", category: .session)
scheduleNextReadAck(); return
return
}
guard let event = try? NostrProtocol.createPrivateMessage(content: ack, recipientPubkey: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to build Nostr event for READ ack", category: .session)
scheduleNextReadAck(); return
}
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: sending READ ack giftWrap id=\(event.id.prefix(16))", category: .session)
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event)
scheduleNextReadAck()
sendWrappedMessage(content: ack, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity)
}
}
private func scheduleNextReadAck() {
DispatchQueue.main.asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + readAckInterval) { [weak self] in
guard let self = self else { return }
self.isSendingReadAcks = false
self.processReadQueueIfNeeded()
self?.queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
self?.isSendingReadAcks = false
self?.processReadQueueIfNeeded()
}
}
}
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct NotificationStreamAssembler {
let hasRecipient = (flags & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRecipient) != 0
let hasSignature = (flags & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasSignature) != 0
let isCompressed = (flags & BinaryProtocol.Flags.isCompressed) != 0
let hasRoute = (version >= 2) && (flags & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) != 0
let lengthOffset = 12
let payloadLength: Int
@@ -80,6 +81,15 @@ struct NotificationStreamAssembler {
var frameLength = framePrefix + payloadLength
if hasRecipient { frameLength += BinaryProtocol.recipientIDSize }
if hasSignature { frameLength += BinaryProtocol.signatureSize }
if hasRoute {
let routeCountOffset = framePrefix + (hasRecipient ? BinaryProtocol.recipientIDSize : 0)
let routeCountIndex = buffer.startIndex + routeCountOffset
guard buffer.count > routeCountOffset else { break }
let routeCount = Int(buffer[routeCountIndex])
frameLength += 1 + (routeCount * BinaryProtocol.senderIDSize)
}
if isCompressed {
let rawLengthFieldBytes = (version == 2) ? 4 : 2
if payloadLength < rawLengthFieldBytes {
+7
View File
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ protocol Transport: AnyObject {
// QR verification (optional for transports)
func sendVerifyChallenge(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)
func sendVerifyResponse(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)
// Pending file management (BCH-01-002: files held in memory until user accepts)
func acceptPendingFile(id: String) -> URL?
func declinePendingFile(id: String)
}
extension Transport {
@@ -70,6 +74,9 @@ extension Transport {
func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String], messageID: String, timestamp: Date) {
sendMessage(content, mentions: mentions)
}
func acceptPendingFile(id: String) -> URL? { nil }
func declinePendingFile(id: String) {}
}
protocol TransportPeerEventsDelegate: AnyObject {
+28 -5
View File
@@ -96,11 +96,12 @@ enum TransportConfig {
// Keep scanning fully ON when we saw traffic very recently
static let bleRecentTrafficForceScanSeconds: TimeInterval = 10.0
static let bleThreadSleepWriteShortDelaySeconds: TimeInterval = 0.05
static let bleExpectedWritePerFragmentMs: Int = 8
static let bleExpectedWriteMaxMs: Int = 2000
// Faster fragment pacing; use slightly tighter spacing for directed trains
static let bleFragmentSpacingMs: Int = 5
static let bleFragmentSpacingDirectedMs: Int = 4
static let bleExpectedWritePerFragmentMs: Int = 20
static let bleExpectedWriteMaxMs: Int = 5000
// Fragment pacing: Conservative spacing to prevent BLE buffer overflow
// Aggressive pacing causes packet loss; needs 25-30ms between fragments for reliable delivery
static let bleFragmentSpacingMs: Int = 30
static let bleFragmentSpacingDirectedMs: Int = 25
static let bleAnnounceIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 4.0
static let bleDutyOnDurationDense: TimeInterval = 3.0
static let bleDutyOffDurationDense: TimeInterval = 15.0
@@ -162,6 +163,14 @@ enum TransportConfig {
static let blePostAnnounceDelaySeconds: TimeInterval = 0.4
static let bleForceAnnounceMinIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 0.15
// BCH-01-004: Rate-limiting for subscription-triggered announces
// Prevents rapid enumeration attacks by rate-limiting announce responses
static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds: TimeInterval = 2.0 // Minimum interval between announces per central
static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitBackoffFactor: Double = 2.0 // Exponential backoff multiplier
static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds: TimeInterval = 30.0 // Maximum backoff period
static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitWindowSeconds: TimeInterval = 60.0 // Window for tracking subscription attempts
static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxAttempts: Int = 5 // Max attempts before extended cooldown
// Store-and-forward for directed packets at relays
static let bleDirectedSpoolWindowSeconds: TimeInterval = 15.0
@@ -203,4 +212,18 @@ enum TransportConfig {
static let uiShareExtensionDismissDelaySeconds: TimeInterval = 2.0
static let uiShareAcceptWindowSeconds: TimeInterval = 30.0
static let uiMigrationCutoffSeconds: TimeInterval = 24 * 60 * 60
// Gossip Sync Configuration
static let syncSeenCapacity: Int = 1000
static let syncGCSMaxBytes: Int = 400
static let syncGCSTargetFpr: Double = 0.01
static let syncMaxMessageAgeSeconds: TimeInterval = 900
static let syncMaintenanceIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 30.0
static let syncStalePeerCleanupIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 60.0
static let syncStalePeerTimeoutSeconds: TimeInterval = 60.0
static let syncFragmentCapacity: Int = 600
static let syncFileTransferCapacity: Int = 200
static let syncFragmentIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 30.0
static let syncFileTransferIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 60.0
static let syncMessageIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 15.0
}
+28 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import Foundation
import BitLogger
// Gossip-based sync manager using on-demand GCS filters
final class GossipSyncManager {
@@ -6,6 +7,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
func sendPacket(_ packet: BitchatPacket)
func sendPacket(to peerID: PeerID, packet: BitchatPacket)
func signPacketForBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> BitchatPacket
func getConnectedPeers() -> [PeerID]
}
private struct PacketStore {
@@ -74,6 +76,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
private let myPeerID: PeerID
private let config: Config
private let requestSyncManager: RequestSyncManager
weak var delegate: Delegate?
// Storage: broadcast packets by type, and latest announce per sender
@@ -88,9 +91,10 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
private var lastStalePeerCleanup: Date = .distantPast
private var syncSchedules: [SyncSchedule] = []
init(myPeerID: PeerID, config: Config = Config()) {
init(myPeerID: PeerID, config: Config = Config(), requestSyncManager: RequestSyncManager) {
self.myPeerID = myPeerID
self.config = config
self.requestSyncManager = requestSyncManager
var schedules: [SyncSchedule] = []
if config.seenCapacity > 0 && config.messageSyncIntervalSeconds > 0 {
schedules.append(SyncSchedule(types: .publicMessages, interval: config.messageSyncIntervalSeconds, lastSent: .distantPast))
@@ -202,6 +206,19 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
}
}
private func sendPeriodicSync(for types: SyncTypeFlags) {
// Unicast sync to connected peers to allow RSR attribution
if let connectedPeers = delegate?.getConnectedPeers(), !connectedPeers.isEmpty {
SecureLogger.debug("Sending periodic sync to \(connectedPeers.count) connected peers", category: .sync)
for peerID in connectedPeers {
sendRequestSync(to: peerID, types: types)
}
} else {
// Fallback to broadcast (discovery phase)
sendRequestSync(for: types)
}
}
private func sendRequestSync(for types: SyncTypeFlags) {
let payload = buildGcsPayload(for: types)
let pkt = BitchatPacket(
@@ -218,6 +235,9 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
}
private func sendRequestSync(to peerID: PeerID, types: SyncTypeFlags) {
// Register the request for RSR validation
requestSyncManager.registerRequest(to: peerID)
let payload = buildGcsPayload(for: types)
var recipient = Data()
var temp = peerID.id
@@ -262,6 +282,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
if !mightContain(idBytes) {
var toSend = pkt
toSend.ttl = 0
toSend.isRSR = true // Mark as solicited response
delegate?.sendPacket(to: peerID, packet: toSend)
}
}
@@ -274,6 +295,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
if !mightContain(idBytes) {
var toSend = pkt
toSend.ttl = 0
toSend.isRSR = true // Mark as solicited response
delegate?.sendPacket(to: peerID, packet: toSend)
}
}
@@ -286,6 +308,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
if !mightContain(idBytes) {
var toSend = pkt
toSend.ttl = 0
toSend.isRSR = true // Mark as solicited response
delegate?.sendPacket(to: peerID, packet: toSend)
}
}
@@ -298,6 +321,7 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
if !mightContain(idBytes) {
var toSend = pkt
toSend.ttl = 0
toSend.isRSR = true // Mark as solicited response
delegate?.sendPacket(to: peerID, packet: toSend)
}
}
@@ -366,11 +390,13 @@ final class GossipSyncManager {
private func performPeriodicMaintenance(now: Date = Date()) {
cleanupExpiredMessages()
cleanupStaleAnnouncementsIfNeeded(now: now)
requestSyncManager.cleanup() // Cleanup expired sync requests
for index in syncSchedules.indices {
guard syncSchedules[index].interval > 0 else { continue }
if syncSchedules[index].lastSent == .distantPast || now.timeIntervalSince(syncSchedules[index].lastSent) >= syncSchedules[index].interval {
syncSchedules[index].lastSent = now
sendRequestSync(for: syncSchedules[index].types)
sendPeriodicSync(for: syncSchedules[index].types)
}
}
}
+74
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
//
// RequestSyncManager.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
import BitLogger
/// Manages outgoing sync requests and validates incoming responses.
///
/// Allows attributing RSR (Request-Sync Response) packets to specific peers
/// that we have actively requested sync from.
final class RequestSyncManager {
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "request.sync.manager", attributes: .concurrent)
private var pendingRequests: [PeerID: TimeInterval] = [:]
// Allow responses for 30s after request
private let responseWindow: TimeInterval = 30.0
/// Register that we are sending a sync request to a peer.
/// - Parameter peerID: The peer we are requesting sync from
func registerRequest(to peerID: PeerID) {
let now = Date().timeIntervalSince1970
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
SecureLogger.debug("Registering sync request to \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .sync)
self.pendingRequests[peerID] = now
}
}
/// Check if a packet from a peer is a valid response to a sync request.
///
/// - Parameters:
/// - peerID: The sender of the packet
/// - isRSR: Whether the packet is marked as a Request-Sync Response
/// - Returns: true if we have a pending request for this peer and the window is open
func isValidResponse(from peerID: PeerID, isRSR: Bool) -> Bool {
guard isRSR else { return false }
return queue.sync {
guard let requestTime = pendingRequests[peerID] else {
SecureLogger.warning("Received unsolicited RSR packet from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security)
return false
}
let now = Date().timeIntervalSince1970
if now - requestTime > responseWindow {
SecureLogger.warning("Received RSR packet from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… outside of response window", category: .security)
// We don't remove here because we might receive multiple packets for one request
return false
}
return true
}
}
/// Periodic cleanup of expired requests
func cleanup() {
let now = Date().timeIntervalSince1970
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
let originalCount = self.pendingRequests.count
self.pendingRequests = self.pendingRequests.filter { _, timestamp in
now - timestamp <= self.responseWindow
}
let removed = originalCount - self.pendingRequests.count
if removed > 0 {
SecureLogger.debug("Cleaned up \(removed) expired sync requests", category: .sync)
}
}
}
}
+5 -3
View File
@@ -52,11 +52,13 @@ struct InputValidator {
// MessageType/NoisePayloadType enums; keeping validator free of stale lists.
/// Validates timestamp is reasonable (not too far in past or future)
/// BCH-01-011: Reduced from ±1 hour to ±5 minutes to limit replay attack window
static func validateTimestamp(_ timestamp: Date) -> Bool {
let now = Date()
let oneHourAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-3600)
let oneHourFromNow = now.addingTimeInterval(3600)
return timestamp >= oneHourAgo && timestamp <= oneHourFromNow
// 5 minutes = 300 seconds (industry standard for replay protection)
let fiveMinutesAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-300)
let fiveMinutesFromNow = now.addingTimeInterval(300)
return timestamp >= fiveMinutesAgo && timestamp <= fiveMinutesFromNow
}
}
+28 -21
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import Foundation
/// Thread-safe deduplicator with LRU eviction and time-based expiry.
/// Used for both message ID deduplication (network layer) and content key deduplication (UI layer).
final class MessageDeduplicator {
private struct Entry {
private struct Entry: Equatable {
let id: String
let timestamp: Date
}
@@ -31,18 +31,20 @@ final class MessageDeduplicator {
self.maxCount = maxCount
}
/// Check if message is duplicate and add if not
/// Check if message is duplicate and add if not.
/// - Parameter id: The message identifier to check.
/// - Returns: `true` if the message was already seen, `false` otherwise.
func isDuplicate(_ id: String) -> Bool {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
cleanupOldEntries()
let now = Date()
cleanupOldEntries(before: now.addingTimeInterval(-maxAge))
if lookup[id] != nil {
return true
}
let now = Date()
entries.append(Entry(id: id, timestamp: now))
lookup[id] = now
trimIfNeeded()
@@ -89,18 +91,22 @@ final class MessageDeduplicator {
}
private func trimIfNeeded() {
// Soft-cap and advance head by a chunk to avoid O(n) shifting
if (entries.count - head) > maxCount {
let removeCount = min(100, entries.count - head)
for i in head..<(head + removeCount) {
lookup.removeValue(forKey: entries[i].id)
}
head += removeCount
// Periodically compact to reclaim memory
if head > entries.count / 2 {
entries.removeFirst(head)
head = 0
}
let activeCount = entries.count - head
guard activeCount > maxCount else { return }
// Remove down to 75% of maxCount for better amortization
let targetCount = (maxCount * 3) / 4
let removeCount = activeCount - targetCount
for i in head..<(head + removeCount) {
lookup.removeValue(forKey: entries[i].id)
}
head += removeCount
// Compact when head exceeds half the array to reclaim memory
if head > entries.count / 2 {
entries.removeFirst(head)
head = 0
}
}
@@ -114,24 +120,25 @@ final class MessageDeduplicator {
lookup.removeAll()
}
/// Periodic cleanup
/// Periodic cleanup of expired entries and memory optimization.
func cleanup() {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
cleanupOldEntries()
cleanupOldEntries(before: Date().addingTimeInterval(-maxAge))
if entries.capacity > maxCount * 2 {
// Shrink capacity if significantly oversized
if entries.capacity > maxCount * 2 && entries.count < maxCount {
entries.reserveCapacity(maxCount)
}
}
private func cleanupOldEntries() {
let cutoff = Date().addingTimeInterval(-maxAge)
private func cleanupOldEntries(before cutoff: Date) {
while head < entries.count, entries[head].timestamp < cutoff {
lookup.removeValue(forKey: entries[head].id)
head += 1
}
// Compact when head exceeds half the array
if head > 0 && head > entries.count / 2 {
entries.removeFirst(head)
head = 0
+100 -84
View File
@@ -279,8 +279,6 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
var geoNicknames: [String: String] = [:] // pubkeyHex(lowercased) -> nickname
// Show Tor status once per app launch
var torStatusAnnounced = false
private var torProgressCancellable: AnyCancellable?
private var lastTorProgressAnnounced = -1
// Track whether a Tor restart is pending so we only announce
// "tor restarted" after an actual restart, not the first launch.
var torRestartPending: Bool = false
@@ -323,8 +321,6 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
)
// Channel activity tracking for background nudges
var lastPublicActivityAt: [String: Date] = [:] // channelKey -> last activity time
private var lastPublicActivityNotifyAt: [String: Date] = [:]
private let channelInactivityThreshold: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.uiChannelInactivityThresholdSeconds
// Geohash participant tracker
let participantTracker = GeohashParticipantTracker(activityCutoff: -TransportConfig.uiRecentCutoffFiveMinutesSeconds)
// Participants who indicated they teleported (by tag in their events)
@@ -448,7 +444,7 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
self.deduplicationService = MessageDeduplicationService()
// Wire up dependencies
self.commandProcessor.chatViewModel = self
self.commandProcessor.contextProvider = self
self.participantTracker.configure(context: self)
// Subscribe to privateChatManager changes to trigger UI updates
@@ -503,8 +499,6 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
String(localized: "system.tor.starting", comment: "System message when Tor is starting")
)
// Suppress incremental Tor progress messages
torProgressCancellable = nil
} else if !TorManager.shared.torEnforced && !torStatusAnnounced {
torStatusAnnounced = true
addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
@@ -631,8 +625,6 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
object: nil
)
// Listen for delivery acknowledgments
// When app becomes active, send read receipts for visible messages
#if os(macOS)
NotificationCenter.default.addObserver(
@@ -1468,56 +1460,6 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
selectedPrivateChatFingerprint = nil
}
// MARK: - Nostr Message Handling
@MainActor
@objc private func handleNostrMessage(_ notification: Notification) {
guard let message = notification.userInfo?["message"] as? BitchatMessage else { return }
// Store the Nostr pubkey if provided (for messages from unknown senders)
if let nostrPubkey = notification.userInfo?["nostrPubkey"] as? String,
let senderPeerID = message.senderPeerID {
// Store mapping for read receipts
nostrKeyMapping[senderPeerID] = nostrPubkey
}
// Process the Nostr message through the same flow as Bluetooth messages
didReceiveMessage(message)
}
@objc private func handleDeliveryAcknowledgment(_ notification: Notification) {
guard let messageId = notification.userInfo?["messageId"] as? String else { return }
// Update the delivery status for the message
if let index = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageId }) {
// Update delivery status to delivered
messages[index].deliveryStatus = DeliveryStatus.delivered(to: "nostr", at: Date())
// Schedule UI update for delivery status
// UI will update automatically
}
// Also update in private chats if it's a private message
for (peerID, chatMessages) in privateChats {
if let index = chatMessages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageId }) {
privateChats[peerID]?[index].deliveryStatus = DeliveryStatus.delivered(to: "nostr", at: Date())
// UI will update automatically
break
}
}
}
@objc private func handleNostrReadReceipt(_ notification: Notification) {
guard let receipt = notification.userInfo?["receipt"] as? ReadReceipt else { return }
SecureLogger.info("📖 Handling read receipt for message \(receipt.originalMessageID) from Nostr", category: .session)
// Process the read receipt through the same flow as Bluetooth read receipts
didReceiveReadReceipt(receipt)
}
@MainActor
@objc private func handlePeerStatusUpdate(_ notification: Notification) {
// Update private chat peer if needed when peer status changes
@@ -2055,13 +1997,42 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to clear media files during panic: \(error)", category: .session)
}
// BCH-01-013: Clear iOS app switcher snapshots
// These are stored in Library/Caches/Snapshots/<bundle_id>/
#if os(iOS)
Self.clearAppSwitcherSnapshots()
#endif
}
// Force immediate UI update for panic mode
// UI updates immediately - no flushing needed
}
/// BCH-01-013: Clear iOS app switcher snapshots during panic mode
/// iOS stores preview screenshots in Library/Caches/Snapshots/<bundle_id>/
/// These could reveal sensitive information visible in the app at the time
#if os(iOS)
private nonisolated static func clearAppSwitcherSnapshots() {
do {
let cacheDir = try FileManager.default.url(for: .cachesDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: false)
let snapshotsDir = cacheDir.appendingPathComponent("Snapshots", isDirectory: true)
// Clear all snapshots (iOS stores them in subdirectories by bundle ID and scene)
if FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: snapshotsDir.path) {
let contents = try FileManager.default.contentsOfDirectory(at: snapshotsDir, includingPropertiesForKeys: nil)
for item in contents {
try FileManager.default.removeItem(at: item)
}
SecureLogger.info("🗑️ Cleared app switcher snapshots during panic clear", category: .session)
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to clear app switcher snapshots: \(error)", category: .session)
}
}
#endif
// MARK: - Autocomplete
func updateAutocomplete(for text: String, cursorPosition: Int) {
@@ -3046,46 +3017,91 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
}
}
/// Find message index trying both short (16-hex) and long (64-hex) peer ID formats.
/// Returns the peer ID where the message was found and its index, or nil if not found.
private func findMessageIndex(messageID: String, peerID: PeerID) -> (peerID: PeerID, index: Int)? {
// Try direct lookup first
if let messages = privateChats[peerID],
let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
return (peerID, idx)
}
// Try with full noise key if peerID is short (16 hex chars)
if peerID.bare.count == 16,
let peer = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID),
!peer.noisePublicKey.isEmpty {
let longID = PeerID(hexData: peer.noisePublicKey)
if let messages = privateChats[longID],
let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
return (longID, idx)
}
}
// Try with short form if peerID is long (64 hex = noise key)
if peerID.bare.count == 64 {
let shortID = peerID.toShort()
if let messages = privateChats[shortID],
let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
return (shortID, idx)
}
}
return nil
}
// Low-level BLE events
func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
Task { @MainActor in
switch type {
case .privateMessage:
guard let pm = PrivateMessagePacket.decode(from: payload) else { return }
// BCH-01-012: Check blocking before processing private message to prevent notification bypass
if isPeerBlocked(peerID) {
SecureLogger.debug("🚫 Ignoring Noise payload from blocked peer: \(peerID)", category: .security)
return
}
let senderName = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname ?? "Unknown"
let pmMentions = parseMentions(from: pm.content)
let msg = BitchatMessage(
id: pm.messageID,
sender: senderName,
content: pm.content,
timestamp: timestamp,
isRelay: false,
originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: nickname,
senderPeerID: peerID,
mentions: pmMentions.isEmpty ? nil : pmMentions
)
let pmMentions = parseMentions(from: pm.content)
let msg = BitchatMessage(
id: pm.messageID,
sender: senderName,
content: pm.content,
timestamp: timestamp,
isRelay: false,
originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: nickname,
senderPeerID: peerID,
mentions: pmMentions.isEmpty ? nil : pmMentions
)
handlePrivateMessage(msg)
// Send delivery ACK back over BLE
meshService.sendDeliveryAck(for: pm.messageID, to: peerID)
case .delivered:
guard let messageID = String(data: payload, encoding: .utf8) else { return }
if let name = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname {
if let messages = privateChats[peerID], let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
privateChats[peerID]?[idx].deliveryStatus = .delivered(to: name, at: Date())
objectWillChange.send()
}
}
guard let name = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname,
let (foundPeerID, idx) = findMessageIndex(messageID: messageID, peerID: peerID) else { return }
// Don't downgrade from .read to .delivered
if case .read = privateChats[foundPeerID]?[idx].deliveryStatus { return }
privateChats[foundPeerID]?[idx].deliveryStatus = .delivered(to: name, at: Date())
objectWillChange.send()
case .readReceipt:
guard let messageID = String(data: payload, encoding: .utf8) else { return }
if let name = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname {
if let messages = privateChats[peerID], let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
privateChats[peerID]?[idx].deliveryStatus = .read(by: name, at: Date())
objectWillChange.send()
}
guard let name = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname,
let (foundPeerID, idx) = findMessageIndex(messageID: messageID, peerID: peerID) else { return }
// Explicitly unwrap and re-assign to ensure the @Published setter is called
if let messages = privateChats[foundPeerID], idx < messages.count {
messages[idx].deliveryStatus = .read(by: name, at: Date())
privateChats[foundPeerID] = messages
privateChatManager.objectWillChange.send()
objectWillChange.send()
}
case .verifyChallenge:
// Parse and respond
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
}
func subscribeNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent) {
guard event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue,
guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue ||
event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue),
!deduplicationService.hasProcessedNostrEvent(event.id)
else {
return
@@ -86,6 +87,11 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
// Update participants last-seen for this pubkey
participantTracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
// If presence heartbeat (Kind 20001), stop here - no content to display
if event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue {
return
}
// Track teleported tag (only our format ["t","teleport"]) for icon state
let hasTeleportTag = event.tags.contains(where: { tag in
tag.count >= 2 && tag[0].lowercased() == "t" && tag[1].lowercased() == "teleport"
@@ -124,12 +130,21 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
)
Task { @MainActor in
// BCH-01-012: Check blocking before any notifications
// handlePublicMessage has its own blocking check but returns silently,
// so we must also guard checkForMentions to prevent notification bypass
let isBlocked = identityManager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey.lowercased())
handlePublicMessage(msg)
checkForMentions(msg)
sendHapticFeedback(for: msg)
// Only check mentions and send haptic if sender is not blocked
if !isBlocked {
checkForMentions(msg)
sendHapticFeedback(for: msg)
}
}
}
func subscribeGiftWrap(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent, id: NostrIdentity) {
guard !deduplicationService.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) else { return }
deduplicationService.recordNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
@@ -239,8 +254,9 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
}
func handleNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent) {
// Only handle ephemeral kind 20000 with matching tag
guard event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue else { return }
// Only handle ephemeral kind 20000 or presence kind 20001 with matching tag
guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue ||
event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue) else { return }
// Deduplicate
if deduplicationService.hasProcessedNostrEvent(event.id) { return }
@@ -250,6 +266,11 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
let tagSummary = event.tags.map { "[" + $0.joined(separator: ",") + "]" }.joined(separator: ",")
SecureLogger.debug("GeoTeleport: recv pub=\(event.pubkey.prefix(8))… tags=\(tagSummary)", category: .session)
// If this pubkey is blocked, skip mapping, participants, and timeline
if identityManager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey) {
return
}
// Track teleport tag for participants only our format ["t", "teleport"]
let hasTeleportTag: Bool = event.tags.contains { tag in
tag.count >= 2 && tag[0].lowercased() == "t" && tag[1].lowercased() == "teleport"
@@ -273,6 +294,9 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
}
}
// Update participants last-seen for this pubkey
participantTracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
// Skip only very recent self-echo from relay; include older self events for hydration
if isSelf {
let eventTime = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
@@ -287,17 +311,14 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
geoNicknames[event.pubkey.lowercased()] = nick
}
// If this pubkey is blocked, skip mapping, participants, and timeline
if identityManager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey) {
return
}
// Store mapping for geohash DM initiation
nostrKeyMapping[PeerID(nostr_: event.pubkey)] = event.pubkey
nostrKeyMapping[PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey)] = event.pubkey
// Update participants last-seen for this pubkey
participantTracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
// If presence heartbeat (Kind 20001), stop here - no content to display
if event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue {
return
}
let senderName = displayNameForNostrPubkey(event.pubkey)
let content = event.content
@@ -464,7 +485,8 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
}
func subscribeNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent, gh: String) {
guard event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue else { return }
guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue ||
event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue) else { return }
// Compute current participant count (5-minute window) BEFORE updating with this event
let existingCount = participantTracker.participantCount(for: gh)
@@ -740,15 +740,11 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
if isViewing {
// Mark read immediately if viewing
// Use router to send read receipt
// Use the incoming peerID directly - it has the established Noise session.
// Don't use PeerID(hexData: noiseKey) as that creates a 64-hex ID without a session.
// Use meshService directly (not messageRouter) so it queues if peer disconnects.
let receipt = ReadReceipt(originalMessageID: message.id, readerID: meshService.myPeerID, readerNickname: nickname)
if let key = noiseKey {
// Send via router to stable key if available (preferred for persistence/Nostr fallback)
messageRouter.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: PeerID(hexData: key))
} else {
// Fallback to mesh direct
meshService.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: peerID)
}
meshService.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: peerID)
sentReadReceipts.insert(message.id)
} else {
// Notify
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
}
}
}
@objc func handleTorWillRestart() {
Task { @MainActor in
self.torRestartPending = true
-22
View File
@@ -86,10 +86,6 @@ struct AppInfoView: View {
]
}
enum Warning {
static let title: LocalizedStringKey = "app_info.warning.title"
static let message: LocalizedStringKey = "app_info.warning.message"
}
}
var body: some View {
@@ -192,24 +188,6 @@ struct AppInfoView: View {
FeatureRow(info: Strings.Privacy.panic)
}
// Warning
VStack(alignment: .leading, spacing: 6) {
SectionHeader(Strings.Warning.title)
.foregroundColor(Color.red)
Text(Strings.Warning.message)
.font(.bitchatSystem(size: 14, design: .monospaced))
.foregroundColor(Color.red)
.fixedSize(horizontal: false, vertical: true)
}
.padding(.top, 6)
.padding(.bottom, 16)
.padding(.horizontal)
.background(Color.red.opacity(0.1))
.cornerRadius(8)
.padding(.top)
}
.padding()
}
+14 -2
View File
@@ -15,10 +15,22 @@ struct PaymentChipView: View {
enum PaymentType {
case cashu(String)
case lightning(String)
private static let cashuAllowedCharacters = CharacterSet.alphanumerics.union(CharacterSet(charactersIn: "-_"))
private static func cashuURL(from link: String) -> URL? {
if let url = URL(string: link), url.scheme != nil {
return url
}
let enc = link.addingPercentEncoding(withAllowedCharacters: cashuAllowedCharacters) ?? link
return URL(string: "cashu:\(enc)")
}
var url: URL? {
switch self {
case .cashu(let link), .lightning(let link):
case .cashu(let link):
return Self.cashuURL(from: link)
case .lightning(let link):
return URL(string: link)
}
}
+3 -68
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ struct ContentView: View {
@Environment(\.colorScheme) var colorScheme
@Environment(\.dismiss) private var dismiss
@Environment(\.dynamicTypeSize) private var dynamicTypeSize
@State private var showPeerList = false
@State private var showSidebar = false
@State private var showAppInfo = false
@State private var showMessageActions = false
@@ -57,7 +56,6 @@ struct ContentView: View {
@State private var expandedMessageIDs: Set<String> = []
@State private var showLocationNotes = false
@State private var notesGeohash: String? = nil
@State private var sheetNotesCount: Int = 0
@State private var imagePreviewURL: URL? = nil
@State private var recordingAlertMessage: String = ""
@State private var showRecordingAlert = false
@@ -1181,19 +1179,6 @@ struct ContentView: View {
)
}
// Split a name into base and a '#abcd' suffix if present
private func splitNameSuffix(_ name: String) -> (base: String, suffix: String) {
guard name.count >= 5 else { return (name, "") }
let suffix = String(name.suffix(5))
if suffix.first == "#", suffix.dropFirst().allSatisfy({ c in
("0"..."9").contains(String(c)) || ("a"..."f").contains(String(c)) || ("A"..."F").contains(String(c))
}) {
let base = String(name.dropLast(5))
return (base, suffix)
}
return (name, "")
}
// Compute channel-aware people count and color for toolbar (cross-platform)
private func channelPeopleCountAndColor() -> (Int, Color) {
switch locationManager.selectedChannel {
@@ -1308,8 +1293,8 @@ struct ContentView: View {
// Bookmark toggle (geochats): to the left of #geohash
if case .location(let ch) = locationManager.selectedChannel {
Button(action: { GeohashBookmarksStore.shared.toggle(ch.geohash) }) {
Image(systemName: GeohashBookmarksStore.shared.isBookmarked(ch.geohash) ? "bookmark.fill" : "bookmark")
Button(action: { bookmarks.toggle(ch.geohash) }) {
Image(systemName: bookmarks.isBookmarked(ch.geohash) ? "bookmark.fill" : "bookmark")
.font(.bitchatSystem(size: 12))
}
.buttonStyle(.plain)
@@ -1567,7 +1552,7 @@ private extension ContentView {
} else if let media = mediaAttachment(for: message) {
mediaMessageRow(message: message, media: media)
} else {
textMessageRow(message)
TextMessageView(message: message, expandedMessageIDs: $expandedMessageIDs)
}
}
@@ -1631,56 +1616,6 @@ private extension ContentView {
.padding(.vertical, 4)
}
@ViewBuilder
private func textMessageRow(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> some View {
let cashuTokens = message.content.extractCashuLinks()
let lightningLinks = message.content.extractLightningLinks()
let isLong = (message.content.count > TransportConfig.uiLongMessageLengthThreshold || message.content.hasVeryLongToken(threshold: TransportConfig.uiVeryLongTokenThreshold)) && cashuTokens.isEmpty
let isExpanded = expandedMessageIDs.contains(message.id)
VStack(alignment: .leading, spacing: 0) {
HStack(alignment: .top, spacing: 0) {
Text(viewModel.formatMessageAsText(message, colorScheme: colorScheme))
.fixedSize(horizontal: false, vertical: true)
.lineLimit(isLong && !isExpanded ? TransportConfig.uiLongMessageLineLimit : nil)
.frame(maxWidth: .infinity, alignment: .leading)
if message.isPrivate && message.sender == viewModel.nickname,
let status = message.deliveryStatus {
DeliveryStatusView(status: status)
.padding(.leading, 4)
}
}
if isLong && cashuTokens.isEmpty {
let labelKey = isExpanded ? LocalizedStringKey("content.message.show_less") : LocalizedStringKey("content.message.show_more")
Button(labelKey) {
if isExpanded { expandedMessageIDs.remove(message.id) }
else { expandedMessageIDs.insert(message.id) }
}
.font(.bitchatSystem(size: 11, weight: .medium, design: .monospaced))
.foregroundColor(Color.blue)
.padding(.top, 4)
}
if !lightningLinks.isEmpty || !cashuTokens.isEmpty {
HStack(spacing: 8) {
ForEach(Array(lightningLinks.prefix(3)), id: \.self) { link in
PaymentChipView(paymentType: .lightning(link))
}
ForEach(Array(cashuTokens.prefix(3)), id: \.self) { token in
let enc = token.addingPercentEncoding(withAllowedCharacters: .alphanumerics.union(CharacterSet(charactersIn: "-_"))) ?? token
let urlStr = "cashu:\(enc)"
PaymentChipView(paymentType: .cashu(urlStr))
}
}
.padding(.top, 6)
.padding(.leading, 2)
}
}
}
private func expandWindow(ifNeededFor message: BitchatMessage,
allMessages: [BitchatMessage],
privatePeer: PeerID?,
+21
View File
@@ -40,10 +40,31 @@ struct LocationChannelsSheet: View {
}
static func levelTitle(for level: GeohashChannelLevel, count: Int) -> String {
// High-precision uncertainty: if count is 0 for high-precision levels,
// show "?" because presence broadcasting is disabled for privacy.
let isHighPrecision = (level == .neighborhood || level == .block || level == .building)
if isHighPrecision && count == 0 {
return String(
format: String(localized: "location_channels.row_title_unknown", defaultValue: "%@ [? people]"),
locale: .current,
level.displayName
)
}
return rowTitle(label: level.displayName, count: count)
}
static func bookmarkTitle(geohash: String, count: Int) -> String {
// Check precision for bookmarks too
let len = geohash.count
// Neighborhood=6, Block=7, Building=8+
let isHighPrecision = (len >= 6)
if isHighPrecision && count == 0 {
return String(
format: String(localized: "location_channels.row_title_unknown", defaultValue: "%@ [? people]"),
locale: .current,
"#\(geohash)"
)
}
return rowTitle(label: "#\(geohash)", count: count)
}
+4 -19
View File
@@ -5,21 +5,6 @@
import Foundation
private enum RegexCache {
static let cashu: NSRegularExpression = {
try! NSRegularExpression(pattern: "\\bcashu[AB][A-Za-z0-9._-]{40,}\\b", options: [])
}()
static let lightningScheme: NSRegularExpression = {
try! NSRegularExpression(pattern: "(?i)\\blightning:[^\\s]+", options: [])
}()
static let bolt11: NSRegularExpression = {
try! NSRegularExpression(pattern: "(?i)\\bln(bc|tb|bcrt)[0-9][a-z0-9]{50,}\\b", options: [])
}()
static let lnurl: NSRegularExpression = {
try! NSRegularExpression(pattern: "(?i)\\blnurl1[a-z0-9]{20,}\\b", options: [])
}()
}
extension String {
// Detect if there is an extremely long token (no whitespace/newlines) that could break layout
func hasVeryLongToken(threshold: Int) -> Bool {
@@ -38,7 +23,7 @@ extension String {
// Extract up to `max` Cashu tokens (cashuA/cashuB). Allow dot '.' and shorter lengths.
func extractCashuLinks(max: Int = 3) -> [String] {
let regex = RegexCache.cashu
let regex = MessageFormattingEngine.Patterns.cashu
let ns = self as NSString
let range = NSRange(location: 0, length: ns.length)
var found: [String] = []
@@ -59,19 +44,19 @@ extension String {
let ns = self as NSString
let full = NSRange(location: 0, length: ns.length)
// lightning: scheme
for m in RegexCache.lightningScheme.matches(in: self, range: full) {
for m in MessageFormattingEngine.Patterns.lightningScheme.matches(in: self, range: full) {
let s = ns.substring(with: m.range(at: 0))
results.append(s)
if results.count >= max { return results }
}
// BOLT11
for m in RegexCache.bolt11.matches(in: self, range: full) {
for m in MessageFormattingEngine.Patterns.bolt11.matches(in: self, range: full) {
let s = ns.substring(with: m.range(at: 0))
results.append("lightning:\(s)")
if results.count >= max { return results }
}
// LNURL bech32
for m in RegexCache.lnurl.matches(in: self, range: full) {
for m in MessageFormattingEngine.Patterns.lnurl.matches(in: self, range: full) {
let s = ns.substring(with: m.range(at: 0))
results.append("lightning:\(s)")
if results.count >= max { return results }
@@ -10,32 +10,64 @@ import Foundation
final class PreviewKeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
private var storage: [String: Data] = [:]
private var serviceStorage: [String: [String: Data]] = [:]
init() {}
func saveIdentityKey(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> Bool {
storage[key] = keyData
return true
}
func getIdentityKey(forKey key: String) -> Data? {
storage[key]
}
func deleteIdentityKey(forKey key: String) -> Bool {
storage.removeValue(forKey: key)
return true
}
func deleteAllKeychainData() -> Bool {
storage.removeAll()
serviceStorage.removeAll()
return true
}
func secureClear(_ data: inout Data) {}
func secureClear(_ string: inout String) {}
func verifyIdentityKeyExists() -> Bool {
storage["identity_noiseStaticKey"] != nil
}
// BCH-01-009: New methods with proper error classification
func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
if let data = storage[key] {
return .success(data)
}
return .itemNotFound
}
func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult {
storage[key] = keyData
return .success
}
// MARK: - Generic Data Storage (consolidated from KeychainHelper)
func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString?) {
if serviceStorage[service] == nil {
serviceStorage[service] = [:]
}
serviceStorage[service]?[key] = data
}
func load(key: String, service: String) -> Data? {
serviceStorage[service]?[key]
}
func delete(key: String, service: String) {
serviceStorage[service]?.removeValue(forKey: key)
}
}
+106
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
//
// BLEServiceCoreTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Focused BLEService tests for packet handling behavior.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
import CoreBluetooth
@testable import bitchat
struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
@Test
func duplicatePacket_isDeduped() async {
let ble = makeService()
let delegate = PublicCaptureDelegate()
ble.delegate = delegate
let sender = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let timestamp = UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
let packet = makePublicPacket(content: "Hello", sender: sender, timestamp: timestamp)
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender)
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender)
_ = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().count == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout)
let messages = delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot()
#expect(messages.count == 1)
#expect(messages.first?.content == "Hello")
}
@Test
func staleBroadcast_isIgnored() async {
let ble = makeService()
let delegate = PublicCaptureDelegate()
ble.delegate = delegate
let sender = PeerID(str: "A1B2C3D4E5F60708")
let oldTimestamp = UInt64(Date().addingTimeInterval(-901).timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
let packet = makePublicPacket(content: "Old", sender: sender, timestamp: oldTimestamp)
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender)
let didReceive = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ !delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().isEmpty }, timeout: 0.3)
#expect(!didReceive)
#expect(delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().isEmpty)
}
}
private func makeService() -> BLEService {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let identityManager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: MockKeychainHelper())
return BLEService(keychain: keychain, idBridge: idBridge, identityManager: identityManager)
}
private func makePublicPacket(content: String, sender: PeerID, timestamp: UInt64) -> BitchatPacket {
BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.message.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: sender.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: timestamp,
payload: Data(content.utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 3
)
}
private final class PublicCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
private let lock = NSLock()
private(set) var publicMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: messageID,
sender: nickname,
content: content,
timestamp: timestamp,
isRelay: false,
originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: false,
recipientNickname: nil,
senderPeerID: peerID,
mentions: nil
)
lock.lock()
publicMessages.append(message)
lock.unlock()
}
func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {}
func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {}
func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState) {}
func publicMessagesSnapshot() -> [BitchatMessage] {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
return publicMessages
}
}
+7 -7
View File
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct BLEServiceTests {
service.sendMessage("Hello, world!")
// Allow async processing
try await sleep(0.5)
try await sleep(1.0)
}
#expect(service.sentMessages.count == 1)
}
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ struct BLEServiceTests {
)
// Allow async processing
try await sleep(0.5)
try await sleep(1.0)
}
#expect(service.sentMessages.count == 1)
}
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ struct BLEServiceTests {
service.sendMessage("@alice @bob check this out", mentions: ["alice", "bob"])
// Allow async processing
try await sleep(0.5)
try await sleep(1.0)
}
}
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ struct BLEServiceTests {
service.simulateIncomingMessage(incomingMessage)
// Allow async processing
try await sleep(0.5)
try await sleep(1.0)
}
}
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ struct BLEServiceTests {
service.simulateIncomingPacket(packet)
// Allow async processing
try await sleep(0.5)
try await sleep(1.0)
}
}
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ struct BLEServiceTests {
service.sendMessage("Test delivery")
// Allow async processing
try await sleep(0.5)
try await sleep(1.0)
}
}
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ struct BLEServiceTests {
service.simulateIncomingPacket(packet)
// Allow async processing
try await sleep(0.5)
try await sleep(1.0)
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
//
// ChatViewModelDeliveryStatusTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Tests for ChatViewModel delivery status state machine.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
// MARK: - Test Helpers
@MainActor
private func makeTestableViewModel() -> (viewModel: ChatViewModel, transport: MockTransport) {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let keychainHelper = MockKeychainHelper()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychainHelper)
let identityManager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let transport = MockTransport()
let viewModel = ChatViewModel(
keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: identityManager,
transport: transport
)
return (viewModel, transport)
}
// MARK: - Delivery Status Tests
struct ChatViewModelDeliveryStatusTests {
// MARK: - Status Transition Tests
@Test @MainActor
func deliveryStatus_noDowngrade_readToDelivered() async {
let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
let messageID = "test-msg-1"
// Setup: create a message with .read status
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: messageID,
sender: viewModel.nickname,
content: "Test message",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Peer",
senderPeerID: transport.myPeerID,
deliveryStatus: .read(by: "Peer", at: Date())
)
viewModel.privateChats[peerID] = [message]
// Action: try to downgrade to .delivered
viewModel.didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus(messageID, status: .delivered(to: "Peer", at: Date()))
// Assert: status should remain .read (no downgrade)
let currentStatus = viewModel.privateChats[peerID]?.first?.deliveryStatus
#expect({
if case .read = currentStatus { return true }
return false
}())
}
@Test @MainActor
func deliveryStatus_upgrade_sentToDelivered() async {
let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
let messageID = "test-msg-2"
// Setup: create a message with .sent status
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: messageID,
sender: viewModel.nickname,
content: "Test message",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Peer",
senderPeerID: transport.myPeerID,
deliveryStatus: .sent
)
viewModel.privateChats[peerID] = [message]
// Action: upgrade to .delivered
viewModel.didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus(messageID, status: .delivered(to: "Peer", at: Date()))
// Assert: status should be .delivered
let currentStatus = viewModel.privateChats[peerID]?.first?.deliveryStatus
#expect({
if case .delivered = currentStatus { return true }
return false
}())
}
@Test @MainActor
func deliveryStatus_upgrade_deliveredToRead() async {
let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
let messageID = "test-msg-3"
// Setup: create a message with .delivered status
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: messageID,
sender: viewModel.nickname,
content: "Test message",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Peer",
senderPeerID: transport.myPeerID,
deliveryStatus: .delivered(to: "Peer", at: Date().addingTimeInterval(-60))
)
viewModel.privateChats[peerID] = [message]
// Action: upgrade to .read
viewModel.didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus(messageID, status: .read(by: "Peer", at: Date()))
// Assert: status should be .read
let currentStatus = viewModel.privateChats[peerID]?.first?.deliveryStatus
#expect({
if case .read = currentStatus { return true }
return false
}())
}
// MARK: - Read Receipt Handling
@Test @MainActor
func didReceiveReadReceipt_updatesMessageStatus() async {
let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
let messageID = "test-msg-4"
// Setup: create a message with .sent status
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: messageID,
sender: viewModel.nickname,
content: "Test message",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Peer",
senderPeerID: transport.myPeerID,
deliveryStatus: .sent
)
viewModel.privateChats[peerID] = [message]
// Action: receive read receipt
let receipt = ReadReceipt(
originalMessageID: messageID,
readerID: peerID,
readerNickname: "Peer"
)
viewModel.didReceiveReadReceipt(receipt)
// Assert: status should be .read
let currentStatus = viewModel.privateChats[peerID]?.first?.deliveryStatus
#expect({
if case .read = currentStatus { return true }
return false
}())
}
// MARK: - Public Timeline Status Tests
@Test @MainActor
func deliveryStatus_publicTimeline_updatesCorrectly() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let messageID = "public-msg-1"
// Setup: add a message to public timeline with .sending status
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: messageID,
sender: viewModel.nickname,
content: "Public message",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: false,
deliveryStatus: .sending
)
viewModel.messages.append(message)
// Action: update to .sent
viewModel.didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus(messageID, status: .sent)
// Assert
let updatedMessage = viewModel.messages.first(where: { $0.id == messageID })
#expect({
if case .sent = updatedMessage?.deliveryStatus { return true }
return false
}())
}
// MARK: - Status Rank Tests (for deduplication)
@Test @MainActor
func statusRank_orderingIsCorrect() async {
// This tests the implicit ordering used in refreshVisibleMessages
// failed < sending < sent < partiallyDelivered < delivered < read
let statuses: [DeliveryStatus] = [
.failed(reason: "test"),
.sending,
.sent,
.partiallyDelivered(reached: 1, total: 3),
.delivered(to: "B", at: Date()),
.read(by: "C", at: Date())
]
// Verify each status has a logical progression
// This is more of a documentation test to ensure the ranking logic is understood
for (index, status) in statuses.enumerated() {
switch status {
case .failed: #expect(index == 0)
case .sending: #expect(index == 1)
case .sent: #expect(index == 2)
case .partiallyDelivered: #expect(index == 3)
case .delivered: #expect(index == 4)
case .read: #expect(index == 5)
}
}
}
}
+138 -15
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,22 @@ struct ChatViewModelPrivateChatExtensionTests {
// MockTransport.sendPrivateMessage is what MessageRouter calls for connected peers
// Check MockTransport implementation... it might need update or verification
}
@Test @MainActor
func sendPrivateMessage_unreachable_setsFailedStatus() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let validHex = "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10"
let peerID = PeerID(str: validHex)
viewModel.sendPrivateMessage("Hello", to: peerID)
#expect(viewModel.privateChats[peerID]?.count == 1)
let status = viewModel.privateChats[peerID]?.last?.deliveryStatus
#expect({
if case .failed = status { return true }
return false
}())
}
@Test @MainActor
func handlePrivateMessage_storesMessage() async {
@@ -250,10 +266,17 @@ struct ChatViewModelNostrExtensionTests {
@Test @MainActor
func subscribeNostrEvent_addsToTimeline_ifMatchesGeohash() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
let channel = ChannelID.location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash))
LocationChannelManager.shared.select(channel)
defer { LocationChannelManager.shared.select(.mesh) }
_ = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ LocationChannelManager.shared.selectedChannel == channel })
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
_ = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ viewModel.activeChannel == channel })
var event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: "pub1",
@@ -267,19 +290,119 @@ struct ChatViewModelNostrExtensionTests {
viewModel.handleNostrEvent(event)
// Allow async processing
let didAppend = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({
viewModel.publicMessagePipeline.flushIfNeeded()
return viewModel.messages.contains { $0.content == "Hello Geo" }
})
#expect(didAppend)
}
@Test @MainActor
func handleNostrEvent_ignoresRecentSelfEcho() async throws {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
let identity = try viewModel.idBridge.deriveIdentity(forGeohash: geohash)
var event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: identity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .ephemeralEvent,
tags: [["g", geohash]],
content: "Self echo"
)
event.id = "evt-self"
viewModel.handleNostrEvent(event)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
// Check timeline
// This depends on `handlePublicMessage` being called and updating `messages`
// Since `handlePublicMessage` delegates to `timelineStore` and updates `messages`...
// And we are in the correct channel...
// However, `handleNostrEvent` in the extension now calls `handlePublicMessage`.
// Let's verify if the message appears.
// Note: `handleNostrEvent` logic was refactored.
// The new logic in `ChatViewModel+Nostr.swift` calls `handlePublicMessage`.
// We need to ensure `deduplicationService` doesn't block it (new instance, so empty).
viewModel.publicMessagePipeline.flushIfNeeded()
#expect(!viewModel.messages.contains { $0.content == "Self echo" })
}
@Test @MainActor
func handleNostrEvent_skipsBlockedSender() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
let blockedPubkey = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
viewModel.identityManager.setNostrBlocked(blockedPubkey, isBlocked: true)
var event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: blockedPubkey,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .ephemeralEvent,
tags: [["g", geohash]],
content: "Blocked"
)
event.id = "evt-blocked"
viewModel.handleNostrEvent(event)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
viewModel.publicMessagePipeline.flushIfNeeded()
#expect(!viewModel.messages.contains { $0.content == "Blocked" })
}
@Test @MainActor
func switchLocationChannel_clearsNostrDedupCache() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
viewModel.deduplicationService.recordNostrEvent("evt-cache")
#expect(viewModel.deduplicationService.hasProcessedNostrEvent("evt-cache"))
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
#expect(!viewModel.deduplicationService.hasProcessedNostrEvent("evt-cache"))
}
}
// MARK: - Geohash Queue Tests
struct ChatViewModelGeohashQueueTests {
@Test @MainActor
func addGeohashOnlySystemMessage_queuesUntilLocationChannel() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
viewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage("Queued system")
#expect(!viewModel.messages.contains { $0.content == "Queued system" })
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
#expect(viewModel.messages.contains { $0.content == "Queued system" })
}
}
// MARK: - GeoDM Tests
struct ChatViewModelGeoDMTests {
@Test @MainActor
func handlePrivateMessage_geohash_dedupsAndTracksAck() async throws {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
let senderPubkey = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
let messageID = "pm-1"
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
let identity = try viewModel.idBridge.deriveIdentity(forGeohash: geohash)
let convKey = PeerID(nostr_: senderPubkey)
let packet = PrivateMessagePacket(messageID: messageID, content: "Hello")
let payloadData = try #require(packet.encode(), "Failed to encode private message")
let payload = NoisePayload(type: .privateMessage, data: payloadData)
viewModel.handlePrivateMessage(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey, id: identity, messageTimestamp: Date())
viewModel.handlePrivateMessage(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey, id: identity, messageTimestamp: Date())
#expect(viewModel.privateChats[convKey]?.count == 1)
#expect(viewModel.sentGeoDeliveryAcks.contains(messageID))
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
//
// ChatViewModelRefactoringTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Pinning tests to characterize ChatViewModel behavior before refactoring.
// These tests act as a safety net to ensure we don't break existing functionality.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
struct ChatViewModelRefactoringTests {
// Helper to setup the environment
@MainActor
private func makePinnedViewModel() -> (viewModel: ChatViewModel, transport: MockTransport, identity: MockIdentityManager) {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let keychainHelper = MockKeychainHelper()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychainHelper)
let identityManager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let transport = MockTransport()
let viewModel = ChatViewModel(
keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: identityManager,
transport: transport
)
return (viewModel, transport, identityManager)
}
// MARK: - Command Processor Integration "Pinning"
@Test @MainActor
func command_msg_routesToTransport() async throws {
let (viewModel, transport, _) = makePinnedViewModel()
// Setup: Use simulateConnect so ChatViewModel and UnifiedPeerService are notified
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0000000000000001")
transport.simulateConnect(peerID, nickname: "alice")
let didResolve = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ viewModel.getPeerIDForNickname("alice") != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout)
#expect(didResolve)
// Action: User types /msg command
viewModel.sendMessage("/msg @alice Hello Private World")
let didSend = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ transport.sentPrivateMessages.count == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout)
#expect(didSend)
// Assert:
// 1. Should NOT go to public transport
#expect(transport.sentMessages.isEmpty, "Command should not be sent as public message")
// 2. Should go to private transport logic
#expect(transport.sentPrivateMessages.count == 1)
#expect(transport.sentPrivateMessages.first?.content == "Hello Private World")
#expect(transport.sentPrivateMessages.first?.peerID == peerID)
}
@Test @MainActor
func command_block_updatesIdentity() async throws {
let (viewModel, transport, identity) = makePinnedViewModel()
// Setup: Use simulateConnect
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0000000000000002")
// Mock the fingerprint so the block command finds it
transport.peerFingerprints[peerID] = "fingerprint_123"
transport.simulateConnect(peerID, nickname: "troll")
let didResolve = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ viewModel.getPeerIDForNickname("troll") != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout)
#expect(didResolve)
// Action
viewModel.sendMessage("/block @troll")
// Assert
// Verify identity manager was called to block "fingerprint_123"
let didBlock = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ identity.isBlocked(fingerprint: "fingerprint_123") },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout)
#expect(didBlock)
}
// MARK: - Message Routing Logic
@Test @MainActor
func routing_incomingPrivateMessage_addsToPrivateChats() async {
let (viewModel, _, _) = makePinnedViewModel()
let senderID = PeerID(str: "sender_1")
// Setup
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: "msg_1",
sender: "bob",
content: "Secret",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "me",
senderPeerID: senderID,
mentions: nil
)
// Action: Simulate incoming private message
viewModel.didReceiveMessage(message)
// Wait for async processing with proper timeout
let found = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ viewModel.privateChats[senderID]?.first?.content == "Secret" },
timeout: TestConstants.defaultTimeout
)
// Assert
#expect(found)
}
@Test @MainActor
func routing_incomingPublicMessage_addsToPublicTimeline() async {
let (viewModel, _, _) = makePinnedViewModel()
let senderID = PeerID(str: "sender_2")
// Setup
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: "msg_2",
sender: "charlie",
content: "Public Hi",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: false,
recipientNickname: nil,
senderPeerID: senderID,
mentions: nil
)
// Action
viewModel.didReceiveMessage(message)
// Wait for async processing with proper timeout
let found = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ viewModel.messages.contains(where: { $0.content == "Public Hi" }) },
timeout: TestConstants.defaultTimeout
)
// Assert
#expect(found)
}
}
+186
View File
@@ -114,6 +114,44 @@ struct ChatViewModelSendingTests {
}
}
// MARK: - Command Handling Tests
struct ChatViewModelCommandTests {
@Test @MainActor
func sendMessage_commandsNotSentToTransport() async {
let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()
let commands = ["/nick bob", "/who", "/help", "/clear"]
for command in commands {
transport.resetRecordings()
viewModel.sendMessage(command)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
#expect(transport.sentMessages.isEmpty)
#expect(transport.sentPrivateMessages.isEmpty)
}
}
}
// MARK: - Timeline Cap Tests
struct ChatViewModelTimelineCapTests {
@Test @MainActor
func sendMessage_trimsTimelineToCap() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let total = TransportConfig.meshTimelineCap + 5
for i in 0..<total {
viewModel.sendMessage("cap-msg-\(i)")
}
#expect(viewModel.messages.count == TransportConfig.meshTimelineCap)
#expect(viewModel.messages.last?.content == "cap-msg-\(total - 1)")
}
}
// MARK: - Message Receiving Tests
struct ChatViewModelReceivingTests {
@@ -164,6 +202,40 @@ struct ChatViewModelReceivingTests {
}
}
// MARK: - Rate Limiting Tests
struct ChatViewModelRateLimitingTests {
@Test @MainActor
func handlePublicMessage_rateLimitsBurstBySender() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let senderID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let now = Date()
for i in 0..<6 {
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: "rate-\(i)",
sender: "Spammer",
content: "rate-msg-\(i)",
timestamp: now,
isRelay: false,
originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: false,
recipientNickname: nil,
senderPeerID: senderID,
mentions: nil
)
viewModel.handlePublicMessage(message)
}
viewModel.publicMessagePipeline.flushIfNeeded()
let burstMessages = viewModel.messages.filter { $0.content.hasPrefix("rate-msg-") }
#expect(burstMessages.count == 5)
#expect(!burstMessages.contains { $0.content == "rate-msg-5" })
}
}
// MARK: - Peer Connection Tests
struct ChatViewModelPeerTests {
@@ -258,6 +330,94 @@ struct ChatViewModelPrivateChatTests {
}
}
// MARK: - Private Chat Selection Tests
struct ChatViewModelPrivateChatSelectionTests {
@Test @MainActor
func openMostRelevantPrivateChat_prefersUnreadMostRecent() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let peerA = PeerID(str: "PEER_A")
let peerB = PeerID(str: "PEER_B")
let older = Date().addingTimeInterval(-120)
let newer = Date().addingTimeInterval(-30)
viewModel.privateChats = [
peerA: [
BitchatMessage(
id: "a-1",
sender: "A",
content: "Old",
timestamp: older,
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Me",
senderPeerID: peerA
)
],
peerB: [
BitchatMessage(
id: "b-1",
sender: "B",
content: "New",
timestamp: newer,
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Me",
senderPeerID: peerB
)
]
]
viewModel.unreadPrivateMessages = [peerA, peerB]
viewModel.openMostRelevantPrivateChat()
#expect(viewModel.selectedPrivateChatPeer == peerB)
}
@Test @MainActor
func openMostRelevantPrivateChat_fallsBackToMostRecentChat() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let peerA = PeerID(str: "PEER_A")
let peerB = PeerID(str: "PEER_B")
let older = Date().addingTimeInterval(-200)
let newer = Date().addingTimeInterval(-20)
viewModel.privateChats = [
peerA: [
BitchatMessage(
id: "a-1",
sender: "A",
content: "Old",
timestamp: older,
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Me",
senderPeerID: peerA
)
],
peerB: [
BitchatMessage(
id: "b-1",
sender: "B",
content: "New",
timestamp: newer,
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Me",
senderPeerID: peerB
)
]
]
viewModel.openMostRelevantPrivateChat()
#expect(viewModel.selectedPrivateChatPeer == peerB)
}
}
// MARK: - Bluetooth State Tests
struct ChatViewModelBluetoothTests {
@@ -309,11 +469,37 @@ struct ChatViewModelPanicTests {
// Set up some state
transport.connectedPeers.insert(PeerID(str: "PEER1"))
viewModel.messages = [
BitchatMessage(
id: "panic-1",
sender: "Tester",
content: "Before",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false
)
]
viewModel.privateChats[PeerID(str: "PEER1")] = [
BitchatMessage(
id: "pm-1",
sender: "Peer",
content: "Secret",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Me",
senderPeerID: PeerID(str: "PEER1")
)
]
viewModel.unreadPrivateMessages.insert(PeerID(str: "PEER1"))
viewModel.panicClearAllData()
// After panic, emergency disconnect should be called
#expect(transport.emergencyDisconnectCallCount == 1)
#expect(viewModel.messages.isEmpty)
#expect(viewModel.privateChats.isEmpty)
#expect(viewModel.unreadPrivateMessages.isEmpty)
#expect(viewModel.selectedPrivateChatPeer == nil)
}
}
+178
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
//
// ChatViewModelTorTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Tests for ChatViewModel+Tor.swift Tor lifecycle notification handlers.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
// MARK: - Test Helpers
@MainActor
private func makeTestableViewModel() -> (viewModel: ChatViewModel, transport: MockTransport) {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let keychainHelper = MockKeychainHelper()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychainHelper)
let identityManager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let transport = MockTransport()
let viewModel = ChatViewModel(
keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: identityManager,
transport: transport
)
return (viewModel, transport)
}
// MARK: - Tor Notification Handler Tests
struct ChatViewModelTorTests {
// MARK: - handleTorWillStart Tests
@Test @MainActor
func handleTorWillStart_whenEnforced_setsAnnouncedFlag() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
// Precondition: flag should start false
#expect(!viewModel.torStatusAnnounced)
// Action: simulate Tor starting notification
viewModel.handleTorWillStart()
// Wait for Task to complete
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
// Assert: flag should be set (torEnforced is true in tests)
#expect(viewModel.torStatusAnnounced)
}
@Test @MainActor
func handleTorWillStart_whenAlreadyAnnounced_doesNotDuplicate() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
// Setup: pre-set the flag
viewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
// Switch to a geohash channel so messages would be visible
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: "u4pruydq")))
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
let initialMessageCount = viewModel.messages.count
// Action: call handler again
viewModel.handleTorWillStart()
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
// Assert: no new message added (flag was already true)
#expect(viewModel.messages.count == initialMessageCount)
}
// MARK: - handleTorWillRestart Tests
@Test @MainActor
func handleTorWillRestart_setsPendingFlag() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
// Precondition
#expect(!viewModel.torRestartPending)
// Action
viewModel.handleTorWillRestart()
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
// Assert
#expect(viewModel.torRestartPending)
}
@Test @MainActor
func handleTorWillRestart_setsFlag_regardlessOfChannel() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
// Action: call handler (works regardless of channel)
viewModel.handleTorWillRestart()
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
// Assert: flag should be set
#expect(viewModel.torRestartPending)
}
// MARK: - handleTorDidBecomeReady Tests
@Test @MainActor
func handleTorDidBecomeReady_afterRestart_clearsPendingFlag() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
// Setup: simulate restart pending state
viewModel.torRestartPending = true
// Action
viewModel.handleTorDidBecomeReady()
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
// Assert: should clear pending flag
#expect(!viewModel.torRestartPending)
}
@Test @MainActor
func handleTorDidBecomeReady_initialStart_setsAnnouncedFlag() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
// Setup: not restarting, but initial ready not announced yet
viewModel.torRestartPending = false
viewModel.torInitialReadyAnnounced = false
// Action
viewModel.handleTorDidBecomeReady()
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
// Assert: should set flag (torEnforced is true in tests)
#expect(viewModel.torInitialReadyAnnounced)
}
@Test @MainActor
func handleTorDidBecomeReady_alreadyAnnounced_noDuplicate() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
// Setup: already announced initial ready
viewModel.torRestartPending = false
viewModel.torInitialReadyAnnounced = true
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: "u4pruydq")))
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
let initialMessageCount = viewModel.messages.count
// Action
viewModel.handleTorDidBecomeReady()
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
// Assert: no new message
#expect(viewModel.messages.count == initialMessageCount)
}
// MARK: - handleTorPreferenceChanged Tests
@Test @MainActor
func handleTorPreferenceChanged_resetsAllFlags() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
// Setup: set all flags
viewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
viewModel.torInitialReadyAnnounced = true
viewModel.torRestartPending = true
// Action
viewModel.handleTorPreferenceChanged(Notification(name: .init("test")))
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
// Assert: all flags reset
#expect(!viewModel.torStatusAnnounced)
#expect(!viewModel.torInitialReadyAnnounced)
#expect(!viewModel.torRestartPending)
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ struct CommandProcessorTests {
@MainActor
@Test func slapNotFoundGrammar() {
let processor = CommandProcessor(chatViewModel: nil, meshService: nil, identityManager: identityManager)
let processor = CommandProcessor(contextProvider: nil, meshService: nil, identityManager: identityManager)
let result = processor.process("/slap @system")
switch result {
case .error(let message):
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ struct CommandProcessorTests {
@MainActor
@Test func hugNotFoundGrammar() {
let processor = CommandProcessor(chatViewModel: nil, meshService: nil, identityManager: identityManager)
let processor = CommandProcessor(contextProvider: nil, meshService: nil, identityManager: identityManager)
let result = processor.process("/hug @system")
switch result {
case .error(let message):
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct CommandProcessorTests {
@MainActor
@Test func slapUsageMessage() {
let processor = CommandProcessor(chatViewModel: nil, meshService: nil, identityManager: identityManager)
let processor = CommandProcessor(contextProvider: nil, meshService: nil, identityManager: identityManager)
let result = processor.process("/slap")
switch result {
case .error(let message):
@@ -32,29 +32,28 @@ struct FragmentationTests {
)
let capture = CaptureDelegate()
ble.delegate = capture
// Construct a big packet (3KB) from a remote sender (not our own ID)
let remoteShortID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let original = makeLargePublicPacket(senderShortHex: remoteShortID, size: 3_000)
// Use a small fragment size to ensure multiple pieces
let fragments = fragmentPacket(original, fragmentSize: 400)
// Shuffle fragments to simulate out-of-order arrival
let shuffled = fragments.shuffled()
// Inject fragments spaced out to avoid concurrent mutation inside BLEService
// Send fragments sequentially with small delays (no fire-and-forget Tasks)
for (i, fragment) in shuffled.enumerated() {
let delay = 5 * Double(i) * 0.001
Task {
try await sleep(delay)
ble._test_handlePacket(fragment, fromPeerID: remoteShortID)
if i > 0 {
try await Task.sleep(for: .milliseconds(5))
}
ble._test_handlePacket(fragment, fromPeerID: remoteShortID)
}
// Allow async processing
try await sleep(0.5)
// Wait for delegate callback with proper timeout
try await capture.waitForPublicMessages(count: 1, timeout: .seconds(2))
#expect(capture.publicMessages.count == 1)
#expect(capture.publicMessages.first?.content.count == 3_000)
}
@@ -68,26 +67,26 @@ struct FragmentationTests {
)
let capture = CaptureDelegate()
ble.delegate = capture
let remoteShortID = PeerID(str: "A1B2C3D4E5F60708")
let original = makeLargePublicPacket(senderShortHex: remoteShortID, size: 2048)
var frags = fragmentPacket(original, fragmentSize: 300)
// Duplicate one fragment
if let dup = frags.first {
frags.insert(dup, at: 1)
}
// Send fragments sequentially with small delays (no fire-and-forget Tasks)
for (i, fragment) in frags.enumerated() {
let delay = 5 * Double(i) * 0.001
Task {
try await sleep(delay)
ble._test_handlePacket(fragment, fromPeerID: remoteShortID)
if i > 0 {
try await Task.sleep(for: .milliseconds(5))
}
ble._test_handlePacket(fragment, fromPeerID: remoteShortID)
}
// Allow async processing
try await sleep(0.5)
// Wait for delegate callback with proper timeout
try await capture.waitForPublicMessages(count: 1, timeout: .seconds(2))
#expect(capture.publicMessages.count == 1)
#expect(capture.publicMessages.first?.content.count == 2048)
@@ -135,7 +134,7 @@ struct FragmentationTests {
}
}
try await sleep(1.0)
try await capture.waitForReceivedMessages(count: 1, timeout: .seconds(2))
let message = try #require(capture.receivedMessages.first, "Expected file transfer message")
#expect(message.content.hasPrefix("[file]"))
@@ -196,12 +195,128 @@ struct FragmentationTests {
}
extension FragmentationTests {
private final class CaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
var publicMessages: [(peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String)] = []
var receivedMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
receivedMessages.append(message)
/// Thread-safe delegate that supports awaiting message delivery
private final class CaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate, @unchecked Sendable {
private let lock = NSLock()
private var _publicMessages: [(peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String)] = []
private var _receivedMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
private var publicMessageContinuation: CheckedContinuation<Void, Never>?
private var receivedMessageContinuation: CheckedContinuation<Void, Never>?
private var expectedPublicMessageCount: Int = 0
private var expectedReceivedMessageCount: Int = 0
var publicMessages: [(peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String)] {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
return _publicMessages
}
var receivedMessages: [BitchatMessage] {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
return _receivedMessages
}
func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
lock.lock()
_receivedMessages.append(message)
let count = _receivedMessages.count
let expected = expectedReceivedMessageCount
let continuation = receivedMessageContinuation
lock.unlock()
if count >= expected, let cont = continuation {
lock.lock()
receivedMessageContinuation = nil
lock.unlock()
cont.resume()
}
}
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
lock.lock()
_publicMessages.append((peerID, nickname, content))
let count = _publicMessages.count
let expected = expectedPublicMessageCount
let continuation = publicMessageContinuation
lock.unlock()
if count >= expected, let cont = continuation {
lock.lock()
publicMessageContinuation = nil
lock.unlock()
cont.resume()
}
}
/// Waits for the specified number of public messages to be received
func waitForPublicMessages(count: Int, timeout: Duration = .seconds(2)) async throws {
lock.lock()
if _publicMessages.count >= count {
lock.unlock()
return
}
expectedPublicMessageCount = count
lock.unlock()
try await withThrowingTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
group.addTask {
await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
self.lock.lock()
// Recheck count after acquiring lock to avoid race condition
// where message arrives between initial check and continuation install
if self._publicMessages.count >= count {
self.lock.unlock()
continuation.resume()
return
}
self.publicMessageContinuation = continuation
self.lock.unlock()
}
}
group.addTask {
try await Task.sleep(for: timeout)
throw CancellationError()
}
try await group.next()
group.cancelAll()
}
}
/// Waits for the specified number of received messages
func waitForReceivedMessages(count: Int, timeout: Duration = .seconds(2)) async throws {
lock.lock()
if _receivedMessages.count >= count {
lock.unlock()
return
}
expectedReceivedMessageCount = count
lock.unlock()
try await withThrowingTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
group.addTask {
await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
self.lock.lock()
// Recheck count after acquiring lock to avoid race condition
// where message arrives between initial check and continuation install
if self._receivedMessages.count >= count {
self.lock.unlock()
continuation.resume()
return
}
self.receivedMessageContinuation = continuation
self.lock.unlock()
}
}
group.addTask {
try await Task.sleep(for: timeout)
throw CancellationError()
}
try await group.next()
group.cancelAll()
}
}
func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {}
@@ -209,9 +324,6 @@ extension FragmentationTests {
func didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus(_ messageID: String, status: DeliveryStatus) {}
func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {}
func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState) {}
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
publicMessages.append((peerID, nickname, content))
}
func didReceiveRegionalPublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date) {}
}
+567
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,567 @@
//
// GeohashPresenceTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Tests for the Geohash Presence (Kind 20001) feature.
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
import Combine
@testable import bitchat
// MARK: - NostrProtocol Presence Event Tests
struct NostrProtocolPresenceTests {
@Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_hasCorrectKind() throws {
let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
geohash: "u4pruydq",
senderIdentity: identity
)
#expect(event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue)
#expect(event.kind == 20001)
}
@Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_hasEmptyContent() throws {
let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
geohash: "u4pruydq",
senderIdentity: identity
)
#expect(event.content == "")
}
@Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_hasOnlyGeohashTag() throws {
let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
geohash: "u4pruydq",
senderIdentity: identity
)
// Should have exactly one tag: ["g", geohash]
#expect(event.tags.count == 1)
#expect(event.tags[0] == ["g", "u4pruydq"])
}
@Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_noNicknameTag() throws {
let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
geohash: "u4pruydq",
senderIdentity: identity
)
// Should NOT contain nickname tag
let hasNicknameTag = event.tags.contains { $0.first == "n" }
#expect(!hasNicknameTag)
}
@Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_usesSenderPubkey() throws {
let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
geohash: "u4pruydq",
senderIdentity: identity
)
#expect(event.pubkey == identity.publicKeyHex)
}
@Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_isSigned() throws {
let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
geohash: "u4pruydq",
senderIdentity: identity
)
#expect(event.sig != nil && !event.sig!.isEmpty)
#expect(!event.id.isEmpty)
}
@Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_differentGeohashes() throws {
let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
let event1 = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(geohash: "87", senderIdentity: identity)
let event2 = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(geohash: "87yw", senderIdentity: identity)
let event3 = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(geohash: "87yw7", senderIdentity: identity)
#expect(event1.tags[0][1] == "87")
#expect(event2.tags[0][1] == "87yw")
#expect(event3.tags[0][1] == "87yw7")
}
// MARK: - Helper
private func makeTestIdentity() throws -> NostrIdentity {
// Generate a fresh test identity
return try NostrIdentity.generate()
}
}
// MARK: - NostrFilter Presence Tests
struct NostrFilterPresenceTests {
@Test func geohashEphemeral_includesBothKinds() {
let filter = NostrFilter.geohashEphemeral("u4pruydq")
#expect(filter.kinds?.contains(20000) == true)
#expect(filter.kinds?.contains(20001) == true)
}
@Test func geohashEphemeral_hasLimit1000() {
let filter = NostrFilter.geohashEphemeral("u4pruydq")
#expect(filter.limit == 1000)
}
@Test func geohashEphemeral_respectsSinceParameter() {
let since = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1700000000)
let filter = NostrFilter.geohashEphemeral("u4pruydq", since: since)
#expect(filter.since == 1700000000)
}
}
// MARK: - ChatViewModel Presence Handling Tests
@MainActor
struct ChatViewModelPresenceHandlingTests {
@Test func handleNostrEvent_presenceUpdatesParticipantTracker() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
// Set up the channel
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
// Create a presence event (kind 20001)
var event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .geohashPresence,
tags: [["g", geohash]],
content: ""
)
event.id = "presence_evt_1"
event.sig = "sig"
// Handle the event
viewModel.handleNostrEvent(event)
// Allow async processing
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
// Participant should be recorded
let count = viewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: geohash)
#expect(count >= 1)
}
@Test func handleNostrEvent_presenceDoesNotAddToTimeline() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
let initialMessageCount = viewModel.messages.count
// Create a presence event (kind 20001)
var event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .geohashPresence,
tags: [["g", geohash]],
content: ""
)
event.id = "presence_evt_2"
event.sig = "sig"
viewModel.handleNostrEvent(event)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
// Message count should NOT increase
#expect(viewModel.messages.count == initialMessageCount)
}
@Test func handleNostrEvent_chatMessageUpdatesParticipant() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
// Create a chat event (kind 20000) - NOT presence
var event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .ephemeralEvent,
tags: [["g", geohash]],
content: "Hello world"
)
event.id = "chat_evt_1"
event.sig = "sig"
viewModel.handleNostrEvent(event)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
// Chat messages should also update participant count (not just presence)
let count = viewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: geohash)
#expect(count >= 1)
}
@Test func presenceEvent_hasDifferentKindThanChat() {
// Verify the two event kinds are distinct
let presenceKind = NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue
let chatKind = NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue
#expect(presenceKind != chatKind)
#expect(presenceKind == 20001)
#expect(chatKind == 20000)
}
@Test func subscribeNostrEvent_acceptsPresenceKind() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let geohash = "u4pruydq"
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
// Create presence event
var event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: "test1234test1234test1234test1234test1234test1234test1234test1234",
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .geohashPresence,
tags: [["g", geohash]],
content: ""
)
event.id = "subscribe_presence_evt"
event.sig = "sig"
// subscribeNostrEvent should accept kind 20001
viewModel.subscribeNostrEvent(event)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
// Should record participant
let count = viewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: geohash)
#expect(count >= 1)
}
@Test func subscribeNostrEvent_presenceForNonActiveGeohash() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let activeGeohash = "u4pruydq"
let otherGeohash = "87yw7"
viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: activeGeohash)))
// Create presence event for a DIFFERENT geohash
var event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: "other1234other1234other1234other1234other1234other1234other1234",
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .geohashPresence,
tags: [["g", otherGeohash]],
content: ""
)
event.id = "other_geohash_presence"
event.sig = "sig"
// Use subscribeNostrEvent with geohash parameter
viewModel.subscribeNostrEvent(event, gh: otherGeohash)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
// Should record for the other geohash
let count = viewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: otherGeohash)
#expect(count >= 1)
}
// MARK: - Test Helper
private func makeTestableViewModel() -> (viewModel: ChatViewModel, transport: MockTransport) {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let keychainHelper = MockKeychainHelper()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychainHelper)
let identityManager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let transport = MockTransport()
let viewModel = ChatViewModel(
keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: identityManager,
transport: transport
)
return (viewModel, transport)
}
}
// MARK: - Presence Privacy Tests
struct GeohashPresencePrivacyTests {
@Test func allowedPrecisions_onlyLowPrecision() {
// The allowed precisions for presence broadcasting should be:
// Region (2), Province (4), City (5)
// NOT Neighborhood (6), Block (7), Building (8+)
let regionPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.region.precision
let provincePrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.province.precision
let cityPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.city.precision
let neighborhoodPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.neighborhood.precision
let blockPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.block.precision
let buildingPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.building.precision
#expect(regionPrecision == 2)
#expect(provincePrecision == 4)
#expect(cityPrecision == 5)
#expect(neighborhoodPrecision == 6)
#expect(blockPrecision == 7)
#expect(buildingPrecision == 8)
// High precision channels should NOT receive presence broadcasts
#expect(neighborhoodPrecision > 5)
#expect(blockPrecision > 5)
#expect(buildingPrecision > 5)
}
@Test func geohashLengthDeterminesPrecision() {
// Verify geohash length maps to expected precision
#expect("87".count == GeohashChannelLevel.region.precision)
#expect("87yw".count == GeohashChannelLevel.province.precision)
#expect("87yw7".count == GeohashChannelLevel.city.precision)
#expect("87yw7t".count == GeohashChannelLevel.neighborhood.precision)
#expect("87yw7tc".count == GeohashChannelLevel.block.precision)
#expect("87yw7tcx".count == GeohashChannelLevel.building.precision)
}
@Test func highPrecisionGeohash_isPrivacySensitive() {
// Helper to check if a geohash is "high precision" (privacy sensitive)
func isHighPrecision(_ geohash: String) -> Bool {
geohash.count >= 6
}
// Low precision - OK to broadcast presence
#expect(!isHighPrecision("87")) // region
#expect(!isHighPrecision("87yw")) // province
#expect(!isHighPrecision("87yw7")) // city
// High precision - should NOT broadcast presence
#expect(isHighPrecision("87yw7t")) // neighborhood
#expect(isHighPrecision("87yw7tc")) // block
#expect(isHighPrecision("87yw7tcx")) // building
}
}
// MARK: - Display Logic Tests
struct LocationChannelsDisplayLogicTests {
@Test func displayLogic_highPrecisionZeroCount_showsUnknown() {
// Test the logic that determines "?" vs actual count
// High precision + count 0 = "?"
let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(
level: .neighborhood,
count: 0
)
#expect(shouldShowUnknown)
}
@Test func displayLogic_highPrecisionNonZeroCount_showsActual() {
// High precision + count > 0 = show actual
let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(
level: .neighborhood,
count: 5
)
#expect(!shouldShowUnknown)
}
@Test func displayLogic_lowPrecisionZeroCount_showsActual() {
// Low precision + count 0 = show "0" (not "?")
let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(
level: .city,
count: 0
)
#expect(!shouldShowUnknown)
}
@Test func displayLogic_lowPrecisionNonZeroCount_showsActual() {
// Low precision + count > 0 = show actual
let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(
level: .region,
count: 10
)
#expect(!shouldShowUnknown)
}
@Test func displayLogic_allHighPrecisionLevels() {
// All high precision levels with 0 should show "?"
let highPrecisionLevels: [GeohashChannelLevel] = [.neighborhood, .block, .building]
for level in highPrecisionLevels {
let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(level: level, count: 0)
#expect(shouldShowUnknown, "Level \(level) with count 0 should show unknown")
}
}
@Test func displayLogic_allLowPrecisionLevels() {
// All low precision levels with 0 should show actual count
let lowPrecisionLevels: [GeohashChannelLevel] = [.region, .province, .city]
for level in lowPrecisionLevels {
let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(level: level, count: 0)
#expect(!shouldShowUnknown, "Level \(level) with count 0 should show actual count")
}
}
@Test func displayLogic_bookmarkHighPrecision() {
// Bookmarks use geohash length to determine precision
#expect(shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw7t", count: 0)) // len 6
#expect(shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw7tc", count: 0)) // len 7
#expect(shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw7tcx", count: 0)) // len 8
}
@Test func displayLogic_bookmarkLowPrecision() {
#expect(!shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87", count: 0)) // len 2
#expect(!shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw", count: 0)) // len 4
#expect(!shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw7", count: 0)) // len 5
}
// MARK: - Helpers (mirror the logic from LocationChannelsSheet)
private func shouldShowUnknownCount(level: GeohashChannelLevel, count: Int) -> Bool {
let isHighPrecision = (level == .neighborhood || level == .block || level == .building)
return isHighPrecision && count == 0
}
private func shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: String, count: Int) -> Bool {
let isHighPrecision = (geohash.count >= 6)
return isHighPrecision && count == 0
}
}
// MARK: - Event Kind Tests
struct NostrEventKindTests {
@Test func eventKind_geohashPresence_is20001() {
#expect(NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue == 20001)
}
@Test func eventKind_ephemeralEvent_is20000() {
#expect(NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue == 20000)
}
@Test func eventKind_presenceIsEphemeral() {
// Both 20000 and 20001 are in the ephemeral range (20000-29999)
let presenceKind = NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue
let chatKind = NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue
#expect(presenceKind >= 20000 && presenceKind < 30000)
#expect(chatKind >= 20000 && chatKind < 30000)
}
}
// MARK: - Participant Tracker Presence Integration Tests
@MainActor
struct ParticipantTrackerPresenceTests {
@Test func recordParticipant_fromPresenceEvent_countsParticipant() async {
let tracker = GeohashParticipantTracker()
let context = PresenceTestParticipantContext()
tracker.configure(context: context)
let geohash = "87yw7"
tracker.setActiveGeohash(geohash)
// Simulate recording from a presence event
tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "presence_user_1")
#expect(tracker.participantCount(for: geohash) == 1)
}
@Test func recordParticipant_multiplePresenceEvents_countsUnique() async {
let tracker = GeohashParticipantTracker()
let context = PresenceTestParticipantContext()
tracker.configure(context: context)
let geohash = "87yw7"
tracker.setActiveGeohash(geohash)
// Multiple presence events from same user = 1 participant
tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user_a")
tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user_a")
tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user_a")
#expect(tracker.participantCount(for: geohash) == 1)
// Different user = 2 participants
tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user_b")
#expect(tracker.participantCount(for: geohash) == 2)
}
@Test func recordParticipant_nonActiveGeohash_stillCounts() async {
let tracker = GeohashParticipantTracker()
let context = PresenceTestParticipantContext()
tracker.configure(context: context)
// Active geohash is different from where we're recording
tracker.setActiveGeohash("active_gh")
// Record to a non-active geohash (like when sampling nearby channels)
tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "nearby_user", geohash: "other_gh")
#expect(tracker.participantCount(for: "other_gh") == 1)
#expect(tracker.participantCount(for: "active_gh") == 0)
}
@Test func objectWillChange_firesOnNonActiveGeohashUpdate() async {
let tracker = GeohashParticipantTracker()
let context = PresenceTestParticipantContext()
tracker.configure(context: context)
tracker.setActiveGeohash("active_gh")
var changeCount = 0
let cancellable = tracker.objectWillChange.sink { _ in
changeCount += 1
}
// Record to non-active geohash
tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user1", geohash: "other_gh")
// Should fire objectWillChange even for non-active geohash
#expect(changeCount >= 1)
_ = cancellable // Keep alive
}
}
// MARK: - Mock for Participant Context (Presence Tests)
@MainActor
private final class PresenceTestParticipantContext: GeohashParticipantContext {
var blockedPubkeys: Set<String> = []
var nicknameMap: [String: String] = [:]
var selfPubkey: String?
func displayNameForPubkey(_ pubkeyHex: String) -> String {
let suffix = String(pubkeyHex.suffix(4))
if let s = selfPubkey, pubkeyHex.lowercased() == s.lowercased() {
return "me#\(suffix)"
}
if let nick = nicknameMap[pubkeyHex.lowercased()] {
return "\(nick)#\(suffix)"
}
return "anon#\(suffix)"
}
func isBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool {
blockedPubkeys.contains(pubkeyHexLowercased.lowercased())
}
}
+17 -7
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,14 @@ struct GossipSyncManagerTests {
private let myPeerID = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
@Test func concurrentPacketIntakeAndSyncRequest() async throws {
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID)
let requestSyncManager = RequestSyncManager()
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID, requestSyncManager: requestSyncManager)
let delegate = RecordingDelegate()
manager.delegate = delegate
try await confirmation("sync request sent") { sent in
delegate.onSend = {
delegate.onSend = nil
sent()
}
@@ -34,7 +36,7 @@ struct GossipSyncManagerTests {
}
manager.scheduleInitialSyncToPeer(PeerID(str: "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"), delaySeconds: 0.0)
try await sleep(0.002)
try await TestHelpers.waitFor({ delegate.lastPacket != nil }, timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout)
}
let lastPacket = try #require(delegate.lastPacket, "Expected sync packet to be sent")
@@ -47,7 +49,8 @@ struct GossipSyncManagerTests {
config.stalePeerCleanupIntervalSeconds = 0
config.stalePeerTimeoutSeconds = 5
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID, config: config)
let requestSyncManager = RequestSyncManager()
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID, config: config, requestSyncManager: requestSyncManager)
let peerHex = "0011223344556677"
let senderData = try #require(Data(hexString: peerHex))
let initialTimestampMs = UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
@@ -92,7 +95,8 @@ struct GossipSyncManagerTests {
config.stalePeerTimeoutSeconds = 5
config.maxMessageAgeSeconds = 100
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID, config: config)
let requestSyncManager = RequestSyncManager()
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID, config: config, requestSyncManager: requestSyncManager)
let peerHex = "8899aabbccddeeff"
let senderData = try #require(Data(hexString: peerHex))
let staleTimestampMs = UInt64(Date().addingTimeInterval(-(config.stalePeerTimeoutSeconds + 1)).timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
@@ -136,7 +140,8 @@ struct GossipSyncManagerTests {
config.fileTransferSyncIntervalSeconds = 1
config.maintenanceIntervalSeconds = 0
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID, config: config)
let requestSyncManager = RequestSyncManager()
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID, config: config, requestSyncManager: requestSyncManager)
let delegate = RecordingDelegate()
manager.delegate = delegate
@@ -206,7 +211,8 @@ struct GossipSyncManagerTests {
config.fragmentSyncIntervalSeconds = 0
config.fileTransferSyncIntervalSeconds = 0
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID, config: config)
let requestSyncManager = RequestSyncManager()
let manager = GossipSyncManager(myPeerID: myPeerID, config: config, requestSyncManager: requestSyncManager)
let delegate = RecordingDelegate()
manager.delegate = delegate
@@ -240,7 +246,7 @@ struct GossipSyncManagerTests {
let request = RequestSyncPacket(p: 4, m: 1, data: Data(), types: .fragment)
manager.handleRequestSync(from: peer, request: request)
try await sleep(0.01)
try await TestHelpers.waitFor({ delegate.packets.count == 1 }, timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout)
let sentPackets = delegate.packets
#expect(sentPackets.count == 1)
#expect(sentPackets[0].type == MessageType.fragment.rawValue)
@@ -268,4 +274,8 @@ private final class RecordingDelegate: GossipSyncManager.Delegate {
func signPacketForBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> BitchatPacket {
packet
}
func getConnectedPeers() -> [PeerID] {
return []
}
}
+32 -14
View File
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ struct InputValidatorTests {
}
// MARK: - Timestamp Validation Tests
// BCH-01-011: Window reduced from ±1 hour to ±5 minutes
@Test func currentTimestampIsValid() throws {
let now = Date()
@@ -138,31 +139,48 @@ struct InputValidatorTests {
#expect(result == true)
}
@Test func timestampWithinOneHourIsValid() throws {
@Test func timestampWithinFiveMinutesIsValid() throws {
// 2 minutes ago should be valid (within 5-minute window)
let twoMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-2 * 60)
let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(twoMinutesAgo)
#expect(result == true)
}
@Test func timestampThirtyMinutesAgoIsInvalid() throws {
// BCH-01-011: 30 minutes is now outside the 5-minute window
let thirtyMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-30 * 60)
let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(thirtyMinutesAgo)
#expect(result == true)
}
@Test func timestampTwoHoursAgoIsInvalid() throws {
let twoHoursAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-2 * 3600)
let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(twoHoursAgo)
#expect(result == false)
}
@Test func timestampTwoHoursInFutureIsInvalid() throws {
let twoHoursFromNow = Date().addingTimeInterval(2 * 3600)
let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(twoHoursFromNow)
@Test func timestampTenMinutesAgoIsInvalid() throws {
// 10 minutes is outside the 5-minute window
let tenMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-10 * 60)
let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(tenMinutesAgo)
#expect(result == false)
}
@Test func timestampAtOneHourBoundaryIsValid() throws {
// Just slightly within the one-hour window
let almostOneHourAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-3599)
let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(almostOneHourAgo)
@Test func timestampTenMinutesInFutureIsInvalid() throws {
// 10 minutes in future is outside the 5-minute window
let tenMinutesFromNow = Date().addingTimeInterval(10 * 60)
let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(tenMinutesFromNow)
#expect(result == false)
}
@Test func timestampAtFiveMinuteBoundaryIsValid() throws {
// Just slightly within the five-minute window (299 seconds)
let almostFiveMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-299)
let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(almostFiveMinutesAgo)
#expect(result == true)
}
@Test func timestampJustOutsideFiveMinuteWindowIsInvalid() throws {
// Just outside the five-minute window (301 seconds)
let justOverFiveMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-301)
let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(justOverFiveMinutesAgo)
#expect(result == false)
}
// MARK: - Edge Cases
@Test func singleCharacterStringIsAccepted() throws {
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
//
// KeychainErrorHandlingTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
// BCH-01-009: Tests for proper keychain error classification and handling
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
struct KeychainErrorHandlingTests {
// MARK: - Error Classification Tests
@Test func keychainReadResult_successIsNotRecoverable() throws {
let result = KeychainReadResult.success(Data([1, 2, 3]))
#expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
}
@Test func keychainReadResult_itemNotFoundIsNotRecoverable() throws {
let result = KeychainReadResult.itemNotFound
#expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
}
@Test func keychainReadResult_deviceLockedIsRecoverable() throws {
let result = KeychainReadResult.deviceLocked
#expect(result.isRecoverableError == true)
}
@Test func keychainReadResult_authenticationFailedIsRecoverable() throws {
let result = KeychainReadResult.authenticationFailed
#expect(result.isRecoverableError == true)
}
@Test func keychainReadResult_accessDeniedIsNotRecoverable() throws {
let result = KeychainReadResult.accessDenied
#expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
}
@Test func keychainSaveResult_successIsNotRecoverable() throws {
let result = KeychainSaveResult.success
#expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
}
@Test func keychainSaveResult_duplicateItemIsRecoverable() throws {
let result = KeychainSaveResult.duplicateItem
#expect(result.isRecoverableError == true)
}
@Test func keychainSaveResult_deviceLockedIsRecoverable() throws {
let result = KeychainSaveResult.deviceLocked
#expect(result.isRecoverableError == true)
}
@Test func keychainSaveResult_storageFullIsNotRecoverable() throws {
let result = KeychainSaveResult.storageFull
#expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
}
// MARK: - Mock Keychain Error Simulation Tests
@Test func mockKeychain_canSimulateReadErrors() throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
// Simulate access denied error
keychain.simulatedReadError = .accessDenied
let result = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "testKey")
switch result {
case .accessDenied:
// Expected
break
default:
throw KeychainTestError("Expected accessDenied, got \(result)")
}
}
@Test func mockKeychain_canSimulateSaveErrors() throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
// Simulate storage full error
keychain.simulatedSaveError = .storageFull
let result = keychain.saveIdentityKeyWithResult(Data([1, 2, 3]), forKey: "testKey")
switch result {
case .storageFull:
// Expected
break
default:
throw KeychainTestError("Expected storageFull, got \(result)")
}
}
@Test func mockKeychain_returnsItemNotFoundForMissingKey() throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let result = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "nonExistentKey")
switch result {
case .itemNotFound:
// Expected
break
default:
throw KeychainTestError("Expected itemNotFound, got \(result)")
}
}
@Test func mockKeychain_returnsSuccessForExistingKey() throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let testData = Data([1, 2, 3, 4, 5])
// First save the key
_ = keychain.saveIdentityKey(testData, forKey: "existingKey")
// Now read it back
let result = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "existingKey")
switch result {
case .success(let data):
#expect(data == testData)
default:
throw KeychainTestError("Expected success, got \(result)")
}
}
@Test func mockKeychain_saveWithResultStoresData() throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let testData = Data([10, 20, 30])
let saveResult = keychain.saveIdentityKeyWithResult(testData, forKey: "newKey")
switch saveResult {
case .success:
// Verify data was stored
let readResult = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "newKey")
switch readResult {
case .success(let data):
#expect(data == testData)
default:
throw KeychainTestError("Expected to read back saved data")
}
default:
throw KeychainTestError("Expected save success, got \(saveResult)")
}
}
// MARK: - NoiseEncryptionService Integration Tests
@Test func noiseEncryptionService_generatesNewIdentityWhenMissing() throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
// Create service with empty keychain - should generate new identity
let service = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
// Should have generated and saved keys
#expect(service.getStaticPublicKeyData().count == 32)
#expect(service.getSigningPublicKeyData().count == 32)
// Keys should be persisted
let noiseKeyResult = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
switch noiseKeyResult {
case .success:
// Expected - key was saved
break
default:
throw KeychainTestError("Expected noise key to be saved")
}
}
@Test func noiseEncryptionService_loadsExistingIdentity() throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
// Create first service to generate identity
let service1 = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
let originalPublicKey = service1.getStaticPublicKeyData()
let originalSigningKey = service1.getSigningPublicKeyData()
// Create second service - should load same identity
let service2 = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
#expect(service2.getStaticPublicKeyData() == originalPublicKey)
#expect(service2.getSigningPublicKeyData() == originalSigningKey)
}
@Test func noiseEncryptionService_handlesAccessDeniedGracefully() throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
keychain.simulatedReadError = .accessDenied
// Service should still initialize with ephemeral key
let service = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
// Should have an identity (ephemeral)
#expect(service.getStaticPublicKeyData().count == 32)
#expect(service.getSigningPublicKeyData().count == 32)
}
@Test func noiseEncryptionService_handlesDeviceLockedGracefully() throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
keychain.simulatedReadError = .deviceLocked
// Service should still initialize with ephemeral key
let service = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
// Should have an identity (ephemeral)
#expect(service.getStaticPublicKeyData().count == 32)
}
}
// Helper error type for tests
private struct KeychainTestError: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
let message: String
init(_ message: String) { self.message = message }
var description: String { message }
}
-530
View File
@@ -1,530 +0,0 @@
//import Foundation
//import XCTest
//@testable import bitchat
//
//private let localizationTestsDirectoryURL = URL(fileURLWithPath: #filePath).deletingLastPathComponent()
//private let testsRootURL = localizationTestsDirectoryURL.deletingLastPathComponent()
//private let repoRootURL = testsRootURL.deletingLastPathComponent()
//
//final class LocalizationCatalogTests: XCTestCase {
// // Ensures every app locale includes exactly the same keys as Base.
// func testAppCatalogLocaleParity() throws {
// let context = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings")
// assertLocaleParity(context: context, catalogName: "App")
// }
//
// // Verifies format placeholders stay consistent across app locales.
// func testAppCatalogPlaceholderConsistency() throws {
// let context = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings")
// assertPlaceholderConsistency(context: context, catalogName: "App")
// }
//
// // Guards a core set of app strings from going empty per locale.
// func testAppPrimaryKeysNonEmpty() throws {
// let context = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings")
// let primaryKeys = try loadPrimaryKeys().app
// assertPrimaryKeysPresent(context: context, keys: primaryKeys, catalogName: "App")
// }
//
// // Ensures every share extension locale matches Base key coverage.
// func testShareExtensionCatalogLocaleParity() throws {
// let context = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Localizable.xcstrings")
// assertLocaleParity(context: context, catalogName: "ShareExtension")
// }
//
// // Verifies share extension placeholders align across locales.
// func testShareExtensionCatalogPlaceholderConsistency() throws {
// let context = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Localizable.xcstrings")
// assertPlaceholderConsistency(context: context, catalogName: "ShareExtension")
// }
//
// // Confirms critical share extension strings remain non-empty per locale.
// func testShareExtensionPrimaryKeysNonEmpty() throws {
// let context = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Localizable.xcstrings")
// let primaryKeys = try loadPrimaryKeys().shareExtension
// assertPrimaryKeysPresent(context: context, keys: primaryKeys, catalogName: "ShareExtension")
// }
//
// // Validates that configured locales contain expected string values.
// func testLocalizationExpectedValues() throws {
// let appContext = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings")
// let shareContext = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Localizable.xcstrings")
// let config = try loadPrimaryKeys()
//
// guard let testLocales = config.testLocales else {
// // If no testLocales specified, skip this test
// return
// }
//
// guard let expectedValues = config.expectedValues else {
// XCTFail("No expectedValues configured in PrimaryLocalizationKeys.json")
// return
// }
//
// // Loop through each locale to test
// for locale in testLocales {
// guard let localeExpectedValues = expectedValues[locale] else {
// XCTFail("No expected values configured for locale '\(locale)' in PrimaryLocalizationKeys.json")
// continue
// }
//
// // Test each expected key/value pair for this locale
// for (key, expectedValue) in localeExpectedValues {
// if config.app.contains(key) {
// assertLocaleStringValue(context: appContext, locale: locale, key: key, expectedValue: expectedValue, catalogName: "App")
// } else if config.shareExtension.contains(key) {
// assertLocaleStringValue(context: shareContext, locale: locale, key: key, expectedValue: expectedValue, catalogName: "ShareExtension")
// }
// }
// }
// }
//
// // Ensures configured test locales are present and complete.
// func testConfiguredLocalesCompleteness() throws {
// let appContext = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings")
// let shareContext = try loadContext(relativePath: "bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Localizable.xcstrings")
// let config = try loadPrimaryKeys()
//
// guard let testLocales = config.testLocales else {
// // If no testLocales specified, skip this test
// return
// }
//
// let baseLocale = appContext.baseLocale
// let baseAppKeys = appContext.keysByLocale[baseLocale] ?? Set()
// let baseShareKeys = shareContext.keysByLocale[baseLocale] ?? Set()
//
// for locale in testLocales {
// // Skip base locale comparison with itself
// if locale == baseLocale { continue }
//
// // Verify locale is present in both catalogs
// XCTAssertTrue(appContext.locales.contains(locale), "Locale '\(locale)' missing from app catalog")
// XCTAssertTrue(shareContext.locales.contains(locale), "Locale '\(locale)' missing from share extension catalog")
//
// // Verify locale has same number of keys as base locale
// let appLocaleKeys = appContext.keysByLocale[locale] ?? Set()
// XCTAssertEqual(appLocaleKeys.count, baseAppKeys.count, "Locale '\(locale)' app catalog missing keys compared to \(baseLocale)")
//
// let shareLocaleKeys = shareContext.keysByLocale[locale] ?? Set()
// XCTAssertEqual(shareLocaleKeys.count, baseShareKeys.count, "Locale '\(locale)' share extension catalog missing keys compared to \(baseLocale)")
// }
// }
//
// // MARK: - Assertions
//
// private func assertLocaleParity(context: CatalogContext, catalogName: String, file: StaticString = #filePath, line: UInt = #line) {
// let baseLocale = context.baseLocale
// guard let baseKeys = context.keysByLocale[baseLocale] else {
// return XCTFail("Missing base locale \(baseLocale) in \(catalogName) catalog", file: file, line: line)
// }
//
// for (locale, keys) in context.keysByLocale.sorted(by: { $0.key < $1.key }) {
// XCTAssertEqual(keys, baseKeys, "Locale \(locale) has key mismatch in \(catalogName) catalog", file: file, line: line)
// }
// }
//
// private func assertPlaceholderConsistency(context: CatalogContext, catalogName: String, file: StaticString = #filePath, line: UInt = #line) {
// let baseLocale = context.baseLocale
// guard let baseSignatures = context.placeholderSignature[baseLocale] else {
// return XCTFail("Missing base placeholder signature for \(catalogName)", file: file, line: line)
// }
//
// for (locale, localeSignatures) in context.placeholderSignature.sorted(by: { $0.key < $1.key }) {
// guard locale != baseLocale else { continue }
// for key in baseSignatures.keys.sorted() {
// guard let baseMap = baseSignatures[key] else {
// continue
// }
// guard let localeMap = localeSignatures[key] else {
// return XCTFail("Key \(key) missing for locale \(locale) in \(catalogName) catalog", file: file, line: line)
// }
// for path in baseMap.keys.sorted() {
// let expected = normalizedPlaceholders(baseMap[path, default: []])
// let actual = normalizedPlaceholders(localeMap[path, default: []])
// XCTAssertEqual(actual, expected, "Placeholder mismatch for key \(key) at \(path) in locale \(locale) (\(catalogName))", file: file, line: line)
// }
// for (localePath, localeTokens) in localeMap {
// guard baseMap[localePath] == nil else { continue }
// guard let fallback = fallbackPath(for: localePath, baseMap: baseMap) else {
// XCTFail("Unexpected variation \(localePath) for key \(key) in locale \(locale) (\(catalogName))", file: file, line: line)
// continue
// }
// let expected = normalizedPlaceholders(baseMap[fallback, default: []])
// let actual = normalizedPlaceholders(localeTokens)
// XCTAssertEqual(actual, expected, "Placeholder mismatch for key \(key) at \(localePath) (fallback \(fallback)) in locale \(locale) (\(catalogName))", file: file, line: line)
// }
// }
// }
// }
//
// private func assertPrimaryKeysPresent(context: CatalogContext, keys: [String], catalogName: String, file: StaticString = #filePath, line: UInt = #line) {
// for key in keys {
// guard let entry = context.catalog.strings[key] else {
// XCTFail("Missing primary key \(key) in \(catalogName) catalog", file: file, line: line)
// continue
// }
// for locale in context.locales.sorted() {
// guard let localization = entry.localizations[locale], let unit = localization.stringUnit else {
// XCTFail("Missing localization for key \(key) in locale \(locale) (\(catalogName))", file: file, line: line)
// continue
// }
// let segments = gatherSegments(from: unit)
// XCTAssertFalse(segments.isEmpty, "No content for key \(key) in locale \(locale) (\(catalogName))", file: file, line: line)
// for segment in segments {
// let trimmed = segment.value.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
// XCTAssertFalse(trimmed.isEmpty, "Empty translation for key \(key) at \(segment.path) in locale \(locale) (\(catalogName))", file: file, line: line)
// }
// }
// }
// }
//
// private func assertLocaleStringValue(context: CatalogContext, locale: String, key: String, expectedValue: String, catalogName: String, file: StaticString = #filePath, line: UInt = #line) {
// guard let entry = context.catalog.strings[key] else {
// XCTFail("Missing key \(key) in \(catalogName) catalog", file: file, line: line)
// return
// }
//
// guard let localization = entry.localizations[locale], let unit = localization.stringUnit else {
// XCTFail("Missing \(locale) localization for key \(key) in \(catalogName) catalog", file: file, line: line)
// return
// }
//
// // For simple strings (non-pluralized)
// if let actualValue = unit.value {
// XCTAssertEqual(actualValue, expectedValue, "\(locale) translation mismatch for key \(key) in \(catalogName) catalog. Expected: '\(expectedValue)', Actual: '\(actualValue)'", file: file, line: line)
// } else {
// XCTFail("Key \(key) has no value in \(locale) localization for \(catalogName) catalog", file: file, line: line)
// }
// }
//
// // MARK: - Loading
//
// private func loadContext(relativePath: String) throws -> CatalogContext {
// let catalog = try loadCatalog(relativePath: relativePath)
// let locales = catalog.locales
// let baseLocale = catalog.sourceLanguage
// var keysByLocale: [String: Set<String>] = [:]
// var placeholderSignature: [String: [String: [String: [String]]]] = [:]
//
// for locale in locales {
// var localeKeys: Set<String> = []
// var localePlaceholders: [String: [String: [String]]] = [:]
// for (key, entry) in catalog.strings {
// guard let localization = entry.localizations[locale], let unit = localization.stringUnit else {
// continue
// }
// localeKeys.insert(key)
// let segments = gatherSegments(from: unit)
// var pathMap: [String: [String]] = [:]
// for segment in segments {
// pathMap[segment.path] = placeholders(in: segment.value)
// }
// localePlaceholders[key] = pathMap
// }
// keysByLocale[locale] = localeKeys
// placeholderSignature[locale] = localePlaceholders
// }
//
// return CatalogContext(catalog: catalog, locales: locales, baseLocale: baseLocale, keysByLocale: keysByLocale, placeholderSignature: placeholderSignature)
// }
//
// private func loadCatalog(relativePath: String) throws -> StringCatalog {
// let url = repoRootURL.appendingPathComponent(relativePath)
// let data = try Data(contentsOf: url)
// return try JSONDecoder().decode(StringCatalog.self, from: data)
// }
//
// private func loadPrimaryKeys() throws -> PrimaryKeyConfig {
// let url = localizationTestsDirectoryURL.appendingPathComponent("PrimaryLocalizationKeys.json")
// let data = try Data(contentsOf: url)
// return try JSONDecoder().decode(PrimaryKeyConfig.self, from: data)
// }
//
// // MARK: - Regression Tests
//
// /// Helper method to access the app bundle for localization testing.
// /// This ensures tests use the actual app's Localizable.xcstrings instead of
// /// the test bundle, preventing false positives where localization keys are
// /// returned instead of translated strings.
// private func appBundle() -> Bundle {
// Bundle(for: ChatViewModel.self)
// }
//
// /// Tests to prevent regression of the pluralization format string issue
// /// These tests ensure that String(localized:) properly handles
// /// pluralized format strings with %#@variable@ syntax
// func testPluralizedFormatStringsDoNotCrash() {
// // These are the exact calls that were causing runtime errors
//
// // Test 1: content.accessibility.people_count with Int argument
// XCTAssertNoThrow({
// let result = String(
// localized: "content.accessibility.people_count",
// bundle: appBundle(),
// comment: "Accessibility label announcing number of people in header"
// )
// XCTAssertFalse(result.isEmpty, "Should return formatted string")
// // Verify we're getting actual localized content, not just the key
// XCTAssertNotEqual(result, "content.accessibility.people_count", "Should return localized string, not key")
// }(), "People count localization should not throw")
//
// // Test 2: location_notes.header with String and Int arguments
// XCTAssertNoThrow({
// let result = String(
// localized: "location_notes.header",
// bundle: appBundle(),
// comment: "Header displaying the geohash and localized note count"
// )
// XCTAssertFalse(result.isEmpty, "Should return formatted string")
// // Verify we're getting actual localized content, not just the key
// XCTAssertNotEqual(result, "location_notes.header", "Should return localized string, not key")
// }(), "Location notes header localization should not throw")
// }
//
// func testFormatStringArgumentMatching() {
// // Verify that the format strings properly handle their expected arguments
//
// // People count expects: %#@people@ format with Int
// let peopleResult = String(
// localized: "content.accessibility.people_count",
// bundle: appBundle(),
// comment: "Test"
// )
//
// // Should not show format specifiers in the base string
// XCTAssertFalse(peopleResult.isEmpty, "Should return non-empty string")
//
// // Location notes expects: #%@ %#@note_count@ format with String, Int
// let notesResult = String(
// localized: "location_notes.header",
// bundle: appBundle(),
// comment: "Test"
// )
//
// XCTAssertFalse(notesResult.isEmpty, "Should return non-empty string")
// }
//
// func testPluralizedStringsWithArguments() {
// // Test the pluralized strings with actual format arguments
//
// // Test people count with different values
// let testCases = [0, 1, 2, 5]
//
// for count in testCases {
// let result = String(
// format: String(localized: "content.accessibility.people_count", bundle: appBundle(), comment: "Test"),
// locale: .current,
// count
// )
//
// // Just verify it doesn't crash and returns a reasonable string
// XCTAssertFalse(result.isEmpty,
// "People count should return non-empty string for count \(count)")
// XCTAssertTrue(result.contains("\(count)"),
// "Result should contain the count number for count \(count)")
// }
// }
//
// func testLocationNotesHeaderWithArguments() {
// let geohash = "abc123"
// let testCases = [0, 1, 2, 10]
//
// for count in testCases {
// let result = String(
// format: String(localized: "location_notes.header", bundle: appBundle(), comment: "Test"),
// locale: .current,
// geohash, count
// )
//
// // Verify basic structure is maintained
// XCTAssertTrue(result.contains(geohash),
// "Result should contain geohash for count \(count)")
// XCTAssertTrue(result.contains("\(count)"),
// "Result should contain count for count \(count)")
// }
// }
//
// func testLocationChannelsRowTitleWithArguments() {
// let label = "test-channel"
// let testCases = [0, 1, 2, 5]
//
// for count in testCases {
// let result = String(
// format: String(localized: "location_channels.row_title", bundle: appBundle(), comment: "Test"),
// locale: .current,
// label, count
// )
//
// // Verify basic structure is maintained
// XCTAssertTrue(result.contains(label),
// "Result should contain label for count \(count)")
// XCTAssertTrue(result.contains("\(count)"),
// "Result should contain count for count \(count)")
// }
// }
//
// func testNoArgumentsLocalization() {
// // Test that strings without arguments still work
// let result = String(
// localized: "common.ok",
// bundle: appBundle(),
// comment: "OK button text"
// )
//
// XCTAssertFalse(result.isEmpty, "Simple localization should work")
// }
//
// func testLocalizationEdgeCases() {
// // Test edge cases that might cause issues
//
// // Large numbers
// let largeNumberResult = String(
// format: String(localized: "content.accessibility.people_count", bundle: appBundle(), comment: "Test"),
// locale: .current,
// 1000000
// )
// XCTAssertTrue(largeNumberResult.contains("1000000"), "Should handle large numbers")
//
// // Zero
// let zeroResult = String(
// format: String(localized: "content.accessibility.people_count", bundle: appBundle(), comment: "Test"),
// locale: .current,
// 0
// )
// XCTAssertTrue(zeroResult.contains("0"), "Should handle zero")
//
// // Empty geohash (edge case)
// let emptyGeohashResult = String(
// format: String(localized: "location_notes.header", bundle: appBundle(), comment: "Test"),
// locale: .current,
// "", 1
// )
// XCTAssertFalse(emptyGeohashResult.isEmpty, "Should handle empty geohash")
// }
//}
//
//// MARK: - Helpers
//
//private struct CatalogContext {
// let catalog: StringCatalog
// let locales: [String]
// let baseLocale: String
// let keysByLocale: [String: Set<String>]
// let placeholderSignature: [String: [String: [String: [String]]]]
//}
//
//private struct StringCatalog: Decodable {
// let sourceLanguage: String
// let strings: [String: CatalogEntry]
//
// var locales: [String] {
// var localeSet: Set<String> = []
// for entry in strings.values {
// localeSet.formUnion(entry.localizations.keys)
// }
// return localeSet.sorted()
// }
//}
//
//private struct CatalogEntry: Decodable {
// let localizations: [String: CatalogLocalization]
//}
//
//private struct CatalogLocalization: Decodable {
// let stringUnit: CatalogStringUnit?
//}
//
//private struct CatalogStringUnit: Decodable {
// let state: String
// let value: String?
// let variations: CatalogVariations?
// let comment: String?
//}
//
//private struct CatalogVariations: Decodable {
// let plural: [String: [String: CatalogVariationValue]]?
//}
//
//private struct CatalogVariationValue: Decodable {
// let stringUnit: CatalogStringUnit?
//}
//
//private struct Segment {
// let components: [String]
// let value: String
//
// var path: String {
// components.isEmpty ? "base" : components.joined(separator: ".")
// }
//}
//
//private func gatherSegments(from unit: CatalogStringUnit, prefix: [String] = []) -> [Segment] {
// var segments: [Segment] = []
// if let value = unit.value {
// segments.append(Segment(components: prefix, value: value))
// } else if prefix.isEmpty {
// segments.append(Segment(components: [], value: ""))
// }
// if let plural = unit.variations?.plural {
// for (variable, categories) in plural.sorted(by: { $0.key < $1.key }) {
// for (category, variation) in categories.sorted(by: { $0.key < $1.key }) {
// if let nested = variation.stringUnit {
// var nextPrefix = prefix
// nextPrefix.append("plural")
// nextPrefix.append(variable)
// nextPrefix.append(category)
// segments.append(contentsOf: gatherSegments(from: nested, prefix: nextPrefix))
// }
// }
// }
// }
// return segments
//}
//
//private func normalizedPlaceholders(_ tokens: [String]) -> [String] {
// tokens.sorted()
//}
//
//private func fallbackPath(for localePath: String, baseMap: [String: [String]]) -> String? {
// let parts = localePath.split(separator: ".")
// guard parts.count == 3, parts.first == "plural" else {
// return nil
// }
// let variable = parts[1]
// let otherKey = "plural.\(variable).other"
// if baseMap[otherKey] != nil {
// return otherKey
// }
// let oneKey = "plural.\(variable).one"
// if baseMap[oneKey] != nil {
// return oneKey
// }
// return nil
//}
//
//private let placeholderRegex: NSRegularExpression = {
// let pattern = "%(?:\\d+\\$)?#@[A-Za-z0-9_]+@|%(?:\\d+\\$)?[#0\\- +'\"]*(?:\\d+|\\*)?(?:\\.\\d+)?(?:hh|h|ll|l|z|t|L)?[a-zA-Z@]"
// return try! NSRegularExpression(pattern: pattern, options: [])
//}()
//
//private func placeholders(in string: String) -> [String] {
// let range = NSRange(location: 0, length: (string as NSString).length)
// let matches = placeholderRegex.matches(in: string, options: [], range: range)
// var tokens: [String] = []
// for match in matches {
// if let range = Range(match.range, in: string) {
// let token = String(string[range])
// if token == "%%" { continue }
// tokens.append(token)
// }
// }
// return tokens
//}
//
//private struct PrimaryKeyConfig: Decodable {
// let app: [String]
// let shareExtension: [String]
// let expectedValues: [String: [String: String]]?
// let testLocales: [String]?
//}
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ import Foundation
// MARK: - LRU Deduplication Cache Tests
@Suite("LRU Deduplication Cache")
@MainActor
struct LRUDeduplicationCacheTests {
// MARK: - Basic Operations
@@ -265,6 +267,8 @@ struct ContentNormalizerTests {
// MARK: - Message Deduplication Service Tests
@Suite("Message Deduplication Service")
@MainActor
struct MessageDeduplicationServiceTests {
// MARK: - Content Deduplication
@@ -467,4 +471,134 @@ struct MessageDeduplicationServiceTests {
#expect(service.contentTimestamp(for: "hello world") == now)
#expect(service.contentTimestamp(for: "Hello World") == now)
}
// MARK: - Thread Safety Tests (via @MainActor enforcement)
@Test("Concurrent content recording is safe via MainActor")
func concurrentContentRecording() async {
let service = MessageDeduplicationService(contentCapacity: 1000, nostrEventCapacity: 1000)
let iterations = 100
// All operations run on MainActor due to @MainActor annotation
// This test verifies the pattern works correctly
await withTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask { @MainActor in
service.recordContent("Message \(i)", timestamp: Date())
}
}
}
// Verify some entries were recorded
#expect(service.contentTimestamp(for: "Message 0") != nil)
#expect(service.contentTimestamp(for: "Message 99") != nil)
}
@Test("Concurrent Nostr event recording is safe via MainActor")
func concurrentNostrEventRecording() async {
let service = MessageDeduplicationService(contentCapacity: 1000, nostrEventCapacity: 1000)
let iterations = 100
await withTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask { @MainActor in
service.recordNostrEvent("event_\(i)")
}
}
}
// Verify events were recorded
#expect(service.hasProcessedNostrEvent("event_0"))
#expect(service.hasProcessedNostrEvent("event_99"))
}
@Test("Mixed concurrent operations are safe via MainActor")
func concurrentMixedOperations() async {
let service = MessageDeduplicationService(contentCapacity: 1000, nostrEventCapacity: 1000)
let iterations = 50
await withTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
// Content recording tasks
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask { @MainActor in
service.recordContent("Content \(i)", timestamp: Date())
}
}
// Event recording tasks
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask { @MainActor in
service.recordNostrEvent("event_\(i)")
}
}
// ACK recording tasks
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask { @MainActor in
service.recordNostrAck("ack_\(i)")
}
}
// Read tasks
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask { @MainActor in
_ = service.contentTimestamp(for: "Content \(i)")
_ = service.hasProcessedNostrEvent("event_\(i)")
_ = service.hasProcessedNostrAck("ack_\(i)")
}
}
}
// If we reach here without crashes, the test passes
}
}
// MARK: - LRU Cache Thread Safety Tests
@Suite("LRU Cache Thread Safety")
@MainActor
struct LRUCacheThreadSafetyTests {
@Test("Concurrent cache access is safe via MainActor")
func concurrentCacheAccess() async {
let cache = LRUDeduplicationCache<Int>(capacity: 500)
let iterations = 100
await withTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
// Write tasks
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask { @MainActor in
cache.record("key_\(i)", value: i)
}
}
// Read tasks
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask { @MainActor in
_ = cache.contains("key_\(i)")
_ = cache.value(for: "key_\(i)")
}
}
}
// Verify cache is in consistent state
#expect(cache.count <= 500) // Respects capacity
}
@Test("Cache eviction under concurrent load is safe")
func cacheEvictionUnderLoad() async {
let cache = LRUDeduplicationCache<Int>(capacity: 10)
let iterations = 100
await withTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask { @MainActor in
cache.record("key_\(i)", value: i)
}
}
}
// Cache should maintain its capacity constraint
#expect(cache.count == 10)
}
}
+26 -3
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ final class MockIdentityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
private var blockedFingerprints: Set<String> = []
private var blockedNostrPubkeys: Set<String> = []
private var socialIdentities: [String: SocialIdentity] = [:]
init(_ keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
self.keychain = keychain
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ final class MockIdentityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
func forceSave() {}
func getSocialIdentity(for fingerprint: String) -> SocialIdentity? {
nil
socialIdentities[fingerprint]
}
func upsertCryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: String, noisePublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data?, claimedNickname: String?) {}
@@ -34,7 +35,14 @@ final class MockIdentityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
[]
}
func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) {}
func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) {
socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint] = identity
if identity.isBlocked {
blockedFingerprints.insert(identity.fingerprint)
} else {
blockedFingerprints.remove(identity.fingerprint)
}
}
func getFavorites() -> Set<String> {
Set()
@@ -47,10 +55,25 @@ final class MockIdentityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
}
func isBlocked(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
blockedFingerprints.contains(fingerprint)
blockedFingerprints.contains(fingerprint) || socialIdentities[fingerprint]?.isBlocked == true
}
func setBlocked(_ fingerprint: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
if var identity = socialIdentities[fingerprint] {
identity.isBlocked = isBlocked
socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
} else {
let identity = SocialIdentity(
fingerprint: fingerprint,
localPetname: nil,
claimedNickname: "",
trustLevel: .unknown,
isFavorite: false,
isBlocked: isBlocked,
notes: nil
)
socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
}
if isBlocked {
blockedFingerprints.insert(fingerprint)
} else {
+154 -18
View File
@@ -11,54 +11,190 @@ import Foundation
final class MockKeychain: KeychainManagerProtocol {
private var storage: [String: Data] = [:]
private var serviceStorage: [String: [String: Data]] = [:]
// BCH-01-009: Configurable error simulation for testing
var simulatedReadError: KeychainReadResult?
var simulatedSaveError: KeychainSaveResult?
func saveIdentityKey(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> Bool {
storage[key] = keyData
return true
}
func getIdentityKey(forKey key: String) -> Data? {
storage[key]
}
func deleteIdentityKey(forKey key: String) -> Bool {
storage.removeValue(forKey: key)
return true
}
func deleteAllKeychainData() -> Bool {
storage.removeAll()
serviceStorage.removeAll()
return true
}
func secureClear(_ data: inout Data) {
//
data = Data()
}
func secureClear(_ string: inout String) {
string = ""
}
func verifyIdentityKeyExists() -> Bool {
storage["identity_noiseStaticKey"] != nil
}
// BCH-01-009: New methods with proper error classification
func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
if let simulated = simulatedReadError {
return simulated
}
if let data = storage[key] {
return .success(data)
}
return .itemNotFound
}
func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult {
if let simulated = simulatedSaveError {
return simulated
}
storage[key] = keyData
return .success
}
// MARK: - Generic Data Storage (consolidated from KeychainHelper)
func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString?) {
if serviceStorage[service] == nil {
serviceStorage[service] = [:]
}
serviceStorage[service]?[key] = data
}
func load(key: String, service: String) -> Data? {
serviceStorage[service]?[key]
}
func delete(key: String, service: String) {
serviceStorage[service]?.removeValue(forKey: key)
}
}
final class MockKeychainHelper: KeychainHelperProtocol {
private typealias Service = String
private typealias Key = String
private var storage: [Service: [Key: Data]] = [:]
/// Typealias for backwards compatibility with tests using MockKeychainHelper
typealias MockKeychainHelper = MockKeychain
/// Mock keychain that tracks secureClear calls for testing DH secret clearing
final class TrackingMockKeychain: KeychainManagerProtocol {
private var storage: [String: Data] = [:]
private var serviceStorage: [String: [String: Data]] = [:]
/// Thread-safe counter for secureClear calls
private let lock = NSLock()
private var _secureClearDataCallCount = 0
private var _secureClearStringCallCount = 0
// BCH-01-009: Configurable error simulation for testing
var simulatedReadError: KeychainReadResult?
var simulatedSaveError: KeychainSaveResult?
var secureClearDataCallCount: Int {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
return _secureClearDataCallCount
}
var secureClearStringCallCount: Int {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
return _secureClearStringCallCount
}
var totalSecureClearCallCount: Int {
return secureClearDataCallCount + secureClearStringCallCount
}
func resetCounts() {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
_secureClearDataCallCount = 0
_secureClearStringCallCount = 0
}
func saveIdentityKey(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> Bool {
storage[key] = keyData
return true
}
func getIdentityKey(forKey key: String) -> Data? {
storage[key]
}
func deleteIdentityKey(forKey key: String) -> Bool {
storage.removeValue(forKey: key)
return true
}
func deleteAllKeychainData() -> Bool {
storage.removeAll()
serviceStorage.removeAll()
return true
}
func secureClear(_ data: inout Data) {
lock.lock()
_secureClearDataCallCount += 1
lock.unlock()
data = Data()
}
func secureClear(_ string: inout String) {
lock.lock()
_secureClearStringCallCount += 1
lock.unlock()
string = ""
}
func verifyIdentityKeyExists() -> Bool {
storage["identity_noiseStaticKey"] != nil
}
// BCH-01-009: New methods with proper error classification
func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
if let simulated = simulatedReadError {
return simulated
}
if let data = storage[key] {
return .success(data)
}
return .itemNotFound
}
func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult {
if let simulated = simulatedSaveError {
return simulated
}
storage[key] = keyData
return .success
}
func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString?) {
storage[service]?[key] = data
if serviceStorage[service] == nil {
serviceStorage[service] = [:]
}
serviceStorage[service]?[key] = data
}
func load(key: String, service: String) -> Data? {
storage[service]?[key]
serviceStorage[service]?[key]
}
func delete(key: String, service: String) {
storage[service]?.removeValue(forKey: key)
serviceStorage[service]?.removeValue(forKey: key)
}
}
+19
View File
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ final class MockTransport: Transport {
}
delegate?.didConnectToPeer(peerID)
delegate?.didUpdatePeerList(Array(connectedPeers))
publishPeerSnapshots()
}
/// Simulates a peer disconnecting
@@ -192,6 +193,7 @@ final class MockTransport: Transport {
peerNicknames.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
delegate?.didDisconnectFromPeer(peerID)
delegate?.didUpdatePeerList(Array(connectedPeers))
publishPeerSnapshots()
}
/// Simulates receiving a message
@@ -224,5 +226,22 @@ final class MockTransport: Transport {
/// Updates the peer snapshot publisher
func updatePeerSnapshots(_ snapshots: [TransportPeerSnapshot]) {
peerSnapshotSubject.send(snapshots)
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
self?.peerEventsDelegate?.didUpdatePeerSnapshots(snapshots)
}
}
private func publishPeerSnapshots() {
let now = Date()
let snapshots = connectedPeers.map { peerID in
TransportPeerSnapshot(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: peerNicknames[peerID] ?? "",
isConnected: true,
noisePublicKey: Data(hexString: peerID.bare),
lastSeen: now
)
}
updatePeerSnapshots(snapshots)
}
}
+157 -2
View File
@@ -746,8 +746,8 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
}
// Get transport ciphers
let (initSend, initRecv) = try initiatorHandshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: false)
let (respSend, respRecv) = try responderHandshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: false)
let (initSend, initRecv, _) = try initiatorHandshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: false)
let (respSend, respRecv, _) = try responderHandshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: false)
// Test transport messages (messages after the 3 handshake messages)
for index in 3..<testVector.messages.count {
@@ -789,4 +789,159 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
"Message \(index + 1): Decrypted payload should match original")
}
}
// MARK: - DH Shared Secret Clearing Tests
@Test func secureClearCalledDuringHandshake() throws {
// Use TrackingMockKeychain to verify secureClear is called
let trackingKeychain = TrackingMockKeychain()
let aliceKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
let bobKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
let alice = NoiseSession(
peerID: PeerID(str: "alice-test"),
role: .initiator,
keychain: trackingKeychain,
localStaticKey: aliceKey
)
let bob = NoiseSession(
peerID: PeerID(str: "bob-test"),
role: .responder,
keychain: trackingKeychain,
localStaticKey: bobKey
)
// Perform handshake
let msg1 = try alice.startHandshake()
let msg2 = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(msg1)!
let msg3 = try alice.processHandshakeMessage(msg2)!
_ = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(msg3)
// In Noise XX pattern handshake:
// - Message 1 (initiator): e token only (no DH)
// - Message 2 (responder): e, ee, s, es tokens (2 DH operations: ee, es)
// - Message 3 (initiator): s, se tokens (1 DH operation: se)
// Total in writeMessage: 3 DH operations (ee, es, se)
//
// In readMessage (performDHOperation):
// - After msg1: no DH
// - After msg2: ee, es (2 DH operations)
// - After msg3: se (1 DH operation)
// Total in performDHOperation: 3 DH operations
//
// Grand total: 6 DH operations requiring secureClear
//
// Note: .ss pattern is only used in certain handshake patterns, not XX
let expectedMinimumCalls = 6
#expect(
trackingKeychain.secureClearDataCallCount >= expectedMinimumCalls,
"Expected at least \(expectedMinimumCalls) secureClear calls for DH secrets, got \(trackingKeychain.secureClearDataCallCount)"
)
}
@Test func encryptionWorksAfterSecureClear() throws {
// Verify that encryption/decryption still works correctly after adding secureClear
let trackingKeychain = TrackingMockKeychain()
let aliceKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
let bobKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
let alice = NoiseSession(
peerID: PeerID(str: "alice-test-enc"),
role: .initiator,
keychain: trackingKeychain,
localStaticKey: aliceKey
)
let bob = NoiseSession(
peerID: PeerID(str: "bob-test-enc"),
role: .responder,
keychain: trackingKeychain,
localStaticKey: bobKey
)
// Perform handshake
let msg1 = try alice.startHandshake()
let msg2 = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(msg1)!
let msg3 = try alice.processHandshakeMessage(msg2)!
_ = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(msg3)
// Verify both sessions are established
#expect(alice.isEstablished())
#expect(bob.isEstablished())
// Verify secureClear was called (basic sanity check)
#expect(trackingKeychain.secureClearDataCallCount > 0)
// Test encryption from Alice to Bob
let plaintext1 = "Hello from Alice after secureClear!".data(using: .utf8)!
let ciphertext1 = try alice.encrypt(plaintext1)
let decrypted1 = try bob.decrypt(ciphertext1)
#expect(decrypted1 == plaintext1)
// Test encryption from Bob to Alice
let plaintext2 = "Hello from Bob after secureClear!".data(using: .utf8)!
let ciphertext2 = try bob.encrypt(plaintext2)
let decrypted2 = try alice.decrypt(ciphertext2)
#expect(decrypted2 == plaintext2)
// Test multiple messages to verify cipher state is correct
for i in 1...10 {
let msg = "Message \(i) from Alice".data(using: .utf8)!
let cipher = try alice.encrypt(msg)
let dec = try bob.decrypt(cipher)
#expect(dec == msg)
}
}
@Test func secureClearCalledInBothWriteAndReadPaths() throws {
// Verify secureClear is called in both writeMessage and readMessage paths
// We do this by checking the count increases at each step
let aliceKeychain = TrackingMockKeychain()
let bobKeychain = TrackingMockKeychain()
let aliceKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
let bobKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
let alice = NoiseSession(
peerID: PeerID(str: "alice-paths"),
role: .initiator,
keychain: aliceKeychain,
localStaticKey: aliceKey
)
let bob = NoiseSession(
peerID: PeerID(str: "bob-paths"),
role: .responder,
keychain: bobKeychain,
localStaticKey: bobKey
)
// Message 1: Alice writes (e token only, no DH)
let msg1 = try alice.startHandshake()
let aliceCountAfterMsg1 = aliceKeychain.secureClearDataCallCount
// No DH in message 1 for initiator
#expect(aliceCountAfterMsg1 == 0, "No DH secrets in message 1 write")
// Bob reads message 1 (no DH) and writes message 2 (ee, es DH operations)
let msg2 = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(msg1)!
let bobCountAfterMsg2 = bobKeychain.secureClearDataCallCount
// Bob should have cleared secrets for: ee (read), es (read), ee (write), es (write)
#expect(bobCountAfterMsg2 >= 2, "Bob should clear DH secrets when processing/writing message 2")
// Alice reads message 2 (ee, es) and writes message 3 (se)
let msg3 = try alice.processHandshakeMessage(msg2)!
let aliceCountAfterMsg3 = aliceKeychain.secureClearDataCallCount
// Alice should have cleared: ee (read), es (read), se (write)
#expect(aliceCountAfterMsg3 >= 3, "Alice should clear DH secrets when processing/writing message 3")
// Bob reads message 3 (se)
_ = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(msg3)
let bobFinalCount = bobKeychain.secureClearDataCallCount
// Bob should have additionally cleared: se (read)
#expect(bobFinalCount > bobCountAfterMsg2, "Bob should clear DH secrets when processing message 3")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
//
// NotificationBlockingTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
// BCH-01-012: Tests for notification blocking feature
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
struct NotificationBlockingTests {
// MARK: - Nostr Blocking Tests
@Test("isNostrBlocked returns true for blocked pubkeys")
func isNostrBlocked_returnsTrueForBlockedPubkey() {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let testPubkey = "abc123def456".lowercased()
// Initially not blocked
#expect(manager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: testPubkey) == false)
// Block the pubkey
manager.setNostrBlocked(testPubkey, isBlocked: true)
// Now should be blocked
#expect(manager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: testPubkey) == true)
// Unblock
manager.setNostrBlocked(testPubkey, isBlocked: false)
#expect(manager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: testPubkey) == false)
}
@Test("isBlocked returns true for blocked fingerprints")
func isBlocked_returnsTrueForBlockedFingerprint() {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let testFingerprint = "fingerprint123"
// Initially not blocked
#expect(manager.isBlocked(fingerprint: testFingerprint) == false)
// Block the fingerprint
manager.setBlocked(testFingerprint, isBlocked: true)
// Now should be blocked
#expect(manager.isBlocked(fingerprint: testFingerprint) == true)
// Unblock
manager.setBlocked(testFingerprint, isBlocked: false)
#expect(manager.isBlocked(fingerprint: testFingerprint) == false)
}
@Test("getBlockedNostrPubkeys returns all blocked pubkeys")
func getBlockedNostrPubkeys_returnsAllBlocked() {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let pubkey1 = "pubkey1".lowercased()
let pubkey2 = "pubkey2".lowercased()
let pubkey3 = "pubkey3".lowercased()
manager.setNostrBlocked(pubkey1, isBlocked: true)
manager.setNostrBlocked(pubkey2, isBlocked: true)
manager.setNostrBlocked(pubkey3, isBlocked: true)
let blocked = manager.getBlockedNostrPubkeys()
#expect(blocked.count == 3)
#expect(blocked.contains(pubkey1))
#expect(blocked.contains(pubkey2))
#expect(blocked.contains(pubkey3))
}
// MARK: - Message Blocking Tests
@Test("BitchatMessage with blocked sender is identified")
func bitchatMessage_blockedSenderIdentified() {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let blockedFingerprint = "blocked_fingerprint_123"
manager.setBlocked(blockedFingerprint, isBlocked: true)
#expect(manager.isBlocked(fingerprint: blockedFingerprint) == true)
}
@Test("Case insensitive blocking for Nostr pubkeys")
func nostrBlocking_caseInsensitive() {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let pubkeyLower = "abc123def456"
// Block lowercase
manager.setNostrBlocked(pubkeyLower, isBlocked: true)
// Check lowercase is blocked
#expect(manager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: pubkeyLower) == true)
// Note: The API expects lowercased input, so callers must normalize
// This test verifies the contract that pubkeys should be lowercased before checking
// The fix in ChatViewModel+Nostr.swift normalizes via event.pubkey.lowercased()
}
}
+152 -3
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
#expect(decodedPacket.signature == TestConstants.testSignature)
}
// MARK: - Source-Based Routing Tests (v2 only)
@Test func packetWithRouteRoundTrip() throws {
let route: [Data] = [
try #require(Data(hexString: "0102030405060708")),
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
try #require(Data(hexString: "2122232425262728"))
]
// Route is only supported for v2+ packets
var packet = BitchatPacket(
type: 0x01,
senderID: route[0],
@@ -69,7 +72,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
payload: Data("route-test".utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 6
ttl: 6,
version: 2
)
packet.route = route
@@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
#expect((flagsByte & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) != 0)
let decoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.decode(encoded), "Failed to decode packet with route")
#expect(decoded.version == 2)
let decodedRoute = try #require(decoded.route)
#expect(decodedRoute.count == route.count)
for (expected, actual) in zip(route, decodedRoute) {
@@ -90,6 +95,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
let destination = try #require(Data(hexString: "8899aabbccddeeff"))
let shortHop = Data([0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC])
// Route is only supported for v2+ packets
var packet = BitchatPacket(
type: 0x02,
senderID: sender,
@@ -97,7 +103,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
timestamp: 1_730_000_000_000,
payload: Data("pad-test".utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 5
ttl: 5,
version: 2
)
packet.route = [shortHop, destination]
@@ -117,6 +124,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
try #require(Data(hexString: "0202020202020202"))
]
let repeatedString = String(repeating: "compress-me", count: 150)
// Route is only supported for v2+ packets
var packet = BitchatPacket(
type: 0x03,
senderID: route[0],
@@ -124,7 +132,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
timestamp: 1_740_000_000_000,
payload: Data(repeatedString.utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
ttl: 7,
version: 2
)
packet.route = route
@@ -135,6 +144,146 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
#expect(decodedRoute == route)
}
@Test func v1PacketIgnoresRouteOnEncode() throws {
// v1 packets should NOT include route even if route is set on the packet object
let route: [Data] = [
try #require(Data(hexString: "0102030405060708")),
try #require(Data(hexString: "1112131415161718"))
]
var packet = BitchatPacket(
type: 0x01,
senderID: route[0],
recipientID: route.last,
timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
payload: Data("v1-no-route".utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 6
// version defaults to 1 (v1 packet)
)
packet.route = route // route is set but should be ignored for v1
let encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(packet), "Failed to encode v1 packet")
// HAS_ROUTE flag should NOT be set for v1 packets
let flagsByte = encoded[BinaryProtocol.Offsets.flags]
#expect((flagsByte & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) == 0, "v1 packet should not have HAS_ROUTE flag set")
// Decoded packet should have no route
let decoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.decode(encoded), "Failed to decode v1 packet")
#expect(decoded.version == 1)
#expect(decoded.route == nil, "v1 packet should decode with nil route")
#expect(decoded.payload == Data("v1-no-route".utf8))
}
@Test func v2PacketIncludesRouteOnEncode() throws {
// v2 packets SHOULD include route when route is set
let route: [Data] = [
try #require(Data(hexString: "0102030405060708")),
try #require(Data(hexString: "1112131415161718"))
]
var packet = BitchatPacket(
type: 0x01,
senderID: route[0],
recipientID: route.last,
timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
payload: Data("v2-with-route".utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 6,
version: 2
)
packet.route = route
let encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(packet), "Failed to encode v2 packet")
// HAS_ROUTE flag SHOULD be set for v2 packets with route
let flagsByte = encoded[BinaryProtocol.Offsets.flags]
#expect((flagsByte & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) != 0, "v2 packet should have HAS_ROUTE flag set")
// Decoded packet should have route
let decoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.decode(encoded), "Failed to decode v2 packet")
#expect(decoded.version == 2)
let decodedRoute = try #require(decoded.route, "v2 packet should decode with route")
#expect(decodedRoute.count == route.count)
#expect(decoded.payload == Data("v2-with-route".utf8))
}
@Test func v2PacketWithoutRouteDecodesCorrectly() throws {
// v2 packet without route should still work
let sender = try #require(Data(hexString: "0011223344556677"))
let recipient = try #require(Data(hexString: "8899aabbccddeeff"))
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: 0x02,
senderID: sender,
recipientID: recipient,
timestamp: 1_750_000_000_000,
payload: Data("v2-no-route".utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 5,
version: 2
)
// route is nil by default
let encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(packet), "Failed to encode v2 packet without route")
// HAS_ROUTE flag should NOT be set when no route
let flagsByte = encoded[BinaryProtocol.Offsets.flags]
#expect((flagsByte & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) == 0, "v2 packet without route should not have HAS_ROUTE flag")
let decoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.decode(encoded), "Failed to decode v2 packet without route")
#expect(decoded.version == 2)
#expect(decoded.route == nil)
#expect(decoded.payload == Data("v2-no-route".utf8))
}
@Test func v1AndV2PayloadLengthDifference() throws {
// Verify that payloadLength does NOT include route bytes
// by comparing encoded sizes
let route: [Data] = [
try #require(Data(hexString: "0102030405060708"))
]
let payloadData = Data("test-payload".utf8)
// v1 packet (route ignored)
var v1Packet = BitchatPacket(
type: 0x01,
senderID: route[0],
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
payload: payloadData,
signature: nil,
ttl: 6
// version defaults to 1
)
v1Packet.route = route // will be ignored for v1
// v2 packet with same payload but route included
var v2Packet = BitchatPacket(
type: 0x01,
senderID: route[0],
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
payload: payloadData,
signature: nil,
ttl: 6,
version: 2
)
v2Packet.route = route
let v1Encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(v1Packet, padding: false))
let v2Encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(v2Packet, padding: false))
// v2 should be larger by: 2 bytes (header length field difference) + 1 byte (route count) + 8 bytes (one hop)
// Header: v1=14, v2=16 -> +2 bytes
// Route: 1 + 8 = 9 bytes
// Total expected difference: 11 bytes
let expectedDiff = 2 + 1 + 8 // header diff + route count + one hop
#expect(v2Encoded.count - v1Encoded.count == expectedDiff,
"v2 packet should be \(expectedDiff) bytes larger than v1 (actual diff: \(v2Encoded.count - v1Encoded.count))")
}
// MARK: - Compression Tests
@Test("Create a large, compressible payload above current threshold (2048B)")
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
//
// PublicMessagePipelineTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Tests for PublicMessagePipeline ordering and deduplication.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
@MainActor
private final class TestPipelineDelegate: PublicMessagePipelineDelegate {
private let dedupService = MessageDeduplicationService()
var messages: [BitchatMessage] = []
func pipelineCurrentMessages(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline) -> [BitchatMessage] {
messages
}
func pipeline(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, setMessages messages: [BitchatMessage]) {
self.messages = messages
}
func pipeline(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, normalizeContent content: String) -> String {
dedupService.normalizedContentKey(content)
}
func pipeline(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, contentTimestampForKey key: String) -> Date? {
dedupService.contentTimestamp(forKey: key)
}
func pipeline(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, recordContentKey key: String, timestamp: Date) {
dedupService.recordContentKey(key, timestamp: timestamp)
}
func pipelineTrimMessages(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline) {}
func pipelinePrewarmMessage(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, message: BitchatMessage) {}
func pipelineSetBatchingState(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, isBatching: Bool) {}
}
struct PublicMessagePipelineTests {
@Test @MainActor
func flush_sortsByTimestamp() async {
let pipeline = PublicMessagePipeline()
let delegate = TestPipelineDelegate()
pipeline.delegate = delegate
let earlier = Date().addingTimeInterval(-10)
let later = Date()
let messageA = BitchatMessage(
id: "a",
sender: "A",
content: "Later",
timestamp: later,
isRelay: false
)
let messageB = BitchatMessage(
id: "b",
sender: "A",
content: "Earlier",
timestamp: earlier,
isRelay: false
)
pipeline.enqueue(messageA)
pipeline.enqueue(messageB)
pipeline.flushIfNeeded()
#expect(delegate.messages.map { $0.id } == ["b", "a"])
}
@Test @MainActor
func flush_deduplicatesByContentWithinWindow() async {
let pipeline = PublicMessagePipeline()
let delegate = TestPipelineDelegate()
pipeline.delegate = delegate
let now = Date()
let messageA = BitchatMessage(
id: "a",
sender: "A",
content: "Same",
timestamp: now,
isRelay: false
)
let messageB = BitchatMessage(
id: "b",
sender: "A",
content: "Same",
timestamp: now.addingTimeInterval(0.2),
isRelay: false
)
pipeline.enqueue(messageA)
pipeline.enqueue(messageB)
pipeline.flushIfNeeded()
#expect(delegate.messages.count == 1)
#expect(delegate.messages.first?.content == "Same")
}
@Test @MainActor
func lateInsert_meshAppendsRecentOlderMessage() async {
let pipeline = PublicMessagePipeline()
let delegate = TestPipelineDelegate()
pipeline.delegate = delegate
pipeline.updateActiveChannel(.mesh)
let base = Date()
let newer = BitchatMessage(
id: "new",
sender: "A",
content: "New",
timestamp: base,
isRelay: false
)
let older = BitchatMessage(
id: "old",
sender: "A",
content: "Old",
timestamp: base.addingTimeInterval(-5),
isRelay: false
)
delegate.messages = [newer]
pipeline.enqueue(older)
pipeline.flushIfNeeded()
#expect(delegate.messages.map { $0.id } == ["new", "old"])
}
@Test @MainActor
func lateInsert_locationInsertsByTimestamp() async {
let pipeline = PublicMessagePipeline()
let delegate = TestPipelineDelegate()
pipeline.delegate = delegate
pipeline.updateActiveChannel(.location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: "u4pruydq")))
let base = Date()
let newer = BitchatMessage(
id: "new",
sender: "A",
content: "New",
timestamp: base,
isRelay: false
)
let older = BitchatMessage(
id: "old",
sender: "A",
content: "Old",
timestamp: base.addingTimeInterval(-5),
isRelay: false
)
delegate.messages = [newer]
pipeline.enqueue(older)
pipeline.flushIfNeeded()
#expect(delegate.messages.map { $0.id } == ["old", "new"])
}
}
@@ -20,9 +20,13 @@ struct MeshTopologyTrackerTests {
let a = try hex("0102030405060708")
let b = try hex("1112131415161718")
tracker.recordDirectLink(between: a, and: b)
// Bidirectional announcement
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a])
let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: b))
#expect(route == [a, b])
// Direct connection returns empty route (no intermediate hops)
#expect(route == [])
}
@Test func multiHopRouteComputation() throws {
@@ -32,41 +36,38 @@ struct MeshTopologyTrackerTests {
let c = try hex("2021222324252627")
let d = try hex("3031323334353637")
tracker.recordDirectLink(between: a, and: b)
tracker.recordDirectLink(between: b, and: c)
tracker.recordDirectLink(between: c, and: d)
// Bidirectional announcements for A-B, B-C, C-D
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a, c])
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: c, neighbors: [b, d])
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: d, neighbors: [c])
let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: d))
#expect(route == [a, b, c, d])
// Route should only contain intermediate hops (b, c), excluding start (a) and end (d)
#expect(route == [b, c])
}
@Test func recordRouteAddsEdges() throws {
let tracker = MeshTopologyTracker()
var a = Data([0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC])
let b = try hex("4445464748494A4B")
let c = try hex("5455565758595A5B")
tracker.recordRoute([a, b, c])
a.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: BinaryProtocol.senderIDSize - a.count))
let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c))
#expect(route.first == a)
#expect(route.last == c)
}
@Test func removingDirectLinkBreaksRoute() throws {
@Test func unconfirmedEdgeDoesNotRoute() throws {
let tracker = MeshTopologyTracker()
let a = try hex("0101010101010101")
let b = try hex("0202020202020202")
let c = try hex("0303030303030303")
tracker.recordDirectLink(between: a, and: b)
tracker.recordDirectLink(between: b, and: c)
let initialRoute = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c))
#expect(initialRoute == [a, b, c])
// A announces B (confirmed)
// B announces A, C (confirmed A-B, unconfirmed B-C)
// C does NOT announce B
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a, c])
// C is silent or announces empty
tracker.removeDirectLink(between: b, and: c)
// Should NOT find route A->C because B->C is unconfirmed (C didn't announce B)
#expect(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c) == nil)
// Now C announces B
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: c, neighbors: [b])
// Should find route
let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c))
#expect(route == [b])
}
@Test func removingPeerClearsEdges() throws {
@@ -75,12 +76,28 @@ struct MeshTopologyTrackerTests {
let b = try hex("0A0B0C0D0E0F0001")
let c = try hex("0011223344556677")
tracker.recordRoute([a, b, c])
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a, c])
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: c, neighbors: [b])
let initialRoute = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c))
#expect(initialRoute == [a, b, c])
#expect(initialRoute == [b])
tracker.removePeer(b)
#expect(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c) == nil)
}
@Test func sameStartAndEndReturnsEmptyRoute() throws {
let tracker = MeshTopologyTracker()
let a = try hex("0102030405060708")
let b = try hex("1112131415161718")
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a])
// When start == end, route should be empty (no intermediate hops needed)
let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: a))
#expect(route == [])
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
//
// MessageRouterTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Tests for MessageRouter transport selection and outbox behavior.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
struct MessageRouterTests {
@Test @MainActor
func sendPrivate_usesReachableTransport() async {
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0000000000000001")
let transportA = MockTransport()
let transportB = MockTransport()
transportB.reachablePeers.insert(peerID)
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transportA, transportB])
router.sendPrivate("Hello", to: peerID, recipientNickname: "Peer", messageID: "m1")
#expect(transportA.sentPrivateMessages.isEmpty)
#expect(transportB.sentPrivateMessages.count == 1)
}
@Test @MainActor
func sendPrivate_queuesThenFlushesWhenReachable() async {
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0000000000000002")
let transport = MockTransport()
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport])
router.sendPrivate("Queued", to: peerID, recipientNickname: "Peer", messageID: "m2")
#expect(transport.sentPrivateMessages.isEmpty)
transport.reachablePeers.insert(peerID)
router.flushOutbox(for: peerID)
#expect(transport.sentPrivateMessages.count == 1)
}
@Test @MainActor
func sendReadReceipt_usesReachableTransport() async {
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0000000000000003")
let transport = MockTransport()
transport.reachablePeers.insert(peerID)
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport])
let receipt = ReadReceipt(originalMessageID: "m3", readerID: transport.myPeerID, readerNickname: "Me")
router.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: peerID)
#expect(transport.sentReadReceipts.count == 1)
}
@Test @MainActor
func sendFavoriteNotification_usesConnectedOrReachable() async {
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0000000000000004")
let transport = MockTransport()
transport.reachablePeers.insert(peerID)
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport])
router.sendFavoriteNotification(to: peerID, isFavorite: true)
#expect(transport.sentFavoriteNotifications.count == 1)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
//
// NostrTransportTests.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
import Testing
@testable import bitchat
@Suite("NostrTransport Thread Safety Tests")
struct NostrTransportTests {
@Test("Concurrent read receipt enqueue does not crash")
@MainActor
func concurrentReadReceiptEnqueue() async throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychain)
let transport = NostrTransport(keychain: keychain, idBridge: idBridge)
// Create 100 concurrent read receipt submissions
let iterations = 100
await withTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask {
let receipt = ReadReceipt(
originalMessageID: UUID().uuidString,
readerID: PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", i)),
readerNickname: "Reader\(i)"
)
let peerID = PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", i))
transport.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: peerID)
}
}
}
// If we reach here without crashing, the test passes
// The concurrent enqueue operations completed without data races
}
@Test("Read queue processes under concurrent load")
@MainActor
func readQueueProcessingUnderLoad() async throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychain)
let transport = NostrTransport(keychain: keychain, idBridge: idBridge)
// Rapidly enqueue many receipts from multiple concurrent sources
let iterations = 50
// First batch - rapid fire
for i in 0..<iterations {
let receipt = ReadReceipt(
originalMessageID: UUID().uuidString,
readerID: PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", i)),
readerNickname: "Reader\(i)"
)
transport.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", i)))
}
// Give some time for processing to start
try await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000) // 100ms
// Second batch - while first might be processing
await withTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
for i in iterations..<(iterations * 2) {
group.addTask {
let receipt = ReadReceipt(
originalMessageID: UUID().uuidString,
readerID: PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", i)),
readerNickname: "Reader\(i)"
)
transport.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", i)))
}
}
}
// If we reach here without crashing or deadlocking, test passes
}
@Test("isPeerReachable is thread safe")
@MainActor
func isPeerReachableThreadSafety() async throws {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychain)
let transport = NostrTransport(keychain: keychain, idBridge: idBridge)
let iterations = 100
// Concurrent reads on isPeerReachable
await withTaskGroup(of: Bool.self) { group in
for i in 0..<iterations {
group.addTask {
let peerID = PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", i))
return transport.isPeerReachable(peerID)
}
}
// Collect results (all should be false since no favorites configured)
for await result in group {
#expect(result == false)
}
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
//
// PrivateChatManagerTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Tests for PrivateChatManager read receipt and selection behavior.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
struct PrivateChatManagerTests {
@Test @MainActor
func startChat_setsSelectedAndClearsUnread() async {
let transport = MockTransport()
let manager = PrivateChatManager(meshService: transport)
let peerID = PeerID(str: "00000000000000AA")
manager.privateChats[peerID] = [
BitchatMessage(
id: "pm-1",
sender: "Peer",
content: "Hi",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Me",
senderPeerID: peerID
)
]
manager.unreadMessages.insert(peerID)
manager.startChat(with: peerID)
#expect(manager.selectedPeer == peerID)
#expect(!manager.unreadMessages.contains(peerID))
#expect(manager.privateChats[peerID] != nil)
}
@Test @MainActor
func markAsRead_sendsReadReceiptViaRouter() async {
let transport = MockTransport()
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport])
let manager = PrivateChatManager(meshService: transport)
manager.messageRouter = router
let peerID = PeerID(str: "00000000000000BB")
transport.reachablePeers.insert(peerID)
manager.privateChats[peerID] = [
BitchatMessage(
id: "pm-2",
sender: "Peer",
content: "Hi",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Me",
senderPeerID: peerID
)
]
manager.unreadMessages.insert(peerID)
manager.markAsRead(from: peerID)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
#expect(transport.sentReadReceipts.count == 1)
#expect(manager.sentReadReceipts.contains("pm-2"))
#expect(!manager.unreadMessages.contains(peerID))
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
//
// RelayControllerTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Tests for relay decision logic.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
struct RelayControllerTests {
@Test
func ttlOne_doesNotRelay() async {
let decision = RelayController.decide(
ttl: 1,
senderIsSelf: false,
isEncrypted: false,
isDirectedEncrypted: false,
isFragment: false,
isDirectedFragment: false,
isHandshake: false,
isAnnounce: false,
degree: 0,
highDegreeThreshold: TransportConfig.bleHighDegreeThreshold
)
#expect(!decision.shouldRelay)
#expect(decision.newTTL == 1)
}
@Test
func handshake_alwaysRelaysWithTTLDecrement() async {
let decision = RelayController.decide(
ttl: 3,
senderIsSelf: false,
isEncrypted: false,
isDirectedEncrypted: false,
isFragment: false,
isDirectedFragment: false,
isHandshake: true,
isAnnounce: false,
degree: 3,
highDegreeThreshold: TransportConfig.bleHighDegreeThreshold
)
#expect(decision.shouldRelay)
#expect(decision.newTTL == 2)
#expect(decision.delayMs >= 10 && decision.delayMs <= 35)
}
@Test
func fragment_relaysWithFragmentCap() async {
let decision = RelayController.decide(
ttl: 10,
senderIsSelf: false,
isEncrypted: false,
isDirectedEncrypted: false,
isFragment: true,
isDirectedFragment: false,
isHandshake: false,
isAnnounce: false,
degree: 3,
highDegreeThreshold: TransportConfig.bleHighDegreeThreshold
)
let ttlCap = min(UInt8(10), TransportConfig.bleFragmentRelayTtlCap)
let expected = ttlCap &- 1
#expect(decision.shouldRelay)
#expect(decision.newTTL == expected)
#expect(decision.delayMs >= TransportConfig.bleFragmentRelayMinDelayMs)
#expect(decision.delayMs <= TransportConfig.bleFragmentRelayMaxDelayMs)
}
@Test
func denseGraph_capsTTL() async {
let decision = RelayController.decide(
ttl: 10,
senderIsSelf: false,
isEncrypted: false,
isDirectedEncrypted: false,
isFragment: false,
isDirectedFragment: false,
isHandshake: false,
isAnnounce: false,
degree: TransportConfig.bleHighDegreeThreshold,
highDegreeThreshold: TransportConfig.bleHighDegreeThreshold
)
#expect(decision.shouldRelay)
#expect(decision.newTTL == 4)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
//
// UnifiedPeerServiceTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Tests for UnifiedPeerService fingerprint and block resolution.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
struct UnifiedPeerServiceTests {
@Test @MainActor
func getFingerprint_prefersMeshService() async {
let transport = MockTransport()
let identity = TestIdentityManager()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: MockKeychainHelper())
let service = UnifiedPeerService(meshService: transport, idBridge: idBridge, identityManager: identity)
let peerID = PeerID(str: "00000000000000CC")
transport.peerFingerprints[peerID] = "fp-1"
let fingerprint = service.getFingerprint(for: peerID)
#expect(fingerprint == "fp-1")
}
@Test @MainActor
func isBlocked_usesSocialIdentity() async {
let transport = MockTransport()
let identity = TestIdentityManager()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: MockKeychainHelper())
let service = UnifiedPeerService(meshService: transport, idBridge: idBridge, identityManager: identity)
let peerID = PeerID(str: "00000000000000DD")
let fingerprint = "fp-blocked"
transport.peerFingerprints[peerID] = fingerprint
identity.setBlocked(fingerprint, isBlocked: true)
#expect(service.isBlocked(peerID))
}
}
private final class TestIdentityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
private var socialIdentities: [String: SocialIdentity] = [:]
private var favorites: Set<String> = []
private var blockedNostr: Set<String> = []
private var verified: Set<String> = []
func forceSave() {}
func getSocialIdentity(for fingerprint: String) -> SocialIdentity? {
socialIdentities[fingerprint]
}
func upsertCryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: String, noisePublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data?, claimedNickname: String?) {}
func getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(_ peerID: PeerID) -> [CryptographicIdentity] {
[]
}
func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) {
socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint] = identity
}
func getFavorites() -> Set<String> {
favorites
}
func setFavorite(_ fingerprint: String, isFavorite: Bool) {
if isFavorite {
favorites.insert(fingerprint)
} else {
favorites.remove(fingerprint)
}
}
func isFavorite(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
favorites.contains(fingerprint)
}
func isBlocked(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
socialIdentities[fingerprint]?.isBlocked ?? false
}
func setBlocked(_ fingerprint: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
var identity = socialIdentities[fingerprint] ?? SocialIdentity(
fingerprint: fingerprint,
localPetname: nil,
claimedNickname: "",
trustLevel: .unknown,
isFavorite: false,
isBlocked: false,
notes: nil
)
identity.isBlocked = isBlocked
socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
}
func isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool {
blockedNostr.contains(pubkeyHexLowercased)
}
func setNostrBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
if isBlocked {
blockedNostr.insert(pubkeyHexLowercased)
} else {
blockedNostr.remove(pubkeyHexLowercased)
}
}
func getBlockedNostrPubkeys() -> Set<String> {
blockedNostr
}
func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState) {}
func updateHandshakeState(peerID: PeerID, state: HandshakeState) {}
func clearAllIdentityData() {
socialIdentities.removeAll()
favorites.removeAll()
blockedNostr.removeAll()
verified.removeAll()
}
func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID) {}
func setVerified(fingerprint: String, verified: Bool) {
if verified {
self.verified.insert(fingerprint)
} else {
self.verified.remove(fingerprint)
}
}
func isVerified(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
verified.contains(fingerprint)
}
func getVerifiedFingerprints() -> Set<String> {
verified
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
//
// SubscriptionRateLimitTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
/// Tests for BCH-01-004 fix: Rate-limiting subscription-triggered announces
/// to prevent device enumeration attacks
struct SubscriptionRateLimitTests {
@Test("Rate limit configuration values are sensible")
func rateLimitConfigurationValues() {
// Minimum interval should be at least 1 second to slow enumeration
#expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds >= 1.0)
// Backoff factor should be > 1 for exponential backoff
#expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitBackoffFactor > 1.0)
// Max backoff should be reasonable (not hours)
#expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds <= 60.0)
#expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds >= TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds)
// Window should be long enough to track repeated attempts
#expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitWindowSeconds >= 30.0)
// Max attempts before suppression should be > 1 to allow legitimate reconnects
#expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxAttempts >= 2)
}
@Test("Exponential backoff calculation is correct")
func exponentialBackoffCalculation() {
let minInterval = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds
let factor = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitBackoffFactor
let maxBackoff = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds
// Simulate backoff progression
var currentBackoff = minInterval
var iterations = 0
let maxIterations = 10
while currentBackoff < maxBackoff && iterations < maxIterations {
let nextBackoff = min(currentBackoff * factor, maxBackoff)
#expect(nextBackoff >= currentBackoff, "Backoff should increase or stay at max")
currentBackoff = nextBackoff
iterations += 1
}
// Should reach max within reasonable iterations
#expect(iterations <= maxIterations, "Backoff should reach max within \(maxIterations) iterations")
#expect(currentBackoff == maxBackoff, "Final backoff should equal max")
}
@Test("Rate limiting would significantly slow enumeration attacks")
func rateLimitingSlowsEnumeration() {
// Without rate limiting: ~120 devices/minute (0.5 seconds per device)
// With rate limiting: minimum interval enforced
let minInterval = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds
let devicesPerMinuteWithRateLimit = 60.0 / minInterval
// Should be significantly slower than 120 devices/minute
#expect(devicesPerMinuteWithRateLimit < 60, "Rate limiting should significantly slow enumeration")
// With 2-second minimum interval, max ~30 devices/minute per connection
// And with backoff, repeated attempts are even slower
#expect(devicesPerMinuteWithRateLimit <= 30, "With 2s minimum, should be <=30/min")
}
@Test("Max attempts threshold prevents complete enumeration")
func maxAttemptsThresholdPreventsEnumeration() {
let maxAttempts = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxAttempts
// After max attempts within window, announces are suppressed entirely
// This means an attacker gets at most maxAttempts announces per window
#expect(maxAttempts >= 2, "Should allow at least 2 attempts for legitimate reconnects")
#expect(maxAttempts <= 10, "Should cap attempts to prevent enumeration")
// With 5 attempts max and 2s minimum interval, attacker gets limited info
let maxAnnounces = maxAttempts
#expect(maxAnnounces <= 10, "Max announces per window should be limited")
}
}
@@ -93,6 +93,22 @@ final class TestHelpers {
try await sleep(0.01)
}
}
@MainActor
static func waitUntil(
_ condition: @escaping () -> Bool,
timeout: TimeInterval = TestConstants.defaultTimeout,
pollInterval: TimeInterval = 0.01
) async -> Bool {
let start = Date()
while !condition() {
if Date().timeIntervalSince(start) > timeout {
return condition()
}
try? await sleep(pollInterval)
}
return true
}
static func expectAsync<T>(
timeout: TimeInterval = TestConstants.defaultTimeout,
+108
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
//
// HexStringTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Tests for Data(hexString:) hex parsing
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
struct HexStringTests {
// MARK: - Valid Hex Strings
@Test func validHexString() {
let data = Data(hexString: "0102030405")
#expect(data == Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05]))
}
@Test func validHexStringUppercase() {
let data = Data(hexString: "AABBCCDD")
#expect(data == Data([0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD]))
}
@Test func validHexStringMixedCase() {
let data = Data(hexString: "aAbBcCdD")
#expect(data == Data([0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD]))
}
@Test func validHexStringWith0xPrefix() {
let data = Data(hexString: "0x0102030405")
#expect(data == Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05]))
}
@Test func validHexStringWith0XPrefix() {
let data = Data(hexString: "0XAABBCCDD")
#expect(data == Data([0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD]))
}
@Test func validHexStringWithWhitespace() {
let data = Data(hexString: " 0102030405 ")
#expect(data == Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05]))
}
@Test func validHexStringWith0xPrefixAndWhitespace() {
let data = Data(hexString: " 0x0102030405 ")
#expect(data == Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05]))
}
@Test func emptyHexString() {
let data = Data(hexString: "")
#expect(data == Data())
}
@Test func emptyHexStringWithWhitespace() {
let data = Data(hexString: " ")
#expect(data == Data())
}
@Test func emptyHexStringWith0xPrefix() {
let data = Data(hexString: "0x")
#expect(data == Data())
}
// MARK: - Invalid Hex Strings
@Test func oddLengthHexStringReturnsNil() {
let data = Data(hexString: "012")
#expect(data == nil)
}
@Test func oddLengthHexStringWith0xPrefixReturnsNil() {
let data = Data(hexString: "0x012")
#expect(data == nil)
}
@Test func invalidCharactersReturnNil() {
let data = Data(hexString: "GHIJ")
#expect(data == nil)
}
@Test func mixedValidAndInvalidCharactersReturnNil() {
let data = Data(hexString: "01GH")
#expect(data == nil)
}
@Test func specialCharactersReturnNil() {
let data = Data(hexString: "01-02")
#expect(data == nil)
}
// MARK: - Round Trip Tests
@Test func roundTripConversion() {
let original = Data([0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF])
let hexString = original.hexEncodedString()
let roundTripped = Data(hexString: hexString)
#expect(roundTripped == original)
}
@Test func roundTripConversionWith0xPrefix() {
let original = Data([0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF])
let hexString = "0x" + original.hexEncodedString()
let roundTripped = Data(hexString: hexString)
#expect(roundTripped == original)
}
}
+66
View File
@@ -426,4 +426,70 @@ struct PeerIDTests {
#expect(!PeerID(str: "nostr:\(hex65)").isValid)
#expect(!PeerID(str: "nostr_\(hex65)").isValid)
}
// MARK: - File Transfer PeerID Normalization
// These tests verify the fix for asymmetric voice/media delivery (BCH-01-XXX)
// The bug occurred when selectedPrivateChatPeer was migrated to 64-hex stable key
// but the receiver expected SHA256-derived 16-hex format
@Test func fileTransfer_toShortNormalizesNoiseKeyToFingerprint() {
// Given: A 64-hex Noise public key (what selectedPrivateChatPeer becomes after session)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xAB, count: 32)
let stableKeyPeerID = PeerID(hexData: noiseKey) // 64-hex
// When: Convert to short form (what sendFilePrivate should do)
let shortID = stableKeyPeerID.toShort()
// Then: Should be 16-hex SHA256 fingerprint (matching myPeerID format)
let expected = noiseKey.sha256Fingerprint().prefix(16)
#expect(shortID.id == String(expected))
#expect(shortID.id.count == 16)
}
@Test func fileTransfer_shortIDMatchesMyPeerIDFormat() {
// Given: A receiver's myPeerID is SHA256-derived (from refreshPeerIdentity)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xCD, count: 32)
let myPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey) // SHA256-derived 16-hex
// When: Sender uses toShort() on 64-hex stable key
let senderStableKey = PeerID(hexData: noiseKey) // 64-hex
let recipientData = Data(hexString: senderStableKey.toShort().id)!
let receivedRecipientID = PeerID(hexData: recipientData)
// Then: Should match receiver's myPeerID (file transfer accepted)
#expect(receivedRecipientID == myPeerID)
}
@Test func fileTransfer_truncatedRawKeyDoesNotMatchMyPeerID() {
// This test demonstrates the bug we fixed
// When 64-hex was truncated to first 8 bytes instead of using SHA256 fingerprint
// Given: Receiver's myPeerID is SHA256-derived
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xEF, count: 32)
let myPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey) // SHA256-derived 16-hex
// When: Truncate raw key (the OLD buggy behavior)
let truncatedRaw = noiseKey.prefix(8) // First 8 bytes of raw key
let wrongRecipientID = PeerID(hexData: truncatedRaw)
// Then: Should NOT match (demonstrates why fix was needed)
#expect(wrongRecipientID != myPeerID)
}
@Test func fileTransfer_shortIDProducesCorrect8ByteRoutingData() {
// Verify the wire format is correct (8 bytes for BinaryProtocol)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x12, count: 32)
let stableKeyPeerID = PeerID(hexData: noiseKey)
let shortID = stableKeyPeerID.toShort()
// routingData should be 8 bytes (16 hex chars -> 8 bytes)
let routingData = shortID.routingData
#expect(routingData != nil)
#expect(routingData?.count == 8)
// And it should match SHA256 fingerprint first 8 bytes
let expectedFingerprint = noiseKey.sha256Fingerprint()
let expectedFirst8 = Data(hexString: String(expectedFingerprint.prefix(16)))
#expect(routingData == expectedFirst8)
}
}
+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
# Geohash Presence Specification
## Overview
The Geohash Presence feature provides a mechanism to track online participants in geohash-based location channels. It uses a dedicated ephemeral Nostr event kind to broadcast "heartbeats," ensuring accurate and privacy-preserving online counts.
## Nostr Protocol
### Event Kind
A new ephemeral event kind is defined for presence heartbeats:
- **Kind:** `20001` (`GEOHASH_PRESENCE`)
- **Type:** Ephemeral (not stored by relays long-term)
### Event Structure
The presence event mimics the structure of a geohash chat message (Kind 20000) but without content or nickname metadata, to minimize overhead and focus purely on "liveness".
```json
{
"kind": 20001,
"created_at": <timestamp>,
"tags": [
["g", "<geohash>"]
],
"content": "",
"pubkey": "<geohash_derived_pubkey>",
"id": "<event_id>",
"sig": "<signature>"
}
```
* **`content`**: Must be empty string.
* **`tags`**: Must include `["g", "<geohash>"]`. Should NOT include `["n", "<nickname>"]`.
* **`pubkey`**: The ephemeral identity derived specifically for this geohash (same as used for chat messages).
## Client Behavior
### 1. Broadcasting Presence
Clients MUST broadcast a Kind 20001 presence event globally when the app is open, regardless of which screen the user is viewing.
* **Global Heartbeat:**
* **Trigger:** Application start / initialization, or whenever location (available geohashes) changes.
* **Frequency:** Randomized loop interval between **40s and 80s** (average 60s).
* **Scope:** Sent to *all* geohash channels corresponding to the device's *current physical location*.
* **Privacy Restriction:** Presence MUST ONLY be broadcast to low-precision geohash levels to protect user privacy. Specifically:
* **Allowed:** `REGION` (precision 2), `PROVINCE` (precision 4), `CITY` (precision 5).
* **Denied:** `NEIGHBORHOOD` (precision 6), `BLOCK` (precision 7), `BUILDING` (precision 8+).
* **Decorrelation:** Individual broadcasts within a heartbeat loop must be separated by random delays (e.g., 2-5 seconds) to prevent temporal correlation of public keys across different geohash levels. The main loop delay is adjusted to maintain the target average cadence.
### 2. Subscribing to Presence
Clients must update their Nostr filters to listen for both chat and presence events on geohash channels.
* **Filter:**
* `kinds`: `[20000, 20001]`
* `#g`: `["<geohash>"]`
### 3. Participant Counting
The "online participants" count shown in the UI aggregates unique public keys from both presence heartbeats and active chat messages.
* **Logic:**
* Maintain a map of `pubkey -> last_seen_timestamp` for each geohash.
* Update `last_seen_timestamp` upon receiving a valid **Kind 20001 (Presence)** OR **Kind 20000 (Chat)** event.
* A participant is considered "online" if their `last_seen_timestamp` is within the last **5 minutes**.
### 4. UI Presentation
The presentation of the participant count depends on the geohash precision level and data availability.
* **Standard Display:** For channels where presence is broadcast (Region, Province, City) OR any channel where at least one participant has been detected, show the exact count: `[N people]`.
* **High-Precision Uncertainty:** For high-precision channels (Neighborhood, Block, Building) where:
* Presence broadcasting is disabled (privacy restriction).
* **AND** the detected participant count is `0`.
* **Display:** `[? people]`
* **Reasoning:** Since clients don't announce themselves in these channels, a count of "0" is misleading (people could be lurking).
### 5. Implementation Details (Android Reference)
* **`NostrKind.GEOHASH_PRESENCE`**: Added constant `20001`.
* **`NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent`**: Helper to generate the event.
* **`GeohashViewModel`**:
* `startGlobalPresenceHeartbeat()`: Coroutine that `collectLatest` on `LocationChannelManager.availableChannels`.
* Implements randomized loop logic (40-80s) and per-broadcast random delays (2-5s).
* Filters channels by `precision <= 5` before broadcasting.
* **`GeohashMessageHandler`**:
* Refactored `onEvent` to update participant counts for both Kind 20000 and 20001.
* **`LocationChannelsSheet`**:
* Implements the `[? people]` display logic for high-precision, zero-count channels.
## Benefits
* **Accuracy:** Counts reflect both active listeners (via heartbeats) and active speakers (via messages).
* **Privacy:** High-precision location presence is NOT broadcast. Temporal correlation between different levels is obfuscated via random delays.
* **Consistency:** "Online" status is maintained globally while the app is open.
* **Transparency:** The UI correctly reflects uncertainty (`?`) when privacy rules prevent accurate passive counting.
+48
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@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
# Request Sync Manager & V2 Packet Updates
This document details the implementation of the Request Sync Manager and updates to the V2 packet structure to improve synchronization security and attribution on iOS, mirroring the Android implementation.
## Overview
The goal of these changes is to make the request sync functionality "less blind". Previously, sync requests were broadcast, and responses were accepted without strict attribution or timestamp validation (to allow syncing old messages). This opened up potential spoofing vectors and prevented us from enforcing timestamp checks on normal traffic.
The new implementation introduces a **RequestSyncManager** to track outgoing sync requests and attributes incoming responses (RSR - Request-Sync Response) to specific peers. This allows us to:
1. **Enforce Timestamp Validation**: Normal packets now require timestamps to be within 2 minutes of the local clock.
2. **Exempt Solicited Sync Responses**: Packets marked as RSR are exempt from timestamp validation *only if* they correspond to a valid, pending sync request sent to that specific peer.
3. **Prevent Unsolicited Sync Floods**: Unsolicited RSR packets are rejected.
## Protocol Changes
### Binary Protocol Updates
* **New Flag**: `IS_RSR` (0x10) added to the packet header flags.
* **BitchatPacket**: Updated to include `isRSR: Bool` field.
* **Encoding/Decoding**: Updated `BinaryProtocol` to handle the new flag.
### Request Sync Payload
The `REQUEST_SYNC` packet payload (TLV encoded) has been updated to include:
* **Future Filters**:
* `sinceTimestamp` (Type 0x05): To request packets since a certain time (UInt64 big-endian).
* `fragmentIdFilter` (Type 0x06): To request specific fragments (UTF-8 string).
## Architecture
### RequestSyncManager
A new component (`Sync/RequestSyncManager.swift`) responsible for:
* **Tracking**: Stores `peerID -> timestamp` mappings for pending sync requests.
* **Validation**: `isValidResponse(from: PeerID, isRSR: Bool)` checks if an incoming RSR packet matches a pending request within the 30-second window.
* **Cleanup**: Periodically removes expired requests.
### GossipSyncManager Updates
* **Unicast Sync**: Instead of blind broadcasting, the periodic sync task now iterates over connected peers and sends unicast `REQUEST_SYNC` packets.
* **Registration**: Before sending, requests are registered with `RequestSyncManager`.
* **Response Marking**: When responding to a `REQUEST_SYNC`, generated packets (Announce/Message) are explicitly marked with `isRSR = true` (and `ttl = 0`).
### BLEService (Security Manager) Updates
* **Timestamp Enforcement**: Checks `abs(now - packetTimestamp) < 2 minutes` for standard packets.
* **Conditional Exemption**: If `packet.isRSR` is true (or packet is a legacy TTL=0 response), it queries `RequestSyncManager`.
* **Valid**: If solicited, timestamp check is skipped (allowing historical data sync).
* **Invalid**: If unsolicited or timed out, the packet is rejected.
## Usage
These changes are integrated into `BLEService` and `GossipSyncManager`. No external API changes are required for clients, but all peers must be updated to support the new `IS_RSR` flag and protocol logic to participate in the secure sync process.
+146
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@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
# Source-Based Routing for BitChat Packets (v2)
This document specifies the Source-Based Routing extension (v2) for the BitChat protocol. This upgrade enables efficient unicast routing across the mesh by allowing senders to specify an explicit path of intermediate relays.
**Status:** Implemented in Android and iOS. Backward compatible (v1 clients ignore routing data).
---
## 1. Protocol Versioning & Layering
To support source routing and larger payloads, the packet format has been upgraded to **Version 2**.
* **Version 1 (Legacy):** 2-byte payload length limit. Ignores routing flags.
* **Version 2 (Current):** 4-byte payload length limit. Supports Source Routing.
**Key Rule:** The `HAS_ROUTE (0x08)` flag is **only valid** if the packet `version >= 2`. Relays receiving a v1 packet must ignore this flag even if set.
---
## 2. Packet Structure Comparison
The following diagram illustrates the structural differences between a standard v1 packet and a source-routed v2 packet.
### V1 Packet (Legacy)
```text
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Fixed Header (14) | Variable Sections |
+-------------------+----------+-------------+------------------+-------------+
| Ver: 1 (1B) | SenderID | RecipientID | Payload | Signature |
| Type, TTL, etc. | (8B) | (8B) | (Length in Head) | (64B) |
| Len: 2 Bytes | | (Optional) | | (Optional) |
+-------------------+----------+-------------+------------------+-------------+
```
### V2 Packet (Source Routed)
```text
+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Fixed Header (16) | Variable Sections |
+-------------------+----------+-------------+-----------------------+------------------+-------------+
| Ver: 2 (1B) | SenderID | RecipientID | SOURCE ROUTE | Payload | Signature |
| Type, TTL, etc. | (8B) | (8B) | (Variable) | (Length in Head) | (64B) |
| Len: 4 Bytes | | (Required*) | Only if HAS_ROUTE=1 | | (Optional) |
+-------------------+----------+-------------+-----------------------+------------------+-------------+
```
**(*) Note:** A `Route` can be attached to **any** packet type that has a `RecipientID` (flag `HAS_RECIPIENT` set).
### Fixed Header Differences
| Field | Size (v1) | Size (v2) | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Version** | 1 byte | 1 byte | `0x01` vs `0x02` |
| **Payload Length** | **2 bytes** | **4 bytes** | `UInt32` in v2 to support large files. **Excludes** route/IDs/sig. |
| **Total Size** | **14 bytes** | **16 bytes** | V2 header is 2 bytes larger. |
---
## 3. Source Route Specification
The `Source Route` field is a variable-length list of **intermediate hops** that the packet must traverse.
* **Location:** Immediately follows `RecipientID`.
* **Structure:**
* `Count` (1 byte): Number of intermediate hops (`N`).
* `Hops` (`N * 8` bytes): Sequence of Peer IDs.
### Intermediate Hops Only
The route list MUST contain **only** the intermediate relays between the sender and the recipient.
* **DO NOT** include the `SenderID` (it is already in the packet).
* **DO NOT** include the `RecipientID` (it is already in the packet).
**Example:**
Topology: `Alice (Sender) -> Bob -> Charlie -> Dave (Recipient)`
* Packet `SenderID`: Alice
* Packet `RecipientID`: Dave
* Packet `Route`: `[Bob, Charlie]` (Count = 2)
---
## 4. Topology Discovery (Gossip)
To calculate routes, nodes need a view of the network topology. This is achieved via a **Neighbor List** extension to the `IdentityAnnouncement` packet.
The `ANNOUNCE` packet payload now consists of a sequence of TLVs. The standard identity information is followed by an optional Gossip TLV.
* **Mechanism:** Appended to the `IdentityAnnouncement` payload.
* **New TLV Type:** `0x04` (Direct Neighbors).
* **Content:** A list of Peer IDs that the announcing node is directly connected to.
**TLV Structure (Type 0x04):**
```text
[Type: 0x04] [Length: 1B] [NeighborID1 (8B)] [NeighborID2 (8B)] ...
```
The `Length` field indicates the total size of the neighbor IDs in bytes (N * 8). There is no explicit count field.
Nodes receiving this TLV update their local mesh graph, linking the sender to the listed neighbors.
### Edge Verification (Two-Way Handshake)
To prevent spoofing and routing through stale connections, the Mesh Graph service implements a strict two-way handshake verification:
* **Unconfirmed Edge:** If Peer A announces Peer B, but Peer B does *not* announce Peer A, the connection is treated as **unconfirmed**. Unconfirmed edges are visualized as dotted lines in debug tools but are **excluded** from route calculations.
* **Confirmed Edge:** An edge is only valid for routing when **both** peers explicitly announce each other in their neighbor lists. This ensures that the connection is bidirectional and currently active from both perspectives.
---
## 5. Fragmentation & Source Routing
When a large source-routed packet (e.g., File Transfer) exceeds the MTU and requires fragmentation:
1. **Version Inheritance:** All fragments MUST be marked as **Version 2**.
2. **Route Inheritance:** All fragments MUST contain the **exact same Route field** as the parent packet.
**Why?** If fragments were sent as v1 packets or without routes, they would fall back to flooding, negating the bandwidth benefits of source routing for large data transfers.
---
## 6. Security & Signing
Source routing is fully secured by the existing Ed25519 signature scheme.
* **Scope:** The signature covers the **entire packet structure** (Header + Sender + Recipient + Route + Payload).
* **Verification:** The receiver verifies the signature against the `SenderID`'s public key.
* **Integrity:** Any tampering with the route list by malicious relays will invalidate the signature, causing the packet to be dropped by the destination.
**Signature Input Construction:**
Serialize the packet exactly as transmitted, but temporarily set `TTL = 0` and remove the `Signature` bytes.
---
## 7. Relay Logic
When a node receives a packet **not** addressed to itself:
1. **Check Route:**
* Is `Version >= 2`?
* Is `HAS_ROUTE` flag set?
* Is the route list non-empty?
2. **If YES (Source Routed):**
* Find local Peer ID in the route list at index `i`.
* **Next Hop:** The peer at `i + 1`.
* **Last Hop:** If `i` is the last index, the Next Hop is the `RecipientID`.
* **Action:** Attempt to unicast (`sendToPeer`) to the Next Hop.
* **Fallback:** If the Next Hop is unreachable, **fall back to broadcast/flood** to ensure delivery.
3. **If NO (Standard):**
* Flood the packet to all connected neighbors (subject to TTL and probability rules).
+3
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
/target/
/.build/
/.swiftpm/
+5046
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
[workspace]
resolver = "2"
members = ["arti-bitchat"]
[profile.release]
opt-level = "z"
lto = "fat"
codegen-units = 1
panic = "abort"
strip = "symbols"
@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@
<array>
<dict>
<key>BinaryPath</key>
<string>tor-nolzma.framework/tor-nolzma</string>
<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
<key>HeadersPath</key>
<string>Headers</string>
<key>LibraryIdentifier</key>
<string>macos-arm64</string>
<key>LibraryPath</key>
<string>tor-nolzma.framework</string>
<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
<key>SupportedArchitectures</key>
<array>
<string>arm64</string>
@@ -20,11 +22,29 @@
</dict>
<dict>
<key>BinaryPath</key>
<string>tor-nolzma.framework/tor-nolzma</string>
<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
<key>HeadersPath</key>
<string>Headers</string>
<key>LibraryIdentifier</key>
<string>ios-arm64</string>
<key>LibraryPath</key>
<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
<key>SupportedArchitectures</key>
<array>
<string>arm64</string>
</array>
<key>SupportedPlatform</key>
<string>ios</string>
</dict>
<dict>
<key>BinaryPath</key>
<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
<key>HeadersPath</key>
<string>Headers</string>
<key>LibraryIdentifier</key>
<string>ios-arm64-simulator</string>
<key>LibraryPath</key>
<string>tor-nolzma.framework</string>
<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
<key>SupportedArchitectures</key>
<array>
<string>arm64</string>
@@ -34,20 +54,6 @@
<key>SupportedPlatformVariant</key>
<string>simulator</string>
</dict>
<dict>
<key>BinaryPath</key>
<string>tor-nolzma.framework/tor-nolzma</string>
<key>LibraryIdentifier</key>
<string>ios-arm64</string>
<key>LibraryPath</key>
<string>tor-nolzma.framework</string>
<key>SupportedArchitectures</key>
<array>
<string>arm64</string>
</array>
<key>SupportedPlatform</key>
<string>ios</string>
</dict>
</array>
<key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
<string>XFWK</string>
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
#ifndef ARTI_H
#define ARTI_H
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
/**
* Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
*
* # Arguments
* * `data_dir` - Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
* * `socks_port` - Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if already running
* * -2 if data_dir is invalid
* * -3 if runtime initialization failed
* * -4 if bootstrap failed
*/
int arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
/**
* Stop Arti gracefully.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_stop(void);
/**
* Check if Arti is currently running.
*
* # Returns
* * 1 if running
* * 0 if not running
*/
int arti_is_running(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
*/
int arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap summary string.
*
* # Arguments
* * `buf` - Buffer to write the summary into
* * `len` - Length of the buffer
*
* # Returns
* * Number of bytes written (not including null terminator)
* * -1 if buffer is null or too small
*/
int arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int len);
/**
* Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
* This is a hint; Arti may not fully support dormant mode yet.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_go_dormant(void);
/**
* Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_wake(void);
#endif /* ARTI_H */
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
#ifndef ARTI_H
#define ARTI_H
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
/**
* Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
*
* # Arguments
* * `data_dir` - Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
* * `socks_port` - Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if already running
* * -2 if data_dir is invalid
* * -3 if runtime initialization failed
* * -4 if bootstrap failed
*/
int arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
/**
* Stop Arti gracefully.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_stop(void);
/**
* Check if Arti is currently running.
*
* # Returns
* * 1 if running
* * 0 if not running
*/
int arti_is_running(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
*/
int arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap summary string.
*
* # Arguments
* * `buf` - Buffer to write the summary into
* * `len` - Length of the buffer
*
* # Returns
* * Number of bytes written (not including null terminator)
* * -1 if buffer is null or too small
*/
int arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int len);
/**
* Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
* This is a hint; Arti may not fully support dormant mode yet.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_go_dormant(void);
/**
* Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_wake(void);
#endif /* ARTI_H */
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
#ifndef ARTI_H
#define ARTI_H
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
/**
* Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
*
* # Arguments
* * `data_dir` - Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
* * `socks_port` - Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if already running
* * -2 if data_dir is invalid
* * -3 if runtime initialization failed
* * -4 if bootstrap failed
*/
int arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
/**
* Stop Arti gracefully.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_stop(void);
/**
* Check if Arti is currently running.
*
* # Returns
* * 1 if running
* * 0 if not running
*/
int arti_is_running(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
*/
int arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap summary string.
*
* # Arguments
* * `buf` - Buffer to write the summary into
* * `len` - Length of the buffer
*
* # Returns
* * Number of bytes written (not including null terminator)
* * -1 if buffer is null or too small
*/
int arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int len);
/**
* Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
* This is a hint; Arti may not fully support dormant mode yet.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_go_dormant(void);
/**
* Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_wake(void);
#endif /* ARTI_H */
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
#ifndef ARTI_H
#define ARTI_H
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
/**
* Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
*
* # Arguments
* * `data_dir` - Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
* * `socks_port` - Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if already running
* * -2 if data_dir is invalid
* * -3 if runtime initialization failed
* * -4 if bootstrap failed
*/
int arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
/**
* Stop Arti gracefully.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_stop(void);
/**
* Check if Arti is currently running.
*
* # Returns
* * 1 if running
* * 0 if not running
*/
int arti_is_running(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
*/
int arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap summary string.
*
* # Arguments
* * `buf` - Buffer to write the summary into
* * `len` - Length of the buffer
*
* # Returns
* * Number of bytes written (not including null terminator)
* * -1 if buffer is null or too small
*/
int arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int len);
/**
* Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
* This is a hint; Arti may not fully support dormant mode yet.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_go_dormant(void);
/**
* Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
*
* # Returns
* * 0 on success
* * -1 if not running
*/
int arti_wake(void);
#endif /* ARTI_H */
+46
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
// swift-tools-version:5.9
import PackageDescription
let package = Package(
name: "Tor", // Keep name "Tor" for drop-in compatibility
platforms: [
.iOS(.v16),
.macOS(.v13),
],
products: [
.library(
name: "Tor",
targets: ["Tor"]
),
],
dependencies: [
.package(path: "../BitLogger"),
],
targets: [
// Main Swift target
.target(
name: "Tor",
dependencies: [
"arti",
.product(name: "BitLogger", package: "BitLogger"),
],
path: "Sources",
exclude: ["C"],
sources: [
"TorManager.swift",
"TorURLSession.swift",
"TorNotifications.swift",
],
linkerSettings: [
.linkedLibrary("resolv"),
.linkedLibrary("z"),
.linkedLibrary("sqlite3"),
]
),
// Binary framework containing the Rust static library
.binaryTarget(
name: "arti",
path: "Frameworks/arti.xcframework"
),
]
)
+3
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
// Empty shim file to satisfy SPM target requirements.
// The actual implementation is in the Rust static library (arti.xcframework).
// This file exists only to make SPM happy with a C target.
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
#ifndef ARTI_H
#define ARTI_H
#include <stdint.h>
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/**
* Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
*
* @param data_dir Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
* @param socks_port Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
* @return 0 on success, negative on error:
* -1: already running
* -2: invalid data_dir
* -3: runtime initialization failed
* -4: bootstrap failed
*/
int32_t arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
/**
* Stop Arti gracefully.
*
* @return 0 on success, -1 if not running
*/
int32_t arti_stop(void);
/**
* Check if Arti is currently running.
*
* @return 1 if running, 0 if not running
*/
int32_t arti_is_running(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
*
* @return Progress percentage
*/
int32_t arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
/**
* Get the current bootstrap summary string.
*
* @param buf Buffer to write the summary into
* @param len Length of the buffer
* @return Number of bytes written, -1 on error
*/
int32_t arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int32_t len);
/**
* Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
*
* @return 0 on success, -1 if not running
*/
int32_t arti_go_dormant(void);
/**
* Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
*
* @return 0 on success, -1 if not running
*/
int32_t arti_wake(void);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* ARTI_H */
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
module ArtiC {
header "arti.h"
export *
}
+448
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
import BitLogger
import Foundation
#if canImport(Network)
import Network
#endif
#if !canImport(Network)
private final class NWPathMonitor {
var pathUpdateHandler: ((Any) -> Void)?
func start(queue: DispatchQueue) {
// Path monitoring is unavailable on this platform; nothing to do.
}
}
#endif
// FFI declarations for Arti (Rust)
@_silgen_name("arti_start")
private func arti_start(_ dataDir: UnsafePointer<CChar>, _ socksPort: UInt16) -> Int32
@_silgen_name("arti_stop")
private func arti_stop() -> Int32
@_silgen_name("arti_is_running")
private func arti_is_running() -> Int32
@_silgen_name("arti_bootstrap_progress")
private func arti_bootstrap_progress() -> Int32
@_silgen_name("arti_bootstrap_summary")
private func arti_bootstrap_summary(_ buf: UnsafeMutablePointer<CChar>, _ len: Int32) -> Int32
@_silgen_name("arti_go_dormant")
private func arti_go_dormant() -> Int32
@_silgen_name("arti_wake")
private func arti_wake() -> Int32
/// Arti-based Tor integration for BitChat.
/// - Boots a local Arti client and exposes a SOCKS5 proxy
/// on 127.0.0.1:socksPort. All app networking should await readiness and
/// route via this proxy. Fails closed by default when Tor is unavailable.
@MainActor
public final class TorManager: ObservableObject {
public static let shared = TorManager()
// SOCKS endpoint where Arti listens
let socksHost: String = "127.0.0.1"
let socksPort: Int = 39050
// State
@Published private(set) public var isReady: Bool = false
@Published private(set) var isStarting: Bool = false
@Published private(set) var lastError: Error?
@Published private(set) var bootstrapProgress: Int = 0
@Published private(set) var bootstrapSummary: String = ""
// Internal readiness trackers
private var socksReady: Bool = false { didSet { recomputeReady() } }
private var restarting: Bool = false
// Whether the app must enforce Tor for all connections (fail-closed).
public var torEnforced: Bool {
#if BITCHAT_DEV_ALLOW_CLEARNET
return false
#else
return true
#endif
}
// Returns true only when Tor is actually up (or dev fallback is compiled).
var networkPermitted: Bool {
if torEnforced { return isReady }
return true
}
private var didStart = false
private var bootstrapMonitorStarted = false
private var pathMonitor: NWPathMonitor?
private var isAppForeground: Bool = true
private var isDormant: Bool = false
private var lastRestartAt: Date? = nil
private var startedAt: Date? = nil // Tracks initial startup time for grace period
private(set) var allowAutoStart: Bool = false
private init() {}
// MARK: - Public API
public func startIfNeeded() {
guard allowAutoStart else { return }
guard isAppForeground else { return }
guard !didStart else { return }
didStart = true
isDormant = false
isStarting = true
startedAt = Date() // Track startup time for grace period
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: startIfNeeded() - startedAt set", category: .session)
lastError = nil
NotificationCenter.default.post(name: .TorWillStart, object: nil)
ensureFilesystemLayout()
startArti()
startPathMonitorIfNeeded()
}
public func setAppForeground(_ foreground: Bool) {
isAppForeground = foreground
}
public func isForeground() -> Bool { isAppForeground }
nonisolated
public func awaitReady(timeout: TimeInterval = 25.0) async -> Bool {
await MainActor.run {
if self.isAppForeground { self.startIfNeeded() }
}
let deadline = Date().addingTimeInterval(timeout)
if await MainActor.run(body: { self.networkPermitted }) { return true }
while Date() < deadline {
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 200_000_000)
if await MainActor.run(body: { self.networkPermitted }) { return true }
}
return await MainActor.run(body: { self.networkPermitted })
}
// MARK: - Filesystem
func dataDirectoryURL() -> URL? {
do {
let base = try FileManager.default.url(
for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
in: .userDomainMask,
appropriateFor: nil,
create: true
)
let dir = base.appendingPathComponent("bitchat/arti", isDirectory: true)
return dir
} catch {
return nil
}
}
private func ensureFilesystemLayout() {
guard let dir = dataDirectoryURL() else { return }
do {
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: dir, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
} catch {
// Non-fatal; Arti will surface errors during start if paths are missing
}
}
// MARK: - Arti Integration
private func startArti() {
guard let dir = dataDirectoryURL()?.path else {
isStarting = false
lastError = NSError(domain: "TorManager", code: -1, userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "No data directory"])
return
}
// Check if already running
if arti_is_running() != 0 {
SecureLogger.info("TorManager: Arti already running", category: .session)
startBootstrapMonitor()
return
}
let result = dir.withCString { dptr in
arti_start(dptr, UInt16(socksPort))
}
if result != 0 {
SecureLogger.error("TorManager: arti_start failed rc=\(result)", category: .session)
isStarting = false
lastError = NSError(domain: "TorManager", code: Int(result), userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "Arti start failed"])
return
}
SecureLogger.info("TorManager: arti_start OK (SOCKS \(socksHost):\(socksPort))", category: .session)
startBootstrapMonitor()
// Start SOCKS readiness probe
Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { [weak self] in
guard let self else { return }
let ready = await self.waitForSocksReady(timeout: 60.0)
await MainActor.run {
self.socksReady = ready
if ready {
SecureLogger.info("TorManager: SOCKS ready at \(self.socksHost):\(self.socksPort)", category: .session)
} else {
self.lastError = NSError(domain: "TorManager", code: -14, userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "SOCKS not reachable"])
SecureLogger.error("TorManager: SOCKS not reachable (timeout)", category: .session)
}
}
}
}
private func waitForSocksReady(timeout: TimeInterval) async -> Bool {
let deadline = Date().addingTimeInterval(timeout)
while Date() < deadline {
if await probeSocksOnce() { return true }
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 250_000_000)
}
return false
}
private func probeSocksOnce() async -> Bool {
#if canImport(Network)
await withCheckedContinuation { cont in
let params = NWParameters.tcp
let host = NWEndpoint.Host.ipv4(.loopback)
guard let port = NWEndpoint.Port(rawValue: UInt16(socksPort)) else {
cont.resume(returning: false)
return
}
let endpoint = NWEndpoint.hostPort(host: host, port: port)
let conn = NWConnection(to: endpoint, using: params)
var resumed = false
let resumeOnce: (Bool) -> Void = { value in
if !resumed {
resumed = true
cont.resume(returning: value)
}
}
conn.stateUpdateHandler = { state in
switch state {
case .ready:
resumeOnce(true)
conn.cancel()
case .failed, .cancelled:
resumeOnce(false)
conn.cancel()
default:
break
}
}
DispatchQueue.global(qos: .utility).asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + 1.0) {
resumeOnce(false)
conn.cancel()
}
conn.start(queue: DispatchQueue.global(qos: .utility))
}
#else
return false
#endif
}
// MARK: - Bootstrap Monitoring
private func startBootstrapMonitor() {
guard !bootstrapMonitorStarted else { return }
bootstrapMonitorStarted = true
Task.detached(priority: .utility) { [weak self] in
await self?.bootstrapPollLoop()
}
}
private func bootstrapPollLoop() async {
let deadline = Date().addingTimeInterval(75)
while Date() < deadline {
let progress = Int(arti_bootstrap_progress())
let summary = getBootstrapSummary()
await MainActor.run {
self.bootstrapProgress = progress
self.bootstrapSummary = summary
if progress >= 100 { self.isStarting = false }
self.recomputeReady()
}
if progress >= 100 { break }
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_000_000_000)
}
}
private func getBootstrapSummary() -> String {
var buf = [CChar](repeating: 0, count: 256)
let len = arti_bootstrap_summary(&buf, Int32(buf.count))
if len > 0 {
return String(cString: buf)
}
return ""
}
// MARK: - Foreground/Background
public func ensureRunningOnForeground() {
if !allowAutoStart { return }
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: ensureRunningOnForeground() started", category: .session)
Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { [weak self] in
guard let self = self else { return }
let claimed: Bool = await MainActor.run {
if self.isStarting || self.restarting { return false }
self.restarting = true
return true
}
if !claimed { return }
// Check if already ready
let alreadyReady = await MainActor.run { self.isReady }
if alreadyReady {
await MainActor.run { self.restarting = false }
return
}
// Arti doesn't support dormant/wake (it's a no-op stub), so always do full restart
await self.restartArti()
await MainActor.run { self.restarting = false }
}
}
public func goDormantOnBackground() {
// Arti doesn't support real dormant mode, so just mark as not ready.
// iOS will suspend the runtime anyway. On foreground we do a full restart.
// Clear isStarting so foreground recovery can proceed if bootstrap was interrupted.
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: goDormantOnBackground() called", category: .session)
Task { @MainActor in
self.isReady = false
self.socksReady = false
self.isStarting = false
}
}
public func shutdownCompletely() {
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: shutdownCompletely() called", category: .session)
Task.detached { [weak self] in
guard let self = self else { return }
_ = arti_stop()
// Wait for shutdown
var waited = 0
while arti_is_running() != 0 && waited < 50 {
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
waited += 1
}
await MainActor.run {
self.isDormant = false
self.isReady = false
self.socksReady = false
self.bootstrapProgress = 0
self.bootstrapSummary = ""
self.isStarting = false
self.didStart = false
self.restarting = false
self.bootstrapMonitorStarted = false
// Note: Don't clear startedAt here - it will be set fresh on next startIfNeeded()
// Clearing it here races with startup and defeats the grace period
}
}
}
private func restartArti() async {
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: restartArti() starting", category: .session)
await MainActor.run {
NotificationCenter.default.post(name: .TorWillRestart, object: nil)
self.isReady = false
self.socksReady = false
self.bootstrapProgress = 0
self.bootstrapSummary = ""
self.isStarting = true
self.isDormant = false
self.lastRestartAt = Date()
}
_ = arti_stop()
// Wait for stop
var waited = 0
while arti_is_running() != 0 && waited < 40 {
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
waited += 1
}
await MainActor.run {
self.bootstrapMonitorStarted = false
self.didStart = false
}
await MainActor.run { self.startIfNeeded() }
}
private func recomputeReady() {
let ready = socksReady && bootstrapProgress >= 100
if ready != isReady {
if !ready {
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: isReady -> false (socksReady=\(socksReady), bootstrap=\(bootstrapProgress))", category: .session)
}
isReady = ready
if ready {
NotificationCenter.default.post(name: .TorDidBecomeReady, object: nil)
}
}
}
private func startPathMonitorIfNeeded() {
#if canImport(Network)
guard pathMonitor == nil else { return }
let monitor = NWPathMonitor()
pathMonitor = monitor
let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "TorPathMonitor")
monitor.pathUpdateHandler = { [weak self] _ in
Task { @MainActor in
guard let self = self else { return }
if self.isAppForeground {
self.pokeTorOnPathChange()
}
}
}
monitor.start(queue: queue)
#endif
}
private func pokeTorOnPathChange() {
// Skip if we recently restarted
if let last = lastRestartAt, Date().timeIntervalSince(last) < 3.0 {
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: pokeTorOnPathChange() skipped - recent restart", category: .session)
return
}
// Skip during initial startup grace period (15s) to avoid race conditions
if let started = startedAt, Date().timeIntervalSince(started) < 15.0 {
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: pokeTorOnPathChange() skipped - startup grace period (\(Int(Date().timeIntervalSince(started)))s)", category: .session)
return
}
if isStarting || restarting {
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: pokeTorOnPathChange() skipped - isStarting=\(isStarting) restarting=\(restarting)", category: .session)
return
}
if isReady { return }
SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: pokeTorOnPathChange() - Arti not ready, initiating recovery", category: .session)
ensureRunningOnForeground()
}
}
// MARK: - Start policy configuration
extension TorManager {
@MainActor
public func setAutoStartAllowed(_ allow: Bool) {
allowAutoStart = allow
}
@MainActor
public func isAutoStartAllowed() -> Bool { allowAutoStart }
}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
[package]
name = "arti-bitchat"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"
rust-version = "1.86"
[lib]
crate-type = ["staticlib"]
[dependencies]
# Arti core - minimal features for client-only SOCKS proxy
arti-client = { version = "0.38", default-features = false, features = [
"tokio",
"rustls",
] }
# Async runtime
tokio = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
"rt-multi-thread",
"net",
"sync",
"time",
"macros",
] }
# Tor runtime compatibility
tor-rtcompat = { version = "0.38", default-features = false, features = ["tokio"] }
# FFI utilities
libc = "0.2"
once_cell = "1"
# Logging (minimal)
tracing = "0.1"
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", default-features = false, features = ["fmt"] }
[features]
default = []
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
language = "C"
include_guard = "ARTI_H"
no_includes = true
sys_includes = ["stdint.h", "stdbool.h"]
[export]
include = ["arti_start", "arti_stop", "arti_is_running", "arti_bootstrap_progress", "arti_bootstrap_summary", "arti_go_dormant", "arti_wake"]
[fn]
args = "Auto"
[parse]
parse_deps = false

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