Add a real security policy (#1489 )

* Add a real security policy Two drive-by template PRs (#1118, #1482) tried to fill this gap with unedited boilerplate. This is the actual policy: private vulnerability reporting (now enabled on the repo) as the channel, honest expectations for a volunteer project, and a scope section that separates the properties the app promises from the documented design behaviors that keep getting reported as vulnerabilities. Closes #1081 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Address Codex review: name the Nostr envelope format precisely 'Gift-wrapped' reads as NIP-59, and the scope section is exactly where a researcher calibrates expectations. Say what it is: bitchat's own private-envelope scheme, explicitly not NIP-17/44/59. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Keep the composer focused after sending with the return key (#1490 )
2026-07-26 20:25:22 +00:00 · 2026-07-26 21:33:59 +02:00 · 2026-07-26 21:19:12 +02:00 · 2026-07-26 21:01:38 +02:00 · 2026-07-26 19:45:37 +02:00 · 2026-07-26 19:26:29 +02:00
414 changed files with 79471 additions and 13843 deletions
@@ -1,42 +1,228 @@
-name: Fetch GeoRelays Data
+name: Propose GeoRelay Data Update
 on:
  schedule:
-    - cron: '0 6 * * 0'
+    - cron: "0 6 * * 0"
  workflow_dispatch:
 # Default to read-only. The publishing job receives only the scopes required
 # to push its branch and publish either a PR or a tracking issue.
 permissions:
-  contents: write
+  contents: read
-  pull-requests: write
+
 concurrency:
  group: georelay-data-update
  cancel-in-progress: false
 env:
  SOURCE_REPOSITORY: https://github.com/permissionlesstech/georelays.git
  UPDATE_BRANCH: automation/georelay-data
  TRACKING_ISSUE_TITLE: GeoRelay update awaiting pull request
 jobs:
-  update-relay-data:
+  propose-relay-data:
    name: Validate and propose relay data
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 10
    permissions:
      contents: write
      pull-requests: write
      issues: write
    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repository
+      - name: Checkout reviewed base
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        # Pinned actions/checkout v5 so a mutable action tag cannot change the
        # code that receives this job's write-capable token.
        uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd
        with:
-          token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          ref: main
          fetch-depth: 0
          # Do not expose the write token to fetch/validation subprocesses.
          persist-credentials: false
-      - name: Fetch GeoRelays
+      - name: Test GeoRelay validator
        run: |
-          wget -q https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv
+          set -euo pipefail
-          mv nostr_relays.csv ./relays/online_relays_gps.csv
+          python3 -m unittest discover -s scripts/tests -p "test_*.py" -v
-      - name: Check for changes
+      - name: Fetch candidate over pinned HTTPS policy
-        id: git-check
+        id: upstream
        run: |
-          git diff --exit-code || echo "changes=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          set -euo pipefail
          source_commit=$(git ls-remote --refs "$SOURCE_REPOSITORY" refs/heads/main | awk 'NR == 1 { print $1 }')
          if [[ ! "$source_commit" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]; then
            echo "::error::Could not resolve an immutable upstream commit"
            exit 1
          fi
          source_url="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/$source_commit/nostr_relays.csv"
          effective_url=$(curl --fail --show-error --silent --location --proto "=https" --proto-redir "=https" --tlsv1.2 --max-time 60 --retry 3 --retry-all-errors --output "$RUNNER_TEMP/georelays-candidate.csv" --write-out "%{url_effective}" "$source_url")
          if [[ "$effective_url" != "$source_url" ]]; then
            echo "::error::Unexpected GeoRelay redirect target: $effective_url"
            exit 1
          fi
          echo "source_commit=$source_commit" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          echo "source_url=$source_url" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-      - name: Commit and push changes
+      - name: Validate candidate against reviewed baseline
-        if: steps.git-check.outputs.changes == 'true'
+        id: validation
        run: |
-          git config --local user.email "action@github.com"
+          set -euo pipefail
-          git config --local user.name "GitHub Action"
+          python3 scripts/validate_georelays.py --input "$RUNNER_TEMP/georelays-candidate.csv" --baseline relays/online_relays_gps.csv --output relays/online_relays_gps.csv --github-output "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          git add relays/online_relays_gps.csv
+
-          git commit -m "Automated update of relay data - $(date -u)"
+      - name: Check for a reviewed-file change
-          git push
+        id: changes
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          if git diff --quiet -- relays/online_relays_gps.csv; then
            echo "changed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
            echo "Upstream GeoRelay data already matches main." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
          else
            echo "changed=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
            git diff --stat -- relays/online_relays_gps.csv
          fi
      - name: Push automation branch and publish review request
        if: steps.changes.outputs.changed == 'true'
        env:
-          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
          SOURCE_COMMIT: ${{ steps.upstream.outputs.source_commit }}
          SOURCE_URL: ${{ steps.upstream.outputs.source_url }}
          DATA_ROWS: ${{ steps.validation.outputs.data_rows }}
          UNIQUE_RELAYS: ${{ steps.validation.outputs.unique_relays }}
          DATA_SHA256: ${{ steps.validation.outputs.sha256 }}
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          # Scope credential exposure to this final publishing step.
          gh auth setup-git
          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
          git switch -C "$UPDATE_BRANCH"
          git add -- relays/online_relays_gps.csv
          git diff --cached --quiet && {
            echo "::error::Expected a staged GeoRelay data change"
            exit 1
          }
          git commit -m "Update reviewed georelay directory" -m "Upstream-commit: $SOURCE_COMMIT"
          remote_ref="refs/remotes/origin/$UPDATE_BRANCH"
          if git fetch --no-tags origin "+refs/heads/$UPDATE_BRANCH:$remote_ref" 2>/dev/null; then
            remote_sha=$(git rev-parse "$remote_ref")
            git push --force-with-lease="refs/heads/$UPDATE_BRANCH:$remote_sha" origin "HEAD:refs/heads/$UPDATE_BRANCH"
          else
            git push origin "HEAD:refs/heads/$UPDATE_BRANCH"
          fi
          body_file="$RUNNER_TEMP/georelay-pr-body.md"
          {
            echo "## Automated GeoRelay data proposal"
            echo
            echo "- Source: $SOURCE_URL"
            echo "- Upstream commit: $SOURCE_COMMIT"
            echo "- Data rows: $DATA_ROWS"
            echo "- Unique normalized relays: $UNIQUE_RELAYS"
            echo "- SHA-256: $DATA_SHA256"
            echo
            echo "The candidate passed strict UTF-8, schema, size, row-count, secure-host, coordinate, duplicate-conflict, and baseline-delta validation."
            echo
            echo "This PR is intentionally not auto-merged. Review the relay additions/removals before merging."
          } > "$body_file"
          existing_pr=$(gh pr list --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --state open --base main --head "$UPDATE_BRANCH" --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
          pr_error="$RUNNER_TEMP/georelay-pr-error.txt"
          pr_url=""
          if [[ -n "$existing_pr" ]]; then
            if gh pr edit "$existing_pr" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "Update reviewed GeoRelay directory" --body-file "$body_file" 2> "$pr_error"; then
              pr_url=$(gh pr view "$existing_pr" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json url --jq .url)
            fi
          else
            if created_pr_url=$(gh pr create --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --base main --head "$UPDATE_BRANCH" --title "Update reviewed GeoRelay directory" --body-file "$body_file" 2> "$pr_error"); then
              pr_url="$created_pr_url"
            fi
          fi
          tracking_issue_numbers=$(gh issue list --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --state open --search "\"$TRACKING_ISSUE_TITLE\" in:title" --limit 100 --json number,title --jq ".[] | select(.title == \"$TRACKING_ISSUE_TITLE\") | .number")
          tracking_issues=()
          if [[ -n "$tracking_issue_numbers" ]]; then
            mapfile -t tracking_issues <<< "$tracking_issue_numbers"
          fi
          if [[ -n "$pr_url" ]]; then
            for issue_number in "${tracking_issues[@]}"; do
              gh issue close "$issue_number" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --comment "A pull request is now available at $pr_url; closing this fallback tracking issue."
            done
            echo "Published GeoRelay review PR: $pr_url" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
            exit 0
          fi
          echo "::warning::GITHUB_TOKEN could not create or update the GeoRelay pull request; publishing the issues-write fallback."
          if [[ -s "$pr_error" ]]; then
            cat "$pr_error" >&2
          fi
          compare_url="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/compare/main...${UPDATE_BRANCH}?expand=1"
          issue_body_file="$RUNNER_TEMP/georelay-tracking-issue-body.md"
          {
            echo "## Validated GeoRelay update awaiting review"
            echo
            echo "The automation branch was updated, but this workflow token could not create or update the pull request. Use the compare link below to create it manually."
            echo
            echo "- Compare and create PR: $compare_url"
            echo "- Automation branch: $UPDATE_BRANCH"
            echo "- Source: $SOURCE_URL"
            echo "- Upstream commit: $SOURCE_COMMIT"
            echo "- Data rows: $DATA_ROWS"
            echo "- Unique normalized relays: $UNIQUE_RELAYS"
            echo "- SHA-256: $DATA_SHA256"
            echo
            echo "The snapshot passed the repository's strict validator before the branch was pushed."
          } > "$issue_body_file"
          if (( ${#tracking_issues[@]} > 0 )); then
            primary_issue="${tracking_issues[0]}"
            gh issue edit "$primary_issue" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "$TRACKING_ISSUE_TITLE" --body-file "$issue_body_file"
            issue_url=$(gh issue view "$primary_issue" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json url --jq .url)
            for duplicate_issue in "${tracking_issues[@]:1}"; do
              gh issue close "$duplicate_issue" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --comment "Closing duplicate GeoRelay automation tracking issue; #$primary_issue is canonical."
            done
          else
            issue_url=$(gh issue create --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "$TRACKING_ISSUE_TITLE" --body-file "$issue_body_file")
          fi
          # Do not claim success until the fallback issue was confirmed.
          [[ -n "$issue_url" ]]
          echo "Published GeoRelay tracking issue fallback: $issue_url" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
      - name: Clean obsolete automation review state
        if: steps.changes.outputs.changed == 'false'
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          gh auth setup-git
          existing_pr=$(gh pr list --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --state open --base main --head "$UPDATE_BRANCH" --json number --jq '.[0].number // empty')
          if [[ -n "$existing_pr" ]]; then
            gh pr close "$existing_pr" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --comment "Upstream now matches the reviewed file on main; closing this obsolete automation proposal."
            echo "Closed obsolete PR #$existing_pr." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
          fi
          tracking_issue_numbers=$(gh issue list --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --state open --search "\"$TRACKING_ISSUE_TITLE\" in:title" --limit 100 --json number,title --jq ".[] | select(.title == \"$TRACKING_ISSUE_TITLE\") | .number")
          if [[ -n "$tracking_issue_numbers" ]]; then
            while IFS= read -r issue_number; do
              gh issue close "$issue_number" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --comment "Upstream now matches the reviewed file on main; closing this obsolete automation tracker."
              echo "Closed obsolete tracking issue #$issue_number." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
            done <<< "$tracking_issue_numbers"
          fi
          if git ls-remote --exit-code --heads origin "refs/heads/$UPDATE_BRANCH" > /dev/null; then
            git push origin --delete "$UPDATE_BRANCH"
            echo "Deleted obsolete automation branch $UPDATE_BRANCH." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
          else
            ls_remote_status=$?
            if (( ls_remote_status != 2 )); then
              echo "::error::Could not inspect the obsolete automation branch"
              exit "$ls_remote_status"
            fi
          fi
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
 name: Dead Code
 on:
  push:
    branches:
      - main
  pull_request:
 jobs:
  periphery:
    name: Periphery scan
    runs-on: macos-latest
    timeout-minutes: 30
    # Advisory, like SwiftLint (#1361): findings annotate the PR but don't
    # block merges. Drop continue-on-error once the baseline proves stable.
    continue-on-error: true
    steps:
      - name: Checkout code
        uses: actions/checkout@v5
      - name: Install Periphery
        # homebrew-core formula; the peripheryapp tap lags years behind.
        run: brew install periphery
      - name: Scan for dead code
        # Config comes from .periphery.yml; known findings (mostly iOS-only
        # code invisible to a macOS scan) are suppressed by the committed
        # baseline. --strict fails the step when NEW dead code appears.
        run: periphery scan --strict --disable-update-check
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
 name: Source manifest
 # Publishes a hash manifest for every tagged release so a copy of the source
 # obtained from somewhere other than this repository can be checked against it.
 #
 # This exists because the repository has been the target of takedown demands.
 # When that succeeds, mirrors appear, and without a manifest there is no way to
 # tell a faithful mirror from a modified one. The manifest is attested to this
 # workflow run, so its own provenance is verifiable with `gh attestation verify`.
 #
 # Scope, stated plainly: this verifies SOURCE. It does not verify any compiled
 # app. See docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md.
 on:
  push:
    tags:
      - 'v*'
  workflow_dispatch:
    inputs:
      ref:
        description: 'Tag or commit to produce a manifest for'
        required: true
 permissions:
  contents: read
 jobs:
  manifest:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: write      # attach the manifest to the release
      id-token: write      # provenance attestation
      attestations: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          ref: ${{ github.event.inputs.ref || github.ref }}
          # Full history so the commit the tag names can be recorded exactly.
          fetch-depth: 0
      - name: Build manifest
        id: build
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          ref_name="${{ github.event.inputs.ref || github.ref_name }}"
          commit="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
          tree="$(git rev-parse HEAD^{tree})"
          # Hash every tracked file, in a stable order, with NUL separation so
          # paths containing spaces or newlines cannot shift the columns.
          git ls-files -z \
            | sort -z \
            | xargs -0 sha256sum \
            > files.sha256
          {
            echo "# bitchat source manifest"
            echo "#"
            echo "# ref:    ${ref_name}"
            echo "# commit: ${commit}"
            echo "# tree:   ${tree}"
            echo "# files:  $(wc -l < files.sha256 | tr -d ' ')"
            echo "#"
            echo "# Verify a checkout of this ref with:"
            echo "#   shasum -a 256 -c files.sha256"
            echo "# Hash checking alone ignores files this manifest does not list, and"
            echo "# the Xcode project compiles any source file present in the tree. So"
            echo "# also confirm nothing extra is present:"
            echo "#   git status --porcelain --ignored   # git checkout: must print nothing"
            echo "# or, for a tarball, diff this manifest's path list against find(1)."
            echo "# Full instructions: docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md"
            echo "# The git tree hash above is the single value covering all tracked content:"
            echo "#   git rev-parse HEAD^{tree}"
            echo "#"
          } > SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt
          cat files.sha256 >> SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt
          echo "commit=${commit}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          echo "tree=${tree}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
      - name: Self-check the manifest
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          # A manifest that does not validate against the tree it was made from
          # is worse than none, so fail loudly rather than publishing it.
          grep -v '^#' SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt > check.sha256
          sha256sum -c check.sha256 > /dev/null
          echo "manifest validates against this checkout"
      - name: Attest the manifest
        uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v1
        with:
          subject-path: SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt
      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
        with:
          name: source-manifest
          path: SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt
      - name: Attach to release
        if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          # A tag may be pushed before its release exists; only attach when
          # there is a release to attach to, and never fail the run over it.
          if gh release view "${{ github.ref_name }}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
            gh release upload "${{ github.ref_name }}" SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt --clobber
          else
            echo "no release for ${{ github.ref_name }} yet; manifest is available as a workflow artifact"
          fi
@@ -94,6 +94,24 @@ jobs:
          kill "$watchdog_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
          exit "$status"
      # Read coverage before the serial benchmark command below rebuilds the
      # test binary without instrumentation. Reporting against that newer
      # binary makes llvm-cov reject the profile as out of date.
      # Informational only: there is deliberately no percentage threshold, but
      # a broken/missing report is a CI configuration error and must be visible.
      - name: Coverage summary
        run: |
          BIN_PATH=$(swift build --show-bin-path --package-path ${{ matrix.path }})
          PROF="$BIN_PATH/codecov/default.profdata"
          XCTEST=$(find "$BIN_PATH" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.xctest' | head -1)
          BINARY="$XCTEST/Contents/MacOS/$(basename "$XCTEST" .xctest)"
          if [ ! -f "$PROF" ] || [ ! -f "$BINARY" ]; then
            echo "::error::Coverage profile or test binary is missing"
            exit 1
          fi
          xcrun llvm-cov report "$BINARY" -instr-profile "$PROF" \
            -ignore-filename-regex='(Tests|\.build|checkouts|Mocks|_PreviewHelpers)'
      # Benchmarks run serially on an otherwise idle runner for stable
      # numbers; BITCHAT_PERF_LOG captures the PERF[...] lines for the gate.
      - name: Run performance benchmarks (serial)
@@ -115,26 +133,10 @@ jobs:
        timeout-minutes: 10
        run: ./scripts/check-perf-floors.sh perf-output.log
-      # Informational only: surfaces per-file and total line coverage in the
+  # SPM tests do not link the shipping app targets. This job covers the
-      # job log so coverage trends are visible on every PR. No thresholds —
+  # iOS-conditional paths and both universal Release link configurations.
      # this must never be the reason a build goes red.
      - name: Coverage summary
        run: |
          BIN_PATH=$(swift build --show-bin-path --package-path ${{ matrix.path }})
          PROF="$BIN_PATH/codecov/default.profdata"
          XCTEST=$(find "$BIN_PATH" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.xctest' | head -1)
          BINARY="$XCTEST/Contents/MacOS/$(basename "$XCTEST" .xctest)"
          if [ -f "$PROF" ] && [ -f "$BINARY" ]; then
            xcrun llvm-cov report "$BINARY" -instr-profile "$PROF" \
              -ignore-filename-regex='(Tests|\.build|checkouts|Mocks|_PreviewHelpers)' || true
          else
            echo "No coverage data found; skipping summary."
          fi
  # SPM tests above only compile the macOS slice; this job covers the
  # iOS-conditional code paths (UIKit, CoreBluetooth restoration, etc.).
  ios-build:
-    name: Build iOS app (simulator)
+    name: Build Release apps (universal)
    runs-on: macos-latest
    timeout-minutes: 15
@@ -142,17 +144,125 @@ jobs:
      - name: Checkout code
        uses: actions/checkout@v5
      - name: Check clean recipe safety
        run: bash scripts/check-just-clean-safety.sh
      - name: Build iOS (simulator, no signing)
-        # arm64 only: the vendored arti.xcframework has no x86_64 simulator slice.
+        # Build both simulator architectures so CI validates every vendored
        # Arti simulator slice and the configuration that ships.
        run: |
          set -o pipefail
          xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj \
            -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \
            -configuration Release \
            -sdk iphonesimulator \
            -destination 'generic/platform=iOS Simulator' \
            ARCHS='arm64 x86_64' \
            ONLY_ACTIVE_ARCH=NO \
            CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
            build
      - name: Build macOS (universal, no signing)
        run: |
          set -o pipefail
          xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj \
            -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" \
            -configuration Release \
            -destination 'generic/platform=macOS' \
            ARCHS='arm64 x86_64' \
            ONLY_ACTIVE_ARCH=NO \
            CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
            build
  # The SwiftPM matrix runs on macOS and cannot execute UIKit/CoreBluetooth
  # conditional tests. Build the shared iOS test target and run it on the first
  # available iPhone simulator from the runner image instead of hard-coding a
  # model that changes when GitHub updates Xcode. The suite intentionally runs
  # in one test runner: a number of integration tests exercise process-global
  # stores and notification centers, so overlapping workers can corrupt each
  # other's fixtures and turn sub-second tests into multi-minute timeouts.
  ios-tests:
    name: Run iOS simulator tests
    runs-on: macos-latest
    timeout-minutes: 20
    steps:
      - name: Checkout code
        uses: actions/checkout@v5
      # Some runner images list only placeholder destinations (rows carrying
      # "error:" or "unavailable") or ship the selected Xcode without a
      # matching iOS simulator runtime, so this walks three paths in order:
      # a usable xcodebuild destination, an existing simctl device, and
      # finally creating a device from the newest installed iOS runtime.
      - name: Select available iPhone simulator
        id: destination
        run: |
          set -uo pipefail
          destinations=$(xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" -showdestinations 2>/dev/null || true)
          destination_id=$(awk -F'id:' '
            /platform:iOS Simulator/ && /name:iPhone/ \
              && !/error/ && !/unavailable/ && !found {
              value=$2
              sub(/,.*/, "", value)
              gsub(/^[[:space:]]+|[[:space:]]+$/, "", value)
              print value
              found=1
            }
          ' <<< "$destinations")
          if [ -n "$destination_id" ]; then
            echo "Selected destination via xcodebuild -showdestinations: $destination_id"
          else
            echo "No usable iPhone destination in -showdestinations output; falling back to simctl"
            destination_id=$(xcrun simctl list devices available --json | jq -r '
              [.devices | to_entries[]
                | select(.key | contains("iOS"))
                | .value[]
                | select(.isAvailable and (.name | startswith("iPhone")))]
              | first.udid // empty')
            if [ -n "$destination_id" ]; then
              echo "Selected existing simctl device: $destination_id"
            else
              echo "No available iPhone simulator device; creating one"
              # Newest installed iOS runtime plus an iPhone device type that
              # runtime itself reports as supported, so the pair always match.
              create_spec=$(xcrun simctl list runtimes --json | jq -r '
                [.runtimes[] | select(.platform == "iOS" and .isAvailable)]
                | sort_by(.version | split(".") | map(tonumber))
                | last // empty
                | .identifier as $runtime
                | ([(.supportedDeviceTypes // [])[]
                    | select(.productFamily == "iPhone"
                        or (.name // "" | startswith("iPhone")))]
                  | first.identifier // empty) as $devicetype
                | "\($devicetype) \($runtime)"')
              read -r devicetype runtime <<< "$create_spec" || true
              if [ -z "${devicetype:-}" ] || [ -z "${runtime:-}" ]; then
                echo "::error::No iPhone simulator destination found and none creatable (no installed iOS runtime with an iPhone device type)"
                exit 1
              fi
              destination_id=$(xcrun simctl create ci-iphone "$devicetype" "$runtime") || {
                echo "::error::simctl create failed for $devicetype on $runtime"
                exit 1
              }
              echo "Created simulator $destination_id ($devicetype, $runtime)"
            fi
          fi
          echo "Using iPhone simulator destination id: $destination_id"
          echo "id=$destination_id" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
      - name: Run iOS tests
        run: |
          set -o pipefail
          xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj \
            -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \
            -sdk iphonesimulator \
-            -destination 'generic/platform=iOS Simulator' \
+            -destination "platform=iOS Simulator,id=${{ steps.destination.outputs.id }}" \
-            ARCHS=arm64 \
+            -parallel-testing-enabled NO \
            CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
-            build
+            test
  # Advisory only: SwiftLint reports style violations without ever failing the
  # build. Runs in a pinned container (no Xcode plugin, no pbxproj changes) so
@@ -80,3 +80,4 @@ build.log
 # Local configs
 Local.xcconfig
 *.profraw
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
 {"v1":{"usrs":["param-buf-arti_bootstrap_summary(_:_:)-s:3Tor22arti_bootstrap_summary33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSpys4Int8VG_AEtF","param-dataDir-arti_start(_:_:)-s:3Tor10arti_start33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSPys4Int8VG_s6UInt16VtF","param-len-arti_bootstrap_summary(_:_:)-s:3Tor22arti_bootstrap_summary33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSpys4Int8VG_AEtF","param-socksPort-arti_start(_:_:)-s:3Tor10arti_start33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSPys4Int8VG_s6UInt16VtF","s:13BitFoundation16PeerCapabilitiesV8wifiBulkACvpZ","s:13BitFoundation18KeychainReadResultO18isRecoverableErrorSbvp","s:13BitFoundation23KeychainManagerProtocolP11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS12MockKeychainC11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC11resetCountsyyF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC25totalSecureClearCallCountSivp","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC26secureClearStringCallCountSivp","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC27_secureClearStringCallCount06_AB6D1M24FD239F2969C82F4108818260LLSivp","s:18bitchatTests_macOS24FailingCacheSaveKeychain33_22380C7A11A569A0B83FA83F34C498A7LLC11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS24MockGeohashPresenceTimer33_483587EFB96650EE130EFB09BBA2A1AALLC7handleryycvp","s:3Tor0A7ManagerC21goDormantOnBackgroundyyF","s:7bitchat10AppRuntimeC24handleScreenshotCaptured33_C8B369AD8BC1D9963A50CEDA77A4332ALLyyF","s:7bitchat10AppRuntimeC33handleDidBecomeActiveNotificationyyF","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC18logBluetoothStatus33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LLyySSF","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC20centralRestorationID33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LLSSvpZ","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC22captureBluetoothStatus33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LL7contextySS_tF","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC23peripheralRestorationID33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LLSSvpZ","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC29scheduleBluetoothStatusSample33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LL5after7contextySd_SStF","s:7bitchat10QRScanViewV8isActiveSbvp","s:7bitchat15BLEPeerRegistryV5countSivp","s:7bitchat15KeychainManagerC11secureClearyySSzF","s:7bitchat15PaymentChipViewV7openURL33_10AC50641B1EBCD52E5092A2E521D236LL7SwiftUI13OpenURLActionVvp","s:7bitchat15TransportConfigO29uiBatchDispatchStaggerSecondsSdvpZ","s:7bitchat15TransportConfigO35uiShareExtensionDismissDelaySecondsSdvpZ","s:7bitchat15TransportConfigO38bleBackgroundPendingConnectSlotReserveSivpZ","s:7bitchat17GossipSyncManagerC10persistNowyyF","s:7bitchat17NostrRelayManagerC15InboundEventKey33_E4160FE8A9A2C9D6308EAAD5A8B5CB07LLV7eventIDSSvp","s:7bitchat25LocationNotesDependenciesV3now10Foundation4DateVycvp","s:7bitchat25NWPathReachabilityMonitorC7monitor33_84633C9DBCAF57538179C1E04DB8E015LL7Network0bD0CSgvp"]}}
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
 # Periphery dead-code scan configuration (https://github.com/peripheryapp/periphery)
 #
 # CI runs the macOS scheme only (an iOS scan needs a device destination and
 # doubles the build time). macOS-only scans falsely flag iOS-only code —
 # state restoration, screenshot handlers, background BLE sampling — so those
 # findings live in .periphery.baseline.json rather than being "fixed".
 # When auditing by hand, scan BOTH schemes and intersect:
 #   periphery scan --schemes "bitchat (iOS)" -- -destination 'generic/platform=iOS' ARCHS=arm64
 project: bitchat.xcodeproj
 schemes:
  - bitchat (macOS)
 retain_swift_ui_previews: true
 # Codable properties are (de)serialized via synthesized conformances the
 # indexer doesn't always attribute reads to: PrekeyBundleStore.StoredBundle
 # .noiseKey flaked CI as "assign-only" even while read in loadFromDisk —
 # and slipped past its baselined USR. Retaining Codable properties outright
 # is deterministic; a truly-dead Codable field is a persisted-format change
 # anyway, never a safe mechanical delete.
 retain_codable_properties: true
 relative_results: true
 baseline: .periphery.baseline.json
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 # (CI checkouts are fresh, so this only matters in a working tree).
 excluded:
  - .build
  - .claude
  - .swiftpm
  - .DerivedData
  - DerivedData
@@ -3,3 +3,6 @@ DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = ABC123
 // Unique bundle id to be able to register and run locally
 PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = chat.bitchat.$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)
 // App and share extension must use an App Group registered to your team.
 APP_GROUP_ID = group.chat.bitchat.$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.4
+MARKETING_VERSION = 1.7.1
 CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION = 1
 IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = 16.0
@@ -1,107 +1,66 @@
-# BitChat macOS Build Justfile
+# BitChat developer commands
-# Handles temporary modifications needed to build and run on macOS
+#
 # Builds use a repository-local, ignored DerivedData directory. No recipe
 # patches, restores, or removes tracked project/configuration files.
 project := "bitchat.xcodeproj"
 macos_scheme := "bitchat (macOS)"
 ios_scheme := "bitchat (iOS)"
 derived_data := ".DerivedData"
 # Default recipe - shows available commands
 default:
-    @echo "BitChat macOS Build Commands:"
+    @echo "BitChat developer commands:"
-    @echo "  just run     - Build and run the macOS app"
+    @echo "  just run                Build and run the macOS app"
-    @echo "  just build   - Build the macOS app only"
+    @echo "  just build              Build the macOS app without signing"
-    @echo "  just clean   - Clean build artifacts and restore original files"
+    @echo "  just test               Run the SwiftPM test suite"
-    @echo "  just check   - Check prerequisites"
+    @echo "  just test-ios           Run tests on the iPhone 17 simulator"
-    @echo ""
+    @echo "  just clean              Remove repo-local build artifacts only"
-    @echo "Original files are preserved - modifications are temporary for builds only"
+    @echo "  just nuke               Also remove nested package build caches"
    @echo "  just check              Validate the development environment"
-# Check prerequisites
+# Static guard against reintroducing source-restoring or source-deleting clean
-check:
+# behavior. CI runs the same script directly.
 check-clean-safety:
    @bash scripts/check-just-clean-safety.sh
 check: check-clean-safety
    @echo "Checking prerequisites..."
-    @command -v xcodebuild >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ xcodebuild not found. Install Xcode from App Store" && exit 1)
+    @command -v xcodebuild >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ xcodebuild not found. Install full Xcode." && exit 1)
-    @xcode-select -p | grep -q "Xcode.app" || (echo "❌ Full Xcode required, not just command line tools. Install from App Store and run:\n   sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer" && exit 1)
+    @developer_dir="$$(xcode-select -p 2>/dev/null)"; case "$$developer_dir" in *.app/Contents/Developer) ;; *) echo "❌ Full Xcode is not selected. Run: sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer"; exit 1;; esac
-    @test -d "/Applications/Xcode.app" || (echo "❌ Xcode.app not found in Applications folder. Install from App Store" && exit 1)
+    @xcodebuild -version
-    @xcodebuild -version >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ Xcode not properly configured. Try:\n   sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer" && exit 1)
+    @echo "✅ Development environment ready (a signing identity is not required for just build)"
    @security find-identity -v -p codesigning | grep -q "Apple Development\|Developer ID" || (echo "⚠️  No Developer ID found - code signing may fail" && exit 0)
    @echo "✅ All prerequisites met"
-# Backup original files
+build: check
 backup:
    @echo "Backing up original project configuration..."
    @if [ -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj ]; then cp bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup; fi
    @if [ -f bitchat/Info.plist ]; then cp bitchat/Info.plist bitchat/Info.plist.backup; fi
 # Restore original files
 restore:
    @echo "Restoring original project configuration..."
    @if [ -f project.yml.backup ]; then mv project.yml.backup project.yml; fi
    @# Restore iOS-specific files
    @if [ -f bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios ]; then mv bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard; fi
    @# Use git to restore all modified files except Justfile
    @git checkout -- project.yml bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj bitchat/Info.plist 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️  Could not restore some files with git"
    @# Remove any backup files
    @rm -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup bitchat/Info.plist.backup 2>/dev/null || true
 # Apply macOS-specific modifications
 patch-for-macos: backup
    @echo "Temporarily hiding iOS-specific files for macOS build..."
    @# Move iOS-specific files out of the way temporarily
    @if [ -f bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard ]; then mv bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios; fi
 # Build the macOS app
 build: #check generate
    @echo "Building BitChat for macOS..."
-    @xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS="" build
+    @xcodebuild -project "{{project}}" -scheme "{{macos_scheme}}" -configuration Debug -derivedDataPath "{{derived_data}}" CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build
 # Run the macOS app
 run: build
-    @echo "Launching BitChat..."
+    @app="{{derived_data}}/Build/Products/Debug/bitchat.app"; test -d "$$app" || (echo "❌ Built app not found at $$app" && exit 1); open "$$app"
    @find ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData -name "bitchat.app" -path "*/Debug/*" -not -path "*/Index.noindex/*" | head -1 | xargs -I {} open "{}"
-# Clean build artifacts and restore original files
+# Backward-compatible alias for the old quick-run recipe.
-clean: restore
+dev-run: run
    @echo "Cleaning build artifacts..."
    @rm -rf ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData/bitchat-* 2>/dev/null || true
    @# Only remove the generated project if we have a backup, otherwise use git
    @if [ -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup ]; then \
        rm -rf bitchat.xcodeproj; \
    else \
        git checkout -- bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️  Could not restore project.pbxproj"; \
    fi
    @rm -f project-macos.yml 2>/dev/null || true
    @echo "✅ Cleaned and restored original files"
-# Quick run without cleaning (for development)
+test:
-dev-run: check
+    @swift test
-    @echo "Quick development build..."
+
-    @xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat_macOS" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS="" build
+test-ios: check
-    @find ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData -name "bitchat.app" -path "*/Debug/*" -not -path "*/Index.noindex/*" | head -1 | xargs -I {} open "{}"
+    @xcodebuild -project "{{project}}" -scheme "{{ios_scheme}}" -sdk iphonesimulator -destination 'platform=iOS Simulator,name=iPhone 17' -derivedDataPath "{{derived_data}}" test
 # Artifact-only cleanup. In particular, this recipe never invokes Git and
 # never writes, moves, restores, or removes source/configuration files.
 clean:
    @echo "Cleaning repo-local build artifacts..."
    @rm -rf -- "{{derived_data}}" ".build"
    @echo "✅ Cleaned {{derived_data}} and .build; tracked files were untouched"
 # Retain the familiar command, but keep it artifact-only as well.
 nuke: clean
    @echo "Cleaning nested package build caches..."
    @find localPackages -type d -name .build -prune -exec rm -rf -- {} +
    @rm -rf -- ".cache"
    @echo "✅ Removed repository build caches; tracked files were untouched"
 # Show app info
 info:
-    @echo "BitChat - Decentralized Mesh Messaging"
+    @echo "BitChat - decentralized mesh messaging"
-    @echo "======================================"
+    @echo "macOS 13+ and iOS 16+"
-    @echo "• Native macOS SwiftUI app"
+    @echo "Bluetooth mesh behavior requires physical Bluetooth-capable devices"
    @echo "• Bluetooth LE mesh networking"
    @echo "• End-to-end encryption"
    @echo "• No internet required"
    @echo "• Works offline with nearby devices"
    @echo ""
    @echo "Requirements:"
    @echo "• macOS 13.0+ (Ventura)"
    @echo "• Bluetooth LE capable Mac"
    @echo "• Physical device (no simulator support)"
    @echo ""
    @echo "Usage:"
    @echo "• Set nickname and start chatting"
    @echo "• Use /join #channel for group chats"
    @echo "• Use /msg @user for private messages"
    @echo "• Triple-tap logo for emergency wipe"
 # Force clean everything (nuclear option)
 nuke:
    @echo "🧨 Nuclear clean - removing all build artifacts and backups..."
    @rm -rf ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData/bitchat-* 2>/dev/null || true
    @rm -rf bitchat.xcodeproj 2>/dev/null || true
    @rm -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup 2>/dev/null || true
    @rm -f bitchat/Info.plist.backup 2>/dev/null || true
    @# Restore iOS-specific files if they were moved
    @if [ -f bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios ]; then mv bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard; fi
    @git checkout bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj bitchat/Info.plist 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️  Not a git repo or no changes to restore"
    @echo "✅ Nuclear clean complete"
@@ -1,165 +1,160 @@
 # bitchat Privacy Policy
-*Last updated: June 2026*
+*Last updated: July 2026*
 ## Our Commitment
-bitchat is designed with privacy as its foundation. We believe private communication is a fundamental human right. This policy explains how bitchat protects your privacy.
+bitchat is designed for private, account-free communication. This policy describes what the app keeps on your device, what it sends when you use mesh or optional internet features, and how long local data can remain.
 ## Summary
- **No personal data collection** - We don't collect names, emails, or phone numbers
+- **No project-operated accounts or messaging servers** — Bluetooth mesh is peer-to-peer; optional internet features use public or user-selected Nostr relays.
- **No accounts or company servers** - Mesh chat works peer-to-peer; optional Nostr features use public or user-selected relays
+- **No analytics, advertising, telemetry, or tracking** — the app does not contain an analytics or advertising SDK.
- **No tracking** - We have no analytics, telemetry, or user tracking
+- **No sale of data** — the project does not sell user data or build advertising profiles.
- **Open source** - You can verify these claims by reading our code
+- **Open source** — the storage, networking, and cryptography described here can be inspected in the source code.
-## What Information bitchat Stores
+## What bitchat Stores on Your Device
-### On Your Device Only
+1. **Identity and cryptographic keys**
   - Noise, signing, group, prekey, and optional Nostr identity material is generated locally.
   - Secret keys are stored in the system keychain as device-only items. Public keys are shared when required for messaging, verification, groups, or Nostr events.
   - Keys remain until they are rotated, removed by the relevant feature, or erased with panic wipe. Because operating-system keychains can outlive an uninstall, bitchat records a non-secret install marker and deletes surviving app keys before use after a later reinstall.
-1. **Identity Keys**
+2. **Nickname, preferences, and relationships**
-   - Cryptographic private keys generated on first launch or when optional Nostr identities are created
+   - Your nickname, settings, favorites, petnames, read-receipt identifiers, and bounded operational metadata are stored locally.
-   - Stored locally in your device's secure storage
+   - The share extension can retain one item you choose to share in the app-group preferences for up to 24 hours. The app shows the destination and a preview for review; it does not send the item automatically. The item is cleared when you add it to the composer, cancel, panic-wipe, or it expires.
   - Allows you to maintain "favorite" relationships across app restarts
   - Private keys never leave your device; public keys are shared when needed for messaging
-2. **Nickname**
+3. **Private group state**
-   - The display name you choose (or auto-generated)
+   - Group names, rosters, creator identity, and key epoch are stored as protected files in Application Support.
-   - Stored only on your device
+   - Current group keys are stored in the keychain. Group state remains until you leave or remove the group, panic-wipe the app, or remove the app.
   - Shared with peers you communicate with
-3. **Message History** (if enabled)
+4. **Queued and carried private messages**
-   - When room owners enable retention, messages are saved locally
+   - An outgoing private message that has not been acknowledged may remain for up to 24 hours in a bounded, encrypted outbox. The outbox is sealed with ChaCha20-Poly1305 and its key is stored in the keychain.
-   - Stored encrypted on your device
+   - A device acting as a courier may store a bounded opaque end-to-end encrypted envelope for another user for up to 24 hours. The courier cannot read its message content.
-   - You can delete this at any time
+   - A panic wipe deletes both stores.
-4. **Favorite Peers**
+5. **Recent public mesh messages and notices**
-   - Public keys of peers you mark as favorites
+   - Signed public mesh messages may be kept in a protected local gossip archive for up to 6 hours so they can cross mesh partitions and survive a relaunch.
-   - Stored only on your device
+   - Public bulletin-board posts and deletion tombstones persist until the post's author-selected expiry, at most seven days. Both stores are bounded and panic-wipeable.
-   - Allows you to recognize these peers in future sessions
+   - These items are public to the mesh or board where they are posted; they are not confidential messages.
-5. **Optional Location Channel State**
+6. **Media attachments**
-   - Your selected geohash channel, bookmarked geohashes, teleport flags, and bookmark display names
+   - Voice notes and images you send or receive can be stored under Application Support so they remain playable while referenced by the app.
-   - Stored locally on your device so the location-channel UI can restore your choices
+   - Incoming media is subject to a 100 MB quota with oldest-file eviction. All stored media, sent and received, is also deleted once it is more than seven days old, and immediately by panic wipe or app removal.
   - Per-geohash Nostr identities are derived locally from a device seed stored in secure storage
   - Exact latitude and longitude are not persisted by bitchat
-### Temporary Session Data
+7. **Optional location-channel state**
   - Your selected geohash channel, bookmarks, teleport flags, and bookmark display names are stored locally so the UI can restore them.
   - Per-geohash Nostr identities are derived locally from a device seed stored in the keychain.
   - bitchat does not persist exact latitude or longitude and does not include exact coordinates in mesh or Nostr messages.
-During each session, bitchat temporarily maintains:
+## Temporary Session Data
 - Active peer connections (forgotten when app closes)
 - Routing information for message delivery
 - Cached messages for offline peers (12 hours max)
 - Your current location while optional location channels are enabled, used locally to compute geohash channels and friendly place names
-## What Information is Shared
+While running, bitchat maintains active connections, routing state, deduplication state, and bounded in-memory conversation timelines. Closing the app clears the in-memory timelines and active connections, but it does not erase the persistent stores listed above.
-### With Other bitchat Users
+## What Is Shared
-When you use bitchat, nearby peers can see:
+### With Nearby Mesh Users
 - Your chosen nickname
 - Your ephemeral public key (changes each session)
 - Messages you send to public rooms or directly to them
 - Your approximate Bluetooth signal strength (for connection quality)
-### With Room Members
+Depending on the feature you use, nearby peers can receive:
-When you join a password-protected room:
+- Your chosen nickname and public Noise/signing identity material.
- Your messages are visible to others with the password
+- Announce metadata such as supported capability flags and a bounded list of short direct-neighbor identifiers. When the bridge is enabled, an announce can also include its coarse rendezvous geohash cell.
- Your nickname appears in the member list
+- Public mesh messages, public notices, and group-control packets you intentionally send.
- Room owners can see you've joined
+- Private ciphertext addressed to them, or opaque courier ciphertext they agree to carry.
 - Radio metadata available to the receiver, such as approximate Bluetooth signal strength.
-### With Nostr Relays (Optional Features)
+Noise identity keys can persist across sessions; do not treat them as anonymous identifiers. Panic wipe rotates local identity state.
-If you enable Nostr-backed features:
+### With Private Group Members
 - Private fallback messages to mutual favorites are sent as encrypted NIP-17 gift wraps. Relays can see event metadata, but not message content.
 - Public location-channel messages, location notes, and presence are scoped with geohash tags. Relays and other participants can see the geohash tag, event kind, timestamp, and public key used for that geohash.
 - Exact GPS coordinates are not included in Nostr events by bitchat. The geohash precision you choose can still reveal an approximate area, from region-level to building-level.
 - Automatic presence heartbeats are limited to low-precision geohashes (region, province, and city). More precise geohash posts happen only when you use those channels or location notes.
-## What We DON'T Do
+Private group members receive the group's name, roster, key epoch, and encrypted group traffic needed to participate. Group messages are confidential to devices holding the current group key, subject to the security of those devices and members.
-bitchat **never**:
+### With Nostr Relays and Internet Gateways
 - Collects personal information
 - Sells or shares your exact GPS location
 - Stores data on servers we operate
 - Sells your data to advertisers or data brokers
 - Uses analytics or telemetry
 - Creates user profiles
 - Requires registration
-## Encryption
+Internet-backed features are optional. When enabled or used:
-All private messages use end-to-end encryption:
+- Private fallback messages use BitChat's app-specific encrypted envelopes. This format is not NIP-17, NIP-44, or NIP-59 compatible. Relays can observe the recipient public-key tag, event timing and size, and network metadata, but not the message plaintext or stable sender identity.
- **X25519** for key exchange
+- Public location-channel messages, notes, notices, and presence include a geohash tag, event kind, timestamp, and a public key. A geohash reveals an approximate area; finer precision reveals a smaller area.
- **AES-256-GCM** for message encryption
+- The optional mesh bridge publishes bridge-enabled public mesh messages and presence to a neighborhood rendezvous cell. Those messages are public to participants and relays for that cell. A per-message “nearby only” choice prevents that message from crossing the bridge.
- **Ed25519** for digital signatures
+- Bridge courier drops contain opaque end-to-end encrypted envelopes and a rotating recipient tag. Relays still observe timing and network metadata.
- **Argon2id** for password-protected rooms
+- A device with gateway features enabled may relay signed bridge/location traffic or opaque courier envelopes for nearby mesh devices.
-## Your Rights
+Nostr relays are operated by third parties. Their retention, logging, availability, and privacy practices are outside the project's control. Public events and encrypted events may remain on relays according to each relay's policy.
-You have complete control:
+You can add relays yourself in settings, including `.onion` addresses. Added relays are stored locally, are limited in number, and are erased by panic wipe. Tor routing is on by default; while it is off, every relay you connect to can see your IP address, including relays carrying your private messages.
 - **Delete Local State**: Triple-tap the logo to instantly wipe local keys, sessions, caches, and preferences
 - **Leave Anytime**: Close the app and local presence stops; relay-backed presence ages out
 - **No Account**: No account record exists for you to delete from us
 - **Portability**: Your local state stays on your device unless you send messages, use optional relay-backed features, or export it
-## Bluetooth & Permissions
+## Location and Apple Services
-bitchat requires Bluetooth permission to function:
+Location permission is optional and requested as when-in-use access. It is used to compute geohash channels, bridge rendezvous cells, and nearby place labels.
 - Used only for peer-to-peer communication
 - Bluetooth is not used for tracking
 - You can revoke this permission at any time in system settings
-## Location Permission
+- Exact coordinates are not included in bitchat mesh or Nostr payloads and are not persisted by bitchat.
 - A selected geohash can still reveal an approximate area to peers and relays.
 - When bitchat asks the operating system for a friendly place name, Apple's `CLGeocoder` service may process the location under Apple's privacy terms.
 - Revoking location permission stops live location sampling. Saved bookmarks remain until you remove them, panic-wipe the app, or remove the app.
-Location permission is optional and is used only for location channels:
+## Microphone, Camera, and Media Permissions
- Used to compute local geohash channels and display names
+
- Requested as when-in-use permission
+- Microphone access is used only while you record a voice note or actively hold live push-to-talk. The resulting audio is sent to the mesh conversation you selected; public-conversation audio is public to that mesh, while private-conversation audio uses the private transport protections described below.
- Exact coordinates are not shared in messages or stored by bitchat
+- Voice-note and live-audio files can remain in Application Support under the media retention rules above.
- Selected and bookmarked geohashes may persist locally until you remove them, use panic wipe, or delete the app
+- Camera access is used to scan peer-verification QR codes. Photo-library access is used when you choose an image to send.
- You can revoke this permission at any time in system settings
+- These permissions can be revoked in system settings. bitchat does not record microphone or camera input while the related capture UI is inactive.
 ## Cryptography
 Private and public features use different protections:
 - Mesh private sessions use Noise XX with X25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305, and SHA-256.
 - Private group messages use ChaCha20-Poly1305; group state and relevant mesh packets use Ed25519 signatures.
 - Nostr events use secp256k1 Schnorr signatures. BitChat private envelopes use secp256k1 key agreement, HKDF-SHA256, and XChaCha20-Poly1305. The envelope format is proprietary, only interoperates with BitChat clients, and does not provide forward secrecy against later compromise of the recipient's static Nostr private key.
 - The persistent private-message outbox uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 with a key held in the keychain. Some other protected local identity state uses AES-GCM.
 - Public mesh, bridge, geohash, and board content is signed or authenticated as appropriate but is intentionally not confidential.
 No cryptographic system can protect content after a recipient reads, copies, screenshots, or exports it.
 ## Data Retention Summary
 - **In-memory chat timelines and active connections:** until the app closes or state is cleared.
 - **Queued outgoing private messages:** until acknowledged, dropped by bounded policy, or 24 hours, whichever comes first.
 - **Opaque courier envelopes:** until handed off, evicted by bounded policy, or 24 hours, whichever comes first.
 - **Recent public mesh gossip:** up to 6 hours.
 - **Public board posts and tombstones:** until expiry, at most seven days.
 - **Media:** seven days, or sooner by quota eviction, panic wipe, or app removal.
 - **Groups, favorites, preferences, identity keys, and bookmarks:** until removed by the feature, panic wipe, or app removal.
 - **Nostr data:** according to the policies of the relays that receive it.
 ## Your Controls
 - **Panic wipe:** Triple-tap the logo to synchronously cancel in-flight media work and clear local keys, sessions, preferences, groups, queues, carried mail, public archives, board data, and media managed by the app.
 - **Notification previews:** Hidden by default, so lock-screen alerts do not show message text, sender names, or geohashes. Full previews can be turned on in settings.
 - **Clearing a conversation:** Clearing the mesh timeline also deletes the recent public gossip this device had stored on disk.
 - **Feature controls:** Location channels, mesh bridge, internet gateway, and related internet behaviors can be disabled in the app. Some already-published relay data cannot be recalled.
 - **System permissions:** Bluetooth, location, microphone, camera, and photo-library access can be revoked in system settings.
 - **No account:** The project operates no account record for you to request or export.
 ## What the Project Does Not Do
 bitchat does not:
 - Operate an account database or project-owned messaging backend.
 - Include advertising, analytics, or tracking SDKs.
 - Sell user data or create advertising profiles.
 - Include exact GPS coordinates in bitchat mesh or Nostr message payloads.
 ## Children's Privacy
-bitchat does not knowingly collect information from children. The app has no age verification because it collects no personal information from anyone.
+The project does not knowingly operate a service that collects children's personal data. The app has no account registration or age-verification system. Users and guardians should understand that public mesh, board, bridge, and location-channel posts are visible to other participants and may be relayed.
 ## Data Retention
 - **Messages**: Deleted from memory when app closes (unless room retention is enabled)
 - **Identity Key**: Persists until you delete the app
 - **Favorites**: Persist until you remove them or delete the app
 - **Location channel choices**: Selected/bookmarked geohashes persist locally until removed, panic-wiped, or the app is deleted
 - **Nostr relay data**: Public geohash events and encrypted gift wraps may be retained by relays according to each relay's policy
 - **Everything Else**: Exists only during active sessions
 ## Security Measures
 - All communication is encrypted
 - No accounts or company servers
 - Optional Nostr relays receive only the events needed for Nostr-backed private fallback or public location channels
 - Open source code for public audit
 - Regular security updates
 - Cryptographic signatures prevent tampering
 ## Changes to This Policy
-If we update this policy:
+Material behavior changes will be reflected in this document and its “Last updated” date. Updating this policy cannot retroactively retrieve data that remained only on a user's device.
 - The "Last updated" date will change
 - The updated policy will be included in the app
 - No retroactive changes can make us collect data already held only in your app
 ## Contact
 bitchat is an open source project. For privacy questions:
 - View our source code: [https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat/tree/main](https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat/tree/main)
 - Open an issue on GitHub
 - Join the discussion in public rooms
-## Philosophy
+- View the source: [https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat](https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat)
-
+- Open an issue on GitHub.
 Privacy isn't just a feature—it's the entire point. bitchat proves that modern communication doesn't require surrendering your privacy. No accounts, no company servers, no analytics. Just people talking freely.
 ---
-*This policy is released into the public domain under The Unlicense, just like bitchat itself.*
+*This policy is released into the public domain under The Unlicense, like the project itself.*
@@ -63,7 +63,11 @@ let package = Package(
                // Only the vector fixture: declaring the whole "Noise"
                // directory would claim its .swift test files as resources
                // and silently drop them from compilation.
-                .process("Noise/NoiseTestVectors.json")
+                .process("Noise/NoiseTestVectors.json"),
                // Frozen envelopes produced by the released iOS (733098bb)
                // and Android (b7f0b33d) private-DM implementations; prove
                // receive compatibility independently of the local generator.
                .process("Nostr/Fixtures")
            ]
        )
    ]
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ A decentralized peer-to-peer messaging app with dual transport architecture: loc
 📲 [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/bitchat-mesh/id6748219622)
 ### Getting a copy you can trust
 Install from the App Store, or build from source you have verified. A compiled build from anywhere else cannot be verified — see [Verifying bitchat](docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md) for how to check source against the per-release hash manifest, and for what to do if that is the only build you can get.
 This matters more than it usually would: this repository has been the target of takedown demands, and when a repository or releases page disappears, mirrors appear that nobody can check.
 ## License
 This project is released into the public domain. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.
@@ -18,8 +24,8 @@ This project is released into the public domain. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file
 - **Location-Based Channels**: Geographic chat rooms using geohash coordinates over global Nostr relays
 - **Intelligent Message Routing**: Automatically chooses best transport (Bluetooth → Nostr fallback)
 - **Decentralized Mesh Network**: Automatic peer discovery and multi-hop message relay over Bluetooth LE
- **Privacy First**: No accounts, no phone numbers, no persistent identifiers
+- **Privacy First**: No accounts, no phone numbers, no servers. Note that the mesh does use a persistent per-device identifier derived from your identity key — see [the whitepaper](WHITEPAPER.md) on identity and metadata for what a nearby radio can observe
- **Private Message End-to-End Encryption**: [Noise Protocol](https://noiseprotocol.org) for mesh, NIP-17 for Nostr
+- **Private Message End-to-End Encryption**: [Noise Protocol](https://noiseprotocol.org) for mesh, BitChat private envelopes for Nostr fallback
 - **IRC-Style Commands**: Familiar `/slap`, `/msg`, `/who` style interface
 - **Universal App**: Native support for iOS and macOS
 - **Emergency Wipe**: Triple-tap to instantly clear all data
@@ -34,7 +40,7 @@ BitChat uses a **hybrid messaging architecture** with two complementary transpor
 - **Local Communication**: Direct peer-to-peer within Bluetooth range
 - **Multi-hop Relay**: Messages route through nearby devices (max 7 hops)
 - **No Internet Required**: Works completely offline in disaster scenarios
- **Noise Protocol Encryption**: End-to-end encryption with forward secrecy
+- **Noise Protocol Encryption**: End-to-end encryption, with forward secrecy for live sessions (store-and-forward mail is sealed without it — see the whitepaper)
 - **Binary Protocol**: Compact packet format optimized for Bluetooth LE constraints
 - **Automatic Discovery**: Peer discovery and connection management
 - **Adaptive Power**: Battery-optimized duty cycling
@@ -44,9 +50,15 @@ BitChat uses a **hybrid messaging architecture** with two complementary transpor
 - **Global Reach**: Connect with users worldwide via internet relays
 - **Location Channels**: Geographic chat rooms using geohash coordinates
 - **290+ Relay Network**: Distributed across the globe for reliability
- **NIP-17 Encryption**: Gift-wrapped private messages for internet privacy
+- **BitChat Private Envelopes**: App-specific encrypted private messages over Nostr relays
 - **Ephemeral Keys**: Fresh cryptographic identity per geohash area
 BitChat's private-envelope format is proprietary and is **not** NIP-17,
 NIP-44, or NIP-59 compatible. It uses Nostr as a relay transport but only
 interoperates with BitChat clients: private payloads travel inside kind-1059
 events whose `v2:`-prefixed content is a BitChat-specific XChaCha20-Poly1305
 construction, not NIP-44 encryption.
 ### Channel Types
 #### `mesh #bluetooth`
@@ -80,7 +92,7 @@ Private messages use **intelligent transport selection**:
 2. **Nostr Fallback** (when Bluetooth unavailable)
   - Uses recipient's Nostr public key
-   - NIP-17 gift-wrapping for privacy
+   - BitChat's app-specific private-envelope encryption
   - Routes through global relay network
 3. **Smart Queuing** (when neither available)
@@ -93,30 +105,62 @@ For detailed protocol documentation, see the [Technical Whitepaper](WHITEPAPER.m
 ### Option 1: Using Xcode
-   ```bash
+```bash
-   cd bitchat
+open bitchat.xcodeproj
-   open bitchat.xcodeproj
+```
   ```
-   To run on a device there're a few steps to prepare the code:
+For a signed device build, create your ignored local configuration and replace
-   - Clone the local configs: `cp Configs/Local.xcconfig.example Configs/Local.xcconfig`
+the example team ID with your Apple Developer Team ID:
-   - Add your Developer Team ID into the newly created `Configs/Local.xcconfig`
+
-      - Bundle ID would be set to `chat.bitchat.<team_id>` (unless you set to something else)
+```bash
-   - Entitlements need to be updated manually (TODO: Automate):
+cp Configs/Local.xcconfig.example Configs/Local.xcconfig
-      - Search and replace `group.chat.bitchat` with `group.<your_bundle_id>` (e.g. `group.chat.bitchat.ABC123`)
+```
 `Local.xcconfig.example` derives unique app and App Group identifiers from that
 team ID. The entitlement files already reference `$(APP_GROUP_ID)`, so tracked
 project or entitlement files do not need to be edited.
 Useful command-line checks from the repository root:
 ```bash
 # macOS Debug build without signing
 xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" \
  -configuration Debug CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build
 # Full SwiftPM test suite
 swift test
 # iOS simulator tests
 xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \
  -sdk iphonesimulator \
  -destination 'platform=iOS Simulator,name=iPhone 17' test
 ```
 If `iPhone 17` is unavailable, choose an installed simulator from:
 ```bash
 xcodebuild -showdestinations -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (iOS)"
 ```
 ### Option 2: Using `just`
-   ```bash
+```bash
-   brew install just
+brew install just
-   ```
+just check
 just run
 ```
-Want to try this on macos: `just run` will set it up and run from source.
+`just build` and `just run` use the current `bitchat (macOS)` scheme and keep
-Run `just clean` afterwards to restore things to original state for mobile app building and development.
+Xcode output in the ignored `.DerivedData/` directory. They never patch source,
 project, configuration, or entitlement files.
 `just clean` removes only `.DerivedData/` and `.build/`. It does not invoke Git
 or restore tracked files, so uncommitted work is preserved. `just test` runs the
 SwiftPM suite and `just test-ios` runs the iPhone 17 simulator suite.
 ## Localization
- Base app resources live under `bitchat/Localization/Base.lproj/`. Add new copy to `Localizable.strings` and plural rules to `Localizable.stringsdict`.
+- App localizations live in `bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings`.
- Share extension strings are separate in `bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Base.lproj/Localizable.strings`.
+- Share extension strings are separate in `bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Localizable.xcstrings`.
 - Prefer keys that describe intent (`app_info.features.offline.title`) and reuse existing ones where possible.
 - Run `xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build` to compile-check any localization updates.
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
 # Security policy
 bitchat is a security-focused messenger, and reports about its security are taken seriously. This page says how to report, what counts as a vulnerability here, and what to expect.
 ## Reporting a vulnerability
 **Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:** [Report a vulnerability](https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat/security/advisories/new) (Security tab → "Report a vulnerability").
 Please do not open a public issue for anything that could put people at risk before a fix ships. bitchat is used by people in hostile network environments; a public proof-of-concept can be acted on faster than a patch can reach them.
 A useful report says what an attacker can do, against which build (App Store version or commit hash), and how to reproduce it. A failing test or a packet capture is worth more than speculation about impact.
 ## What to expect
 This is a volunteer-maintained project. The aim is to acknowledge reports within a week and to move on confirmed vulnerabilities immediately — historically, confirmed protocol and key-handling issues have been fixed within days. You'll be kept in the loop in the advisory thread, and credited in the fix unless you'd rather not be. There is no bug bounty.
 ## Supported versions
 Fixes ship to the latest App Store release and `main`. Older releases are not patched; the fix is to update.
 ## Scope
 In scope — the properties the app promises:
 - Confidentiality and integrity of private messages and media (Noise sessions over BLE; over Nostr, bitchat's own ephemeral private-envelope format — a proprietary scheme, *not* NIP-17/NIP-44/NIP-59, see `WHITEPAPER.md`)
 - Identity: key handling, verification, impersonation, session binding
 - The panic wipe actually destroying what it claims to destroy
 - Metadata exposure beyond what the documentation already discloses (see `PRIVACY_POLICY.md` and `docs/privacy-assessment.md`)
 - Downgrade paths: anything that silently moves traffic from an encrypted path to a plaintext one
 - Tor routing: anything that makes traffic bypass Tor while the Tor preference is on
 - Supply-chain integrity of the source and its vendored binaries (see `docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md`)
 Out of scope — documented design properties, not vulnerabilities:
 - Public visibility of mesh announces and geohash channels: broadcast content, nicknames, and public keys are public by design
 - Bluetooth proximity being observable: anyone in radio range can tell a BLE device is present
 - Mesh flooding/relay behavior inherent to a broadcast mesh (rate limits exist; the topology is what it is)
 - Behavior of third-party Nostr relays
 - Denial of service requiring physical proximity, and battery-drain attacks in general
 If you're unsure whether something is in scope, report it privately anyway — a false alarm costs a few minutes; a real issue reported publicly can cost much more.
 ## Verifying what you're running
 If your concern is that the app or source you have has been tampered with, that has its own document: `docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md`.
@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@ bitchat is a decentralized, peer-to-peer messaging application for secure, priva
 * **Authentication:** peers are identified by cryptographic keys; announcements are signed and verified.
 * **Resilience:** the network functions in lossy, low-bandwidth, partitioned environments with churning membership.
 * **Eventual delivery:** a message to an out-of-range peer should still arrive — relayed by the mesh, carried by a moving person, or resting on an internet relay — within a bounded retention window.
-* **Ephemerality by default:** no plaintext message content is ever written to disk. Everything the store-and-forward stack persists is either sealed ciphertext or already-public broadcast traffic, and all of it dies with the panic wipe.
+* **Ephemerality by default:** conversation timelines live in memory only. Everything the store-and-forward stack persists is either sealed ciphertext or already-public broadcast traffic, and all of it dies with the panic wipe. Media is the exception: accepted images and voice notes are written to disk unsealed, protected by the platform's data-protection class rather than by app-layer encryption, and bounded by a storage quota.
 ## 2. Architecture Overview
 Two transports implement a common `Transport` interface and are coordinated by a `MessageRouter`:
 * **BLE mesh** — every device is simultaneously a GATT central and peripheral, relaying packets in a controlled flood. No infrastructure, pairing, or accounts.
-* **Nostr** — private messages to mutual favorites travel as NIP-17 gift-wrapped events over public relays (over Tor where enabled), bridging separate meshes through the internet.
+* **Nostr** — private messages to mutual favorites travel in BitChat's app-specific encrypted envelopes over public relays (over Tor where enabled), bridging separate meshes through the internet.
 The router prefers a live mesh link, falls back to Nostr, and engages the courier system when neither can deliver promptly.
@@ -36,13 +36,17 @@ Each device holds two long-term key pairs in the Keychain:
 * a **Curve25519 static key** for Noise key agreement — its SHA-256 fingerprint is the peer's stable identity, and
 * an **Ed25519 signing key** for packet signatures.
-On the mesh, peers appear under short ephemeral IDs derived per session; favoriting pins the full Noise public key so identity survives across sessions. Mutual favorites also exchange Nostr public keys for the internet path. Optional QR verification binds a nickname to a fingerprint in person.
+On the mesh, peers appear under a short 8-byte peer ID. That ID is **not ephemeral**: it is the first 8 bytes of the SHA-256 fingerprint of the device's Noise static key, so it is stable across sessions, reboots, and reinstalls that preserve the keychain, and it changes only when the identity itself is replaced by a panic wipe. Favoriting pins the full Noise public key so identity survives across sessions. Mutual favorites also exchange Nostr public keys for the internet path. Optional QR verification binds a nickname to a fingerprint in person.
 Signed announcements additionally carry the nickname, the Noise static public key, and the Ed25519 signing public key in cleartext (§4.5), so a passive receiver in radio range can link a device across time and place regardless of the peer ID. Unlinkable presence is not a property this protocol currently provides; see §9.
 ## 4. BLE Mesh Layer
 ### 4.1 Packet Format
-A compact binary header (version, type, TTL, timestamp, flags) is followed by an 8-byte sender ID, an optional 8-byte recipient ID, the payload, and an optional Ed25519 signature. Version 2 packets may carry an explicit source route. Signatures exclude the TTL byte so relays can decrement it without invalidating them. Packets other than fragments are padded toward uniform sizes.
+A compact binary header (version, type, TTL, timestamp, flags) is followed by an 8-byte sender ID, an optional 8-byte recipient ID, the payload, and an optional Ed25519 signature. Version 2 packets may carry an explicit source route. Signatures exclude the TTL byte so relays can decrement it without invalidating them.
 Only `noiseEncrypted` and `noiseHandshake` packets are padded, toward 256/512/1024/2048-byte buckets; every other type — public messages, announcements, board posts, group messages, fragments, files, and voice frames — goes out at its natural length. Padding is PKCS#7-style with pad bytes equal to the pad length, and because that length must fit one byte, a frame needing more than 255 bytes to reach its bucket is emitted unpadded. Payload length is therefore observable for most traffic.
 ### 4.2 Flood Control
@@ -78,7 +82,9 @@ Courier envelopes are sealed to the recipient's *static* key with the one-way No
 ### 5.3 Nostr Path
-Private messages to mutual favorites are wrapped per NIP-17/NIP-59: a rumor (kind 14) sealed (kind 13) and gift-wrapped (kind 1059) under a throwaway ephemeral key, so relays learn neither sender nor content.
+Private messages to mutual favorites use BitChat's proprietary private-envelope protocol. An unsigned inner message (kind 14) is encrypted and placed in a sender-signed seal (kind 13); that seal is encrypted again inside a public envelope (kind 1059) signed by a one-time key, so relays learn neither the stable sender identity nor the content. Each encrypted content field is `v2:` followed by base64url of a 24-byte nonce, XChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphertext, and its 16-byte tag. Keys come from secp256k1 ECDH and HKDF-SHA256 (the derivation reuses a "nip44-v2" info label but is not the NIP-44 key schedule).
 This format reuses NIP-17/NIP-59 kind numbers but is **not NIP-17, NIP-44, or NIP-59 compatible** and interoperates only with BitChat clients. The outer `p` tag exposes the recipient's Nostr public key to relays; the plaintext and stable sender identity remain inside authenticated ciphertext. Public seal and envelope timestamps are randomized by up to ±15 minutes, while the actual message timestamp is encrypted. The protocol does not provide forward secrecy: compromise of the recipient's static Nostr private key can expose stored envelopes addressed to that key.
 ## 6. Store and Forward
@@ -105,7 +111,7 @@ Public broadcast messages are cached (1000 packets) and reconciled between peers
 ### 6.4 Nostr Mailboxes
-Gift-wrapped messages rest on Nostr relays; clients re-subscribe with a 24-hour lookback on reconnect, covering the both-devices-offline case for mutual favorites whenever either side touches the internet.
+BitChat private envelopes rest on Nostr relays; clients re-subscribe with a 24-hour lookback on reconnect, covering the both-devices-offline case for mutual favorites whenever either side touches the internet.
 ### 6.5 Delivery Metrics
@@ -122,12 +128,12 @@ Bare local counters (deposits, handovers, sprays, opens, outbox flushes and drop
 ## 8. Security Considerations
-* **Relay nodes** cannot read private traffic; they forward padded, opaque ciphertext.
+* **Relay nodes** cannot read private traffic; they forward opaque ciphertext. Padding applies to Noise frames only (§4.1), so other packet types relay at their natural length.
 * **Couriers** are quota-bounded mailbags. A malicious courier can drop mail (redundant copies and deposit retry mitigate this) but cannot read it, link it across days, or amplify it — copy budgets are capped and every envelope is validated against size and lifetime policy on deposit.
 * **Flooding abuse** is bounded by TTL clamps, deduplication, per-depositor quotas, connect-rate limits, and announce-rate limiting.
 * **Replay** of public broadcasts is bounded by the 6-hour acceptance window plus deduplication; private payloads are protected by Noise nonces.
-* **Metadata.** BLE proximity is inherently observable; ephemeral IDs and daily-rotating courier tags limit long-term correlation. Nostr traffic can ride Tor.
+* **Metadata is the weakest part of this design, and the peer ID does not help.** The 8-byte sender ID in every packet header is derived from a never-rotating key (§3), and announcements publish the static keys and nickname in cleartext, so a passive listener can enumerate participants and follow a device between places. Announcements also carry up to ten direct-neighbor IDs (§4.3), which hands a single sniffer the local adjacency graph. Origin packets leave at the default TTL, so hop distance identifies the originator. Daily-rotating courier tags do limit correlation of carried mail, and Nostr traffic can ride Tor. Addressing the radio-layer exposure is future work (§9).
-* **No forward secrecy for sealed mail** (§5.2) is the main cryptographic trade-off of the offline path.
+* **No forward secrecy for sealed mail or Nostr private envelopes** (§5.2–5.3) means compromise of a recipient's static key can expose retained ciphertext addressed to that key.
 ## 9. Future Work
@@ -135,6 +141,9 @@ Bare local counters (deposits, handovers, sprays, opens, outbox flushes and drop
 * Couriered media beyond the 16 KiB text cap.
 * Probabilistic relay and edge-of-network TTL boosting for very dense and very sparse graphs.
 * Multi-hop courier routing informed by encounter history.
 * **Rotating on-air identity.** Epoch-rotating peer IDs, with static-key disclosure moved inside the encrypted handshake and mutual favorites recognising each other through a tag derived from their shared secret, so presence stops being linkable across sessions (§3, §8).
 * **Padding for non-Noise packet types**, and closing the gap where a frame needing more than 255 bytes of padding is emitted unpadded (§4.1).
 * Making the neighbor list in announcements optional, or restricted to authenticated links (§4.3).
 ---
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
 		A6E32D1B2E762EA70032EA8A /* Exceptions for "bitchat" folder in "bitchatShareExtension" target */ = {
 			isa = PBXFileSystemSynchronizedBuildFileExceptionSet;
 			membershipExceptions = (
 				Services/SharedContentHandoff.swift,
 				Services/TransportConfig.swift,
 			);
 			target = 57CA17A36A2532A6CFF367BB /* bitchatShareExtension */;
@@ -92,7 +93,8 @@
 		A6E32D232E762EAB0032EA8A /* Exceptions for "bitchatShareExtension" folder in "bitchatShareExtension" target */ = {
 			isa = PBXFileSystemSynchronizedBuildFileExceptionSet;
 			membershipExceptions = (
-				ShareViewController.swift,
+				Info.plist,
 				bitchatShareExtension.entitlements,
 			);
 			target = 57CA17A36A2532A6CFF367BB /* bitchatShareExtension */;
 		};
@@ -258,9 +260,13 @@
 			buildConfigurationList = E4EA6DC648DF55FF84032EB5 /* Build configuration list for PBXNativeTarget "bitchatShareExtension" */;
 			buildPhases = (
 				0A08E70F08F55FD5BA8C7EF3 /* Sources */,
 				7E9B64F63F93443FB7BA12DF /* Resources */,
 			);
 			buildRules = (
 			);
 			fileSystemSynchronizedGroups = (
 				A6E32D212E762EAB0032EA8A /* bitchatShareExtension */,
 			);
 			name = bitchatShareExtension;
 			productName = bitchatShareExtension;
 			productReference = 61F92EBA29C47C0FCC482F1F /* bitchatShareExtension.appex */;
@@ -332,6 +338,7 @@
 				es,
 				ar,
 				de,
 				fa,
 				fr,
 				he,
 				id,
@@ -388,6 +395,13 @@
 				E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678E /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */,
 			);
 		};
 		7E9B64F63F93443FB7BA12DF /* Resources */ = {
 			isa = PBXResourcesBuildPhase;
 			buildActionMask = 2147483647;
 			files = (
 			);
 			runOnlyForDeploymentPostprocessing = 0;
 		};
 /* End PBXResourcesBuildPhase section */
 /* Begin PBXSourcesBuildPhase section */
@@ -2,11 +2,6 @@ import BitFoundation
 import Combine
 import Foundation
 enum SharedContentKind: String, Sendable, Equatable {
    case text
    case url
 }
 enum RuntimeScenePhase: String, Sendable, Equatable {
    case active
    case inactive
@@ -18,6 +13,8 @@ enum TorLifecycleEvent: String, Sendable, Equatable {
    case willRestart
    case didBecomeReady
    case preferenceChanged
    /// Bootstrap ran out its deadline without completing.
    case bootstrapDidStall
 }
 enum AppEvent: Sendable, Equatable {
@@ -25,7 +22,7 @@ enum AppEvent: Sendable, Equatable {
    case startupCompleted
    case scenePhaseChanged(RuntimeScenePhase)
    case openedURL(String)
-    case sharedContentAccepted(SharedContentKind)
+    case sharedContentReadyForReview(SharedContentKind)
    case notificationOpened(peerID: PeerID?)
    case deepLinkOpened(String)
    case torLifecycleChanged(TorLifecycleEvent)
@@ -36,34 +33,12 @@ enum AppEvent: Sendable, Equatable {
 actor AppEventStream {
    private var continuations: [UUID: AsyncStream<AppEvent>.Continuation] = [:]
    func stream() -> AsyncStream<AppEvent> {
        let id = UUID()
        return AsyncStream { continuation in
            continuations[id] = continuation
            continuation.onTermination = { [id] _ in
                Task {
                    await self.removeContinuation(id)
                }
            }
        }
    }
    func emit(_ event: AppEvent) {
        for continuation in continuations.values {
            continuation.yield(event)
        }
    }
    func finish() {
        for continuation in continuations.values {
            continuation.finish()
        }
        continuations.removeAll()
    }
    private func removeContinuation(_ id: UUID) {
        continuations.removeValue(forKey: id)
    }
 }
 /// Identity key for a direct conversation. Equality and hashing use the
@@ -10,19 +10,32 @@ final class AppChromeModel: ObservableObject {
    @Published var showingFingerprintFor: PeerID?
    @Published var isAppInfoPresented = false
    @Published var isLocationChannelsSheetPresented = false
    @Published var isNoticesSheetPresented = false
    /// When the sheet is opened for "notes left here" (empty mesh timeline),
    /// it should land on the geo tab instead of the channel-derived default.
    @Published var noticesSheetPrefersGeoTab = false
    @Published var showBluetoothAlert = false
    @Published var bluetoothAlertMessage = ""
    @Published var bluetoothState: CBManagerState = .unknown
    @Published var showScreenshotPrivacyWarning = false
    private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
    private let onPanicWipe: () -> Void
    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
    /// The composer owns capture state above ChatViewModel. ContentView
    /// installs this hook so both panic entry points synchronously stop it.
    private var prepareForPanic: (@MainActor () -> Void)?
    /// Bulletin-board coordinator, created on first use of the board sheet.
    private(set) lazy var boardManager = BoardManager(transport: chatViewModel.meshService)
-    init(chatViewModel: ChatViewModel, privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel) {
+    init(
        chatViewModel: ChatViewModel,
        privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel,
        onPanicWipe: @escaping () -> Void = {}
    ) {
        self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
        self.onPanicWipe = onPanicWipe
        self.nickname = chatViewModel.nickname
        bind(privateInboxModel: privateInboxModel)
@@ -62,6 +75,11 @@ final class AppChromeModel: ObservableObject {
        isAppInfoPresented = true
    }
    func presentNotices(geoTab: Bool = false) {
        noticesSheetPrefersGeoTab = geoTab
        isNoticesSheetPresented = true
    }
    /// Builds the mesh topology map model from the transport's gossiped
    /// graph plus the live nickname table. Unknown nodes (heard about via a
    /// neighbor claim but never announced to us) fall back to a short ID.
@@ -88,7 +106,13 @@ final class AppChromeModel: ObservableObject {
        showScreenshotPrivacyWarning = true
    }
    func setPanicPreparation(_ preparation: (@MainActor () -> Void)?) {
        prepareForPanic = preparation
    }
    func panicClearAllData() {
        prepareForPanic?()
        onPanicWipe()
        chatViewModel.panicClearAllData()
    }
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
    /// (docs/CONVERSATION-STORE-DESIGN.md). Owned here; the feature models
    /// and `ChatViewModel` observe and mutate it through its intent API.
    let conversations: ConversationStore
    let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
    let locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore
    let publicChatModel: PublicChatModel
    let privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel
    let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel
@@ -28,6 +26,8 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
    let locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel
    let peerListModel: PeerListModel
    let appChromeModel: AppChromeModel
    let boardAlertsModel: BoardAlertsModel
    let sharedContentImportModel: SharedContentImportModel
    private let idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge
    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
@@ -41,8 +41,9 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
    #endif
    init(
-        keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager(),
+        keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager.makeDefault(),
-        idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge = NostrIdentityBridge()
+        idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(),
        sharedContentStore: SharedContentStore? = nil
    ) {
        self.idBridge = idBridge
        let conversations = ConversationStore()
@@ -50,8 +51,6 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
        let locationPresenceStore = LocationPresenceStore()
        let locationManager = LocationChannelManager.shared
        self.conversations = conversations
        self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore
        self.locationPresenceStore = locationPresenceStore
        self.chatViewModel = ChatViewModel(
            keychain: keychain,
            idBridge: idBridge,
@@ -87,17 +86,48 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
            peerIdentityStore: peerIdentityStore,
            locationPresenceStore: locationPresenceStore
        )
        let resolvedSharedContentStore: SharedContentStore?
        if let sharedContentStore {
            resolvedSharedContentStore = sharedContentStore
        } else if let sharedDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: BitchatApp.groupID) {
            resolvedSharedContentStore = SharedContentStore(defaults: sharedDefaults)
        } else {
            resolvedSharedContentStore = nil
        }
        let sharedContentImportModel = SharedContentImportModel(store: resolvedSharedContentStore)
        self.sharedContentImportModel = sharedContentImportModel
        self.appChromeModel = AppChromeModel(
            chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
-            privateInboxModel: self.privateInboxModel
+            privateInboxModel: self.privateInboxModel,
            onPanicWipe: { sharedContentImportModel.discardAll() }
        )
-
+        let chatViewModel = self.chatViewModel
-        GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded()
+        self.boardAlertsModel = BoardAlertsModel(
            arrivals: BoardStore.shared.postArrivals.eraseToAnyPublisher(),
            wipes: BoardStore.shared.didWipe.eraseToAnyPublisher(),
            dependencies: BoardAlertsModel.Dependencies(
                isOwnPost: { post in
                    let key = chatViewModel.meshService.noiseSigningPublicKeyData()
                    return !key.isEmpty && key == post.authorSigningKey
                },
                emitSystemLine: { content, geohash in
                    if geohash.isEmpty {
                        chatViewModel.addMeshOnlySystemMessage(content)
                    } else {
                        chatViewModel.addGeohashSystemMessage(content, geohash: geohash)
                    }
                }
            )
        )
        if chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed {
            GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded()
        }
        bindRuntimeObservers()
        NotificationDelegate.shared.runtime = self
    }
    func start() {
        guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
        guard !started else {
            checkForSharedContent()
            return
@@ -122,11 +152,21 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
        NetworkActivationService.shared.start()
        GeohashPresenceService.shared.start()
        checkForSharedContent()
        expireAgedMedia()
        record(.launched)
        record(.startupCompleted)
    }
    /// Drops media that has outlived the retention window. Off the main thread
    /// and best-effort: the sweep walks the media tree, and nothing at launch
    /// depends on its result.
    private func expireAgedMedia() {
        Task(priority: .utility) {
            BLEIncomingFileStore().expireAgedMedia()
        }
    }
    func handleOpenURL(_ url: URL) {
        record(.openedURL(url.absoluteString))
@@ -136,12 +176,14 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
    }
    func handleDidBecomeActiveNotification() {
        guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
        chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
        checkForSharedContent()
    }
    #if os(macOS)
    func handleMacDidBecomeActiveNotification() {
        guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
        record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active))
        chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
        checkForSharedContent()
@@ -160,6 +202,7 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
            didEnterBackground = true
        case .active:
            guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
            record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active))
            chatViewModel.meshService.startServices()
            TorManager.shared.setAppForeground(true)
@@ -202,7 +245,17 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
        chatViewModel.applicationWillTerminate()
    }
-    func handleNotificationResponse(identifier: String, userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any]) {
+    func handleNotificationResponse(
        identifier: String,
        actionIdentifier: String = UNNotificationDefaultActionIdentifier,
        userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any]
    ) {
        guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
        if actionIdentifier == NotificationService.waveActionID {
            chatViewModel.sendMeshWave()
            return
        }
        if identifier.hasPrefix("private-"), let peerID = PeerID(str: userInfo["peerID"] as? String) {
            record(.notificationOpened(peerID: peerID))
            chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
@@ -249,6 +302,8 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillRestart)
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] _ in
                guard self?.chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed == true
                else { return }
                self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willRestart))
                self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillRestart()
            }
@@ -257,6 +312,8 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorDidBecomeReady)
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] _ in
                guard self?.chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed == true
                else { return }
                self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.didBecomeReady))
                self?.chatViewModel.handleTorDidBecomeReady()
            }
@@ -265,14 +322,28 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillStart)
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] _ in
                guard self?.chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed == true
                else { return }
                self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willStart))
                self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillStart()
            }
            .store(in: &cancellables)
        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorBootstrapDidStall)
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] _ in
                guard self?.chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed == true
                else { return }
                self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.bootstrapDidStall))
                self?.chatViewModel.handleTorBootstrapDidStall()
            }
            .store(in: &cancellables)
        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorUserPreferenceChanged)
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] notification in
                guard self?.chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed == true
                else { return }
                self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.preferenceChanged))
                self?.chatViewModel.handleTorPreferenceChanged(notification)
            }
@@ -289,36 +360,22 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
    }
    func checkForSharedContent() {
-        guard let userDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: BitchatApp.groupID),
+        let previousID = sharedContentImportModel.offer?.id
-              let sharedContent = userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContent"),
+        guard let payload = sharedContentImportModel.refresh(
-              let sharedDate = userDefaults.object(forKey: "sharedContentDate") as? Date else {
+            destination: currentSharedContentDestination
-            return
+        ) else { return }
        if previousID != payload.id {
            record(.sharedContentReadyForReview(payload.kind))
        }
    }
-        guard Date().timeIntervalSince(sharedDate) < TransportConfig.uiShareAcceptWindowSeconds else {
+    var currentSharedContentDestination: SharedContentDestination {
-            return
+        SharedContentDestination.resolve(
-        }
+            selectedPrivatePeerID: privateConversationModel.selectedPeerID,
-
+            privateDisplayName: privateConversationModel.selectedHeaderState?.displayName,
-        let contentKind = SharedContentKind(rawValue: userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContentType") ?? "") ?? .text
+            activeChannel: locationChannelsModel.selectedChannel
-
+        )
        userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContent")
        userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentType")
        userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentDate")
        switch contentKind {
        case .url:
            if let data = sharedContent.data(using: .utf8),
               let urlData = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: String],
               let url = urlData["url"] {
                chatViewModel.sendMessage(url)
            } else {
                chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
            }
        case .text:
            chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
        }
        record(.sharedContentAccepted(contentKind))
    }
    func handleNostrRelayConnectionChanged(_ isConnected: Bool) {
@@ -327,7 +384,9 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
        let becameConnected = isConnected && !lastNostrRelayConnectedState
        lastNostrRelayConnectedState = isConnected
-        guard started, becameConnected else { return }
+        guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed,
              started,
              becameConnected else { return }
        let isInitialConnection = !didHandleInitialNostrConnection
        didHandleInitialNostrConnection = true
@@ -349,12 +408,12 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
            TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() {
            chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
            chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
-                String(localized: "system.tor.starting", defaultValue: "starting tor...", comment: "System message when Tor is starting")
+                String(localized: "system.tor.starting", comment: "System message when Tor is starting")
            )
        } else if !TorManager.shared.torEnforced && !chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced {
            chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
            chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
-                String(localized: "system.tor.dev_bypass", defaultValue: "development build: Tor bypass enabled.", comment: "System message when Tor bypass is enabled in development")
+                String(localized: "system.tor.dev_bypass", comment: "System message when Tor bypass is enabled in development")
            )
        }
    }
@@ -39,15 +39,17 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
    @Published private(set) var messages: [BitchatMessage] = []
    @Published private(set) var isUnread: Bool = false
-    /// Incrementally-maintained message-ID → index map for O(1) dedup and
+    /// Incrementally-maintained message-ID → logical-index map for O(1)
-    /// delivery-status lookup. Kept in sync on every mutation:
+    /// dedup and delivery-status lookup. Logical indexes are physical array
-    /// - tail append: single insert
+    /// indexes plus `indexOffset`; trimming from the head advances the offset
-    /// - out-of-order insert: suffix reindex from the insertion point
+    /// instead of rewriting every surviving dictionary entry. This matters
-    /// - trim: full rebuild — `removeFirst(k)` is already O(n), so the
+    /// after the 1337-message cap is reached, when every steady-state tail
-    ///   rebuild does not change the asymptotics, and trim only happens once
+    /// append evicts one old row.
-    ///   the cap (1337) is reached. Simple and correct beats the
+    ///
-    ///   offset-tracking alternative here.
+    /// Out-of-order inserts and middle removals still reindex only the
    /// affected suffix. Full filtering resets the offset while rebuilding.
    private var indexByMessageID: [String: Int] = [:]
    private var indexOffset = 0
    fileprivate init(id: ConversationID, cap: Int) {
        self.id = id
@@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
    }
    func message(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
-        guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return nil }
+        guard let index = physicalIndex(forMessageID: messageID) else { return nil }
        return messages[index]
    }
@@ -101,7 +103,7 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
            reindex(from: index)
        } else {
            messages.append(message)
-            indexByMessageID[message.id] = messages.count - 1
+            indexByMessageID[message.id] = indexOffset + messages.count - 1
        }
        return InsertResult(inserted: true, trimmedMessageIDs: trimIfNeeded())
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
    /// timeline position (in-place updates like media progress reuse the
    /// original timestamp); a new message goes through ordered insertion.
    fileprivate func upsert(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> UpsertOutcome {
-        if let index = indexByMessageID[message.id] {
+        if let index = physicalIndex(forMessageID: message.id) {
            messages[index] = message
            return .updated
        }
@@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
    /// `.read` is never downgraded to `.delivered` or `.sent`.
    /// Returns `true` when the status was applied.
    fileprivate func applyDeliveryStatus(_ status: DeliveryStatus, forMessageID messageID: String) -> Bool {
-        guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return false }
+        guard let index = physicalIndex(forMessageID: messageID) else { return false }
        let message = messages[index]
        guard !Self.shouldSkipStatusUpdate(current: message.deliveryStatus, new: status) else { return false }
@@ -142,7 +144,7 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
    /// observers still need an @Published emission to re-render.
    @discardableResult
    fileprivate func republishMessage(withID messageID: String) -> Bool {
-        guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return false }
+        guard let index = physicalIndex(forMessageID: messageID) else { return false }
        messages[index] = messages[index]
        return true
    }
@@ -157,10 +159,14 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
    /// Removes a single message by ID. Returns the removed message, or
    /// `nil` when no message with that ID exists.
    fileprivate func remove(messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
-        guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return nil }
+        guard let index = physicalIndex(forMessageID: messageID) else { return nil }
        let removed = messages.remove(at: index)
        indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
-        reindex(from: index)
+        if index == 0 {
            indexOffset += 1
        } else {
            reindex(from: index)
        }
        return removed
    }
@@ -177,6 +183,7 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
        for id in removedIDs {
            indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: id)
        }
        indexOffset = 0
        reindex(from: 0)
        return removedIDs
    }
@@ -184,6 +191,7 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
    fileprivate func clearMessages() {
        messages.removeAll()
        indexByMessageID.removeAll()
        indexOffset = 0
    }
    // MARK: Diagnostics
@@ -205,9 +213,10 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
            let message = messages[position]
            // Count equality + every message resolving to its own position
            // proves the index is exactly the inverse map (no stale extras).
-            if let index = indexByMessageID[message.id] {
+            if let logicalIndex = indexByMessageID[message.id] {
-                if index != position {
+                let expectedIndex = indexOffset + position
-                    violations.append("\(label): message \(message.id.prefix(8))… at \(position) indexed at \(index)")
+                if logicalIndex != expectedIndex {
                    violations.append("\(label): message \(message.id.prefix(8))… at \(position) indexed at \(logicalIndex - indexOffset)")
                }
            } else {
                violations.append("\(label): message \(message.id.prefix(8))… at \(position) missing from index")
@@ -225,8 +234,25 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
        guard let current else { return false }
        if current == new { return true }
        // Never downgrade to a weaker delivery state. Ordering of certainty:
        // sending < sent < carried < delivered < read. A late `.sent` write
        // (e.g. the optimistic stamp after routing) must not clobber the
        // `.carried` the router already set when it handed a copy to a
        // courier/bridge, nor a `.delivered`/`.read` ack. A late asynchronous
        // failure is weaker than a confirmed recipient receipt too, so it may
        // not replace `.delivered`/`.read`. Same for the
        // `.sending` stamp a pre-handshake resend emits asynchronously: it
        // can land after the message already reached `.sent`, and "Sent" was
        // already truthful. (`.failed` → `.sending` stays allowed so a real
        // failure retry is visible.)
        switch (current, new) {
-        case (.read, .delivered), (.read, .sent):
+        case (.read, .delivered), (.read, .carried), (.read, .sent), (.read, .sending), (.read, .failed):
            return true
        case (.delivered, .carried), (.delivered, .sent), (.delivered, .sending), (.delivered, .failed):
            return true
        case (.carried, .sent), (.carried, .sending):
            return true
        case (.sent, .sending):
            return true
        default:
            return false
@@ -252,10 +278,17 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
    private func reindex(from start: Int) {
        for index in start..<messages.count {
-            indexByMessageID[messages[index].id] = index
+            indexByMessageID[messages[index].id] = indexOffset + index
        }
    }
    private func physicalIndex(forMessageID messageID: String) -> Int? {
        guard let logicalIndex = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return nil }
        let index = logicalIndex - indexOffset
        guard messages.indices.contains(index) else { return nil }
        return index
    }
    /// Trims oldest messages over the cap; returns the trimmed message IDs.
    private func trimIfNeeded() -> [String] {
        guard messages.count > cap else { return [] }
@@ -265,7 +298,7 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
            indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: id)
        }
        messages.removeFirst(overflow)
-        reindex(from: 0)
+        indexOffset += overflow
        return trimmedIDs
    }
 }
@@ -409,6 +442,40 @@ final class ConversationStore: ObservableObject {
    @discardableResult
    func setDeliveryStatus(_ status: DeliveryStatus, forMessageID messageID: String) -> Bool {
        guard let ids = conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] else { return false }
        return applyDeliveryStatus(status, forMessageID: messageID, among: ids)
    }
    /// Applies an authenticated delivery/read receipt only to the supplied
    /// direct-conversation aliases. A colliding message ID in another peer's
    /// conversation (or a public timeline) must not inherit the receipt.
    ///
    /// Stable and ephemeral aliases can temporarily hold the same message
    /// instance during handoff. The shared helper republishes every targeted
    /// alias even when the first mutation already changed that instance.
    @discardableResult
    func setDeliveryStatus(
        _ status: DeliveryStatus,
        forMessageID messageID: String,
        inDirectPeerAliases peerIDs: Set<PeerID>
    ) -> Bool {
        guard !peerIDs.isEmpty,
              let indexedIDs = conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] else {
            return false
        }
        let allowedIDs = Set(peerIDs.map { ConversationID.directPeer($0) })
        return applyDeliveryStatus(
            status,
            forMessageID: messageID,
            among: indexedIDs.intersection(allowedIDs)
        )
    }
    private func applyDeliveryStatus(
        _ status: DeliveryStatus,
        forMessageID messageID: String,
        among ids: Set<ConversationID>
    ) -> Bool {
        guard !ids.isEmpty else { return false }
        var applied = false
        var skipped: [ConversationID] = []
        for id in ids {
@@ -796,16 +863,6 @@ extension ConversationStore {
        return messageIDs
    }
    /// Removes every direct conversation (panic clear).
    func removeAllDirectConversations() {
        let directIDs = conversationIDs.filter { id in
            if case .direct = id { return true }
            return false
        }
        for id in directIDs {
            removeConversation(id)
        }
    }
 }
 // MARK: - Diagnostics support
@@ -837,8 +894,8 @@ extension Conversation {
    /// (positions 0 and 1 swap their index entries). Requires >= 2 messages.
    func _testCorruptIndexEntries() {
        guard messages.count >= 2 else { return }
-        indexByMessageID[messages[0].id] = 1
+        indexByMessageID[messages[0].id] = indexOffset + 1
-        indexByMessageID[messages[1].id] = 0
+        indexByMessageID[messages[1].id] = indexOffset
    }
    /// Drops a message's index entry entirely (count mismatch + missing).
@@ -852,8 +909,8 @@ extension Conversation {
    func _testCorruptOrderingPreservingIndex() {
        guard messages.count >= 2 else { return }
        messages.swapAt(0, messages.count - 1)
-        indexByMessageID[messages[0].id] = 0
+        indexByMessageID[messages[0].id] = indexOffset
-        indexByMessageID[messages[messages.count - 1].id] = messages.count - 1
+        indexByMessageID[messages[messages.count - 1].id] = indexOffset + messages.count - 1
    }
 }
@@ -893,7 +950,7 @@ extension ConversationStore {
 extension Conversation {
    fileprivate func _testAppendBypassingTrim(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
        messages.append(message)
-        indexByMessageID[message.id] = messages.count - 1
+        indexByMessageID[message.id] = indexOffset + messages.count - 1
    }
 }
 #endif
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
    @Published private(set) var currentNickname: String
    @Published private(set) var isBatchingPublic = false
    @Published private(set) var canSendMediaInCurrentContext = true
    @Published private(set) var legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest: LegacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?
    /// Who is talking live in the public mesh channel right now (floor
    /// courtesy: the composer mic tints "busy" while someone holds the floor).
    @Published private(set) var activeLiveVoiceTalker: String?
    private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
    private let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel
@@ -150,6 +154,24 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
        chatViewModel.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
    }
    func resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(requestID: UUID, approved: Bool) {
        chatViewModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
            requestID: requestID,
            approved: approved
        )
    }
    /// Capture backend for the mic gesture: live PTT when the current DM
    /// peer can hear it now, classic voice note otherwise.
    func makeVoiceCaptureSession() -> VoiceCaptureSession {
        chatViewModel.makeVoiceCaptureSession()
    }
    /// Whether this message is a live voice burst still streaming in.
    func isLiveVoiceMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
        chatViewModel.liveVoiceCoordinator.isLiveVoiceMessage(message)
    }
    func cancelMediaSend(messageID: String) {
        chatViewModel.cancelMediaSend(messageID: messageID)
    }
@@ -175,6 +197,14 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .assign(to: &$isBatchingPublic)
        chatViewModel.$activePublicVoiceTalker
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .assign(to: &$activeLiveVoiceTalker)
        chatViewModel.$legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .assign(to: &$legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest)
        conversations.$activeChannel
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] channel in
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
 import BitFoundation
 import Combine
 import Foundation
@@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ final class LocationChannelsModel: ObservableObject {
    private let manager: LocationChannelManager
    private let network: NetworkActivationService
    private let gateway: GatewayService
    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
    init(
        manager: LocationChannelManager? = nil,
@@ -102,10 +100,6 @@ final class LocationChannelsModel: ObservableObject {
        network.setUserTorEnabled(enabled)
    }
    func setGatewayEnabled(_ enabled: Bool) {
        gateway.setEnabled(enabled)
    }
    func refreshMeshChannelsIfNeeded() {
        guard case .mesh = selectedChannel,
              permissionState == .authorized,
@@ -7,45 +7,146 @@ final class LocationPresenceStore: ObservableObject {
    @Published private(set) var geoNicknames: [String: String] = [:]
    @Published private(set) var teleportedGeo: Set<String> = []
    private let teleportedGeoCapacity: Int
    private var teleportedGeoOrder: [String] = []
    private let geoNicknameCapacity: Int
    private var geoNicknameOrder: [String] = []
    init(
        teleportedGeoCapacity: Int = TransportConfig.geoTeleportedParticipantsCap,
        geoNicknameCapacity: Int = TransportConfig.geoNicknameParticipantsCap
    ) {
        self.teleportedGeoCapacity = max(0, teleportedGeoCapacity)
        self.geoNicknameCapacity = max(0, geoNicknameCapacity)
    }
    func setCurrentGeohash(_ geohash: String?) {
-        currentGeohash = geohash?.lowercased()
+        let normalized = geohash?.lowercased()
        if currentGeohash != normalized {
            // Presence markers are scoped to the active geohash channel.
            clearTeleportedGeo()
            clearGeoNicknames()
        }
        currentGeohash = normalized
    }
    func setNickname(_ nickname: String, for pubkeyHex: String) {
-        geoNicknames[pubkeyHex.lowercased()] = nickname
+        guard geoNicknameCapacity > 0 else {
            clearGeoNicknames()
            return
        }
        let key = pubkeyHex.lowercased()
        if geoNicknames[key] != nil {
            geoNicknames[key] = nickname
            return
        }
        while geoNicknameOrder.count >= geoNicknameCapacity, let oldest = geoNicknameOrder.first {
            geoNicknameOrder.removeFirst()
            geoNicknames.removeValue(forKey: oldest)
        }
        geoNicknames[key] = nickname
        geoNicknameOrder.append(key)
    }
    func replaceGeoNicknames(_ nicknames: [String: String]) {
-        geoNicknames = Dictionary(
+        guard geoNicknameCapacity > 0 else {
-            uniqueKeysWithValues: nicknames.map { key, value in
+            clearGeoNicknames()
-                (key.lowercased(), value)
+            return
-            }
+        }
-        )
+
        var seen: Set<String> = []
        var ordered: [String] = []
        var normalized: [String: String] = [:]
        for (key, value) in nicknames {
            let lower = key.lowercased()
            guard seen.insert(lower).inserted else { continue }
            ordered.append(lower)
            normalized[lower] = value
        }
        if ordered.count > geoNicknameCapacity {
            let kept = Array(ordered.suffix(geoNicknameCapacity))
            ordered = kept
            normalized = Dictionary(uniqueKeysWithValues: kept.compactMap { key in
                normalized[key].map { (key, $0) }
            })
        }
        geoNicknameOrder = ordered
        geoNicknames = normalized
    }
    func clearGeoNicknames() {
        geoNicknames.removeAll()
        geoNicknameOrder.removeAll()
    }
    func retainGeoNicknames(keeping pubkeys: Set<String>) {
        let allowed = Set(pubkeys.map { $0.lowercased() })
        geoNicknameOrder = geoNicknameOrder.filter { allowed.contains($0) }
        geoNicknames = geoNicknames.filter { allowed.contains($0.key) }
    }
    func markTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) {
-        teleportedGeo.insert(pubkeyHex.lowercased())
+        guard teleportedGeoCapacity > 0 else {
            clearTeleportedGeo()
            return
        }
        let key = pubkeyHex.lowercased()
        guard !teleportedGeo.contains(key) else { return }
        while teleportedGeoOrder.count >= teleportedGeoCapacity, let oldest = teleportedGeoOrder.first {
            teleportedGeoOrder.removeFirst()
            teleportedGeo.remove(oldest)
        }
        teleportedGeo.insert(key)
        teleportedGeoOrder.append(key)
    }
    func clearTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) {
-        teleportedGeo.remove(pubkeyHex.lowercased())
+        let key = pubkeyHex.lowercased()
        teleportedGeo.remove(key)
        teleportedGeoOrder.removeAll { $0 == key }
    }
    func replaceTeleportedGeo(_ pubkeys: Set<String>) {
-        teleportedGeo = Set(pubkeys.map { $0.lowercased() })
+        guard teleportedGeoCapacity > 0 else {
            clearTeleportedGeo()
            return
        }
        var seen: Set<String> = []
        var ordered: [String] = []
        for key in pubkeys.map({ $0.lowercased() }) where !seen.contains(key) {
            seen.insert(key)
            ordered.append(key)
        }
        if ordered.count > teleportedGeoCapacity {
            ordered = Array(ordered.suffix(teleportedGeoCapacity))
        }
        teleportedGeoOrder = ordered
        teleportedGeo = Set(ordered)
    }
    func retainTeleportedGeo(keeping pubkeys: Set<String>) {
        let allowed = Set(pubkeys.map { $0.lowercased() })
        teleportedGeoOrder = teleportedGeoOrder.filter { allowed.contains($0) }
        teleportedGeo = teleportedGeo.intersection(allowed)
    }
    func clearTeleportedGeo() {
        teleportedGeo.removeAll()
        teleportedGeoOrder.removeAll()
    }
    func reset() {
        currentGeohash = nil
        geoNicknames.removeAll()
        geoNicknameOrder.removeAll()
        teleportedGeo.removeAll()
        teleportedGeoOrder.removeAll()
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
 //
 // NearbyNotesCounter.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // Counts unexpired location notes left at the user's current building-level
 // geohash so the empty mesh timeline can say "📍 3 notes left here". Only
 // subscribes while a view holds it active, and only when location notes are
 // enabled and location permission is already granted (it never prompts).
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 //
 import Combine
 import Foundation
@MainActor
 final class NearbyNotesCounter: ObservableObject {
    static let shared = NearbyNotesCounter()
    @Published private(set) var noteCount = 0
    /// Whether an explicit notes act (the empty-timeline "check for notes"
    /// tap, opening the notices sheet's geo tab, or a successful /drop) has
    /// unlocked the counter this session. Until then nothing subscribes:
    /// merely looking at the mesh timeline must not open a building-precision
    /// relay REQ that leaks location passively.
    @Published private(set) var revealed = false
    private var manager: LocationNotesManager?
    private var managerCancellable: AnyCancellable?
    private var channelsCancellable: AnyCancellable?
    private var permissionCancellable: AnyCancellable?
    private var settingCancellable: AnyCancellable?
    private var activeHolders = 0
    private let locationManager: LocationChannelManager
    private let managerFactory: @MainActor (String) -> LocationNotesManager
    private let releaseManager: @MainActor (LocationNotesManager?) -> Void
    private let locationNotesEnabled: @MainActor () -> Bool
    private let locationNotesSettingsPublisher: AnyPublisher<Void, Never>
    init(
        locationManager: LocationChannelManager = .shared,
        managerFactory: @escaping @MainActor (String) -> LocationNotesManager = { LocationNotesPool.shared.acquire($0) },
        releaseManager: @escaping @MainActor (LocationNotesManager?) -> Void = { LocationNotesPool.shared.release($0) },
        locationNotesEnabled: @escaping @MainActor () -> Bool = { LocationNotesSettings.enabled },
        locationNotesSettings: AnyPublisher<Void, Never>? = nil
    ) {
        self.locationManager = locationManager
        self.managerFactory = managerFactory
        self.releaseManager = releaseManager
        self.locationNotesEnabled = locationNotesEnabled
        self.locationNotesSettingsPublisher = locationNotesSettings
            ?? NotificationCenter.default
                .publisher(for: LocationNotesSettings.didChangeNotification)
                .map { _ in () }
                .eraseToAnyPublisher()
    }
    /// Whether the empty-timeline "check for notes" hint should render.
    /// The permission gate matters: `retarget()` never subscribes without
    /// location authorization, so offering the hint to an unauthorized
    /// install would be a silent dead-end — tap, `revealed` flips, the hint
    /// vanishes, and nothing else happens for the session. The hint never
    /// prompts; it simply stays hidden until permission exists. The caller
    /// passes its own observed permission state so the hint re-renders when
    /// authorization changes.
    func offersRevealHint(permissionState: LocationChannelManager.PermissionState) -> Bool {
        !revealed && locationNotesEnabled() && permissionState == .authorized
    }
    /// Marks the one explicit act that lets the counter subscribe. Sticky for
    /// the rest of the session (the singleton's lifetime); `deactivate()`
    /// deliberately does not reset it.
    func reveal() {
        guard !revealed else { return }
        revealed = true
        retarget()
    }
    /// Begins (or keeps) the notes subscription for the current building
    /// geohash. Balanced by `deactivate()`; ref-counted so multiple views can
    /// hold it.
    func activate() {
        activeHolders += 1
        guard activeHolders == 1 else { return }
        channelsCancellable = locationManager.$availableChannels
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] _ in self?.retarget() }
        // CoreLocation can revoke authorization while the view remains
        // mounted. `availableChannels` deliberately retains its last value,
        // so permission must be an independent invalidation signal or the
        // building REQ survives on stale coordinates.
        permissionCancellable = locationManager.$permissionState
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] _ in self?.retarget() }
        // The app-info kill switch must take effect immediately, not on the
        // next location change or remount.
        settingCancellable = locationNotesSettingsPublisher
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] _ in self?.retarget() }
        retarget()
    }
    func deactivate() {
        activeHolders = max(0, activeHolders - 1)
        guard activeHolders == 0 else { return }
        channelsCancellable = nil
        permissionCancellable = nil
        settingCancellable = nil
        managerCancellable = nil
        releaseManager(manager)
        manager = nil
        noteCount = 0
    }
    private func retarget() {
        guard activeHolders > 0,
              revealed,
              locationNotesEnabled(),
              locationManager.permissionState == .authorized,
              let geohash = locationManager.availableChannels
                  .first(where: { $0.level == .building })?.geohash
        else {
            managerCancellable = nil
            releaseManager(manager)
            manager = nil
            noteCount = 0
            return
        }
        if let manager {
            guard manager.geohash != geohash.lowercased() else { return }
            // Pooled managers are shared; never retarget one in place —
            // release the old cell and acquire the new one.
            managerCancellable = nil
            releaseManager(manager)
            self.manager = nil
        }
        let fresh = managerFactory(geohash)
        manager = fresh
        managerCancellable = fresh.$notes
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] notes in
                let now = Date()
                self?.noteCount = notes.filter { $0.expiresAt.map { $0 > now } ?? true }.count
            }
    }
 }
@@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ final class PeerIdentityStore: ObservableObject {
        stablePeerIDsByShortID[peerID] = stablePeerID
    }
    func replaceStablePeerIDs(_ mappings: [PeerID: PeerID]) {
        stablePeerIDsByShortID = mappings
    }
    func fingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? {
        peerFingerprintsByPeerID[peerID]
    }
@@ -94,10 +90,6 @@ final class PeerIdentityStore: ObservableObject {
        invalidateEncryptionCache(for: peerID)
    }
    func replaceEncryptionStatuses(_ statuses: [PeerID: EncryptionStatus]) {
        encryptionStatuses = statuses
    }
    func setVerifiedFingerprints(_ fingerprints: Set<String>) {
        verifiedFingerprints = fingerprints
    }
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
 //
 // PrivacyScreen.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 #if os(iOS)
 import UIKit
 /// Covers the window while the app is not frontmost, so the snapshot iOS takes
 /// for the app switcher shows a placeholder instead of the open conversation.
 ///
 /// The cover is added on `willResignActive` and removed on `didBecomeActive`.
 /// Both are deliberately UIKit notifications rather than SwiftUI's `scenePhase`:
 /// the snapshot is captured shortly after `willResignActive`, and adding an
 /// opaque subview to the window synchronously in that callback is the only way
 /// to guarantee it is in the render tree before the capture. A SwiftUI overlay
 /// driven by state may not have been laid out yet.
 ///
 /// Panic wipe separately deletes any snapshots already on disk; this keeps new
 /// ones from containing anything worth deleting.
 final class PrivacyScreen {
    static let shared = PrivacyScreen()
    private var cover: UIView?
    private var observers: [NSObjectProtocol] = []
    private init() {}
    /// Idempotent: repeated calls do not stack observers.
    ///
    /// `queue: nil` is required, not incidental. Passing an `OperationQueue`
    /// would enqueue the handler to run in a later runloop turn, which the
    /// snapshot can beat; with no queue the block runs synchronously on the
    /// thread that posted the notification — the main thread, for UIApplication
    /// lifecycle notifications.
    func install() {
        guard observers.isEmpty else { return }
        let center = NotificationCenter.default
        observers = [
            center.addObserver(
                forName: UIApplication.willResignActiveNotification,
                object: nil,
                queue: nil
            ) { _ in
                PrivacyScreen.shared.show()
            },
            center.addObserver(
                forName: UIApplication.didBecomeActiveNotification,
                object: nil,
                queue: nil
            ) { _ in
                PrivacyScreen.shared.hide()
            }
        ]
    }
    private func show() {
        guard cover == nil, let window = Self.activeWindow() else { return }
        // Opaque rather than a blur: blurred large text can stay partly
        // legible, and the snapshot is stored on disk.
        let view = UIView(frame: window.bounds)
        view.backgroundColor = .systemBackground
        view.autoresizingMask = [.flexibleWidth, .flexibleHeight]
        let label = UILabel()
        label.text = "bitchat"
        label.font = .monospacedSystemFont(ofSize: 22, weight: .medium)
        label.textColor = .secondaryLabel
        label.translatesAutoresizingMaskIntoConstraints = false
        view.addSubview(label)
        NSLayoutConstraint.activate([
            label.centerXAnchor.constraint(equalTo: view.centerXAnchor),
            label.centerYAnchor.constraint(equalTo: view.centerYAnchor)
        ])
        window.addSubview(view)
        cover = view
    }
    private func hide() {
        cover?.removeFromSuperview()
        cover = nil
    }
    private static func activeWindow() -> UIWindow? {
        UIApplication.shared.connectedScenes
            .compactMap { $0 as? UIWindowScene }
            .flatMap(\.windows)
            .first { $0.isKeyWindow } ??
        UIApplication.shared.connectedScenes
            .compactMap { $0 as? UIWindowScene }
            .flatMap(\.windows)
            .first
    }
 }
 #endif
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ final class PrivateConversationModel: ObservableObject {
            if let group = chatViewModel.groupStore.group(for: conversationPeerID) {
                displayName = "#\(group.name) (\(group.members.count))"
            } else {
-                displayName = String(localized: "common.unknown", defaultValue: "unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer")
+                displayName = String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer")
            }
            return PrivateConversationHeaderState(
                conversationPeerID: conversationPeerID,
@@ -265,10 +265,10 @@ final class PrivateConversationModel: ObservableObject {
        let headerPeerID = chatViewModel.getShortIDForNoiseKey(conversationPeerID)
        let peer = chatViewModel.getPeer(byID: headerPeerID)
        let displayName = resolveDisplayName(for: conversationPeerID, headerPeerID: headerPeerID, peer: peer)
-        // Geo DMs are always routed over Nostr (NIP-17); their nostr_ keys
+        // Geo DMs are always routed through BitChat private envelopes over
-        // never resolve to a reachable mesh peer, so resolveAvailability would
+        // Nostr; their nostr_ keys never resolve to a reachable mesh peer, so
-        // report .offline. Report .nostrAvailable so the header shows the
+        // resolveAvailability would report .offline. Report .nostrAvailable
-        // globe instead of a misleading "offline" tag.
+        // so the header shows the globe instead of a misleading "offline" tag.
        let availability = conversationPeerID.isGeoDM
            ? .nostrAvailable
            : resolveAvailability(for: headerPeerID, peer: peer)
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ final class PrivateConversationModel: ObservableObject {
            }
        }
-        return String(localized: "common.unknown", defaultValue: "unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer")
+        return String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer")
    }
    private func resolveAvailability(for headerPeerID: PeerID, peer: BitchatPeer?) -> PrivateConversationAvailability {
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
 import BitFoundation
 import Combine
 import Foundation
 enum SharedContentDestination: Sendable, Equatable {
    case mesh
    case geohash(String)
    case privateConversation(peerID: PeerID, displayName: String)
    static func resolve(
        selectedPrivatePeerID: PeerID?,
        privateDisplayName: String?,
        activeChannel: ChannelID
    ) -> SharedContentDestination {
        if let selectedPrivatePeerID {
            let fallback = String(selectedPrivatePeerID.id.prefix(12))
            return .privateConversation(
                peerID: selectedPrivatePeerID,
                displayName: privateDisplayName?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty ?? fallback
            )
        }
        switch activeChannel {
        case .mesh:
            return .mesh
        case .location(let channel):
            return .geohash(channel.geohash.lowercased())
        }
    }
    var displayName: String {
        switch self {
        case .mesh:
            return "#mesh"
        case .geohash(let geohash):
            return "#\(geohash)"
        case .privateConversation(_, let displayName):
            return displayName
        }
    }
 }
 struct SharedContentOffer: Identifiable, Sendable, Equatable {
    let payload: SharedContentPayload
    let destination: SharedContentDestination
    var id: UUID { payload.id }
 }
 /// Holds a pending extension handoff until the user chooses a destination and
 /// explicitly adds it to the composer. This type has no send dependency by
 /// design: confirming an import can never transmit a message.
@MainActor
 final class SharedContentImportModel: ObservableObject {
    @Published private(set) var offer: SharedContentOffer?
    private let store: SharedContentStore?
    init(store: SharedContentStore?) {
        self.store = store
    }
    @discardableResult
    func refresh(
        destination: SharedContentDestination,
        now: Date = Date()
    ) -> SharedContentPayload? {
        guard let payload = store?.pending(now: now) else {
            offer = nil
            return nil
        }
        let nextOffer = SharedContentOffer(payload: payload, destination: destination)
        if offer != nextOffer {
            offer = nextOffer
        }
        return payload
    }
    func updateDestination(_ destination: SharedContentDestination) {
        guard let offer, offer.destination != destination else { return }
        self.offer = SharedContentOffer(payload: offer.payload, destination: destination)
    }
    /// Returns composer text only when the currently displayed destination is
    /// still current and the reviewed envelope is still the stored envelope.
    /// A destination change updates the prompt and requires another tap.
    func confirm(
        destination: SharedContentDestination,
        now: Date = Date()
    ) -> String? {
        guard let offer else { return nil }
        guard offer.destination == destination else {
            updateDestination(destination)
            return nil
        }
        guard let payload = store?.consume(id: offer.id, now: now) else {
            _ = refresh(destination: destination, now: now)
            return nil
        }
        self.offer = nil
        return payload.composerText
    }
    func cancel(destination: SharedContentDestination, now: Date = Date()) {
        guard let offer else { return }
        store?.discard(id: offer.id)
        self.offer = nil
        // If a newer share replaced the reviewed envelope, surface it rather
        // than losing it with the older cancellation.
        _ = refresh(destination: destination, now: now)
    }
    func discardAll() {
        store?.discardAll()
        offer = nil
    }
 }
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import Combine
 import Foundation
 struct FingerprintPresentationState: Equatable {
    let statusPeerID: PeerID
    let peerNickname: String
    let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus
    let theirFingerprint: String?
@@ -56,10 +55,6 @@ final class VerificationModel: ObservableObject {
        return VerificationService.shared.buildMyQRString(nickname: currentNickname, npub: npub) ?? ""
    }
    func beginQRVerification(with qr: VerificationService.VerificationQR) -> Bool {
        chatViewModel.beginQRVerification(with: qr)
    }
    func verifyScannedPayload(_ payload: String) -> VerificationScanOutcome {
        guard let qr = VerificationService.shared.verifyScannedQR(payload) else {
            return .invalid
@@ -110,7 +105,6 @@ final class VerificationModel: ObservableObject {
        }
        return FingerprintPresentationState(
            statusPeerID: statusPeerID,
            peerNickname: peerNickname,
            encryptionStatus: encryptionStatus,
            theirFingerprint: theirFingerprint,
@@ -186,6 +180,6 @@ final class VerificationModel: ObservableObject {
            }
        }
-        return String(localized: "common.unknown", defaultValue: "unknown", comment: "Label for an unknown peer")
+        return String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Label for an unknown peer")
    }
 }
@@ -27,6 +27,66 @@
      "idiom" : "universal",
      "platform" : "ios",
      "size" : "1024x1024"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_16x16.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "1x",
      "size" : "16x16"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_16x16@2x.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "2x",
      "size" : "16x16"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_32x32.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "1x",
      "size" : "32x32"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_32x32@2x.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "2x",
      "size" : "32x32"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_128x128.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "1x",
      "size" : "128x128"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_128x128@2x.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "2x",
      "size" : "128x128"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_256x256.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "1x",
      "size" : "256x256"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_256x256@2x.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "2x",
      "size" : "256x256"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_512x512.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "1x",
      "size" : "512x512"
    },
    {
      "filename" : "mac_512x512@2x.png",
      "idiom" : "mac",
      "scale" : "2x",
      "size" : "512x512"
    }
  ],
  "info" : {
@@ -8,9 +8,6 @@
 import SwiftUI
 import UserNotifications
 #if DEBUG
 import BitLogger
 #endif
@main
 struct BitchatApp: App {
@@ -43,14 +40,11 @@ struct BitchatApp: App {
                .environmentObject(runtime.locationChannelsModel)
                .environmentObject(runtime.peerListModel)
                .environmentObject(runtime.appChromeModel)
                .environmentObject(runtime.boardAlertsModel)
                .environmentObject(runtime.sharedContentImportModel)
                .onAppear {
                    appDelegate.runtime = runtime
                    runtime.start()
                    #if DEBUG
                    // Arm the opt-in UDP log sink from persisted config (no-op
                    // until a collector host is set in the App Info sheet).
                    LogNetworkSink.shared.reloadConfiguration()
                    #endif
                }
                .onOpenURL { url in
                    runtime.handleOpenURL(url)
@@ -80,7 +74,10 @@ final class AppDelegate: NSObject, UIApplicationDelegate {
    weak var runtime: AppRuntime?
    func application(_ application: UIApplication, didFinishLaunchingWithOptions launchOptions: [UIApplication.LaunchOptionsKey: Any]? = nil) -> Bool {
-        true
+        // Installed before the first resign-active so the app-switcher snapshot
        // never captures an open conversation.
        PrivacyScreen.shared.install()
        return true
    }
    func applicationWillTerminate(_ application: UIApplication) {
@@ -111,12 +108,20 @@ final class NotificationDelegate: NSObject, UNUserNotificationCenterDelegate {
    func userNotificationCenter(_ center: UNUserNotificationCenter, didReceive response: UNNotificationResponse, withCompletionHandler completionHandler: @escaping () -> Void) {
        let identifier = response.notification.request.identifier
        let actionIdentifier = response.actionIdentifier
        let userInfo = response.notification.request.content.userInfo
        // Complete only after the response is handled: for a background
        // action (👋 wave) the system may suspend the app the moment the
        // completion handler runs, which would drop the queued send.
        Task { @MainActor in
-            self.runtime?.handleNotificationResponse(identifier: identifier, userInfo: userInfo)
+            self.runtime?.handleNotificationResponse(
                identifier: identifier,
                actionIdentifier: actionIdentifier,
                userInfo: userInfo
            )
            completionHandler()
        }
        completionHandler()
    }
    func userNotificationCenter(_ center: UNUserNotificationCenter, willPresent notification: UNNotification, withCompletionHandler completionHandler: @escaping (UNNotificationPresentationOptions) -> Void) {
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
 //
 // AudioSessionCoordinator.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import AVFoundation
 import BitLogger
 import Foundation
 /// The raw audio-session calls the coordinator makes, abstracted so the
 /// state machine is unit-testable with a mock (and compiles on the macOS
 /// test host, where `AVAudioSession` doesn't exist).
 ///
 /// Calls arrive on the coordinator's private serial queue — never the main
 /// thread. `setCategory`/`setActive` block on IPC to the audio server
 /// (observed >1 s under contention on device, tripping the system gesture
 /// gate), and Apple explicitly recommends activating the session off the
 /// main thread.
 protocol SessionApplying: Sendable {
    func setCategory(_ category: AudioSessionCoordinator.Category) throws
    func setActive(_ active: Bool, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: Bool) throws
 }
 /// Sole owner of `AVAudioSession` category/activation for voice features.
 ///
 /// Talk-over means capture (push-to-talk) and playback (inbound bursts,
 /// voice notes) can be live simultaneously; letting each engine configure
 /// the shared session directly made them stomp each other's category and
 /// route mid-flight (the AURemoteIO -10851 dead-input class). Instead every
 /// client acquires a `Token` and the coordinator:
 ///
 /// - reference-counts activation: `setActive(true)` only on the first
 ///   holder, `setActive(false, notifyOthersOnDeactivation:)` only when the
 ///   last one releases — no client can deactivate another's session;
 /// - keeps one escalating category: playback-only holders get `.playback`,
 ///   any capture holder escalates to `.playAndRecord`, and the category is
 ///   never downgraded while anyone still holds a token (capture ending must
 ///   not yank the route out from under live playback);
 /// - fans out `onInterrupted` on system interruptions and when the active
 ///   route's device disappears (no auto-resume: bursts are transient, the
 ///   next press or burst simply re-acquires). The escalating category change
 ///   fans out separately as `onCategoryEscalated` — the session stays live,
 ///   so holders that can rebuild their engine against the new configuration
 ///   keep playing (talk-over is bidirectional); holders that don't provide
 ///   it fall back to `onInterrupted`.
 ///
 /// Threading: all state lives on a private serial queue, which both
 /// serializes rapid acquire/release pairs and keeps the blocking session IPC
 /// off the main thread (`acquire` is `async` for exactly that hop; `release`
 /// is fire-and-forget onto the queue). Holder callbacks always run on the
 /// main actor.
 ///
 /// Microphone *permission* queries stay with their callers; this type owns
 /// only category and activation.
 ///
 /// `@unchecked Sendable`: every mutable property is confined to `queue`.
 final class AudioSessionCoordinator: @unchecked Sendable {
    enum Use {
        case playback
        case capture
    }
    /// The session category the coordinator has applied (the `SessionApplying`
    /// adapter maps these to concrete `AVAudioSession` category/mode/options).
    enum Category {
        case playback
        case playAndRecord
    }
    /// Opaque handle for one client's hold on the session. Release exactly
    /// once when done (extra releases are ignored).
    ///
    /// `@unchecked` because the stored callbacks are `@MainActor`-isolated
    /// closures (non-Sendable as stored types). Lifecycle state is protected
    /// by `stateLock`, and callbacks are only ever invoked on the main actor.
    final class Token: @unchecked Sendable {
        fileprivate enum CallbackKind: Sendable {
            case interrupted
            case categoryEscalated
        }
        /// A callback snapshot is only valid for the lifecycle epoch in which
        /// it was captured. `release` advances the epoch synchronously before
        /// its queue work, so a callback already headed to the main actor can't
        /// reach a client that has since released this token and reacquired a
        /// different one.
        fileprivate struct CallbackTicket: Sendable {
            let token: Token
            let kind: CallbackKind
            let lifecycleEpoch: UInt64
        }
        private enum Lifecycle {
            /// Registered on the session queue, but `acquire` has not yet
            /// returned into the client's main-actor call frame.
            case acquiring
            case ready
            case released
        }
        fileprivate let onInterrupted: @MainActor () -> Void
        fileprivate let onCategoryEscalated: (@MainActor () -> Void)?
        private let stateLock = NSLock()
        private var lifecycle = Lifecycle.acquiring
        private var lifecycleEpoch: UInt64 = 0
        /// A terminal event that lands while the token is registered but not
        /// yet handed off invalidates the acquire before its caller can start.
        private var terminalEventPendingHandoff = false
        fileprivate init(
            onInterrupted: @escaping @MainActor () -> Void,
            onCategoryEscalated: (@MainActor () -> Void)?
        ) {
            self.onInterrupted = onInterrupted
            self.onCategoryEscalated = onCategoryEscalated
        }
        /// Records an event at the same linearization point at which the
        /// coordinator snapshots its holders. An acquiring token cannot safely
        /// receive a callback yet: terminal events invalidate the acquire,
        /// while category escalation needs no callback because its engine will
        /// start against the already-escalated configuration.
        fileprivate func record(_ kind: CallbackKind) -> CallbackTicket? {
            stateLock.withLock {
                switch lifecycle {
                case .acquiring:
                    switch kind {
                    case .interrupted:
                        terminalEventPendingHandoff = true
                    case .categoryEscalated:
                        break
                    }
                    return nil
                case .ready:
                    return CallbackTicket(token: self, kind: kind, lifecycleEpoch: lifecycleEpoch)
                case .released:
                    return nil
                }
            }
        }
        /// Completes the main-actor ownership handoff if no terminal event
        /// invalidated it. Because `acquire` itself is main-actor isolated, a
        /// successful handoff returns directly into the caller without another
        /// actor hop; no callback can interleave before the caller stores the
        /// returned token.
        fileprivate func completeHandoff() -> Bool {
            stateLock.withLock {
                guard lifecycle == .acquiring,
                      !terminalEventPendingHandoff
                else { return false }
                lifecycle = .ready
                return true
            }
        }
        /// Marks the token dead synchronously, before the asynchronous holder
        /// removal. Returns false for an already-released token.
        fileprivate func markReleased() -> Bool {
            stateLock.withLock {
                guard lifecycle != .released else { return false }
                lifecycle = .released
                lifecycleEpoch &+= 1
                terminalEventPendingHandoff = false
                return true
            }
        }
        /// Revalidates a queue snapshot at the main-actor delivery boundary.
        /// The lock is deliberately released before invoking client code: real
        /// callbacks commonly call `release` on this same token.
        @MainActor
        fileprivate func deliver(_ ticket: CallbackTicket) {
            let isLive = stateLock.withLock {
                lifecycle == .ready && lifecycleEpoch == ticket.lifecycleEpoch
            }
            guard isLive else { return }
            switch ticket.kind {
            case .interrupted:
                onInterrupted()
            case .categoryEscalated:
                (onCategoryEscalated ?? onInterrupted)()
            }
        }
    }
    /// Deterministic suspension points for lifecycle race tests. Production
    /// instances use the nil defaults; the hooks never move session calls off
    /// the coordinator queue or callback execution off the main actor.
    struct TestingHooks: Sendable {
        let beforeAcquireHandoff: (@Sendable () async -> Void)?
        let beforeCallbackDelivery: (@Sendable () async -> Void)?
        init(
            beforeAcquireHandoff: (@Sendable () async -> Void)? = nil,
            beforeCallbackDelivery: (@Sendable () async -> Void)? = nil
        ) {
            self.beforeAcquireHandoff = beforeAcquireHandoff
            self.beforeCallbackDelivery = beforeCallbackDelivery
        }
    }
    static let shared = AudioSessionCoordinator(session: SystemAudioSession())
    private let session: SessionApplying
    private let testingHooks: TestingHooks
    /// Confines all mutable state, serializes whole acquire/release
    /// operations (two rapid presses can't interleave their category and
    /// activation calls), and hosts the blocking session IPC off main.
    private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.audio-session", qos: .userInitiated)
    // Queue-confined state.
    private var holders: [ObjectIdentifier: Token] = [:]
    private var currentCategory: Category?
    private var sessionActive = false
    /// Written once in init, read in deinit — never touched concurrently.
    private var observers: [NSObjectProtocol] = []
    init(session: SessionApplying, testingHooks: TestingHooks = TestingHooks()) {
        self.session = session
        self.testingHooks = testingHooks
        observeSystemNotifications()
    }
    deinit {
        for observer in observers {
            NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
        }
    }
    /// Configures + activates the session for `use` and registers the caller
    /// as a holder. The blocking `AVAudioSession` calls run on the session
    /// queue — the caller suspends instead of stalling its thread (a PTT
    /// press used to block main >1 s in `setActive`, tripping the system
    /// gesture gate). `onInterrupted` fires (on the main actor) when the
    /// client must stop using the session: a system interruption began or
    /// its route's device went away. The client should stop its engine,
    /// finalize any artifacts, and release — resuming means acquiring again.
    ///
    /// `onCategoryEscalated` fires instead when the session category
    /// escalated underneath the holder (a capture client joined): the session
    /// stays active, so a holder that can rebuild its engine against the new
    /// configuration should restart and keep going. Holders that pass `nil`
    /// get `onInterrupted` for escalation too. Escalation is delivered before
    /// `acquire` returns, so the new holder starts its engine strictly after
    /// existing ones were told to rebuild. Main-actor isolation is also the
    /// ownership handoff boundary: if interruption or route loss lands after
    /// queue registration but before that boundary, the provisional holder is
    /// removed and `acquire` throws `CancellationError` instead of returning a
    /// token whose callback already fired.
    @MainActor
    func acquire(
        _ use: Use,
        onInterrupted: @escaping @MainActor () -> Void,
        onCategoryEscalated: (@MainActor () -> Void)? = nil
    ) async throws -> Token {
        let token = Token(onInterrupted: onInterrupted, onCategoryEscalated: onCategoryEscalated)
        let reconfigured: [Token.CallbackTicket] = try await withCheckedThrowingContinuation { continuation in
            queue.async {
                do {
                    continuation.resume(returning: try self.activateOnQueue(use, registering: token))
                } catch {
                    continuation.resume(throwing: error)
                }
            }
        }
        // Escalating playback -> playAndRecord reconfigures the hardware
        // route; engines started against the old configuration must restart.
        if !reconfigured.isEmpty {
            SecureLogger.info("AudioSession: category escalated to playAndRecord with \(reconfigured.count) live holder(s)", category: .session)
            await deliver(reconfigured)
        }
        if let beforeAcquireHandoff = testingHooks.beforeAcquireHandoff {
            await beforeAcquireHandoff()
        }
        guard token.completeHandoff() else {
            // A call/Siri interruption or route loss landed after registration
            // but before ownership handoff. Remove the provisional holder and
            // fail instead of starting a client engine after the stop event.
            release(token)
            throw CancellationError()
        }
        return token
    }
    /// Drops one holder. Deactivates the session (notifying other apps) only
    /// when the last holder releases. Safe to call more than once, from any
    /// thread (including `deinit` paths): the work is fire-and-forget onto
    /// the session queue, so the blocking deactivation IPC never runs on the
    /// caller.
    func release(_ token: Token) {
        guard token.markReleased() else { return }
        queue.async {
            self.releaseOnQueue(token)
        }
    }
    // MARK: - Queue-confined core
    /// Returns callback tickets for pre-existing live holders whose engines
    /// must restart because this acquire escalated the category.
    private func activateOnQueue(_ use: Use, registering token: Token) throws -> [Token.CallbackTicket] {
        let target: Category = (use == .capture || currentCategory == .playAndRecord) ? .playAndRecord : .playback
        let categoryChanged = target != currentCategory
        let previousCategory = currentCategory
        if categoryChanged {
            try session.setCategory(target)
            currentCategory = target
        }
        if !sessionActive {
            do {
                try session.setActive(true, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: false)
            } catch {
                // Activation failed (e.g. a phone call owns the hardware):
                // with no holder registered, an escalated category recorded
                // here would stick and pin later playback-only acquires to
                // .playAndRecord. Existing holders keep the category the
                // hardware really has.
                if categoryChanged, holders.isEmpty {
                    currentCategory = previousCategory
                }
                throw error
            }
            sessionActive = true
        }
        let reconfigured = categoryChanged
            ? holders.values.compactMap { $0.record(.categoryEscalated) }
            : []
        holders[ObjectIdentifier(token)] = token
        return reconfigured
    }
    private func releaseOnQueue(_ token: Token) {
        guard holders.removeValue(forKey: ObjectIdentifier(token)) != nil else { return }
        guard holders.isEmpty else { return }
        currentCategory = nil
        guard sessionActive else { return }
        sessionActive = false
        do {
            try session.setActive(false, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: true)
        } catch {
            SecureLogger.error("AudioSession: deactivation failed: \(error)", category: .session)
        }
    }
    private func onQueue<T: Sendable>(_ body: @escaping @Sendable () -> T) async -> T {
        await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
            queue.async {
                continuation.resume(returning: body())
            }
        }
    }
    @MainActor
    private func deliver(_ tickets: [Token.CallbackTicket]) async {
        guard !tickets.isEmpty else { return }
        if let beforeCallbackDelivery = testingHooks.beforeCallbackDelivery {
            await beforeCallbackDelivery()
        }
        for ticket in tickets {
            ticket.token.deliver(ticket)
        }
    }
    // MARK: - System events (internal so tests can drive them directly)
    /// A system interruption began: the session is already deactivated by the
    /// OS, so just mark it inactive and tell every ready holder (on the main
    /// actor) to stop. A provisional acquiring holder is invalidated instead.
    /// No auto-resume — the next acquire re-activates.
    func handleInterruptionBegan() async {
        let tickets = await onQueue { () -> [Token.CallbackTicket] in
            self.sessionActive = false
            return self.holders.values.compactMap { $0.record(.interrupted) }
        }
        await deliver(tickets)
    }
    /// The active route's input/output device disappeared (e.g. BT headset
    /// off): ready holders' engines are wedged against a dead route — stop
    /// them; invalidate a holder whose acquire has not returned yet.
    func handleRouteDeviceUnavailable() async {
        let tickets = await onQueue {
            self.holders.values.compactMap { $0.record(.interrupted) }
        }
        await deliver(tickets)
    }
    /// Test hook: suspends until every session operation enqueued before this
    /// call — including fire-and-forget `release`s — has completed.
    func drain() async {
        await onQueue {}
    }
    private func observeSystemNotifications() {
        #if os(iOS)
        let center = NotificationCenter.default
        observers.append(center.addObserver(
            forName: AVAudioSession.interruptionNotification,
            object: AVAudioSession.sharedInstance(),
            queue: .main
        ) { [weak self] note in
            guard let raw = note.userInfo?[AVAudioSessionInterruptionTypeKey] as? UInt,
                  AVAudioSession.InterruptionType(rawValue: raw) == .began,
                  let self
            else { return }
            SecureLogger.info("AudioSession: interruption began", category: .session)
            Task { await self.handleInterruptionBegan() }
        })
        observers.append(center.addObserver(
            forName: AVAudioSession.routeChangeNotification,
            object: AVAudioSession.sharedInstance(),
            queue: .main
        ) { [weak self] note in
            guard let raw = note.userInfo?[AVAudioSessionRouteChangeReasonKey] as? UInt,
                  AVAudioSession.RouteChangeReason(rawValue: raw) == .oldDeviceUnavailable,
                  let self
            else { return }
            SecureLogger.info("AudioSession: route device became unavailable", category: .session)
            Task { await self.handleRouteDeviceUnavailable() }
        })
        #endif
    }
 }
 // MARK: - Production adapter
 #if os(iOS)
 private struct SystemAudioSession: SessionApplying {
    func setCategory(_ category: AudioSessionCoordinator.Category) throws {
        let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
        switch category {
        case .playback:
            try session.setCategory(.playback, mode: .spokenAudio, options: [.mixWithOthers])
        case .playAndRecord:
            // allowBluetoothHFP is not available on iOS Simulator
            #if targetEnvironment(simulator)
            try session.setCategory(
                .playAndRecord,
                mode: .default,
                options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP, .mixWithOthers]
            )
            #else
            try session.setCategory(
                .playAndRecord,
                mode: .default,
                options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP, .allowBluetoothHFP, .mixWithOthers]
            )
            #endif
        }
    }
    func setActive(_ active: Bool, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: Bool) throws {
        try AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().setActive(
            active,
            options: notifyOthersOnDeactivation ? [.notifyOthersOnDeactivation] : []
        )
    }
 }
 #else
 /// macOS has no app-level audio session; the coordinator still runs its
 /// bookkeeping so client code is identical across platforms.
 private struct SystemAudioSession: SessionApplying {
    func setCategory(_ category: AudioSessionCoordinator.Category) throws {}
    func setActive(_ active: Bool, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: Bool) throws {}
 }
 #endif
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
 //
 // PTTAudioCodec.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import AVFoundation
 import BitLogger
 import Foundation
 /// Streaming PCM -> AAC-LC encoder for live voice. Stateful (the AAC encoder
 /// carries a bit reservoir across frames); one instance per burst.
 /// Not thread-safe — confine to one queue.
 final class PTTFrameEncoder {
    private let converter: AVAudioConverter
    private var pendingInput: [AVAudioPCMBuffer] = []
    init?() {
        guard let pcm = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat,
              let aac = PTTAudioFormat.aacFormat,
              let converter = AVAudioConverter(from: pcm, to: aac)
        else { return nil }
        converter.bitRate = PTTAudioFormat.bitRate
        self.converter = converter
    }
    /// Feeds PCM (16 kHz mono float) and returns every complete AAC frame the
    /// encoder produced. Frames come out ~130 bytes each at 16 kbps.
    func encode(_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer) -> [Data] {
        pendingInput.append(buffer)
        return drainConverter()
    }
    private func drainConverter() -> [Data] {
        var frames: [Data] = []
        while true {
            let output = AVAudioCompressedBuffer(
                format: converter.outputFormat,
                packetCapacity: 8,
                maximumPacketSize: max(converter.maximumOutputPacketSize, 1)
            )
            var error: NSError?
            let status = converter.convert(to: output, error: &error) { [weak self] _, outStatus in
                guard let self, let next = self.pendingInput.first else {
                    outStatus.pointee = .noDataNow
                    return nil
                }
                self.pendingInput.removeFirst()
                outStatus.pointee = .haveData
                return next
            }
            if status == .error {
                SecureLogger.error("PTT encode failed: \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "unknown")", category: .session)
                return frames
            }
            frames.append(contentsOf: Self.extractPackets(from: output))
            // .haveData means the output buffer filled and more may be ready;
            // anything else means the converter wants more input.
            if status != .haveData { return frames }
        }
    }
    private static func extractPackets(from buffer: AVAudioCompressedBuffer) -> [Data] {
        guard buffer.packetCount > 0, let descriptions = buffer.packetDescriptions else { return [] }
        var frames: [Data] = []
        frames.reserveCapacity(Int(buffer.packetCount))
        for index in 0..<Int(buffer.packetCount) {
            let description = descriptions[index]
            guard description.mDataByteSize > 0 else { continue }
            let start = buffer.data.advanced(by: Int(description.mStartOffset))
            frames.append(Data(bytes: start, count: Int(description.mDataByteSize)))
        }
        return frames
    }
 }
 /// Streaming AAC-LC -> PCM decoder for live voice. Stateful; one instance per
 /// inbound burst. Not thread-safe — confine to one queue/actor.
 final class PTTFrameDecoder {
    private let converter: AVAudioConverter
    private let pcmFormat: AVAudioFormat
    private let aacFormat: AVAudioFormat
    init?() {
        guard let pcm = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat,
              let aac = PTTAudioFormat.aacFormat,
              let converter = AVAudioConverter(from: aac, to: pcm)
        else { return nil }
        self.converter = converter
        self.pcmFormat = pcm
        self.aacFormat = aac
    }
    /// Decodes one raw AAC frame to PCM. Returns nil for malformed input or
    /// while the decoder is still priming (the first frame of a stream).
    func decode(_ frame: Data) -> AVAudioPCMBuffer? {
        guard !frame.isEmpty, frame.count <= 8 * 1024 else { return nil }
        let input = AVAudioCompressedBuffer(format: aacFormat, packetCapacity: 1, maximumPacketSize: frame.count)
        frame.withUnsafeBytes { raw in
            guard let base = raw.baseAddress else { return }
            input.data.copyMemory(from: base, byteCount: frame.count)
        }
        input.byteLength = UInt32(frame.count)
        input.packetCount = 1
        input.packetDescriptions?.pointee = AudioStreamPacketDescription(
            mStartOffset: 0,
            mVariableFramesInPacket: 0,
            mDataByteSize: UInt32(frame.count)
        )
        guard let output = AVAudioPCMBuffer(
            pcmFormat: pcmFormat,
            frameCapacity: PTTAudioFormat.samplesPerFrame * 2
        ) else { return nil }
        var consumed = false
        var error: NSError?
        let status = converter.convert(to: output, error: &error) { _, outStatus in
            if consumed {
                outStatus.pointee = .noDataNow
                return nil
            }
            consumed = true
            outStatus.pointee = .haveData
            return input
        }
        guard status != .error else {
            SecureLogger.debug("PTT decode failed: \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "unknown")", category: .session)
            return nil
        }
        return output.frameLength > 0 ? output : nil
    }
 }
 /// Sample-rate/channel converter from the microphone's native format to the
 /// 16 kHz mono processing format. Stateful; not thread-safe.
 final class PTTInputResampler {
    private let converter: AVAudioConverter
    private let outputFormat: AVAudioFormat
    private let ratio: Double
    init?(inputFormat: AVAudioFormat) {
        guard let pcm = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat,
              let converter = AVAudioConverter(from: inputFormat, to: pcm)
        else { return nil }
        self.converter = converter
        self.outputFormat = pcm
        self.ratio = PTTAudioFormat.sampleRate / inputFormat.sampleRate
    }
    func resample(_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer) -> AVAudioPCMBuffer? {
        let capacity = AVAudioFrameCount(Double(buffer.frameLength) * ratio) + 64
        guard let output = AVAudioPCMBuffer(pcmFormat: outputFormat, frameCapacity: capacity) else { return nil }
        var consumed = false
        var error: NSError?
        let status = converter.convert(to: output, error: &error) { _, outStatus in
            if consumed {
                outStatus.pointee = .noDataNow
                return nil
            }
            consumed = true
            outStatus.pointee = .haveData
            return buffer
        }
        guard status != .error else {
            SecureLogger.debug("PTT resample failed: \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "unknown")", category: .session)
            return nil
        }
        return output.frameLength > 0 ? output : nil
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
 //
 // PTTAudioFormat.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import AVFoundation
 import Foundation
 /// Shared audio parameters for live push-to-talk: AAC-LC, 16 kHz, mono,
 /// ~16 kbps — deliberately identical to `VoiceRecorder`'s voice-note settings
 /// so a burst's finalized `.m4a` and its live frames sound the same.
 enum PTTAudioFormat {
    static let sampleRate: Double = 16_000
    static let channelCount: AVAudioChannelCount = 1
    static let bitRate = 16_000
    /// AAC-LC frame size is fixed by the codec: 1024 samples = 64 ms at 16 kHz.
    static let samplesPerFrame: AVAudioFrameCount = 1024
    static var frameDuration: TimeInterval { Double(samplesPerFrame) / sampleRate }
    /// Uncompressed processing format (deinterleaved float PCM).
    static var pcmFormat: AVAudioFormat? {
        AVAudioFormat(standardFormatWithSampleRate: sampleRate, channels: channelCount)
    }
    /// Compressed wire format.
    static var aacFormat: AVAudioFormat? {
        var description = AudioStreamBasicDescription(
            mSampleRate: sampleRate,
            mFormatID: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
            mFormatFlags: 0,
            mBytesPerPacket: 0,
            mFramesPerPacket: samplesPerFrame,
            mBytesPerFrame: 0,
            mChannelsPerFrame: channelCount,
            mBitsPerChannel: 0,
            mReserved: 0
        )
        return AVAudioFormat(streamDescription: &description)
    }
    /// Voice-note container settings for the finalized `.m4a`, mirroring
    /// `VoiceRecorder.startRecording()`.
    static var voiceNoteFileSettings: [String: Any] {
        [
            AVFormatIDKey: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
            AVSampleRateKey: sampleRate,
            AVNumberOfChannelsKey: Int(channelCount),
            AVEncoderBitRateKey: bitRate
        ]
    }
 }
 /// Builds ADTS-framed AAC so a receiver can persist a burst progressively:
 /// unlike `.m4a` (whose moov atom only exists after close), an ADTS `.aac`
 /// stream is playable at any prefix — a partially received burst is still a
 /// replayable voice note.
 enum ADTSFramer {
    private static let headerSize = 7
    /// MPEG-4 sampling frequency index for 16 kHz.
    private static let samplingFrequencyIndex: UInt8 = 8
    private static let channelConfiguration: UInt8 = 1
    /// Wraps one raw AAC-LC frame in an ADTS header.
    static func frame(_ aacFrame: Data) -> Data {
        let frameLength = aacFrame.count + headerSize
        var data = Data(capacity: frameLength)
        // Syncword 0xFFF, MPEG-4, layer 00, no CRC.
        data.append(0xFF)
        data.append(0xF1)
        // Profile AAC-LC (audio object type 2 -> bits 01), frequency index,
        // private bit 0, channel config high bit.
        data.append((0b01 << 6) | (samplingFrequencyIndex << 2) | ((channelConfiguration >> 2) & 0x1))
        data.append(((channelConfiguration & 0x3) << 6) | UInt8((frameLength >> 11) & 0x3))
        data.append(UInt8((frameLength >> 3) & 0xFF))
        data.append(UInt8((frameLength & 0x7) << 5) | 0x1F)
        // Buffer fullness 0x7FF (VBR), one AAC frame per ADTS frame.
        data.append(0xFC)
        data.append(aacFrame)
        return data
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
 //
 // PTTBurstPlayer.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
@preconcurrency import AVFoundation
 import BitLogger
 import Foundation
 /// The engine operations behind live-burst playback, abstracted so the
 /// player's lifecycle (jitter start, category-escalation restart, stop) is
 /// unit-testable without real audio hardware.
@MainActor
 protocol PTTPlaybackEngine: AnyObject {
    /// The object `AVAudioEngineConfigurationChange` notifications are posted
    /// for (nil for mocks — no observer is registered).
    var configChangeObject: AnyObject? { get }
    func start() throws
    func play()
    func stop()
    func schedule(
        _ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer,
        completionType: PTTPlaybackCompletionType,
        completionHandler: @escaping @Sendable (PTTPlaybackCompletionEvent) -> Void
    )
 }
 /// The lifecycle point requested from `AVAudioPlayerNode` for a scheduled
 /// buffer. `dataConsumed` only means the node no longer needs the bytes; it
 /// may arrive before the render pipeline has made the audio audible.
 enum PTTPlaybackCompletionType: Equatable, Sendable {
    case dataConsumed
    case dataPlayedBack
 }
 enum PTTPlaybackCompletionEvent: Equatable, Sendable {
    case dataConsumed
    case dataPlayedBack
    /// AVAudioPlayerNode invokes the requested callback when the node is
    /// stopped too. That is not audible completion and must remain replayable.
    case playbackStopped
 }
 /// One `AVAudioEngine` + `AVAudioPlayerNode` pair. Created fresh per (re)start:
 /// an engine instantiated against an earlier audio-session configuration keeps
 /// rendering to the stale route (same class of failure as the capture side's
 /// fresh-engine-per-press rule).
@MainActor
 private final class SystemPTTPlaybackEngine: PTTPlaybackEngine {
    private let engine = AVAudioEngine()
    private let node = AVAudioPlayerNode()
    init(format: AVAudioFormat) {
        engine.attach(node)
        engine.connect(node, to: engine.mainMixerNode, format: format)
    }
    var configChangeObject: AnyObject? { engine }
    func start() throws {
        engine.prepare()
        try engine.start()
    }
    func play() {
        node.play()
    }
    func stop() {
        node.stop()
        engine.stop()
    }
    func schedule(
        _ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer,
        completionType: PTTPlaybackCompletionType,
        completionHandler: @escaping @Sendable (PTTPlaybackCompletionEvent) -> Void
    ) {
        let callbackType: AVAudioPlayerNodeCompletionCallbackType = switch completionType {
        case .dataConsumed: .dataConsumed
        case .dataPlayedBack: .dataPlayedBack
        }
        let scheduledEngine = engine
        node.scheduleBuffer(buffer, completionCallbackType: callbackType) { [weak scheduledEngine] callbackType in
            // The API invokes this callback when the player is stopped as
            // well. A configuration change can stop the engine before its
            // notification reaches MainActor, so do not misclassify that
            // flushed tail as audible playback.
            guard scheduledEngine?.isRunning == true else {
                completionHandler(.playbackStopped)
                return
            }
            switch callbackType {
            case .dataConsumed:
                completionHandler(.dataConsumed)
            case .dataRendered:
                completionHandler(.dataConsumed)
            case .dataPlayedBack:
                completionHandler(.dataPlayedBack)
            @unknown default:
                completionHandler(.playbackStopped)
            }
        }
    }
 }
 /// Completion callbacks arrive off the main actor, while engine rebuilds are
 /// serialized on it. This small lock-backed latch lets a rebuild atomically
 /// claim only buffers whose completion has not already fired — even when the
 /// callback's hop back to the main actor is still queued.
 private final class PTTPlaybackCompletionState: @unchecked Sendable {
    private enum State {
        case scheduled
        case completed
        case retired
    }
    private let lock = NSLock()
    private var state: State = .scheduled
    /// Returns true exactly once when playback completion wins the race with
    /// an engine rebuild or stop.
    func complete() -> Bool {
        lock.withLock {
            guard case .scheduled = state else { return false }
            state = .completed
            return true
        }
    }
    /// Returns true exactly once when a rebuild or stop claims this
    /// still-pending schedule. Later callbacks from that engine are stale.
    func retireIfPending() -> Bool {
        lock.withLock {
            guard case .scheduled = state else { return false }
            state = .retired
            return true
        }
    }
 }
 /// Plays one inbound live voice burst with a small jitter buffer.
 ///
 /// Frames are decoded and scheduled back-to-back on an `AVAudioPlayerNode`;
 /// an underrun (missing/late packets) simply pauses output until the next
 /// buffer arrives, which self-heals timing without explicit silence
 /// insertion. Playback starts once `TransportConfig.pttJitterBufferSeconds`
 /// of audio is queued or `pttJitterDeadlineSeconds` has elapsed.
 ///
 /// Talk-over is bidirectional: when push-to-talk capture starts while this
 /// burst plays, the session category escalates underneath the engine — the
 /// player rebuilds a fresh engine against the new configuration and keeps
 /// streaming instead of dying. Real interruptions (phone call, route device
 /// gone) still stop it; the burst keeps assembling to file either way.
@MainActor
 final class PTTBurstPlayer {
    /// Restart-on-reconfigure ceiling: a burst is at most ~2 minutes, so a
    /// handful of category/route changes is plenty — beyond it something is
    /// thrashing and stopping cleanly beats an engine-rebuild loop.
    private static let maxEngineRestarts = 8
    private let makeEngine: @MainActor () -> PTTPlaybackEngine
    private var engine: PTTPlaybackEngine
    private let decoder: PTTFrameDecoder
    private let coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator
    /// Injectable so tests don't fight over the app-wide exclusive-playback
    /// slot (a parallel test's `play()` would stop this player mid-test).
    private let exclusivity: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator
    private var queuedBuffers: [AVAudioPCMBuffer] = []
    private var queuedDuration: TimeInterval = 0
    private struct ScheduledBuffer {
        let id: UInt64
        let buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer
        let completionState: PTTPlaybackCompletionState
    }
    /// Buffers handed to the current engine whose completion has not yet
    /// been processed on the main actor. Keeping the buffers themselves lets
    /// a category-escalation rebuild replay the unfinished tail in order.
    private var scheduledBuffers: [ScheduledBuffer] = []
    private var nextScheduledBufferID: UInt64 = 0
    /// Bumped on every engine rebuild or stop so completion tasks from a
    /// torn-down engine cannot mutate the current generation's pending list.
    private var engineGeneration = 0
    private var engineRestarts = 0
    private var engineStarted = false
    private var finished = false
    /// Latched off (internal read so tests can await the async failure path).
    private(set) var stopped = false
    /// A session acquire is in flight (it suspends off-main for the blocking
    /// session IPC); gates `startIfReady` against double acquisition.
    private var acquiringSession = false
    private var deadlineTask: Task<Void, Never>?
    private var sessionToken: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
    /// Reserved before the session acquire suspends. Activation succeeds only
    /// if no newer playback request claimed the floor in the meantime.
    private var playbackReservation: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.Reservation?
    private var configChangeObserver: NSObjectProtocol?
    private(set) var isPlaying = false
    /// Fires exactly once when the player stops for good (drain-out, cancel,
    /// interruption, failure). `ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator` uses it to unpark
    /// the draining player it keeps alive after the assembly — the player's
    /// only long-lived owner — is discarded on burst END.
    var onStopped: (() -> Void)?
    init?(
        coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator? = nil,
        exclusivity: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator? = nil,
        makeEngine: (@MainActor () -> PTTPlaybackEngine)? = nil
    ) {
        guard let format = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat, let decoder = PTTFrameDecoder() else { return nil }
        self.decoder = decoder
        self.coordinator = coordinator ?? .shared
        self.exclusivity = exclusivity ?? .shared
        let factory = makeEngine ?? { SystemPTTPlaybackEngine(format: format) }
        self.makeEngine = factory
        self.engine = factory()
        deadlineTask = Task { [weak self] in
            try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(TransportConfig.pttJitterDeadlineSeconds * 1_000_000_000))
            self?.startIfReady(force: true)
        }
    }
    deinit {
        // Backstop for an owner dropping the player before it stopped: the
        // session coordinator retains registered tokens strongly, so a token
        // leaked here would keep the session active (and pin any escalated
        // category) for the app's lifetime. `release` is fire-and-forget
        // onto the coordinator's queue, so it is deinit-safe.
        if let token = sessionToken {
            coordinator.release(token)
        }
        if let observer = configChangeObserver {
            NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
        }
        deadlineTask?.cancel()
    }
    /// Decodes and queues frames (in burst order). Starts playback when the
    /// jitter buffer fills.
    func enqueue(_ frames: [Data]) {
        guard !stopped else { return }
        for frame in frames {
            guard let pcm = decoder.decode(frame) else { continue }
            if engineStarted {
                schedule(pcm)
            } else {
                queuedBuffers.append(pcm)
                queuedDuration += Double(pcm.frameLength) / PTTAudioFormat.sampleRate
            }
        }
        startIfReady(force: false)
    }
    /// The burst ended: stop once everything scheduled has played out.
    func finishAfterDrain() {
        finished = true
        // The complete burst is queued — no jitter left to wait for. This
        // also matters when END lands while the async session acquire is
        // still in flight: the queued audio must play out, not be treated
        // as already drained.
        startIfReady(force: true)
        stopIfDrained()
    }
    /// Immediate stop (cancel, another playback taking over, interruption,
    /// teardown).
    func stop() {
        guard !stopped else { return }
        stopped = true
        deadlineTask?.cancel()
        removeConfigObserver()
        queuedBuffers = []
        retireScheduledBuffers()
        if engineStarted {
            engine.stop()
        }
        isPlaying = false
        releaseSessionToken()
        exclusivity.deactivate(self)
        onStopped?()
    }
    private func startIfReady(force: Bool) {
        guard !engineStarted, !acquiringSession, !stopped, !queuedBuffers.isEmpty else { return }
        guard force || queuedDuration >= TransportConfig.pttJitterBufferSeconds else { return }
        // Acquiring the session suspends for its blocking IPC (off the main
        // actor); frames arriving meanwhile keep queueing and are flushed
        // onto the engine once it starts.
        acquiringSession = true
        playbackReservation = exclusivity.reserve(self)
        Task { [weak self] in
            await self?.acquireSessionAndStart()
        }
    }
    private func acquireSessionAndStart() async {
        let token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token
        do {
            token = try await coordinator.acquire(
                .playback,
                onInterrupted: { [weak self] in self?.stop() },
                onCategoryEscalated: { [weak self] in self?.restartEngine() }
            )
        } catch {
            acquiringSession = false
            SecureLogger.error("PTT playback session activation failed: \(error)", category: .session)
            // Playing unregistered would leave the engine exposed: another
            // holder's last release deactivates the session mid-play, and no
            // interruption/escalation fan-out ever reaches us. Bail like the
            // engine-start failure below; the burst still assembles to file.
            // (stop() also fires onStopped so a parked draining player is
            // unparked instead of leaking.)
            stop()
            return
        }
        acquiringSession = false
        // stop() (cancel, exclusivity, teardown) may have landed while the
        // session was activating: hand the token straight back.
        guard !stopped else {
            coordinator.release(token)
            return
        }
        sessionToken = token
        guard let playbackReservation,
              exclusivity.isCurrent(playbackReservation, for: self)
        else {
            // The request was superseded while audio-session activation was
            // suspended. Do not even start the retired engine.
            stop()
            return
        }
        // Observe reconfiguration before starting so nothing lands between.
        registerConfigObserver()
        do {
            try engine.start()
        } catch {
            // A capture racing this start can reconfigure the session while
            // the engine spins up (its escalation fan-out no-ops on a player
            // that never started): rebuild once against the settled
            // configuration — counted against the restart cap — before
            // giving up.
            SecureLogger.warning("PTT playback engine failed to start (\(error)) — rebuilding once", category: .session)
            removeConfigObserver()
            engineRestarts += 1
            engine = makeEngine()
            registerConfigObserver()
            do {
                try engine.start()
            } catch {
                SecureLogger.error("PTT playback engine failed to start: \(error)", category: .session)
                // stop() removes the observer, hands the token back, and
                // fires onStopped for any parked draining owner.
                stop()
                return
            }
        }
        engineStarted = true
        guard exclusivity.activate(self, reservation: playbackReservation)
        else {
            // A newer user-initiated playback reserved the floor while this
            // older PTT request was suspended in audio-session activation.
            // Never let the late completion steal playback back.
            stop()
            return
        }
        isPlaying = true
        engine.play()
        let buffered = queuedBuffers
        queuedBuffers = []
        queuedDuration = 0
        for buffer in buffered {
            schedule(buffer)
        }
    }
    /// The audio session was reconfigured underneath the running engine
    /// (category escalation for talk-over, or an engine configuration
    /// change): rebuild a fresh engine against the new configuration and
    /// keep streaming. Buffers already completed stay completed; the
    /// unfinished scheduled tail is replayed in order on the fresh engine,
    /// and frames still arriving continue scheduling after it.
    private func restartEngine() {
        guard engineStarted, !stopped else { return }
        engineRestarts += 1
        guard engineRestarts <= Self.maxEngineRestarts else {
            SecureLogger.warning("PTT playback: engine reconfigured \(engineRestarts) times in one burst — stopping", category: .session)
            stop()
            return
        }
        removeConfigObserver()
        // Claim the unfinished tail before stopping the old engine. Stopping
        // a player node may itself invoke its completion handlers; retiring
        // the claimed entries first makes those callbacks unambiguously stale.
        // A completion that fired just before this rebuild wins the latch and
        // is excluded even if its MainActor task has not run yet.
        let buffersToReplay = scheduledBuffers.compactMap { scheduled in
            scheduled.completionState.retireIfPending() ? scheduled.buffer : nil
        }
        scheduledBuffers = []
        engineGeneration += 1
        engine.stop()
        engine = makeEngine()
        registerConfigObserver()
        do {
            try engine.start()
        } catch {
            SecureLogger.error("PTT playback engine failed to restart after session reconfigure: \(error)", category: .session)
            stop()
            return
        }
        engine.play()
        for buffer in buffersToReplay {
            schedule(buffer)
        }
        SecureLogger.info("PTT playback: engine restarted after session reconfigure", category: .session)
        // If every old buffer completed before the rebuild, a finished burst
        // can stop now. Otherwise the replayed tail keeps it alive until its
        // new-generation completions arrive.
        stopIfDrained()
    }
    private func registerConfigObserver() {
        guard let object = engine.configChangeObject else { return }
        configChangeObserver = NotificationCenter.default.addObserver(
            forName: .AVAudioEngineConfigurationChange,
            object: object,
            queue: .main
        ) { [weak self] _ in
            Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
                self?.restartEngine()
            }
        }
    }
    private func removeConfigObserver() {
        if let observer = configChangeObserver {
            NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
            configChangeObserver = nil
        }
    }
    private func schedule(_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer) {
        let id = nextScheduledBufferID
        nextScheduledBufferID &+= 1
        let completionState = PTTPlaybackCompletionState()
        scheduledBuffers.append(ScheduledBuffer(
            id: id,
            buffer: buffer,
            completionState: completionState
        ))
        let generation = engineGeneration
        engine.schedule(buffer, completionType: .dataPlayedBack) { [weak self, completionState] event in
            guard event == .dataPlayedBack else { return }
            // Mark completion before hopping to MainActor. A rebuild can then
            // distinguish already-completed audio from an unfinished tail
            // even when this task has not run yet.
            guard completionState.complete() else { return }
            Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
                guard let self, self.engineGeneration == generation else { return }
                self.scheduledBuffers.removeAll { $0.id == id }
                self.stopIfDrained()
            }
        }
    }
    private func retireScheduledBuffers() {
        engineGeneration += 1
        for scheduled in scheduledBuffers {
            _ = scheduled.completionState.retireIfPending()
        }
        scheduledBuffers = []
    }
    private func stopIfDrained() {
        guard finished, scheduledBuffers.isEmpty else { return }
        // Started: everything scheduled has played out. Never started with
        // nothing queued or in flight (e.g. no decodable frames): nothing
        // will ever play. Otherwise the engine start is still pending (the
        // async session acquire) and the queued audio must play out first.
        guard engineStarted || (!acquiringSession && queuedBuffers.isEmpty) else { return }
        stop()
    }
    private func releaseSessionToken() {
        sessionToken.map(coordinator.release)
        sessionToken = nil
    }
 }
 extension PTTBurstPlayer: ExclusivePlayback {
    /// A live stream can't meaningfully pause; yielding the floor stops it.
    /// The burst keeps assembling to file, so nothing is lost.
    nonisolated func pauseForExclusivity() {
        Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
            self?.stop()
        }
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
 //
 // PTTCaptureEngine.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import AVFoundation
 import BitLogger
 import Foundation
 /// Owns one capture token and returns it even when the capture engine's owner
 /// disappears without reaching its normal stop/cancel path. The coordinator
 /// retains registered tokens strongly, so relying on `Token.deinit` cannot
 /// reclaim an abandoned hold.
 final class PTTCaptureSessionLease: @unchecked Sendable {
    private let coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator
    private let lock = NSLock()
    private var token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
    init(coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator) {
        self.coordinator = coordinator
    }
    func install(_ token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token) {
        let previous = lock.withLock {
            let previous = self.token
            self.token = token
            return previous
        }
        previous.map(coordinator.release)
    }
    func release() {
        let token = lock.withLock {
            let token = self.token
            self.token = nil
            return token
        }
        token.map(coordinator.release)
    }
    deinit {
        release()
    }
 }
 /// Monotonic capture identity shared by main-actor lifecycle code and queued
 /// engine callbacks. Removing a notification observer does not cancel a block
 /// already enqueued on the main queue, so every callback must also prove it
 /// still belongs to the current hold before mutating capture state.
 final class PTTCaptureGeneration: @unchecked Sendable {
    private let lock = NSLock()
    private var value: UInt = 0
    func begin() -> UInt {
        lock.withLock {
            value &+= 1
            return value
        }
    }
    func invalidate() {
        lock.withLock { value &+= 1 }
    }
    func invalidate(ifCurrent generation: UInt) -> Bool {
        lock.withLock {
            guard value == generation else { return false }
            value &+= 1
            return true
        }
    }
    func isCurrent(_ generation: UInt) -> Bool {
        lock.withLock { value == generation }
    }
 }
 /// Captures microphone audio for a live push-to-talk burst, producing both:
 /// - live AAC frames via `onFrames` (called on the capture queue), and
 /// - a finalized `.m4a` voice note on `stop()` — the same artifact
 ///   `VoiceRecorder` produces, so the existing voice-note send pipeline
 ///   handles delivery to receivers that missed the live stream.
 /// `@unchecked Sendable`: every mutable property is confined to one executor —
 /// the capture `queue` (resampler/encoder/file/counters) or the main actor
 /// (`engine`, `engineStarted`, `sessionLease`, `configChangeObserver`) — so
 /// weak references may cross the `@Sendable` tap/notification closures, which
 /// immediately hop back to the owning executor.
 final class PTTCaptureEngine: @unchecked Sendable {
    /// Hard cap matching `VoiceRecorder.maxRecordingDuration`: past it the
    /// engine keeps running (the UI owns the gesture) but stops encoding.
    private static let maxCaptureDuration: TimeInterval = 120
    /// Recreated on every `start()`: an engine whose input unit was
    /// instantiated against an earlier (playback-only or inactive) audio
    /// session keeps reporting a dead 0 Hz / 2 ch input format and fails to
    /// enable the mic (AURemoteIO -10851, observed on iPhone field tests).
    private var engine = AVAudioEngine()
    private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.ptt.capture", qos: .userInitiated)
    private let coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator
    private let sessionLease: PTTCaptureSessionLease
    private let captureGeneration = PTTCaptureGeneration()
    // Capture-queue-confined state.
    private var resampler: PTTInputResampler?
    private var encoder: PTTFrameEncoder?
    private var file: AVAudioFile?
    private var fileURL: URL?
    private var encodedFrameCount = 0
    private var running = false
    private var captureStart = Date()
    /// Whether `engine.start()` succeeded for the current capture
    /// (see `stopEngineIfStarted`).
    @MainActor private var engineStarted = false
    @MainActor private var configChangeObserver: NSObjectProtocol?
    /// Called on the capture queue with each batch of encoded AAC frames.
    var onFrames: (([Data]) -> Void)?
    enum CaptureError: Error {
        case inputUnavailable
        case audioSetupFailed
    }
    init(coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator = .shared) {
        self.coordinator = coordinator
        self.sessionLease = PTTCaptureSessionLease(coordinator: coordinator)
    }
    deinit {
        sessionLease.release()
    }
    /// Async because acquiring the session hops its blocking IPC off the main
    /// actor (a PTT press used to stall main >1 s in `setActive`); the engine
    /// itself still starts back on main once the session is configured.
    @MainActor
    func start(outputURL: URL) async throws {
        let generation = captureGeneration.begin()
        let token = try await coordinator.acquire(.capture) { [weak self] in
            self?.handleInterruption(for: generation)
        }
        // The hold ended (stop/cancel) while the session was activating:
        // starting the engine now would leave a hot mic after release.
        guard captureGeneration.isCurrent(generation) else {
            coordinator.release(token)
            throw CancellationError()
        }
        sessionLease.install(token)
        do {
            try beginCapture(outputURL: outputURL, generation: generation)
        } catch {
            releaseSessionToken()
            throw error
        }
    }
    @MainActor
    private func beginCapture(outputURL: URL, generation: UInt) throws {
        // Fresh engine per capture so its input unit binds to the session
        // that is active *now* (see `engine` doc comment).
        engine = AVAudioEngine()
        let inputFormat = engine.inputNode.outputFormat(forBus: 0)
        guard inputFormat.sampleRate > 0, inputFormat.channelCount > 0 else {
            SecureLogger.error("PTT: capture input unavailable (input reports \(Int(inputFormat.sampleRate)) Hz, \(inputFormat.channelCount) ch)", category: .session)
            throw CaptureError.inputUnavailable
        }
        guard let resampler = PTTInputResampler(inputFormat: inputFormat),
              let encoder = PTTFrameEncoder(),
              let pcmFormat = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat
        else { throw CaptureError.audioSetupFailed }
        let file = try AVAudioFile(
            forWriting: outputURL,
            settings: PTTAudioFormat.voiceNoteFileSettings,
            commonFormat: pcmFormat.commonFormat,
            interleaved: pcmFormat.isInterleaved
        )
        queue.sync {
            self.resampler = resampler
            self.encoder = encoder
            self.file = file
            self.fileURL = outputURL
            self.encodedFrameCount = 0
            self.captureStart = Date()
            self.running = true
        }
        engine.inputNode.installTap(onBus: 0, bufferSize: 4096, format: inputFormat) { [weak self] buffer, _ in
            self?.queue.async { self?.process(buffer, generation: generation) }
        }
        // Route/category changes reconfigure the engine underneath the tap;
        // stop and finalize cleanly — the .m4a captured so far still sends.
        // Registered before start() so no reconfigure lands unobserved
        // (handleInterruption also validates this capture generation).
        configChangeObserver = NotificationCenter.default.addObserver(
            forName: .AVAudioEngineConfigurationChange,
            object: engine,
            queue: .main
        ) { [weak self] _ in
            Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
                self?.handleInterruption(for: generation)
            }
        }
        engine.prepare()
        do {
            try engine.start()
        } catch {
            SecureLogger.error("PTT: capture engine failed to start (input: \(Int(inputFormat.sampleRate)) Hz, \(inputFormat.channelCount) ch): \(error)", category: .session)
            if let observer = configChangeObserver {
                NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
                configChangeObserver = nil
            }
            engine.inputNode.removeTap(onBus: 0)
            queue.sync { self.teardown(deleteFile: true) }
            throw error
        }
        engineStarted = true
        SecureLogger.info("PTT: capture engine running (input: \(Int(inputFormat.sampleRate)) Hz, \(inputFormat.channelCount) ch)", category: .session)
    }
    /// Stops capture and finalizes the `.m4a`. Returns the file URL and the
    /// number of encoded AAC frames (each `PTTAudioFormat.frameDuration` long).
    @MainActor
    func stop() -> (url: URL?, encodedFrames: Int) {
        captureGeneration.invalidate()
        stopEngineIfStarted()
        let result: (URL?, Int) = queue.sync {
            let url = fileURL
            let frames = encodedFrameCount
            teardown(deleteFile: false)
            return (url, frames)
        }
        releaseSessionToken()
        return result
    }
    @MainActor
    func cancel() {
        captureGeneration.invalidate()
        stopEngineIfStarted()
        queue.sync { teardown(deleteFile: true) }
        releaseSessionToken()
    }
    /// Audio session interrupted (call, Siri) or the engine was reconfigured
    /// mid-capture: behave like `stop()` — finalize the `.m4a` container but
    /// keep `fileURL`/`encodedFrameCount` so the caller's pending `stop()`
    /// still returns the note for delivery.
    @MainActor
    private func handleInterruption(for generation: UInt) {
        // Also invalidate a start whose acquire has registered its token but
        // has not returned to this actor yet. Without this bump the callback
        // is lost while `engineStarted == false`, and the resumed start can
        // open the mic after the stop signal.
        guard captureGeneration.invalidate(ifCurrent: generation) else { return }
        guard engineStarted else {
            releaseSessionToken()
            return
        }
        stopEngineIfStarted()
        queue.sync {
            running = false
            // Releasing the AVAudioFile finalizes the .m4a container.
            file = nil
            encoder = nil
            resampler = nil
        }
        releaseSessionToken()
        SecureLogger.info("PTT: capture interrupted — burst finalized early", category: .session)
    }
    /// Touching `inputNode` on an engine that never started instantiates its
    /// input unit against whatever session is active and spams AURemoteIO
    /// errors — a canceled-before-start hold must not touch the engine.
    @MainActor
    private func stopEngineIfStarted() {
        if let observer = configChangeObserver {
            NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
            configChangeObserver = nil
        }
        guard engineStarted else { return }
        engineStarted = false
        engine.inputNode.removeTap(onBus: 0)
        engine.stop()
    }
    @MainActor
    private func releaseSessionToken() {
        sessionLease.release()
    }
    // MARK: - Capture queue
    private func process(_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer, generation: UInt) {
        guard captureGeneration.isCurrent(generation),
              running,
              Date().timeIntervalSince(captureStart) < Self.maxCaptureDuration,
              let resampled = resampler?.resample(buffer)
        else { return }
        do {
            try file?.write(from: resampled)
        } catch {
            SecureLogger.error("PTT capture file write failed: \(error)", category: .session)
        }
        guard let frames = encoder?.encode(resampled), !frames.isEmpty else { return }
        encodedFrameCount += frames.count
        onFrames?(frames)
    }
    private func teardown(deleteFile: Bool) {
        running = false
        // Releasing the AVAudioFile finalizes the .m4a container.
        file = nil
        encoder = nil
        resampler = nil
        if deleteFile, let url = fileURL {
            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url)
        }
        fileURL = nil
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
 //
 // PTTSettings.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import Foundation
 #if os(iOS)
 import UIKit
 #elseif os(macOS)
 import AppKit
 #endif
 /// User preference for live push-to-talk voice. One switch controls both
 /// directions: streaming your holds live, and auto-playing inbound bursts.
 /// Off means voice messages behave exactly like classic voice notes.
 enum PTTSettings {
    private static let liveVoiceEnabledKey = "ptt.liveVoiceEnabled"
    static var liveVoiceEnabled: Bool {
        get { UserDefaults.standard.object(forKey: liveVoiceEnabledKey) as? Bool ?? true }
        set { UserDefaults.standard.set(newValue, forKey: liveVoiceEnabledKey) }
    }
    /// Autoplay is foreground-only: audio must never start from the
    /// background.
    @MainActor
    static var isAppActive: Bool {
        #if os(iOS)
        return UIApplication.shared.applicationState == .active
        #elseif os(macOS)
        return NSApplication.shared.isActive
        #else
        return true
        #endif
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
 //
 // VoiceCaptureSession.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import BitFoundation
 import BitLogger
 import Foundation
 /// Capture backend behind the composer's hold-to-record gesture.
 /// `VoiceRecordingViewModel` drives one session per press; the concrete type
 /// decides *how* audio leaves the device: `VoiceNoteCaptureSession` records a
 /// note delivered on release (today's behavior), `PTTLiveVoiceSession`
 /// additionally streams frames live while the button is held.
@MainActor
 protocol VoiceCaptureSession: AnyObject {
    /// Whether audio is leaving the device in real time while recording —
    /// drives the composer's LIVE treatment.
    var isLive: Bool { get }
    func requestPermission() async -> Bool
    func start() async throws
    /// Stops capture and returns the finalized voice-note file, or nil when
    /// nothing valid was captured.
    func finish() async -> URL?
    func cancel() async
    /// Stops capture and suppresses every later send before returning.
    func panicCancelSynchronously()
 }
 /// The classic record-then-send backend, wrapping the shared `VoiceRecorder`.
@MainActor
 final class VoiceNoteCaptureSession: VoiceCaptureSession {
    private let recorder: VoiceRecorder
    private let owner = VoiceRecorder.RecordingOwner()
    var isLive: Bool { false }
    init(recorder: VoiceRecorder = .shared) {
        self.recorder = recorder
    }
    func requestPermission() async -> Bool {
        await recorder.requestPermission()
    }
    func start() async throws {
        try await recorder.startRecording(owner: owner)
    }
    func finish() async -> URL? {
        await recorder.stopRecording(owner: owner)
    }
    func cancel() async {
        await recorder.cancelRecording(owner: owner)
    }
    func panicCancelSynchronously() {
        recorder.panicCancelSynchronously(owner: owner)
    }
 }
 /// Testable surface of the live capture engine. Production uses
 /// `PTTCaptureEngine`; tests can supply captured-frame counts without opening
 /// real audio hardware.
@MainActor
 protocol PTTCapturing: AnyObject {
    var onFrames: (([Data]) -> Void)? { get set }
    func start(outputURL: URL) async throws
    func stop() -> (url: URL?, encodedFrames: Int)
    func cancel()
 }
 extension PTTCaptureEngine: PTTCapturing {}
 /// Live push-to-talk backend: streams `VoiceBurstPacket`s to one peer while
 /// recording, then finalizes the same audio as a standard voice note whose
 /// file name carries the burst ID (`voice_<burstID>.m4a`) so receivers that
 /// heard the live stream absorb the note silently instead of seeing a
 /// duplicate.
@MainActor
 final class PTTLiveVoiceSession: VoiceCaptureSession {
    let burstID: Data
    private let sendPacket: (Data) -> Void
    private let capture: any PTTCapturing
    private let now: () -> Date
    /// Capture-queue-confined stream state: packetizes frames and lazily
    /// emits START so packet order is guaranteed by queue serialization.
    private final class StreamState {
        var packetizer: VoiceBurstPacketizer
        var sentStart = false
        init(burstID: Data) {
            packetizer = VoiceBurstPacketizer(burstID: burstID)
        }
    }
    private let stream: StreamState
    private var startDate: Date?
    private var completed = false
    var isLive: Bool { true }
    /// - Parameter sendPacket: delivers one encoded `VoiceBurstPacket` to the
    ///   target peer; must be safe to call from any queue (BLEService hops to
    ///   its own message queue internally).
    init(
        sendPacket: @escaping (Data) -> Void,
        capture: (any PTTCapturing)? = nil,
        now: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init,
        burstID: Data? = nil
    ) {
        self.burstID = burstID ?? VoiceBurstPacket.makeBurstID()
        self.sendPacket = sendPacket
        self.capture = capture ?? PTTCaptureEngine()
        self.now = now
        self.stream = StreamState(burstID: self.burstID)
    }
    func requestPermission() async -> Bool {
        await VoiceRecorder.shared.requestPermission()
    }
    func start() async throws {
        let outputURL = try Self.makeOutputURL(burstID: burstID)
        let sendPacket = sendPacket
        let stream = stream
        capture.onFrames = { frames in
            if !stream.sentStart {
                stream.sentStart = true
                if let start = VoiceBurstPacket(
                    burstID: stream.packetizer.burstID,
                    seq: 0,
                    kind: .start(codec: .aacLC16kMono)
                ) {
                    sendPacket(start.encode())
                }
            }
            for frame in frames {
                for packet in stream.packetizer.add(frame) {
                    sendPacket(packet)
                }
            }
            // Flush per callback batch: at ~130-byte frames the budget fits
            // one frame per packet anyway, and holding residue would add
            // ~100 ms of avoidable latency.
            for packet in stream.packetizer.flush() {
                sendPacket(packet)
            }
        }
        do {
            try await capture.start(outputURL: outputURL)
        } catch is CancellationError {
            // The hold was released/canceled while the session acquire was
            // in flight: the engine never started and the capture already
            // handed its token back — nothing to retry. A coordinator-side
            // interruption during handoff also cancels acquire, but that is
            // not a successful start and must propagate to the view model.
            guard completed else { throw CancellationError() }
            return
        } catch {
            // The HAL can briefly report a dead input right after the audio
            // session (re)activates while the route settles; one retry after
            // a short pause covers it (observed on iPhone field tests).
            SecureLogger.warning("PTT: capture start failed (\(error)) — retrying once after route settle", category: .session)
            try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 150_000_000)
            // The hold may have been released/canceled during the retry pause.
            // Starting the mic now would leave it live and streaming after the
            // user let go, so bail instead of opening a hot mic.
            guard !completed else {
                capture.cancel()
                return
            }
            try await capture.start(outputURL: outputURL)
        }
        startDate = now()
        SecureLogger.info("PTT: live burst \(burstID.hexEncodedString()) capture started", category: .session)
    }
    func finish() async -> URL? {
        guard !completed else { return nil }
        completed = true
        let elapsed = startDate.map { now().timeIntervalSince($0) } ?? 0
        let (url, encodedFrames) = capture.stop()
        // stop() drained the capture queue, so touching `stream` is safe now.
        let capturedDuration = Double(encodedFrames) * PTTAudioFormat.frameDuration
        guard elapsed >= VoiceRecorder.minRecordingDuration,
              capturedDuration >= VoiceRecorder.minRecordingDuration,
              let url
        else {
            sendControlPacket(.canceled)
            if let url {
                try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url)
            }
            return nil
        }
        for packet in stream.packetizer.flush() {
            sendPacket(packet)
        }
        let durationMs = UInt32((capturedDuration * 1000).rounded())
        sendControlPacket(.end(totalDataPackets: stream.packetizer.dataPacketCount, durationMs: durationMs))
        SecureLogger.info("PTT: live burst \(burstID.hexEncodedString()) finished — \(stream.packetizer.dataPacketCount) data packets, \(encodedFrames) frames, \(durationMs) ms", category: .session)
        return url
    }
    func cancel() async {
        let alreadyCompleted = completed
        completed = true
        // Always tear down the capture, even if a quick-release already marked
        // us completed: the engine can start late (during start()'s retry
        // pause), and only capture.cancel() stops the mic and deactivates the
        // session. It is idempotent, so a redundant call is harmless.
        capture.cancel()
        if !alreadyCompleted {
            sendControlPacket(.canceled)
        }
    }
    func panicCancelSynchronously() {
        // Do not emit a canceled packet: it would itself be pre-panic
        // conversation data racing the emergency transport reset.
        completed = true
        capture.cancel()
    }
    private func sendControlPacket(_ kind: VoiceBurstPacket.Kind) {
        guard let packet = VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: stream.packetizer.nextSeq, kind: kind) else { return }
        sendPacket(packet.encode())
    }
    private static func makeOutputURL(burstID: Data) throws -> URL {
        let base = try FileManager.default.url(
            for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
            in: .userDomainMask,
            appropriateFor: nil,
            create: true
        )
        let directory = base
            .appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
            .appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: directory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
        return directory.appendingPathComponent("voice_\(burstID.hexEncodedString()).m4a")
    }
 }
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
    @Published private(set) var duration: TimeInterval = 0
    @Published private(set) var progress: Double = 0
    /// Internal lifecycle visibility for deterministic acquisition tests.
    var isPlaybackStartPending: Bool { sessionAcquireInFlight }
    /// rounded so 4.9s shows "00:05"
    var roundedDuration: Int {
        guard duration.isFinite else { return 0 }
@@ -24,9 +27,24 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
    private var player: AVAudioPlayer?
    private var timer: Timer?
    private var url: URL
    /// Test seam; `AudioSessionCoordinator.shared` when nil.
    private let sessionCoordinatorOverride: AudioSessionCoordinator?
    /// Injectable so tests don't fight over the app-wide exclusive-playback
    /// slot (a parallel test's `play()` would pause this controller mid-test).
    private let exclusivity: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator
    private var sessionToken: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
    /// A session acquire is in flight (it suspends off-main for the blocking
    /// session IPC); gates against double acquisition on rapid play taps.
    private var sessionAcquireInFlight = false
-    init(url: URL) {
+    init(
        url: URL,
        sessionCoordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator? = nil,
        exclusivity: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator? = nil
    ) {
        self.url = url
        self.sessionCoordinatorOverride = sessionCoordinator
        self.exclusivity = exclusivity ?? .shared
        super.init()
        // Don't load anything eagerly - wait until user interaction or view is fully displayed
    }
@@ -51,6 +69,16 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
    deinit {
        timer?.invalidate()
        player?.stop()
        // A per-row @StateObject can be discarded mid-playback (navigating
        // away). Leaking the token here would hold the session forever —
        // never deactivating it, and pinning any escalated category for the
        // app's lifetime. `release` is fire-and-forget onto the coordinator's
        // queue, so it is deinit-safe: only the Sendable token crosses.
        if let token = sessionToken {
            sessionToken = nil
            (sessionCoordinatorOverride ?? .shared).release(token)
        }
    }
    func replaceURL(_ url: URL) {
@@ -68,11 +96,15 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
    func play() {
        guard ensurePlayerReady() else { return }
-        VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.activate(self)
+        exclusivity.activate(self)
-        player?.play()
+        isPlaying = true
        startTimer()
        updateProgress()
-        isPlaying = true
+        // Acquired here (not in ensurePlayerReady): scrubbing a paused note
        // must not hold the session while nothing is audible. The session
        // calls block on audio-server IPC, so they run off the main thread;
        // the player starts once the session is configured.
        startPlayerAfterAcquiringSession()
    }
    func pause() {
@@ -80,6 +112,7 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
        stopTimer()
        updateProgress()
        isPlaying = false
        releaseSession()
    }
    func stop() {
@@ -88,7 +121,8 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
        stopTimer()
        updateProgress()
        isPlaying = false
-        VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.deactivate(self)
+        releaseSession()
        exclusivity.deactivate(self)
    }
    func seek(to fraction: Double) {
@@ -96,8 +130,11 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
        let clamped = max(0, min(1, fraction))
        if let player = player {
            player.currentTime = clamped * player.duration
-            if isPlaying {
+            // While the session acquire is still in flight, don't start
-                player.play()
+            // audio pre-activation — the pending acquire's completion starts
            // playback (from the new position) once the session resolves.
            if isPlaying, !sessionAcquireInFlight {
                startPreparedPlayer()
            }
            updateProgress()
        }
@@ -112,18 +149,20 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
            self.stopTimer()
            self.updateProgress()
            self.isPlaying = false
-            VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.deactivate(self)
+            self.releaseSession()
            self.exclusivity.deactivate(self)
        }
    }
    // MARK: - Private Helpers
    private func preparePlayer(for url: URL) {
-        // Prepare player synchronously (only called when playback is requested)
+        // Load metadata synchronously, but do not call prepareToPlay here:
        // paused scrubbing reaches this path and must not acquire playback
        // hardware outside the AudioSessionCoordinator token lifetime.
        do {
            let player = try AVAudioPlayer(contentsOf: url)
            player.delegate = self
            player.prepareToPlay()
            self.player = player
            duration = player.duration
            currentTime = player.currentTime
@@ -141,18 +180,81 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
        if player == nil {
            preparePlayer(for: url)
        }
        #if os(iOS)
        let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
        do {
            try session.setCategory(.playback, mode: .spokenAudio, options: [.mixWithOthers])
            try session.setActive(true, options: [])
        } catch {
            SecureLogger.error("Failed to activate audio session: \(error)", category: .session)
        }
        #endif
        return player != nil
    }
    /// All entry points (SwiftUI actions, `pauseForExclusivity`, the
    /// delegate's main-queue hop) run on the main thread; the acquire itself
    /// suspends while the blocking session IPC runs on the coordinator's
    /// queue, and the player starts when it resolves. An acquire failure
    /// leaves playback stopped: starting without a registered token would
    /// bypass interruption fan-out and the coordinator's refcount. A
    /// pause/stop landing mid-acquire hands the token straight back.
    private func startPlayerAfterAcquiringSession() {
        if sessionToken != nil {
            startPreparedPlayer()
            return
        }
        guard !sessionAcquireInFlight else { return }
        sessionAcquireInFlight = true
        let coordinator = sessionCoordinatorOverride ?? AudioSessionCoordinator.shared
        Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
            var token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
            do {
                token = try await coordinator.acquire(.playback) { [weak self] in
                    self?.pause()
                }
            } catch {
                SecureLogger.error("Failed to activate audio session: \(error)", category: .session)
            }
            guard let self else {
                // The row was discarded while acquiring; deinit had no token
                // to release yet.
                token.map(coordinator.release)
                return
            }
            self.sessionAcquireInFlight = false
            guard self.isPlaying else {
                // Paused/stopped while the session was activating.
                token.map(coordinator.release)
                return
            }
            guard let token else {
                self.failPlaybackStart()
                return
            }
            self.sessionToken = token
            self.startPreparedPlayer()
        }
    }
    @discardableResult
    private func startPreparedPlayer() -> Bool {
        guard let player,
              player.prepareToPlay(),
              player.play()
        else {
            SecureLogger.error("Voice note player refused to start " + url.lastPathComponent, category: .session)
            failPlaybackStart()
            return false
        }
        return true
    }
    private func failPlaybackStart() {
        player?.pause()
        stopTimer()
        updateProgress()
        isPlaying = false
        releaseSession()
        exclusivity.deactivate(self)
    }
    private func releaseSession() {
        sessionToken.map((sessionCoordinatorOverride ?? .shared).release)
        sessionToken = nil
    }
    private func startTimer() {
        if timer != nil { return }
        timer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: 0.05, repeats: true) { [weak self] _ in
@@ -181,25 +283,75 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
    }
 }
-/// Ensures only one voice note plays at a time.
+/// Something that can hold the app's single audio-playback slot and yield it
 /// when another playback starts (voice notes pause; live bursts stop).
 protocol ExclusivePlayback: AnyObject {
    func pauseForExclusivity()
 }
 extension VoiceNotePlaybackController: ExclusivePlayback {
    func pauseForExclusivity() {
        pause()
    }
 }
 /// Ensures only one voice playback (note or live burst) runs at a time.
 final class VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator {
    static let shared = VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator()
-    private weak var activeController: VoiceNotePlaybackController?
+    struct Reservation: Equatable {
-
+        fileprivate let generation: UInt64
    private init() {}
    func activate(_ controller: VoiceNotePlaybackController) {
        if activeController === controller {
            return
        }
        activeController?.pause()
        activeController = controller
    }
-    func deactivate(_ controller: VoiceNotePlaybackController) {
+    private weak var activeController: (any ExclusivePlayback)?
    private weak var latestReservedController: (any ExclusivePlayback)?
    private var latestReservation = Reservation(generation: 0)
    /// Internal so tests can isolate their own exclusivity slot; the app
    /// uses `shared`.
    init() {}
    /// Records playback intent without interrupting audio that is already
    /// audible. Async starters reserve before suspension, then activate only
    /// after their audio resource is ready.
    func reserve(_ controller: any ExclusivePlayback) -> Reservation {
        latestReservation = Reservation(generation: latestReservation.generation &+ 1)
        latestReservedController = controller
        return latestReservation
    }
    /// Immediate activation for synchronous/user-initiated playback.
    @discardableResult
    func activate(_ controller: any ExclusivePlayback) -> Reservation {
        let reservation = reserve(controller)
        _ = activate(controller, reservation: reservation)
        return reservation
    }
    /// Commits an earlier reservation only when it is still the newest
    /// playback request. This prevents an older async acquire from stealing
    /// the floor after a newer play gesture.
    @discardableResult
    func activate(_ controller: any ExclusivePlayback, reservation: Reservation) -> Bool {
        guard isCurrent(reservation, for: controller) else { return false }
        if activeController === controller {
            return true
        }
        activeController?.pauseForExclusivity()
        activeController = controller
        return true
    }
    func isCurrent(_ reservation: Reservation, for controller: any ExclusivePlayback) -> Bool {
        latestReservation == reservation && latestReservedController === controller
    }
    func deactivate(_ controller: any ExclusivePlayback) {
        if activeController === controller {
            activeController = nil
        }
        if latestReservedController === controller {
            latestReservedController = nil
        }
    }
 }
@@ -1,22 +1,95 @@
 import Foundation
 import AVFoundation
 /// The small surface of `AVAudioRecorder` that `VoiceRecorder` owns. Keeping
 /// it behind a protocol lets lifecycle races be tested without opening the
 /// microphone on the test host.
 protocol VoiceAudioRecording: AnyObject {
    var isRecording: Bool { get }
    var isMeteringEnabled: Bool { get set }
    func prepareToRecord() -> Bool
    func record(forDuration duration: TimeInterval) -> Bool
    func stop()
 }
 extension AVAudioRecorder: VoiceAudioRecording {}
 protocol VoiceAudioRecorderCreating {
    func makeRecorder(url: URL) throws -> any VoiceAudioRecording
 }
 private struct SystemVoiceAudioRecorderFactory: VoiceAudioRecorderCreating {
    func makeRecorder(url: URL) throws -> any VoiceAudioRecording {
        let settings: [String: Any] = [
            AVFormatIDKey: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
            AVSampleRateKey: 16_000,
            AVNumberOfChannelsKey: 1,
            AVEncoderBitRateKey: 16_000
        ]
        return try AVAudioRecorder(url: url, settings: settings)
    }
 }
 /// Manages audio capture for mesh voice notes with predictable encoding settings.
 actor VoiceRecorder {
-    enum RecorderError: Error {
+    enum RecorderError: Error, Equatable {
        case microphoneAccessDenied
        case recorderInitializationFailed
        case recordingInProgress
        case failedToStartRecording
    }
    static let shared = VoiceRecorder()
    private let paddingInterval: TimeInterval = 0.5
    private let maxRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 120
    static let minRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 1
-    private var recorder: AVAudioRecorder?
+    /// Identity of one press/hold. Every lifecycle mutation must present the
    /// same owner that started the recorder, so a stale finish or cancel from
    /// another hold cannot stop or delete the current recording.
    final class RecordingOwner: @unchecked Sendable {}
    /// Test-only scheduling seams for lifecycle boundaries that otherwise rely
    /// on wall-clock sleeps. Production uses the real padding delay.
    struct TestingHooks: Sendable {
        let waitForStopPadding: (@Sendable (TimeInterval) async -> Void)?
        init(waitForStopPadding: (@Sendable (TimeInterval) async -> Void)? = nil) {
            self.waitForStopPadding = waitForStopPadding
        }
    }
    private let sessionCoordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator
    private let recorderFactory: any VoiceAudioRecorderCreating
    private let permissionGranted: () -> Bool
    private let paddingInterval: TimeInterval
    private let maxRecordingDuration: TimeInterval
    private let outputDirectory: URL?
    private let testingHooks: TestingHooks
    private var recorder: (any VoiceAudioRecording)?
    private var currentURL: URL?
    private var sessionToken: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
    private var activeOwner: RecordingOwner?
    /// True only while `startRecording()` is suspended in session acquire.
    /// A second start is rejected instead of superseding the first one.
    private var startInFlight = false
    init(
        sessionCoordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator = .shared,
        recorderFactory: any VoiceAudioRecorderCreating = SystemVoiceAudioRecorderFactory(),
        permissionGranted: (() -> Bool)? = nil,
        paddingInterval: TimeInterval = 0.5,
        maxRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 120,
        outputDirectory: URL? = nil,
        testingHooks: TestingHooks = TestingHooks()
    ) {
        self.sessionCoordinator = sessionCoordinator
        self.recorderFactory = recorderFactory
        self.permissionGranted = permissionGranted ?? Self.hasSystemPermission
        self.paddingInterval = paddingInterval
        self.maxRecordingDuration = maxRecordingDuration
        self.outputDirectory = outputDirectory
        self.testingHooks = testingHooks
    }
    // MARK: - Permissions
@@ -42,82 +115,130 @@ actor VoiceRecorder {
    // MARK: - Recording Lifecycle
    @discardableResult
-    func startRecording() throws -> URL {
+    func startRecording(owner: RecordingOwner) async throws -> URL {
-        if recorder?.isRecording == true {
+        if activeOwner != nil {
            throw RecorderError.recordingInProgress
        }
-        #if os(iOS)
+        guard permissionGranted() else {
        let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
        guard session.recordPermission == .granted else {
            throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied
        }
-        #if targetEnvironment(simulator)
+
-        // allowBluetoothHFP is not available on iOS Simulator
+        activeOwner = owner
-        try session.setCategory(
+        startInFlight = true
-            .playAndRecord,
+
-            mode: .default,
+        // The acquire suspends while the blocking session IPC runs on the
-            options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP]
+        // coordinator's queue (never this actor's thread or main).
-        )
+        let token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token
-        #else
+        do {
-        try session.setCategory(
+            token = try await sessionCoordinator.acquire(.capture) { [weak self] in
-            .playAndRecord,
+                Task { await self?.handleSessionInterruption(for: owner) }
-            mode: .default,
+            }
-            options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP, .allowBluetoothHFP]
+        } catch {
-        )
+            guard activeOwner === owner else {
-        #endif
+                throw CancellationError()
-        try session.setActive(true, options: .notifyOthersOnDeactivation)
+            }
-        #endif
+            startInFlight = false
-        #if os(macOS)
+            activeOwner = nil
-        guard AVCaptureDevice.authorizationStatus(for: .audio) == .authorized else {
+            throw error
            throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied
        }
        #endif
-        let outputURL = try makeOutputURL()
+        // Actor reentrancy: release/cancel may have ended this hold while the
-        let settings: [String: Any] = [
+        // blocking session activation was still in progress.
-            AVFormatIDKey: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
+        guard activeOwner === owner, startInFlight else {
-            AVSampleRateKey: 16_000,
+            sessionCoordinator.release(token)
-            AVNumberOfChannelsKey: 1,
+            throw CancellationError()
-            AVEncoderBitRateKey: 16_000
+        }
-        ]
+        startInFlight = false
        sessionToken = token
-        let audioRecorder = try AVAudioRecorder(url: outputURL, settings: settings)
+        var outputURL: URL?
-        audioRecorder.isMeteringEnabled = true
+        do {
-        audioRecorder.prepareToRecord()
+            let newURL = try makeOutputURL()
-        audioRecorder.record(forDuration: maxRecordingDuration)
+            outputURL = newURL
            let audioRecorder = try recorderFactory.makeRecorder(url: newURL)
            audioRecorder.isMeteringEnabled = true
            guard audioRecorder.prepareToRecord() else {
                throw RecorderError.failedToStartRecording
            }
            guard audioRecorder.record(forDuration: maxRecordingDuration) else {
                throw RecorderError.failedToStartRecording
            }
-        recorder = audioRecorder
+            recorder = audioRecorder
-        currentURL = outputURL
+            currentURL = newURL
-        return outputURL
+            return newURL
        } catch {
            releaseSessionToken()
            recorder = nil
            currentURL = nil
            activeOwner = nil
            if let outputURL {
                try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: outputURL)
            }
            throw error
        }
    }
-    func stopRecording() async -> URL? {
+    func stopRecording(owner: RecordingOwner) async -> URL? {
-        guard let recorder, recorder.isRecording else {
+        guard activeOwner === owner else { return nil }
-            return currentURL
+
        // `finish()` can race a still-suspended start on a direct caller even
        // though the UI normally routes quick releases through cancel().
        if startInFlight {
            activeOwner = nil
            startInFlight = false
            return nil
        }
        guard let activeRecorder = recorder else {
            let sessionURL = currentURL
            releaseSessionToken()
            currentURL = nil
            activeOwner = nil
            return sessionURL
        }
        let sessionURL = currentURL
-        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(paddingInterval * 1_000_000_000))
+        if activeRecorder.isRecording, paddingInterval > 0 {
-
+            if let waitForStopPadding = testingHooks.waitForStopPadding {
-        recorder.stop()
+                await waitForStopPadding(paddingInterval)
-
+            } else {
-        // A new session may have started during the sleep — don't touch its state
+                try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(paddingInterval * 1_000_000_000))
-        if self.recorder === recorder {
+            }
            cleanupSession()
            self.recorder = nil
            currentURL = nil
        }
        // Cancellation or interruption may have run during the padding sleep.
        // Only the recorder whose stop began here may be finalized by it.
        guard activeOwner === owner,
              let recorder = self.recorder,
              recorder === activeRecorder
        else { return nil }
        if activeRecorder.isRecording {
            activeRecorder.stop()
        }
        releaseSessionToken()
        self.recorder = nil
        currentURL = nil
        activeOwner = nil
        return sessionURL
    }
-    func cancelRecording() {
+    func cancelRecording(owner: RecordingOwner) async {
        guard activeOwner === owner else { return }
        // Invalidate ownership before cleanup. An actor-reentrant start whose
        // session acquire resumes later will observe the mismatch and release
        // its token without opening the microphone.
        activeOwner = nil
        startInFlight = false
        if let recorder, recorder.isRecording {
            recorder.stop()
        }
-        cleanupSession()
+        releaseSessionToken()
        if let currentURL {
            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: currentURL)
        }
@@ -125,14 +246,60 @@ actor VoiceRecorder {
        currentURL = nil
    }
    /// Panic is a synchronous security boundary: the caller must know the
    /// microphone, audio-session lease, and partial file are gone before it
    /// rotates identities or deletes the media tree. VoiceRecorder is an
    /// independent actor and this cleanup path never hops to MainActor, so a
    /// short semaphore join is safe even when invoked by the UI actor.
    nonisolated
    func panicCancelSynchronously(owner: RecordingOwner) {
        let finished = DispatchSemaphore(value: 0)
        Task {
            await cancelRecording(owner: owner)
            finished.signal()
        }
        finished.wait()
    }
    /// The audio session was interrupted (call, Siri) or reconfigured: stop
    /// the recorder but keep `recorder`/`currentURL` so the caller's pending
    /// `stopRecording()` still returns the partial note.
    private func handleSessionInterruption(for owner: RecordingOwner) async {
        // A callback captured for a released token must never stop a newer
        // recording. Conversely, an interruption delivered while acquire is
        // still suspended invalidates that acquire before it can open the mic.
        guard activeOwner === owner else { return }
        if startInFlight {
            activeOwner = nil
            startInFlight = false
            return
        }
        startInFlight = false
        if let recorder, recorder.isRecording {
            recorder.stop()
        }
        releaseSessionToken()
    }
    // MARK: - Helpers
    private static func hasSystemPermission() -> Bool {
        #if os(iOS)
        AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().recordPermission == .granted
        #elseif os(macOS)
        AVCaptureDevice.authorizationStatus(for: .audio) == .authorized
        #else
        true
        #endif
    }
    private func makeOutputURL() throws -> URL {
        let formatter = DateFormatter()
        formatter.dateFormat = "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
-        let fileName = "voice_\(formatter.string(from: Date())).m4a"
+        let fileName = "voice_\(formatter.string(from: Date()))_\(UUID().uuidString).m4a"
-        let baseDirectory = try applicationFilesDirectory().appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
+        let baseDirectory = try outputDirectory
            ?? applicationFilesDirectory().appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: baseDirectory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
        return baseDirectory.appendingPathComponent(fileName)
    }
@@ -147,9 +314,11 @@ actor VoiceRecorder {
        #endif
    }
-    private func cleanupSession() {
+    /// Fire-and-forget: the coordinator hops the blocking deactivation IPC
-        #if os(iOS)
+    /// onto its own queue.
-        try? AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().setActive(false, options: .notifyOthersOnDeactivation)
+    private func releaseSessionToken() {
-        #endif
+        guard let token = sessionToken else { return }
        sessionToken = nil
        sessionCoordinator.release(token)
    }
 }
@@ -56,12 +56,6 @@ final class WaveformCache {
        }
    }
    func purgeAll() {
        queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
            self?.cache.removeAll()
        }
    }
    private func computeWaveform(url: URL, bins: Int) -> [Float]? {
        guard bins > 0 else { return nil }
        // Use autoreleasepool to manage memory from audio buffer allocations
@@ -14,18 +14,22 @@
 ///
 /// ## Overview
 /// BitChat's identity system separates concerns across three distinct layers:
-/// 1. **Ephemeral Identity**: Short-lived, rotatable peer IDs for privacy
+/// 1. **Network Identity**: the 8-byte peer ID seen on air
 /// 2. **Cryptographic Identity**: Long-term Noise static keys for security
-/// 3. **Social Identity**: User-assigned names and trust relationships
+/// 3. **Social Identity**: assigned names and trust relationships
 ///
-/// This separation allows users to maintain stable cryptographic identities
+/// The layers are separate concerns, but they are not independent: the network
-/// while frequently rotating their network identifiers for privacy.
+/// identity is *derived* from the cryptographic one, so it does not provide
 /// unlinkability. Rotating peer IDs would be a change to this model, not a
 /// description of it — see the note below.
 ///
 /// ## Three-Layer Architecture
 ///
-/// ### Layer 1: Ephemeral Identity
+/// ### Layer 1: Network Identity
-/// - Random 8-byte peer IDs that rotate periodically
+/// - 8-byte peer ID = first 8 bytes of the Noise static key fingerprint
-/// - Provides network-level privacy and prevents tracking
+/// - **Not ephemeral and not rotating.** It is stable across sessions and
 ///   reboots, and changes only when the underlying identity is replaced by a
 ///   panic wipe. A passive observer can use it to track a device.
 /// - Changes don't affect cryptographic relationships
 /// - Includes handshake state tracking
 ///
@@ -33,7 +37,7 @@
 /// - Based on Noise Protocol static key pairs
 /// - Fingerprint derived from SHA256 of public key
 /// - Enables end-to-end encryption and authentication
-/// - Persists across peer ID rotations
+/// - The root of the peer ID above, and never rotated on a schedule
 ///
 /// ### Layer 3: Social Identity
 /// - User-assigned names (petnames) for contacts
@@ -44,10 +48,13 @@
 /// ## Privacy Design
 /// The model is designed with privacy-first principles:
 /// - No mandatory persistent storage
-/// - Optional identity caching with user consent
+/// - Optional identity caching with explicit consent
 /// - Ephemeral IDs prevent long-term tracking
 /// - Social mappings stored locally only
 ///
 /// It does **not** currently prevent long-term tracking by a passive radio
 /// observer: the peer ID is stable (Layer 1) and signed announcements carry the
 /// static keys and nickname in cleartext.
 ///
 /// ## Trust Model
 /// Four levels of trust:
 /// 1. **Unknown**: New or unverified peers
@@ -56,17 +63,17 @@
 /// 4. **Verified**: Cryptographic verification completed
 ///
 /// ## Identity Resolution
-/// When a peer rotates their ephemeral ID:
+/// When a peer's ID changes (a panic wipe on their side, or a future rotation):
 /// 1. Cryptographic handshake reveals their fingerprint
 /// 2. System looks up social identity by fingerprint
-/// 3. UI seamlessly maintains user relationships
+/// 3. UI seamlessly maintains existing relationships
 /// 4. Historical messages remain properly attributed
 ///
 /// ## Conflict Resolution
 /// Handles edge cases like:
 /// - Multiple peers claiming same nickname
 /// - Nickname changes and conflicts
-/// - Identity rotation during active chats
+/// - Identity replacement during active chats
 /// - Network partitions and rejoins
 ///
 /// ## Usage Example
@@ -85,11 +92,13 @@ import BitFoundation
 // MARK: - Three-Layer Identity Model
-/// Represents the ephemeral layer of identity - short-lived peer IDs that provide network privacy.
+/// Represents the network layer of identity — the peer ID seen on air, plus the
-/// These IDs rotate periodically to prevent tracking while maintaining cryptographic relationships.
+/// handshake state tracked against it.
 ///
 /// Named "ephemeral" for historical reasons; the peer ID is in fact stable,
 /// being derived from the Noise static key fingerprint. It does not rotate and
 /// does not prevent tracking.
 struct EphemeralIdentity {
    let peerID: PeerID          // 8 random bytes
    let sessionStart: Date
    var handshakeState: HandshakeState
 }
@@ -98,19 +107,18 @@ enum HandshakeState {
    case initiated
    case inProgress
    case completed(fingerprint: String)
    case failed(reason: String)
 }
 /// Represents the cryptographic layer of identity - the stable Noise Protocol static key pair.
-/// This identity persists across ephemeral ID rotations and enables secure communication.
+/// This identity outlives any change to a peer's network ID and enables secure communication.
-/// The fingerprint serves as the permanent identifier for a peer's cryptographic identity.
+/// The fingerprint serves as the permanent identifier for a peer's cryptographic identity, and
 /// its first 8 bytes are the peer ID broadcast on the mesh.
 struct CryptographicIdentity: Codable {
    let fingerprint: String     // SHA256 of public key
    let publicKey: Data         // Noise static public key
    // Optional Ed25519 signing public key (used to authenticate public messages)
    var signingPublicKey: Data? = nil
    let firstSeen: Date
    let lastHandshake: Date?
 }
 /// Represents the social layer of identity - user-assigned names and trust relationships.
@@ -180,9 +188,9 @@ struct IdentityCache: Codable {
    var blockedNostrPubkeys: Set<String> = []
    // Vouching (transitive verification). All three fields are Optional so
-    // caches persisted before this feature decode cleanly — the synthesized
+    // caches persisted before this feature decode cleanly — decodeIfPresent
-    // decoder uses decodeIfPresent for optionals, and a missing key must not
+    // is used below, and a missing key must not trip the "unreadable cache"
-    // trip the "unreadable cache" recovery path that discards everything.
+    // recovery path that discards everything.
    // Vouchee fingerprint -> accepted vouches (capped per vouchee)
    var vouchesByVouchee: [String: [VouchRecord]]? = nil
@@ -194,8 +202,49 @@ struct IdentityCache: Codable {
    // entries verified before this field exists sort as oldest)
    var verifiedAt: [String: Date]? = nil
    // Stable Noise fingerprints that proved encrypted private-media support
    // inside an authenticated Noise session. Optional for decoding caches
    // written before this migration. Entries are monotonic until a panic wipe
    // so an old/replayed announce cannot silently downgrade a peer.
    var privateMediaCapableFingerprints: Set<String>? = nil
    // Noise-fingerprint -> Ed25519 announcement key, learned only from the
    // authenticated peer-state payload. This prevents a self-signed announce
    // containing a copied public Noise key from replacing a previously bound
    // public-message signing identity. Optional for old cache compatibility.
    var authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint: [String: Data]? = nil
    // Fingerprint -> Cryptographic identity (noise + pinned signing key).
    // Persisting the signing-key pin is security-critical: it must survive
    // app restarts so an attacker cannot replay a known peer's
    // noiseKey/peerID with their own signing key and be treated as first
    // contact (TOFU downgrade).
    var cryptographicIdentities: [String: CryptographicIdentity] = [:]
    // Schema version for future migrations
    var version: Int = 1
    init() {}
    // Custom decoding so caches written by older builds (missing newer keys
    // such as `cryptographicIdentities` or the vouching fields) still load
    // instead of being discarded. Every field uses decodeIfPresent so a
    // missing key falls back to its default rather than throwing.
    init(from decoder: Decoder) throws {
        let container = try decoder.container(keyedBy: CodingKeys.self)
        socialIdentities = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: SocialIdentity].self, forKey: .socialIdentities) ?? [:]
        nicknameIndex = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: Set<String>].self, forKey: .nicknameIndex) ?? [:]
        verifiedFingerprints = try container.decodeIfPresent(Set<String>.self, forKey: .verifiedFingerprints) ?? []
        lastInteractions = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: Date].self, forKey: .lastInteractions) ?? [:]
        blockedNostrPubkeys = try container.decodeIfPresent(Set<String>.self, forKey: .blockedNostrPubkeys) ?? []
        vouchesByVouchee = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: [VouchRecord]].self, forKey: .vouchesByVouchee)
        vouchBatchSentAt = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: Date].self, forKey: .vouchBatchSentAt)
        verifiedAt = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: Date].self, forKey: .verifiedAt)
        privateMediaCapableFingerprints = try container.decodeIfPresent(Set<String>.self, forKey: .privateMediaCapableFingerprints)
        authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: Data].self, forKey: .authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint)
        cryptographicIdentities = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: CryptographicIdentity].self, forKey: .cryptographicIdentities) ?? [:]
        version = try container.decodeIfPresent(Int.self, forKey: .version) ?? 1
    }
 }
 //
@@ -108,8 +108,6 @@ protocol SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity)
    // MARK: Favorites Management
    func getFavorites() -> Set<String>
    func setFavorite(_ fingerprint: String, isFavorite: Bool)
    func isFavorite(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
    // MARK: Blocked Users Management
@@ -123,7 +121,6 @@ protocol SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    // MARK: Ephemeral Session Management
    func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState)
    func updateHandshakeState(peerID: PeerID, state: HandshakeState)
    // MARK: Cleanup
    func clearAllIdentityData()
@@ -139,11 +136,18 @@ protocol SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    func recordVouch(voucheeFingerprint: String, voucherFingerprint: String, timestamp: Date) -> Bool
    func validVouchers(for fingerprint: String) -> [VouchRecord]
    func isVouched(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
    func effectiveTrustLevel(for fingerprint: String) -> TrustLevel
    func lastVouchBatchSent(to fingerprint: String) -> Date?
    func markVouchBatchSent(to fingerprint: String, at date: Date)
    func signingPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data?
    func mostRecentlyVerifiedFingerprints(limit: Int, excluding fingerprint: String) -> [String]
    // MARK: Noise-authenticated announcement identity
    func bindAuthenticatedSigningPublicKey(_ signingPublicKey: Data, fingerprint: String)
    func authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data?
    // MARK: Private-media downgrade protection
    func markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: String)
    func hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
 }
 /// Singleton manager for secure identity state persistence and retrieval.
@@ -156,18 +160,30 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    // In-memory state
    private var ephemeralSessions: [PeerID: EphemeralIdentity] = [:]
-    private var cryptographicIdentities: [String: CryptographicIdentity] = [:]
+    // Cryptographic identities (including pinned signing keys) live inside
    // `cache` so they persist across app restarts; see IdentityCache.
    private var cache: IdentityCache = IdentityCache()
    // Thread safety
    private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "bitchat.identity.state", attributes: .concurrent)
    private let queueSpecificKey = DispatchSpecificKey<UInt8>()
    // Pending-save coalescing flag. Reads/writes are serialized on `queue`.
-    // Persistence is done with a fire-and-forget `queue.async(.barrier)` rather
+    //
-    // than a retained DispatchSourceTimer: a lingering, never-cancelled timer
+    // Persistence is SYNCHRONOUS: every mutating API runs its mutate + encrypt
-    // keeps the dispatch machinery alive and prevents the unit-test process from
+    // + keychain write inside `queue.sync(flags: .barrier)`, so when the call
-    // exiting. (The original code used Timer.scheduledTimer on a GCD queue with
+    // returns the write is already complete and NOTHING is left scheduled on
-    // no run loop, so saves never actually fired.)
+    // the queue. This is deliberate — a retained DispatchSourceTimer (the
    // original design) kept the dispatch machinery alive and prevented the
    // unit-test process from exiting, and fire-and-forget `queue.async(.barrier)`
    // (a later design) left a backlog of instrumented barrier saves still
    // draining when LLVM's `--enable-code-coverage` `atexit` handler dumped
    // `.profraw`, deadlocking the process at teardown on the constrained CI
    // runner. Synchronous persistence has zero outstanding dispatch at exit, so
    // neither failure mode is possible. `pendingSave` is now effectively always
    // false after any mutation (saveIdentityCache persists inline and clears
    // it); it remains only as a belt-and-suspenders flag read by `forceSave`
    // and `deinit`.
    private var pendingSave = false
    // Encryption key
@@ -218,6 +234,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
        self.encryptionKey = loadedKey
        self.encryptionKeyIsEphemeral = keyIsEphemeral
        queue.setSpecific(key: queueSpecificKey, value: 1)
        // Only read the persisted cache when we hold the real key; with an
        // ephemeral key the decrypt would fail and discard the real cache.
@@ -227,7 +244,22 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    }
    deinit {
-        forceSave()
+        // Do NOT dispatch onto `queue` here. `deinit` can run on any thread
        // (including one draining `queue`), and the object is being
        // deallocated: a `queue.sync` risks a re-entrant same-queue wait
        // (deadlock) and a `queue.async` schedules work that resurrects `self`
        // and may not drain before process exit.
        //
        // A flush here is redundant anyway: every mutating API already
        // persists inline within its own barrier, so the keychain is already
        // up to date. As a queue-free best-effort belt-and-suspenders, only
        // flush if something is still pending. This is a direct read of
        // in-hand state — safe because a deallocating object has no other
        // live references, so nothing can be mutating `cache` concurrently.
        if pendingSave {
            pendingSave = false
            persist(snapshot: cache)
        }
    }
    // MARK: - Secure Loading/Saving
@@ -252,21 +284,27 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
        }
    }
-    /// Persists the cache. Always invoked on `queue` under a barrier (its callers
+    /// Persists the cache. Always invoked on `queue` under a barrier (its
-    /// run inside `queue.async(.barrier)`), so it simply marks the cache dirty
+    /// callers run inside `queue.sync(flags: .barrier)`), so `cache` is read
-    /// and persists it on the same serialized context — no timer, nothing left
+    /// while serialized. The encode + keychain write are done here (already on
-    /// scheduled to keep the process alive.
+    /// the exclusive barrier context), synchronously, so no separate hop is
    /// scheduled and nothing is left to keep the process alive.
    private func saveIdentityCache() {
        pendingSave = true
-        performSave()
+        // On the barrier context already: snapshot is trivially consistent.
        persist(snapshot: cache)
        pendingSave = false
    }
-    /// Writes the cache to the keychain. Must run on `queue` with exclusive
+    /// Encodes, seals, and writes a *snapshot* of the cache to the keychain.
-    /// (barrier) access.
+    ///
-    private func performSave() {
+    /// Takes the cache by value so callers can capture a consistent snapshot
-        guard pendingSave else { return }
+    /// under `queue` and then encode without holding it. Reading `cache`
-        pendingSave = false
+    /// concurrently with a barrier writer would be a data race on the
-
+    /// dictionary storage, which — because `JSONEncoder` walks that storage —
    /// can spin forever (observed as a CI test-suite hang), so the snapshot
    /// must be taken on `queue`, never off it.
    private func persist(snapshot: IdentityCache) {
        // Never persist under an ephemeral key — it would overwrite the real
        // cache with data the next launch cannot decrypt.
        guard !encryptionKeyIsEphemeral else {
@@ -275,7 +313,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
        }
        do {
-            let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(cache)
+            let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(snapshot)
            let sealedBox = try AES.GCM.seal(data, using: encryptionKey)
            let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(sealedBox.combined!, forKey: cacheKey)
            if saved {
@@ -286,14 +324,26 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
        }
    }
-    // Force immediate save (for app termination / lifecycle events). Mutations
+    // Force a flush (for app-termination / lifecycle events — NOT from
-    // already persist synchronously via saveIdentityCache, so this is normally a
+    // `deinit`, which persists inline; see the deinit note). Every mutating
-    // no-op (performSave early-returns when nothing is pending). Runs directly on
+    // API already persists inline inside its own barrier via
-    // the caller's thread — deliberately NOT a `queue.sync(barrier)`, which is
+    // `saveIdentityCache`, so by the time this is called the keychain is
-    // reachable from `deinit` and from async tests on the swift-concurrency
+    // already up to date and this is normally a no-op; it exists as a
-    // cooperative pool where a blocking barrier-sync can starve/deadlock it.
+    // belt-and-suspenders flush of any `pendingSave` left set.
    //
    // Runs synchronously inside a `queue.sync(flags: .barrier)`: the barrier
    // makes the `cache` read race-free (a plain off-queue read races in-flight
    // barrier writers — JSONEncoder walking a concurrently-mutated dictionary
    // can spin forever, which surfaced as a CI hang), and being synchronous it
    // leaves nothing scheduled to keep the process alive at teardown. Safe
    // against re-entrant deadlock because this is never invoked from `deinit`
    // (the only path that can run *on* `queue`).
    func forceSave() {
-        performSave()
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            guard pendingSave else { return }
            pendingSave = false
            persist(snapshot: cache)
        }
    }
    // MARK: - Social Identity Management
@@ -307,36 +357,46 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    // MARK: - Cryptographic Identities
    /// Insert or update a cryptographic identity and optionally persist its signing key and claimed nickname.
    ///
    /// TOFU signing-key pinning: once a signing key has been persisted for a
    /// fingerprint, an update carrying a *different* signing key is refused in
    /// full (including the claimed-nickname update) and security-logged. This
    /// mirrors `BLEPeerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce` — without it, an
    /// attacker replaying a victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own signing
    /// key could overwrite the victim's persisted identity while the victim is
    /// offline or after an app restart. The refusal is permanent: there is
    /// currently no targeted in-app way to reset the pin (`setVerified` does
    /// not touch it). Recovering from a legitimate signing re-key requires the
    /// peer to establish a new noise identity (new peerID) or the local user
    /// to wipe all identity data (`clearAllIdentityData`, e.g. panic wipe).
    /// - Parameters:
    ///   - fingerprint: SHA-256 hex of the Noise static public key
    ///   - noisePublicKey: Noise static public key data
    ///   - signingPublicKey: Optional Ed25519 signing public key for authenticating public messages
    ///   - claimedNickname: Optional latest claimed nickname to persist into social identity
    func upsertCryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: String, noisePublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data?, claimedNickname: String? = nil) {
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            let now = Date()
-            if var existing = self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] {
+            if var existing = self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] {
                if let pinnedSigningKey = existing.signingPublicKey,
                   let announcedSigningKey = signingPublicKey,
                   pinnedSigningKey != announcedSigningKey {
                    SecureLogger.warning("🚨 Refusing to replace pinned signing key for \(fingerprint.prefix(8))… (possible impersonation attempt)", category: .security)
                    return
                }
                // Update keys if changed
                if existing.publicKey != noisePublicKey {
                    existing = CryptographicIdentity(
                        fingerprint: fingerprint,
                        publicKey: noisePublicKey,
                        signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey,
-                        firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
+                        firstSeen: existing.firstSeen
                        lastHandshake: now
                    )
-                    self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing
+                    self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing
                } else {
-                    // Update signing key and lastHandshake
+                    // Update signing key
                    existing.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey
-                    let updated = CryptographicIdentity(
+                    self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing
                        fingerprint: existing.fingerprint,
                        publicKey: existing.publicKey,
                        signingPublicKey: existing.signingPublicKey,
                        firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
                        lastHandshake: now
                    )
                    self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = updated
                }
                // Persist updated state (already assigned in branches above)
            } else {
@@ -345,10 +405,9 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
                    fingerprint: fingerprint,
                    publicKey: noisePublicKey,
                    signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
-                    firstSeen: now,
+                    firstSeen: now
                    lastHandshake: now
                )
-                self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = entry
+                self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = entry
            }
            // Optionally persist claimed nickname into social identity
@@ -380,12 +439,72 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
        queue.sync {
            // Defensive: ensure hex and correct length
            guard peerID.isShort else { return [] }
-            return cryptographicIdentities.values.filter { $0.fingerprint.hasPrefix(peerID.id) }
+            return cache.cryptographicIdentities.values.filter { $0.fingerprint.hasPrefix(peerID.id) }
        }
    }
    // MARK: - Private-media downgrade protection
    func markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: String) {
        guard !fingerprint.isEmpty else { return }
        let insertAndPersist = {
            var pinned = self.cache.privateMediaCapableFingerprints ?? []
            guard pinned.insert(fingerprint).inserted else { return }
            self.cache.privateMediaCapableFingerprints = pinned
            self.saveIdentityCache()
        }
        // Downgrade decisions can run immediately after an authenticated
        // announce. Make the pin visible before returning; merely enqueueing a
        // barrier leaves a cross-queue window where a replay can look legacy.
        // The queue-specific fast path prevents self-deadlock if a future
        // identity-state mutation records the capability from inside `queue`.
        if DispatchQueue.getSpecific(key: queueSpecificKey) != nil {
            insertAndPersist()
        } else {
            queue.sync(flags: .barrier, execute: insertAndPersist)
        }
    }
    func hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
        guard !fingerprint.isEmpty else { return false }
        return queue.sync {
            cache.privateMediaCapableFingerprints?.contains(fingerprint) == true
        }
    }
    // MARK: - Noise-authenticated announcement identity
    func bindAuthenticatedSigningPublicKey(_ signingPublicKey: Data, fingerprint: String) {
        guard signingPublicKey.count == AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.signingPublicKeyLength,
              !fingerprint.isEmpty else { return }
        let bindAndPersist = {
            var bindings = self.cache.authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint ?? [:]
            let bindingChanged = bindings[fingerprint] != signingPublicKey
            bindings[fingerprint] = signingPublicKey
            self.cache.authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint = bindings
            if var cryptoIdentity = self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] {
                cryptoIdentity.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey
                self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = cryptoIdentity
            }
            guard bindingChanged else { return }
            self.saveIdentityCache()
        }
        if DispatchQueue.getSpecific(key: queueSpecificKey) != nil {
            bindAndPersist()
        } else {
            queue.sync(flags: .barrier, execute: bindAndPersist)
        }
    }
    func authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data? {
        guard !fingerprint.isEmpty else { return nil }
        return queue.sync {
            cache.authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint?[fingerprint]
        }
    }
    func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) {
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            let previousClaimedNickname = self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint]?.claimedNickname
            self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint] = identity
@@ -421,7 +540,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    }
    func setFavorite(_ fingerprint: String, isFavorite: Bool) {
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            if var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] {
                identity.isFavorite = isFavorite
                self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
@@ -459,7 +578,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    func setBlocked(_ fingerprint: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
        SecureLogger.info("User \(isBlocked ? "blocked" : "unblocked"): \(fingerprint)", category: .security)
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            if var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] {
                identity.isBlocked = isBlocked
                if isBlocked {
@@ -493,7 +612,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    func setNostrBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
        let key = pubkeyHexLowercased.lowercased()
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            if isBlocked {
                self.cache.blockedNostrPubkeys.insert(key)
            } else {
@@ -511,16 +630,12 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState = .none) {
        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
-            self.ephemeralSessions[peerID] = EphemeralIdentity(
+            self.ephemeralSessions[peerID] = EphemeralIdentity(handshakeState: handshakeState)
                peerID: peerID,
                sessionStart: Date(),
                handshakeState: handshakeState
            )
        }
    }
    func updateHandshakeState(peerID: PeerID, state: HandshakeState) {
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            self.ephemeralSessions[peerID]?.handshakeState = state
            // If handshake completed, update last interaction
@@ -536,10 +651,9 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    func clearAllIdentityData() {
        SecureLogger.warning("Clearing all identity data", category: .security)
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            self.cache = IdentityCache()
            self.ephemeralSessions.removeAll()
            self.cryptographicIdentities.removeAll()
            // Delete from keychain
            let deleted = self.keychain.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: self.cacheKey)
@@ -548,7 +662,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    }
    func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID) {
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            self.ephemeralSessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
        }
    }
@@ -558,7 +672,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    func setVerified(fingerprint: String, verified: Bool) {
        SecureLogger.info("Fingerprint \(verified ? "verified" : "unverified"): \(fingerprint)", category: .security)
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
            if verified {
                self.cache.verifiedFingerprints.insert(fingerprint)
                var verifiedAt = self.cache.verifiedAt ?? [:]
@@ -726,7 +840,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
    /// The peer's announce-bound Ed25519 signing key, if seen this session.
    func signingPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data? {
-        queue.sync { cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint]?.signingPublicKey }
+        queue.sync { cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint]?.signingPublicKey }
    }
    /// Verified fingerprints ordered most recently verified first (entries
@@ -31,24 +31,20 @@
 	</array>
 	<key>CFBundleVersion</key>
 	<string>$(CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION)</string>
 	<key>LSApplicationCategoryType</key>
 	<string>public.app-category.social-networking</string>
 	<key>LSMinimumSystemVersion</key>
 	<string>$(MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET)</string>
 	<key>NSBonjourServices</key>
 	<array>
 		<string>_bitchat-bulk._tcp</string>
 	</array>
 	<key>NSBluetoothAlwaysUsageDescription</key>
 	<string>bitchat uses Bluetooth to create a secure mesh network for chatting with nearby users.</string>
 	<key>NSBluetoothPeripheralUsageDescription</key>
 	<string>bitchat uses Bluetooth to discover and connect with other bitchat users nearby.</string>
 	<key>NSCameraUsageDescription</key>
 	<string>bitchat uses the camera to scan QR codes to verify peers.</string>
 	<key>NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription</key>
 	<string>bitchat uses peer-to-peer Wi-Fi to transfer large photos and voice notes directly between nearby devices.</string>
 	<key>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription</key>
-	<string>bitchat uses your approximate location to compute local geohash channels for optional public chats. Exact GPS is never shared.</string>
+	<string>bitchat uses your location to compute optional geohash channels, bridge cells, and nearby place labels. Exact coordinates are not included in bitchat messages.</string>
 	<key>NSMicrophoneUsageDescription</key>
-	<string>bitchat uses the microphone to record voice notes that relay across the mesh.</string>
+	<string>bitchat uses the microphone while you record voice notes or hold live push-to-talk, then sends that audio to your selected mesh conversation.</string>
 	<key>NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription</key>
 	<string>bitchat lets you pick images from your photo library to share with nearby peers.</string>
 	<key>UIBackgroundModes</key>
@@ -13,13 +13,6 @@ extension BitchatMessage {
    enum Media {
        case voice(URL)
        case image(URL)
        var url: URL {
            switch self {
            case .voice(let url), .image(let url):
                return url
            }
        }
    }
    // Cache the directory lookup to avoid repeated FileManager calls during view rendering
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
    let peerID: PeerID // Hex-encoded peer ID
    let noisePublicKey: Data
    let nickname: String
    let lastSeen: Date
    let isConnected: Bool
    let isReachable: Bool
@@ -77,14 +76,13 @@ struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
        peerID: PeerID,
        noisePublicKey: Data,
        nickname: String,
-        lastSeen: Date = Date(),
+        lastSeen _: Date = Date(),
        isConnected: Bool = false,
        isReachable: Bool = false
    ) {
        self.peerID = peerID
        self.noisePublicKey = noisePublicKey
        self.nickname = nickname
        self.lastSeen = lastSeen
        self.isConnected = isConnected
        self.isReachable = isReachable
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
    case unfavorite = "unfav"
    case ping
    case trace
    case drop
    var id: String { rawValue }
@@ -36,11 +37,13 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
    var placeholder: String? {
        switch self {
        case .block, .hug, .message, .slap, .unblock, .favorite, .unfavorite, .ping, .trace:
-            return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.nickname_placeholder", defaultValue: "nickname") + ">"
+            return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.nickname_placeholder") + ">"
        case .group:
-            return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.group_placeholder", defaultValue: "create|invite|leave|list") + ">"
+            return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.group_placeholder") + ">"
        case .pay:
-            return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.token_placeholder", defaultValue: "token") + ">"
+            return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.token_placeholder") + ">"
        case .drop:
            return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.note_placeholder") + ">"
        case .clear, .help, .who:
            return nil
        }
@@ -48,25 +51,26 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
    var description: String {
        switch self {
-        case .block:        String(localized: "content.commands.block", defaultValue: "block or list blocked peers")
+        case .block:        String(localized: "content.commands.block")
-        case .clear:        String(localized: "content.commands.clear", defaultValue: "clear chat messages")
+        case .clear:        String(localized: "content.commands.clear")
-        case .group:        String(localized: "content.commands.group", defaultValue: "create or manage private groups")
+        case .group:        String(localized: "content.commands.group")
-        case .help:         String(localized: "content.commands.help", defaultValue: "show available commands")
+        case .help:         String(localized: "content.commands.help")
-        case .hug:          String(localized: "content.commands.hug", defaultValue: "send someone a warm hug")
+        case .hug:          String(localized: "content.commands.hug")
-        case .message:      String(localized: "content.commands.message", defaultValue: "send private message")
+        case .message:      String(localized: "content.commands.message")
-        case .pay:          String(localized: "content.commands.pay", defaultValue: "send a cashu ecash token in this chat")
+        case .pay:          String(localized: "content.commands.pay")
-        case .slap:         String(localized: "content.commands.slap", defaultValue: "slap someone with a trout")
+        case .slap:         String(localized: "content.commands.slap")
-        case .unblock:      String(localized: "content.commands.unblock", defaultValue: "unblock a peer")
+        case .unblock:      String(localized: "content.commands.unblock")
-        case .who:          String(localized: "content.commands.who", defaultValue: "see who's online")
+        case .who:          String(localized: "content.commands.who")
-        case .favorite:     String(localized: "content.commands.favorite", defaultValue: "add to favorites")
+        case .favorite:     String(localized: "content.commands.favorite")
-        case .unfavorite:   String(localized: "content.commands.unfavorite", defaultValue: "remove from favorites")
+        case .unfavorite:   String(localized: "content.commands.unfavorite")
-        case .ping:         String(localized: "content.commands.ping", defaultValue: "measure round-trip time to a mesh peer")
+        case .ping:         String(localized: "content.commands.ping")
-        case .trace:        String(localized: "content.commands.trace", defaultValue: "estimate the mesh path to a peer")
+        case .trace:        String(localized: "content.commands.trace")
        case .drop:         String(localized: "content.commands.drop")
        }
    }
    static func all(isGeoPublic: Bool, isGeoDM: Bool) -> [CommandInfo] {
-        var commands: [CommandInfo] = [.block, .unblock, .clear, .help, .hug, .message, .slap, .who]
+        var commands: [CommandInfo] = [.block, .unblock, .clear, .drop, .help, .hug, .message, .slap, .who]
        // Cashu tokens are bearer instruments: in a public geohash any nearby
        // stranger can redeem one, so don't *suggest* /pay there (the
        // processor still allows it behind an explicit "public" confirm).
@@ -74,11 +78,11 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
        if !isGeoPublic {
            commands.append(.pay)
        }
-        // The processor rejects favorites, groups and mesh diagnostics in
+        // The processor rejects favorites, groups, and mesh diagnostics in
-        // geohash contexts, so only suggest them where they actually work: mesh.
+        // geohash contexts, so only suggest them where they work: mesh.
        if isGeoPublic || isGeoDM {
            return commands
        }
-        return commands + [.favorite, .unfavorite, .group, .ping, .trace]
+        return commands + [.favorite, .unfavorite, .ping, .trace, .group]
    }
 }
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct NoisePayload {
        // Safely get the first byte
        let firstByte = data[data.startIndex]
-        guard let type = NoisePayloadType(rawValue: firstByte) else {
+        guard let type = NoisePayloadType.decoded(rawValue: firstByte) else {
            return nil
        }
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
        return messageBuffer
    }
-    func readMessage(_ message: Data, expectedPayloadLength: Int = 0) throws -> Data {
+    func readMessage(_ message: Data, expectedPayloadLength _: Int = 0) throws -> Data {
        guard currentPattern < messagePatterns.count else {
            throw NoiseError.handshakeComplete
@@ -6,27 +6,67 @@
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import BitFoundation
 import Foundation
 enum NoiseSecurityConstants {
    // Maximum message size to prevent memory exhaustion
    static let maxMessageSize = 65535 // 64KB as per Noise spec
    /// The extracted transport nonce (4 bytes) and Poly1305 tag (16 bytes)
    /// added by `NoiseCipherState` around every transport plaintext.
    static let transportCiphertextOverhead = 20
    /// Private files are an explicit BitChat extension to the ordinary Noise
    /// message-size ceiling. They remain bounded by the same framed-file cap
    /// used by the binary and fragment decoders. Only the `.privateFile`
    /// typed-payload path is allowed to use this larger budget.
    private static let privateFileOuterPacketOverhead =
        (BinaryProtocol.v1HeaderSize + 2) // v2 adds two length bytes
        + BinaryProtocol.senderIDSize
        + BinaryProtocol.recipientIDSize
    static let maxPrivateFilePlaintextSize = FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes
        - privateFileOuterPacketOverhead
        - transportCiphertextOverhead
    static let maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize =
        maxPrivateFilePlaintextSize + transportCiphertextOverhead
    // Maximum handshake message size
    static let maxHandshakeMessageSize = 2048 // 2KB to accommodate XX pattern
    // Noise XX message 1 contains only the initiator's 32-byte ephemeral key.
    static let xxInitialMessageSize = 32
    // Bounds an ordinary initiator whose message 1 or 2 is lost.
    static let ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 10
    // Bounds the receive-only rollback quarantine created by an unauthenticated
    // inbound message 1. A lost message 3 must not strand outbound traffic.
    static let ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 20
    // A released client may immediately retry after both crossed initiators
    // yielded. Give that unilateral retry a brief head start before the
    // patched side spends its one bounded recovery.
    static let handshakeCollisionRecoveryDelay: TimeInterval = 0.2
    // Rate-limited recovery remains actionable without spinning.
    static let handshakeRateLimitRecoveryDelay: TimeInterval = 60
    // Covers only reordering between a winning message 3 and the losing
    // crossed message 1.
    static let recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: TimeInterval = 1
    // After unauthenticated responder rollback, reject another attempt long
    // enough that paced message 1 traffic cannot keep outbound paused. A
    // legitimate peer converges through the one manager-owned local retry.
    static let ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown: TimeInterval = 60
    // Session timeout - sessions older than this should be renegotiated
    static let sessionTimeout: TimeInterval = 86400 // 24 hours
    // Maximum number of messages before rekey (2^64 - 1 is the nonce limit)
    static let maxMessagesPerSession: UInt64 = 1_000_000_000 // 1 billion messages
    // Handshake timeout - abandon incomplete handshakes
    static let handshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 60 // 1 minute
    // Maximum concurrent sessions per peer
    static let maxSessionsPerPeer = 3
    // Rate limiting
    static let maxHandshakesPerMinute = 10
    static let maxMessagesPerSecond = 100
@@ -14,5 +14,4 @@ enum NoiseSecurityError: Error {
    case messageTooLarge
    case invalidPeerID
    case rateLimitExceeded
    case handshakeTimeout
 }
@@ -15,6 +15,19 @@ struct NoiseSecurityValidator {
        return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
    }
    static func validateCiphertextSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
        data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
            + NoiseSecurityConstants.transportCiphertextOverhead
    }
    static func validatePrivateFileMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
        data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFilePlaintextSize
    }
    static func validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
        data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize
    }
    /// Validate handshake message size
    static func validateHandshakeMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
        return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakeMessageSize
@@ -66,7 +66,10 @@ class NoiseSession {
            // Only initiator writes the first message
            if role == .initiator {
-                let message = try handshakeState!.writeMessage()
+                guard let handshake = handshakeState else {
                    throw NoiseSessionError.invalidState
                }
                let message = try handshake.writeMessage()
                sentHandshakeMessages.append(message)
                return message
            } else {
@@ -11,4 +11,11 @@ enum NoiseSessionError: Error, Equatable {
    case notEstablished
    case sessionNotFound
    case alreadyEstablished
    case peerIdentityMismatch
 }
 /// The manager owns the exact attempt's one bounded recovery. Packet handling
 /// must not launch its historical second, immediate restart for this failure.
 struct NoiseManagedHandshakeFailure: Error {
    let underlying: Error
 }
@@ -24,8 +24,12 @@ final class SecureNoiseSession: NoiseSession {
            throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExhausted
        }
-        // Validate message size
+        // Ordinary Noise messages keep the protocol ceiling. Finalized media
-        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(plaintext) else {
+        // is the sole typed-payload extension and remains under the framed-file
        // cap enforced again at the service and file-decoder layers.
        let isPrivateFile = NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: plaintext.first)
            && NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileMessageSize(plaintext)
        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(plaintext) || isPrivateFile else {
            throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
        }
@@ -42,8 +46,11 @@ final class SecureNoiseSession: NoiseSession {
            throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
        }
-        // Validate message size
+        // The payload type is encrypted, so a large candidate can only be
-        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(ciphertext) else {
+        // bounded here; `NoiseEncryptionService.decrypt` authenticates it and
        // then requires the resulting type to be `.privateFile`.
        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateCiphertextSize(ciphertext)
                || NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(ciphertext) else {
            throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
        }
@@ -32,6 +32,23 @@ struct GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
    var retrySleep: (TimeInterval) async -> Void
    var activeNotificationName: Notification.Name?
    var autoStart: Bool
    var validationPolicy: GeoRelayDirectoryValidationPolicy
 }
 struct GeoRelayDirectoryValidationPolicy: Sendable {
    let maximumBytes: Int
    let maximumRows: Int
    let maximumEntries: Int
    let minimumRemoteEntries: Int
    let minimumRetainedFraction: Double
    static let live = GeoRelayDirectoryValidationPolicy(
        maximumBytes: 512 * 1024,
        maximumRows: 5_000,
        maximumEntries: 5_000,
        minimumRemoteEntries: 50,
        minimumRetainedFraction: 0.5
    )
 }
 private extension GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
@@ -44,21 +61,57 @@ private extension GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
 #else
        let activeNotificationName: Notification.Name? = nil
 #endif
        let validationPolicy = GeoRelayDirectoryValidationPolicy.live
        return Self(
            userDefaults: .standard,
            notificationCenter: .default,
            now: Date.init,
-            remoteURL: URL(string: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv")!,
+            // Runtime refreshes only from bitchat's reviewed copy. Upstream
            // georelays/main is imported by a validator-backed pull request,
            // so an upstream mutation cannot immediately retarget clients.
            remoteURL: URL(string: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat/refs/heads/main/relays/online_relays_gps.csv")!,
            fetchInterval: TransportConfig.geoRelayFetchIntervalSeconds,
            refreshCheckInterval: TransportConfig.geoRelayRefreshCheckIntervalSeconds,
            retryInitialSeconds: TransportConfig.geoRelayRetryInitialSeconds,
            retryMaxSeconds: TransportConfig.geoRelayRetryMaxSeconds,
-            awaitTorReady: { await TorManager.shared.awaitReady() },
+            // Only wait for Tor when Tor is switched on. With it off, the fetch
            // is meant to go direct through the same unproxied session the relay
            // sockets already use — and `TorManager` has been shut down, so
            // awaiting readiness would spend the whole bootstrap timeout on
            // every refresh and freeze the directory on its cached copy.
            //
            // Deliberately keyed on the preference rather than live readiness:
            // if Tor is wanted but not ready, this must keep returning false so
            // the fetch is skipped instead of silently leaking the IP.
            awaitTorReady: {
                guard NetworkActivationService.persistedTorPreference() else { return true }
                return await TorManager.shared.awaitReady()
            },
            makeFetchData: {
                let session = TorURLSession.shared.session
                return { request in
-                    let (data, _) = try await session.data(for: request)
+                    let (bytes, response) = try await session.bytes(for: request)
                    guard let response = response as? HTTPURLResponse,
                          (200...299).contains(response.statusCode),
                          response.url == request.url else {
                        throw URLError(.badServerResponse)
                    }
                    let maximumBytes = validationPolicy.maximumBytes
                    guard response.expectedContentLength <= Int64(maximumBytes) else {
                        throw URLError(.dataLengthExceedsMaximum)
                    }
                    var data = Data()
                    if response.expectedContentLength > 0 {
                        data.reserveCapacity(Int(response.expectedContentLength))
                    }
                    for try await byte in bytes {
                        guard data.count < maximumBytes else {
                            throw URLError(.dataLengthExceedsMaximum)
                        }
                        data.append(byte)
                    }
                    return data
                }
            },
@@ -76,7 +129,11 @@ private extension GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
                    )
                    let dir = base.appendingPathComponent("bitchat", isDirectory: true)
                    try? FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: dir, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
-                    return dir.appendingPathComponent("georelays_cache.csv")
+                    // v2 ignores caches populated from the old direct-upstream
                    // trust path and subjects every load to strict validation.
                    let legacyCache = dir.appendingPathComponent("georelays_cache.csv")
                    try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: legacyCache)
                    return dir.appendingPathComponent("georelays_cache_v2.csv")
                } catch {
                    return nil
                }
@@ -94,7 +151,8 @@ private extension GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
                try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: nanoseconds)
            },
            activeNotificationName: activeNotificationName,
-            autoStart: true
+            autoStart: true,
            validationPolicy: validationPolicy
        )
    }
 }
@@ -125,7 +183,7 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
    }
    private enum DetachedFetchOutcome: Sendable {
-        case success(entries: [Entry], csv: String)
+        case success(entries: [Entry], csv: Data)
        case torNotReady
        case invalidData
        case network(String)
@@ -212,6 +270,8 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
        )
        let awaitTorReady = dependencies.awaitTorReady
        let fetchData = dependencies.makeFetchData()
        let validationPolicy = dependencies.validationPolicy
        let baselineEntries = Set(entries)
        Task { [weak self] in
            guard let self else { return }
@@ -219,7 +279,9 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
            let outcome = await Self.fetchRemoteOutcome(
                request: request,
                awaitTorReady: awaitTorReady,
-                fetchData: fetchData
+                fetchData: fetchData,
                validationPolicy: validationPolicy,
                baselineEntries: baselineEntries
            )
            switch outcome {
@@ -238,7 +300,9 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
    nonisolated private static func fetchRemoteOutcome(
        request: URLRequest,
        awaitTorReady: @escaping @Sendable () async -> Bool,
-        fetchData: @escaping @Sendable (URLRequest) async throws -> Data
+        fetchData: @escaping @Sendable (URLRequest) async throws -> Data,
        validationPolicy: GeoRelayDirectoryValidationPolicy,
        baselineEntries: Set<Entry>
    ) async -> DetachedFetchOutcome {
        await Task.detached(priority: .utility) {
            let ready = await awaitTorReady()
@@ -246,16 +310,16 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
            do {
                let data = try await fetchData(request)
-                guard let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) else {
+                guard let parsed = Self.validatedEntries(
                    from: data,
                    policy: validationPolicy,
                    minimumEntries: validationPolicy.minimumRemoteEntries,
                    baselineEntries: baselineEntries
                ) else {
                    return .invalidData
                }
-                let parsed = Self.parseCSV(text)
+                return .success(entries: parsed, csv: data)
                guard !parsed.isEmpty else {
                    return .invalidData
                }
                return .success(entries: parsed, csv: text)
            } catch {
                return .network(error.localizedDescription)
            }
@@ -269,7 +333,7 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
    }
    @MainActor
-    private func handleFetchSuccess(entries parsed: [Entry], csv: String) {
+    private func handleFetchSuccess(entries parsed: [Entry], csv: Data) {
        entries = parsed
        persistCache(csv)
        dependencies.userDefaults.set(dependencies.now(), forKey: lastFetchKey)
@@ -321,9 +385,8 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
        cleanupState.retryTask = nil
    }
-    private func persistCache(_ text: String) {
+    private func persistCache(_ data: Data) {
        guard let url = dependencies.cacheURL() else { return }
        guard let data = text.data(using: .utf8) else { return }
        do {
            try dependencies.writeData(data, url)
        } catch {
@@ -336,9 +399,12 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
        // Prefer cached file if present
        if let cache = dependencies.cacheURL(),
           let data = dependencies.readData(cache),
-           let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
+           let entries = Self.validatedEntries(
-            let arr = Self.parseCSV(text)
+               from: data,
-            if !arr.isEmpty { return arr }
+               policy: dependencies.validationPolicy,
               minimumEntries: 1
           ) {
            return entries
        }
        // Try bundled resource(s)
@@ -346,36 +412,157 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
        for url in bundleCandidates {
            if let data = dependencies.readData(url),
-               let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
+               let entries = Self.validatedEntries(
-                let arr = Self.parseCSV(text)
+                   from: data,
-                if !arr.isEmpty { return arr }
+                   policy: dependencies.validationPolicy,
                   minimumEntries: 1
               ) {
                return entries
            }
        }
        // Try filesystem path (development/test)
        if let cwd = dependencies.currentDirectoryPath(),
           let data = dependencies.readData(URL(fileURLWithPath: cwd).appendingPathComponent("relays/online_relays_gps.csv")),
-           let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
+           let entries = Self.validatedEntries(
-            return Self.parseCSV(text)
+               from: data,
               policy: dependencies.validationPolicy,
               minimumEntries: 1
           ) {
            return entries
        }
        SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: no local CSV found; entries empty", category: .session)
        return []
    }
-    nonisolated static func parseCSV(_ text: String) -> [Entry] {
+    /// Parses the fixed three-column format as an all-or-nothing trust unit.
-        var result: Set<Entry> = []
+    /// One malformed or conflicting row rejects the complete dataset rather
-        let lines = text.split(whereSeparator: { $0.isNewline })
+    /// than silently shrinking or partially replacing the current directory.
-        for (idx, raw) in lines.enumerated() {
+    nonisolated static func validatedEntries(
-            guard let line = raw.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty else { continue }
+        from data: Data,
-            if idx == 0 && line.lowercased().contains("relay url") { continue }
+        policy: GeoRelayDirectoryValidationPolicy,
-            let parts = line.split(separator: ",").map { $0.trimmed }
+        minimumEntries: Int,
-            guard parts.count >= 3 else { continue }
+        baselineEntries: Set<Entry>? = nil
-            guard let host = NostrRelayURL.directoryAddress(parts[0]) else { continue }
+    ) -> [Entry]? {
-            guard let lat = Double(parts[1]), let lon = Double(parts[2]) else { continue }
+        guard !data.isEmpty, data.count <= policy.maximumBytes,
-            result.insert(Entry(host: host, lat: lat, lon: lon))
+              let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8),
              !text.hasPrefix("\u{feff}") else {
            return nil
        }
-        return Array(result)
+
        let lines = text.split(whereSeparator: { $0.isNewline })
            .map { $0.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) }
            .filter { !$0.isEmpty }
        guard let header = lines.first,
              lines.count - 1 <= policy.maximumRows else {
            return nil
        }
        let headerParts = header
            .split(separator: ",", omittingEmptySubsequences: false)
            .map { $0.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).lowercased() }
        let supportedHeaders = [
            ["relay url", "latitude", "longitude"],
            ["relay url", "lat", "lon"]
        ]
        guard supportedHeaders.contains(headerParts) else {
            return nil
        }
        var entriesByHost: [String: Entry] = [:]
        for line in lines.dropFirst() {
            let parts = line
                .split(separator: ",", omittingEmptySubsequences: false)
                .map { $0.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines) }
            guard parts.count == 3,
                  let host = validatedDirectoryAddress(parts[0]),
                  let latitude = Double(parts[1]), latitude.isFinite,
                  (-90.0...90.0).contains(latitude),
                  let longitude = Double(parts[2]), longitude.isFinite,
                  (-180.0...180.0).contains(longitude) else {
                return nil
            }
            let entry = Entry(host: host, lat: latitude, lon: longitude)
            if let existing = entriesByHost[host], existing != entry {
                // One endpoint cannot truthfully occupy two coordinates. Do
                // not let row ordering choose which location clients trust.
                return nil
            }
            entriesByHost[host] = entry
            guard entriesByHost.count <= policy.maximumEntries else { return nil }
        }
        let parsedEntries = Set(entriesByHost.values)
        guard parsedEntries.count >= minimumEntries else { return nil }
        if let baselineEntries {
            guard (0...1).contains(policy.minimumRetainedFraction) else { return nil }
            let requiredOverlap = Int(
                ceil(Double(baselineEntries.count) * policy.minimumRetainedFraction)
            )
            guard parsedEntries.intersection(baselineEntries).count >= requiredOverlap else {
                return nil
            }
        }
        return parsedEntries.sorted {
            ($0.host, $0.lat, $0.lon) < ($1.host, $1.lat, $1.lon)
        }
    }
    nonisolated private static func validatedDirectoryAddress(_ rawValue: String) -> String? {
        let value = rawValue.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
        guard !value.isEmpty,
              value.unicodeScalars.allSatisfy({
                  $0.isASCII && !CharacterSet.controlCharacters.contains($0)
              }) else {
            return nil
        }
        let candidate = value.contains("://") ? value : "wss://\(value)"
        guard let components = URLComponents(string: candidate),
              let scheme = components.scheme?.lowercased(),
              scheme == "wss" || scheme == "https",
              components.user == nil,
              components.password == nil,
              components.query == nil,
              components.fragment == nil,
              components.path.isEmpty || components.path == "/",
              let rawHost = components.host else {
            return nil
        }
        let host = rawHost.lowercased()
        guard !host.isEmpty, host.count <= 253,
              host.unicodeScalars.allSatisfy({ $0.isASCII }),
              !host.hasSuffix("."),
              host != "localhost",
              !host.hasSuffix(".localhost"),
              !host.hasSuffix(".local"),
              !host.hasSuffix(".internal") else {
            return nil
        }
        let labels = host.split(separator: ".", omittingEmptySubsequences: false)
        let allowed = CharacterSet(charactersIn: "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-")
        guard labels.count >= 2,
              !labels.allSatisfy({ $0.allSatisfy(\.isNumber) }),
              labels.allSatisfy({ label in
                  (1...63).contains(label.count) &&
                  label.first != "-" &&
                  label.last != "-" &&
                  label.unicodeScalars.allSatisfy { allowed.contains($0) }
              }) else {
            return nil
        }
        if let port = components.port {
            guard (1...65_535).contains(port) else { return nil }
            if port != 443 { return "\(host):\(port)" }
        }
        return host
    }
    // MARK: - Observers & Timers
@@ -1,19 +1,18 @@
 import Foundation
 import P256K
-/// Manages Nostr identity (secp256k1 keypair) for NIP-17 private messaging
+/// Manages the secp256k1 identity used by BitChat's Nostr relay features,
 /// including the proprietary private-envelope transport.
 struct NostrIdentity: Codable {
    let privateKey: Data
    let publicKey: Data
    let npub: String // Bech32-encoded public key
    let createdAt: Date
    /// Memberwise initializer
-    init(privateKey: Data, publicKey: Data, npub: String, createdAt: Date) {
+    init(privateKey: Data, publicKey: Data, npub: String, createdAt _: Date) {
        self.privateKey = privateKey
        self.publicKey = publicKey
        self.npub = npub
        self.createdAt = createdAt
    }
    /// Generate a new Nostr identity
@@ -39,12 +38,6 @@ struct NostrIdentity: Codable {
        self.privateKey = privateKeyData
        self.publicKey = xOnlyPubkey
        self.npub = try Bech32.encode(hrp: "npub", data: xOnlyPubkey)
        self.createdAt = Date()
    }
    /// Get signing key for event signatures
    func signingKey() throws -> P256K.Signing.PrivateKey {
        try P256K.Signing.PrivateKey(dataRepresentation: privateKey)
    }
    /// Get Schnorr signing key for Nostr event signatures
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ final class NostrIdentityBridge {
    private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
-    init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager()) {
+    init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager.makeDefault()) {
        self.keychain = keychain
    }
@@ -37,14 +37,6 @@ final class NostrIdentityBridge {
        return nostrIdentity
    }
    /// Associate a Nostr identity with a Noise public key (for favorites)
    func associateNostrIdentity(_ nostrPubkey: String, with noisePublicKey: Data) {
        let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
        if let data = nostrPubkey.data(using: .utf8) {
            keychain.save(key: key, data: data, service: keychainService, accessible: nil)
        }
    }
    /// Get Nostr public key associated with a Noise public key
    func getNostrPublicKey(for noisePublicKey: Data) -> String? {
        let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
@@ -57,29 +49,10 @@ final class NostrIdentityBridge {
    /// Clear all Nostr identity associations and current identity
    func clearAllAssociations() {
-        let query: [String: Any] = [
+        // Must go through the injected keychain, not raw SecItem calls:
-            kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
+        // under test that keychain is in-memory, and a direct delete here
-            kSecAttrService as String: keychainService,
+        // would wipe the developer's real Nostr identity on every test run.
-            kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitAll,
+        keychain.deleteAll(service: keychainService)
            kSecReturnAttributes as String: true
        ]
        var result: AnyObject?
        let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
        if status == errSecSuccess, let items = result as? [[String: Any]] {
            for item in items {
                var deleteQuery: [String: Any] = [
                    kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
                    kSecAttrService as String: keychainService
                ]
                if let account = item[kSecAttrAccount as String] as? String {
                    deleteQuery[kSecAttrAccount as String] = account
                }
                SecItemDelete(deleteQuery as CFDictionary)
            }
        } else if status == errSecItemNotFound {
            // nothing persisted; no action needed
        }
        deviceSeedCache = nil
        // Also drop the in-memory derived per-geohash identities. These hold the
@@ -113,6 +86,13 @@ final class NostrIdentityBridge {
        return seed
    }
    /// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a mesh-bridge
    /// rendezvous cell. Distinct HMAC label keeps it unlinkable from the
    /// geohash-chat identity for the same cell string.
    func deriveIdentity(forBridgeRendezvous cell: String) throws -> NostrIdentity {
        try deriveIdentity(forGeohash: "bridge|" + cell)
    }
    /// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a given geohash.
    /// Uses HMAC-SHA256(deviceSeed, geohash) as private key material, with fallback rehashing
    /// if the candidate is not a valid secp256k1 private key.
@@ -7,42 +7,74 @@ import Security
 // Note: This file depends on Data extension from BinaryEncodingUtils.swift
 // Make sure BinaryEncodingUtils.swift is included in the target
-/// NIP-17 Protocol Implementation for Private Direct Messages
+/// BitChat's private-envelope protocol transported over Nostr relays.
 ///
 /// This construction is deliberately BitChat-specific and is **not** NIP-17,
 /// NIP-44, or NIP-59 compatible, even though it historically reuses those
 /// NIPs' kind numbers (1059/13/14) and a `v2:` content prefix. It uses Nostr
 /// events and secp256k1 identities, but the XChaCha20-Poly1305 payload layout
 /// and key derivation are proprietary and interoperate only with BitChat
 /// clients.
 struct NostrProtocol {
    /// Nostr event kinds
    enum EventKind: Int {
        case metadata = 0
        case textNote = 1
-        case dm = 14 // NIP-17 DM rumor kind
+        // BitChat's proprietary private-envelope layers. These reuse the
-        case seal = 13 // NIP-17 sealed event
+        // NIP-17/NIP-59 kind numbers (14/13/1059) for historical reasons, but
-        case giftWrap = 1059 // NIP-59 gift wrap
+        // the encrypted payloads are BitChat-specific and not NIP-compatible.
        case dm = 14 // unsigned inner message (inside ciphertext)
        case seal = 13 // sender-signed seal (inside ciphertext)
        case giftWrap = 1059 // public outer envelope (one-time key)
        case ephemeralEvent = 20000
        case geohashPresence = 20001
        case deletion = 5 // NIP-09 event deletion request
        /// Sealed courier envelope parked on relays under its rotating
        /// recipient tag (`#x`). Regular (stored) kind so it survives until
        /// its NIP-40 expiration — the whole point is store-and-forward.
        case courierDrop = 1401
    }
-    /// Create a NIP-17 private message
+    /// Bound work before Base64-decoding either encrypted layer of an inbound
    /// private envelope, and before parsing each decrypted nested JSON layer.
    /// Real envelopes are normally a few KiB; 64 KiB leaves ample headroom
    /// without letting an addressed relay event drive unbounded allocation.
    static let maximumPrivateEnvelopeCiphertextBytes = 64 * 1024
    /// Create a BitChat private envelope for relay transport (outer kind 1059).
    static func createPrivateMessage(
        content: String,
        recipientPubkey: String,
        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
        try createPrivateMessage(
            content: content,
            recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
            senderIdentity: senderIdentity,
            messageTags: []
        )
    }
-        // Creating private message
+    private static func createPrivateMessage(
-        
+        content: String,
-        // 1. Create the rumor (unsigned event)
+        recipientPubkey: String,
        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity,
        messageTags: [[String]]
    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
        // 1. Create the rumor (unsigned inner event)
        let rumor = NostrEvent(
            pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
            createdAt: Date(),
-            kind: .dm, // NIP-17: DM rumor kind 14
+            kind: .dm,
-            tags: [],
+            tags: messageTags,
            content: content
        )
        // 2. Seal the rumor (encrypt to recipient) and sign it with the SENDER'S
-        //    real identity key. NIP-17 requires the seal be signed by the sender
+        //    real identity key so the recipient can authenticate who sent the
-        //    so the recipient can authenticate who sent the message; signing with
+        //    message; signing with a throwaway key leaves DMs
-        //    a throwaway key leaves DMs forgeable/impersonatable.
+        //    forgeable/impersonatable.
        let senderKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
        let sealedEvent = try createSeal(
            rumor: rumor,
@@ -50,7 +82,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
            senderKey: senderKey
        )
-        // 3. Gift wrap the sealed event with a throwaway ephemeral key (the wrap
+        // 3. Wrap the sealed event with a throwaway ephemeral key (the wrap
        //    layer hides the sender's identity from relays; createGiftWrap mints
        //    its own ephemeral key internally).
        let giftWrap = try createGiftWrap(
@@ -58,19 +90,30 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
            recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey
        )
        // Created gift wrap
        return giftWrap
    }
-    /// Decrypt a received NIP-17 message
+    /// Decrypt a received BitChat private envelope.
-    /// Returns the content, sender pubkey, and the actual message timestamp (not the randomized gift wrap timestamp)
+    /// Returns the content, sender pubkey, and the actual message timestamp (not the randomized outer timestamp)
    static func decryptPrivateMessage(
        giftWrap: NostrEvent,
        recipientIdentity: NostrIdentity
    ) throws -> (content: String, senderPubkey: String, timestamp: Int) {
-        // Starting decryption
+        // 0. Validate the untrusted outer envelope before any decryption work.
        //    Every BitChat client (released iOS and current Android) publishes
        //    exactly one outer recipient `p` tag on a validly signed kind-1059
        //    wrap; anything else is malformed or misbound.
        guard giftWrap.content.utf8.count <= maximumPrivateEnvelopeCiphertextBytes else {
            SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: oversized outer envelope ciphertext", category: .session)
            throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext
        }
        guard giftWrap.kind == EventKind.giftWrap.rawValue,
              giftWrap.tags == [["p", recipientIdentity.publicKeyHex]],
              giftWrap.isValidSignature() else {
            SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: malformed or misbound outer envelope", category: .session)
            throw NostrError.invalidEvent
        }
        // 1. Unwrap the gift wrap
        let seal: NostrEvent
@@ -86,10 +129,13 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        }
        // 2. Authenticate the seal. The seal MUST be signed by the sender's real
-        //    identity key (NIP-17); without this check a DM is forgeable by anyone
+        //    identity key; without this check a DM is forgeable by anyone who
-        //    who knows the recipient's npub. Verify the seal's own signature.
+        //    knows the recipient's npub. Every BitChat sender emits a tagless
-        guard seal.isValidSignature() else {
+        //    kind-13 seal, so bind the decrypted layer to that exact shape.
-            SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: seal signature is missing or invalid", category: .session)
+        guard seal.kind == EventKind.seal.rawValue,
              seal.tags.isEmpty,
              seal.isValidSignature() else {
            SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: seal is malformed or its signature is missing/invalid", category: .session)
            throw NostrError.invalidEvent
        }
@@ -106,11 +152,16 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
            throw error
        }
-        // 4. The sender claimed inside the rumor must match the key that actually
+        // 4. The rumor is intentionally unsigned; sender authentication comes
-        //    signed the seal, otherwise the sender field is unauthenticated and
+        //    from the seal. The sender claimed inside the rumor must match the
-        //    spoofable.
+        //    key that actually signed the seal, otherwise the sender field is
-        guard seal.pubkey == rumor.pubkey else {
+        //    unauthenticated and spoofable. Also bind the inner kind and tag
-            SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: rumor pubkey does not match seal signer", category: .session)
+        //    shape to what BitChat clients actually emit.
        guard rumor.kind == EventKind.dm.rawValue,
              validInnerMessageTags(rumor.tags, recipientPubkey: recipientIdentity.publicKeyHex),
              rumor.sig == nil,
              seal.pubkey == rumor.pubkey else {
            SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: rumor is malformed or does not match seal signer", category: .session)
            throw NostrError.invalidEvent
        }
@@ -118,6 +169,17 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        return (content: rumor.content, senderPubkey: seal.pubkey, timestamp: rumor.created_at)
    }
    /// Released iOS envelopes use no inner tags, while current Android
    /// envelopes place exactly the authenticated recipient's `p` tag on the
    /// unsigned inner event. Accept only those two historical shapes;
    /// alternate recipients, duplicate tags, and extra tags are rejected.
    private static func validInnerMessageTags(
        _ tags: [[String]],
        recipientPubkey: String
    ) -> Bool {
        tags.isEmpty || tags == [["p", recipientPubkey]]
    }
    #if DEBUG
    static func createPrivateMessageWithInvalidSealSignatureForTesting(
        content: String,
@@ -160,6 +222,23 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        )
        return try createGiftWrap(seal: seal, recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey)
    }
    /// Reproduces historical wire shapes (current Android places exactly one
    /// recipient `p` tag on the unsigned inner event) without making the
    /// production encoder depend on that quirk.
    static func createPrivateMessageWithInnerTagsForTesting(
        content: String,
        recipientPubkey: String,
        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity,
        innerMessageTags: [[String]]
    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
        try createPrivateMessage(
            content: content,
            recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
            senderIdentity: senderIdentity,
            messageTags: innerMessageTags
        )
    }
    #endif
    /// Create a geohash-scoped ephemeral public message (kind 20000)
@@ -255,17 +334,115 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
    }
    // MARK: - Mesh bridge (rendezvous) events
    /// Create a mesh-bridge public message (kind 20000) for a geohash-cell
    /// rendezvous. The distinct `r` tag keeps bridge traffic out of geohash
    /// channel subscriptions (which filter on `#g`); `m` is
    /// `[stable ID, mesh sender ID, wire timestamp in ms]`. Element 1 is the
    /// content-stable mesh message ID (`MeshMessageIdentity`) for v1.7.0
    /// parsers, which key their dedup on `m[1]` unconditionally and need it
    /// per-message-unique. Current parsers key bridge rows by the authenticated
    /// event ID and recompute elements 2-3 only as a radio-copy hint; the mesh
    /// coordinates are public and cannot authenticate the Nostr signer.
    static func createBridgeMeshEvent(
        content: String,
        cell: String,
        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity,
        nickname: String? = nil,
        meshSenderID: String? = nil,
        meshTimestampMs: UInt64? = nil
    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
        var tags = [["r", cell]]
        if let nickname = nickname?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty {
            tags.append(["n", nickname])
        }
        if let meshSenderID = meshSenderID?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty, let meshTimestampMs {
            let stableID = MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(
                senderIDHex: meshSenderID,
                timestampMs: meshTimestampMs,
                content: content
            )
            tags.append(["m", stableID, meshSenderID, String(meshTimestampMs)])
        }
        let event = NostrEvent(
            pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
            createdAt: Date(),
            kind: .ephemeralEvent,
            tags: tags,
            content: content
        )
        let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
        return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
    }
    /// Create a mesh-bridge presence heartbeat (kind 20001) on a rendezvous
    /// cell: empty content, `r` tag only — the bridge analogue of geohash
    /// presence, counted into "people across the bridge".
    static func createBridgePresenceEvent(
        cell: String,
        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
        let event = NostrEvent(
            pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
            createdAt: Date(),
            kind: .geohashPresence,
            tags: [["r", cell]],
            content: ""
        )
        let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
        return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
    }
    /// Create a courier drop (kind 1401): an opaque sealed courier envelope
    /// parked on relays. `x` is the hex recipient tag the recipient (or a
    /// gateway acting for them) subscribes for; the NIP-40 expiration tracks
    /// the envelope expiry so honoring relays garbage-collect the drop. The
    /// signing identity should be a throwaway — the envelope authenticates
    /// its sender internally via Noise-X, and linking drops to a stable
    /// publisher key would leak courier traffic patterns.
    static func createCourierDropEvent(
        envelope: Data,
        recipientTagHex: String,
        expiresAt: Date,
        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
        let tags = [
            ["x", recipientTagHex],
            ["expiration", String(Int(expiresAt.timeIntervalSince1970))]
        ]
        let event = NostrEvent(
            pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
            createdAt: Date(),
            kind: .courierDrop,
            tags: tags,
            content: envelope.base64EncodedString()
        )
        let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
        return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
    }
    /// Create a persistent location note (kind 1: text note) tagged to a street-level geohash.
    /// An optional `expiresAt` adds a NIP-40 expiration tag so honoring relays
    /// drop the note in step with a bridged board post's expiry.
    static func createGeohashTextNote(
        content: String,
        geohash: String,
        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity,
-        nickname: String? = nil
+        nickname: String? = nil,
        expiresAt: Date? = nil,
        urgent: Bool = false
    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
        var tags = [["g", geohash]]
        if let nickname = nickname?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty {
            tags.append(["n", nickname])
        }
        if let expiresAt {
            tags.append(["expiration", String(Int(expiresAt.timeIntervalSince1970))])
        }
        if urgent {
            tags.append(["t", "urgent"])
        }
        let event = NostrEvent(
            pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
            createdAt: Date(),
@@ -277,6 +454,24 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
    }
    /// Create a NIP-09 deletion request for one of our own events. Relays that
    /// honor NIP-09 drop the referenced event; it must be signed by the same
    /// key that signed the original.
    static func createDeleteEvent(
        ofEventID eventID: String,
        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
        let event = NostrEvent(
            pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
            createdAt: Date(),
            kind: .deletion,
            tags: [["e", eventID]],
            content: ""
        )
        let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
        return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
    }
    // MARK: - Private Methods
    private static func createSeal(
@@ -347,6 +542,11 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
            recipientKey: recipientKey
        )
        // Check UTF-8 size before allocating Data or invoking the general
        // JSON parser on attacker-influenced plaintext.
        guard decrypted.utf8.count <= maximumPrivateEnvelopeCiphertextBytes else {
            throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext
        }
        guard let data = decrypted.data(using: .utf8),
              let sealDict = try JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: Any] else {
            throw NostrError.invalidEvent
@@ -369,6 +569,9 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
            recipientKey: recipientKey
        )
        guard decrypted.utf8.count <= maximumPrivateEnvelopeCiphertextBytes else {
            throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext
        }
        guard let data = decrypted.data(using: .utf8),
              let rumorDict = try JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: Any] else {
            throw NostrError.invalidEvent
@@ -377,7 +580,11 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        return try NostrEvent(from: rumorDict)
    }
-    // MARK: - Encryption (NIP-44 v2)
+    // MARK: - BitChat private-envelope encryption
    //
    // Not NIP-44: the `v2:` prefix, base64url(nonce24 || ciphertext || tag)
    // layout, XChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher, and HKDF parameters are all
    // BitChat-specific.
    private static func encrypt(
        plaintext: String,
@@ -389,21 +596,24 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
            throw NostrError.invalidPublicKey
        }
        // Encrypting message (NIP-44 v2: XChaCha20-Poly1305, versioned)
        // Derive shared secret
        let sharedSecret = try deriveSharedSecret(
            privateKey: senderKey,
            publicKey: recipientPubkeyData
        )
-        // Derive NIP-44 v2 symmetric key (HKDF-SHA256 with label in info)
+        // Derive the BitChat private-envelope symmetric key (HKDF-SHA256)
-        let key = try deriveNIP44V2Key(from: sharedSecret)
+        let key = try derivePrivateEnvelopeKey(from: sharedSecret)
        // 24-byte random nonce for XChaCha20-Poly1305
        var nonce24 = Data(count: 24)
-        _ = nonce24.withUnsafeMutableBytes { ptr in
+        let randomStatus = nonce24.withUnsafeMutableBytes { ptr in
            SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, 24, ptr.baseAddress!)
        }
        // Never encrypt with an unrandomized nonce: nonce reuse under the same
        // key breaks XChaCha20-Poly1305 confidentiality and authenticity.
        guard randomStatus == errSecSuccess else {
            throw NostrError.cryptographicFailure
        }
        let pt = Data(plaintext.utf8)
        let sealed = try XChaCha20Poly1305Compat.seal(plaintext: pt, key: key, nonce24: nonce24)
@@ -421,8 +631,12 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        senderPubkey: String,
        recipientKey: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey
    ) throws -> String {
-        // Expect NIP-44 v2 format
+        // Expect BitChat's historical `v2:` private-envelope framing, and
-        guard ciphertext.hasPrefix("v2:") else { throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext }
+        // bound work before Base64 decoding attacker-sized input.
        guard ciphertext.utf8.count <= maximumPrivateEnvelopeCiphertextBytes,
              ciphertext.hasPrefix("v2:") else {
            throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext
        }
        let encoded = String(ciphertext.dropFirst(3))
        guard let data = Base64URLCoding.decode(encoded),
              data.count > (24 + 16),
@@ -438,7 +652,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        // Try decryption with even-Y then odd-Y when sender pubkey is x-only
        func attemptDecrypt(using pubKeyData: Data) throws -> Data {
            let ss = try deriveSharedSecret(privateKey: recipientKey, publicKey: pubKeyData)
-            let key = try deriveNIP44V2Key(from: ss)
+            let key = try derivePrivateEnvelopeKey(from: ss)
            return try XChaCha20Poly1305Compat.open(
                ciphertext: Data(ct),
                tag: Data(tag),
@@ -448,18 +662,25 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        }
        // If 32 bytes (x-only) try both parities, otherwise single try
        let plaintext: Data
        if senderPubkeyData.count == 32 {
            let even = Data([0x02]) + senderPubkeyData
            if let pt = try? attemptDecrypt(using: even) {
-                return String(data: pt, encoding: .utf8) ?? ""
+                plaintext = pt
            } else {
                let odd = Data([0x03]) + senderPubkeyData
                plaintext = try attemptDecrypt(using: odd)
            }
            let odd = Data([0x03]) + senderPubkeyData
            let pt = try attemptDecrypt(using: odd)
            return String(data: pt, encoding: .utf8) ?? ""
        } else {
-            let pt = try attemptDecrypt(using: senderPubkeyData)
+            plaintext = try attemptDecrypt(using: senderPubkeyData)
            return String(data: pt, encoding: .utf8) ?? ""
        }
        // Authenticated plaintext that is not valid UTF-8 is a malformed
        // envelope, not an empty message.
        guard let decoded = String(data: plaintext, encoding: .utf8) else {
            throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext
        }
        return decoded
    }
    private static func deriveSharedSecret(
@@ -519,38 +740,8 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
        let sharedSecretData = sharedSecret.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
        // ECDH shared secret derived
-        // Return raw ECDH shared secret; HKDF is applied by deriveNIP44V2Key
+        // Return raw ECDH shared secret; HKDF is applied by
-        return sharedSecretData
+        // derivePrivateEnvelopeKey
    }
    // Direct version that doesn't try to add prefixes
    private static func deriveSharedSecretDirect(
        privateKey: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey,
        publicKey: Data
    ) throws -> Data {
        // Direct shared secret calculation
        // Convert Schnorr private key to KeyAgreement private key
        let keyAgreementPrivateKey = try P256K.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey(
            dataRepresentation: privateKey.dataRepresentation
        )
        // Use the public key as-is (should already have prefix)
        let keyAgreementPublicKey = try P256K.KeyAgreement.PublicKey(
            dataRepresentation: publicKey,
            format: .compressed
        )
        // Perform ECDH
        let sharedSecret = try keyAgreementPrivateKey.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(
            with: keyAgreementPublicKey,
            format: .compressed
        )
        // Convert SharedSecret to Data
        let sharedSecretData = sharedSecret.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
        // Return raw ECDH shared secret; HKDF is applied by deriveNIP44V2Key
        return sharedSecretData
    }
@@ -611,6 +802,10 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
            throw NostrError.invalidEvent
        }
        guard Self.isWithinInboundTagLimits(tags) else {
            throw NostrError.invalidEvent
        }
        self.id = dict["id"] as? String ?? ""
        self.pubkey = pubkey
        self.created_at = createdAt
@@ -620,6 +815,21 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
        self.sig = dict["sig"] as? String
    }
    /// Bounds untrusted relay tag arrays so attackers cannot force large
    /// allocations or expensive joins on the inbound hot path.
    static func isWithinInboundTagLimits(_ tags: [[String]]) -> Bool {
        guard tags.count <= TransportConfig.nostrMaxEventTags else { return false }
        for tag in tags {
            guard tag.count <= TransportConfig.nostrMaxEventTagValues else { return false }
            guard tag.allSatisfy({ $0.utf8.count <= TransportConfig.nostrMaxEventTagValueBytes }) else {
                return false
            }
        }
        return true
    }
    func sign(with key: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey) throws -> NostrEvent {
        let (eventId, eventIdHash) = try calculateEventId()
@@ -683,17 +893,19 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
 enum NostrError: Error {
    case invalidPublicKey
    case invalidPrivateKey
    case invalidEvent
    case invalidCiphertext
-    case signingFailed
+    case cryptographicFailure
    case encryptionFailed
 }
-// MARK: - NIP-44 v2 helpers (XChaCha20-Poly1305)
+// MARK: - BitChat private-envelope key derivation
 private extension NostrProtocol {
-    static func deriveNIP44V2Key(from sharedSecretData: Data) throws -> Data {
+    /// The HKDF info string retains the historical "nip44-v2" label for wire
    /// compatibility with deployed clients, but this is not the NIP-44 key
    /// schedule: NIP-44 derives a conversation key via HKDF-extract with that
    /// label as the *salt* and uses ChaCha20 with per-message expanded keys.
    static func derivePrivateEnvelopeKey(from sharedSecretData: Data) throws -> Data {
        let derivedKey = HKDF<CryptoKit.SHA256>.deriveKey(
            inputKeyMaterial: SymmetricKey(data: sharedSecretData),
            salt: Data(),
@@ -48,7 +48,14 @@ private struct URLSessionAdapter: NostrRelaySessionProtocol {
    let base: URLSession
    func webSocketTask(with url: URL) -> NostrRelayConnectionProtocol {
-        URLSessionWebSocketTaskAdapter(base: base.webSocketTask(with: url))
+        let task = base.webSocketTask(with: url)
        // Byte bound per inbound frame; without it the per-relay buffer cap
        // (nostrInboundPerRelayBufferCap) bounds FRAMES but not BYTES, and a
        // hostile relay could pile up cap × 1 MiB (URLSession default) per
        // connection. See TransportConfig.nostrInboundMaxFrameBytes for the
        // sizing rationale. Oversized frames fail the receive with an error.
        task.maximumMessageSize = TransportConfig.nostrInboundMaxFrameBytes
        return URLSessionWebSocketTaskAdapter(base: task)
    }
 }
@@ -69,6 +76,18 @@ struct NostrRelayManagerDependencies {
    /// Uniform random value in [0, 1) used to jitter reconnect backoff.
    /// Injectable so tests can pin or sweep the jitter deterministically.
    var jitterUnit: () -> Double
    /// Where relay-settings changes are observed. Injectable so a test can use
    /// its own center instead of racing the process-wide one.
    var notificationCenter: NotificationCenter = .default
    /// Relays added by hand, merged with the built-in set. Injectable so tests
    /// do not have to write to shared preferences.
    var customRelays: () -> [String] = { NostrRelaySettings.customRelays() }
    /// Whether a location channel is currently open. Mirrors the third arm of
    /// `NetworkActivationService`'s gate: teleporting into a geohash needs no
    /// location permission, and without this the relays would stay filtered out
    /// for someone who denied location and has no mutual favorites.
    var isInLocationChannel: () -> Bool = { false }
    var selectedChannelPublisher: AnyPublisher<ChannelID, Never> = Empty().eraseToAnyPublisher()
 }
 private extension NostrRelayManagerDependencies {
@@ -97,7 +116,12 @@ private extension NostrRelayManagerDependencies {
                DispatchQueue.main.asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + delay, execute: action)
            },
            now: Date.init,
-            jitterUnit: { Double.random(in: 0..<1) }
+            jitterUnit: { Double.random(in: 0..<1) },
            isInLocationChannel: {
                if case .location = LocationChannelManager.shared.selectedChannel { return true }
                return false
            },
            selectedChannelPublisher: LocationChannelManager.shared.$selectedChannel.eraseToAnyPublisher()
        )
    }
 }
@@ -106,7 +130,10 @@ private extension NostrRelayManagerDependencies {
@MainActor
 final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
    static let shared = NostrRelayManager()
-    // Track gift-wraps (kind 1059) we initiated so we can log OK acks at info
+    // Track gift-wraps (kind 1059) we initiated so we can log OK acks at info.
    // Entries are removed only on OK acks (or panic wipe); relays that never
    // ack leave entries behind for the process lifetime. Observability-only
    // state, bounded in practice by outbound DM volume.
    private(set) static var pendingGiftWrapIDs = Set<String>()
    static func registerPendingGiftWrap(id: String) {
        pendingGiftWrapIDs.insert(id)
@@ -117,7 +144,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        let url: String
        var isConnected: Bool = false
        var lastError: Error?
        var lastConnectedAt: Date?
        var messagesSent: Int = 0
        var messagesReceived: Int = 0
        var reconnectAttempts: Int = 0
@@ -125,15 +151,40 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        var nextReconnectTime: Date?
    }
-    // Default relays carry NIP-17 gift wraps, so avoid relays known to reject kind 1059.
+    // Built-in relays carry private-message envelopes, so avoid relays known to
-    private static let defaultRelays = [
+    // reject the kinds they use.
    private static let builtInRelays = [
        "wss://relay.damus.io",
        "wss://nos.lol",
        "wss://relay.primal.net",
        "wss://offchain.pub"
        // For local testing, you can add: "ws://localhost:8080"
    ]
-    private static let defaultRelaySet = Set(defaultRelays.compactMap { NostrRelayURL.normalized($0) })
+    private static let builtInRelaySet = Set(builtInRelays.compactMap { NostrRelayURL.normalized($0) })
    /// The relays private messages target: the built-in set plus any added by
    /// hand. Four hardcoded hostnames are four names for a censor to block, so
    /// the added ones are what keeps this reachable without a new build.
    ///
    /// Cached rather than computed per access: `allowedRelayList` consults the
    /// set once per candidate URL, and recomputing would mean a `UserDefaults`
    /// read and a fresh normalize-and-dedupe pass inside that loop. Refreshed
    /// from `reloadDefaultRelays()` on construction and whenever the relay
    /// settings change.
    private var defaultRelays: [String] = []
    private var defaultRelaySet: Set<String> = []
    private func reloadDefaultRelays() {
        var seen = Set<String>()
        defaultRelays = (Self.builtInRelays + dependencies.customRelays())
            .compactMap { NostrRelayURL.normalized($0) }
            .filter { seen.insert($0).inserted }
        defaultRelaySet = Set(defaultRelays)
    }
    /// Exposed so the relay settings UI can reject re-adding a built-in.
    /// `nonisolated` because it is an immutable constant with no actor state.
    nonisolated static var builtInRelayURLs: Set<String> { builtInRelaySet }
    @Published private(set) var relays: [Relay] = []
    @Published private(set) var isConnected = false
@@ -184,11 +235,26 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
    }
    private var subscriptionRequestState: [String: SubscriptionRequestState] = [:]
-    // Track EOSE per subscription to signal when initial stored events are done
+    // Track EOSE per subscription to signal when initial stored events are
    // done. Completion is scoped to relays the REQ actually reached: targets
    // still mid-connect must not hold the callback hostage until the fallback
    // timer (a dead relay of five used to pin "loading" for the full 10s).
    private struct EOSETracker {
-        var pendingRelays: Set<String>
+        /// Targets the REQ has not been delivered to yet (still connecting).
        var awaitingSend: Set<String>
        /// Relays that received the REQ and have not sent EOSE yet.
        var awaitingEOSE: Set<String>
        /// True once any relay received the REQ (or answered with EOSE) —
        /// completion with zero sends would mean "done" without ever asking.
        var didSend = false
        var callback: () -> Void
        let epoch: Int
        /// Done when every relay that got the REQ has resolved, provided at
        /// least one did — or when every target dropped out entirely.
        var isComplete: Bool {
            (didSend && awaitingEOSE.isEmpty) || (awaitingSend.isEmpty && awaitingEOSE.isEmpty)
        }
    }
    private var eoseTrackers: [String: EOSETracker] = [:]
    private var eoseTrackerEpoch = 0
@@ -202,6 +268,15 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
    }
    private var messageQueue: [PendingSend] = []
    private let messageQueueLock = NSLock()
    /// Non-queued sends whose callers require relay durability. A WebSocket
    /// write only proves bytes left this process; NIP-01 `OK` is the relay's
    /// accept/reject acknowledgment.
    private struct ConfirmedSendState {
        let token: UUID
        var awaitingRelays: Set<String>
        let completion: (Bool) -> Void
    }
    private var confirmedSends: [String: ConfirmedSendState] = [:]
    // Total pending sends dropped at the queue cap; drives the sampled
    // overflow warning (first + every Nth drop).
    private var pendingSendDropCount = 0
@@ -217,37 +292,41 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
    // Bump generation to invalidate scheduled reconnects when we reset/disconnect
    private var connectionGeneration: Int = 0
-    init() {
+    // Per-relay off-main inbound pipeline: raw socket frames are parsed and
-        self.dependencies = .live()
+    // Schnorr-verified in arrival order OFF the main actor (this is the single
-        hasMutualFavorites = dependencies.hasMutualFavorites()
+    // signature verification for the whole inbound path — downstream handlers
-        hasLocationPermission = dependencies.hasLocationPermission()
+    // receive only verified events), then hop back to the main actor for dedup
-        applyDefaultRelayPolicy(force: true)
+    // recording and handler dispatch.
-        // Deterministic JSON shape for outbound requests
+    //
-        self.encoder.outputFormatting = .sortedKeys
+    // Each relay connection owns its OWN AsyncStream + consumer task, so N
-        dependencies.mutualFavoritesPublisher
+    // relays verify in parallel while every relay's frames stay in arrival
-            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+    // order (a single subscription's events for a relay all arrive on that
-            .sink { [weak self] favorites in
+    // relay's socket, so per-relay ordering preserves per-subscription
-                guard let self = self else { return }
+    // ordering). A burst of EVENT frames from one busy/malicious relay only
-                self.hasMutualFavorites = !favorites.isEmpty
+    // blocks that relay's own verification backlog — DMs, OKs, EOSEs, and
-                self.applyDefaultRelayPolicy()
+    // events from every other relay keep flowing on their own pipelines.
-            }
+    //
-            .store(in: &cancellables)
+    // Each stream is bounded (`.bufferingNewest`) so a relay flooding faster
-        dependencies.locationPermissionPublisher
+    // than its verification drains sheds its own oldest frames instead of
-            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+    // growing memory without bound; it can never starve other relays.
-            .sink { [weak self] state in
+    //
-                guard let self = self else { return }
+    // Continuations live in a lock-guarded, `Sendable` router (see
-                let authorized = (state == .authorized)
+    // `InboundFrameRouter` at file scope) so the raw socket receive callback
-                if authorized == self.hasLocationPermission { return }
+    // (which is NOT main-actor isolated) can route a frame to the right relay
-                self.hasLocationPermission = authorized
+    // stream without a per-frame main hop, while the main actor owns pipeline
-                self.applyDefaultRelayPolicy()
+    // creation/teardown. The expensive work (Schnorr verify) is what runs
-            }
+    // off-main; the yield stays cheap.
-            .store(in: &cancellables)
+    private let inboundRouter = InboundFrameRouter()
    convenience init() {
        self.init(dependencies: .live())
    }
    internal init(dependencies: NostrRelayManagerDependencies) {
        self.dependencies = dependencies
        hasMutualFavorites = dependencies.hasMutualFavorites()
        hasLocationPermission = dependencies.hasLocationPermission()
        reloadDefaultRelays()
        applyDefaultRelayPolicy(force: true)
        // Deterministic JSON shape for outbound requests
        self.encoder.outputFormatting = .sortedKeys
@@ -269,6 +348,91 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
                self.applyDefaultRelayPolicy()
            }
            .store(in: &cancellables)
        dependencies.selectedChannelPublisher
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] _ in
                self?.applyDefaultRelayPolicy()
            }
            .store(in: &cancellables)
        // Adding or removing a relay by hand changes the target set, so
        // reconcile connections now rather than at the next send.
        dependencies.notificationCenter
            .publisher(for: NostrRelaySettings.didChangeNotification)
            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
            .sink { [weak self] _ in
                guard let self else { return }
                // Reconcile against the previous set: a removed relay is no
                // longer in `defaultRelays`, so nothing downstream would ever
                // close its socket or drop its queued sends.
                let previous = self.defaultRelaySet
                self.reloadDefaultRelays()
                self.dropRelays(previous.subtracting(self.defaultRelaySet))
                self.applyDefaultRelayPolicy(force: true)
            }
            .store(in: &cancellables)
    }
    deinit {
        inboundRouter.finishAll()
    }
    /// Ensure a serial off-main consumer pipeline exists for a relay. Called on
    /// the main actor when a socket is (re)armed for receiving. Idempotent.
    ///
    /// Ordering within the relay is deliberate and security/performance-critical:
    /// 1. `precheckInboundEvent` (main hop): per-relay stats plus a cheap
    ///    duplicate LOOKUP — duplicate fan-in from multiple relays dominates
    ///    real traffic and must never pay for Schnorr verification.
    /// 2. `isValidSignature()` runs here, off the main actor — the ONLY
    ///    signature verification on the inbound path (JSON re-serialization +
    ///    SHA-256 + secp256k1 Schnorr per event).
    /// 3. `deliverVerifiedInboundEvent` (main hop): authoritative
    ///    check-and-RECORD plus handler dispatch. Recording only after
    ///    verification means a forged-signature copy can never poison the
    ///    dedup cache and suppress the genuine event.
    private func ensureRelayInboundPipeline(for relayUrl: String) {
        let started = inboundRouter.startPipeline(for: relayUrl) { [weak self] stream in
            Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) {
                for await frame in stream {
                    guard let parsed = ParsedInbound(frame.message) else { continue }
                    guard let self else { return }
                    switch parsed {
                    case .event(let subId, let event):
                        guard await self.precheckInboundEvent(
                            subscriptionID: subId,
                            eventID: event.id,
                            relayUrl: relayUrl
                        ) else {
                            continue
                        }
                        guard event.isValidSignature() else {
                            SecureLogger.warning(
                                "⚠️ Dropped invalid Nostr event id=\(event.id.prefix(16))… sub=\(subId) relay=\(relayUrl)",
                                category: .session
                            )
                            continue
                        }
                        await self.deliverVerifiedInboundEvent(subscriptionID: subId, event: event, from: relayUrl)
                    case .eose, .ok, .notice:
                        await self.handleParsedMessage(parsed, from: relayUrl)
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        if started {
            SecureLogger.debug("🧵 Started inbound verify pipeline for \(relayUrl)", category: .session)
        }
    }
    /// Tear down a relay's inbound pipeline (socket gone or state wiped). The
    /// consumer drains any already-buffered frames before finishing, so
    /// in-flight verified events are still delivered.
    private func teardownRelayInboundPipeline(for relayUrl: String) {
        inboundRouter.finishPipeline(for: relayUrl)
    }
    private func teardownAllRelayInboundPipelines() {
        inboundRouter.finishAll()
    }
    /// Connect to all configured relays
@@ -285,6 +449,8 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
            task.cancel(with: .goingAway, reason: nil)
        }
        connections.removeAll()
        // Sockets are gone; drop every relay's inbound verify pipeline.
        teardownAllRelayInboundPipelines()
        markRelaySocketsClosed(resetState: false)
        // Sockets are gone, so per-relay subscription state is cleared — but
        // durable intent (subscriptionRequestState, messageHandlers, parked
@@ -298,6 +464,9 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        for (_, tracker) in trackers {
            tracker.callback()
        }
        let confirmed = confirmedSends.values.map(\.completion)
        confirmedSends.removeAll()
        confirmed.forEach { $0(false) }
        pendingTorConnectionURLs.removeAll()
        awaitingTorForConnections = false
        torReadyWaitAttempts = 0
@@ -314,6 +483,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
            task.cancel(with: .goingAway, reason: nil)
        }
        connections.removeAll()
        teardownAllRelayInboundPipelines()
        markRelaySocketsClosed(resetState: true)
        subscriptions.removeAll()
        pendingSubscriptions.removeAll()
@@ -331,6 +501,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        duplicateInboundEventDropCountBySubscription.removeAll()
        inboundEventLogCount = 0
        Self.pendingGiftWrapIDs.removeAll()
        confirmedSends.removeAll()
        messageQueueLock.lock()
        messageQueue.removeAll()
@@ -347,7 +518,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
            relays[index].nextReconnectTime = nil
            if resetState {
                relays[index].lastError = nil
                relays[index].lastConnectedAt = nil
                relays[index].lastDisconnectedAt = nil
                relays[index].messagesSent = 0
                relays[index].messagesReceived = 0
@@ -381,13 +551,13 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
            // event locally so it survives a slow bootstrap (queued sends flush
            // when relays connect), then kick off connection setup, which itself
            // waits for Tor readiness.
-            let targetRelays = allowedRelayList(from: relayUrls ?? Self.defaultRelays)
+            let targetRelays = allowedRelayList(from: relayUrls ?? defaultRelays)
            guard !targetRelays.isEmpty else { return }
            enqueuePendingSend(event, pendingRelays: Set(targetRelays))
            ensureConnections(to: targetRelays)
            return
        }
-        let requestedRelays = relayUrls ?? Self.defaultRelays
+        let requestedRelays = relayUrls ?? defaultRelays
        let targetRelays = allowedRelayList(from: requestedRelays)
        guard !targetRelays.isEmpty else { return }
        ensureConnections(to: targetRelays)
@@ -406,6 +576,97 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        }
    }
    /// Attempts an event only on currently connected target relays and
    /// reports whether at least one relay explicitly accepted it via NIP-01
    /// `OK`. A successful WebSocket write alone is not durable acceptance.
    /// Unlike `sendEvent`, this never enters the process-local pending queue;
    /// callers use it when success unlocks durable state or user-visible
    /// delivery progress.
    func sendEventImmediately(
        _ event: NostrEvent,
        to relayUrls: [String]? = nil,
        completion: @escaping (Bool) -> Void
    ) {
        guard dependencies.activationAllowed() else {
            completion(false)
            return
        }
        guard !(shouldUseTor && dependencies.torEnforced() && !dependencies.torIsReady()) else {
            completion(false)
            return
        }
        let requestedRelays = relayUrls ?? defaultRelays
        let targetRelays = allowedRelayList(from: requestedRelays)
        let connectedTargets = targetRelays.compactMap { relayUrl -> (String, NostrRelayConnectionProtocol)? in
            guard let connection = connectedConnection(for: relayUrl) else { return nil }
            return (relayUrl, connection)
        }
        guard !connectedTargets.isEmpty else {
            completion(false)
            return
        }
        let token = UUID()
        let eventID = event.id
        if let replaced = confirmedSends.removeValue(forKey: eventID) {
            replaced.completion(false)
        }
        confirmedSends[eventID] = ConfirmedSendState(
            token: token,
            awaitingRelays: Set(connectedTargets.map(\.0)),
            completion: completion
        )
        dependencies.scheduleAfter(TransportConfig.nostrConfirmedSendAckTimeoutSeconds) { [weak self] in
            Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
                self?.timeoutConfirmedSend(eventID: eventID, token: token)
            }
        }
        for (relayUrl, connection) in connectedTargets {
            sendToRelay(event: event, connection: connection, relayUrl: relayUrl) { [weak self] succeeded in
                guard let self else { return }
                // Success only means the bytes reached the socket; wait for
                // the matching relay OK. A failed write settles this target
                // as rejected because no OK can arrive for it.
                if !succeeded {
                    self.resolveConfirmedSend(
                        eventID: eventID,
                        relayURL: relayUrl,
                        accepted: false,
                        token: token
                    )
                }
            }
        }
    }
    private func resolveConfirmedSend(
        eventID: String,
        relayURL: String,
        accepted: Bool,
        token: UUID? = nil
    ) {
        guard var state = confirmedSends[eventID],
              token == nil || state.token == token,
              state.awaitingRelays.remove(relayURL) != nil else { return }
        if accepted {
            confirmedSends.removeValue(forKey: eventID)
            state.completion(true)
        } else if state.awaitingRelays.isEmpty {
            confirmedSends.removeValue(forKey: eventID)
            state.completion(false)
        } else {
            confirmedSends[eventID] = state
        }
    }
    private func timeoutConfirmedSend(eventID: String, token: UUID) {
        guard let state = confirmedSends[eventID], state.token == token else { return }
        confirmedSends.removeValue(forKey: eventID)
        state.completion(false)
    }
    private func enqueuePendingSend(_ event: NostrEvent, pendingRelays: Set<String>) {
        messageQueueLock.lock()
        messageQueue.append(PendingSend(event: event, pendingRelays: pendingRelays))
@@ -504,7 +765,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
            // SecureLogger.debug("📋 Subscription filter JSON: \(messageString.prefix(200))...", category: .session)
            // Target specific relays if provided; else default. Filter permanently failed relays.
-            let baseUrls = relayUrls ?? Self.defaultRelays
+            let baseUrls = relayUrls ?? defaultRelays
            let urls = allowedRelayList(from: baseUrls).filter { !isPermanentlyFailed($0) }
            let requestState = SubscriptionRequestState(messageString: messageString, relayURLs: Set(urls))
            if subscriptionRequestState[id] == requestState, subscriptionStateExists(id: id, requestState: requestState) {
@@ -546,49 +807,60 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
    }
    private func applyDefaultRelayPolicy(force: Bool = false) {
-        let shouldAllow = hasMutualFavorites || hasLocationPermission
+        let shouldAllow = hasMutualFavorites || hasLocationPermission || dependencies.isInLocationChannel()
        if !force && shouldAllow == allowDefaultRelays { return }
        allowDefaultRelays = shouldAllow
        if shouldAllow {
            var existing = Set(relays.map { $0.url })
-            for url in Self.defaultRelays where !existing.contains(url) {
+            for url in defaultRelays where !existing.contains(url) {
                relays.append(Relay(url: url))
                existing.insert(url)
            }
            if dependencies.activationAllowed() {
-                ensureConnections(to: Self.defaultRelays)
+                ensureConnections(to: defaultRelays)
            }
        } else {
-            for url in Self.defaultRelays {
+            dropRelays(defaultRelaySet)
                if let connection = connections[url] {
                    connection.cancel(with: .goingAway, reason: nil)
                }
                connections.removeValue(forKey: url)
                subscriptions.removeValue(forKey: url)
                pendingSubscriptions.removeValue(forKey: url)
            }
            messageQueueLock.lock()
            for index in (0..<messageQueue.count).reversed() {
                var item = messageQueue[index]
                item.pendingRelays.subtract(Self.defaultRelaySet)
                if item.pendingRelays.isEmpty {
                    messageQueue.remove(at: index)
                } else {
                    messageQueue[index] = item
                }
            }
            messageQueueLock.unlock()
            relays.removeAll { Self.defaultRelaySet.contains($0.url) }
            updateConnectionStatus()
        }
    }
    /// Closes and forgets a set of relays: connection, inbound pipeline,
    /// subscriptions, queued sends addressed only to them, and the published row.
    private func dropRelays(_ urls: Set<String>) {
        guard !urls.isEmpty else { return }
        for url in urls {
            if let connection = connections[url] {
                connection.cancel(with: .goingAway, reason: nil)
            }
            connections.removeValue(forKey: url)
            teardownRelayInboundPipeline(for: url)
            subscriptions.removeValue(forKey: url)
            pendingSubscriptions.removeValue(forKey: url)
        }
        messageQueueLock.lock()
        for index in (0..<messageQueue.count).reversed() {
            var item = messageQueue[index]
            item.pendingRelays.subtract(urls)
            if item.pendingRelays.isEmpty {
                messageQueue.remove(at: index)
            } else {
                messageQueue[index] = item
            }
        }
        messageQueueLock.unlock()
        // A relay queued while Tor bootstraps would otherwise reconnect when
        // the queue drains, overriding the explicit removal.
        pendingTorConnectionURLs.subtract(urls)
        relays.removeAll { urls.contains($0.url) }
        updateConnectionStatus()
    }
    private func allowedRelayList(from urls: [String]) -> [String] {
        var seen = Set<String>()
        var result: [String] = []
        for rawURL in urls {
            guard let url = NostrRelayURL.normalized(rawURL) else { continue }
-            if !allowDefaultRelays && Self.defaultRelaySet.contains(url) { continue }
+            if !allowDefaultRelays && defaultRelaySet.contains(url) { continue }
            if seen.insert(url).inserted {
                result.append(url)
            }
@@ -795,7 +1067,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
    private func startEOSETracking(id: String, relayURLs: Set<String>, callback: @escaping () -> Void) {
        eoseTrackerEpoch += 1
        let epoch = eoseTrackerEpoch
-        eoseTrackers[id] = EOSETracker(pendingRelays: relayURLs, callback: callback, epoch: epoch)
+        eoseTrackers[id] = EOSETracker(awaitingSend: relayURLs, awaitingEOSE: [], callback: callback, epoch: epoch)
        // Fallback timeout to avoid hanging if a relay never sends EOSE.
        dependencies.scheduleAfter(TransportConfig.nostrSubscriptionEOSEFallbackSeconds) { [weak self] in
            Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
@@ -904,12 +1176,17 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        connections[urlString] = task
        task.resume()
        // Bring up this relay's own serial verify pipeline before arming the
        // socket, so inbound frames have somewhere to land.
        ensureRelayInboundPipeline(for: urlString)
        // Start receiving messages
        receiveMessage(from: task, relayUrl: urlString)
        // Send initial ping to verify connection
        task.sendPing { [weak self] error in
            DispatchQueue.main.async {
                guard self?.connections[urlString] === task else { return }
                if error == nil {
                    SecureLogger.debug("✅ Connected to Nostr relay: \(urlString)", category: .session)
                    self?.updateRelayStatus(urlString, isConnected: true)
@@ -919,7 +1196,11 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
                    SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to connect to Nostr relay \(urlString): \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "Unknown error")", category: .session)
                    self?.updateRelayStatus(urlString, isConnected: false, error: error)
                    // Trigger disconnection handler for proper backoff
-                    self?.handleDisconnection(relayUrl: urlString, error: error ?? NSError(domain: "NostrRelay", code: -1, userInfo: nil))
+                    self?.handleDisconnection(
                        relayUrl: urlString,
                        error: error ?? NSError(domain: "NostrRelay", code: -1, userInfo: nil),
                        connection: task
                    )
                }
            }
        }
@@ -935,8 +1216,19 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
            toSend[id] = state.messageString
        }
        for (id, messageString) in toSend {
-            if self.subscriptions[relayUrl]?.contains(id) == true { continue }
+            if self.subscriptions[relayUrl]?.contains(id) == true {
                // Already subscribed on this relay (e.g. a tracker promoted
                // after an earlier flush): its EOSE is coming, count it.
                markEOSESubscribed(id: id, relayUrl: relayUrl)
                continue
            }
            startPendingEOSETrackingIfNeeded(id: id)
            // Mark at send *initiation*, not in the async completion: a fast
            // relay's EOSE could otherwise complete the tracker while this
            // relay — REQ already on the wire — still sat in awaitingSend.
            // If the send fails the socket is going down with it, and the
            // disconnect settle (or the fallback timer) releases the wait.
            markEOSESubscribed(id: id, relayUrl: relayUrl)
            connection.send(.string(messageString)) { [weak self, weak connection] error in
                Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
                    guard let self else { return }
@@ -962,22 +1254,23 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
            switch result {
            case .success(let message):
-                // Parse off-main to reduce UI jank, then hop back for state updates
+                // Hand the raw frame to this relay's serial inbound pipeline:
-                Task.detached(priority: .utility) {
+                // parsing and signature verification run off-main, in arrival
-                    guard let parsed = ParsedInbound(message) else { return }
+                // order, independently of every other relay's pipeline. Routing
-                    await MainActor.run {
+                // through the lock-guarded router keeps this off the main actor
-                        self.handleParsedMessage(parsed, from: relayUrl)
+                // (no per-frame main hop).
-                    }
+                self.inboundRouter.yield(InboundFrame(message: message), to: relayUrl)
-                }
+
                // Continue receiving
                Task { @MainActor in
                    guard self.connections[relayUrl] === task else { return }
                    self.receiveMessage(from: task, relayUrl: relayUrl)
                }
            case .failure(let error):
                DispatchQueue.main.async {
-                    self.handleDisconnection(relayUrl: relayUrl, error: error)
+                    self.handleDisconnection(relayUrl: relayUrl, error: error, connection: task)
                }
            }
        }
@@ -987,39 +1280,63 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
    // Note: declared at file scope below to avoid MainActor isolation inside this class
    // and keep parsing off the main actor.
-    // Handle parsed message on MainActor (state updates and handlers)
+    /// First main-actor hop for an inbound EVENT: per-relay stats plus a cheap
    /// duplicate LOOKUP (no recording) so duplicate fan-in from multiple
    /// relays never pays for Schnorr verification. Recording happens only
    /// after the signature verifies (`deliverVerifiedInboundEvent`), so a
    /// forged-signature copy can never poison the dedup cache and suppress
    /// the genuine event.
    private func precheckInboundEvent(subscriptionID: String, eventID: String, relayUrl: String) -> Bool {
        if let index = relays.firstIndex(where: { $0.url == relayUrl }) {
            relays[index].messagesReceived += 1
        }
        guard !eventID.isEmpty else { return true }
        let key = InboundEventKey(subscriptionID: subscriptionID, eventID: eventID)
        if recentInboundEventKeys.contains(key) {
            recordDuplicateInboundEventDrop(subscriptionID: subscriptionID)
            return false
        }
        return true
    }
    /// Second main-actor hop, after off-main signature verification:
    /// authoritative check-and-record (the serial pipeline means the same
    /// event is never in flight twice, but the record must stay atomic with
    /// delivery) and handler dispatch.
    private func deliverVerifiedInboundEvent(subscriptionID subId: String, event: NostrEvent, from relayUrl: String) {
        guard shouldDeliverInboundEvent(subscriptionID: subId, eventID: event.id) else {
            return
        }
        if event.kind != 1059 {
            // Per-event logging floods dev builds in busy geohashes; sample it.
            inboundEventLogCount += 1
            if inboundEventLogCount == 1 || inboundEventLogCount.isMultiple(of: TransportConfig.nostrInboundEventLogInterval) {
                SecureLogger.debug("📥 Event #\(inboundEventLogCount) kind=\(event.kind) id=\(event.id.prefix(16))… relay=\(relayUrl)", category: .session)
            }
        }
        if let handler = self.messageHandlers[subId] {
            handler(event)
        } else {
            SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ No handler for subscription \(subId)", category: .session)
        }
    }
    // Handle parsed non-EVENT messages on MainActor (state updates and handlers)
    private func handleParsedMessage(_ parsed: ParsedInbound, from relayUrl: String) {
        switch parsed {
-        case .event(let subId, let event):
+        case .event:
-            if let index = self.relays.firstIndex(where: { $0.url == relayUrl }) {
+            // Events flow through the serial inbound pipeline (precheck →
-                self.relays[index].messagesReceived += 1
+            // off-main signature verification → deliverVerifiedInboundEvent)
-            }
+            // and never reach this fallback.
-            guard event.isValidSignature() else {
+            assertionFailure("inbound EVENT bypassed the verified pipeline")
                SecureLogger.warning(
                    "⚠️ Dropped invalid Nostr event id=\(event.id.prefix(16))… sub=\(subId) relay=\(relayUrl)",
                    category: .session
                )
                return
            }
            guard shouldDeliverInboundEvent(subscriptionID: subId, eventID: event.id) else {
                return
            }
            if event.kind != 1059 {
                // Per-event logging floods dev builds in busy geohashes; sample it.
                inboundEventLogCount += 1
                if inboundEventLogCount == 1 || inboundEventLogCount.isMultiple(of: TransportConfig.nostrInboundEventLogInterval) {
                    SecureLogger.debug("📥 Event #\(inboundEventLogCount) kind=\(event.kind) id=\(event.id.prefix(16))… relay=\(relayUrl)", category: .session)
                }
            }
            if let handler = self.messageHandlers[subId] {
                handler(event)
            } else {
                SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ No handler for subscription \(subId)", category: .session)
            }
        case .eose(let subId):
            if var tracker = eoseTrackers[subId] {
-                tracker.pendingRelays.remove(relayUrl)
+                // An EOSE proves the relay received the REQ even if the local
-                if tracker.pendingRelays.isEmpty {
+                // send completion hasn't run yet.
                tracker.awaitingSend.remove(relayUrl)
                tracker.awaitingEOSE.remove(relayUrl)
                tracker.didSend = true
                if tracker.isComplete {
                    eoseTrackers.removeValue(forKey: subId)
                    tracker.callback()
                } else {
@@ -1027,6 +1344,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
                }
            }
        case .ok(let eventId, let success, let reason):
            resolveConfirmedSend(eventID: eventId, relayURL: relayUrl, accepted: success)
            if success {
                _ = Self.pendingGiftWrapIDs.remove(eventId)
                SecureLogger.debug("✅ Accepted id=\(eventId.prefix(16))… relay=\(relayUrl)", category: .session)
@@ -1043,7 +1361,12 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        }
    }
-    private func sendToRelay(event: NostrEvent, connection: NostrRelayConnectionProtocol, relayUrl: String) {
+    private func sendToRelay(
        event: NostrEvent,
        connection: NostrRelayConnectionProtocol,
        relayUrl: String,
        completion: ((Bool) -> Void)? = nil
    ) {
        let req = NostrRequest.event(event)
        do {
@@ -1056,17 +1379,20 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
                DispatchQueue.main.async {
                    if let error = error {
                        SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to send event to \(relayUrl): \(error)", category: .session)
                        completion?(false)
                    } else {
                        // SecureLogger.debug("✅ Event sent to relay: \(relayUrl)", category: .session)
                        // Update relay stats
                        if let index = self?.relays.firstIndex(where: { $0.url == relayUrl }) {
                            self?.relays[index].messagesSent += 1
                        }
                        completion?(true)
                    }
                }
            }
        } catch {
            SecureLogger.error("Failed to encode event: \(error)", category: .session)
            completion?(false)
        }
    }
@@ -1075,7 +1401,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
            relays[index].isConnected = isConnected
            relays[index].lastError = error
            if isConnected {
                relays[index].lastConnectedAt = dependencies.now()
                relays[index].reconnectAttempts = 0  // Reset on successful connection
                relays[index].nextReconnectTime = nil
            } else {
@@ -1093,16 +1418,18 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        isConnected = relays.contains { $0.isConnected }
        // Relay URLs are normalized before entries are created, so direct
        // set membership is sound.
-        isDMRelayConnected = relays.contains { $0.isConnected && Self.defaultRelaySet.contains($0.url) }
+        isDMRelayConnected = relays.contains { $0.isConnected && defaultRelaySet.contains($0.url) }
    }
    /// A relay that drops before sending EOSE must not stall initial-load
    /// callbacks; treat it as done and let the remaining relays (or the
    /// fallback timeout) drive completion.
    private func settleEOSETrackers(droppingRelay relayUrl: String) {
-        for (id, var tracker) in eoseTrackers where tracker.pendingRelays.contains(relayUrl) {
+        for (id, var tracker) in eoseTrackers
-            tracker.pendingRelays.remove(relayUrl)
+        where tracker.awaitingSend.contains(relayUrl) || tracker.awaitingEOSE.contains(relayUrl) {
-            if tracker.pendingRelays.isEmpty {
+            tracker.awaitingSend.remove(relayUrl)
            tracker.awaitingEOSE.remove(relayUrl)
            if tracker.isComplete {
                eoseTrackers.removeValue(forKey: id)
                tracker.callback()
            } else {
@@ -1111,9 +1438,39 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        }
    }
-    private func handleDisconnection(relayUrl: String, error: Error) {
+    /// Whether any of `relayUrls` currently holds a live connection. Lets
    /// subscribers distinguish "loaded, empty" from "never reached a relay"
    /// when an EOSE fallback fires.
    func isAnyRelayConnected(among relayUrls: [String]) -> Bool {
        let targets = Set(relayUrls)
        return relays.contains { targets.contains($0.url) && $0.isConnected }
    }
    /// Marks the REQ as delivered to `relayUrl`: EOSE completion now waits on
    /// this relay instead of the never-connected remainder.
    private func markEOSESubscribed(id: String, relayUrl: String) {
        guard var tracker = eoseTrackers[id],
              tracker.awaitingSend.remove(relayUrl) != nil else { return }
        tracker.awaitingEOSE.insert(relayUrl)
        tracker.didSend = true
        eoseTrackers[id] = tracker
    }
    private func handleDisconnection(
        relayUrl: String,
        error: Error,
        connection: NostrRelayConnectionProtocol? = nil
    ) {
        if let connection, connections[relayUrl] !== connection { return }
        connections.removeValue(forKey: relayUrl)
        teardownRelayInboundPipeline(for: relayUrl)
        subscriptions.removeValue(forKey: relayUrl)
        let awaitingConfirmation = confirmedSends.compactMap { eventID, state in
            state.awaitingRelays.contains(relayUrl) ? eventID : nil
        }
        for eventID in awaitingConfirmation {
            resolveConfirmedSend(eventID: eventID, relayURL: relayUrl, accepted: false)
        }
        updateRelayStatus(relayUrl, isConnected: false, error: error)
        settleEOSETrackers(droppingRelay: relayUrl)
        // If networking is disallowed, do not schedule reconnection
@@ -1201,6 +1558,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
        if let connection = connections[normalizedRelayUrl] {
            connection.cancel(with: .goingAway, reason: nil)
            connections.removeValue(forKey: normalizedRelayUrl)
            teardownRelayInboundPipeline(for: normalizedRelayUrl)
        }
        // Attempt immediate reconnection
@@ -1295,6 +1653,77 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
 // MARK: - Off-main inbound parsing helpers (file scope, non-isolated)
 /// A single raw socket frame awaiting off-main parse + Schnorr verification.
 private struct InboundFrame: Sendable {
    let message: URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message
 }
 /// Lock-guarded registry of per-relay inbound streams.
 ///
 /// The raw WebSocket receive callback is not main-actor isolated, so it needs a
 /// `Sendable` path to route a frame to the correct relay's stream without a
 /// per-frame hop onto the main actor. Pipeline lifecycle (start/finish) is
 /// driven from the main actor; frame delivery (`yield`) can come from any
 /// thread. All access is serialized by a single lock — contention is negligible
 /// because the guarded critical section is only a dictionary lookup + yield.
 private final class InboundFrameRouter: @unchecked Sendable {
    private let lock = NSLock()
    private var continuations: [String: AsyncStream<InboundFrame>.Continuation] = [:]
    private var tasks: [String: Task<Void, Never>] = [:]
    /// Start a relay's stream + consumer if one does not already exist.
    /// Returns true when a new pipeline was created. The bounded
    /// `.bufferingNewest` policy makes a single relay shed its OWN oldest
    /// frames under a flood, never other relays' frames. Buffered memory per
    /// relay is bounded (not eliminated) at the frame cap times the per-frame
    /// byte cap (`maximumMessageSize`) — see TransportConfig.
    func startPipeline(
        for relayUrl: String,
        makeConsumer: (AsyncStream<InboundFrame>) -> Task<Void, Never>
    ) -> Bool {
        lock.lock()
        defer { lock.unlock() }
        if continuations[relayUrl] != nil { return false }
        let (stream, continuation) = AsyncStream<InboundFrame>.makeStream(
            bufferingPolicy: .bufferingNewest(TransportConfig.nostrInboundPerRelayBufferCap)
        )
        continuations[relayUrl] = continuation
        tasks[relayUrl] = makeConsumer(stream)
        return true
    }
    /// Route a frame to a relay's stream. No-op if the relay has no live
    /// pipeline (socket already torn down) — the frame is simply dropped, which
    /// is safe for best-effort Nostr inbound.
    func yield(_ frame: InboundFrame, to relayUrl: String) {
        lock.lock()
        let continuation = continuations[relayUrl]
        lock.unlock()
        continuation?.yield(frame)
    }
    /// Finish a relay's stream. The consumer drains any already-buffered frames
    /// before exiting, so in-flight verified events are still delivered.
    func finishPipeline(for relayUrl: String) {
        lock.lock()
        let continuation = continuations.removeValue(forKey: relayUrl)
        tasks.removeValue(forKey: relayUrl)
        lock.unlock()
        continuation?.finish()
    }
    func finishAll() {
        lock.lock()
        let allContinuations = continuations
        continuations.removeAll()
        tasks.removeAll()
        lock.unlock()
        for continuation in allContinuations.values {
            continuation.finish()
        }
    }
 }
 private enum ParsedInbound {
    case event(subId: String, event: NostrEvent)
    case ok(eventId: String, success: Bool, reason: String)
@@ -1302,7 +1731,7 @@ private enum ParsedInbound {
    case notice(String)
    init?(_ message: URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message) {
-        guard let data = message.data,
+        guard let data = message.dataWithinInboundLimit,
              let array = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [Any],
              array.count >= 2,
              let type = array[0] as? String else {
@@ -1347,11 +1776,19 @@ private enum ParsedInbound {
 }
 private extension URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message {
-    var data: Data? {
+    /// Prefer rejecting oversized frames before UTF-8/Data materialization
    /// where we can (string length), and always before JSON parse.
    var dataWithinInboundLimit: Data? {
        let maxBytes = TransportConfig.nostrMaxInboundMessageBytes
        switch self {
-        case .string(let text): text.data(using: .utf8)
+        case .string(let text):
-        case .data(let data):   data
+            guard text.utf8.count <= maxBytes else { return nil }
-        @unknown default:       nil
+            return text.data(using: .utf8)
        case .data(let data):
            guard data.count <= maxBytes else { return nil }
            return data
        @unknown default:
            return nil
        }
    }
 }
@@ -1463,6 +1900,29 @@ struct NostrFilter: Encodable {
        filter.limit = limit
        return filter
    }
    // For the mesh bridge: rendezvous messages (kind 20000) and presence
    // (kind 20001) tagged `#r` with one or more cells (own + neighbors).
    static func bridgeRendezvous(_ cells: [String], since: Date? = nil, limit: Int = 200) -> NostrFilter {
        var filter = NostrFilter()
        filter.kinds = [20000, 20001]
        filter.since = since?.timeIntervalSince1970.toInt()
        filter.tagFilters = ["r": cells]
        filter.limit = limit
        return filter
    }
    // For courier drops: sealed envelopes (kind 1401) parked under rotating
    // recipient tags (`#x`, hex). Callers pass every candidate tag (adjacent
    // UTC days x recipients) in one filter.
    static func courierDrops(recipientTagsHex: [String], since: Date? = nil, limit: Int = 100) -> NostrFilter {
        var filter = NostrFilter()
        filter.kinds = [NostrProtocol.EventKind.courierDrop.rawValue]
        filter.since = since?.timeIntervalSince1970.toInt()
        filter.tagFilters = ["x": recipientTagsHex]
        filter.limit = limit
        return filter
    }
 }
 // Dynamic coding key for tag filters
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
 //
 // NostrRelaySettings.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import BitLogger
 import Foundation
 /// Relays someone has added by hand, alongside the built-in set.
 ///
 /// The built-in relays are four well-known clearnet hostnames, so a censor
 /// blocking four names ends internet-delivered private messages for everyone.
 /// Adding relays — including `.onion` addresses, or a relay run by whoever
 /// needs it — is the escape hatch that does not require shipping a new build.
 ///
 /// Stored normalized so comparisons against connection keys and the built-in
 /// set are exact, and bounded so a long list cannot turn every send into a
 /// fan-out across dozens of sockets.
 enum NostrRelaySettings {
    /// Enough to add a personal relay, an onion address, and a couple of
    /// regional fallbacks without letting the connection fan-out grow unbounded.
    static let maxCustomRelays = 8
    private static let storageKey = "nostr.customRelays"
    static let didChangeNotification = Notification.Name("bitchat.nostrRelaySettingsDidChange")
    enum AddFailure: Error, Equatable {
        case malformed
        case alreadyPresent
        case limitReached
    }
    /// Normalized relay URLs, in the order they were added.
    static func customRelays(in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) -> [String] {
        let stored = defaults.stringArray(forKey: storageKey) ?? []
        // Re-normalize on read: a value written by an older build, or edited
        // outside the app, must not reach the connection layer unchecked.
        var seen = Set<String>()
        return stored.compactMap { NostrRelayURL.normalized($0) }
            .filter { seen.insert($0).inserted }
    }
    /// Adds a relay, returning the normalized URL or why it was rejected.
    @discardableResult
    static func add(
        _ rawValue: String,
        builtIn: Set<String>,
        in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard
    ) -> Result<String, AddFailure> {
        // Bare hostnames are the common way people quote a relay, and wss is
        // the only sensible assumption for one.
        guard let normalized = NostrRelayURL.normalized(rawValue, defaultScheme: "wss") else {
            return .failure(.malformed)
        }
        var current = customRelays(in: defaults)
        guard !current.contains(normalized), !builtIn.contains(normalized) else {
            return .failure(.alreadyPresent)
        }
        guard current.count < maxCustomRelays else {
            return .failure(.limitReached)
        }
        current.append(normalized)
        write(current, in: defaults)
        return .success(normalized)
    }
    static func remove(_ url: String, in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) {
        // Same default scheme as `add`, so a relay entered as a bare hostname
        // can be removed the way it was typed.
        guard let normalized = NostrRelayURL.normalized(url, defaultScheme: "wss") else { return }
        let remaining = customRelays(in: defaults).filter { $0 != normalized }
        write(remaining, in: defaults)
    }
    /// Panic-wipe hook: an added relay names somewhere someone chose to route
    /// through, which is exactly the kind of trace a wipe should not leave.
    static func reset(in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) {
        defaults.removeObject(forKey: storageKey)
        NotificationCenter.default.post(name: didChangeNotification, object: nil)
    }
    private static func write(_ relays: [String], in defaults: UserDefaults) {
        defaults.set(relays, forKey: storageKey)
        NotificationCenter.default.post(name: didChangeNotification, object: nil)
    }
 }
@@ -39,13 +39,4 @@ enum NostrRelayURL {
        return components.string
    }
    static func directoryAddress(_ rawValue: String) -> String? {
        guard var normalized = normalized(rawValue, defaultScheme: "wss") else { return nil }
        for prefix in ["wss://", "ws://"] where normalized.hasPrefix(prefix) {
            normalized.removeFirst(prefix.count)
            break
        }
        return normalized
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
 <plist version="1.0">
 <dict>
 	<key>NSPrivacyTracking</key>
 	<false/>
 	<key>NSPrivacyTrackingDomains</key>
 	<array/>
 	<key>NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes</key>
 	<array/>
 	<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes</key>
 	<array>
 		<dict>
 			<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key>
 			<string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategoryFileTimestamp</string>
 			<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key>
 			<array>
 				<string>C617.1</string>
 				<string>3B52.1</string>
 			</array>
 		</dict>
 		<dict>
 			<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key>
 			<string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategorySystemBootTime</string>
 			<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key>
 			<array>
 				<string>35F9.1</string>
 			</array>
 		</dict>
 		<dict>
 			<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key>
 			<string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategoryUserDefaults</string>
 			<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key>
 			<array>
 				<string>CA92.1</string>
 				<string>1C8F.1</string>
 			</array>
 		</dict>
 	</array>
 </dict>
 </plist>
@@ -28,14 +28,12 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
    /// Encodes the packet using v2 canonical TLVs (4-byte FILE_SIZE, 4-byte CONTENT length).
    /// Returns `nil` when fields exceed protocol limits (e.g., content > UInt32.max).
-    /// `limit` defaults to the Bluetooth payload cap; Wi-Fi bulk transfers pass
+    func encode() -> Data? {
    /// `FileTransferLimits.maxWifiBulkPayloadBytes`.
    func encode(limit: Int = FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) -> Data? {
        let resolvedSize = fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count)
        guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(UInt32.max) else { return nil }
-        guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(limit) else { return nil }
+        guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) else { return nil }
        guard content.count <= Int(UInt32.max) else { return nil }
-        guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count, limit: limit) else { return nil }
+        guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count) else { return nil }
        func appendBE<T: FixedWidthInteger>(_ value: T, into data: inout Data) {
            var big = value.bigEndian
@@ -68,9 +66,7 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
    }
    /// Decodes TLV payloads, tolerating legacy encodings (FILE_SIZE len=8, CONTENT len=2) when possible.
-    /// `limit` defaults to the Bluetooth payload cap; Wi-Fi bulk transfers pass
+    static func decode(_ data: Data) -> BitchatFilePacket? {
    /// the (smaller of the) accepted-offer size and the Wi-Fi bulk ceiling.
    static func decode(_ data: Data, limit: Int = FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) -> BitchatFilePacket? {
        var cursor = data.startIndex
        let end = data.endIndex
@@ -130,7 +126,7 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
                    for byte in value {
                        size = (size << 8) | UInt64(byte)
                    }
-                    if size > UInt64(limit) {
+                    if size > UInt64(FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) {
                        return nil
                    }
                    fileSize = size
@@ -139,7 +135,7 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
                mimeType = String(data: Data(value), encoding: .utf8)
            case .content:
                let proposedSize = content.count + value.count
-                if proposedSize > limit {
+                if proposedSize > FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes {
                    return nil
                }
                content.append(contentsOf: value)
@@ -149,7 +145,7 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
        }
        guard !content.isEmpty else { return nil }
-        guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count, limit: limit) else { return nil }
+        guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count) else { return nil }
        return BitchatFilePacket(
            fileName: fileName,
            fileSize: fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count),
@@ -158,3 +154,90 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
        )
    }
 }
 /// Wire-compatible identity for private media exchanged by clients using the
 /// current iOS entropy-bearing filenames, without extending the deployed file
 /// TLV. Android clients reject unknown file tags, so eligible senders and
 /// receivers derive the receipt key from fields already on the wire.
 ///
 /// Locally-created image and voice-note filenames contain a UUID or live-voice
 /// burst ID. Including the normalized direction keeps a reused filename
 /// distinct across chats while allowing short and full Noise-key peer IDs to
 /// converge. Android and older-iOS timestamp-only names remain ineligible and
 /// retain their legacy random local IDs (transfer-compatible, no receipts).
 enum PrivateMediaMessageIdentity {
    private static let domain = Data("bitchat-private-media-message-v1".utf8)
    private static let idPrefix = "media-"
    private static let digestHexLength = 32
    static func isStableID(_ candidate: String) -> Bool {
        guard candidate.hasPrefix(idPrefix) else { return false }
        let digest = candidate.dropFirst(idPrefix.count)
        guard digest.utf8.count == digestHexLength else { return false }
        return digest.utf8.allSatisfy { byte in
            (UInt8(ascii: "0")...UInt8(ascii: "9")).contains(byte)
                || (UInt8(ascii: "a")...UInt8(ascii: "f")).contains(byte)
        }
    }
    static func stableID(
        senderPeerID: PeerID,
        recipientPeerID: PeerID,
        fileName: String?
    ) -> String? {
        guard let fileName, !fileName.isEmpty else { return nil }
        let leafName = (fileName as NSString).lastPathComponent
        guard leafName == fileName else { return nil }
        let path = leafName as NSString
        let stem = path.deletingPathExtension
        let fileExtension = path.pathExtension.lowercased()
        switch true {
        case stem.hasPrefix("img_"):
            guard fileExtension == "jpg" || fileExtension == "jpeg" else { return nil }
        case stem.hasPrefix("voice_"):
            guard fileExtension == "m4a" else { return nil }
        default:
            return nil
        }
        let entropyToken = stem.split(separator: "_").last.map(String.init)
        let hasUUIDEntropy = entropyToken.flatMap(UUID.init(uuidString:)) != nil
        let voiceBurstID = stem.hasPrefix("voice_")
            ? String(stem.dropFirst("voice_".count))
            : ""
        let hasBurstEntropy = voiceBurstID.count == 16
            && voiceBurstID.allSatisfy(\.isHexDigit)
        guard hasUUIDEntropy || hasBurstEntropy else {
            return nil
        }
        let fields = [
            Data(senderPeerID.toShort().bare.utf8),
            Data(recipientPeerID.toShort().bare.utf8),
            Data(leafName.utf8)
        ]
        var input = domain
        for field in fields {
            guard let length = UInt32(exactly: field.count) else { return nil }
            var bigEndianLength = length.bigEndian
            withUnsafeBytes(of: &bigEndianLength) {
                input.append(contentsOf: $0)
            }
            input.append(field)
        }
        return "\(idPrefix)\(input.sha256Hex().prefix(digestHexLength))"
    }
    static func stableID(
        for packet: BitchatFilePacket,
        senderPeerID: PeerID,
        recipientPeerID: PeerID
    ) -> String? {
        stableID(
            senderPeerID: senderPeerID,
            recipientPeerID: recipientPeerID,
            fileName: packet.fileName
        )
    }
 }
@@ -38,11 +38,15 @@
 /// 7. **Decoding**: Binary data parsed back to message objects
 ///
 /// ## Security Considerations
-/// - Message padding (to 256/512/1024/2048-byte blocks) obscures actual content length
+/// - Noise frames are padded (to 256/512/1024/2048-byte blocks) to obscure
 ///   content length; other packet types are not padded, so their payload
 ///   length is observable
 /// - Randomized relay jitter reduces the traffic-analysis signal; there is no
 ///   cover traffic or per-message timing obfuscation
 /// - Integration with Noise Protocol for E2E encryption
-/// - No persistent identifiers in protocol headers
+/// - The 8-byte sender ID in every header IS a persistent identifier: it is
 ///   derived from the long-lived Noise static key and rotates only on a panic
 ///   wipe. Treat headers as linkable across sessions.
 ///
 /// ## Message Types
 /// - **Announce/Leave**: Peer presence notifications
@@ -74,27 +78,50 @@ enum NoisePayloadType: UInt8 {
    case privateMessage = 0x01      // Private chat message
    case readReceipt = 0x02         // Message was read
    case delivered = 0x03           // Message was delivered
-    // Wi-Fi bulk transport negotiation (AWDL data plane for large media)
+    // Private groups (0x04/0x05 reserved by other features)
    case bulkTransferOffer = 0x04    // Offer to move a large file over peer-to-peer Wi-Fi
    case bulkTransferResponse = 0x05 // Accept/decline reply to a bulk transfer offer
    // Private groups
    case groupInvite = 0x06         // Creator-signed group state (invite)
    case groupKeyUpdate = 0x07      // Creator-signed group state (key rotation / roster update)
    // Live voice (push-to-talk)
    case voiceFrame = 0x08          // One live voice-burst packet (see VoiceBurstPacket)
    // Finalized private media. `0x20` is the value already deployed by the
    // Android client. The complete BitchatFilePacket is encrypted inside
    // Noise before the outer noiseEncrypted packet is fragmented.
    case privateFile = 0x20
    // Versioned peer state authenticated by the surrounding Noise session.
    // This is intentionally distinct from the public announce: announce
    // capabilities are discovery hints, while this payload proves possession
    // of the advertised Noise static key before downgrade state is pinned.
    case authenticatedPeerState = 0x21
    // Verification (QR-based OOB binding)
    case verifyChallenge = 0x10     // Verification challenge
    case verifyResponse  = 0x11     // Verification response
    // Transitive verification (web of trust)
    case vouch = 0x12               // Batch of vouch attestations
    /// #1434 briefly used 0x09 before release. Accept it while prerelease
    /// builds age out, but never emit it. Decoders canonicalize both values to
    /// `.privateFile` so the compatibility alias cannot leak into app logic.
    static let prereleasePrivateFileRawValue: UInt8 = 0x09
    static func decoded(rawValue: UInt8) -> NoisePayloadType? {
        rawValue == prereleasePrivateFileRawValue ? .privateFile : Self(rawValue: rawValue)
    }
    static func isPrivateFile(rawValue: UInt8?) -> Bool {
        guard let rawValue else { return false }
        return rawValue == privateFile.rawValue || rawValue == prereleasePrivateFileRawValue
    }
    var description: String {
        switch self {
        case .privateMessage: return "privateMessage"
        case .readReceipt: return "readReceipt"
        case .delivered: return "delivered"
        case .bulkTransferOffer: return "bulkTransferOffer"
        case .bulkTransferResponse: return "bulkTransferResponse"
        case .groupInvite: return "groupInvite"
        case .groupKeyUpdate: return "groupKeyUpdate"
        case .voiceFrame: return "voiceFrame"
        case .privateFile: return "privateFile"
        case .authenticatedPeerState: return "authenticatedPeerState"
        case .verifyChallenge: return "verifyChallenge"
        case .verifyResponse: return "verifyResponse"
        case .vouch: return "vouch"
@@ -132,6 +159,9 @@ protocol BitchatDelegate: AnyObject {
    // Encrypted group broadcast (opaque envelope; decrypted by the group coordinator)
    func didReceiveGroupMessage(payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
    // Public live-voice burst packet (signature-verified by the transport)
    func didReceivePublicVoiceFrame(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
    // Bluetooth state updates for user notifications
    func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState)
    func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?)
@@ -155,6 +185,10 @@ extension BitchatDelegate {
        // Default empty implementation
    }
    func didReceivePublicVoiceFrame(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
        // Default empty implementation
    }
    func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
        // Default empty implementation
    }
@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ enum Geohash {
        return map
    }()
-    /// Validates a geohash string for building-level precision (8 characters).
+    /// Validates a geohash string at any channel precision (1-12 characters).
    /// - Parameter geohash: The geohash string to validate
-    /// - Returns: true if valid 8-character base32 geohash, false otherwise
+    /// - Returns: true if a non-empty base32 geohash of at most 12 characters
-    static func isValidBuildingGeohash(_ geohash: String) -> Bool {
+    static func isValidGeohash(_ geohash: String) -> Bool {
-        guard geohash.count == 8 else { return false }
+        guard (1...12).contains(geohash.count) else { return false }
        return geohash.lowercased().allSatisfy { base32Map[$0] != nil }
    }
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ enum GeohashChannelLevel: CaseIterable, Codable, Equatable {
    var displayName: String {
        switch self {
        case .building:
-            return String(localized: "location_levels.building", defaultValue: "building", comment: "Name for building-level location channel")
+            return String(localized: "location_levels.building", comment: "Name for building-level location channel")
        case .block:
-            return String(localized: "location_levels.block", defaultValue: "block", comment: "Name for block-level location channel")
+            return String(localized: "location_levels.block", comment: "Name for block-level location channel")
        case .neighborhood:
-            return String(localized: "location_levels.neighborhood", defaultValue: "neighborhood", comment: "Name for neighborhood-level location channel")
+            return String(localized: "location_levels.neighborhood", comment: "Name for neighborhood-level location channel")
        case .city:
-            return String(localized: "location_levels.city", defaultValue: "city", comment: "Name for city-level location channel")
+            return String(localized: "location_levels.city", comment: "Name for city-level location channel")
        case .province:
-            return String(localized: "location_levels.province", defaultValue: "province", comment: "Name for province-level location channel")
+            return String(localized: "location_levels.province", comment: "Name for province-level location channel")
        case .region:
-            return String(localized: "location_levels.region", defaultValue: "region", comment: "Name for region-level location channel")
+            return String(localized: "location_levels.region", comment: "Name for region-level location channel")
        }
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
 //
 // MeshMessageIdentity.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import BitFoundation
 import Foundation
 /// Content-derived identity for public mesh messages.
 ///
 /// The BLE wire carries no message ID for public broadcasts, so every device
 /// recomputes the same stable ID from the signed wire fields (sender ID,
 /// millisecond timestamp, content). That gives the mesh bridge a
 /// cross-device-consistent radio identity with zero wire change. Bridge events
 /// carry this value only as a hint for detecting a radio copy that is already
 /// present: sender/timestamp/content are public, so a different Nostr signer
 /// can copy them and must never be allowed to reserve the genuine event's
 /// authenticated dedup slot.
 enum MeshMessageIdentity {
    /// Matches the wire truncation in `BLEService.sendMessage`.
    static func millisecondTimestamp(_ date: Date) -> UInt64 {
        UInt64(date.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
    }
    static func stableID(senderIDHex: String, timestampMs: UInt64, content: String) -> String {
        let input = senderIDHex.lowercased() + "|" + String(timestampMs) + "|" + content.trimmed
        return String(Data(input.utf8).sha256Hex().prefix(32))
    }
 }
@@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ struct NostrCarrierPacket: Equatable {
    enum Direction: UInt8 {
        case toGateway = 0x01
        case fromGateway = 0x02
        /// Mesh-bridge uplink: a mesh-only peer asks a bridge gateway to
        /// publish its signed rendezvous event. Directed, like `toGateway`.
        case toBridge = 0x03
        /// Mesh-bridge downlink: a bridge gateway rebroadcasts a rendezvous
        /// event from a remote island. Broadcast, like `fromGateway`.
        /// Old clients fail the Direction decode on 0x03/0x04 and drop the
        /// carrier quietly — bridge traffic degrades to invisible, not junk.
        case fromBridge = 0x04
    }
    let direction: Direction
@@ -9,19 +9,25 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
    let signingPublicKey: Data          // Ed25519 public key for signing
    let directNeighbors: [Data]?        // 8-byte peer IDs
    let capabilities: PeerCapabilities? // advertised feature bits; nil when absent (old clients)
    /// Rendezvous geohash cell this peer bridges, when advertising `.bridge`.
    /// Coarse (cell-level) by design; lets mesh-only peers compose correctly
    /// tagged rendezvous events without their own location fix.
    let bridgeGeohash: String?
    init(
        nickname: String,
        noisePublicKey: Data,
        signingPublicKey: Data,
        directNeighbors: [Data]?,
-        capabilities: PeerCapabilities? = nil
+        capabilities: PeerCapabilities? = nil,
        bridgeGeohash: String? = nil
    ) {
        self.nickname = nickname
        self.noisePublicKey = noisePublicKey
        self.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey
        self.directNeighbors = directNeighbors
        self.capabilities = capabilities
        self.bridgeGeohash = bridgeGeohash
    }
    private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
@@ -30,6 +36,7 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
        case signingPublicKey = 0x03
        case directNeighbors = 0x04
        case capabilities = 0x05
        case bridgeGeohash = 0x06
    }
    func encode() -> Data? {
@@ -74,6 +81,15 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
            data.append(capabilityBytes)
        }
        // TLV for bridge rendezvous cell (optional; old clients skip it)
        if let bridgeGeohash = bridgeGeohash,
           let cellData = bridgeGeohash.data(using: .utf8),
           !cellData.isEmpty, cellData.count <= 12 {
            data.append(TLVType.bridgeGeohash.rawValue)
            data.append(UInt8(cellData.count))
            data.append(cellData)
        }
        return data
    }
@@ -84,6 +100,7 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
        var signingPublicKey: Data?
        var directNeighbors: [Data]?
        var capabilities: PeerCapabilities?
        var bridgeGeohash: String?
        while offset + 2 <= data.count {
            let typeRaw = data[offset]
@@ -116,6 +133,10 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
                    }
                case .capabilities:
                    capabilities = PeerCapabilities(encoded: Data(value))
                case .bridgeGeohash:
                    if length <= 12 {
                        bridgeGeohash = String(data: value, encoding: .utf8)
                    }
                }
            } else {
                // Unknown TLV; skip (tolerant decoder for forward compatibility)
@@ -129,7 +150,91 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
            noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
            signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
            directNeighbors: directNeighbors,
-            capabilities: capabilities
+            capabilities: capabilities,
            bridgeGeohash: bridgeGeohash
        )
    }
 }
 /// State that is authoritative only because it is carried inside an
 /// established Noise session. The public announce remains useful for
 /// discovery, but its self-signature cannot prove possession of the copied
 /// Noise public key it contains.
 ///
 /// Wire format (v1):
 /// `[version=0x01][type][length][value]...`
 /// - TLV `0x01`: canonical minimal little-endian `PeerCapabilities`
 /// - TLV `0x02`: 32-byte Ed25519 signing public key
 ///
 /// Unknown TLVs are skipped for forward compatibility. Unknown versions,
 /// duplicates, non-canonical capability fields, and malformed lengths are
 /// rejected without changing authenticated state.
 struct AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket: Equatable {
    static let currentVersion: UInt8 = 1
    static let signingPublicKeyLength = 32
    let capabilities: PeerCapabilities
    let signingPublicKey: Data
    private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
        case capabilities = 0x01
        case signingPublicKey = 0x02
    }
    func encode() -> Data? {
        guard signingPublicKey.count == Self.signingPublicKeyLength else { return nil }
        let capabilityBytes = capabilities.encoded()
        guard !capabilityBytes.isEmpty, capabilityBytes.count <= 8 else { return nil }
        var data = Data([Self.currentVersion])
        data.append(TLVType.capabilities.rawValue)
        data.append(UInt8(capabilityBytes.count))
        data.append(capabilityBytes)
        data.append(TLVType.signingPublicKey.rawValue)
        data.append(UInt8(signingPublicKey.count))
        data.append(signingPublicKey)
        return data
    }
    static func decode(from data: Data) -> AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket? {
        guard data.first == Self.currentVersion else { return nil }
        var offset = 1
        var capabilities: PeerCapabilities?
        var signingPublicKey: Data?
        while offset < data.count {
            guard offset + 2 <= data.count else { return nil }
            let typeRaw = data[offset]
            let length = Int(data[offset + 1])
            offset += 2
            guard offset + length <= data.count else { return nil }
            let value = Data(data[offset..<(offset + length)])
            offset += length
            guard let type = TLVType(rawValue: typeRaw) else {
                continue
            }
            switch type {
            case .capabilities:
                guard capabilities == nil,
                      !value.isEmpty,
                      value.count <= 8 else { return nil }
                let decoded = PeerCapabilities(encoded: value)
                guard decoded.encoded() == value else { return nil }
                capabilities = decoded
            case .signingPublicKey:
                guard signingPublicKey == nil,
                      value.count == Self.signingPublicKeyLength else { return nil }
                signingPublicKey = value
            }
        }
        guard let capabilities, let signingPublicKey else { return nil }
        return AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket(
            capabilities: capabilities,
            signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey
        )
    }
 }
@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@ import BitFoundation
 extension PeerCapabilities {
    /// Capabilities this build advertises in its announce packets.
    /// Each feature adds its bit here when it ships.
-    static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = {
+    static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [
-        var caps: PeerCapabilities = [.prekeys, .vouch, .groups]
+        .vouch,
-        if TransportConfig.wifiBulkEnabled { caps.insert(.wifiBulk) }
+        .prekeys,
-        return caps
+        .groups,
-    }()
+        .privateMedia,
        .privateMediaReceipts
    ]
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
 //
 // VoiceBurstPacket.swift
 // bitchat
 //
 // This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 import Foundation
 import Security
 /// Audio codec of a live voice burst. START packets carry it so receivers can
 /// reject bursts they can't decode instead of feeding garbage to the decoder.
 enum VoiceBurstCodec: UInt8 {
    /// AAC-LC, 16 kHz, mono, ~16 kbps — matches the voice-note recorder, so
    /// the finalized `.m4a` and the live frames come from the same encoder
    /// settings.
    case aacLC16kMono = 0x01
 }
 /// One packet of a live push-to-talk voice burst (the inner payload of
 /// `NoisePayloadType.voiceFrame`, and — for public mesh bursts — the payload
 /// of `MessageType.voiceFrame`).
 ///
 /// Wire format:
 /// ```
 /// [burstID: 8][seq: UInt16 BE][flags: UInt8][payload…]
 /// ```
 /// - flags 0x01 (START): payload = [codec: UInt8]
 /// - flags 0x02 (END):   payload = [totalDataPackets: UInt16 BE][durationMs: UInt32 BE]
 /// - flags 0x04 (CANCELED): empty payload; receivers discard the burst
 /// - flags 0x00 (data):  payload = repeated [length: UInt16 BE][AAC frame]
 struct VoiceBurstPacket: Equatable {
    enum Kind: Equatable {
        case start(codec: VoiceBurstCodec)
        case frames([Data])
        case end(totalDataPackets: UInt16, durationMs: UInt32)
        case canceled
    }
    static let burstIDSize = 8
    private static let headerSize = burstIDSize + 2 + 1
    /// Sanity cap on frames per packet; real packets carry 1-2 frames.
    static let maxFramesPerPacket = 8
    private enum Flags {
        static let start: UInt8 = 0x01
        static let end: UInt8 = 0x02
        static let canceled: UInt8 = 0x04
    }
    let burstID: Data
    let seq: UInt16
    let kind: Kind
    init?(burstID: Data, seq: UInt16, kind: Kind) {
        guard burstID.count == Self.burstIDSize else { return nil }
        if case .frames(let frames) = kind {
            guard !frames.isEmpty,
                  frames.count <= Self.maxFramesPerPacket,
                  frames.allSatisfy({ !$0.isEmpty && $0.count <= Int(UInt16.max) })
            else { return nil }
        }
        self.burstID = burstID
        self.seq = seq
        self.kind = kind
    }
    func encode() -> Data {
        var data = Data(capacity: Self.headerSize + payloadSize)
        data.append(burstID)
        data.append(UInt8((seq >> 8) & 0xFF))
        data.append(UInt8(seq & 0xFF))
        switch kind {
        case .start(let codec):
            data.append(Flags.start)
            data.append(codec.rawValue)
        case .frames(let frames):
            data.append(0)
            for frame in frames {
                let length = UInt16(frame.count)
                data.append(UInt8((length >> 8) & 0xFF))
                data.append(UInt8(length & 0xFF))
                data.append(frame)
            }
        case .end(let totalDataPackets, let durationMs):
            data.append(Flags.end)
            data.append(UInt8((totalDataPackets >> 8) & 0xFF))
            data.append(UInt8(totalDataPackets & 0xFF))
            for shift in stride(from: 24, through: 0, by: -8) {
                data.append(UInt8((durationMs >> UInt32(shift)) & 0xFF))
            }
        case .canceled:
            data.append(Flags.canceled)
        }
        return data
    }
    static func decode(_ data: Data) -> VoiceBurstPacket? {
        // Work on a re-based copy so subscripting is offset-safe.
        let data = Data(data)
        guard data.count >= headerSize else { return nil }
        let burstID = data.prefix(burstIDSize)
        let seq = (UInt16(data[burstIDSize]) << 8) | UInt16(data[burstIDSize + 1])
        let flags = data[burstIDSize + 2]
        let payload = data.dropFirst(headerSize)
        let kind: Kind
        switch flags {
        case Flags.start:
            guard let codecByte = payload.first,
                  let codec = VoiceBurstCodec(rawValue: codecByte)
            else { return nil }
            kind = .start(codec: codec)
        case Flags.end:
            guard payload.count >= 6 else { return nil }
            let bytes = Array(payload)
            let total = (UInt16(bytes[0]) << 8) | UInt16(bytes[1])
            let duration = bytes[2...5].reduce(UInt32(0)) { ($0 << 8) | UInt32($1) }
            kind = .end(totalDataPackets: total, durationMs: duration)
        case Flags.canceled:
            kind = .canceled
        case 0:
            var frames: [Data] = []
            var offset = payload.startIndex
            while offset < payload.endIndex {
                guard payload.distance(from: offset, to: payload.endIndex) >= 2 else { return nil }
                let length = (Int(payload[offset]) << 8) | Int(payload[payload.index(after: offset)])
                offset = payload.index(offset, offsetBy: 2)
                guard length > 0,
                      payload.distance(from: offset, to: payload.endIndex) >= length,
                      frames.count < maxFramesPerPacket
                else { return nil }
                let end = payload.index(offset, offsetBy: length)
                frames.append(Data(payload[offset..<end]))
                offset = end
            }
            guard !frames.isEmpty else { return nil }
            kind = .frames(frames)
        default:
            return nil
        }
        return VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: Data(burstID), seq: seq, kind: kind)
    }
    static func makeBurstID() -> Data {
        var bytes = Data(count: burstIDSize)
        let result = bytes.withUnsafeMutableBytes {
            SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, burstIDSize, $0.baseAddress!)
        }
        guard result == errSecSuccess else {
            return Data((0..<burstIDSize).map { _ in UInt8.random(in: .min ... .max) })
        }
        return bytes
    }
    private var payloadSize: Int {
        switch kind {
        case .start: return 1
        case .frames(let frames): return frames.reduce(0) { $0 + 2 + $1.count }
        case .end: return 6
        case .canceled: return 0
        }
    }
 }
 /// Greedy packetizer for outgoing bursts: batches encoded frames into
 /// `VoiceBurstPacket`s without exceeding the byte budget that keeps each
 /// packet in a single BLE frame after Noise encryption and padding.
 /// Not thread-safe — confine to one queue.
 struct VoiceBurstPacketizer {
    let burstID: Data
    private let budget: Int
    private var pendingFrames: [Data] = []
    private var pendingSize = 0
    /// seq 0 is reserved for START; data packets start at 1.
    private(set) var nextSeq: UInt16 = 1
    private(set) var dataPacketCount: UInt16 = 0
    init(burstID: Data, budget: Int = TransportConfig.pttMaxBurstContentBytes) {
        self.burstID = burstID
        self.budget = budget
    }
    /// Adds one encoded frame, returning any packets that became full.
    /// Frames larger than the budget are dropped (the encoder's ~130-byte
    /// frames never hit this; it guards against misconfiguration looping).
    mutating func add(_ frame: Data) -> [Data] {
        let frameCost = 2 + frame.count
        guard VoiceBurstPacket.burstIDSize + 3 + frameCost <= budget else { return [] }
        var packets: [Data] = []
        if !pendingFrames.isEmpty,
           VoiceBurstPacket.burstIDSize + 3 + pendingSize + frameCost > budget
            || pendingFrames.count >= VoiceBurstPacket.maxFramesPerPacket {
            packets.append(contentsOf: flush())
        }
        pendingFrames.append(frame)
        pendingSize += frameCost
        return packets
    }
    /// Emits any buffered frames as a final data packet.
    mutating func flush() -> [Data] {
        guard !pendingFrames.isEmpty,
              let packet = VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: nextSeq, kind: .frames(pendingFrames))
        else {
            pendingFrames = []
            pendingSize = 0
            return []
        }
        pendingFrames = []
        pendingSize = 0
        nextSeq &+= 1
        dataPacketCount &+= 1
        return [packet.encode()]
    }
 }
@@ -11,13 +11,6 @@ import Foundation
 /// Manages autocomplete functionality for chat
 final class AutocompleteService {
    private let mentionRegex = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "@([\\p{L}0-9_]*)$", options: [])
    private let commandRegex = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "^/([a-z]*)$", options: [])
    private let commands = [
        "/msg", "/who", "/clear",
        "/hug", "/slap", "/fav", "/unfav",
        "/block", "/unblock"
    ]
    /// Get autocomplete suggestions for current text
    func getSuggestions(for text: String, peers: [String], cursorPosition: Int) -> (suggestions: [String], range: NSRange?) {
@@ -73,26 +66,6 @@ final class AutocompleteService {
        return suggestions.isEmpty ? nil : (Array(suggestions), fullRange)
    }
    private func getCommandSuggestions(_ text: String) -> ([String], NSRange)? {
        guard let regex = commandRegex else { return nil }
        let nsText = text as NSString
        let matches = regex.matches(in: text, options: [], range: NSRange(location: 0, length: nsText.length))
        guard let match = matches.last else { return nil }
        let fullRange = match.range(at: 0)
        let captureRange = match.range(at: 1)
        let prefix = nsText.substring(with: captureRange).lowercased()
        let suggestions = commands
            .filter { $0.hasPrefix("/\(prefix)") }
            .sorted()
            .prefix(5)
        return suggestions.isEmpty ? nil : (Array(suggestions), fullRange)
    }
    private func needsArgument(command: String) -> Bool {
        switch command {
        case "/who", "/clear":
@@ -14,22 +14,39 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
    let messageTTL: UInt8
    /// Current time source.
    let now: () -> Date
-    /// Noise public key already recorded for the peer, if any (registry read).
+    /// Noise and signing public keys already recorded for the peer, if any
-    let existingNoisePublicKey: (PeerID) -> Data?
+    /// (single registry read so both come from one consistent snapshot).
    let existingPeerKeys: (PeerID) -> (noisePublicKey: Data?, signingPublicKey: Data?)
    /// Signing key from the persisted cryptographic identity for the peer, if
    /// any. Registry pins do not survive app restarts or offline-peer
    /// eviction; this fallback keeps the TOFU signing-key pin effective for
    /// returning peers.
    let persistedSigningPublicKey: (PeerID) -> Data?
    /// Ed25519 key previously bound to this Noise identity by an authenticated
    /// peer-state payload, if any (persistent identity-state read).
    let authenticatedSigningPublicKey: (_ noisePublicKey: Data) -> Data?
    /// Verifies the packet signature against the announced signing key.
    let verifySignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool
    /// Direct link state for the peer (BLE-queue read).
    let linkState: (PeerID) -> (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool)
    /// Whether the link this packet arrived on is already bound to a
    /// different peer ID (ingress-registry + BLE-queue read). Directness
    /// rides on the unsigned TTL, so a replayed announce can look "direct"
    /// on the replayer's link; that link must not shortcut an absent peer
    /// into "connected".
    let linkBoundToOtherPeer: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool
    /// Runs the registry mutation phase under the collections barrier.
    let withRegistryBarrier: (() -> Void) -> Void
    /// Upserts the verified announce into the peer registry.
    /// Returns `nil` when the registry refuses the announce because it carries
    /// a signing key different from the one already pinned for this peer.
    /// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
    let upsertVerifiedAnnounce: (
        _ peerID: PeerID,
        _ announcement: AnnouncementPacket,
        _ isConnected: Bool,
        _ now: Date
-    ) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate
+    ) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate?
    /// Debounced reconnect-log decision.
    /// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
    let shouldEmitReconnectLog: (_ peerID: PeerID, _ now: Date) -> Bool
@@ -109,7 +126,16 @@ final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
        // Suppress announce logs to reduce noise
        // Precompute signature verification outside barrier to reduce contention
-        let existingNoisePublicKey = env.existingNoisePublicKey(peerID)
+        var existingPeerKeys = env.existingPeerKeys(peerID)
        if existingPeerKeys.signingPublicKey == nil {
            // The registry entry (and its signing-key pin) is dropped on app
            // restart and offline-peer eviction, but the persisted
            // cryptographic identity survives both. Fall back to it so a
            // returning peer is not treated as first contact — otherwise an
            // attacker could replay the peer's noiseKey/peerID with their own
            // signing key and re-pin the identity (TOFU downgrade).
            existingPeerKeys.signingPublicKey = env.persistedSigningPublicKey(peerID)
        }
        let hasSignature = packet.signature != nil
        let signatureValid: Bool
        if hasSignature {
@@ -123,18 +149,49 @@ final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
        let trustDecision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
            hasSignature: hasSignature,
            signatureValid: signatureValid,
-            existingNoisePublicKey: existingNoisePublicKey,
+            existingNoisePublicKey: existingPeerKeys.noisePublicKey,
-            announcedNoisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey
+            announcedNoisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
            existingSigningPublicKey: existingPeerKeys.signingPublicKey,
            authenticatedSigningPublicKey: env.authenticatedSigningPublicKey(
                announcement.noisePublicKey
            ),
            announcedSigningPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey
        )
        if case .reject(.keyMismatch) = trustDecision {
            SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce key mismatch for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — keeping unverified", category: .security)
        }
-        let verifiedAnnounce = trustDecision.isVerified
+        if case .reject(.signingKeyMismatch) = trustDecision {
            SecureLogger.warning("🚨 Announce signing-key mismatch for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — refusing to replace pinned signing key (possible impersonation attempt)", category: .security)
        }
        if case .reject(.authenticatedSigningKeyMismatch) = trustDecision {
            SecureLogger.warning(
                "⚠️ Announce signing-key replacement rejected for Noise-authenticated peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…",
                category: .security
            )
        }
        var verifiedAnnounce = trustDecision.isVerified
        var isNewPeer = false
        var isReconnectedPeer = false
        let directLinkState = env.linkState(peerID)
        let isDirectAnnounce = packet.ttl == env.messageTTL
        // A "direct" announce arriving on a link that another peer already
        // owns is either a rotation heal or a replay with its TTL restored;
        // both are ambiguous, so only the rebind (which containment-checks
        // the claimed identity) may promote it — never this shortcut.
        //
        // Known limitation: denying the shortcut cannot prevent forged
        // presence outright. A rebind that passes the containment checks
        // promotes the claimed peer to connected — it must, or a legitimate
        // rotation on an open link would read as disconnected — so a replay
        // that wins the rebind (absent victim, cooldown clear) still forges
        // presence. That residue is presence display only: DMs stay gated on
        // canDeliverSecurely (no Noise session means retain + courier, see
        // MessageRouter.sendPrivate). What this check buys: the ambiguous
        // announce alone never flips presence — forging requires winning the
        // containment-checked rebind (never steals an identity that owns a
        // live link; at most one rebind per link per cooldown window).
        let linkBoundToOtherPeer = isDirectAnnounce && env.linkBoundToOtherPeer(packet, peerID)
        env.withRegistryBarrier {
            let hasPeripheralConnection = directLinkState.hasPeripheral
@@ -149,12 +206,22 @@ final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
                return
            }
-            let update = env.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
+            // The registry re-checks the signing-key pin inside the barrier.
            // The pre-barrier trust check reads the registry outside the
            // barrier, so this closes the race where two announces for the
            // same peer are evaluated concurrently.
            guard let update = env.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
                peerID,
                announcement,
-                isDirectAnnounce || hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription,
+                hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription || (isDirectAnnounce && !linkBoundToOtherPeer),
                now
-            )
+            ) else {
                SecureLogger.warning("🚨 Registry refused announce for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — signing key differs from pinned key", category: .security)
                verifiedAnnounce = false
                isNewPeer = false
                isReconnectedPeer = false
                return
            }
            isNewPeer = update.isNewPeer
            isReconnectedPeer = update.wasDisconnected
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ enum BLEAnnounceTrustRejection: Equatable {
    case missingSignature
    case invalidSignature
    case keyMismatch
    case signingKeyMismatch
    case authenticatedSigningKeyMismatch
 }
 enum BLEAnnounceTrustDecision: Equatable {
@@ -72,12 +74,34 @@ enum BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy {
        hasSignature: Bool,
        signatureValid: Bool,
        existingNoisePublicKey: Data?,
-        announcedNoisePublicKey: Data
+        announcedNoisePublicKey: Data,
        existingSigningPublicKey: Data? = nil,
        authenticatedSigningPublicKey: Data? = nil,
        announcedSigningPublicKey: Data
    ) -> BLEAnnounceTrustDecision {
        if let existingNoisePublicKey, existingNoisePublicKey != announcedNoisePublicKey {
            return .reject(.keyMismatch)
        }
        // Strongest binding first: an Ed25519 key bound to this Noise identity
        // inside an authenticated Noise session can never be replaced by a
        // merely self-signed announce.
        if let authenticatedSigningPublicKey,
           announcedSigningPublicKey != authenticatedSigningPublicKey {
            return .reject(.authenticatedSigningKeyMismatch)
        }
        // TOFU signing-key pinning. The packet signature only proves the
        // announce is self-consistent — it is verified against the Ed25519 key
        // carried *inside the same announce*. Since peerIDs derive from the
        // broadcast (public) noise key, an attacker can replay a victim's
        // peerID+noiseKey with their own signing key and a valid
        // self-signature. Once we have bound a signing key to this peer,
        // refuse to silently replace it.
        if let existingSigningPublicKey, existingSigningPublicKey != announcedSigningPublicKey {
            return .reject(.signingKeyMismatch)
        }
        guard hasSignature else {
            return .reject(.missingSignature)
        }
@@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
 import Foundation
-struct BLEAnnounceThrottle {
+/// Thread-safe announce admission state.
 ///
 /// Announce requests originate from the Bluetooth delegate queue, the
 /// concurrent message queue, and the maintenance timer. Keeping the timestamp
 /// behind a lock makes admission and maintenance snapshots atomic when those
 /// request sources race.
 final class BLEAnnounceThrottle: @unchecked Sendable {
    private let lock = NSLock()
    private var lastSent: Date
    private let normalMinimumInterval: TimeInterval
    private let forcedMinimumInterval: TimeInterval
@@ -16,16 +23,18 @@ struct BLEAnnounceThrottle {
    }
    func elapsed(since now: Date) -> TimeInterval {
-        now.timeIntervalSince(lastSent)
+        lock.withLock { now.timeIntervalSince(lastSent) }
    }
-    mutating func shouldSend(force: Bool, now: Date) -> Bool {
+    func shouldSend(force: Bool, now: Date) -> Bool {
-        let minimumInterval = force ? forcedMinimumInterval : normalMinimumInterval
+        lock.withLock {
-        guard elapsed(since: now) >= minimumInterval else {
+            let minimumInterval = force ? forcedMinimumInterval : normalMinimumInterval
-            return false
+            guard now.timeIntervalSince(lastSent) >= minimumInterval else {
-        }
+                return false
            }
-        lastSent = now
+            lastSent = now
-        return true
+            return true
        }
    }
 }
@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
        excludedLinks: Set<BLEIngressLinkID> = [],
        peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
        centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
        preferredPeripheralPerPeer: [PeerID: String] = [:],
        collapseDuplicatePeerLinks: Bool = true,
        directedPeerHint: PeerID?,
        requireDirectPeerLink: Bool = false,
        packetType: UInt8,
        messageID: String
    ) -> BLEFanoutSelection {
@@ -31,10 +34,14 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
               to: directedPeerHint,
               links: rawAllowed,
               peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
-               centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
+               centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings,
               preferredPeripheralPerPeer: preferredPeripheralPerPeer
           ) {
            return directedSelection
        }
        if directedPeerHint != nil, requireDirectPeerLink {
            return BLEFanoutSelection(peripheralIDs: [], centralIDs: [])
        }
        if let directedPeerHint,
           hasBoundLink(
               to: directedPeerHint,
@@ -46,11 +53,20 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
            return BLEFanoutSelection(peripheralIDs: [], centralIDs: [])
        }
-        let allowed = collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
+        // Direct announces are the packet that binds a link to its peer
-            rawAllowed,
+        // (BLEService's raw bind and verified rebind). Collapsing them per
-            peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
+        // peer starves duplicate same-peer links of the announce they need to
-            centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
+        // become bound — the duplicates then look "pre-announce" forever and
-        )
+        // every broadcast sprays down all of them. Announces are small and
        // throttled, so they go on every live link.
        let allowed = collapseDuplicatePeerLinks
            ? collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
                rawAllowed,
                peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
                centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings,
                preferredPeripheralPerPeer: preferredPeripheralPerPeer
            )
            : rawAllowed
        guard shouldSubset(packetType: packetType, directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint) else {
            return BLEFanoutSelection(
@@ -97,7 +113,8 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
        to peerID: PeerID,
        links: (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]),
        peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
-        centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID]
+        centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
        preferredPeripheralPerPeer: [PeerID: String]
    ) -> BLEFanoutSelection? {
        let directLinks = collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
            (
@@ -105,7 +122,8 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
                centralIDs: links.centralIDs.filter { centralPeerBindings[$0] == peerID }
            ),
            peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
-            centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
+            centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings,
            preferredPeripheralPerPeer: preferredPeripheralPerPeer
        )
        guard !directLinks.peripheralIDs.isEmpty || !directLinks.centralIDs.isEmpty else {
@@ -140,7 +158,8 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
    private static func collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
        _ links: (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]),
        peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
-        centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID]
+        centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
        preferredPeripheralPerPeer: [PeerID: String]
    ) -> (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]) {
        guard !peripheralPeerBindings.isEmpty || !centralPeerBindings.isEmpty else {
            return links
@@ -148,13 +167,30 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
        var seenPeers = Set<PeerID>()
        var keptPeripheralIDs: [String] = []
        // When a peer has several bound peripheral links (duplicate
        // connections after a restore), collapse onto its preferred one (the
        // most recently bound) instead of dictionary order — an arbitrary
        // pick could route a peer's single collapsed copy down a stale link.
        for id in links.peripheralIDs {
-            if let peer = peripheralPeerBindings[id], !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted {
+            guard let peer = peripheralPeerBindings[id],
-                continue
+                  preferredPeripheralPerPeer[peer] == id,
                  seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted else { continue }
            keptPeripheralIDs.append(id)
        }
        for id in links.peripheralIDs {
            if let peer = peripheralPeerBindings[id] {
                if preferredPeripheralPerPeer[peer] == id { continue }
                if !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted { continue }
            }
            keptPeripheralIDs.append(id)
        }
        // Known limitation: centrals collapse in subscription order (oldest
        // first) — there is no recency signal like the peripheral reverse
        // map. A central-only peer with duplicate subscriptions rides the
        // oldest one until the remote side (which owns those connections)
        // consolidates on its next verified announce (bounded by its
        // retirement cooldown).
        var keptCentralIDs: [String] = []
        for id in links.centralIDs {
            if let peer = centralPeerBindings[id], !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted {
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
		`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
							{"v1":{"usrs":["param-buf-arti_bootstrap_summary(_:_:)-s:3Tor22arti_bootstrap_summary33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSpys4Int8VG_AEtF","param-dataDir-arti_start(_:_:)-s:3Tor10arti_start33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSPys4Int8VG_s6UInt16VtF","param-len-arti_bootstrap_summary(_:_:)-s:3Tor22arti_bootstrap_summary33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSpys4Int8VG_AEtF","param-socksPort-arti_start(_:_:)-s:3Tor10arti_start33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSPys4Int8VG_s6UInt16VtF","s:13BitFoundation16PeerCapabilitiesV8wifiBulkACvpZ","s:13BitFoundation18KeychainReadResultO18isRecoverableErrorSbvp","s:13BitFoundation23KeychainManagerProtocolP11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS12MockKeychainC11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC11resetCountsyyF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC25totalSecureClearCallCountSivp","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC26secureClearStringCallCountSivp","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC27_secureClearStringCallCount06_AB6D1M24FD239F2969C82F4108818260LLSivp","s:18bitchatTests_macOS24FailingCacheSaveKeychain33_22380C7A11A569A0B83FA83F34C498A7LLC11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS24MockGeohashPresenceTimer33_483587EFB96650EE130EFB09BBA2A1AALLC7handleryycvp","s:3Tor0A7ManagerC21goDormantOnBackgroundyyF","s:7bitchat10AppRuntimeC24handleScreenshotCaptured33_C8B369AD8BC1D9963A50CEDA77A4332ALLyyF","s:7bitchat10AppRuntimeC33handleDidBecomeActiveNotificationyyF","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC18logBluetoothStatus33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LLyySSF","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC20centralRestorationID33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LLSSvpZ","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC22captureBluetoothStatus33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LL7contextySS_tF","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC23peripheralRestorationID33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LLSSvpZ","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC29scheduleBluetoothStatusSample33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LL5after7contextySd_SStF","s:7bitchat10QRScanViewV8isActiveSbvp","s:7bitchat15BLEPeerRegistryV5countSivp","s:7bitchat15KeychainManagerC11secureClearyySSzF","s:7bitchat15PaymentChipViewV7openURL33_10AC50641B1EBCD52E5092A2E521D236LL7SwiftUI13OpenURLActionVvp","s:7bitchat15TransportConfigO29uiBatchDispatchStaggerSecondsSdvpZ","s:7bitchat15TransportConfigO35uiShareExtensionDismissDelaySecondsSdvpZ","s:7bitchat15TransportConfigO38bleBackgroundPendingConnectSlotReserveSivpZ","s:7bitchat17GossipSyncManagerC10persistNowyyF","s:7bitchat17NostrRelayManagerC15InboundEventKey33_E4160FE8A9A2C9D6308EAAD5A8B5CB07LLV7eventIDSSvp","s:7bitchat25LocationNotesDependenciesV3now10Foundation4DateVycvp","s:7bitchat25NWPathReachabilityMonitorC7monitor33_84633C9DBCAF57538179C1E04DB8E015LL7Network0bD0CSgvp"]}}