Merge branch 'main' into chore/perf-privacy-polish

The unpinned setup-swift action installs Swift 6.1, which refuses the
SDK on runner images that have rolled to Xcode 26.5 ("this SDK is not
supported by the compiler"). Jobs passed or failed depending on which
image they landed on. The Xcode-bundled toolchain always matches the
image's SDK, and matches local development. Cache keys now include the
toolchain version so artifacts from one compiler are never restored
into builds with another.

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.cache/clang/ModuleCache/Swift-207X6UTF85MUY.swiftmodule

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
----
-path:            '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/swift/macosx/prebuilt-modules/26.0/Swift.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftmodule'
-dependencies:
-  - mtime:           1757258659000000000
-    path:            '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/swift/macosx/prebuilt-modules/26.0/Swift.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftmodule'
-    size:            14166264
-  - mtime:           1754189697000000000
-    path:            'usr/lib/swift/Swift.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftinterface'
-    size:            2261306
-    sdk_relative:    true
-version:         1
-...

.cache/clang/ModuleCache/SwiftOnoneSupport-3W234PQLRG1JJ.swiftmodule

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
----
-path:            '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/swift/macosx/prebuilt-modules/26.0/SwiftOnoneSupport.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftmodule'
-dependencies:
-  - mtime:           1757258662000000000
-    path:            '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/swift/macosx/prebuilt-modules/26.0/SwiftOnoneSupport.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftmodule'
-    size:            18068
-  - mtime:           1754189697000000000
-    path:            'usr/lib/swift/Swift.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftinterface'
-    size:            2261306
-    sdk_relative:    true
-  - mtime:           1754191141000000000
-    path:            'usr/lib/swift/SwiftOnoneSupport.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftinterface'
-    size:            1224
-    sdk_relative:    true
-version:         1
-...

.cache/clang/ModuleCache/_Concurrency-IW47C06QYY26.swiftmodule

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
----
-path:            '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/swift/macosx/prebuilt-modules/26.0/_Concurrency.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftmodule'
-dependencies:
-  - mtime:           1757258669000000000
-    path:            '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/swift/macosx/prebuilt-modules/26.0/_Concurrency.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftmodule'
-    size:            699544
-  - mtime:           1754189697000000000
-    path:            'usr/lib/swift/Swift.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftinterface'
-    size:            2261306
-    sdk_relative:    true
-  - mtime:           1754192470000000000
-    path:            'usr/lib/swift/_Concurrency.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftinterface'
-    size:            364219
-    sdk_relative:    true
-version:         1
-...

.cache/clang/ModuleCache/_StringProcessing-1C2ZFCSIKDXY1.swiftmodule

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
----
-path:            '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/swift/macosx/prebuilt-modules/26.0/_StringProcessing.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftmodule'
-dependencies:
-  - mtime:           1757258664000000000
-    path:            '/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/swift/macosx/prebuilt-modules/26.0/_StringProcessing.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftmodule'
-    size:            83568
-  - mtime:           1754189697000000000
-    path:            'usr/lib/swift/Swift.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftinterface'
-    size:            2261306
-    sdk_relative:    true
-  - mtime:           1754192532000000000
-    path:            'usr/lib/swift/_StringProcessing.swiftmodule/arm64e-apple-macos.swiftinterface'
-    size:            24507
-    sdk_relative:    true
-version:         1
-...

.github/workflows/arti-provenance.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+name: Arti Binary Provenance
+
+# The Arti xcframework is a vendored binary; these checks turn the policy in
+# docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md into an enforced gate:
+#  1. The checked-in binary must match the hash manifest in the provenance doc.
+#  2. A PR that changes the binary must also change at least one provenance
+#     input (Rust source, lockfile, build script, or the doc itself).
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - main
+    paths:
+      - "localPackages/Arti/**"
+      - "docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md"
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "localPackages/Arti/**"
+      - "docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md"
+
+jobs:
+  verify-hashes:
+    name: Verify xcframework hashes against provenance doc
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout code
+        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+
+      - name: Compare artifact hashes with manifest
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          doc="docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md"
+
+          # Extract the manifest: lines of "<sha256>  <path>" from the doc.
+          grep -E '^[0-9a-f]{64}  localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti\.xcframework/' "$doc" \
+            | sort -k2 > expected.txt
+
+          if [ ! -s expected.txt ]; then
+            echo "::error::No hash manifest found in $doc"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          # Hash the same file set the doc documents.
+          find localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti.xcframework -maxdepth 3 -type f -print0 \
+            | sort -z | xargs -0 sha256sum | sed 's/  \.\//  /' | sort -k2 > actual.txt
+
+          if ! diff -u expected.txt actual.txt; then
+            echo "::error::Checked-in arti.xcframework does not match the manifest in $doc. If the binary change is intentional, rebuild per the doc and update the manifest in the same PR."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "All $(wc -l < actual.txt) artifact hashes match the provenance manifest."
+
+  require-provenance-evidence:
+    name: Binary changes must ship with provenance inputs
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout code
+        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Check changed files
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          base="origin/${{ github.base_ref }}"
+          git fetch --no-tags --depth=1 origin "${{ github.base_ref }}"
+          changed=$(git diff --name-only "$base"...HEAD)
+          echo "Changed files:"
+          echo "$changed"
+
+          if ! echo "$changed" | grep -q '^localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti\.xcframework/'; then
+            echo "No binary artifact changes; nothing to verify."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+
+          if echo "$changed" | grep -Eq '^(localPackages/Arti/(Cargo\.(toml|lock)|build-ios\.sh|arti-bitchat/)|docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE\.md)'; then
+            echo "Binary change is accompanied by provenance inputs."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+
+          echo "::error::arti.xcframework changed without matching source, lockfile, build-script, or provenance-doc changes. See docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md (\"Do not accept an xcframework-only update\")."
+          exit 1

.github/workflows/fetch_georelays.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ on:
 
 permissions:
   contents: write
+  pull-requests: write
 
 jobs:
   update-relay-data:
@@ -17,10 +18,11 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          fetch-depth: 0
 
       - name: Fetch GeoRelays
         run: |
-          wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv
+          wget -q https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv
           mv nostr_relays.csv ./relays/online_relays_gps.csv
 
       - name: Check for changes

.github/workflows/swift-tests.yml

@@ -5,23 +5,143 @@ on:
     branches:
       - main
   pull_request:
-    branches:
-      - main
 
 jobs:
   test:
-    name: Run Swift Tests
+    name: Run Swift Tests (${{ matrix.name }})
     runs-on: macos-latest
+    # A hung test must fail fast, not hold a runner for GitHub's 360-minute
+    # default (observed: intermittent app-suite hangs starving the queue).
+    timeout-minutes: 15
+
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false # Don't cancel other matrix jobs when one fails
+      matrix:
+        include:
+          - name: app
+            path: .
+          - name: BitLogger
+            path: localPackages/BitLogger
+          - name: BitFoundation
+            path: localPackages/BitFoundation
 
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@v5
 
-      - name: Set up Swift
+      # Use the Xcode-bundled Swift toolchain: it always matches the SDK on
-        uses: swift-actions/setup-swift@v2
+      # the runner image. A standalone swift.org toolchain (setup-swift) broke
+      # whenever the image's Xcode moved ahead of it ("this SDK is not
+      # supported by the compiler").
+      - name: Note toolchain version (cache key)
+        id: swift-version
+        run: echo "version=$(swift --version 2>/dev/null | head -1 | shasum | cut -c1-12)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
-      - name: Build the package
+      - name: Cache build artifacts
-        run: swift build
+        uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: ${{ matrix.path }}/.build
+          key: ${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.swift-version.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.name }}-${{ hashFiles(format('{0}/**/*.swift', matrix.path), format('{0}/**/Package.resolved', matrix.path)) }}
+          restore-keys: |
+            ${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.swift-version.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.name }}-${{ hashFiles(format('{0}/**/Package.resolved', matrix.path)) }}
+            ${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.swift-version.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.name }}-
+
+      - name: Build tests
+        # Built separately so the hang watchdog below times only test
+        # execution: a cold-cache coverage build on a slow runner can
+        # legitimately take several minutes, and is already bounded by the
+        # 15-minute job timeout.
+        run: swift build --build-tests --enable-code-coverage --package-path ${{ matrix.path }}
 
       - name: Run Tests
-        run: swift test --parallel
+        # Perf benchmarks are excluded here and run in their own serial step
+        # below: measuring while parallel test processes contend for cores
+        # produces noisy numbers, and the XCTest measure machinery has hung
+        # intermittently under parallel workers on loaded runners. Excluded
+        # via --skip (not just the env guard): every app run since the
+        # baselines landed timed out at the 15-minute job limit with the
+        # baseline tests dispatched into the parallel phase.
+        #
+        # The watchdog samples any still-running test processes after 5
+        # minutes (the suite passes in seconds when healthy; the build is
+        # done by this step) and kills the run, so a hang fails fast with
+        # stacks in the log instead of a silent timeout.
+        env:
+          BITCHAT_SKIP_PERF_BASELINES: "1"
+        run: |
+          swift test --skip-build --parallel --quiet --enable-code-coverage \
+            --skip PerformanceBaselineTests \
+            --package-path ${{ matrix.path }} &
+          test_pid=$!
+          (
+            sleep 300
+            if kill -0 "$test_pid" 2>/dev/null; then
+              echo "::group::Tests still running after 5 minutes — sampling before kill"
+              for pid in $(pgrep -if 'swiftpm-testing|xctest|PackageTests' || true); do
+                echo "--- sample of pid $pid ---"
+                sample "$pid" 5 2>/dev/null || true
+              done
+              echo "::endgroup::"
+              pkill -KILL -P "$test_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+              kill -KILL "$test_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+            fi
+          ) &
+          watchdog_pid=$!
+          wait "$test_pid" && status=0 || status=$?
+          kill "$watchdog_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+          exit "$status"
+
+      # Benchmarks run serially on an otherwise idle runner for stable
+      # numbers; BITCHAT_PERF_LOG captures the PERF[...] lines for the gate.
+      - name: Run performance benchmarks (serial)
+        if: matrix.name == 'app'
+        timeout-minutes: 6
+        env:
+          BITCHAT_PERF_LOG: ${{ github.workspace }}/perf-output.log
+        run: swift test --quiet --filter PerformanceBaselineTests
+
+      # Order-of-magnitude performance regression gate. Floors are deliberately
+      # generous (see bitchatTests/Performance/perf-floors.json) so this
+      # catches algorithmic regressions, never runner variance.
+      - name: Performance floor gate
+        if: matrix.name == 'app'
+        run: ./scripts/check-perf-floors.sh perf-output.log
+
+      # Informational only: surfaces per-file and total line coverage in the
+      # job log so coverage trends are visible on every PR. No thresholds —
+      # this must never be the reason a build goes red.
+      - name: Coverage summary
+        run: |
+          BIN_PATH=$(swift build --show-bin-path --package-path ${{ matrix.path }})
+          PROF="$BIN_PATH/codecov/default.profdata"
+          XCTEST=$(find "$BIN_PATH" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.xctest' | head -1)
+          BINARY="$XCTEST/Contents/MacOS/$(basename "$XCTEST" .xctest)"
+          if [ -f "$PROF" ] && [ -f "$BINARY" ]; then
+            xcrun llvm-cov report "$BINARY" -instr-profile "$PROF" \
+              -ignore-filename-regex='(Tests|\.build|checkouts|Mocks|_PreviewHelpers)' || true
+          else
+            echo "No coverage data found; skipping summary."
+          fi
+
+  # SPM tests above only compile the macOS slice; this job covers the
+  # iOS-conditional code paths (UIKit, CoreBluetooth restoration, etc.).
+  ios-build:
+    name: Build iOS app (simulator)
+    runs-on: macos-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 15
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout code
+        uses: actions/checkout@v5
+
+      - name: Build iOS (simulator, no signing)
+        # arm64 only: the vendored arti.xcframework has no x86_64 simulator slice.
+        run: |
+          set -o pipefail
+          xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj \
+            -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \
+            -sdk iphonesimulator \
+            -destination 'generic/platform=iOS Simulator' \
+            ARCHS=arm64 \
+            CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
+            build

.gitignore

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
 plans/
 
 ## AI
-CLAUDE.md
 AGENTS.md
+.claude/
 
 ## compatibility with Xcode 8 and earlier (ignoring not required starting Xcode 9)
 *.xcscmblueprint
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ __pycache__/
 *.tmp
 *.temp
 
+## Cache
+.cache/
+
 # Local build results
 .Result*/
 .Result*.xcresult/

.swiftlint.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# SwiftLint configuration for BitChat.
+#
+# Intentionally pragmatic: rules that would flood the existing codebase are
+# disabled so the lint signal stays actionable; re-enable them individually as
+# files get cleaned up. Not wired into CI yet — run locally with `swiftlint`
+# from the repo root.
+
+included:
+  - bitchat
+  - bitchatTests
+  - localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources
+  - localPackages/BitFoundation/Tests
+  - localPackages/BitLogger/Sources
+
+excluded:
+  - .build
+  - localPackages/Arti
+  - localPackages/BitFoundation/.build
+  - localPackages/BitLogger/.build
+
+disabled_rules:
+  # Style/volume rules that currently produce noise across the codebase.
+  - line_length
+  - identifier_name
+  - type_name
+  - type_body_length
+  - cyclomatic_complexity
+  - function_parameter_count
+  - large_tuple
+  - nesting
+  - todo
+  - trailing_comma
+  - opening_brace
+  - statement_position
+  - for_where
+  - redundant_string_enum_value
+  - non_optional_string_data_conversion
+  # Common in tests (force casts/tries on fixtures).
+  - force_cast
+  - force_try
+
+file_length:
+  warning: 600
+  # BLEService.swift is currently ~3,500 lines; the error threshold sits above
+  # today's maximum so the codebase passes as-is and only future growth of the
+  # largest files trips it.
+  error: 4000
+
+function_body_length:
+  warning: 100
+  error: 200

CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# CLAUDE.md
+
+This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
+
+## Build & Test Commands
+
+```bash
+# Build macOS (no signing)
+xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build
+
+# Build iOS for simulator
+xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" -sdk iphonesimulator -destination 'platform=iOS Simulator,name=iPhone 15' build
+
+# Run all tests (iOS simulator)
+xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme bitchat -sdk iphonesimulator -destination 'platform=iOS Simulator,name=iPhone 15' test
+
+# Run tests via Swift Package Manager (used in CI)
+swift build && swift test --parallel
+
+# Clean build
+xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" clean
+
+# Quick dev build and run (macOS only, requires `just`)
+just run
+```
+
+### Running Specific Tests
+
+```bash
+# Run a single test class
+xcodebuild test -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme bitchat -sdk iphonesimulator -destination 'platform=iOS Simulator,name=iPhone 15' -only-testing:bitchatTests/IntegrationTests
+
+# Run a single test method
+xcodebuild test -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme bitchat -sdk iphonesimulator -destination 'platform=iOS Simulator,name=iPhone 15' -only-testing:bitchatTests/NoiseProtocolTests/testHandshake
+```
+
+## Architecture Overview
+
+BitChat is a **dual-transport P2P messaging app**: Bluetooth mesh for offline local communication, Nostr protocol for internet-based global messaging.
+
+### Local Packages (`localPackages/`)
+
+- **BitFoundation**: Shared foundation types — `BinaryProtocol` (compact binary packet format for BLE), `BitchatPacket`, `BitchatMessage`, `PeerID`, hex/SHA256/compression utilities. Has its own test suite under `localPackages/BitFoundation/Tests` (run `swift test` inside the package).
+- **BitLogger**: `SecureLogger` logging.
+- **Arti**: Tor integration (exposes the `Tor` product).
+
+### Transport Layer
+
+- **BLEService** (`bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift`): Core Bluetooth LE mesh networking - peer discovery, connection management, multi-hop relay (max 7 hops), packet fragmentation. The BLE directory contains ~40 focused collaborators (handlers, policies, buffers): `BLEReceivePipeline` dispatches inbound packets to `BLEAnnounceHandler` / `BLENoisePacketHandler` / `BLEPublicMessageHandler` / `BLEFragmentHandler` etc.; outbound planning lives in the `BLEOutbound*` types; peer state in `BLEPeerRegistry`.
+- **NostrTransport** (`bitchat/Services/NostrTransport.swift`): Internet transport via Nostr relays with NIP-17 encryption
+- **Transport protocol** (`bitchat/Services/Transport.swift`): Common interface both transports implement
+
+### Encryption Layer
+
+- **NoiseProtocol** (`bitchat/Noise/`): Noise XX pattern for end-to-end encryption with forward secrecy
+  - `NoiseEncryptionService`: Main encryption/decryption API
+  - `NoiseSessionManager`: Thread-safe per-peer session management
+  - `NoiseSession`: Individual peer session state (handshake, send/receive ciphers)
+- **NostrProtocol** (`bitchat/Nostr/NostrProtocol.swift`): NIP-17 gift-wrapped encryption for Nostr messages
+
+### Protocol Layer
+
+- **BinaryProtocol** (`localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/BinaryProtocol.swift`): Compact binary packet format for BLE (lives in BitFoundation, not `bitchat/Protocols/`)
+- **BitchatProtocol** (`bitchat/Protocols/BitchatProtocol.swift`): Message types and packet structures
+- **LocationChannel/Geohash** (`bitchat/Protocols/`): Geographic channel routing
+
+### Application Layer
+
+- **AppRuntime** (`bitchat/App/AppRuntime.swift`): Composition root. Owns `ChatViewModel`, `ConversationStore`, the feature models (`PublicChatModel`, `PeerListModel`, `LocationPresenceStore`, `PeerIdentityStore`, ...), and the app event stream.
+- **ConversationStore** (`bitchat/App/ConversationStore.swift`): Single-writer, single source of truth for conversation message state and selection (see `docs/CONVERSATION-STORE-DESIGN.md`). Feature models and `ChatViewModel` observe it and mutate it through its intent API.
+- **ChatViewModel** (`bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift`, ~1,600 lines): Central coordinator that wires and delegates to ~25 focused coordinator/pipeline types in `bitchat/ViewModels/`, e.g.:
+  - `ChatPrivateConversationCoordinator` / `ChatPublicConversationCoordinator`: DM and public chat flows
+  - `ChatNostrCoordinator` → `GeohashSubscriptionManager`, `NostrInboundPipeline`, `GeoPresenceTracker`, `GeoChannelCoordinator`: Nostr/geohash channel logic
+  - `ChatOutgoingCoordinator`, `ChatDeliveryCoordinator`, `PublicMessagePipeline`: send paths and delivery tracking
+  - `ChatMediaTransferCoordinator`, `ChatMediaPreparation`: media transfers
+  - `ChatLifecycleCoordinator`, `ChatTransportEventCoordinator`, `ChatPeerListCoordinator`, `ChatPeerIdentityCoordinator`, `ChatVerificationCoordinator`: lifecycle, transport events, peer state
+  - `bitchat/ViewModels/Extensions/` (`ChatViewModel+Nostr/+PrivateChat/+Tor`): thin delegation shims kept for call-site stability; the real logic lives in the coordinators
+- **MessageRouter** (`bitchat/Services/MessageRouter.swift`): Intelligent transport selection (BLE → Nostr fallback)
+- **PrivateChatManager** (`bitchat/Services/PrivateChatManager.swift`): DM session management
+
+## Test Infrastructure
+
+Tests use an **in-memory networking harness** for deterministic, race-free testing:
+
+- **MockBLEService** (`bitchatTests/Mocks/MockBLEService.swift`): Simulated BLE mesh with configurable topology
+  - `MockBLEService.resetTestBus()` - Clear state in setUp()
+  - `simulateConnectedPeer(_:)` / `simulateDisconnectedPeer(_:)` - Configure topology
+  - `autoFloodEnabled` - Enable broadcast flooding for Integration tests only
+
+- **Test categories**:
+  - `bitchatTests/EndToEnd/`: Full message flow tests with explicit routing
+  - `bitchatTests/Integration/`: Multi-node topology tests with auto-flooding
+  - Unit tests: Individual component tests
+
+## Key Patterns
+
+- **Threading**: Use `@MainActor` for UI, `Task { @MainActor in ... }` for main thread dispatch
+- **Delegation**: `BitchatDelegate`, `TransportPeerEventsDelegate` for event propagation
+- **Session recovery**: On decrypt failure, clear local session and re-initiate Noise handshake (no NACK)
+
+## Device Setup
+
+To run on physical devices:
+1. Copy `Configs/Local.xcconfig.example` to `Configs/Local.xcconfig`
+2. Add your Developer Team ID to `Local.xcconfig`
+3. Replace `group.chat.bitchat` with `group.<your_bundle_id>` in entitlements

Configs/Release.xcconfig

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-MARKETING_VERSION = 1.4.4
+MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.3
 CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION = 1
 
 IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = 16.0
@@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = L3N5LHJD5Y
 CODE_SIGN_STYLE = Automatic
 
 PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = chat.bitchat
+APP_GROUP_ID = group.chat.bitchat

Justfile

@@ -14,8 +14,11 @@ default:
 # Check prerequisites
 check:
     @echo "Checking prerequisites..."
-    @command -v xcodebuild >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ Xcode not found. Install Xcode from App Store" && exit 1)
+    @command -v xcodebuild >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ xcodebuild not found. Install Xcode from App Store" && exit 1)
-    @security find-identity -v -p codesigning | grep -q "Developer ID" || (echo "⚠️  No Developer ID found - code signing may fail" && exit 0)
+    @xcode-select -p | grep -q "Xcode.app" || (echo "❌ Full Xcode required, not just command line tools. Install from App Store and run:\n   sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer" && exit 1)
+    @test -d "/Applications/Xcode.app" || (echo "❌ Xcode.app not found in Applications folder. Install from App Store" && exit 1)
+    @xcodebuild -version >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ Xcode not properly configured. Try:\n   sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer" && exit 1)
+    @security find-identity -v -p codesigning | grep -q "Apple Development\|Developer ID" || (echo "⚠️  No Developer ID found - code signing may fail" && exit 0)
     @echo "✅ All prerequisites met"
 
 # Backup original files
@@ -44,7 +47,7 @@ patch-for-macos: backup
 # Build the macOS app
 build: #check generate
     @echo "Building BitChat for macOS..."
-    @xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat_macOS" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS="" build
+    @xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS="" build
 
 # Run the macOS app
 run: build

PRIVACY_POLICY.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # bitchat Privacy Policy
 
-*Last updated: January 2025*
+*Last updated: June 2026*
 
 ## Our Commitment
 
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ bitchat is designed with privacy as its foundation. We believe private communica
 ## Summary
 
 - **No personal data collection** - We don't collect names, emails, or phone numbers
-- **No servers** - Everything happens on your device and through peer-to-peer connections
+- **No accounts or company servers** - Mesh chat works peer-to-peer; optional Nostr features use public or user-selected relays
 - **No tracking** - We have no analytics, telemetry, or user tracking
 - **Open source** - You can verify these claims by reading our code
 
@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ bitchat is designed with privacy as its foundation. We believe private communica
 
 ### On Your Device Only
 
-1. **Identity Key** 
+1. **Identity Keys**
-   - A cryptographic key generated on first launch
+   - Cryptographic private keys generated on first launch or when optional Nostr identities are created
    - Stored locally in your device's secure storage
    - Allows you to maintain "favorite" relationships across app restarts
-   - Never leaves your device
+   - Private keys never leave your device; public keys are shared when needed for messaging
 
 2. **Nickname**
    - The display name you choose (or auto-generated)
@@ -38,12 +38,19 @@ bitchat is designed with privacy as its foundation. We believe private communica
    - Stored only on your device
    - Allows you to recognize these peers in future sessions
 
+5. **Optional Location Channel State**
+   - Your selected geohash channel, bookmarked geohashes, teleport flags, and bookmark display names
+   - Stored locally on your device so the location-channel UI can restore your choices
+   - Per-geohash Nostr identities are derived locally from a device seed stored in secure storage
+   - Exact latitude and longitude are not persisted by bitchat
+
 ### Temporary Session Data
 
 During each session, bitchat temporarily maintains:
 - Active peer connections (forgotten when app closes)
 - Routing information for message delivery
 - Cached messages for offline peers (12 hours max)
+- Your current location while optional location channels are enabled, used locally to compute geohash channels and friendly place names
 
 ## What Information is Shared
 
@@ -62,13 +69,21 @@ When you join a password-protected room:
 - Your nickname appears in the member list
 - Room owners can see you've joined
 
+### With Nostr Relays (Optional Features)
+
+If you enable Nostr-backed features:
+- Private fallback messages to mutual favorites are sent as encrypted NIP-17 gift wraps. Relays can see event metadata, but not message content.
+- Public location-channel messages, location notes, and presence are scoped with geohash tags. Relays and other participants can see the geohash tag, event kind, timestamp, and public key used for that geohash.
+- Exact GPS coordinates are not included in Nostr events by bitchat. The geohash precision you choose can still reveal an approximate area, from region-level to building-level.
+- Automatic presence heartbeats are limited to low-precision geohashes (region, province, and city). More precise geohash posts happen only when you use those channels or location notes.
+
 ## What We DON'T Do
 
 bitchat **never**:
 - Collects personal information
-- Tracks your location
+- Sells or shares your exact GPS location
-- Stores data on servers
+- Stores data on servers we operate
-- Shares data with third parties
+- Sells your data to advertisers or data brokers
 - Uses analytics or telemetry
 - Creates user profiles
 - Requires registration
@@ -84,19 +99,27 @@ All private messages use end-to-end encryption:
 ## Your Rights
 
 You have complete control:
-- **Delete Everything**: Triple-tap the logo to instantly wipe all data
+- **Delete Local State**: Triple-tap the logo to instantly wipe local keys, sessions, caches, and preferences
-- **Leave Anytime**: Close the app and your presence disappears
+- **Leave Anytime**: Close the app and local presence stops; relay-backed presence ages out
-- **No Account**: Nothing to delete from servers because there are none
+- **No Account**: No account record exists for you to delete from us
-- **Portability**: Your data never leaves your device unless you export it
+- **Portability**: Your local state stays on your device unless you send messages, use optional relay-backed features, or export it
 
 ## Bluetooth & Permissions
 
 bitchat requires Bluetooth permission to function:
 - Used only for peer-to-peer communication
-- No location data is accessed or stored
 - Bluetooth is not used for tracking
 - You can revoke this permission at any time in system settings
 
+## Location Permission
+
+Location permission is optional and is used only for location channels:
+- Used to compute local geohash channels and display names
+- Requested as when-in-use permission
+- Exact coordinates are not shared in messages or stored by bitchat
+- Selected and bookmarked geohashes may persist locally until you remove them, use panic wipe, or delete the app
+- You can revoke this permission at any time in system settings
+
 ## Children's Privacy
 
 bitchat does not knowingly collect information from children. The app has no age verification because it collects no personal information from anyone.
@@ -106,12 +129,15 @@ bitchat does not knowingly collect information from children. The app has no age
 - **Messages**: Deleted from memory when app closes (unless room retention is enabled)
 - **Identity Key**: Persists until you delete the app
 - **Favorites**: Persist until you remove them or delete the app
+- **Location channel choices**: Selected/bookmarked geohashes persist locally until removed, panic-wiped, or the app is deleted
+- **Nostr relay data**: Public geohash events and encrypted gift wraps may be retained by relays according to each relay's policy
 - **Everything Else**: Exists only during active sessions
 
 ## Security Measures
 
 - All communication is encrypted
-- No data transmitted to servers (there are none)
+- No accounts or company servers
+- Optional Nostr relays receive only the events needed for Nostr-backed private fallback or public location channels
 - Open source code for public audit
 - Regular security updates
 - Cryptographic signatures prevent tampering
@@ -121,7 +147,7 @@ bitchat does not knowingly collect information from children. The app has no age
 If we update this policy:
 - The "Last updated" date will change
 - The updated policy will be included in the app
-- No retroactive changes can affect data (since we don't collect any)
+- No retroactive changes can make us collect data already held only in your app
 
 ## Contact
 
@@ -132,7 +158,7 @@ bitchat is an open source project. For privacy questions:
 
 ## Philosophy
 
-Privacy isn't just a feature—it's the entire point. bitchat proves that modern communication doesn't require surrendering your privacy. No accounts, no servers, no surveillance. Just people talking freely.
+Privacy isn't just a feature—it's the entire point. bitchat proves that modern communication doesn't require surrendering your privacy. No accounts, no company servers, no analytics. Just people talking freely.
 
 ---
 

Package.swift

@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ let package = Package(
         ),
     ],
     dependencies:[
-        .package(path: "localPackages/Tor"),
+        .package(path: "localPackages/Arti"),
+        .package(path: "localPackages/BitFoundation"),
         .package(path: "localPackages/BitLogger"),
         .package(url: "https://github.com/21-DOT-DEV/swift-secp256k1", exact: "0.21.1")
     ],
@@ -25,16 +26,19 @@ let package = Package(
             name: "bitchat",
             dependencies: [
                 .product(name: "P256K", package: "swift-secp256k1"),
+                .product(name: "BitFoundation", package: "BitFoundation"),
                 .product(name: "BitLogger", package: "BitLogger"),
-                .product(name: "Tor", package: "Tor")
+                .product(name: "Tor", package: "Arti")
             ],
             path: "bitchat",
             exclude: [
                 "Info.plist",
                 "Assets.xcassets",
+                "_PreviewHelpers/PreviewAssets.xcassets",
                 "bitchat.entitlements",
                 "bitchat-macOS.entitlements",
-                "LaunchScreen.storyboard"
+                "LaunchScreen.storyboard",
+                "ViewModels/Extensions/README.md"
             ],
             resources: [
                 .process("Localizable.xcstrings")
@@ -42,14 +46,24 @@ let package = Package(
         ),
         .testTarget(
             name: "bitchatTests",
-            dependencies: ["bitchat"],
+            dependencies: [
+                "bitchat",
+                .product(name: "BitFoundation", package: "BitFoundation")
+            ],
             path: "bitchatTests",
             exclude: [
                 "Info.plist",
-                "README.md"
+                "README.md",
+                // CI perf gate data (read by scripts/check-perf-floors.sh),
+                // not a test resource.
+                "Performance/perf-floors.json"
             ],
             resources: [
-                .process("Localization")
+                .process("Localization"),
+                // Only the vector fixture: declaring the whole "Noise"
+                // directory would claim its .swift test files as resources
+                // and silently drop them from compilation.
+                .process("Noise/NoiseTestVectors.json")
             ]
         )
     ]

README.md

@@ -8,9 +8,6 @@ A decentralized peer-to-peer messaging app with dual transport architecture: loc
 
 📲 [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/bitchat-mesh/id6748219622)
 
-> [!WARNING]
-> Private messages have not received external security review and may contain vulnerabilities. Do not use for sensitive use cases, and do not rely on its security until it has been reviewed. Now uses the [Noise Protocol](https://www.noiseprotocol.org) for identity and encryption. Public local chat (the main feature) has no security concerns.
-
 ## License
 
 This project is released into the public domain. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.

bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj

@@ -10,11 +10,12 @@
 		17901751FD8010AFC8E750F2 /* bitchatShareExtension.appex in Embed Foundation Extensions */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = 61F92EBA29C47C0FCC482F1F /* bitchatShareExtension.appex */; settings = {ATTRIBUTES = (RemoveHeadersOnCopy, ); }; };
 		3EE336D150427F736F32B56C /* P256K in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = B1D9136AA0083366353BFA2F /* P256K */; };
 		885BBED78092484A5B069461 /* P256K in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = 4EB6BA1B8464F1EA38F4E286 /* P256K */; };
+		A6BCF9482F80953E001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6BCF9472F80953E001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation */; };
+		A6BCF94A2F809550001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6BCF9492F809550001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation */; };
 		A6E3E5702E77036A0032EA8A /* BitLogger in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3E56F2E77036A0032EA8A /* BitLogger */; };
 		A6E3E5722E7703760032EA8A /* BitLogger in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3E5712E7703760032EA8A /* BitLogger */; };
 		A6E3EA7F2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3EA7E2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor */; };
 		A6E3EA812E7706A80032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3EA802E7706A80032EA8A /* Tor */; };
-		A6F183FD2E948783006A9046 /* tor-nolzma.xcframework in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = A6F183FC2E948783006A9046 /* tor-nolzma.xcframework */; };
 		E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678D /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678A /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv */; };
 		E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678E /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678A /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv */; };
 /* End PBXBuildFile section */
@@ -95,6 +96,24 @@
 			);
 			target = 57CA17A36A2532A6CFF367BB /* bitchatShareExtension */;
 		};
+		C5E027A52ECCDFD700BD6012 /* Exceptions for "bitchatTests" folder in "bitchatTests_macOS" target */ = {
+			isa = PBXFileSystemSynchronizedBuildFileExceptionSet;
+			membershipExceptions = (
+				Info.plist,
+				Localization/PrimaryLocalizationKeys.json,
+				README.md,
+			);
+			target = 47FF23248747DD7CB666CB91 /* bitchatTests_macOS */;
+		};
+		C5E027A82ECCDFE200BD6012 /* Exceptions for "bitchatTests" folder in "bitchatTests_iOS" target */ = {
+			isa = PBXFileSystemSynchronizedBuildFileExceptionSet;
+			membershipExceptions = (
+				Info.plist,
+				Localization/PrimaryLocalizationKeys.json,
+				README.md,
+			);
+			target = 6CB97DF2EA57234CB3E563B8 /* bitchatTests_iOS */;
+		};
 /* End PBXFileSystemSynchronizedBuildFileExceptionSet section */
 
 /* Begin PBXFileSystemSynchronizedRootGroup section */
@@ -118,6 +137,10 @@
 		};
 		A6E32D412E762EAE0032EA8A /* bitchatTests */ = {
 			isa = PBXFileSystemSynchronizedRootGroup;
+			exceptions = (
+				C5E027A82ECCDFE200BD6012 /* Exceptions for "bitchatTests" folder in "bitchatTests_iOS" target */,
+				C5E027A52ECCDFD700BD6012 /* Exceptions for "bitchatTests" folder in "bitchatTests_macOS" target */,
+			);
 			path = bitchatTests;
 			sourceTree = "<group>";
 		};
@@ -135,15 +158,16 @@
 				A6E3E5722E7703760032EA8A /* BitLogger in Frameworks */,
 				3EE336D150427F736F32B56C /* P256K in Frameworks */,
 				A6E3EA812E7706A80032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */,
+				A6BCF94A2F809550001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation in Frameworks */,
 			);
 		};
 		B5A5CC493FFB3D8966548140 /* Frameworks */ = {
 			isa = PBXFrameworksBuildPhase;
 			files = (
-				A6F183FD2E948783006A9046 /* tor-nolzma.xcframework in Frameworks */,
 				A6E3E5702E77036A0032EA8A /* BitLogger in Frameworks */,
 				885BBED78092484A5B069461 /* P256K in Frameworks */,
 				A6E3EA7F2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */,
+				A6BCF9482F80953E001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation in Frameworks */,
 			);
 		};
 /* End PBXFrameworksBuildPhase section */
@@ -203,6 +227,7 @@
 				B1D9136AA0083366353BFA2F /* P256K */,
 				A6E3E5712E7703760032EA8A /* BitLogger */,
 				A6E3EA802E7706A80032EA8A /* Tor */,
+				A6BCF9492F809550001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation */,
 			);
 			productName = bitchat_macOS;
 			productReference = 8F3A7C058C2C8E1A06C8CF8B /* bitchat.app */;
@@ -213,6 +238,7 @@
 			buildConfigurationList = 1C27B5BA3DB46DDF0DBFEF62 /* Build configuration list for PBXNativeTarget "bitchatTests_macOS" */;
 			buildPhases = (
 				5C22AA7B9ACC5A861445C769 /* Sources */,
+				C5E027A42ECCDFD700BD6012 /* Resources */,
 			);
 			buildRules = (
 			);
@@ -245,6 +271,7 @@
 			buildConfigurationList = 38C4AF6313E5037F25CEF30B /* Build configuration list for PBXNativeTarget "bitchatTests_iOS" */;
 			buildPhases = (
 				865C8403EF02C089369A9FCB /* Sources */,
+				C5E027A72ECCDFE200BD6012 /* Resources */,
 			);
 			buildRules = (
 			);
@@ -281,6 +308,7 @@
 				4EB6BA1B8464F1EA38F4E286 /* P256K */,
 				A6E3E56F2E77036A0032EA8A /* BitLogger */,
 				A6E3EA7E2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor */,
+				A6BCF9472F80953E001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation */,
 			);
 			productName = bitchat_iOS;
 			productReference = 96D0D41CA19EE5A772AA8434 /* bitchat.app */;
@@ -293,7 +321,7 @@
 			isa = PBXProject;
 			attributes = {
 				BuildIndependentTargetsInParallel = YES;
-				LastUpgradeCheck = 1640;
+				LastUpgradeCheck = 2650;
 			};
 			buildConfigurationList = 3EA424CBD51200895D361189 /* Build configuration list for PBXProject "bitchat" */;
 			developmentRegion = en;
@@ -312,6 +340,7 @@
 				ne,
 				"pt-BR",
 				ru,
+				tr,
 				uk,
 				"zh-Hans",
 			);
@@ -320,7 +349,8 @@
 			packageReferences = (
 				B8C407587481BBB190741C93 /* XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference "swift-secp256k1" */,
 				A6E3E56E2E77036A0032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/BitLogger" */,
-				A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Tor" */,
+				A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Arti" */,
+				A6BCF9462F80953E001CF9B9 /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/BitFoundation" */,
 			);
 			preferredProjectObjectVersion = 90;
 			projectDirPath = "";
@@ -342,6 +372,16 @@
 				E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678D /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */,
 			);
 		};
+		C5E027A42ECCDFD700BD6012 /* Resources */ = {
+			isa = PBXResourcesBuildPhase;
+			files = (
+			);
+		};
+		C5E027A72ECCDFE200BD6012 /* Resources */ = {
+			isa = PBXResourcesBuildPhase;
+			files = (
+			);
+		};
 		CD6E8F32BC38357473954F97 /* Resources */ = {
 			isa = PBXResourcesBuildPhase;
 			files = (
@@ -406,7 +446,6 @@
 				CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED = YES;
 				CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED = YES;
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchatTests/Info.plist;
 				IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "$(IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET)";
 				LD_RUNPATH_SEARCH_PATHS = (
@@ -431,7 +470,6 @@
 				CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED = YES;
 				CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED = YES;
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchatTests/Info.plist;
 				IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "$(IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET)";
 				LD_RUNPATH_SEARCH_PATHS = (
@@ -458,7 +496,6 @@
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
 				COMBINE_HIDPI_IMAGES = YES;
 				DEAD_CODE_STRIPPING = YES;
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchatTests/Info.plist;
 				LD_RUNPATH_SEARCH_PATHS = (
 					"$(inherited)",
@@ -483,7 +520,6 @@
 				CODE_SIGN_ALLOW_ENTITLEMENTS_MODIFICATION = YES;
 				CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS = bitchatShareExtension/bitchatShareExtension.entitlements;
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchatShareExtension/Info.plist;
 				INFOPLIST_KEY_CFBundleDisplayName = bitchat;
 				IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "$(IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET)";
@@ -515,7 +551,7 @@
 				CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED = YES;
 				CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS = bitchat/bitchat.entitlements;
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
+				DEVELOPMENT_ASSET_PATHS = bitchat/_PreviewHelpers;
 				ENABLE_PREVIEWS = NO;
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchat/Info.plist;
 				INFOPLIST_KEY_CFBundleDisplayName = bitchat;
@@ -525,7 +561,7 @@
 					"$(inherited)",
 					"@executable_path/Frameworks",
 				);
-				MARKETING_VERSION = "$(MARKETING_VERSION)";
+				MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.3;
 				PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = "$(PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER)";
 				PRODUCT_NAME = bitchat;
 				SDKROOT = iphoneos;
@@ -549,7 +585,6 @@
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
 				COMBINE_HIDPI_IMAGES = YES;
 				DEAD_CODE_STRIPPING = YES;
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchatTests/Info.plist;
 				LD_RUNPATH_SEARCH_PATHS = (
 					"$(inherited)",
@@ -575,7 +610,7 @@
 				CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED = YES;
 				CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS = bitchat/bitchat.entitlements;
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
+				DEVELOPMENT_ASSET_PATHS = bitchat/_PreviewHelpers;
 				ENABLE_PREVIEWS = YES;
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchat/Info.plist;
 				INFOPLIST_KEY_CFBundleDisplayName = bitchat;
@@ -585,7 +620,7 @@
 					"$(inherited)",
 					"@executable_path/Frameworks",
 				);
-				MARKETING_VERSION = "$(MARKETING_VERSION)";
+				MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.3;
 				PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = "$(PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER)";
 				PRODUCT_NAME = bitchat;
 				SDKROOT = iphoneos;
@@ -611,7 +646,6 @@
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
 				COMBINE_HIDPI_IMAGES = YES;
 				DEAD_CODE_STRIPPING = YES;
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				ENABLE_PREVIEWS = YES;
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchat/Info.plist;
 				INFOPLIST_KEY_CFBundleDisplayName = bitchat;
@@ -621,7 +655,7 @@
 					"@executable_path/../Frameworks",
 				);
 				MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "$(MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET)";
-				MARKETING_VERSION = "$(MARKETING_VERSION)";
+				MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.3;
 				PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = "$(PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER)";
 				PRODUCT_NAME = bitchat;
 				REGISTER_APP_GROUPS = YES;
@@ -634,6 +668,7 @@
 			isa = XCBuildConfiguration;
 			buildSettings = {
 				ALWAYS_SEARCH_USER_PATHS = NO;
+				CLANG_ANALYZER_LOCALIZABILITY_NONLOCALIZED = YES;
 				CLANG_ANALYZER_NONNULL = YES;
 				CLANG_ANALYZER_NUMBER_OBJECT_CONVERSION = YES_AGGRESSIVE;
 				CLANG_CXX_LANGUAGE_STANDARD = "gnu++14";
@@ -667,6 +702,7 @@
 				CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION = "$(CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION)";
 				DEAD_CODE_STRIPPING = YES;
 				DEBUG_INFORMATION_FORMAT = "dwarf-with-dsym";
+				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				ENABLE_NS_ASSERTIONS = NO;
 				ENABLE_STRICT_OBJC_MSGSEND = YES;
 				ENABLE_USER_SCRIPT_SANDBOXING = YES;
@@ -684,6 +720,7 @@
 				MTL_ENABLE_DEBUG_INFO = NO;
 				MTL_FAST_MATH = YES;
 				PRODUCT_NAME = "$(TARGET_NAME)";
+				STRING_CATALOG_GENERATE_SYMBOLS = NO;
 				SWIFT_COMPILATION_MODE = wholemodule;
 				SWIFT_OPTIMIZATION_LEVEL = "-O";
 				SWIFT_VERSION = "$(SWIFT_VERSION)";
@@ -703,7 +740,6 @@
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
 				COMBINE_HIDPI_IMAGES = YES;
 				DEAD_CODE_STRIPPING = YES;
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				ENABLE_PREVIEWS = NO;
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchat/Info.plist;
 				INFOPLIST_KEY_CFBundleDisplayName = bitchat;
@@ -713,7 +749,7 @@
 					"@executable_path/../Frameworks",
 				);
 				MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "$(MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET)";
-				MARKETING_VERSION = "$(MARKETING_VERSION)";
+				MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.3;
 				PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = "$(PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER)";
 				PRODUCT_NAME = bitchat;
 				REGISTER_APP_GROUPS = YES;
@@ -726,6 +762,7 @@
 			isa = XCBuildConfiguration;
 			buildSettings = {
 				ALWAYS_SEARCH_USER_PATHS = NO;
+				CLANG_ANALYZER_LOCALIZABILITY_NONLOCALIZED = YES;
 				CLANG_ANALYZER_NONNULL = YES;
 				CLANG_ANALYZER_NUMBER_OBJECT_CONVERSION = YES_AGGRESSIVE;
 				CLANG_CXX_LANGUAGE_STANDARD = "gnu++14";
@@ -759,6 +796,7 @@
 				CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION = "$(CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION)";
 				DEAD_CODE_STRIPPING = YES;
 				DEBUG_INFORMATION_FORMAT = dwarf;
+				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				ENABLE_STRICT_OBJC_MSGSEND = YES;
 				ENABLE_TESTABILITY = YES;
 				ENABLE_USER_SCRIPT_SANDBOXING = YES;
@@ -783,6 +821,7 @@
 				MTL_FAST_MATH = YES;
 				ONLY_ACTIVE_ARCH = YES;
 				PRODUCT_NAME = "$(TARGET_NAME)";
+				STRING_CATALOG_GENERATE_SYMBOLS = NO;
 				SWIFT_ACTIVE_COMPILATION_CONDITIONS = DEBUG;
 				SWIFT_OPTIMIZATION_LEVEL = "-Onone";
 				SWIFT_VERSION = "$(SWIFT_VERSION)";
@@ -799,7 +838,6 @@
 				CODE_SIGN_ALLOW_ENTITLEMENTS_MODIFICATION = YES;
 				CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS = bitchatShareExtension/bitchatShareExtension.entitlements;
 				CODE_SIGN_STYLE = "$(CODE_SIGN_STYLE)";
-				DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = "$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)";
 				INFOPLIST_FILE = bitchatShareExtension/Info.plist;
 				INFOPLIST_KEY_CFBundleDisplayName = bitchat;
 				IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = "$(IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET)";
@@ -874,13 +912,17 @@
 /* End XCConfigurationList section */
 
 /* Begin XCLocalSwiftPackageReference section */
+		A6BCF9462F80953E001CF9B9 /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/BitFoundation" */ = {
+			isa = XCLocalSwiftPackageReference;
+			relativePath = localPackages/BitFoundation;
+		};
 		A6E3E56E2E77036A0032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/BitLogger" */ = {
 			isa = XCLocalSwiftPackageReference;
 			relativePath = localPackages/BitLogger;
 		};
-		A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Tor" */ = {
+		A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Arti" */ = {
 			isa = XCLocalSwiftPackageReference;
-			relativePath = localPackages/Tor;
+			relativePath = localPackages/Arti;
 		};
 /* End XCLocalSwiftPackageReference section */
 
@@ -889,8 +931,8 @@
 			isa = XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference;
 			repositoryURL = "https://github.com/21-DOT-DEV/swift-secp256k1";
 			requirement = {
-				kind = upToNextMajorVersion;
+				kind = exactVersion;
-				minimumVersion = 0.21.1;
+				version = 0.21.1;
 			};
 		};
 /* End XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference section */
@@ -901,6 +943,15 @@
 			package = B8C407587481BBB190741C93 /* XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference "swift-secp256k1" */;
 			productName = P256K;
 		};
+		A6BCF9472F80953E001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation */ = {
+			isa = XCSwiftPackageProductDependency;
+			productName = BitFoundation;
+		};
+		A6BCF9492F809550001CF9B9 /* BitFoundation */ = {
+			isa = XCSwiftPackageProductDependency;
+			package = A6BCF9462F80953E001CF9B9 /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/BitFoundation" */;
+			productName = BitFoundation;
+		};
 		A6E3E56F2E77036A0032EA8A /* BitLogger */ = {
 			isa = XCSwiftPackageProductDependency;
 			productName = BitLogger;

bitchat.xcodeproj/xcshareddata/xcschemes/bitchat (iOS).xcscheme

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <Scheme
-   LastUpgradeVersion = "1640"
+   LastUpgradeVersion = "2650"
    version = "1.3">
    <BuildAction
       parallelizeBuildables = "YES"
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@
       </BuildableProductRunnable>
       <EnvironmentVariables>
          <EnvironmentVariable
-            key = "-DBITCHAT_DEV_ALLOW_CLEARNET"
+            key = "BITCHAT_LOG_LEVEL"
-            value = ""
+            value = "debug"
             isEnabled = "YES">
          </EnvironmentVariable>
       </EnvironmentVariables>

bitchat.xcodeproj/xcshareddata/xcschemes/bitchat (macOS).xcscheme

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <Scheme
-   LastUpgradeVersion = "1640"
+   LastUpgradeVersion = "2650"
    version = "1.3">
    <BuildAction
       parallelizeBuildables = "YES"

bitchat/App/AppArchitecture.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import Foundation
+
+enum SharedContentKind: String, Sendable, Equatable {
+    case text
+    case url
+}
+
+enum RuntimeScenePhase: String, Sendable, Equatable {
+    case active
+    case inactive
+    case background
+}
+
+enum TorLifecycleEvent: String, Sendable, Equatable {
+    case willStart
+    case willRestart
+    case didBecomeReady
+    case preferenceChanged
+}
+
+enum AppEvent: Sendable, Equatable {
+    case launched
+    case startupCompleted
+    case scenePhaseChanged(RuntimeScenePhase)
+    case openedURL(String)
+    case sharedContentAccepted(SharedContentKind)
+    case notificationOpened(peerID: PeerID?)
+    case deepLinkOpened(String)
+    case torLifecycleChanged(TorLifecycleEvent)
+    case nostrRelayConnectionChanged(Bool)
+    case terminationRequested
+}
+
+actor AppEventStream {
+    private var continuations: [UUID: AsyncStream<AppEvent>.Continuation] = [:]
+
+    func stream() -> AsyncStream<AppEvent> {
+        let id = UUID()
+        return AsyncStream { continuation in
+            continuations[id] = continuation
+            continuation.onTermination = { [id] _ in
+                Task {
+                    await self.removeContinuation(id)
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    func emit(_ event: AppEvent) {
+        for continuation in continuations.values {
+            continuation.yield(event)
+        }
+    }
+
+    func finish() {
+        for continuation in continuations.values {
+            continuation.finish()
+        }
+        continuations.removeAll()
+    }
+
+    private func removeContinuation(_ id: UUID) {
+        continuations.removeValue(forKey: id)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Identity key for a direct conversation. Equality and hashing use the
+/// canonical `id` only; `routingPeerID` carries the transport-level peer ID
+/// the conversation is keyed under (see `ConversationID.directPeer`).
+struct PeerHandle: Sendable, Identifiable {
+    let id: String
+    let routingPeerID: PeerID
+}
+
+extension PeerHandle: Equatable {
+    static func == (lhs: PeerHandle, rhs: PeerHandle) -> Bool {
+        lhs.id == rhs.id
+    }
+}
+
+extension PeerHandle: Hashable {
+    func hash(into hasher: inout Hasher) {
+        hasher.combine(id)
+    }
+}
+
+enum ConversationID: Hashable, Sendable {
+    case mesh
+    case geohash(String)
+    case direct(PeerHandle)
+
+    init(channelID: ChannelID) {
+        switch channelID {
+        case .mesh:
+            self = .mesh
+        case .location(let channel):
+            self = .geohash(channel.geohash.lowercased())
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/AppChromeModel.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import CoreBluetooth
+import Foundation
+
+@MainActor
+final class AppChromeModel: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var hasUnreadPrivateMessages = false
+    @Published var nickname: String
+    @Published var showingFingerprintFor: PeerID?
+    @Published var isAppInfoPresented = false
+    @Published var isLocationChannelsSheetPresented = false
+    @Published var showBluetoothAlert = false
+    @Published var bluetoothAlertMessage = ""
+    @Published var bluetoothState: CBManagerState = .unknown
+    @Published var showScreenshotPrivacyWarning = false
+
+    private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
+    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+
+    init(chatViewModel: ChatViewModel, privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel) {
+        self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
+        self.nickname = chatViewModel.nickname
+
+        bind(privateInboxModel: privateInboxModel)
+    }
+
+    var shouldSuppressScreenshotNotification: Bool {
+        isLocationChannelsSheetPresented || isAppInfoPresented
+    }
+
+    func setNickname(_ nickname: String) {
+        self.nickname = nickname
+        if chatViewModel.nickname != nickname {
+            chatViewModel.nickname = nickname
+        }
+    }
+
+    func validateAndSaveNickname() {
+        chatViewModel.validateAndSaveNickname()
+        if nickname != chatViewModel.nickname {
+            nickname = chatViewModel.nickname
+        }
+    }
+
+    func openMostRelevantPrivateChat() {
+        chatViewModel.openMostRelevantPrivateChat()
+    }
+
+    func showFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) {
+        showingFingerprintFor = peerID
+    }
+
+    func clearFingerprint() {
+        showingFingerprintFor = nil
+    }
+
+    func presentAppInfo() {
+        isAppInfoPresented = true
+    }
+
+    func triggerScreenshotPrivacyWarning() {
+        showScreenshotPrivacyWarning = true
+    }
+
+    func panicClearAllData() {
+        chatViewModel.panicClearAllData()
+    }
+
+    private func bind(privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel) {
+        privateInboxModel.$unreadPeerIDs
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] unreadPeerIDs in
+                self?.hasUnreadPrivateMessages = !unreadPeerIDs.isEmpty
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        chatViewModel.$nickname
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] nickname in
+                guard let self, self.nickname != nickname else { return }
+                self.nickname = nickname
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        chatViewModel.$showBluetoothAlert
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$showBluetoothAlert)
+
+        chatViewModel.$bluetoothAlertMessage
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$bluetoothAlertMessage)
+
+        chatViewModel.$bluetoothState
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$bluetoothState)
+
+        hasUnreadPrivateMessages = !privateInboxModel.unreadPeerIDs.isEmpty
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/AppRuntime.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import Foundation
+import SwiftUI
+import Tor
+import UserNotifications
+#if os(iOS)
+import UIKit
+#elseif os(macOS)
+import AppKit
+#endif
+
+@MainActor
+final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
+    let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
+    let events = AppEventStream()
+    /// Single source of truth for conversation message state and selection
+    /// (docs/CONVERSATION-STORE-DESIGN.md). Owned here; the feature models
+    /// and `ChatViewModel` observe and mutate it through its intent API.
+    let conversations: ConversationStore
+    let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
+    let locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore
+    let publicChatModel: PublicChatModel
+    let privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel
+    let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel
+    let verificationModel: VerificationModel
+    let conversationUIModel: ConversationUIModel
+    let locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel
+    let peerListModel: PeerListModel
+    let appChromeModel: AppChromeModel
+
+    private let idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge
+    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+    private var started = false
+    private var lastNostrRelayConnectedState = false
+    private var didHandleInitialNostrConnection = false
+
+    #if os(iOS)
+    private var didHandleInitialActive = false
+    private var didEnterBackground = false
+    #endif
+
+    init(
+        keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager(),
+        idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge = NostrIdentityBridge()
+    ) {
+        self.idBridge = idBridge
+        let conversations = ConversationStore()
+        let peerIdentityStore = PeerIdentityStore()
+        let locationPresenceStore = LocationPresenceStore()
+        let locationManager = LocationChannelManager.shared
+        self.conversations = conversations
+        self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore
+        self.locationPresenceStore = locationPresenceStore
+        self.chatViewModel = ChatViewModel(
+            keychain: keychain,
+            idBridge: idBridge,
+            identityManager: SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain),
+            conversations: conversations,
+            peerIdentityStore: peerIdentityStore,
+            locationPresenceStore: locationPresenceStore,
+            locationManager: locationManager
+        )
+        self.publicChatModel = PublicChatModel(conversations: conversations)
+        self.privateInboxModel = PrivateInboxModel(conversations: conversations)
+        self.locationChannelsModel = LocationChannelsModel(manager: locationManager)
+        self.privateConversationModel = PrivateConversationModel(
+            chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
+            conversations: conversations,
+            locationChannelsModel: self.locationChannelsModel,
+            peerIdentityStore: peerIdentityStore
+        )
+        self.verificationModel = VerificationModel(
+            chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
+            privateConversationModel: self.privateConversationModel,
+            peerIdentityStore: peerIdentityStore
+        )
+        self.conversationUIModel = ConversationUIModel(
+            chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
+            privateConversationModel: self.privateConversationModel,
+            conversations: conversations
+        )
+        self.peerListModel = PeerListModel(
+            chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
+            conversations: conversations,
+            locationChannelsModel: self.locationChannelsModel,
+            peerIdentityStore: peerIdentityStore,
+            locationPresenceStore: locationPresenceStore
+        )
+        self.appChromeModel = AppChromeModel(
+            chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
+            privateInboxModel: self.privateInboxModel
+        )
+
+        GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded()
+        bindRuntimeObservers()
+        NotificationDelegate.shared.runtime = self
+    }
+
+    func start() {
+        guard !started else {
+            checkForSharedContent()
+            return
+        }
+
+        started = true
+        NotificationDelegate.shared.runtime = self
+        VerificationService.shared.configure(with: chatViewModel.meshService)
+        announceInitialTorStatusIfNeeded()
+
+        Task(priority: .utility) { [weak self] in
+            guard let self else { return }
+            let nickname = await MainActor.run { self.chatViewModel.nickname }
+            let npub = await MainActor.run {
+                try? self.idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity()?.npub
+            }
+            await MainActor.run {
+                _ = VerificationService.shared.buildMyQRString(nickname: nickname, npub: npub)
+            }
+        }
+
+        NetworkActivationService.shared.start()
+        GeohashPresenceService.shared.start()
+        checkForSharedContent()
+
+        record(.launched)
+        record(.startupCompleted)
+    }
+
+    func handleOpenURL(_ url: URL) {
+        record(.openedURL(url.absoluteString))
+
+        if url.scheme == "bitchat", url.host == "share" {
+            checkForSharedContent()
+        }
+    }
+
+    func handleDidBecomeActiveNotification() {
+        chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
+        checkForSharedContent()
+    }
+
+    #if os(macOS)
+    func handleMacDidBecomeActiveNotification() {
+        record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active))
+        chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
+        checkForSharedContent()
+    }
+    #endif
+
+    #if os(iOS)
+    func handleScenePhaseChange(_ newPhase: ScenePhase) {
+        switch newPhase {
+        case .background:
+            record(.scenePhaseChanged(.background))
+            TorManager.shared.setAppForeground(false)
+            TorManager.shared.goDormantOnBackground()
+            chatViewModel.endGeohashSampling()
+            NostrRelayManager.shared.disconnect()
+            didEnterBackground = true
+
+        case .active:
+            record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active))
+            chatViewModel.meshService.startServices()
+            TorManager.shared.setAppForeground(true)
+            let shouldRefreshNostrConnections = didHandleInitialActive && didEnterBackground
+
+            if didHandleInitialActive && didEnterBackground {
+                if TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() && !TorManager.shared.isReady {
+                    TorManager.shared.ensureRunningOnForeground()
+                }
+            } else {
+                didHandleInitialActive = true
+            }
+
+            didEnterBackground = false
+
+            if shouldRefreshNostrConnections && TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() {
+                Task.detached {
+                    let _ = await TorManager.shared.awaitReady(timeout: 60)
+                    await MainActor.run {
+                        TorURLSession.shared.rebuild()
+                        NostrRelayManager.shared.resetAllConnections()
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
+            checkForSharedContent()
+
+        case .inactive:
+            record(.scenePhaseChanged(.inactive))
+
+        @unknown default:
+            break
+        }
+    }
+    #endif
+
+    func applicationWillTerminate() {
+        record(.terminationRequested)
+        chatViewModel.applicationWillTerminate()
+    }
+
+    func handleNotificationResponse(identifier: String, userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any]) {
+        if identifier.hasPrefix("private-"), let peerID = PeerID(str: userInfo["peerID"] as? String) {
+            record(.notificationOpened(peerID: peerID))
+            chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
+        }
+
+        if let deepLink = userInfo["deeplink"] as? String, let url = URL(string: deepLink) {
+            record(.deepLinkOpened(deepLink))
+            openExternalURL(url)
+        }
+    }
+
+    func presentationOptions(
+        forNotificationIdentifier identifier: String,
+        userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any]
+    ) async -> UNNotificationPresentationOptions {
+        if identifier.hasPrefix("private-"), let peerID = PeerID(str: userInfo["peerID"] as? String) {
+            if conversations.selectedPrivatePeerID == peerID {
+                return []
+            }
+            return [.banner, .sound]
+        }
+
+        if identifier.hasPrefix("geo-activity-"),
+           let deepLink = userInfo["deeplink"] as? String,
+           let geohash = deepLink.components(separatedBy: "/").last,
+           case .location(let channel) = locationChannelsModel.selectedChannel,
+           channel.geohash == geohash {
+            return []
+        }
+
+        return [.banner, .sound]
+    }
+}
+
+private extension AppRuntime {
+    func bindRuntimeObservers() {
+        NostrRelayManager.shared.$isConnected
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] isConnected in
+                self?.handleNostrRelayConnectionChanged(isConnected)
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillRestart)
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willRestart))
+                self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillRestart()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorDidBecomeReady)
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.didBecomeReady))
+                self?.chatViewModel.handleTorDidBecomeReady()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillStart)
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willStart))
+                self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillStart()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorUserPreferenceChanged)
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] notification in
+                self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.preferenceChanged))
+                self?.chatViewModel.handleTorPreferenceChanged(notification)
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        #if os(iOS)
+        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: UIApplication.userDidTakeScreenshotNotification)
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.handleScreenshotCaptured()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    func checkForSharedContent() {
+        guard let userDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: BitchatApp.groupID),
+              let sharedContent = userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContent"),
+              let sharedDate = userDefaults.object(forKey: "sharedContentDate") as? Date else {
+            return
+        }
+
+        guard Date().timeIntervalSince(sharedDate) < TransportConfig.uiShareAcceptWindowSeconds else {
+            return
+        }
+
+        let contentKind = SharedContentKind(rawValue: userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContentType") ?? "") ?? .text
+
+        userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContent")
+        userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentType")
+        userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentDate")
+
+        switch contentKind {
+        case .url:
+            if let data = sharedContent.data(using: .utf8),
+               let urlData = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: String],
+               let url = urlData["url"] {
+                chatViewModel.sendMessage(url)
+            } else {
+                chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
+            }
+        case .text:
+            chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
+        }
+
+        record(.sharedContentAccepted(contentKind))
+    }
+
+    func handleNostrRelayConnectionChanged(_ isConnected: Bool) {
+        record(.nostrRelayConnectionChanged(isConnected))
+
+        let becameConnected = isConnected && !lastNostrRelayConnectedState
+        lastNostrRelayConnectedState = isConnected
+
+        guard started, becameConnected else { return }
+
+        let isInitialConnection = !didHandleInitialNostrConnection
+        didHandleInitialNostrConnection = true
+
+        if !chatViewModel.nostrHandlersSetup {
+            chatViewModel.setupNostrMessageHandling()
+            chatViewModel.nostrHandlersSetup = true
+        }
+
+        guard !isInitialConnection else { return }
+
+        chatViewModel.resubscribeCurrentGeohash()
+        chatViewModel.geoChannelCoordinator?.refreshSampling()
+    }
+
+    func announceInitialTorStatusIfNeeded() {
+        if TorManager.shared.torEnforced &&
+            !chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced &&
+            TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() {
+            chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
+            chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
+                String(localized: "system.tor.starting", comment: "System message when Tor is starting")
+            )
+        } else if !TorManager.shared.torEnforced && !chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced {
+            chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
+            chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
+                String(localized: "system.tor.dev_bypass", comment: "System message when Tor bypass is enabled in development")
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
+    func handleScreenshotCaptured() {
+        if appChromeModel.isLocationChannelsSheetPresented {
+            appChromeModel.triggerScreenshotPrivacyWarning()
+            return
+        }
+
+        if appChromeModel.isAppInfoPresented {
+            return
+        }
+
+        chatViewModel.handleScreenshotCaptured()
+    }
+
+    func openExternalURL(_ url: URL) {
+        #if os(iOS)
+        UIApplication.shared.open(url)
+        #else
+        NSWorkspace.shared.open(url)
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    func record(_ event: AppEvent) {
+        Task {
+            await events.emit(event)
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/ConversationStore.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,918 @@
+//
+// ConversationStore.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// Single source of truth for conversation message state (see
+// docs/CONVERSATION-STORE-DESIGN.md). One `Conversation` object per
+// `ConversationID`; all mutations flow through the store's intent API and
+// every mutation emits a `ConversationChange` after state is consistent.
+//
+// The store also owns conversation selection: the active public channel and
+// the selected private peer (the two UI selection axes) plus the derived
+// `selectedConversationID`.
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import BitFoundation
+import BitLogger
+import Combine
+import Foundation
+
+// MARK: - Conversation
+
+/// A single conversation timeline (`.mesh`, `.geohash`, or `.direct`).
+///
+/// Publishing granularity is per conversation: views observe ONE
+/// `Conversation` object, so an append to chat A never invalidates observers
+/// of chat B.
+///
+/// Mutations are `fileprivate` by design — only `ConversationStore`'s intent
+/// API may mutate a conversation, keeping the store the sole writer.
+@MainActor
+final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
+    let id: ConversationID
+    /// Maximum retained messages; oldest are trimmed on overflow.
+    let cap: Int
+
+    @Published private(set) var messages: [BitchatMessage] = []
+    @Published private(set) var isUnread: Bool = false
+
+    /// Incrementally-maintained message-ID → index map for O(1) dedup and
+    /// delivery-status lookup. Kept in sync on every mutation:
+    /// - tail append: single insert
+    /// - out-of-order insert: suffix reindex from the insertion point
+    /// - trim: full rebuild — `removeFirst(k)` is already O(n), so the
+    ///   rebuild does not change the asymptotics, and trim only happens once
+    ///   the cap (1337) is reached. Simple and correct beats the
+    ///   offset-tracking alternative here.
+    private var indexByMessageID: [String: Int] = [:]
+
+    fileprivate init(id: ConversationID, cap: Int) {
+        self.id = id
+        self.cap = max(1, cap)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: Reads
+
+    func containsMessage(withID messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        indexByMessageID[messageID] != nil
+    }
+
+    func message(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
+        guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return nil }
+        return messages[index]
+    }
+
+    /// All message IDs currently in this conversation (unordered).
+    var messageIDs: Dictionary<String, Int>.Keys {
+        indexByMessageID.keys
+    }
+
+    // MARK: Store-internal mutations
+
+    /// Result of an ordered insert. `trimmedMessageIDs` reports messages
+    /// evicted by the cap so the store can keep its message-ID →
+    /// conversation map exact.
+    fileprivate struct InsertResult {
+        let inserted: Bool
+        let trimmedMessageIDs: [String]
+
+        static let duplicate = InsertResult(inserted: false, trimmedMessageIDs: [])
+    }
+
+    fileprivate enum UpsertOutcome {
+        case appended(trimmedMessageIDs: [String])
+        case updated
+    }
+
+    /// Inserts a message in timestamp order, deduplicating by message ID.
+    /// Fast path appends when the timestamp is >= the current tail;
+    /// otherwise a binary search finds the upper-bound insertion point so
+    /// arrival order is preserved among equal timestamps.
+    /// Reports `inserted: false` if a message with the same ID already exists.
+    fileprivate func insert(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> InsertResult {
+        guard indexByMessageID[message.id] == nil else { return .duplicate }
+
+        if let last = messages.last, message.timestamp < last.timestamp {
+            let index = insertionIndex(for: message.timestamp)
+            messages.insert(message, at: index)
+            reindex(from: index)
+        } else {
+            messages.append(message)
+            indexByMessageID[message.id] = messages.count - 1
+        }
+
+        return InsertResult(inserted: true, trimmedMessageIDs: trimIfNeeded())
+    }
+
+    /// Replace-or-append by message ID. An existing message keeps its
+    /// timeline position (in-place updates like media progress reuse the
+    /// original timestamp); a new message goes through ordered insertion.
+    fileprivate func upsert(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> UpsertOutcome {
+        if let index = indexByMessageID[message.id] {
+            messages[index] = message
+            return .updated
+        }
+        let result = insert(message)
+        return .appended(trimmedMessageIDs: result.trimmedMessageIDs)
+    }
+
+    /// Applies a delivery status keyed by message ID, honoring the
+    /// no-downgrade rule (the SOLE enforcement point — every delivery
+    /// update flows through the store): equal statuses are skipped, and
+    /// `.read` is never downgraded to `.delivered` or `.sent`.
+    /// Returns `true` when the status was applied.
+    fileprivate func applyDeliveryStatus(_ status: DeliveryStatus, forMessageID messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return false }
+        let message = messages[index]
+        guard !Self.shouldSkipStatusUpdate(current: message.deliveryStatus, new: status) else { return false }
+
+        message.deliveryStatus = status
+        // BitchatMessage is a reference type; write back through the
+        // subscript so the @Published wrapper emits.
+        messages[index] = message
+        return true
+    }
+
+    /// Republishes a message without changing state. Used for mirrored
+    /// copies that share a BitchatMessage instance: the first conversation's
+    /// status apply mutated the shared object, so this conversation's
+    /// observers still need an @Published emission to re-render.
+    @discardableResult
+    fileprivate func republishMessage(withID messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return false }
+        messages[index] = messages[index]
+        return true
+    }
+
+    @discardableResult
+    fileprivate func setUnread(_ unread: Bool) -> Bool {
+        guard isUnread != unread else { return false }
+        isUnread = unread
+        return true
+    }
+
+    /// Removes a single message by ID. Returns the removed message, or
+    /// `nil` when no message with that ID exists.
+    fileprivate func remove(messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
+        guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return nil }
+        let removed = messages.remove(at: index)
+        indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+        reindex(from: index)
+        return removed
+    }
+
+    /// Removes every message matching `predicate`. Returns the removed
+    /// message IDs (empty when nothing matched).
+    fileprivate func removeAll(where predicate: (BitchatMessage) -> Bool) -> [String] {
+        var removedIDs: [String] = []
+        messages.removeAll { message in
+            guard predicate(message) else { return false }
+            removedIDs.append(message.id)
+            return true
+        }
+        guard !removedIDs.isEmpty else { return [] }
+        for id in removedIDs {
+            indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: id)
+        }
+        reindex(from: 0)
+        return removedIDs
+    }
+
+    fileprivate func clearMessages() {
+        messages.removeAll()
+        indexByMessageID.removeAll()
+    }
+
+    // MARK: Diagnostics
+
+    /// Appends human-readable invariant violations for this conversation
+    /// (empty when healthy): the ID index must be the exact inverse of the
+    /// messages array, the cap must hold, and timestamps must be
+    /// non-decreasing (equal timestamps keep arrival order, so only strict
+    /// inversions are violations). O(messages); allocates only on violation.
+    fileprivate func collectInvariantViolations(into violations: inout [String], label: String) {
+        if indexByMessageID.count != messages.count {
+            violations.append("\(label): index has \(indexByMessageID.count) entries for \(messages.count) messages")
+        }
+        if messages.count > cap {
+            violations.append("\(label): \(messages.count) messages exceeds cap \(cap)")
+        }
+        var previousTimestamp: Date?
+        for position in messages.indices {
+            let message = messages[position]
+            // Count equality + every message resolving to its own position
+            // proves the index is exactly the inverse map (no stale extras).
+            if let index = indexByMessageID[message.id] {
+                if index != position {
+                    violations.append("\(label): message \(message.id.prefix(8))… at \(position) indexed at \(index)")
+                }
+            } else {
+                violations.append("\(label): message \(message.id.prefix(8))… at \(position) missing from index")
+            }
+            if let previousTimestamp, message.timestamp < previousTimestamp {
+                violations.append("\(label): timestamp order violated at \(position)")
+            }
+            previousTimestamp = message.timestamp
+        }
+    }
+
+    // MARK: Internals
+
+    static func shouldSkipStatusUpdate(current: DeliveryStatus?, new: DeliveryStatus) -> Bool {
+        guard let current else { return false }
+        if current == new { return true }
+
+        switch (current, new) {
+        case (.read, .delivered), (.read, .sent):
+            return true
+        default:
+            return false
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Upper-bound binary search: first index whose timestamp is strictly
+    /// greater than `timestamp`, so equal-timestamp messages keep arrival
+    /// order.
+    private func insertionIndex(for timestamp: Date) -> Int {
+        var low = 0
+        var high = messages.count
+        while low < high {
+            let mid = (low + high) / 2
+            if messages[mid].timestamp <= timestamp {
+                low = mid + 1
+            } else {
+                high = mid
+            }
+        }
+        return low
+    }
+
+    private func reindex(from start: Int) {
+        for index in start..<messages.count {
+            indexByMessageID[messages[index].id] = index
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Trims oldest messages over the cap; returns the trimmed message IDs.
+    private func trimIfNeeded() -> [String] {
+        guard messages.count > cap else { return [] }
+        let overflow = messages.count - cap
+        let trimmedIDs = messages.prefix(overflow).map(\.id)
+        for id in trimmedIDs {
+            indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: id)
+        }
+        messages.removeFirst(overflow)
+        reindex(from: 0)
+        return trimmedIDs
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - ConversationChange
+
+/// Typed mutation events for non-UI consumers (delivery tracking,
+/// notifications, sync) that need "something changed in conversation X"
+/// without subscribing to whole message arrays. Emitted on the store's
+/// `changes` subject AFTER the corresponding state is consistent.
+enum ConversationChange {
+    case appended(ConversationID, BitchatMessage)
+    case updated(ConversationID, messageID: String)
+    case statusChanged(ConversationID, messageID: String, DeliveryStatus)
+    case messageRemoved(ConversationID, messageID: String)
+    case cleared(ConversationID)
+    case removed(ConversationID)
+    case migrated(from: ConversationID, to: ConversationID)
+    case unreadChanged(ConversationID, isUnread: Bool)
+}
+
+// MARK: - ConversationStore
+
+/// Sole writer and sole holder of conversation message state. All mutations
+/// go through the intent API below; backing collections are `private(set)`.
+/// Reads are synchronous — writers and readers share the main actor, so
+/// after an intent returns every observer sees the result.
+@MainActor
+final class ConversationStore: ObservableObject {
+    /// Conversation creation order; published so list-style consumers can
+    /// observe conversations appearing/disappearing without rebuilding from
+    /// the dictionary.
+    @Published private(set) var conversationIDs: [ConversationID] = []
+    @Published private(set) var selectedConversationID: ConversationID?
+    @Published private(set) var unreadConversations: Set<ConversationID> = []
+
+    // MARK: Selection state
+    // The two UI selection axes: which public channel is active, and which
+    // private chat (if any) is open on top of it. `selectedConversationID`
+    // is derived: the open private chat wins, otherwise the active public
+    // channel's conversation. Mutate via `setActiveChannel` /
+    // `setSelectedPrivatePeer` only.
+
+    @Published private(set) var activeChannel: ChannelID = .mesh
+    @Published private(set) var selectedPrivatePeerID: PeerID?
+
+    private(set) var conversationsByID: [ConversationID: Conversation] = [:]
+
+    /// Store-level message-ID → conversation-membership map for ID-only
+    /// lookups (delivery receipts arrive with a message ID, not a
+    /// conversation). Maintained incrementally at every mutation point —
+    /// all mutation is centralized in the intent API below, so the map is
+    /// exact, never scanned or rebuilt.
+    ///
+    /// The value is a `Set` because a private message can legitimately live
+    /// in TWO direct conversations: step 2's raw per-peer keying mirrors a
+    /// message into both the stable-key and ephemeral-peer chats
+    /// (`mirrorToEphemeralIfNeeded`). A delivery update must reach both
+    /// copies.
+    private var conversationIDsByMessageID: [String: Set<ConversationID>] = [:]
+
+    /// Monotonic count of messages inserted into any conversation (appends,
+    /// upsert-appends, migration inserts). Field-observability only: the
+    /// periodic store audit folds the delta into its heartbeat line so logs
+    /// carry throughput context. Never read on a hot path.
+    private(set) var appendCount: Int = 0
+
+    /// Sample counter for the mirrored-republish debug log in the ID-only
+    /// `setDeliveryStatus` fan-out (first + every Nth occurrence).
+    private var mirroredRepublishLogCount = 0
+
+    let changes = PassthroughSubject<ConversationChange, Never>()
+
+    // MARK: Intent API
+
+    /// Returns the conversation for `id`, creating it (with the cap policy
+    /// for its kind) on first access.
+    @discardableResult
+    func conversation(for id: ConversationID) -> Conversation {
+        if let existing = conversationsByID[id] {
+            return existing
+        }
+        let conversation = Conversation(id: id, cap: Self.cap(for: id))
+        conversationsByID[id] = conversation
+        conversationIDs.append(id)
+        return conversation
+    }
+
+    /// Appends a message in timestamp order. Returns `false` (and emits
+    /// nothing) if a message with the same ID is already present.
+    @discardableResult
+    func append(_ message: BitchatMessage, to id: ConversationID) -> Bool {
+        let conversation = conversation(for: id)
+        let result = conversation.insert(message)
+        guard result.inserted else { return false }
+        registerMessageID(message.id, in: id)
+        unregisterMessageIDs(result.trimmedMessageIDs, from: id)
+        changes.send(.appended(id, message))
+        return true
+    }
+
+    /// Replace-or-append by message ID (media progress, edits).
+    func upsertByID(_ message: BitchatMessage, in id: ConversationID) {
+        let conversation = conversation(for: id)
+        switch conversation.upsert(message) {
+        case .appended(let trimmedMessageIDs):
+            registerMessageID(message.id, in: id)
+            unregisterMessageIDs(trimmedMessageIDs, from: id)
+            changes.send(.appended(id, message))
+        case .updated:
+            changes.send(.updated(id, messageID: message.id))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Applies a delivery status keyed by message ID. Returns `false` when
+    /// the message is unknown or the update would downgrade the status
+    /// (read beats delivered beats sent).
+    @discardableResult
+    func setDeliveryStatus(_ status: DeliveryStatus, forMessageID messageID: String, in id: ConversationID) -> Bool {
+        guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id],
+              conversation.applyDeliveryStatus(status, forMessageID: messageID) else {
+            return false
+        }
+        changes.send(.statusChanged(id, messageID: messageID, status))
+        return true
+    }
+
+    /// Applies a delivery status to EVERY conversation containing
+    /// `messageID` (ID-only — delivery receipts don't know conversations;
+    /// mirrored private copies live in two direct chats). Returns `false`
+    /// when the message is unknown or no copy changed (equal status or
+    /// downgrade — read beats delivered beats sent).
+    ///
+    /// `BitchatMessage` is a reference type, so mirrored copies sharing one
+    /// instance are mutated by the first conversation's apply. The skipped
+    /// conversations still hold the changed message, so they get an explicit
+    /// republish and `.statusChanged` event - otherwise a view observing the
+    /// mirrored conversation would render stale status. Distinct copies whose
+    /// update was genuinely rejected (downgrade) are left untouched, guarded
+    /// by status equality.
+    @discardableResult
+    func setDeliveryStatus(_ status: DeliveryStatus, forMessageID messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        guard let ids = conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] else { return false }
+        var applied = false
+        var skipped: [ConversationID] = []
+        for id in ids {
+            if setDeliveryStatus(status, forMessageID: messageID, in: id) {
+                applied = true
+            } else {
+                skipped.append(id)
+            }
+        }
+        guard applied else { return false }
+        for id in skipped {
+            guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id],
+                  conversation.message(withID: messageID)?.deliveryStatus == status,
+                  conversation.republishMessage(withID: messageID) else { continue }
+            // Field proof the mirrored-copy republish path actually fires;
+            // sampled (first + every Nth) so mirrored chats can't spam logs.
+            mirroredRepublishLogCount += 1
+            if mirroredRepublishLogCount == 1
+                || mirroredRepublishLogCount.isMultiple(of: TransportConfig.conversationStoreMirroredRepublishLogInterval) {
+                SecureLogger.debug(
+                    "mirrored republish #\(mirroredRepublishLogCount) for \(messageID.prefix(8))… in \(id.auditDescription)",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+            }
+            changes.send(.statusChanged(id, messageID: messageID, status))
+        }
+        return true
+    }
+
+    /// Current delivery status of `messageID` in whichever conversation
+    /// holds it (mirrored copies share status — see `setDeliveryStatus`).
+    func deliveryStatus(forMessageID messageID: String) -> DeliveryStatus? {
+        guard let ids = conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] else { return nil }
+        for id in ids {
+            if let status = conversationsByID[id]?.message(withID: messageID)?.deliveryStatus {
+                return status
+            }
+        }
+        return nil
+    }
+
+    /// Every conversation currently containing `messageID` (empty when the
+    /// message is unknown).
+    func conversationIDs(forMessageID messageID: String) -> Set<ConversationID> {
+        conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] ?? []
+    }
+
+    func markRead(_ id: ConversationID) {
+        guard unreadConversations.contains(id) else { return }
+        unreadConversations.remove(id)
+        conversationsByID[id]?.setUnread(false)
+        changes.send(.unreadChanged(id, isUnread: false))
+    }
+
+    func markUnread(_ id: ConversationID) {
+        guard !unreadConversations.contains(id) else { return }
+        let conversation = conversation(for: id)
+        unreadConversations.insert(id)
+        conversation.setUnread(true)
+        changes.send(.unreadChanged(id, isUnread: true))
+    }
+
+    /// Selects a conversation (creating it if needed) or clears the
+    /// selection with `nil`.
+    func select(_ id: ConversationID?) {
+        if let id {
+            conversation(for: id)
+        }
+        guard selectedConversationID != id else { return }
+        selectedConversationID = id
+    }
+
+    /// Switches the active public channel. While no private chat is open
+    /// the selection follows the channel.
+    func setActiveChannel(_ channelID: ChannelID) {
+        if activeChannel != channelID {
+            activeChannel = channelID
+        }
+        refreshDerivedSelection()
+    }
+
+    /// Opens a private chat (`nil` closes it, returning the selection to the
+    /// active public channel's conversation).
+    func setSelectedPrivatePeer(_ peerID: PeerID?) {
+        if selectedPrivatePeerID != peerID {
+            selectedPrivatePeerID = peerID
+        }
+        refreshDerivedSelection()
+    }
+
+    private func refreshDerivedSelection() {
+        if let peerID = selectedPrivatePeerID {
+            select(.directPeer(peerID))
+        } else {
+            select(ConversationID(channelID: activeChannel))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Moves all messages from `source` into `destination` (the
+    /// ephemeral↔stable peer-ID handoff): dedups by message ID, preserves
+    /// timestamp order, carries unread state over, and hands off the
+    /// selection — mirroring `ChatPrivateConversationCoordinator`'s
+    /// migration semantics. The source conversation is removed. Emits a
+    /// single `.migrated(from:to:)` once the whole move is consistent.
+    func migrateConversation(from source: ConversationID, to destination: ConversationID) {
+        guard source != destination, let sourceConversation = conversationsByID[source] else { return }
+
+        let destinationConversation = conversation(for: destination)
+        for message in sourceConversation.messages {
+            let result = destinationConversation.insert(message)
+            guard result.inserted else { continue }
+            registerMessageID(message.id, in: destination)
+            unregisterMessageIDs(result.trimmedMessageIDs, from: destination)
+        }
+        for messageID in sourceConversation.messageIDs {
+            unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: source)
+        }
+
+        let wasUnread = unreadConversations.contains(source)
+        let wasSelected = selectedConversationID == source
+
+        conversationsByID.removeValue(forKey: source)
+        conversationIDs.removeAll { $0 == source }
+        unreadConversations.remove(source)
+
+        if wasUnread, !unreadConversations.contains(destination) {
+            unreadConversations.insert(destination)
+            destinationConversation.setUnread(true)
+        }
+        if wasSelected {
+            selectedConversationID = destination
+            // Keep the private-peer selection axis consistent with the
+            // handed-off selection.
+            if let peerID = selectedPrivatePeerID,
+               source == .directPeer(peerID),
+               case .direct(let destinationHandle) = destination {
+                selectedPrivatePeerID = destinationHandle.routingPeerID
+            }
+        }
+
+        changes.send(.migrated(from: source, to: destination))
+    }
+
+    /// Removes a single message by ID from a conversation. Returns the
+    /// removed message, or `nil` (emitting nothing) when the conversation or
+    /// message is unknown.
+    @discardableResult
+    func removeMessage(withID messageID: String, from id: ConversationID) -> BitchatMessage? {
+        guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id],
+              let removed = conversation.remove(messageID: messageID) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: id)
+        changes.send(.messageRemoved(id, messageID: messageID))
+        return removed
+    }
+
+    /// Removes every message matching `predicate` from a conversation,
+    /// emitting one `.messageRemoved` per removed message after the
+    /// conversation is consistent. No-op for unknown conversations.
+    func removeMessages(from id: ConversationID, where predicate: (BitchatMessage) -> Bool) {
+        guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id] else { return }
+        let removedIDs = conversation.removeAll(where: predicate)
+        unregisterMessageIDs(removedIDs, from: id)
+        for messageID in removedIDs {
+            changes.send(.messageRemoved(id, messageID: messageID))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Empties a conversation's timeline but keeps the conversation (and
+    /// its unread/selection state) alive.
+    func clear(_ id: ConversationID) {
+        guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id] else { return }
+        for messageID in conversation.messageIDs {
+            unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: id)
+        }
+        conversation.clearMessages()
+        changes.send(.cleared(id))
+    }
+
+    /// Removes a conversation entirely, including unread state; clears the
+    /// selection if it pointed at the removed conversation.
+    func removeConversation(_ id: ConversationID) {
+        guard let conversation = conversationsByID.removeValue(forKey: id) else { return }
+        for messageID in conversation.messageIDs {
+            unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: id)
+        }
+        conversationIDs.removeAll { $0 == id }
+        unreadConversations.remove(id)
+        if selectedConversationID == id {
+            selectedConversationID = nil
+        }
+        changes.send(.removed(id))
+    }
+
+    func clearAll() {
+        let removedIDs = conversationIDs
+        guard !removedIDs.isEmpty || selectedConversationID != nil else { return }
+
+        conversationsByID.removeAll()
+        conversationIDs.removeAll()
+        unreadConversations.removeAll()
+        conversationIDsByMessageID.removeAll()
+        if selectedConversationID != nil {
+            selectedConversationID = nil
+        }
+
+        for id in removedIDs {
+            changes.send(.removed(id))
+        }
+    }
+
+    // MARK: Diagnostics
+
+    /// Total messages across all conversations. O(#conversations) — heartbeat
+    /// logging only, never a hot path.
+    var totalMessageCount: Int {
+        conversationsByID.values.reduce(0) { $0 + $1.messages.count }
+    }
+
+    /// Number of distinct message IDs in the store-level membership map.
+    var messageIDMapCount: Int {
+        conversationIDsByMessageID.count
+    }
+
+    /// Verifies the store's correctness invariants and returns human-readable
+    /// violations (empty = healthy). Intended for a periodic field audit:
+    /// O(total messages) and allocation-free while healthy. Checks:
+    /// - the `conversationIDs` ordering array matches `conversationsByID`
+    /// - per conversation: ID index exact, cap held, timestamp order
+    ///   (see `Conversation.collectInvariantViolations`)
+    /// - the message-ID → conversation map matches reality exactly: every
+    ///   mapped membership points at a live conversation actually holding
+    ///   the message, and total memberships equal total messages (with the
+    ///   forward check, equality proves no conversation message is missing
+    ///   from the map)
+    /// - `unreadConversations` only references existing conversations
+    /// - `selectedConversationID`, when set, references an existing
+    ///   conversation (`select(_:)` creates on selection and
+    ///   `removeConversation`/`clearAll` clear it, so existence is the
+    ///   invariant for both the channel-derived and direct-peer cases)
+    func auditInvariants() -> [String] {
+        var violations: [String] = []
+
+        if conversationIDs.count != conversationsByID.count {
+            violations.append("conversationIDs lists \(conversationIDs.count) conversations but dictionary holds \(conversationsByID.count)")
+        }
+        for id in conversationIDs where conversationsByID[id] == nil {
+            violations.append("conversationIDs lists \(id.auditDescription) but no conversation exists")
+        }
+
+        var totalMessages = 0
+        for (id, conversation) in conversationsByID {
+            totalMessages += conversation.messages.count
+            conversation.collectInvariantViolations(into: &violations, label: id.auditDescription)
+        }
+
+        var totalMappedMemberships = 0
+        for (messageID, ids) in conversationIDsByMessageID {
+            totalMappedMemberships += ids.count
+            if ids.isEmpty {
+                violations.append("message map: \(messageID.prefix(8))… has an empty membership set")
+            }
+            for id in ids {
+                guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id] else {
+                    violations.append("message map: \(messageID.prefix(8))… claims unknown conversation \(id.auditDescription)")
+                    continue
+                }
+                if !conversation.containsMessage(withID: messageID) {
+                    violations.append("message map: \(messageID.prefix(8))… not present in claimed conversation \(id.auditDescription)")
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if totalMappedMemberships != totalMessages {
+            violations.append("message map holds \(totalMappedMemberships) memberships but conversations hold \(totalMessages) messages")
+        }
+
+        for id in unreadConversations where conversationsByID[id] == nil {
+            violations.append("unreadConversations contains unknown conversation \(id.auditDescription)")
+        }
+
+        if let selected = selectedConversationID, conversationsByID[selected] == nil {
+            violations.append("selectedConversationID \(selected.auditDescription) has no conversation")
+        }
+
+        return violations
+    }
+
+    // MARK: Internals
+
+    private func registerMessageID(_ messageID: String, in id: ConversationID) {
+        conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID, default: []].insert(id)
+        // Single choke point for every successful insertion (append, upsert
+        // append, migration insert) — the audit heartbeat's throughput delta.
+        appendCount += 1
+    }
+
+    private func unregisterMessageID(_ messageID: String, from id: ConversationID) {
+        guard var ids = conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] else { return }
+        ids.remove(id)
+        if ids.isEmpty {
+            conversationIDsByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+        } else {
+            conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] = ids
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func unregisterMessageIDs(_ messageIDs: [String], from id: ConversationID) {
+        for messageID in messageIDs {
+            unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: id)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static func cap(for id: ConversationID) -> Int {
+        switch id {
+        case .mesh:
+            return TransportConfig.meshTimelineCap
+        case .geohash:
+            return TransportConfig.geoTimelineCap
+        case .direct:
+            return TransportConfig.privateChatCap
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Direct-conversation keying + derived views
+
+extension ConversationID {
+    /// Direct-conversation ID keyed by the *raw* routing peer ID.
+    ///
+    /// Direct conversations are deliberately keyed per `PeerID`, not per
+    /// resolved identity: the private-chat coordinators mirror messages into
+    /// both the ephemeral and stable peer's conversations
+    /// (`mirrorToEphemeralIfNeeded`) and consolidate/migrate between them
+    /// explicitly, so a raw lookup by whichever peer ID is selected always
+    /// finds the right timeline without an identity-resolution layer.
+    static func directPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) -> ConversationID {
+        .direct(PeerHandle(id: "peer:\(peerID.id)", routingPeerID: peerID))
+    }
+}
+
+extension ConversationStore {
+    /// All direct conversations' messages keyed by routing peer ID — the
+    /// shape `ChatViewModel.privateChats` exposes to the coordinators.
+    /// Values are the conversations' backing arrays (COW), so building this
+    /// is O(#conversations), not O(#messages).
+    func directMessagesByRoutingPeerID() -> [PeerID: [BitchatMessage]] {
+        var messagesByPeerID: [PeerID: [BitchatMessage]] = [:]
+        messagesByPeerID.reserveCapacity(conversationsByID.count)
+        for (id, conversation) in conversationsByID {
+            guard case .direct(let handle) = id else { continue }
+            messagesByPeerID[handle.routingPeerID] = conversation.messages
+        }
+        return messagesByPeerID
+    }
+
+    /// Unread direct conversations as routing peer IDs — the shape
+    /// `ChatViewModel.unreadPrivateMessages` exposes to the coordinators.
+    func unreadDirectRoutingPeerIDs() -> Set<PeerID> {
+        var peerIDs = Set<PeerID>()
+        for id in unreadConversations {
+            guard case .direct(let handle) = id else { continue }
+            peerIDs.insert(handle.routingPeerID)
+        }
+        return peerIDs
+    }
+
+    /// `true` when any direct conversation contains a message with `messageID`
+    /// (O(1) via the store-level message-ID → conversation map).
+    func directConversationsContainMessage(withID messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        conversationIDs(forMessageID: messageID).contains { id in
+            if case .direct = id { return true }
+            return false
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Message IDs across all direct conversations (read-receipt pruning
+    /// keeps only receipts whose messages still exist).
+    func directMessageIDs() -> Set<String> {
+        var messageIDs = Set<String>()
+        for (id, conversation) in conversationsByID {
+            guard case .direct = id else { continue }
+            messageIDs.formUnion(conversation.messageIDs)
+        }
+        return messageIDs
+    }
+
+    /// Removes every direct conversation (panic clear).
+    func removeAllDirectConversations() {
+        let directIDs = conversationIDs.filter { id in
+            if case .direct = id { return true }
+            return false
+        }
+        for id in directIDs {
+            removeConversation(id)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Diagnostics support
+
+extension ConversationID {
+    /// Short, log-safe description for audit/diagnostic lines. Direct
+    /// conversations truncate the handle so full peer keys never hit logs.
+    fileprivate var auditDescription: String {
+        switch self {
+        case .mesh:
+            return "mesh"
+        case .geohash(let geohash):
+            return "geo:\(geohash)"
+        case .direct(let handle):
+            return "direct:\(handle.id.prefix(13))…"
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#if DEBUG
+// Test-only corruption hooks for `auditInvariants()` tests. The store is the
+// sole writer by design — `Conversation`'s mutators are fileprivate and the
+// store's backing collections are private — so the inconsistent states the
+// audit exists to catch CANNOT be manufactured through the intent API. These
+// DEBUG-only hooks deliberately bypass that lockdown to inject exactly those
+// impossible states. Never call them outside tests.
+extension Conversation {
+    /// Points an existing message's index entry at the wrong position
+    /// (positions 0 and 1 swap their index entries). Requires >= 2 messages.
+    func _testCorruptIndexEntries() {
+        guard messages.count >= 2 else { return }
+        indexByMessageID[messages[0].id] = 1
+        indexByMessageID[messages[1].id] = 0
+    }
+
+    /// Drops a message's index entry entirely (count mismatch + missing).
+    func _testRemoveIndexEntry(forMessageID messageID: String) {
+        indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+    }
+
+    /// Swaps the first and last messages while keeping the index consistent,
+    /// so ONLY the timestamp-order invariant is violated (requires the two
+    /// messages to have distinct timestamps).
+    func _testCorruptOrderingPreservingIndex() {
+        guard messages.count >= 2 else { return }
+        messages.swapAt(0, messages.count - 1)
+        indexByMessageID[messages[0].id] = 0
+        indexByMessageID[messages[messages.count - 1].id] = messages.count - 1
+    }
+}
+
+extension ConversationStore {
+    /// Adds a map membership that the conversation does not actually hold.
+    func _testRegisterPhantomMessageID(_ messageID: String, in id: ConversationID) {
+        conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID, default: []].insert(id)
+    }
+
+    /// Drops a real map membership (conversation message missing from map).
+    func _testUnregisterMessageID(_ messageID: String, from id: ConversationID) {
+        conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID]?.remove(id)
+        if conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID]?.isEmpty == true {
+            conversationIDsByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Appends past the conversation cap, bypassing trim (map kept exact so
+    /// only the cap invariant is violated).
+    func _testAppendBypassingCap(_ message: BitchatMessage, to id: ConversationID) {
+        let conversation = conversation(for: id)
+        conversation._testAppendBypassingTrim(message)
+        conversationIDsByMessageID[message.id, default: []].insert(id)
+    }
+
+    /// Marks a nonexistent conversation unread without creating it.
+    func _testInsertUnreadConversationID(_ id: ConversationID) {
+        unreadConversations.insert(id)
+    }
+
+    /// Sets the selection directly, without `select(_:)`'s create-on-select.
+    func _testSetSelectedConversationID(_ id: ConversationID?) {
+        selectedConversationID = id
+    }
+}
+
+extension Conversation {
+    fileprivate func _testAppendBypassingTrim(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
+        messages.append(message)
+        indexByMessageID[message.id] = messages.count - 1
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+// MARK: - Public timeline derived views
+
+extension ConversationStore {
+    /// Removes a message by ID from whichever public (mesh/geohash)
+    /// conversation contains it. Returns the removed message, if any.
+    @discardableResult
+    func removePublicMessage(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
+        for id in conversationIDs(forMessageID: messageID) {
+            switch id {
+            case .mesh, .geohash:
+                return removeMessage(withID: messageID, from: id)
+            case .direct:
+                continue
+            }
+        }
+        return nil
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/ConversationUIModel.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import SwiftUI
+#if os(iOS)
+import UIKit
+#endif
+
+@MainActor
+final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var showAutocomplete = false
+    @Published private(set) var autocompleteSuggestions: [String] = []
+    @Published private(set) var currentNickname: String
+    @Published private(set) var isBatchingPublic = false
+    @Published private(set) var canSendMediaInCurrentContext = true
+
+    private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
+    private let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel
+    private let conversations: ConversationStore
+    private var activeChannel: ChannelID
+    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+
+    init(
+        chatViewModel: ChatViewModel,
+        privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel,
+        conversations: ConversationStore
+    ) {
+        self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
+        self.privateConversationModel = privateConversationModel
+        self.conversations = conversations
+        self.activeChannel = conversations.activeChannel
+        self.currentNickname = chatViewModel.nickname
+        self.isBatchingPublic = chatViewModel.isBatchingPublic
+        self.showAutocomplete = chatViewModel.showAutocomplete
+        self.autocompleteSuggestions = chatViewModel.autocompleteSuggestions
+        self.canSendMediaInCurrentContext = chatViewModel.canSendMediaInCurrentContext
+
+        bind()
+    }
+
+    func setCurrentColorScheme(_ colorScheme: ColorScheme) {
+        chatViewModel.currentColorScheme = colorScheme
+    }
+
+    func setCurrentTheme(_ theme: AppTheme) {
+        chatViewModel.currentTheme = theme
+    }
+
+    func sendMessage(_ message: String) {
+        chatViewModel.sendMessage(message)
+    }
+
+    func clearCurrentConversation() {
+        chatViewModel.sendMessage("/clear")
+    }
+
+    func sendHug(to sender: String) {
+        chatViewModel.sendMessage("/hug @\(sender)")
+    }
+
+    func sendSlap(to sender: String) {
+        chatViewModel.sendMessage("/slap @\(sender)")
+    }
+
+    func block(peerID: PeerID?, displayName: String?) {
+        guard let displayName else { return }
+
+        if let peerID, peerID.isGeoChat,
+           let full = chatViewModel.fullNostrHex(forSenderPeerID: peerID) {
+            chatViewModel.blockGeohashUser(pubkeyHexLowercased: full, displayName: displayName)
+        } else {
+            chatViewModel.sendMessage("/block \(displayName)")
+        }
+    }
+
+    func updateAutocomplete(for text: String, cursorPosition: Int) {
+        chatViewModel.updateAutocomplete(for: text, cursorPosition: cursorPosition)
+    }
+
+    func completeNickname(_ nickname: String, in text: inout String) -> Int {
+        chatViewModel.completeNickname(nickname, in: &text)
+    }
+
+    func formatMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage, colorScheme: ColorScheme, theme: AppTheme? = nil) -> AttributedString {
+        chatViewModel.formatMessageAsText(message, colorScheme: colorScheme, theme: theme)
+    }
+
+    func formatMessageHeader(_ message: BitchatMessage, colorScheme: ColorScheme, theme: AppTheme? = nil) -> AttributedString {
+        chatViewModel.formatMessageHeader(message, colorScheme: colorScheme, theme: theme)
+    }
+
+    func mediaAttachment(for message: BitchatMessage) -> BitchatMessage.Media? {
+        message.mediaAttachment(for: currentNickname)
+    }
+
+    func isSelfSender(peerID: PeerID?, displayName: String?) -> Bool {
+        chatViewModel.isSelfSender(peerID: peerID, displayName: displayName)
+    }
+
+    func isSentByCurrentUser(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
+        message.sender == currentNickname || message.sender.hasPrefix(currentNickname + "#")
+    }
+
+    func isMediaMessageFromCurrentUser(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
+        message.sender == currentNickname || message.senderPeerID == chatViewModel.meshService.myPeerID
+    }
+
+    func senderDisplayName(for peerID: PeerID, fallbackMessages: [BitchatMessage]) -> String? {
+        if peerID.isGeoDM || peerID.isGeoChat {
+            return chatViewModel.geohashDisplayName(for: peerID)
+        }
+        if let nickname = chatViewModel.meshService.peerNickname(peerID: peerID) {
+            return nickname
+        }
+        return fallbackMessages.last(where: { $0.senderPeerID == peerID && $0.sender != "system" })?.sender
+    }
+
+    #if os(iOS)
+    func processSelectedImage(_ image: UIImage?) {
+        chatViewModel.processThenSendImage(image)
+    }
+    #endif
+
+    func processSelectedImage(from url: URL?) {
+        #if os(macOS)
+        chatViewModel.processThenSendImage(from: url)
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    func sendVoiceNote(at url: URL) {
+        chatViewModel.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+    }
+
+    func cancelMediaSend(messageID: String) {
+        chatViewModel.cancelMediaSend(messageID: messageID)
+    }
+
+    func deleteMediaMessage(messageID: String) {
+        chatViewModel.deleteMediaMessage(messageID: messageID)
+    }
+
+    private func bind() {
+        chatViewModel.$nickname
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$currentNickname)
+
+        chatViewModel.$showAutocomplete
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$showAutocomplete)
+
+        chatViewModel.$autocompleteSuggestions
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$autocompleteSuggestions)
+
+        chatViewModel.$isBatchingPublic
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$isBatchingPublic)
+
+        conversations.$activeChannel
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] channel in
+                self?.activeChannel = channel
+                self?.refreshComputedState()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        privateConversationModel.$selectedPeerID
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refreshComputedState()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+    }
+
+    private func refreshComputedState() {
+        if let selectedPeerID = privateConversationModel.selectedPeerID {
+            canSendMediaInCurrentContext = !(selectedPeerID.isGeoDM || selectedPeerID.isGeoChat)
+            return
+        }
+
+        switch activeChannel {
+        case .mesh:
+            canSendMediaInCurrentContext = true
+        case .location:
+            canSendMediaInCurrentContext = false
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/LocationChannelsModel.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import Foundation
+
+@MainActor
+final class LocationChannelsModel: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var permissionState: LocationChannelManager.PermissionState
+    @Published private(set) var availableChannels: [GeohashChannel]
+    @Published private(set) var selectedChannel: ChannelID
+    @Published private(set) var teleported: Bool
+    @Published private(set) var bookmarks: [String]
+    @Published private(set) var bookmarkNames: [String: String]
+    @Published private(set) var locationNames: [GeohashChannelLevel: String]
+    @Published private(set) var userTorEnabled: Bool
+
+    private let manager: LocationChannelManager
+    private let network: NetworkActivationService
+    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+
+    init(
+        manager: LocationChannelManager? = nil,
+        network: NetworkActivationService? = nil
+    ) {
+        let manager = manager ?? .shared
+        let network = network ?? .shared
+
+        self.manager = manager
+        self.network = network
+        self.permissionState = manager.permissionState
+        self.availableChannels = manager.availableChannels
+        self.selectedChannel = manager.selectedChannel
+        self.teleported = manager.teleported
+        self.bookmarks = manager.bookmarks
+        self.bookmarkNames = manager.bookmarkNames
+        self.locationNames = manager.locationNames
+        self.userTorEnabled = network.userTorEnabled
+
+        bind()
+    }
+
+    var currentBuildingGeohash: String? {
+        availableChannels.first(where: { $0.level == .building })?.geohash
+    }
+
+    func isSelected(_ channel: GeohashChannel) -> Bool {
+        guard case .location(let selected) = selectedChannel else { return false }
+        return selected == channel
+    }
+
+    func isBookmarked(_ geohash: String) -> Bool {
+        manager.isBookmarked(geohash)
+    }
+
+    func enableLocationChannels() {
+        manager.enableLocationChannels()
+    }
+
+    func refreshChannels() {
+        manager.refreshChannels()
+    }
+
+    func enableAndRefresh() {
+        manager.enableLocationChannels()
+        manager.refreshChannels()
+    }
+
+    func beginLiveRefresh() {
+        manager.beginLiveRefresh()
+    }
+
+    func endLiveRefresh() {
+        manager.endLiveRefresh()
+    }
+
+    func select(_ channel: ChannelID) {
+        manager.select(channel)
+    }
+
+    func markTeleported(for geohash: String, _ flag: Bool) {
+        manager.markTeleported(for: geohash, flag)
+    }
+
+    func toggleBookmark(_ geohash: String) {
+        manager.toggleBookmark(geohash)
+    }
+
+    func resolveBookmarkNameIfNeeded(for geohash: String) {
+        manager.resolveBookmarkNameIfNeeded(for: geohash)
+    }
+
+    func locationName(for level: GeohashChannelLevel) -> String? {
+        locationNames[level]
+    }
+
+    func setUserTorEnabled(_ enabled: Bool) {
+        network.setUserTorEnabled(enabled)
+    }
+
+    func refreshMeshChannelsIfNeeded() {
+        guard case .mesh = selectedChannel,
+              permissionState == .authorized,
+              availableChannels.isEmpty else {
+            return
+        }
+        refreshChannels()
+    }
+
+    func openLocationChannel(for geohash: String) {
+        let normalized = geohash.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).lowercased()
+        let allowed = Set("0123456789bcdefghjkmnpqrstuvwxyz")
+        guard (2...12).contains(normalized.count),
+              normalized.allSatisfy({ allowed.contains($0) }) else {
+            return
+        }
+
+        let channel = GeohashChannel(level: level(forLength: normalized.count), geohash: normalized)
+        let isRegional = availableChannels.contains { $0.geohash == normalized }
+        if !isRegional && !availableChannels.isEmpty {
+            markTeleported(for: normalized, true)
+        }
+        select(.location(channel))
+    }
+
+    func teleport(to geohash: String) {
+        let normalized = geohash.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).lowercased()
+        let channel = GeohashChannel(level: level(forLength: normalized.count), geohash: normalized)
+        markTeleported(for: normalized, true)
+        select(.location(channel))
+    }
+
+    private func bind() {
+        manager.$permissionState
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$permissionState)
+
+        manager.$availableChannels
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$availableChannels)
+
+        manager.$selectedChannel
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$selectedChannel)
+
+        manager.$teleported
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$teleported)
+
+        manager.$bookmarks
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$bookmarks)
+
+        manager.$bookmarkNames
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$bookmarkNames)
+
+        manager.$locationNames
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$locationNames)
+
+        network.$userTorEnabled
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$userTorEnabled)
+    }
+
+    private func level(forLength length: Int) -> GeohashChannelLevel {
+        switch length {
+        case 0...2: return .region
+        case 3...4: return .province
+        case 5: return .city
+        case 6: return .neighborhood
+        case 7: return .block
+        case 8...12: return .building
+        default: return .block
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/LocationPresenceStore.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+import Combine
+import Foundation
+
+@MainActor
+final class LocationPresenceStore: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var currentGeohash: String?
+    @Published private(set) var geoNicknames: [String: String] = [:]
+    @Published private(set) var teleportedGeo: Set<String> = []
+
+    func setCurrentGeohash(_ geohash: String?) {
+        currentGeohash = geohash?.lowercased()
+    }
+
+    func setNickname(_ nickname: String, for pubkeyHex: String) {
+        geoNicknames[pubkeyHex.lowercased()] = nickname
+    }
+
+    func replaceGeoNicknames(_ nicknames: [String: String]) {
+        geoNicknames = Dictionary(
+            uniqueKeysWithValues: nicknames.map { key, value in
+                (key.lowercased(), value)
+            }
+        )
+    }
+
+    func clearGeoNicknames() {
+        geoNicknames.removeAll()
+    }
+
+    func markTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) {
+        teleportedGeo.insert(pubkeyHex.lowercased())
+    }
+
+    func clearTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) {
+        teleportedGeo.remove(pubkeyHex.lowercased())
+    }
+
+    func replaceTeleportedGeo(_ pubkeys: Set<String>) {
+        teleportedGeo = Set(pubkeys.map { $0.lowercased() })
+    }
+
+    func clearTeleportedGeo() {
+        teleportedGeo.removeAll()
+    }
+
+    func reset() {
+        currentGeohash = nil
+        geoNicknames.removeAll()
+        teleportedGeo.removeAll()
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/PeerIdentityStore.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import Foundation
+
+@MainActor
+final class PeerIdentityStore: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var encryptionStatuses: [PeerID: EncryptionStatus] = [:]
+    @Published private(set) var verifiedFingerprints: Set<String> = []
+
+    private(set) var peerFingerprintsByPeerID: [PeerID: String] = [:]
+    private(set) var selectedPrivateChatFingerprint: String?
+
+    private var stablePeerIDsByShortID: [PeerID: PeerID] = [:]
+    private var encryptionStatusCache: [PeerID: EncryptionStatus] = [:]
+
+    func stablePeerID(forShortID peerID: PeerID) -> PeerID? {
+        stablePeerIDsByShortID[peerID]
+    }
+
+    func shortPeerID(forStablePeerID stablePeerID: PeerID) -> PeerID? {
+        stablePeerIDsByShortID.first(where: { $0.value == stablePeerID })?.key
+    }
+
+    func setStablePeerID(_ stablePeerID: PeerID, forShortID peerID: PeerID) {
+        stablePeerIDsByShortID[peerID] = stablePeerID
+    }
+
+    func replaceStablePeerIDs(_ mappings: [PeerID: PeerID]) {
+        stablePeerIDsByShortID = mappings
+    }
+
+    func fingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? {
+        peerFingerprintsByPeerID[peerID]
+    }
+
+    func setFingerprint(_ fingerprint: String?, for peerID: PeerID) {
+        if let fingerprint {
+            peerFingerprintsByPeerID[peerID] = fingerprint
+        } else {
+            peerFingerprintsByPeerID.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    func replaceFingerprintMappings(_ mappings: [PeerID: String]) {
+        peerFingerprintsByPeerID = mappings
+    }
+
+    @discardableResult
+    func migrateFingerprintMapping(
+        from oldPeerID: PeerID,
+        to newPeerID: PeerID,
+        fallback: String? = nil
+    ) -> String? {
+        let fingerprint = peerFingerprintsByPeerID.removeValue(forKey: oldPeerID) ?? fallback
+        if let fingerprint {
+            peerFingerprintsByPeerID[newPeerID] = fingerprint
+            if selectedPrivateChatFingerprint == nil {
+                selectedPrivateChatFingerprint = fingerprint
+            }
+        }
+        return fingerprint
+    }
+
+    func setSelectedPrivateChatFingerprint(_ fingerprint: String?) {
+        selectedPrivateChatFingerprint = fingerprint
+    }
+
+    func cachedEncryptionStatus(for peerID: PeerID) -> EncryptionStatus? {
+        encryptionStatusCache[peerID]
+    }
+
+    func setCachedEncryptionStatus(_ status: EncryptionStatus, for peerID: PeerID) {
+        encryptionStatusCache[peerID] = status
+    }
+
+    func invalidateEncryptionCache(for peerID: PeerID? = nil) {
+        if let peerID {
+            encryptionStatusCache.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+        } else {
+            encryptionStatusCache.removeAll()
+        }
+    }
+
+    func encryptionStatus(for peerID: PeerID) -> EncryptionStatus? {
+        encryptionStatuses[peerID]
+    }
+
+    func setEncryptionStatus(_ status: EncryptionStatus?, for peerID: PeerID) {
+        if let status {
+            encryptionStatuses[peerID] = status
+        } else {
+            encryptionStatuses.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+        }
+        invalidateEncryptionCache(for: peerID)
+    }
+
+    func replaceEncryptionStatuses(_ statuses: [PeerID: EncryptionStatus]) {
+        encryptionStatuses = statuses
+    }
+
+    func setVerifiedFingerprints(_ fingerprints: Set<String>) {
+        verifiedFingerprints = fingerprints
+    }
+
+    func setVerified(_ fingerprint: String, verified: Bool) {
+        if verified {
+            verifiedFingerprints.insert(fingerprint)
+        } else {
+            verifiedFingerprints.remove(fingerprint)
+        }
+    }
+
+    func isVerified(_ fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
+        verifiedFingerprints.contains(fingerprint)
+    }
+
+    func clearAll() {
+        encryptionStatuses.removeAll()
+        verifiedFingerprints.removeAll()
+        peerFingerprintsByPeerID.removeAll()
+        selectedPrivateChatFingerprint = nil
+        stablePeerIDsByShortID.removeAll()
+        encryptionStatusCache.removeAll()
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/PeerListModel.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import SwiftUI
+
+struct MeshPeerRow: Identifiable, Equatable {
+    let peerID: PeerID
+    let displayName: String
+    let isMe: Bool
+    let hasUnread: Bool
+    let isBlocked: Bool
+    let isFavorite: Bool
+    let isConnected: Bool
+    let isReachable: Bool
+    let isMutualFavorite: Bool
+    let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus
+    let showsVerifiedBadgeWhenOffline: Bool
+
+    var id: String { peerID.id }
+}
+
+struct GeohashPersonRow: Identifiable, Equatable {
+    let id: String
+    let displayName: String
+    let isMe: Bool
+    let isTeleported: Bool
+    let isBlocked: Bool
+}
+
+@MainActor
+final class PeerListModel: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var allPeers: [BitchatPeer] = []
+    @Published private(set) var meshRows: [MeshPeerRow] = []
+    @Published private(set) var geohashPeople: [GeohashPersonRow] = []
+    @Published private(set) var reachableMeshPeerCount = 0
+    @Published private(set) var connectedMeshPeerCount = 0
+    @Published private(set) var visibleGeohashPeerCount = 0
+    @Published private(set) var renderID = ""
+
+    private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
+    private let conversations: ConversationStore
+    private let locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel
+    private let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
+    private let locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore
+    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+
+    init(
+        chatViewModel: ChatViewModel,
+        conversations: ConversationStore,
+        locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel? = nil,
+        peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore? = nil,
+        locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore? = nil
+    ) {
+        self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
+        self.conversations = conversations
+        self.locationChannelsModel = locationChannelsModel ?? LocationChannelsModel()
+        self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore ?? chatViewModel.peerIdentityStore
+        self.locationPresenceStore = locationPresenceStore ?? chatViewModel.locationPresenceStore
+        self.allPeers = chatViewModel.allPeers
+
+        bind()
+        refresh()
+    }
+
+    func colorForMeshPeer(id peerID: PeerID, isDark: Bool) -> Color {
+        chatViewModel.colorForMeshPeer(id: peerID, isDark: isDark)
+    }
+
+    func colorForGeohashPerson(id: String, isDark: Bool) -> Color {
+        chatViewModel.colorForNostrPubkey(id, isDark: isDark)
+    }
+
+    func participantCount(for geohash: String) -> Int {
+        chatViewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: geohash)
+    }
+
+    func startConversation(with peerID: PeerID) {
+        chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
+    }
+
+    func toggleFavorite(peerID: PeerID) {
+        chatViewModel.toggleFavorite(peerID: peerID)
+    }
+
+    func openGeohashDirectMessage(with pubkeyHex: String) {
+        chatViewModel.startGeohashDM(withPubkeyHex: pubkeyHex)
+    }
+
+    func blockGeohashUser(pubkeyHexLowercased: String, displayName: String) {
+        chatViewModel.blockGeohashUser(
+            pubkeyHexLowercased: pubkeyHexLowercased,
+            displayName: displayName
+        )
+    }
+
+    func unblockGeohashUser(pubkeyHexLowercased: String, displayName: String) {
+        chatViewModel.unblockGeohashUser(
+            pubkeyHexLowercased: pubkeyHexLowercased,
+            displayName: displayName
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func bind() {
+        chatViewModel.$allPeers
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] peers in
+                self?.allPeers = peers
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        chatViewModel.$nickname
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        locationPresenceStore.$teleportedGeo
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        conversations.$unreadConversations
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        peerIdentityStore.$encryptionStatuses
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        peerIdentityStore.$verifiedFingerprints
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: Notification.Name("peerStatusUpdated"))
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        chatViewModel.participantTracker.$visiblePeople
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        locationChannelsModel.$selectedChannel
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        locationChannelsModel.$teleported
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        locationChannelsModel.$availableChannels
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refresh()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+    }
+
+    private func refresh() {
+        let myPeerID = chatViewModel.meshService.myPeerID
+        let meshRows = allPeers.map { peer in
+            let isMe = peer.peerID == myPeerID
+            let verifiedBadge: Bool
+            if !isMe && !peer.isConnected,
+               let fingerprint = chatViewModel.getFingerprint(for: peer.peerID) {
+                verifiedBadge = peerIdentityStore.isVerified(fingerprint)
+            } else {
+                verifiedBadge = false
+            }
+
+            return MeshPeerRow(
+                peerID: peer.peerID,
+                displayName: isMe ? chatViewModel.nickname : peer.nickname,
+                isMe: isMe,
+                hasUnread: chatViewModel.hasUnreadMessages(for: peer.peerID),
+                isBlocked: !isMe && chatViewModel.isPeerBlocked(peer.peerID),
+                isFavorite: peer.favoriteStatus?.isFavorite ?? false,
+                isConnected: peer.isConnected,
+                isReachable: peer.isReachable,
+                isMutualFavorite: peer.isMutualFavorite,
+                encryptionStatus: chatViewModel.getEncryptionStatus(for: peer.peerID),
+                showsVerifiedBadgeWhenOffline: verifiedBadge
+            )
+        }
+
+        let meshCounts = meshRows.reduce(into: (reachable: 0, connected: 0)) { counts, row in
+            guard !row.isMe else { return }
+            if row.isConnected {
+                counts.connected += 1
+                counts.reachable += 1
+            } else if row.isReachable {
+                counts.reachable += 1
+            }
+        }
+
+        let geohashPeople = buildGeohashPeople()
+
+        self.meshRows = meshRows
+        reachableMeshPeerCount = meshCounts.reachable
+        connectedMeshPeerCount = meshCounts.connected
+        self.geohashPeople = geohashPeople
+        visibleGeohashPeerCount = geohashPeople.count
+        renderID = (
+            meshRows.map {
+                "\($0.id)-\($0.isConnected)-\($0.isReachable)-\($0.hasUnread)-\($0.isFavorite)-\($0.isBlocked)"
+            } +
+            geohashPeople.map {
+                "geo:\($0.id)-\($0.isTeleported)-\($0.isBlocked)-\($0.displayName)"
+            }
+        ).joined(separator: "|")
+    }
+
+    private func buildGeohashPeople() -> [GeohashPersonRow] {
+        let myHex = currentGeohashIdentityHex()
+        let teleportedSet = Set(locationPresenceStore.teleportedGeo.map { $0.lowercased() })
+
+        return chatViewModel.visibleGeohashPeople().map { person in
+            let isMe = person.id == myHex
+            return GeohashPersonRow(
+                id: person.id,
+                displayName: person.displayName,
+                isMe: isMe,
+                isTeleported: teleportedSet.contains(person.id.lowercased()) || (isMe && locationChannelsModel.teleported),
+                isBlocked: !isMe && chatViewModel.isGeohashUserBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: person.id)
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func currentGeohashIdentityHex() -> String? {
+        guard case .location(let channel) = locationChannelsModel.selectedChannel,
+              let identity = try? chatViewModel.idBridge.deriveIdentity(forGeohash: channel.geohash) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        return identity.publicKeyHex.lowercased()
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/PrivateConversationModels.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import Foundation
+
+/// Feature model for private (direct) conversations.
+///
+/// Reads the single-writer `ConversationStore` directly: `messages(for:)`
+/// returns the peer's conversation backing array (no mirror dictionary), and
+/// the store's typed `changes` subject drives invalidation — a change in the
+/// SELECTED peer's conversation republishes this model, while appends to
+/// other private chats only surface through the unread set. Direct
+/// conversations are keyed by raw routing peer ID; the coordinators'
+/// ephemeral/stable mirroring guarantees the selected peer's key always
+/// holds the full timeline (see `ConversationID.directPeer`).
+@MainActor
+final class PrivateInboxModel: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var selectedPeerID: PeerID?
+    @Published private(set) var unreadPeerIDs: Set<PeerID> = []
+
+    private let conversations: ConversationStore
+    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+
+    init(conversations: ConversationStore) {
+        self.conversations = conversations
+        self.selectedPeerID = conversations.selectedPrivatePeerID
+        self.unreadPeerIDs = conversations.unreadDirectRoutingPeerIDs()
+
+        bind()
+    }
+
+    func messages(for peerID: PeerID?) -> [BitchatMessage] {
+        guard let peerID else { return [] }
+        return conversations.conversationsByID[.directPeer(peerID)]?.messages ?? []
+    }
+
+    private func bind() {
+        conversations.$selectedPrivatePeerID
+            .dropFirst()
+            .sink { [weak self] peerID in
+                guard let self, self.selectedPeerID != peerID else { return }
+                self.selectedPeerID = peerID
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        conversations.changes
+            .sink { [weak self] change in
+                self?.apply(change)
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+    }
+
+    private func apply(_ change: ConversationChange) {
+        switch change {
+        case .appended(let id, _),
+             .updated(let id, _),
+             .statusChanged(let id, _, _),
+             .messageRemoved(let id, _),
+             .cleared(let id):
+            republishIfSelected(id)
+
+        case .unreadChanged(let id, _):
+            guard isDirect(id) else { return }
+            refreshUnreadPeerIDs()
+
+        case .removed(let id):
+            guard isDirect(id) else { return }
+            refreshUnreadPeerIDs()
+            republishIfSelected(id)
+
+        case .migrated(let source, let destination):
+            guard isDirect(source) || isDirect(destination) else { return }
+            refreshUnreadPeerIDs()
+            republishIfSelected(source)
+            republishIfSelected(destination)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func republishIfSelected(_ id: ConversationID) {
+        guard let selectedPeerID, id == .directPeer(selectedPeerID) else { return }
+        objectWillChange.send()
+    }
+
+    private func refreshUnreadPeerIDs() {
+        let next = conversations.unreadDirectRoutingPeerIDs()
+        guard unreadPeerIDs != next else { return }
+        unreadPeerIDs = next
+    }
+
+    private func isDirect(_ id: ConversationID) -> Bool {
+        if case .direct = id { return true }
+        return false
+    }
+}
+
+enum PrivateConversationAvailability: Equatable {
+    case bluetoothConnected
+    case meshReachable
+    case nostrAvailable
+    case offline
+}
+
+struct PrivateConversationHeaderState: Equatable {
+    let conversationPeerID: PeerID
+    let headerPeerID: PeerID
+    let displayName: String
+    let availability: PrivateConversationAvailability
+    let isFavorite: Bool
+    let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus?
+
+    var supportsFavoriteToggle: Bool {
+        !conversationPeerID.isGeoDM
+    }
+}
+
+@MainActor
+final class PrivateConversationModel: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var selectedPeerID: PeerID?
+    @Published private(set) var selectedHeaderState: PrivateConversationHeaderState?
+
+    private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
+    private let conversations: ConversationStore
+    private let locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel
+    private let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
+    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+
+    init(
+        chatViewModel: ChatViewModel,
+        conversations: ConversationStore,
+        locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel? = nil,
+        peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore? = nil
+    ) {
+        self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
+        self.conversations = conversations
+        self.locationChannelsModel = locationChannelsModel ?? LocationChannelsModel()
+        self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore ?? chatViewModel.peerIdentityStore
+        let initialPeerID = conversations.selectedPrivatePeerID
+        self.selectedPeerID = initialPeerID
+        self.selectedHeaderState = initialPeerID.flatMap { peerID in
+            makeHeaderState(for: peerID)
+        }
+
+        bind()
+    }
+
+    func startConversation(with peerID: PeerID) {
+        chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
+        refreshSelectedConversation()
+    }
+
+    func openConversation(for peerID: PeerID) {
+        if peerID.isGeoChat {
+            guard let full = chatViewModel.fullNostrHex(forSenderPeerID: peerID) else { return }
+            chatViewModel.startGeohashDM(withPubkeyHex: full)
+        } else {
+            chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
+        }
+
+        refreshSelectedConversation()
+    }
+
+    func endConversation() {
+        chatViewModel.endPrivateChat()
+        refreshSelectedConversation()
+    }
+
+    func toggleFavorite(peerID: PeerID) {
+        chatViewModel.toggleFavorite(peerID: peerID)
+        refreshSelectedConversation()
+    }
+
+    func toggleFavoriteForSelectedConversation() {
+        guard let headerPeerID = selectedHeaderState?.headerPeerID else { return }
+        toggleFavorite(peerID: headerPeerID)
+    }
+
+    func markMessagesAsRead(from peerID: PeerID) {
+        chatViewModel.markPrivateMessagesAsRead(from: peerID)
+    }
+
+    private func bind() {
+        conversations.$selectedPrivatePeerID
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        chatViewModel.$allPeers
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        peerIdentityStore.$encryptionStatuses
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .favoriteStatusChanged)
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: Notification.Name("peerStatusUpdated"))
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        locationChannelsModel.$selectedChannel
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+    }
+
+    private func refreshSelectedConversation() {
+        selectedPeerID = conversations.selectedPrivatePeerID
+        selectedHeaderState = selectedPeerID.flatMap { peerID in
+            makeHeaderState(for: peerID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func makeHeaderState(for conversationPeerID: PeerID) -> PrivateConversationHeaderState {
+        let headerPeerID = chatViewModel.getShortIDForNoiseKey(conversationPeerID)
+        let peer = chatViewModel.getPeer(byID: headerPeerID)
+        let displayName = resolveDisplayName(for: conversationPeerID, headerPeerID: headerPeerID, peer: peer)
+        let availability = resolveAvailability(for: headerPeerID, peer: peer)
+        let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus? = conversationPeerID.isGeoDM
+            ? nil
+            : chatViewModel.getEncryptionStatus(for: headerPeerID)
+
+        return PrivateConversationHeaderState(
+            conversationPeerID: conversationPeerID,
+            headerPeerID: headerPeerID,
+            displayName: displayName,
+            availability: availability,
+            isFavorite: chatViewModel.isFavorite(peerID: headerPeerID),
+            encryptionStatus: encryptionStatus
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func resolveDisplayName(
+        for conversationPeerID: PeerID,
+        headerPeerID: PeerID,
+        peer: BitchatPeer?
+    ) -> String {
+        if conversationPeerID.isGeoDM, case .location(let channel) = locationChannelsModel.selectedChannel {
+            return "#\(channel.geohash)/@\(chatViewModel.geohashDisplayName(for: conversationPeerID))"
+        }
+        if let displayName = peer?.displayName {
+            return displayName
+        }
+        if let nickname = chatViewModel.meshService.peerNickname(peerID: headerPeerID) {
+            return nickname
+        }
+        if let favorite = FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.getFavoriteStatus(
+            for: Data(hexString: headerPeerID.id) ?? Data()
+        ), !favorite.peerNickname.isEmpty {
+            return favorite.peerNickname
+        }
+        if headerPeerID.id.count == 16 {
+            let candidates = chatViewModel.identityManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(headerPeerID)
+            if let identity = candidates.first,
+               let social = chatViewModel.identityManager.getSocialIdentity(for: identity.fingerprint) {
+                if let pet = social.localPetname, !pet.isEmpty {
+                    return pet
+                }
+                if !social.claimedNickname.isEmpty {
+                    return social.claimedNickname
+                }
+            }
+        } else if let noiseKey = headerPeerID.noiseKey {
+            let fingerprint = noiseKey.sha256Fingerprint()
+            if let social = chatViewModel.identityManager.getSocialIdentity(for: fingerprint) {
+                if let pet = social.localPetname, !pet.isEmpty {
+                    return pet
+                }
+                if !social.claimedNickname.isEmpty {
+                    return social.claimedNickname
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        return String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer")
+    }
+
+    private func resolveAvailability(for headerPeerID: PeerID, peer: BitchatPeer?) -> PrivateConversationAvailability {
+        if let connectionState = peer?.connectionState {
+            switch connectionState {
+            case .bluetoothConnected:
+                return .bluetoothConnected
+            case .meshReachable:
+                return .meshReachable
+            case .nostrAvailable:
+                return .nostrAvailable
+            case .offline:
+                return .offline
+            }
+        }
+
+        if chatViewModel.meshService.isPeerReachable(headerPeerID) {
+            return .meshReachable
+        }
+        if let noiseKey = Data(hexString: headerPeerID.id),
+           let favoriteStatus = FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.getFavoriteStatus(for: noiseKey),
+           favoriteStatus.isMutual {
+            return .nostrAvailable
+        }
+        if chatViewModel.meshService.isPeerConnected(headerPeerID) || chatViewModel.connectedPeers.contains(headerPeerID) {
+            return .bluetoothConnected
+        }
+
+        return .offline
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/PublicChatModel.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import SwiftUI
+
+/// Feature model for the active public (mesh/geohash) timeline.
+///
+/// Observes ONE `Conversation` object in the single-writer
+/// `ConversationStore` — the active channel's — so appends to background
+/// conversations (other geohashes, private chats) never invalidate it.
+/// `messages` reads the observed conversation's backing array directly;
+/// there is no mirror copy.
+@MainActor
+final class PublicChatModel: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var activeChannel: ChannelID
+
+    /// The active public conversation's timeline.
+    var messages: [BitchatMessage] { activeConversation.messages }
+
+    private let conversations: ConversationStore
+    private var activeConversation: Conversation
+    private var activeConversationCancellable: AnyCancellable?
+    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+
+    init(conversations: ConversationStore) {
+        let channel = conversations.activeChannel
+        self.conversations = conversations
+        self.activeChannel = channel
+        self.activeConversation = conversations.conversation(for: ConversationID(channelID: channel))
+
+        observeActiveConversation()
+        bind()
+    }
+
+    private func bind() {
+        conversations.$activeChannel
+            .dropFirst()
+            .sink { [weak self] channel in
+                guard let self else { return }
+                self.activeChannel = channel
+                self.retargetActiveConversation(to: channel)
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        // The store replaces a conversation's object when it is removed
+        // (panic clear); retarget to the fresh instance so the observation
+        // never goes stale.
+        conversations.changes
+            .sink { [weak self] change in
+                guard let self,
+                      case .removed(let id) = change,
+                      id == self.activeConversation.id else { return }
+                self.retargetActiveConversation(to: self.activeChannel)
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+    }
+
+    private func retargetActiveConversation(to channel: ChannelID) {
+        let conversation = conversations.conversation(for: ConversationID(channelID: channel))
+        guard conversation !== activeConversation else {
+            // Same object (e.g. re-selected channel): keep the existing
+            // observation, but `messages` may still differ from what views
+            // last rendered, so republish.
+            objectWillChange.send()
+            return
+        }
+        objectWillChange.send()
+        activeConversation = conversation
+        observeActiveConversation()
+    }
+
+    private func observeActiveConversation() {
+        activeConversationCancellable = activeConversation.objectWillChange
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.objectWillChange.send()
+            }
+    }
+}

bitchat/App/VerificationModel.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Combine
+import Foundation
+
+struct FingerprintPresentationState: Equatable {
+    let statusPeerID: PeerID
+    let peerNickname: String
+    let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus
+    let theirFingerprint: String?
+    let myFingerprint: String
+    let isVerified: Bool
+
+    var canToggleVerification: Bool {
+        encryptionStatus == .noiseSecured || encryptionStatus == .noiseVerified
+    }
+}
+
+enum VerificationScanOutcome: Equatable {
+    case requested(String)
+    case notFound
+    case invalid
+}
+
+@MainActor
+final class VerificationModel: ObservableObject {
+    @Published private(set) var currentNickname: String
+    @Published private(set) var selectedPeerID: PeerID?
+
+    private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
+    private let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
+    private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+
+    init(
+        chatViewModel: ChatViewModel,
+        privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel,
+        peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore? = nil
+    ) {
+        self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
+        self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore ?? chatViewModel.peerIdentityStore
+        self.currentNickname = chatViewModel.nickname
+        self.selectedPeerID = privateConversationModel.selectedPeerID
+
+        bind(privateConversationModel: privateConversationModel)
+    }
+
+    func myQRString() -> String {
+        let npub = try? chatViewModel.idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity()?.npub
+        return VerificationService.shared.buildMyQRString(nickname: currentNickname, npub: npub) ?? ""
+    }
+
+    func beginQRVerification(with qr: VerificationService.VerificationQR) -> Bool {
+        chatViewModel.beginQRVerification(with: qr)
+    }
+
+    func verifyScannedPayload(_ payload: String) -> VerificationScanOutcome {
+        guard let qr = VerificationService.shared.verifyScannedQR(payload) else {
+            return .invalid
+        }
+
+        guard chatViewModel.beginQRVerification(with: qr) else {
+            return .notFound
+        }
+
+        return .requested(qr.nickname)
+    }
+
+    func verifyFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) {
+        chatViewModel.verifyFingerprint(for: peerID)
+    }
+
+    func unverifyFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) {
+        chatViewModel.unverifyFingerprint(for: peerID)
+    }
+
+    func isVerified(peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
+        guard let fingerprint = chatViewModel.getFingerprint(for: peerID) else { return false }
+        return peerIdentityStore.isVerified(fingerprint)
+    }
+
+    func fingerprintPresentation(for peerID: PeerID) -> FingerprintPresentationState {
+        let statusPeerID = chatViewModel.getShortIDForNoiseKey(peerID)
+        let encryptionStatus = chatViewModel.getEncryptionStatus(for: statusPeerID)
+        let theirFingerprint = chatViewModel.getFingerprint(for: statusPeerID)
+        let peerNickname = resolveDisplayName(for: peerID, statusPeerID: statusPeerID)
+
+        return FingerprintPresentationState(
+            statusPeerID: statusPeerID,
+            peerNickname: peerNickname,
+            encryptionStatus: encryptionStatus,
+            theirFingerprint: theirFingerprint,
+            myFingerprint: chatViewModel.getMyFingerprint(),
+            isVerified: theirFingerprint.map { peerIdentityStore.isVerified($0) } ?? false
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func bind(privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel) {
+        chatViewModel.$nickname
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$currentNickname)
+
+        privateConversationModel.$selectedPeerID
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .assign(to: &$selectedPeerID)
+
+        peerIdentityStore.$encryptionStatuses
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.objectWillChange.send()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        peerIdentityStore.$verifiedFingerprints
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.objectWillChange.send()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+
+        chatViewModel.$allPeers
+            .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.objectWillChange.send()
+            }
+            .store(in: &cancellables)
+    }
+
+    private func resolveDisplayName(for peerID: PeerID, statusPeerID: PeerID) -> String {
+        if let peer = chatViewModel.getPeer(byID: statusPeerID) {
+            return peer.displayName
+        }
+        if let name = chatViewModel.meshService.peerNickname(peerID: statusPeerID) {
+            return name
+        }
+        if let data = peerID.noiseKey {
+            if let favorite = FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.getFavoriteStatus(for: data),
+               !favorite.peerNickname.isEmpty {
+                return favorite.peerNickname
+            }
+            let fingerprint = data.sha256Fingerprint()
+            if let social = chatViewModel.identityManager.getSocialIdentity(for: fingerprint) {
+                if let pet = social.localPetname, !pet.isEmpty {
+                    return pet
+                }
+                if !social.claimedNickname.isEmpty {
+                    return social.claimedNickname
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        return String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Label for an unknown peer")
+    }
+}

bitchat/Assets.xcassets/AppIconDebug.appiconset/Contents.json

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
           "value" : "dark"
         }
       ],
-      "filename" : "image-1024 1.png",
       "idiom" : "universal",
       "platform" : "ios",
       "size" : "1024x1024"
@@ -25,7 +24,6 @@
           "value" : "tinted"
         }
       ],
-      "filename" : "image-1024 2.png",
       "idiom" : "universal",
       "platform" : "ios",
       "size" : "1024x1024"

bitchat/BitchatApp.swift

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 
-import Tor
 import SwiftUI
 import UserNotifications
 
@@ -15,111 +14,49 @@ struct BitchatApp: App {
     static let bundleID = Bundle.main.bundleIdentifier ?? "chat.bitchat"
     static let groupID = "group.\(bundleID)"
 
-    @StateObject private var chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
+    @StateObject private var runtime: AppRuntime
+    @AppStorage(AppTheme.storageKey) private var appThemeRawValue = AppTheme.matrix.rawValue
     #if os(iOS)
     @Environment(\.scenePhase) var scenePhase
     @UIApplicationDelegateAdaptor(AppDelegate.self) var appDelegate
-    // Skip the very first .active-triggered Tor restart on cold launch
-    @State private var didHandleInitialActive: Bool = false
-    @State private var didEnterBackground: Bool = false
     #elseif os(macOS)
     @NSApplicationDelegateAdaptor(MacAppDelegate.self) var appDelegate
     #endif
 
     init() {
-        let keychain = KeychainManager()
+        _runtime = StateObject(wrappedValue: AppRuntime())
-        _chatViewModel = StateObject(
-            wrappedValue: ChatViewModel(
-                keychain: keychain,
-                identityManager: SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain)
-            )
-        )
-        
         UNUserNotificationCenter.current().delegate = NotificationDelegate.shared
-        // Warm up georelay directory and refresh if stale (once/day)
-        GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded()
     }
 
     var body: some Scene {
         WindowGroup {
             ContentView()
-                .environmentObject(chatViewModel)
+                .environment(\.appTheme, AppTheme(rawValue: appThemeRawValue) ?? .matrix)
+                .environmentObject(runtime.publicChatModel)
+                .environmentObject(runtime.privateInboxModel)
+                .environmentObject(runtime.privateConversationModel)
+                .environmentObject(runtime.verificationModel)
+                .environmentObject(runtime.conversationUIModel)
+                .environmentObject(runtime.locationChannelsModel)
+                .environmentObject(runtime.peerListModel)
+                .environmentObject(runtime.appChromeModel)
                 .onAppear {
-                    NotificationDelegate.shared.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
+                    appDelegate.runtime = runtime
-                    // Inject live Noise service into VerificationService to avoid creating new BLE instances
+                    runtime.start()
-                    VerificationService.shared.configure(with: chatViewModel.meshService.getNoiseService())
-                    // Prewarm Nostr identity and QR to make first VERIFY sheet fast
-                    DispatchQueue.global(qos: .utility).async {
-                        let npub = try? NostrIdentityBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity()?.npub
-                        _ = VerificationService.shared.buildMyQRString(nickname: chatViewModel.nickname, npub: npub)
-                    }
-                    #if os(iOS)
-                    appDelegate.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
-                    #elseif os(macOS)
-                    appDelegate.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
-                    #endif
-                    // Initialize network activation policy; will start Tor/Nostr only when allowed
-                    NetworkActivationService.shared.start()
-                    // Check for shared content
-                    checkForSharedContent()
                 }
                 .onOpenURL { url in
-                    handleURL(url)
+                    runtime.handleOpenURL(url)
                 }
                 #if os(iOS)
                 .onChange(of: scenePhase) { newPhase in
-                    switch newPhase {
+                    runtime.handleScenePhaseChange(newPhase)
-                    case .background:
-                        // Keep BLE mesh running in background; BLEService adapts scanning automatically
-                        // Always send Tor to dormant on background for a clean restart later.
-                        TorManager.shared.setAppForeground(false)
-                        TorManager.shared.goDormantOnBackground()
-                        // Stop geohash sampling while backgrounded
-                        Task { @MainActor in
-                            chatViewModel.endGeohashSampling()
-                        }
-                        // Proactively disconnect Nostr to avoid spurious socket errors while Tor is down
-                        NostrRelayManager.shared.disconnect()
-                        didEnterBackground = true
-                    case .active:
-                        // Restart services when becoming active
-                        chatViewModel.meshService.startServices()
-                        TorManager.shared.setAppForeground(true)
-                        // On initial cold launch, Tor was just started in onAppear.
-                        // Skip the deterministic restart the first time we become active.
-                        if didHandleInitialActive && didEnterBackground {
-                            if TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() && !TorManager.shared.isReady {
-                                TorManager.shared.ensureRunningOnForeground()
-                            }
-                        } else {
-                            didHandleInitialActive = true
-                        }
-                        didEnterBackground = false
-                        if TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() {
-                            Task.detached {
-                                let _ = await TorManager.shared.awaitReady(timeout: 60)
-                                await MainActor.run {
-                                    // Rebuild proxied sessions to bind to the live Tor after readiness
-                                    TorURLSession.shared.rebuild()
-                                    // Reconnect Nostr via fresh sessions; will gate until Tor 100%
-                                    NostrRelayManager.shared.resetAllConnections()
-                                }
-                            }
-                        }
-                        checkForSharedContent()
-                    case .inactive:
-                        break
-                    @unknown default:
-                        break
-                    }
                 }
                 .onReceive(NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: UIApplication.didBecomeActiveNotification)) { _ in
-                    // Check for shared content when app becomes active
+                    runtime.handleDidBecomeActiveNotification()
-                    checkForSharedContent()
                 }
                 #elseif os(macOS)
                 .onReceive(NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: NSApplication.didBecomeActiveNotification)) { _ in
-                    // App became active
+                    runtime.handleMacDidBecomeActiveNotification()
                 }
                 #endif
         }
@@ -128,62 +65,18 @@ struct BitchatApp: App {
         .windowResizability(.contentSize)
         #endif
     }
-    
-    private func handleURL(_ url: URL) {
-        if url.scheme == "bitchat" && url.host == "share" {
-            // Handle shared content
-            checkForSharedContent()
-        }
-    }
-    
-    private func checkForSharedContent() {
-        // Check app group for shared content from extension
-        guard let userDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: BitchatApp.groupID) else {
-            return
-        }
-        
-        guard let sharedContent = userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContent"),
-              let sharedDate = userDefaults.object(forKey: "sharedContentDate") as? Date else {
-            return
-        }
-        
-        // Only process if shared within configured window
-        if Date().timeIntervalSince(sharedDate) < TransportConfig.uiShareAcceptWindowSeconds {
-            let contentType = userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContentType") ?? "text"
-            
-            // Clear the shared content
-            userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContent")
-            userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentType")
-            userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentDate")
-            // No need to force synchronize here
-            
-            // Send the shared content immediately on the main queue
-            DispatchQueue.main.async {
-                if contentType == "url" {
-                    // Try to parse as JSON first
-                    if let data = sharedContent.data(using: .utf8),
-                       let urlData = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: String],
-                       let url = urlData["url"] {
-                        // Send plain URL
-                        self.chatViewModel.sendMessage(url)
-                    } else {
-                        // Fallback to simple URL
-                        self.chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
-                    }
-                } else {
-                    self.chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
 }
 
 #if os(iOS)
 final class AppDelegate: NSObject, UIApplicationDelegate {
-    weak var chatViewModel: ChatViewModel?
+    weak var runtime: AppRuntime?
 
     func application(_ application: UIApplication, didFinishLaunchingWithOptions launchOptions: [UIApplication.LaunchOptionsKey : Any]? = nil) -> Bool {
-        return true
+        true
+    }
+
+    func applicationWillTerminate(_ application: UIApplication) {
+        runtime?.applicationWillTerminate()
     }
 }
 #endif
@@ -192,44 +85,29 @@ final class AppDelegate: NSObject, UIApplicationDelegate {
 import AppKit
 
 final class MacAppDelegate: NSObject, NSApplicationDelegate {
-    weak var chatViewModel: ChatViewModel?
+    weak var runtime: AppRuntime?
 
     func applicationWillTerminate(_ notification: Notification) {
-        chatViewModel?.applicationWillTerminate()
+        runtime?.applicationWillTerminate()
     }
 
     func applicationShouldTerminateAfterLastWindowClosed(_ sender: NSApplication) -> Bool {
-        return true
+        true
     }
 }
 #endif
 
 final class NotificationDelegate: NSObject, UNUserNotificationCenterDelegate {
     static let shared = NotificationDelegate()
-    weak var chatViewModel: ChatViewModel?
+    weak var runtime: AppRuntime?
 
     func userNotificationCenter(_ center: UNUserNotificationCenter, didReceive response: UNNotificationResponse, withCompletionHandler completionHandler: @escaping () -> Void) {
         let identifier = response.notification.request.identifier
         let userInfo = response.notification.request.content.userInfo
 
-        // Check if this is a private message notification
+        Task { @MainActor in
-        if identifier.hasPrefix("private-") {
+            self.runtime?.handleNotificationResponse(identifier: identifier, userInfo: userInfo)
-            // Get peer ID from userInfo
-            if let peerID = userInfo["peerID"] as? String {
-                DispatchQueue.main.async {
-                    self.chatViewModel?.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
         }
-            }
-        }
-        // Handle deeplink (e.g., geohash activity)
-        if let deep = userInfo["deeplink"] as? String, let url = URL(string: deep) {
-            #if os(iOS)
-            DispatchQueue.main.async { UIApplication.shared.open(url) }
-            #else
-            DispatchQueue.main.async { NSWorkspace.shared.open(url) }
-            #endif
-        }
-        
         completionHandler()
     }
 
@@ -237,34 +115,12 @@ final class NotificationDelegate: NSObject, UNUserNotificationCenterDelegate {
         let identifier = notification.request.identifier
         let userInfo = notification.request.content.userInfo
 
-        // Check if this is a private message notification
+        Task {
-        if identifier.hasPrefix("private-") {
+            let options = await self.runtime?.presentationOptions(
-            // Get peer ID from userInfo
+                forNotificationIdentifier: identifier,
-            if let peerID = userInfo["peerID"] as? String {
+                userInfo: userInfo
-                // Don't show notification if the private chat is already open
+            ) ?? [.banner, .sound]
-                if chatViewModel?.selectedPrivateChatPeer == peerID {
+            completionHandler(options)
-                    completionHandler([])
-                    return
         }
     }
-        }
-        // Suppress geohash activity notification if we're already in that geohash channel
-        if identifier.hasPrefix("geo-activity-"),
-           let deep = userInfo["deeplink"] as? String,
-           let gh = deep.components(separatedBy: "/").last {
-            if case .location(let ch) = LocationChannelManager.shared.selectedChannel, ch.geohash == gh {
-                completionHandler([])
-                return
-            }
-        }
-        
-        // Show notification in all other cases
-        completionHandler([.banner, .sound])
-    }
-}
-
-extension String {
-    var nilIfEmpty: String? {
-        self.isEmpty ? nil : self
-    }
 }

bitchat/Features/media/ImageUtils.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+import Foundation
+import ImageIO
+import UniformTypeIdentifiers
+#if os(iOS)
+import UIKit
+#else
+import AppKit
+#endif
+
+enum ImageUtilsError: Error {
+    case invalidImage
+    case encodingFailed
+}
+
+enum ImageUtils {
+    private static let compressionQuality: CGFloat = 0.82
+    private static let targetImageBytes: Int = 45_000
+    private static let maxSourceImageBytes: Int = 10 * 1024 * 1024
+
+    static func processImage(at url: URL, maxDimension: CGFloat = 448, outputDirectory: URL? = nil) throws -> URL {
+        try validateImageSource(at: url)
+
+        let data = try Data(contentsOf: url)
+        #if os(iOS)
+        guard let image = UIImage(data: data) else { throw ImageUtilsError.invalidImage }
+        return try processImage(image, maxDimension: maxDimension, outputDirectory: outputDirectory)
+        #else
+        guard let image = NSImage(data: data) else { throw ImageUtilsError.invalidImage }
+        return try processImage(image, maxDimension: maxDimension, outputDirectory: outputDirectory)
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    static func validateImageSource(at url: URL) throws {
+        // Security H1: Check file size BEFORE reading into memory.
+        let attrs = try FileManager.default.attributesOfItem(atPath: url.path)
+        guard let fileSize = attrs[.size] as? Int,
+              fileSize > 0,
+              fileSize <= maxSourceImageBytes else {
+            throw ImageUtilsError.invalidImage
+        }
+
+        let options = [kCGImageSourceShouldCache: false] as CFDictionary
+        guard let source = CGImageSourceCreateWithURL(url as CFURL, options),
+              CGImageSourceGetType(source) != nil else {
+            throw ImageUtilsError.invalidImage
+        }
+    }
+
+    #if os(iOS)
+    static func processImage(_ image: UIImage, maxDimension: CGFloat = 448, outputDirectory: URL? = nil) throws -> URL {
+        return try autoreleasepool {
+            // Scale the image first
+            let scaled = scaledImage(image, maxDimension: maxDimension)
+
+            // Get CGImage from UIImage - this is the key to stripping metadata
+            guard let cgImage = scaled.cgImage else {
+                throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
+            }
+
+            // Use CGImageDestination to encode without metadata (same as macOS)
+            var quality = compressionQuality
+            guard var jpegData = encodeJPEG(from: cgImage, quality: quality) else {
+                throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
+            }
+
+            // Compress to target size
+            while jpegData.count > targetImageBytes && quality > 0.3 {
+                quality -= 0.1
+                autoreleasepool {
+                    if let next = encodeJPEG(from: cgImage, quality: quality) {
+                        jpegData = next
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            let outputURL = try makeOutputURL(outputDirectory: outputDirectory)
+            try jpegData.write(to: outputURL, options: .atomic)
+            return outputURL
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static func scaledImage(_ image: UIImage, maxDimension: CGFloat) -> UIImage {
+        let size = image.size
+        let maxSide = max(size.width, size.height)
+        guard maxSide > maxDimension else { return image }
+        let scale = maxDimension / maxSide
+        let newSize = CGSize(width: size.width * scale, height: size.height * scale)
+
+        // Draw into a new context to get a clean CGImage without metadata
+        UIGraphicsBeginImageContextWithOptions(newSize, true, 1.0)
+        image.draw(in: CGRect(origin: .zero, size: newSize))
+        let rendered = UIGraphicsGetImageFromCurrentImageContext()
+        UIGraphicsEndImageContext()
+        return rendered ?? image
+    }
+
+    // Shared EXIF-stripping JPEG encoder for both iOS and macOS
+    private static func encodeJPEG(from cgImage: CGImage, quality: CGFloat) -> Data? {
+        guard let data = CFDataCreateMutable(nil, 0) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        guard let destination = CGImageDestinationCreateWithData(data, UTType.jpeg.identifier as CFString, 1, nil) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        // Security: Strip ALL metadata (EXIF, GPS, TIFF, IPTC, XMP)
+        // By only specifying compression quality and no metadata keys,
+        // we ensure a clean JPEG with no privacy-leaking information
+        let options: [CFString: Any] = [
+            kCGImageDestinationLossyCompressionQuality: quality
+        ]
+        CGImageDestinationAddImage(destination, cgImage, options as CFDictionary)
+        guard CGImageDestinationFinalize(destination) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return data as Data
+    }
+    #else
+    static func processImage(_ image: NSImage, maxDimension: CGFloat = 448, outputDirectory: URL? = nil) throws -> URL {
+        return try autoreleasepool {
+            let scaled = scaledImage(image, maxDimension: maxDimension)
+            guard let inputCG = scaled.cgImage(forProposedRect: nil, context: nil, hints: nil) else {
+                throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
+            }
+            let width = inputCG.width
+            let height = inputCG.height
+            let colorSpace = CGColorSpace(name: CGColorSpace.sRGB) ?? CGColorSpaceCreateDeviceRGB()
+            guard let context = CGContext(
+                data: nil,
+                width: width,
+                height: height,
+                bitsPerComponent: 8,
+                bytesPerRow: 0,
+                space: colorSpace,
+                bitmapInfo: CGImageAlphaInfo.premultipliedLast.rawValue
+            ) else {
+                throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
+            }
+            context.draw(inputCG, in: CGRect(x: 0, y: 0, width: width, height: height))
+            guard let cgImage = context.makeImage() else {
+                throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
+            }
+            var quality = compressionQuality
+            guard var jpegData = encodeJPEG(from: cgImage, quality: quality) else {
+                throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
+            }
+            while jpegData.count > targetImageBytes && quality > 0.3 {
+                quality -= 0.1
+                autoreleasepool {
+                    if let next = encodeJPEG(from: cgImage, quality: quality) {
+                        jpegData = next
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            let outputURL = try makeOutputURL(outputDirectory: outputDirectory)
+            try jpegData.write(to: outputURL, options: .atomic)
+            return outputURL
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static func scaledImage(_ image: NSImage, maxDimension: CGFloat) -> NSImage {
+        let size = image.size
+        let maxSide = max(size.width, size.height)
+        guard maxSide > maxDimension else { return image }
+        let scale = maxDimension / maxSide
+        let newSize = NSSize(width: size.width * scale, height: size.height * scale)
+        let scaledImage = NSImage(size: newSize)
+        scaledImage.lockFocus()
+        image.draw(in: NSRect(origin: .zero, size: newSize),
+                   from: NSRect(origin: .zero, size: size),
+                   operation: .copy,
+                   fraction: 1.0)
+        scaledImage.unlockFocus()
+        return scaledImage
+    }
+
+    // Shared EXIF-stripping JPEG encoder for both iOS and macOS
+    private static func encodeJPEG(from cgImage: CGImage, quality: CGFloat) -> Data? {
+        guard let data = CFDataCreateMutable(nil, 0) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        guard let destination = CGImageDestinationCreateWithData(data, UTType.jpeg.identifier as CFString, 1, nil) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        // Security: Strip ALL metadata (EXIF, GPS, TIFF, IPTC, XMP)
+        // By only specifying compression quality and no metadata keys,
+        // we ensure a clean JPEG with no privacy-leaking information
+        let options: [CFString: Any] = [
+            kCGImageDestinationLossyCompressionQuality: quality
+        ]
+        CGImageDestinationAddImage(destination, cgImage, options as CFDictionary)
+        guard CGImageDestinationFinalize(destination) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return data as Data
+    }
+    #endif
+
+    private static func makeOutputURL(outputDirectory: URL? = nil) throws -> URL {
+        let formatter = DateFormatter()
+        formatter.dateFormat = "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
+        let fileName = "img_\(formatter.string(from: Date()))_\(UUID().uuidString).jpg"
+
+        let directory: URL
+        if let outputDirectory {
+            directory = outputDirectory
+        } else {
+            directory = try applicationFilesDirectory().appendingPathComponent("images/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
+        }
+        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: directory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
+        return directory.appendingPathComponent(fileName)
+    }
+
+    private static func applicationFilesDirectory() throws -> URL {
+        let base = try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
+        return base.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
+    }
+}

bitchat/Features/voice/VoiceNotePlaybackController.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+import Foundation
+import AVFoundation
+import BitLogger
+
+/// Controls playback for a single voice note and coordinates exclusive playback across the app.
+final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlayerDelegate {
+    @Published private(set) var isPlaying: Bool = false
+    @Published private(set) var currentTime: TimeInterval = 0
+    @Published private(set) var duration: TimeInterval = 0
+    @Published private(set) var progress: Double = 0
+
+    /// rounded so 4.9s shows "00:05"
+    var roundedDuration: Int {
+        guard duration.isFinite else { return 0 }
+        return Int(duration.rounded())
+    }
+
+    /// ceil so "00:01" stays visible until playback ends, capped to rounded duration
+    var remainingSeconds: Int {
+        let remaining = max(0, duration - currentTime)
+        return min(roundedDuration, Int(ceil(remaining)))
+    }
+
+    private var player: AVAudioPlayer?
+    private var timer: Timer?
+    private var url: URL
+
+    init(url: URL) {
+        self.url = url
+        super.init()
+        // Don't load anything eagerly - wait until user interaction or view is fully displayed
+    }
+
+    func loadDuration() {
+        guard duration == 0 else { return }
+
+        DispatchQueue.global(qos: .utility).async { [weak self] in
+            guard let self = self else { return }
+            do {
+                let player = try AVAudioPlayer(contentsOf: self.url)
+                let loadedDuration = player.duration
+                DispatchQueue.main.async { [weak self] in
+                    guard let self = self, self.duration == 0 else { return }
+                    self.duration = loadedDuration
+                }
+            } catch {
+                SecureLogger.error("Failed to load audio duration: \(error)", category: .session)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    deinit {
+        timer?.invalidate()
+    }
+
+    func replaceURL(_ url: URL) {
+        guard url != self.url else { return }
+        stop()
+        self.url = url
+        player = nil
+        duration = 0
+        // Duration will be loaded on demand when needed
+    }
+
+    func togglePlayback() {
+        isPlaying ? pause() : play()
+    }
+
+    func play() {
+        guard ensurePlayerReady() else { return }
+        VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.activate(self)
+        player?.play()
+        startTimer()
+        updateProgress()
+        isPlaying = true
+    }
+
+    func pause() {
+        player?.pause()
+        stopTimer()
+        updateProgress()
+        isPlaying = false
+    }
+
+    func stop() {
+        player?.stop()
+        player?.currentTime = 0
+        stopTimer()
+        updateProgress()
+        isPlaying = false
+        VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.deactivate(self)
+    }
+
+    func seek(to fraction: Double) {
+        guard ensurePlayerReady() else { return }
+        let clamped = max(0, min(1, fraction))
+        if let player = player {
+            player.currentTime = clamped * player.duration
+            if isPlaying {
+                player.play()
+            }
+            updateProgress()
+        }
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - AVAudioPlayerDelegate
+
+    func audioPlayerDidFinishPlaying(_ player: AVAudioPlayer, successfully flag: Bool) {
+        // Delegate callback may be on background thread - ensure main thread for UI updates
+        DispatchQueue.main.async { [weak self] in
+            guard let self = self else { return }
+            self.stopTimer()
+            self.updateProgress()
+            self.isPlaying = false
+            VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.deactivate(self)
+        }
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Private Helpers
+
+    private func preparePlayer(for url: URL) {
+        // Prepare player synchronously (only called when playback is requested)
+        do {
+            let player = try AVAudioPlayer(contentsOf: url)
+            player.delegate = self
+            player.prepareToPlay()
+            self.player = player
+            duration = player.duration
+            currentTime = player.currentTime
+            progress = duration > 0 ? currentTime / duration : 0
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error("Voice note playback failed for \(url.lastPathComponent): \(error)", category: .session)
+            player = nil
+            duration = 0
+            currentTime = 0
+            progress = 0
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func ensurePlayerReady() -> Bool {
+        if player == nil {
+            preparePlayer(for: url)
+        }
+        #if os(iOS)
+        let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
+        do {
+            try session.setCategory(.playback, mode: .spokenAudio, options: [.mixWithOthers])
+            try session.setActive(true, options: [])
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error("Failed to activate audio session: \(error)", category: .session)
+        }
+        #endif
+        return player != nil
+    }
+
+    private func startTimer() {
+        if timer != nil { return }
+        timer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: 0.05, repeats: true) { [weak self] _ in
+            self?.updateProgress()
+        }
+        if let timer = timer {
+            RunLoop.main.add(timer, forMode: .common)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func stopTimer() {
+        timer?.invalidate()
+        timer = nil
+    }
+
+    private func updateProgress() {
+        guard let player = player else {
+            currentTime = 0
+            duration = 0
+            progress = 0
+            return
+        }
+        currentTime = player.currentTime
+        duration = player.duration
+        progress = duration > 0 ? currentTime / duration : 0
+    }
+}
+
+/// Ensures only one voice note plays at a time.
+final class VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator {
+    static let shared = VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator()
+
+    private weak var activeController: VoiceNotePlaybackController?
+
+    private init() {}
+
+    func activate(_ controller: VoiceNotePlaybackController) {
+        if activeController === controller {
+            return
+        }
+        activeController?.pause()
+        activeController = controller
+    }
+
+    func deactivate(_ controller: VoiceNotePlaybackController) {
+        if activeController === controller {
+            activeController = nil
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/Features/voice/VoiceRecorder.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+import Foundation
+import AVFoundation
+
+/// Manages audio capture for mesh voice notes with predictable encoding settings.
+actor VoiceRecorder {
+    enum RecorderError: Error {
+        case microphoneAccessDenied
+        case recorderInitializationFailed
+        case recordingInProgress
+    }
+
+    static let shared = VoiceRecorder()
+
+    private let paddingInterval: TimeInterval = 0.5
+    private let maxRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 120
+    static let minRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 1
+
+    private var recorder: AVAudioRecorder?
+    private var currentURL: URL?
+
+    // MARK: - Permissions
+
+    nonisolated
+    func requestPermission() async -> Bool {
+        #if os(iOS)
+        return await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
+            AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().requestRecordPermission { granted in
+                continuation.resume(returning: granted)
+            }
+        }
+        #elseif os(macOS)
+        return await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
+            AVCaptureDevice.requestAccess(for: .audio) { granted in
+                continuation.resume(returning: granted)
+            }
+        }
+        #else
+        return true
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Recording Lifecycle
+
+    @discardableResult
+    func startRecording() throws -> URL {
+        if recorder?.isRecording == true {
+            throw RecorderError.recordingInProgress
+        }
+
+        #if os(iOS)
+        let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
+        guard session.recordPermission == .granted else {
+            throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied
+        }
+        #if targetEnvironment(simulator)
+        // allowBluetoothHFP is not available on iOS Simulator
+        try session.setCategory(
+            .playAndRecord,
+            mode: .default,
+            options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP]
+        )
+        #else
+        try session.setCategory(
+            .playAndRecord,
+            mode: .default,
+            options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP, .allowBluetoothHFP]
+        )
+        #endif
+        try session.setActive(true, options: .notifyOthersOnDeactivation)
+        #endif
+        #if os(macOS)
+        guard AVCaptureDevice.authorizationStatus(for: .audio) == .authorized else {
+            throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied
+        }
+        #endif
+
+        let outputURL = try makeOutputURL()
+        let settings: [String: Any] = [
+            AVFormatIDKey: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
+            AVSampleRateKey: 16_000,
+            AVNumberOfChannelsKey: 1,
+            AVEncoderBitRateKey: 16_000
+        ]
+
+        let audioRecorder = try AVAudioRecorder(url: outputURL, settings: settings)
+        audioRecorder.isMeteringEnabled = true
+        audioRecorder.prepareToRecord()
+        audioRecorder.record(forDuration: maxRecordingDuration)
+
+        recorder = audioRecorder
+        currentURL = outputURL
+        return outputURL
+    }
+
+    func stopRecording() async -> URL? {
+        guard let recorder, recorder.isRecording else {
+            return currentURL
+        }
+
+        let sessionURL = currentURL
+
+        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(paddingInterval * 1_000_000_000))
+
+        recorder.stop()
+
+        // A new session may have started during the sleep — don't touch its state
+        if self.recorder === recorder {
+            cleanupSession()
+            self.recorder = nil
+            currentURL = nil
+        }
+
+        return sessionURL
+    }
+
+    func cancelRecording() {
+        if let recorder, recorder.isRecording {
+            recorder.stop()
+        }
+        cleanupSession()
+        if let currentURL {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: currentURL)
+        }
+        recorder = nil
+        currentURL = nil
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Helpers
+
+    private func makeOutputURL() throws -> URL {
+        let formatter = DateFormatter()
+        formatter.dateFormat = "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
+        let fileName = "voice_\(formatter.string(from: Date())).m4a"
+
+        let baseDirectory = try applicationFilesDirectory().appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
+        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: baseDirectory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
+        return baseDirectory.appendingPathComponent(fileName)
+    }
+
+    private func applicationFilesDirectory() throws -> URL {
+        #if os(iOS)
+        return try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
+            .appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
+        #else
+        let base = try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
+        return base.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    private func cleanupSession() {
+        #if os(iOS)
+        try? AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().setActive(false, options: .notifyOthersOnDeactivation)
+        #endif
+    }
+}

bitchat/Features/voice/Waveform.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+import AVFoundation
+import Foundation
+import BitLogger
+
+/// Generates and caches downsampled waveforms for audio files so UI rendering is cheap.
+final class WaveformCache {
+    static let shared = WaveformCache()
+
+    private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "com.bitchat.waveform-cache", attributes: .concurrent)
+    private var cache: [URL: (waveform: [Float], lastAccess: Date)] = [:]
+    private let maxCacheSize = 20  // Limit cache to prevent unbounded memory growth
+
+    private init() {}
+
+    func cachedWaveform(for url: URL) -> [Float]? {
+        queue.sync {
+            guard let entry = cache[url] else { return nil }
+            return entry.waveform
+        }
+    }
+
+    func waveform(for url: URL, bins: Int = 120, completion: @escaping ([Float]) -> Void) {
+        queue.async { [weak self] in
+            guard let self = self else { return }
+
+            // Check cache (read-only, no update needed on cache hit for performance)
+            if let entry = self.cache[url] {
+                DispatchQueue.main.async { completion(entry.waveform) }
+                return
+            }
+
+            guard let computed = self.computeWaveform(url: url, bins: bins) else {
+                DispatchQueue.main.async { completion([]) }
+                return
+            }
+
+            self.queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
+                guard let self = self else { return }
+
+                // Evict oldest entry if cache is full
+                if self.cache.count >= self.maxCacheSize {
+                    if let oldest = self.cache.min(by: { $0.value.lastAccess < $1.value.lastAccess }) {
+                        self.cache.removeValue(forKey: oldest.key)
+                    }
+                }
+
+                self.cache[url] = (computed, Date())
+            }
+            DispatchQueue.main.async { completion(computed) }
+        }
+    }
+
+    func purge(url: URL) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
+            self?.cache.removeValue(forKey: url)
+        }
+    }
+
+    func purgeAll() {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
+            self?.cache.removeAll()
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func computeWaveform(url: URL, bins: Int) -> [Float]? {
+        guard bins > 0 else { return nil }
+        // Use autoreleasepool to manage memory from audio buffer allocations
+        return autoreleasepool {
+            do {
+                let audioFile = try AVAudioFile(forReading: url)
+                let length = Int(audioFile.length)
+                guard length > 0 else { return nil }
+
+                guard let buffer = AVAudioPCMBuffer(pcmFormat: audioFile.processingFormat, frameCapacity: AVAudioFrameCount(length)) else {
+                    return nil
+                }
+                try audioFile.read(into: buffer, frameCount: AVAudioFrameCount(length))
+                guard let channelData = buffer.floatChannelData else { return nil }
+
+                let channelCount = Int(audioFile.processingFormat.channelCount)
+                let frameLength = Int(buffer.frameLength)
+                let samplesPerBin = max(1, frameLength / bins)
+
+                var magnitudes: [Float] = Array(repeating: 0, count: bins)
+                for bin in 0..<bins {
+                    let start = bin * samplesPerBin
+                    let end = min(frameLength, start + samplesPerBin)
+                    if start >= end { break }
+
+                    var sum: Float = 0
+                    var sampleCount = 0
+                    for frame in start..<end {
+                        var sampleValue: Float = 0
+                        for channel in 0..<channelCount {
+                            sampleValue += fabsf(channelData[channel][frame])
+                        }
+                        sum += sampleValue / Float(channelCount)
+                        sampleCount += 1
+                    }
+                    magnitudes[bin] = sampleCount > 0 ? sum / Float(sampleCount) : 0
+                }
+
+                if let maxMagnitude = magnitudes.max(), maxMagnitude > 0 {
+                    magnitudes = magnitudes.map { min($0 / maxMagnitude, 1.0) }
+                }
+                return magnitudes
+            } catch {
+                SecureLogger.error("Waveform extraction failed for \(url.lastPathComponent): \(error)", category: .session)
+                return nil
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/Identity/IdentityModels.swift

@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
 ///
 
 import Foundation
+import BitFoundation
 
 // MARK: - Three-Layer Identity Model
 

bitchat/Identity/SecureIdentityStateManager.swift

@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
 ///
 
 import BitLogger
+import BitFoundation
 import Foundation
 import CryptoKit
 
@@ -150,39 +151,69 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     // Thread safety
     private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "bitchat.identity.state", attributes: .concurrent)
     
-    // Debouncing for keychain saves
+    // Pending-save coalescing flag. Reads/writes are serialized on `queue`.
-    private var saveTimer: Timer?
+    // Persistence is done with a fire-and-forget `queue.async(.barrier)` rather
-    private let saveDebounceInterval: TimeInterval = 2.0  // Save at most once every 2 seconds
+    // than a retained DispatchSourceTimer: a lingering, never-cancelled timer
+    // keeps the dispatch machinery alive and prevents the unit-test process from
+    // exiting. (The original code used Timer.scheduledTimer on a GCD queue with
+    // no run loop, so saves never actually fired.)
     private var pendingSave = false
 
     // Encryption key
     private let encryptionKey: SymmetricKey
+    /// True when `encryptionKey` is a throwaway generated this session because the
+    /// persisted key could not be read (device locked / access denied). In that
+    /// state we must NOT persist (it would overwrite the real cache with data the
+    /// next launch can't decrypt) and must NOT delete the existing cache.
+    private let encryptionKeyIsEphemeral: Bool
     
     init(_ keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
         self.keychain = keychain
 
-        // Generate or retrieve encryption key from keychain
+        // Retrieve (or, only on genuine first run, generate) the cache
+        // encryption key. We MUST distinguish "key doesn't exist yet" from a
+        // transient failure (device locked / access denied): the legacy
+        // getIdentityKey(forKey:) collapses both to nil, and generating+saving a
+        // new key deletes the existing one first — permanently orphaning the
+        // encrypted cache on a launch that merely couldn't read the key.
         let loadedKey: SymmetricKey
+        let keyIsEphemeral: Bool
 
-        // Try to load from keychain
+        switch keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: encryptionKeyName) {
-        if let keyData = keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: encryptionKeyName) {
+        case .success(let keyData):
             loadedKey = SymmetricKey(data: keyData)
+            keyIsEphemeral = false
             SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "identity cache encryption key", success: true)
-        }
+
-        // Generate new key if needed
+        case .itemNotFound:
-        else {
+            // Genuine first run: generate and persist a new key.
-            loadedKey = SymmetricKey(size: .bits256)
+            let newKey = SymmetricKey(size: .bits256)
-            let keyData = loadedKey.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
+            let keyData = newKey.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
-            // Save to keychain
             let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: encryptionKeyName)
+            loadedKey = newKey
+            // If even the save failed, treat the key as ephemeral so we don't
+            // later try to persist a cache the next launch can't read.
+            keyIsEphemeral = !saved
             SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.generate, keyType: "identity cache encryption key", success: saved)
+
+        case .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed, .accessDenied, .otherError:
+            // Transient/critical read failure. Do NOT overwrite the persisted
+            // key. Use a session-only ephemeral key; the real key and cache are
+            // left intact for a healthy launch.
+            SecureLogger.warning("Identity cache key unavailable; using ephemeral key for this session (not persisting)", category: .security)
+            loadedKey = SymmetricKey(size: .bits256)
+            keyIsEphemeral = true
         }
 
         self.encryptionKey = loadedKey
+        self.encryptionKeyIsEphemeral = keyIsEphemeral
 
-        // Load identity cache on init
+        // Only read the persisted cache when we hold the real key; with an
+        // ephemeral key the decrypt would fail and discard the real cache.
+        if !keyIsEphemeral {
             loadIdentityCache()
         }
+    }
     
     deinit {
         forceSave()
@@ -201,28 +232,37 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
             let decryptedData = try AES.GCM.open(sealedBox, using: encryptionKey)
             cache = try JSONDecoder().decode(IdentityCache.self, from: decryptedData)
         } catch {
-            // Log error but continue with empty cache
+            cache = IdentityCache()
-            SecureLogger.error(error, context: "Failed to load identity cache", category: .security)
+            let deleted = keychain.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: cacheKey)
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "Discarded unreadable identity cache; starting fresh (deleted=\(deleted), error=\(error.localizedDescription))",
+                category: .security
+            )
         }
     }
     
+    /// Persists the cache. Always invoked on `queue` under a barrier (its callers
+    /// run inside `queue.async(.barrier)`), so it simply marks the cache dirty
+    /// and persists it on the same serialized context — no timer, nothing left
+    /// scheduled to keep the process alive.
     private func saveIdentityCache() {
-        // Mark that we need to save
         pendingSave = true
-        
+        performSave()
-        // Cancel any existing timer
-        saveTimer?.invalidate()
-        
-        // Schedule a new save after the debounce interval
-        saveTimer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: saveDebounceInterval, repeats: false) { [weak self] _ in
-            self?.performSave()
-        }
     }
 
+    /// Writes the cache to the keychain. Must run on `queue` with exclusive
+    /// (barrier) access.
     private func performSave() {
         guard pendingSave else { return }
         pendingSave = false
 
+        // Never persist under an ephemeral key — it would overwrite the real
+        // cache with data the next launch cannot decrypt.
+        guard !encryptionKeyIsEphemeral else {
+            SecureLogger.debug("Skipping identity cache save (ephemeral key this session)", category: .security)
+            return
+        }
+
         do {
             let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(cache)
             let sealedBox = try AES.GCM.seal(data, using: encryptionKey)
@@ -235,9 +275,13 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
         }
     }
 
-    // Force immediate save (for app termination)
+    // Force immediate save (for app termination / lifecycle events). Mutations
+    // already persist synchronously via saveIdentityCache, so this is normally a
+    // no-op (performSave early-returns when nothing is pending). Runs directly on
+    // the caller's thread — deliberately NOT a `queue.sync(barrier)`, which is
+    // reachable from `deinit` and from async tests on the swift-concurrency
+    // cooperative pool where a blocking barrier-sync can starve/deadlock it.
     func forceSave() {
-        saveTimer?.invalidate()
         performSave()
     }
     
@@ -331,16 +375,15 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     
     func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) {
         queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+            let previousClaimedNickname = self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint]?.claimedNickname
             self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint] = identity
             
             // Update nickname index
-            if let existingIdentity = self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint] {
+            if let previousClaimedNickname,
-                // Remove old nickname from index if changed
+               previousClaimedNickname != identity.claimedNickname {
-                if existingIdentity.claimedNickname != identity.claimedNickname {
+                self.cache.nicknameIndex[previousClaimedNickname]?.remove(identity.fingerprint)
-                    self.cache.nicknameIndex[existingIdentity.claimedNickname]?.remove(identity.fingerprint)
+                if self.cache.nicknameIndex[previousClaimedNickname]?.isEmpty == true {
-                    if self.cache.nicknameIndex[existingIdentity.claimedNickname]?.isEmpty == true {
+                    self.cache.nicknameIndex.removeValue(forKey: previousClaimedNickname)
-                        self.cache.nicknameIndex.removeValue(forKey: existingIdentity.claimedNickname)
-                    }
                 }
             }
             
@@ -532,4 +575,16 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
             return cache.verifiedFingerprints
         }
     }
+
+    var debugNicknameIndex: [String: Set<String>] {
+        queue.sync { cache.nicknameIndex }
+    }
+
+    func debugEphemeralSession(for peerID: PeerID) -> EphemeralIdentity? {
+        queue.sync { ephemeralSessions[peerID] }
+    }
+
+    func debugLastInteraction(for fingerprint: String) -> Date? {
+        queue.sync { cache.lastInteractions[fingerprint] }
+    }
 }

bitchat/Info.plist

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
 <plist version="1.0">
 <dict>
+	<key>AppGroupID</key>
+	<string>$(APP_GROUP_ID)</string>
 	<key>CFBundleDevelopmentRegion</key>
 	<string>$(DEVELOPMENT_LANGUAGE)</string>
 	<key>CFBundleDisplayName</key>
@@ -39,6 +41,10 @@
 	<string>bitchat uses the camera to scan QR codes to verify peers.</string>
 	<key>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription</key>
 	<string>bitchat uses your approximate location to compute local geohash channels for optional public chats. Exact GPS is never shared.</string>
+	<key>NSMicrophoneUsageDescription</key>
+	<string>bitchat uses the microphone to record voice notes that relay across the mesh.</string>
+	<key>NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription</key>
+	<string>bitchat lets you pick images from your photo library to share with nearby peers.</string>
 	<key>UIBackgroundModes</key>
 	<array>
 		<string>bluetooth-central</string>

bitchat/Models/BitchatMessage+Media.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+//
+// BitchatMessage+Media.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+extension BitchatMessage {
+    enum Media {
+        case voice(URL)
+        case image(URL)
+
+        var url: URL {
+            switch self {
+            case .voice(let url), .image(let url):
+                return url
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Cache the directory lookup to avoid repeated FileManager calls during view rendering
+    private struct Cache {
+        let filesDir: URL?
+
+        static let shared = Cache()
+        private init() {
+            do {
+                let base = try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
+                let filesDir = base.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
+                try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: filesDir, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
+                self.filesDir = filesDir
+            } catch {
+                filesDir = nil
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    func mediaAttachment(for nickname: String) -> Media? {
+        guard let baseDirectory = Cache.shared.filesDir else { return nil }
+
+        func url(for category: MimeType.Category) -> URL? {
+            guard content.hasPrefix(category.messagePrefix),
+                  let filename = String(content.dropFirst(category.messagePrefix.count)).trimmedOrNilIfEmpty
+            else {
+                return nil
+            }
+
+            // Check outgoing first for sent messages, incoming for received
+            let subdir = sender == nickname ? "\(category.mediaDir)/outgoing" : "\(category.mediaDir)/incoming"
+
+            // Construct URL directly without fileExists check (avoids blocking disk I/O in view body)
+            // Files are checked during playback/display, so missing files fail gracefully
+            let directory = baseDirectory.appendingPathComponent(subdir, isDirectory: true)
+            return directory.appendingPathComponent(filename)
+        }
+
+        if let url = url(for: .audio) {
+            return .voice(url)
+        }
+        if let url = url(for: .image) {
+            return .image(url)
+        }
+        return nil
+    }
+}

bitchat/Models/BitchatPeer.swift

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import Foundation
 import CoreBluetooth
+import BitFoundation
 
 /// Represents a peer in the BitChat network with all associated metadata
 struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {

bitchat/Models/CommandInfo.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+//
+// CommandsInfo.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import Foundation
+
+// MARK: - CommandInfo Enum
+
+enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
+    case block
+    case clear
+    case hug
+    case message = "dm"
+    case slap
+    case unblock
+    case who
+    case favorite
+    case unfavorite
+    
+    var id: String { rawValue }
+    
+    var alias: String { "/" + rawValue }
+    
+    var placeholder: String? {
+        switch self {
+        case .block, .hug, .message, .slap, .unblock, .favorite, .unfavorite:
+            return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.nickname_placeholder") + ">"
+        case .clear, .who:
+            return nil
+        }
+    }
+    
+    var description: String {
+        switch self {
+        case .block:        String(localized: "content.commands.block")
+        case .clear:        String(localized: "content.commands.clear")
+        case .hug:          String(localized: "content.commands.hug")
+        case .message:      String(localized: "content.commands.message")
+        case .slap:         String(localized: "content.commands.slap")
+        case .unblock:      String(localized: "content.commands.unblock")
+        case .who:          String(localized: "content.commands.who")
+        case .favorite:     String(localized: "content.commands.favorite")
+        case .unfavorite:   String(localized: "content.commands.unfavorite")
+        }
+    }
+    
+    static func all(isGeoPublic: Bool, isGeoDM: Bool) -> [CommandInfo] {
+        let baseCommands: [CommandInfo] = [.block, .unblock, .clear, .hug, .message, .slap, .who]
+        if isGeoPublic || isGeoDM {
+            return baseCommands + [.favorite, .unfavorite]
+        }
+        return baseCommands
+    }
+}

bitchat/Models/ReadReceipt.swift

@@ -7,15 +7,16 @@
 //
 
 import Foundation
+import BitFoundation
 
 struct ReadReceipt: Codable {
     let originalMessageID: String
     let receiptID: String
-    var readerID: String  // Who read it
+    var readerID: PeerID  // Who read it
     let readerNickname: String
     let timestamp: Date
     
-    init(originalMessageID: String, readerID: String, readerNickname: String) {
+    init(originalMessageID: String, readerID: PeerID, readerNickname: String) {
         self.originalMessageID = originalMessageID
         self.receiptID = UUID().uuidString
         self.readerID = readerID
@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ struct ReadReceipt: Codable {
     }
     
     // For binary decoding
-    private init(originalMessageID: String, receiptID: String, readerID: String, readerNickname: String, timestamp: Date) {
+    private init(originalMessageID: String, receiptID: String, readerID: PeerID, readerNickname: String, timestamp: Date) {
         self.originalMessageID = originalMessageID
         self.receiptID = receiptID
         self.readerID = readerID
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ struct ReadReceipt: Codable {
         data.appendUUID(receiptID)
         // ReaderID as 8-byte hex string
         var readerData = Data()
-        var tempID = readerID
+        var tempID = readerID.id
         while tempID.count >= 2 && readerData.count < 8 {
             let hexByte = String(tempID.prefix(2))
             if let byte = UInt8(hexByte, radix: 16) {
@@ -78,8 +79,8 @@ struct ReadReceipt: Codable {
               let receiptID = dataCopy.readUUID(at: &offset) else { return nil }
         
         guard let readerIDData = dataCopy.readFixedBytes(at: &offset, count: 8) else { return nil }
-        let readerID = readerIDData.hexEncodedString()
+        let readerID = PeerID(hexData: readerIDData)
-        guard PeerID(str: readerID).isValid else { return nil }
+        guard readerID.isValid else { return nil }
         
         guard let timestamp = dataCopy.readDate(at: &offset),
               InputValidator.validateTimestamp(timestamp),

bitchat/Models/RequestSyncPacket.swift

@@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ struct RequestSyncPacket {
     let p: Int
     let m: UInt32
     let data: Data
+    let types: SyncTypeFlags?
+    let sinceTimestamp: UInt64?
+    let fragmentIdFilter: String?
+
+    init(p: Int, m: UInt32, data: Data, types: SyncTypeFlags? = nil, sinceTimestamp: UInt64? = nil, fragmentIdFilter: String? = nil) {
+        self.p = p
+        self.m = m
+        self.data = data
+        self.types = types
+        self.sinceTimestamp = sinceTimestamp
+        self.fragmentIdFilter = fragmentIdFilter
+    }
 
     func encode() -> Data {
         var out = Data()
@@ -25,6 +37,16 @@ struct RequestSyncPacket {
         putTLV(0x02, withUnsafeBytes(of: &mBE) { Data($0) })
         // data
         putTLV(0x03, data)
+        if let typesData = types?.toData() {
+            putTLV(0x04, typesData)
+        }
+        if let ts = sinceTimestamp {
+            var tsBE = ts.bigEndian
+            putTLV(0x05, withUnsafeBytes(of: &tsBE) { Data($0) })
+        }
+        if let fid = fragmentIdFilter, let fidData = fid.data(using: .utf8) {
+            putTLV(0x06, fidData)
+        }
         return out
     }
     
@@ -33,6 +55,9 @@ struct RequestSyncPacket {
         var p: Int? = nil
         var m: UInt32? = nil
         var payload: Data? = nil
+        var types: SyncTypeFlags? = nil
+        var sinceTimestamp: UInt64? = nil
+        var fragmentIdFilter: String? = nil
 
         while off + 3 <= data.count {
             let t = Int(data[off]); off += 1
@@ -52,12 +77,26 @@ struct RequestSyncPacket {
             case 0x03:
                 if v.count > maxAcceptBytes { return nil }
                 payload = v
+            case 0x04:
+                if let decoded = SyncTypeFlags.decode(v) {
+                    types = decoded
+                }
+            case 0x05:
+                if v.count == 8 {
+                    var ts: UInt64 = 0
+                    for b in v { ts = (ts << 8) | UInt64(b) }
+                    sinceTimestamp = ts
+                }
+            case 0x06:
+                if let fid = String(data: v, encoding: .utf8) {
+                    fragmentIdFilter = fid
+                }
             default:
                 break // forward compatible; ignore unknown TLVs
             }
         }
 
-        guard let pp = p, let mm = m, let dd = payload, pp >= 1, mm > 0 else { return nil }
+        guard let pp = p, let mm = m, let dd = payload, pp >= 1, pp <= GCSFilter.maxP, mm > 0 else { return nil }
-        return RequestSyncPacket(p: pp, m: mm, data: dd)
+        return RequestSyncPacket(p: pp, m: mm, data: dd, types: types, sinceTimestamp: sinceTimestamp, fragmentIdFilter: fragmentIdFilter)
     }
 }

bitchat/Noise/NoiseProtocol.swift

@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
 ///
 
 import BitLogger
+import BitFoundation
 import Foundation
 import CryptoKit
 
@@ -165,8 +166,12 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
     // MARK: - Sliding Window Replay Protection
     
     /// Check if nonce is valid for replay protection
+    /// BCH-01-010: Use safe arithmetic to prevent integer overflow
     private func isValidNonce(_ receivedNonce: UInt64) -> Bool {
-        if receivedNonce + UInt64(Self.REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE) <= highestReceivedNonce {
+        // Safe overflow check: instead of (receivedNonce + WINDOW_SIZE <= highest)
+        // use (highest >= WINDOW_SIZE && receivedNonce <= highest - WINDOW_SIZE)
+        let windowSize = UInt64(Self.REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE)
+        if highestReceivedNonce >= windowSize && receivedNonce <= highestReceivedNonce - windowSize {
             return false  // Too old, outside window
         }
 
@@ -317,6 +322,13 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
                 throw NoiseError.replayDetected
             }
             
+            // The 4-byte nonce prefix has been stripped, so the remaining bytes
+            // must still hold at least the 16-byte Poly1305 tag. The up-front
+            // `ciphertext.count >= 16` guard is not sufficient here (it counts
+            // the nonce), and `prefix(count - 16)` would trap on a short payload.
+            guard actualCiphertext.count >= 16 else {
+                throw NoiseError.invalidCiphertext
+            }
             // Split ciphertext and tag
             encryptedData = actualCiphertext.prefix(actualCiphertext.count - 16)
             tag = actualCiphertext.suffix(16)
@@ -348,15 +360,19 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
         do {
             let plaintext = try ChaChaPoly.open(sealedBox, using: key, authenticating: associatedData)
 
+            // BCH-01-010: Atomic nonce state update
+            // Both replay window marking and nonce increment must complete together
+            // to prevent state desynchronization. We perform both after successful
+            // decryption only, ensuring state consistency on any failure path.
             if useExtractedNonce {
-                // Mark nonce as seen after successful decryption
                 markNonceAsSeen(decryptionNonce)
             }
             nonce += 1
+
             return plaintext
         } catch {
+            // Decryption failed - nonce state remains unchanged (atomic rollback)
             SecureLogger.debug("Decrypt failed: \(error) for nonce \(decryptionNonce)")
-            // Log authentication failures with nonce info
             SecureLogger.error("Decryption failed at nonce \(decryptionNonce)", category: .encryption)
             throw error
         }
@@ -376,6 +392,16 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
             replayWindow[i] = 0
         }
     }
+
+    #if DEBUG
+    func setNonceForTesting(_ nonce: UInt64) {
+        self.nonce = nonce
+    }
+
+    func extractNonceFromCiphertextPayloadForTesting(_ combinedPayload: Data) throws -> (nonce: UInt64, ciphertext: Data)? {
+        try extractNonceFromCiphertextPayload(combinedPayload)
+    }
+    #endif
 }
 
 // MARK: - Symmetric State
@@ -451,17 +477,40 @@ final class NoiseSymmetricState {
         }
     }
     
-    func split() -> (NoiseCipherState, NoiseCipherState) {
+    func split(useExtractedNonce: Bool) -> (NoiseCipherState, NoiseCipherState) {
         let output = hkdf(chainingKey: chainingKey, inputKeyMaterial: Data(), numOutputs: 2)
         let tempKey1 = SymmetricKey(data: output[0])
         let tempKey2 = SymmetricKey(data: output[1])
 
-        let c1 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey1, useExtractedNonce: true)
+        let c1 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey1, useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
-        let c2 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey2, useExtractedNonce: true)
+        let c2 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey2, useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
+
+        // BCH-01-010: Clear symmetric state after split per Noise spec
+        // The chaining key and hash should not be retained after handshake completes
+        clearSensitiveData()
 
         return (c1, c2)
     }
 
+    /// BCH-01-010: Securely clear sensitive cryptographic state
+    /// Called after split() to clear chaining key and hash per Noise spec
+    func clearSensitiveData() {
+        // Clear chaining key by overwriting with zeros
+        let chainingKeyCount = chainingKey.count
+        chainingKey = Data(repeating: 0, count: chainingKeyCount)
+
+        // Clear hash by overwriting with zeros
+        let hashCount = hash.count
+        hash = Data(repeating: 0, count: hashCount)
+
+        // Clear the internal cipher state
+        cipherState.clearSensitiveData()
+    }
+
+    deinit {
+        clearSensitiveData()
+    }
+
     // HKDF implementation
     private func hkdf(chainingKey: Data, inputKeyMaterial: Data, numOutputs: Int) -> [Data] {
         let tempKey = HMAC<SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: inputKeyMaterial, using: SymmetricKey(data: chainingKey))
@@ -507,16 +556,24 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
     private var messagePatterns: [[NoiseMessagePattern]] = []
     private var currentPattern = 0
     
+    // Test support: predetermined ephemeral keys for test vectors
+    private var predeterminedEphemeralKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey?
+    private var prologueData: Data
+    
     init(
         role: NoiseRole,
         pattern: NoisePattern,
         keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
         localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey? = nil,
-        remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? = nil
+        remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? = nil,
+        prologue: Data = Data(),
+        predeterminedEphemeralKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey? = nil
     ) {
         self.role = role
         self.pattern = pattern
         self.keychain = keychain
+        self.prologueData = prologue
+        self.predeterminedEphemeralKey = predeterminedEphemeralKey
         
         // Initialize static keys
         if let localKey = localStaticKey {
@@ -537,8 +594,8 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
     }
     
     private func mixPreMessageKeys() {
-        // Mix prologue (empty for XX pattern normally)
+        // Mix prologue
-        symmetricState.mixHash(Data()) // Empty prologue for XX pattern
+        symmetricState.mixHash(self.prologueData)
         // For XX pattern, no pre-message keys
         // For IK/NK patterns, we'd mix the responder's static key here
         switch pattern {
@@ -546,8 +603,9 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
             break // No pre-message keys
         case .IK, .NK:
             if role == .initiator, let remoteStatic = remoteStaticPublic {
-                _ = symmetricState.getHandshakeHash()
                 symmetricState.mixHash(remoteStatic.rawRepresentation)
+            } else if role == .responder, let localStatic = localStaticPublic {
+                symmetricState.mixHash(localStatic.rawRepresentation)
             }
         }
     }
@@ -563,8 +621,13 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
         for pattern in patterns {
             switch pattern {
             case .e:
-                // Generate ephemeral key
+                // Generate ephemeral key (or use predetermined key for tests)
+                if let predetermined = predeterminedEphemeralKey {
+                    localEphemeralPrivate = predetermined
+                    predeterminedEphemeralKey = nil
+                } else {
                     localEphemeralPrivate = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
+                }
                 localEphemeralPublic = localEphemeralPrivate!.publicKey
                 messageBuffer.append(localEphemeralPublic!.rawRepresentation)
                 symmetricState.mixHash(localEphemeralPublic!.rawRepresentation)
@@ -597,14 +660,20 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
                         throw NoiseError.missingKeys
                     }
                     let shared = try localEphemeral.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteStatic)
-                    symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
+                    var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
+                    symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
+                    // Clear sensitive shared secret
+                    keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
                 } else {
                     guard let localStatic = localStaticPrivate,
                           let remoteEphemeral = remoteEphemeralPublic else {
                         throw NoiseError.missingKeys
                     }
                     let shared = try localStatic.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteEphemeral)
-                    symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
+                    var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
+                    symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
+                    // Clear sensitive shared secret
+                    keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
                 }
                 
             case .se:
@@ -615,14 +684,20 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
                         throw NoiseError.missingKeys
                     }
                     let shared = try localStatic.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteEphemeral)
-                    symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
+                    var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
+                    symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
+                    // Clear sensitive shared secret
+                    keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
                 } else {
                     guard let localEphemeral = localEphemeralPrivate,
                           let remoteStatic = remoteStaticPublic else {
                         throw NoiseError.missingKeys
                     }
                     let shared = try localEphemeral.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteStatic)
-                    symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
+                    var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
+                    symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
+                    // Clear sensitive shared secret
+                    keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
                 }
                 
             case .ss:
@@ -711,7 +786,10 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
                 throw NoiseError.missingKeys
             }
             let shared = try localEphemeral.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteEphemeral)
-            symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
+            var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
+            symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
+            // Clear sensitive shared secret
+            keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
 
         case .es:
             if role == .initiator {
@@ -765,9 +843,12 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
                 throw NoiseError.missingKeys
             }
             let shared = try localStatic.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteStatic)
-            symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
+            var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
+            symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
+            // Clear sensitive shared secret
+            keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
 
-        default:
+        case .e, .s:
             break
         }
     }
@@ -776,16 +857,20 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
         return currentPattern >= messagePatterns.count
     }
     
-    func getTransportCiphers() throws -> (send: NoiseCipherState, receive: NoiseCipherState) {
+    func getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: Bool) throws -> (send: NoiseCipherState, receive: NoiseCipherState, handshakeHash: Data) {
         guard isHandshakeComplete() else {
             throw NoiseError.handshakeNotComplete
         }
 
-        let (c1, c2) = symmetricState.split()
+        // BCH-01-010: Capture handshake hash BEFORE split() clears symmetric state
+        let finalHandshakeHash = symmetricState.getHandshakeHash()
+
+        let (c1, c2) = symmetricState.split(useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
 
         // Initiator uses c1 for sending, c2 for receiving
         // Responder uses c2 for sending, c1 for receiving
-        return role == .initiator ? (c1, c2) : (c2, c1)
+        let ciphers = role == .initiator ? (c1, c2) : (c2, c1)
+        return (send: ciphers.0, receive: ciphers.1, handshakeHash: finalHandshakeHash)
     }
     
     func getRemoteStaticPublicKey() -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? {
@@ -795,6 +880,20 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
     func getHandshakeHash() -> Data {
         return symmetricState.getHandshakeHash()
     }
+
+    #if DEBUG
+    func performDHOperationForTesting(_ pattern: NoiseMessagePattern) throws {
+        try performDHOperation(pattern)
+    }
+
+    func setCurrentPatternForTesting(_ currentPattern: Int) {
+        self.currentPattern = currentPattern
+    }
+
+    func setRemoteEphemeralPublicKeyForTesting(_ key: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey?) {
+        self.remoteEphemeralPublic = key
+    }
+    #endif
 }
 
 // MARK: - Pattern Extensions
@@ -846,19 +945,44 @@ enum NoiseError: Error {
     case nonceExceeded
 }
 
+// MARK: - Constant-Time Operations
+
+/// BCH-01-010: Constant-time comparison to prevent timing side-channel attacks
+/// This function compares two Data objects in constant time, preventing
+/// information leakage via timing analysis.
+private func constantTimeCompare(_ a: Data, _ b: Data) -> Bool {
+    guard a.count == b.count else { return false }
+
+    var result: UInt8 = 0
+    for i in 0..<a.count {
+        result |= a[a.startIndex.advanced(by: i)] ^ b[b.startIndex.advanced(by: i)]
+    }
+    return result == 0
+}
+
+/// BCH-01-010: Constant-time check if all bytes are zero
+private func constantTimeIsZero(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
+    var result: UInt8 = 0
+    for byte in data {
+        result |= byte
+    }
+    return result == 0
+}
+
 // MARK: - Key Validation
 
 extension NoiseHandshakeState {
     /// Validate a Curve25519 public key
     /// Checks for weak/invalid keys that could compromise security
+    /// BCH-01-010: Uses constant-time operations to prevent timing side-channels
     static func validatePublicKey(_ keyData: Data) throws -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey {
         // Check key length
         guard keyData.count == 32 else {
             throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
         }
 
-        // Check for all-zero key (point at infinity)
+        // BCH-01-010: Constant-time check for all-zero key (point at infinity)
-        if keyData.allSatisfy({ $0 == 0 }) {
+        if constantTimeIsZero(keyData) {
             throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
         }
 
@@ -883,8 +1007,16 @@ extension NoiseHandshakeState {
                   0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff])  // Another bad point
         ]
 
-        // Check against known bad points
+        // BCH-01-010: Constant-time check against known bad points
-        if lowOrderPoints.contains(keyData) {
+        // We check all points and accumulate matches to avoid early exit timing leaks
+        var foundBadPoint = false
+        for badPoint in lowOrderPoints {
+            if constantTimeCompare(keyData, badPoint) {
+                foundBadPoint = true
+            }
+        }
+
+        if foundBadPoint {
             SecureLogger.warning("Low-order point detected", category: .security)
             throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
         }

bitchat/Noise/NoiseRateLimiter.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+//
+// NoiseRateLimiter.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import BitLogger
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+final class NoiseRateLimiter {
+    private var handshakeTimestamps: [PeerID: [Date]] = [:]
+    private var messageTimestamps: [PeerID: [Date]] = [:]
+    
+    // Global rate limiting
+    private var globalHandshakeTimestamps: [Date] = []
+    private var globalMessageTimestamps: [Date] = []
+    
+    private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.ratelimit", attributes: .concurrent)
+    
+    func allowHandshake(from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
+        return queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+            let now = Date()
+            let oneMinuteAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-60)
+            
+            // Check global rate limit first
+            globalHandshakeTimestamps = globalHandshakeTimestamps.filter { $0 > oneMinuteAgo }
+            if globalHandshakeTimestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute {
+                SecureLogger.warning("Global handshake rate limit exceeded: \(globalHandshakeTimestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute) per minute", category: .security)
+                return false
+            }
+            
+            // Check per-peer rate limit
+            var timestamps = handshakeTimestamps[peerID] ?? []
+            timestamps = timestamps.filter { $0 > oneMinuteAgo }
+            
+            if timestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakesPerMinute {
+                SecureLogger.warning("Per-peer handshake rate limit exceeded for \(peerID): \(timestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakesPerMinute) per minute", category: .security)
+                return false
+            }
+            
+            // Record new handshake
+            timestamps.append(now)
+            handshakeTimestamps[peerID] = timestamps
+            globalHandshakeTimestamps.append(now)
+            return true
+        }
+    }
+    
+    func allowMessage(from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
+        return queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+            let now = Date()
+            let oneSecondAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-1)
+            
+            // Check global rate limit first
+            globalMessageTimestamps = globalMessageTimestamps.filter { $0 > oneSecondAgo }
+            if globalMessageTimestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond {
+                SecureLogger.warning("Global message rate limit exceeded: \(globalMessageTimestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond) per second", category: .security)
+                return false
+            }
+            
+            // Check per-peer rate limit
+            var timestamps = messageTimestamps[peerID] ?? []
+            timestamps = timestamps.filter { $0 > oneSecondAgo }
+            
+            if timestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSecond {
+                SecureLogger.warning("Per-peer message rate limit exceeded for \(peerID): \(timestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSecond) per second", category: .security)
+                return false
+            }
+            
+            // Record new message
+            timestamps.append(now)
+            messageTimestamps[peerID] = timestamps
+            globalMessageTimestamps.append(now)
+            return true
+        }
+    }
+    
+    func reset(for peerID: PeerID) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+            self.handshakeTimestamps.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+            self.messageTimestamps.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    func resetAll() {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+            self.handshakeTimestamps.removeAll()
+            self.messageTimestamps.removeAll()
+            self.globalHandshakeTimestamps.removeAll()
+            self.globalMessageTimestamps.removeAll()
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSecurityConsiderations.swift

@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
-//
-// NoiseSecurityConsiderations.swift
-// bitchat
-//
-// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
-// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
-//
-
-import BitLogger
-import Foundation
-
-// MARK: - Security Constants
-
-enum NoiseSecurityConstants {
-    // Maximum message size to prevent memory exhaustion
-    static let maxMessageSize = 65535 // 64KB as per Noise spec
-    
-    // Maximum handshake message size
-    static let maxHandshakeMessageSize = 2048 // 2KB to accommodate XX pattern
-    
-    // Session timeout - sessions older than this should be renegotiated
-    static let sessionTimeout: TimeInterval = 86400 // 24 hours
-    
-    // Maximum number of messages before rekey (2^64 - 1 is the nonce limit)
-    static let maxMessagesPerSession: UInt64 = 1_000_000_000 // 1 billion messages
-    
-    // Handshake timeout - abandon incomplete handshakes
-    static let handshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 60 // 1 minute
-    
-    // Maximum concurrent sessions per peer
-    static let maxSessionsPerPeer = 3
-    
-    // Rate limiting
-    static let maxHandshakesPerMinute = 10
-    static let maxMessagesPerSecond = 100
-    
-    // Global rate limiting (across all peers)
-    static let maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute = 30
-    static let maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond = 500
-}
-
-// MARK: - Security Validations
-
-struct NoiseSecurityValidator {
-    
-    /// Validate message size
-    static func validateMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
-        return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
-    }
-    
-    /// Validate handshake message size
-    static func validateHandshakeMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
-        return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakeMessageSize
-    }
-}
-
-// MARK: - Enhanced Noise Session with Security
-
-final class SecureNoiseSession: NoiseSession {
-    private(set) var messageCount: UInt64 = 0
-    private let sessionStartTime = Date()
-    private(set) var lastActivityTime = Date()
-    
-    override func encrypt(_ plaintext: Data) throws -> Data {
-        // Check session age
-        if Date().timeIntervalSince(sessionStartTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
-            throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
-        }
-        
-        // Check message count
-        if messageCount >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSession {
-            throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExhausted
-        }
-        
-        // Validate message size
-        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(plaintext) else {
-            throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
-        }
-        
-        let encrypted = try super.encrypt(plaintext)
-        messageCount += 1
-        lastActivityTime = Date()
-        
-        return encrypted
-    }
-    
-    override func decrypt(_ ciphertext: Data) throws -> Data {
-        // Check session age
-        if Date().timeIntervalSince(sessionStartTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
-            throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
-        }
-        
-        // Validate message size
-        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(ciphertext) else {
-            throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
-        }
-        
-        let decrypted = try super.decrypt(ciphertext)
-        lastActivityTime = Date()
-        
-        return decrypted
-    }
-    
-    func needsRenegotiation() -> Bool {
-        // Check if we've used more than 90% of message limit
-        let messageThreshold = UInt64(Double(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSession) * 0.9)
-        if messageCount >= messageThreshold {
-            return true
-        }
-        
-        // Check if last activity was more than 30 minutes ago
-        if Date().timeIntervalSince(lastActivityTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
-            return true
-        }
-        
-        return false
-    }
-    
-    // MARK: - Testing Support
-    #if DEBUG
-    func setLastActivityTimeForTesting(_ date: Date) {
-        lastActivityTime = date
-    }
-    
-    func setMessageCountForTesting(_ count: UInt64) {
-        messageCount = count
-    }
-    #endif
-}
-
-// MARK: - Rate Limiter
-
-final class NoiseRateLimiter {
-    private var handshakeTimestamps: [PeerID: [Date]] = [:]
-    private var messageTimestamps: [PeerID: [Date]] = [:]
-    
-    // Global rate limiting
-    private var globalHandshakeTimestamps: [Date] = []
-    private var globalMessageTimestamps: [Date] = []
-    
-    private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.ratelimit", attributes: .concurrent)
-    
-    func allowHandshake(from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
-        return queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
-            let now = Date()
-            let oneMinuteAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-60)
-            
-            // Check global rate limit first
-            globalHandshakeTimestamps = globalHandshakeTimestamps.filter { $0 > oneMinuteAgo }
-            if globalHandshakeTimestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute {
-                SecureLogger.warning("Global handshake rate limit exceeded: \(globalHandshakeTimestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute) per minute", category: .security)
-                return false
-            }
-            
-            // Check per-peer rate limit
-            var timestamps = handshakeTimestamps[peerID] ?? []
-            timestamps = timestamps.filter { $0 > oneMinuteAgo }
-            
-            if timestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakesPerMinute {
-                SecureLogger.warning("Per-peer handshake rate limit exceeded for \(peerID): \(timestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakesPerMinute) per minute", category: .security)
-                return false
-            }
-            
-            // Record new handshake
-            timestamps.append(now)
-            handshakeTimestamps[peerID] = timestamps
-            globalHandshakeTimestamps.append(now)
-            return true
-        }
-    }
-    
-    func allowMessage(from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
-        return queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
-            let now = Date()
-            let oneSecondAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-1)
-            
-            // Check global rate limit first
-            globalMessageTimestamps = globalMessageTimestamps.filter { $0 > oneSecondAgo }
-            if globalMessageTimestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond {
-                SecureLogger.warning("Global message rate limit exceeded: \(globalMessageTimestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond) per second", category: .security)
-                return false
-            }
-            
-            // Check per-peer rate limit
-            var timestamps = messageTimestamps[peerID] ?? []
-            timestamps = timestamps.filter { $0 > oneSecondAgo }
-            
-            if timestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSecond {
-                SecureLogger.warning("Per-peer message rate limit exceeded for \(peerID): \(timestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSecond) per second", category: .security)
-                return false
-            }
-            
-            // Record new message
-            timestamps.append(now)
-            messageTimestamps[peerID] = timestamps
-            globalMessageTimestamps.append(now)
-            return true
-        }
-    }
-    
-    func reset(for peerID: PeerID) {
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
-            self.handshakeTimestamps.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
-            self.messageTimestamps.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
-        }
-    }
-
-    func resetAll() {
-        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
-            self.handshakeTimestamps.removeAll()
-            self.messageTimestamps.removeAll()
-            self.globalHandshakeTimestamps.removeAll()
-            self.globalMessageTimestamps.removeAll()
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-// MARK: - Security Errors
-
-enum NoiseSecurityError: Error {
-    case sessionExpired
-    case sessionExhausted
-    case messageTooLarge
-    case invalidPeerID
-    case rateLimitExceeded
-    case handshakeTimeout
-}

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSecurityConstants.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+//
+// NoiseSecurityConstants.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import Foundation
+
+enum NoiseSecurityConstants {
+    // Maximum message size to prevent memory exhaustion
+    static let maxMessageSize = 65535 // 64KB as per Noise spec
+    
+    // Maximum handshake message size
+    static let maxHandshakeMessageSize = 2048 // 2KB to accommodate XX pattern
+    
+    // Session timeout - sessions older than this should be renegotiated
+    static let sessionTimeout: TimeInterval = 86400 // 24 hours
+    
+    // Maximum number of messages before rekey (2^64 - 1 is the nonce limit)
+    static let maxMessagesPerSession: UInt64 = 1_000_000_000 // 1 billion messages
+    
+    // Handshake timeout - abandon incomplete handshakes
+    static let handshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 60 // 1 minute
+    
+    // Maximum concurrent sessions per peer
+    static let maxSessionsPerPeer = 3
+    
+    // Rate limiting
+    static let maxHandshakesPerMinute = 10
+    static let maxMessagesPerSecond = 100
+    
+    // Global rate limiting (across all peers)
+    static let maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute = 30
+    static let maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond = 500
+}

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSecurityError.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+//
+// NoiseSecurityError.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import Foundation
+
+enum NoiseSecurityError: Error {
+    case sessionExpired
+    case sessionExhausted
+    case messageTooLarge
+    case invalidPeerID
+    case rateLimitExceeded
+    case handshakeTimeout
+}

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSecurityValidator.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+//
+// NoiseSecurityValidator.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import Foundation
+
+struct NoiseSecurityValidator {
+    
+    /// Validate message size
+    static func validateMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
+        return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
+    }
+    
+    /// Validate handshake message size
+    static func validateHandshakeMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
+        return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakeMessageSize
+    }
+}

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSession.swift

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 import BitLogger
 import Foundation
 import CryptoKit
+import BitFoundation
 
 class NoiseSession {
     let peerID: PeerID
@@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ class NoiseSession {
             
             // Check if handshake is complete
             if handshake.isHandshakeComplete() {
-                // Get transport ciphers
+                // Get transport ciphers and handshake hash (hash captured before split clears state)
-                let (send, receive) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers()
+                let (send, receive, hash) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
                 sendCipher = send
                 receiveCipher = receive
 
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ class NoiseSession {
                 remoteStaticPublicKey = handshake.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
 
                 // Store handshake hash for channel binding
-                handshakeHash = handshake.getHandshakeHash()
+                handshakeHash = hash
 
                 state = .established
                 handshakeState = nil // Clear handshake state
@@ -128,8 +129,8 @@ class NoiseSession {
                 
                 // Check if handshake is complete after writing
                 if handshake.isHandshakeComplete() {
-                    // Get transport ciphers
+                    // Get transport ciphers and handshake hash (hash captured before split clears state)
-                    let (send, receive) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers()
+                    let (send, receive, hash) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
                     sendCipher = send
                     receiveCipher = receive
 
@@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ class NoiseSession {
                     remoteStaticPublicKey = handshake.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
 
                     // Store handshake hash for channel binding
-                    handshakeHash = handshake.getHandshakeHash()
+                    handshakeHash = hash
 
                     state = .established
                     handshakeState = nil // Clear handshake state
@@ -196,12 +197,6 @@ class NoiseSession {
         }
     }
     
-    func getHandshakeHash() -> Data? {
-        return sessionQueue.sync {
-            return handshakeHash
-        }
-    }
-    
     func reset() {
         sessionQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
             let wasEstablished = state == .established

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSessionError.swift

@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@
 // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
 //
 
-enum NoiseSessionError: Error {
+enum NoiseSessionError: Error, Equatable {
     case invalidState
     case notEstablished
     case sessionNotFound
-    case handshakeFailed(Error)
     case alreadyEstablished
 }

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSessionManager.swift

@@ -9,11 +9,13 @@
 import BitLogger
 import CryptoKit
 import Foundation
+import BitFoundation
 
 final class NoiseSessionManager {
     private var sessions: [PeerID: NoiseSession] = [:]
     private let localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey
     private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
+    private let sessionFactory: (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
     private let managerQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.manager", attributes: .concurrent)
     
     // Callbacks
@@ -23,23 +25,30 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
     init(localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey, keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
         self.localStaticKey = localStaticKey
         self.keychain = keychain
-    }
+        self.sessionFactory = { peerID, role in
-    
+            SecureNoiseSession(
-    // MARK: - Session Management
-    
-    func createSession(for peerID: PeerID, role: NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession {
-        return managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
-            let session = SecureNoiseSession(
                 peerID: peerID,
                 role: role,
                 keychain: keychain,
                 localStaticKey: localStaticKey
             )
-            sessions[peerID] = session
-            return session
         }
     }
 
+    #if DEBUG
+    init(
+        localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey,
+        keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
+        sessionFactory: @escaping (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
+    ) {
+        self.localStaticKey = localStaticKey
+        self.keychain = keychain
+        self.sessionFactory = sessionFactory
+    }
+    #endif
+    
+    // MARK: - Session Management
+    
     func getSession(for peerID: PeerID) -> NoiseSession? {
         return managerQueue.sync {
             return sessions[peerID]
@@ -48,14 +57,9 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
     
     func removeSession(for peerID: PeerID) {
         managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
-            if let session = sessions[peerID] {
+            if let session = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
-                if session.isEstablished() {
+                session.reset() // Clear sensitive data before removing
-                    SecureLogger.info(.sessionExpired(peerID: peerID.id))
             }
-                // Clear sensitive data before removing
-                session.reset()
-            }
-            _ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
         }
     }
 
@@ -68,12 +72,6 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
         }
     }
     
-    func getEstablishedSessions() -> [PeerID: NoiseSession] {
-        return managerQueue.sync {
-            return sessions.filter { $0.value.isEstablished() }
-        }
-    }
-    
     // MARK: - Handshake Helpers
     
     func initiateHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
@@ -90,12 +88,7 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
             }
             
             // Create new initiator session
-            let session = SecureNoiseSession(
+            let session = sessionFactory(peerID, .initiator)
-                peerID: peerID,
-                role: .initiator,
-                keychain: keychain,
-                localStaticKey: localStaticKey
-            )
             sessions[peerID] = session
             
             do {
@@ -141,12 +134,7 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
             // Get or create session
             let session: NoiseSession
             if shouldCreateNew {
-                let newSession = SecureNoiseSession(
+                let newSession = sessionFactory(peerID, .responder)
-                    peerID: peerID,
-                    role: .responder,
-                    keychain: keychain,
-                    localStaticKey: localStaticKey
-                )
                 sessions[peerID] = newSession
                 session = newSession
             } else {
@@ -207,10 +195,6 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
         return getSession(for: peerID)?.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
     }
     
-    func getHandshakeHash(for peerID: PeerID) -> Data? {
-        return getSession(for: peerID)?.getHandshakeHash()
-    }
-    
     // MARK: - Session Rekeying
     
     func getSessionsNeedingRekey() -> [(peerID: PeerID, needsRekey: Bool)] {

bitchat/Noise/SecureNoiseSession.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+//
+// SecureNoiseSession.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import Foundation
+
+final class SecureNoiseSession: NoiseSession {
+    private(set) var messageCount: UInt64 = 0
+    private var sessionStartTime = Date()
+    private(set) var lastActivityTime = Date()
+    
+    override func encrypt(_ plaintext: Data) throws -> Data {
+        // Check session age
+        if Date().timeIntervalSince(sessionStartTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
+            throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
+        }
+        
+        // Check message count
+        if messageCount >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSession {
+            throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExhausted
+        }
+        
+        // Validate message size
+        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(plaintext) else {
+            throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
+        }
+        
+        let encrypted = try super.encrypt(plaintext)
+        messageCount += 1
+        lastActivityTime = Date()
+        
+        return encrypted
+    }
+    
+    override func decrypt(_ ciphertext: Data) throws -> Data {
+        // Check session age
+        if Date().timeIntervalSince(sessionStartTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
+            throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
+        }
+        
+        // Validate message size
+        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(ciphertext) else {
+            throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
+        }
+        
+        let decrypted = try super.decrypt(ciphertext)
+        lastActivityTime = Date()
+        
+        return decrypted
+    }
+    
+    func needsRenegotiation() -> Bool {
+        // Check if we've used more than 90% of message limit
+        let messageThreshold = UInt64(Double(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSession) * 0.9)
+        if messageCount >= messageThreshold {
+            return true
+        }
+        
+        // Check if last activity was more than 30 minutes ago
+        if Date().timeIntervalSince(lastActivityTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
+            return true
+        }
+        
+        return false
+    }
+    
+    // MARK: - Testing Support
+    #if DEBUG
+    func setLastActivityTimeForTesting(_ date: Date) {
+        lastActivityTime = date
+    }
+    
+    func setMessageCountForTesting(_ count: UInt64) {
+        messageCount = count
+    }
+
+    func setSessionStartTimeForTesting(_ date: Date) {
+        sessionStartTime = date
+    }
+    #endif
+}

bitchat/Nostr/Base64URLCoding.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import Foundation
+
+enum Base64URLCoding {
+    static func encode(_ data: Data) -> String {
+        data.base64EncodedString()
+            .replacingOccurrences(of: "+", with: "-")
+            .replacingOccurrences(of: "/", with: "_")
+            .replacingOccurrences(of: "=", with: "")
+    }
+
+    static func decode(_ string: String) -> Data? {
+        var base64 = string
+        let padding = (4 - (base64.count % 4)) % 4
+        if padding > 0 {
+            base64 += String(repeating: "=", count: padding)
+        }
+        base64 = base64
+            .replacingOccurrences(of: "-", with: "+")
+            .replacingOccurrences(of: "_", with: "/")
+        return Data(base64Encoded: base64)
+    }
+}

bitchat/Nostr/Bech32.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+import Foundation
+
+/// Bech32 encoding for Nostr (minimal implementation)
+enum Bech32 {
+    private static let charset = "qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l"
+    private static let generator = [0x3b6a57b2, 0x26508e6d, 0x1ea119fa, 0x3d4233dd, 0x2a1462b3]
+    
+    static func encode(hrp: String, data: Data) throws -> String {
+        let values = convertBits(from: 8, to: 5, pad: true, data: Array(data))
+        let checksum = createChecksum(hrp: hrp, values: values)
+        let combined = values + checksum
+        
+        return hrp + "1" + combined.map { 
+            let index = charset.index(charset.startIndex, offsetBy: Int($0))
+            return String(charset[index])
+        }.joined()
+    }
+    
+    static func decode(_ bech32String: String) throws -> (hrp: String, data: Data) {
+        // Find the last occurrence of '1'
+        guard let separatorIndex = bech32String.lastIndex(of: "1") else {
+            throw Bech32Error.invalidFormat
+        }
+        
+        let hrp = String(bech32String[..<separatorIndex])
+        
+        // Validate HRP contains only ASCII characters
+        for char in hrp {
+            guard char.asciiValue != nil else {
+                throw Bech32Error.invalidCharacter
+            }
+        }
+        
+        let dataString = String(bech32String[bech32String.index(after: separatorIndex)...])
+        
+        // Convert characters to values
+        var values = [UInt8]()
+        for char in dataString {
+            guard let index = charset.firstIndex(of: char) else {
+                throw Bech32Error.invalidCharacter
+            }
+            values.append(UInt8(charset.distance(from: charset.startIndex, to: index)))
+        }
+        
+        // Verify checksum
+        guard values.count >= 6 else {
+            throw Bech32Error.invalidChecksum
+        }
+        
+        let payloadValues = Array(values.dropLast(6))
+        let checksum = Array(values.suffix(6))
+        let expectedChecksum = createChecksum(hrp: hrp, values: payloadValues)
+        
+        guard checksum == expectedChecksum else {
+            throw Bech32Error.invalidChecksum
+        }
+        
+        // Convert back to bytes
+        let bytes = convertBits(from: 5, to: 8, pad: false, data: payloadValues)
+        return (hrp: hrp, data: Data(bytes))
+    }
+    
+    enum Bech32Error: Error {
+        case invalidFormat
+        case invalidCharacter
+        case invalidChecksum
+    }
+    
+    private static func convertBits(from: Int, to: Int, pad: Bool, data: [UInt8]) -> [UInt8] {
+        var acc = 0
+        var bits = 0
+        var result = [UInt8]()
+        let maxv = (1 << to) - 1
+        
+        for value in data {
+            acc = (acc << from) | Int(value)
+            bits += from
+            
+            while bits >= to {
+                bits -= to
+                result.append(UInt8((acc >> bits) & maxv))
+            }
+        }
+        
+        if pad && bits > 0 {
+            result.append(UInt8((acc << (to - bits)) & maxv))
+        }
+        
+        return result
+    }
+    
+    private static func createChecksum(hrp: String, values: [UInt8]) -> [UInt8] {
+        let checksumValues = hrpExpand(hrp) + values + [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
+        let polymod = polymod(checksumValues) ^ 1
+        var checksum = [UInt8]()
+        
+        for i in 0..<6 {
+            checksum.append(UInt8((polymod >> (5 * (5 - i))) & 31))
+        }
+        
+        return checksum
+    }
+    
+    private static func hrpExpand(_ hrp: String) -> [UInt8] {
+        var result = [UInt8]()
+        for c in hrp {
+            guard let asciiValue = c.asciiValue else {
+                return [] // Return empty array for invalid input
+            }
+            result.append(UInt8(asciiValue >> 5))
+        }
+        result.append(0)
+        for c in hrp {
+            guard let asciiValue = c.asciiValue else {
+                return [] // Return empty array for invalid input
+            }
+            result.append(UInt8(asciiValue & 31))
+        }
+        return result
+    }
+    
+    private static func polymod(_ values: [UInt8]) -> Int {
+        var chk = 1
+        for value in values {
+            let b = chk >> 25
+            chk = (chk & 0x1ffffff) << 5 ^ Int(value)
+            for i in 0..<5 {
+                if (b >> i) & 1 == 1 {
+                    chk ^= generator[i]
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        return chk
+    }
+}

bitchat/Nostr/GeoRelayDirectory.swift

@@ -1,29 +1,167 @@
 import BitLogger
 import Foundation
 import Tor
+#if os(iOS)
+import UIKit
+#elseif os(macOS)
+import AppKit
+#endif
+
+extension Notification.Name {
+    /// Posted after the geo relay directory successfully refreshes its entries.
+    static let geoRelayDirectoryDidRefresh = Notification.Name("bitchat.geoRelayDirectoryDidRefresh")
+}
 
 /// Directory of online Nostr relays with approximate GPS locations, used for geohash routing.
+struct GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
+    var userDefaults: UserDefaults
+    var notificationCenter: NotificationCenter
+    var now: () -> Date
+    var remoteURL: URL
+    var fetchInterval: TimeInterval
+    var refreshCheckInterval: TimeInterval
+    var retryInitialSeconds: TimeInterval
+    var retryMaxSeconds: TimeInterval
+    var awaitTorReady: @Sendable () async -> Bool
+    var makeFetchData: @MainActor @Sendable () -> (@Sendable (URLRequest) async throws -> Data)
+    var readData: (URL) -> Data?
+    var writeData: (Data, URL) throws -> Void
+    var cacheURL: () -> URL?
+    var bundledCSVURLs: () -> [URL]
+    var currentDirectoryPath: () -> String?
+    var retrySleep: (TimeInterval) async -> Void
+    var activeNotificationName: Notification.Name?
+    var autoStart: Bool
+}
+
+private extension GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
+    @MainActor
+    static func live() -> Self {
+#if os(iOS)
+        let activeNotificationName: Notification.Name? = UIApplication.didBecomeActiveNotification
+#elseif os(macOS)
+        let activeNotificationName: Notification.Name? = NSApplication.didBecomeActiveNotification
+#else
+        let activeNotificationName: Notification.Name? = nil
+#endif
+
+        return Self(
+            userDefaults: .standard,
+            notificationCenter: .default,
+            now: Date.init,
+            remoteURL: URL(string: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv")!,
+            fetchInterval: TransportConfig.geoRelayFetchIntervalSeconds,
+            refreshCheckInterval: TransportConfig.geoRelayRefreshCheckIntervalSeconds,
+            retryInitialSeconds: TransportConfig.geoRelayRetryInitialSeconds,
+            retryMaxSeconds: TransportConfig.geoRelayRetryMaxSeconds,
+            awaitTorReady: { await TorManager.shared.awaitReady() },
+            makeFetchData: {
+                let session = TorURLSession.shared.session
+                return { request in
+                    let (data, _) = try await session.data(for: request)
+                    return data
+                }
+            },
+            readData: { try? Data(contentsOf: $0) },
+            writeData: { data, url in
+                try data.write(to: url, options: .atomic)
+            },
+            cacheURL: {
+                do {
+                    let base = try FileManager.default.url(
+                        for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
+                        in: .userDomainMask,
+                        appropriateFor: nil,
+                        create: true
+                    )
+                    let dir = base.appendingPathComponent("bitchat", isDirectory: true)
+                    try? FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: dir, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
+                    return dir.appendingPathComponent("georelays_cache.csv")
+                } catch {
+                    return nil
+                }
+            },
+            bundledCSVURLs: {
+                [
+                    Bundle.main.url(forResource: "nostr_relays", withExtension: "csv"),
+                    Bundle.main.url(forResource: "online_relays_gps", withExtension: "csv"),
+                    Bundle.main.url(forResource: "online_relays_gps", withExtension: "csv", subdirectory: "relays")
+                ].compactMap { $0 }
+            },
+            currentDirectoryPath: { FileManager.default.currentDirectoryPath },
+            retrySleep: { delay in
+                let nanoseconds = UInt64(delay * 1_000_000_000)
+                try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: nanoseconds)
+            },
+            activeNotificationName: activeNotificationName,
+            autoStart: true
+        )
+    }
+}
+
 @MainActor
 final class GeoRelayDirectory {
-    struct Entry: Hashable {
+    private final class CleanupState {
+        let notificationCenter: NotificationCenter
+        var observers: [NSObjectProtocol] = []
+        var refreshTimer: Timer?
+        var retryTask: Task<Void, Never>?
+
+        init(notificationCenter: NotificationCenter) {
+            self.notificationCenter = notificationCenter
+        }
+
+        deinit {
+            observers.forEach { notificationCenter.removeObserver($0) }
+            refreshTimer?.invalidate()
+            retryTask?.cancel()
+        }
+    }
+
+    struct Entry: Hashable, Sendable {
         let host: String
         let lat: Double
         let lon: Double
     }
 
+    private enum DetachedFetchOutcome: Sendable {
+        case success(entries: [Entry], csv: String)
+        case torNotReady
+        case invalidData
+        case network(String)
+    }
+
     static let shared = GeoRelayDirectory()
+
     private(set) var entries: [Entry] = []
-    private let cacheFileName = "georelays_cache.csv"
     private let lastFetchKey = "georelay.lastFetchAt"
-    private let remoteURL = URL(string: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv")!
+    private let dependencies: GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies
-    private let fetchInterval: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.geoRelayFetchIntervalSeconds // 24h
+    private let cleanupState: CleanupState
+
+    private var retryAttempt: Int = 0
+    private var isFetching: Bool = false
 
     private init() {
-        // Load cached or bundled data synchronously
+        self.dependencies = .live()
-        self.entries = self.loadLocalEntries()
+        self.cleanupState = CleanupState(notificationCenter: dependencies.notificationCenter)
-        // Fire-and-forget remote refresh if stale
+        entries = loadLocalEntries()
+        if dependencies.autoStart {
+            registerObservers()
+            startRefreshTimer()
             prefetchIfNeeded()
         }
+    }
+
+    internal init(dependencies: GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies) {
+        self.dependencies = dependencies
+        self.cleanupState = CleanupState(notificationCenter: dependencies.notificationCenter)
+        entries = loadLocalEntries()
+        if dependencies.autoStart {
+            registerObservers()
+            startRefreshTimer()
+            prefetchIfNeeded()
+        }
+    }
 
     /// Returns up to `count` relay URLs (wss://) closest to the geohash center.
     func closestRelays(toGeohash geohash: String, count: Int = 5) -> [String] {
@@ -32,57 +170,162 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
     }
 
     /// Returns up to `count` relay URLs (wss://) closest to the given coordinate.
+    /// Ties break by host so every device with the same directory picks the
+    /// same relay set — publishers and subscribers must agree on relays.
     func closestRelays(toLat lat: Double, lon: Double, count: Int = 5) -> [String] {
-        guard !entries.isEmpty else { return [] }
+        guard !entries.isEmpty, count > 0 else { return [] }
-        let sorted = entries
+
-            .sorted { a, b in
+        return entries
-                haversineKm(lat, lon, a.lat, a.lon) < haversineKm(lat, lon, b.lat, b.lon)
+            .map { (entry: $0, distance: haversineKm(lat, lon, $0.lat, $0.lon)) }
-            }
+            .sorted { ($0.distance, $0.entry.host) < ($1.distance, $1.entry.host) }
             .prefix(count)
-        return sorted.map { "wss://\($0.host)" }
+            .map { "wss://\($0.entry.host)" }
     }
 
     // MARK: - Remote Fetch
-    func prefetchIfNeeded() {
+    func prefetchIfNeeded(force: Bool = false) {
-        let now = Date()
+        guard !isFetching else { return }
-        let last = UserDefaults.standard.object(forKey: lastFetchKey) as? Date ?? .distantPast
+
-        guard now.timeIntervalSince(last) >= fetchInterval else { return }
+        let now = dependencies.now()
+        let last = dependencies.userDefaults.object(forKey: lastFetchKey) as? Date ?? .distantPast
+
+        if !force {
+            guard now.timeIntervalSince(last) >= dependencies.fetchInterval else { return }
+        } else if last != .distantPast,
+                  now.timeIntervalSince(last) < dependencies.retryInitialSeconds {
+            // Skip forced fetches if we just refreshed moments ago.
+            return
+        }
+
+        cancelRetry()
         fetchRemote()
     }
 
     private func fetchRemote() {
-        let req = URLRequest(url: remoteURL, cachePolicy: .reloadIgnoringLocalCacheData, timeoutInterval: 15)
+        guard !isFetching else { return }
-        // Ensure Tor readiness before fetching (fail-closed by default)
+        isFetching = true
-        Task.detached {
+
-            let ready = await TorManager.shared.awaitReady()
+        let request = URLRequest(
-            if !ready {
+            url: dependencies.remoteURL,
-                SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: Tor not ready; skipping remote fetch (fail-closed)", category: .session)
+            cachePolicy: .reloadIgnoringLocalCacheData,
-                return
+            timeoutInterval: 15
+        )
+        let awaitTorReady = dependencies.awaitTorReady
+        let fetchData = dependencies.makeFetchData()
+
+        Task { [weak self] in
+            guard let self else { return }
+
+            let outcome = await Self.fetchRemoteOutcome(
+                request: request,
+                awaitTorReady: awaitTorReady,
+                fetchData: fetchData
+            )
+
+            switch outcome {
+            case .success(let parsed, let csv):
+                self.handleFetchSuccess(entries: parsed, csv: csv)
+            case .torNotReady:
+                self.handleFetchFailure(.torNotReady)
+            case .invalidData:
+                self.handleFetchFailure(.invalidData)
+            case .network(let description):
+                self.handleFetchFailure(.network(description))
             }
-            let task = TorURLSession.shared.session.dataTask(with: req) { [weak self] data, _, error in
-                guard let self = self else { return }
-                if let data = data, error == nil, let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
-                    let parsed = GeoRelayDirectory.parseCSV(text)
-                    if !parsed.isEmpty {
-                        Task { @MainActor in
-                            self.entries = parsed
-                            self.persistCache(text)
-                            UserDefaults.standard.set(Date(), forKey: self.lastFetchKey)
-                            SecureLogger.info("GeoRelayDirectory: refreshed \(parsed.count) relays from remote", category: .session)
-                        }
-                        return
-                    }
-                }
-                SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: remote fetch failed; keeping local entries", category: .session)
-            }
-            task.resume()
         }
     }
 
-    private func persistCache(_ text: String) {
+    nonisolated private static func fetchRemoteOutcome(
-        guard let url = cacheURL() else { return }
+        request: URLRequest,
+        awaitTorReady: @escaping @Sendable () async -> Bool,
+        fetchData: @escaping @Sendable (URLRequest) async throws -> Data
+    ) async -> DetachedFetchOutcome {
+        await Task.detached(priority: .utility) {
+            let ready = await awaitTorReady()
+            guard ready else { return .torNotReady }
+
             do {
-            try text.data(using: .utf8)?.write(to: url, options: .atomic)
+                let data = try await fetchData(request)
+                guard let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) else {
+                    return .invalidData
+                }
+
+                let parsed = Self.parseCSV(text)
+                guard !parsed.isEmpty else {
+                    return .invalidData
+                }
+
+                return .success(entries: parsed, csv: text)
+            } catch {
+                return .network(error.localizedDescription)
+            }
+        }.value
+    }
+
+    private enum FetchFailure {
+        case torNotReady
+        case invalidData
+        case network(String)
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    private func handleFetchSuccess(entries parsed: [Entry], csv: String) {
+        entries = parsed
+        persistCache(csv)
+        dependencies.userDefaults.set(dependencies.now(), forKey: lastFetchKey)
+        SecureLogger.info("GeoRelayDirectory: refreshed \(parsed.count) relays from remote", category: .session)
+        isFetching = false
+        retryAttempt = 0
+        cancelRetry()
+        // Let waiters (e.g. location notes stuck in a "no relays" state) retry.
+        dependencies.notificationCenter.post(name: .geoRelayDirectoryDidRefresh, object: nil)
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    private func handleFetchFailure(_ reason: FetchFailure) {
+        switch reason {
+        case .torNotReady:
+            SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: Tor not ready; scheduling retry", category: .session)
+        case .invalidData:
+            SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: remote fetch returned invalid data; scheduling retry", category: .session)
+        case .network(let errorDescription):
+            SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: remote fetch failed with error: \(errorDescription)", category: .session)
+        }
+        isFetching = false
+        scheduleRetry()
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    private func scheduleRetry() {
+        retryAttempt = min(retryAttempt + 1, 10)
+        let base = dependencies.retryInitialSeconds
+        let maxDelay = dependencies.retryMaxSeconds
+        let multiplier = pow(2.0, Double(max(retryAttempt - 1, 0)))
+        let calculated = base * multiplier
+        let delay = min(maxDelay, max(base, calculated))
+
+        cancelRetry()
+        cleanupState.retryTask = Task { [weak self] in
+            guard let self else { return }
+            await self.dependencies.retrySleep(delay)
+            guard !Task.isCancelled else { return }
+            await MainActor.run {
+                self.prefetchIfNeeded(force: true)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    private func cancelRetry() {
+        cleanupState.retryTask?.cancel()
+        cleanupState.retryTask = nil
+    }
+
+    private func persistCache(_ text: String) {
+        guard let url = dependencies.cacheURL() else { return }
+        guard let data = text.data(using: .utf8) else { return }
+        do {
+            try dependencies.writeData(data, url)
         } catch {
             SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: failed to write cache: \(error)", category: .session)
         }
@@ -91,30 +334,31 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
     // MARK: - Loading
     private func loadLocalEntries() -> [Entry] {
         // Prefer cached file if present
-        if let cache = self.cacheURL(),
+        if let cache = dependencies.cacheURL(),
-           let data = try? Data(contentsOf: cache),
+           let data = dependencies.readData(cache),
            let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
             let arr = Self.parseCSV(text)
             if !arr.isEmpty { return arr }
         }
+
         // Try bundled resource(s)
-        let bundleCandidates = [
+        let bundleCandidates = dependencies.bundledCSVURLs()
-            Bundle.main.url(forResource: "nostr_relays", withExtension: "csv"),
+
-            Bundle.main.url(forResource: "online_relays_gps", withExtension: "csv"),
-            Bundle.main.url(forResource: "online_relays_gps", withExtension: "csv", subdirectory: "relays")
-        ].compactMap { $0 }
         for url in bundleCandidates {
-            if let data = try? Data(contentsOf: url), let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
+            if let data = dependencies.readData(url),
+               let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
                 let arr = Self.parseCSV(text)
                 if !arr.isEmpty { return arr }
             }
         }
+
         // Try filesystem path (development/test)
-        if let cwd = FileManager.default.currentDirectoryPath as String?,
+        if let cwd = dependencies.currentDirectoryPath(),
-           let data = try? Data(contentsOf: URL(fileURLWithPath: cwd).appendingPathComponent("relays/online_relays_gps.csv")),
+           let data = dependencies.readData(URL(fileURLWithPath: cwd).appendingPathComponent("relays/online_relays_gps.csv")),
            let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
             return Self.parseCSV(text)
         }
+
         SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: no local CSV found; entries empty", category: .session)
         return []
     }
@@ -122,33 +366,67 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
     nonisolated static func parseCSV(_ text: String) -> [Entry] {
         var result: Set<Entry> = []
         let lines = text.split(whereSeparator: { $0.isNewline })
-        // Skip header if present
         for (idx, raw) in lines.enumerated() {
-            let line = raw.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+            guard let line = raw.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty else { continue }
-            if line.isEmpty { continue }
             if idx == 0 && line.lowercased().contains("relay url") { continue }
-            let parts = line.split(separator: ",").map { String($0).trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespaces) }
+            let parts = line.split(separator: ",").map { $0.trimmed }
             guard parts.count >= 3 else { continue }
-            var host = parts[0]
+            guard let host = NostrRelayURL.directoryAddress(parts[0]) else { continue }
-            host = host.replacingOccurrences(of: "https://", with: "")
-            host = host.replacingOccurrences(of: "http://", with: "")
-            host = host.replacingOccurrences(of: "wss://", with: "")
-            host = host.replacingOccurrences(of: "ws://", with: "")
-            host = host.trimmingCharacters(in: CharacterSet(charactersIn: "/"))
             guard let lat = Double(parts[1]), let lon = Double(parts[2]) else { continue }
             result.insert(Entry(host: host, lat: lat, lon: lon))
         }
         return Array(result)
     }
 
-    private func cacheURL() -> URL? {
+    // MARK: - Observers & Timers
-        do {
+    private func registerObservers() {
-            let base = try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
+        let center = dependencies.notificationCenter
-            let dir = base.appendingPathComponent("bitchat", isDirectory: true)
+
-            try? FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: dir, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
+        let torReady = center.addObserver(
-            return dir.appendingPathComponent(cacheFileName)
+            forName: .TorDidBecomeReady,
-        } catch { return nil }
+            object: nil,
+            queue: .main
+        ) { [weak self] _ in
+            guard let self else { return }
+            Task { @MainActor in
+                self.prefetchIfNeeded(force: true)
             }
+        }
+        cleanupState.observers.append(torReady)
+
+        if let activeNotificationName = dependencies.activeNotificationName {
+            let didBecomeActive = center.addObserver(
+                forName: activeNotificationName,
+                object: nil,
+                queue: .main
+            ) { [weak self] _ in
+                guard let self else { return }
+                Task { @MainActor in
+                    self.prefetchIfNeeded()
+                }
+            }
+            cleanupState.observers.append(didBecomeActive)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func startRefreshTimer() {
+        cleanupState.refreshTimer?.invalidate()
+        let interval = dependencies.refreshCheckInterval
+        guard interval > 0 else { return }
+
+        let timer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: interval, repeats: true) { [weak self] _ in
+            guard let self else { return }
+            Task { @MainActor in
+                self.prefetchIfNeeded()
+            }
+        }
+        cleanupState.refreshTimer = timer
+        RunLoop.main.add(timer, forMode: .common)
+    }
+
+    var debugRetryAttempt: Int { retryAttempt }
+    var debugHasRetryTask: Bool { cleanupState.retryTask != nil }
+    var debugObserverCount: Int { cleanupState.observers.count }
 }
 
 // MARK: - Distance

bitchat/Nostr/NostrEmbeddedBitChat.swift

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 import Foundation
+import BitFoundation
 
 // MARK: - BitChat-over-Nostr Adapter
 
 struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
     /// Build a `bitchat1:` base64url-encoded BitChat packet carrying a private message for Nostr DMs.
-    static func encodePMForNostr(content: String, messageID: String, recipientPeerID: String, senderPeerID: String) -> String? {
+    static func encodePMForNostr(content: String, messageID: String, recipientPeerID: PeerID, senderPeerID: PeerID) -> String? {
         // TLV-encode the private message
         let pm = PrivateMessagePacket(messageID: messageID, content: content)
         guard let tlv = pm.encode() else { return nil }
@@ -14,12 +15,12 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
         payload.append(tlv)
 
         // Determine 8-byte recipient ID to embed
-        let recipientIDHex: String = normalizeRecipientPeerID(recipientPeerID)
+        let recipientID = normalizeRecipientPeerID(recipientPeerID)
 
         let packet = BitchatPacket(
             type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
-            senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID) ?? Data(),
+            senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
-            recipientID: Data(hexString: recipientIDHex),
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: recipientID.id),
             timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
             payload: payload,
             signature: nil,
@@ -31,18 +32,18 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
     }
 
     /// Build a `bitchat1:` base64url-encoded BitChat packet carrying a delivery/read ack for Nostr DMs.
-    static func encodeAckForNostr(type: NoisePayloadType, messageID: String, recipientPeerID: String, senderPeerID: String) -> String? {
+    static func encodeAckForNostr(type: NoisePayloadType, messageID: String, recipientPeerID: PeerID, senderPeerID: PeerID) -> String? {
         guard type == .delivered || type == .readReceipt else { return nil }
 
         var payload = Data([type.rawValue])
         payload.append(Data(messageID.utf8))
 
-        let recipientIDHex: String = normalizeRecipientPeerID(recipientPeerID)
+        let recipientID = normalizeRecipientPeerID(recipientPeerID)
 
         let packet = BitchatPacket(
             type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
-            senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID) ?? Data(),
+            senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
-            recipientID: Data(hexString: recipientIDHex),
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: recipientID.id),
             timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
             payload: payload,
             signature: nil,
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
     }
 
     /// Build a `bitchat1:` ACK (delivered/read) without an embedded recipient peer ID (geohash DMs).
-    static func encodeAckForNostrNoRecipient(type: NoisePayloadType, messageID: String, senderPeerID: String) -> String? {
+    static func encodeAckForNostrNoRecipient(type: NoisePayloadType, messageID: String, senderPeerID: PeerID) -> String? {
         guard type == .delivered || type == .readReceipt else { return nil }
 
         var payload = Data([type.rawValue])
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
 
         let packet = BitchatPacket(
             type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
-            senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID) ?? Data(),
+            senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
             recipientID: nil,
             timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
             payload: payload,
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
     }
 
     /// Build a `bitchat1:` payload without an embedded recipient peer ID (used for geohash DMs).
-    static func encodePMForNostrNoRecipient(content: String, messageID: String, senderPeerID: String) -> String? {
+    static func encodePMForNostrNoRecipient(content: String, messageID: String, senderPeerID: PeerID) -> String? {
         let pm = PrivateMessagePacket(messageID: messageID, content: content)
         guard let tlv = pm.encode() else { return nil }
 
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
 
         let packet = BitchatPacket(
             type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
-            senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID) ?? Data(),
+            senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
             recipientID: nil,
             timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
             payload: payload,
@@ -96,11 +97,11 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
         return "bitchat1:" + base64URLEncode(data)
     }
 
-    private static func normalizeRecipientPeerID(_ recipientPeerID: String) -> String {
+    private static func normalizeRecipientPeerID(_ recipientPeerID: PeerID) -> PeerID {
-        if let maybeData = Data(hexString: recipientPeerID) {
+        if let maybeData = Data(hexString: recipientPeerID.id) {
             if maybeData.count == 32 {
                 // Treat as Noise static public key; derive peerID from fingerprint
-                return PeerID(publicKey: maybeData).id
+                return PeerID(publicKey: maybeData)
             } else if maybeData.count == 8 {
                 // Already an 8-byte peer ID
                 return recipientPeerID

bitchat/Nostr/NostrIdentity.swift

@@ -1,50 +1,5 @@
 import Foundation
-import CryptoKit
 import P256K
-import Security
-
-// Keychain helper for secure storage
-struct KeychainHelper {
-    static func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString? = nil) {
-        var query: [String: Any] = [
-            kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
-            kSecAttrService as String: service,
-            kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
-            kSecValueData as String: data
-        ]
-        if let accessible = accessible {
-            query[kSecAttrAccessible as String] = accessible
-        }
-        
-        SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
-        SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
-    }
-    
-    static func load(key: String, service: String) -> Data? {
-        let query: [String: Any] = [
-            kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
-            kSecAttrService as String: service,
-            kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
-            kSecReturnData as String: true
-        ]
-        
-        var result: AnyObject?
-        let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
-        
-        guard status == errSecSuccess else { return nil }
-        return result as? Data
-    }
-    
-    static func delete(key: String, service: String) {
-        let query: [String: Any] = [
-            kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
-            kSecAttrService as String: service,
-            kSecAttrAccount as String: key
-        ]
-        
-        SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
-    }
-}
 
 /// Manages Nostr identity (secp256k1 keypair) for NIP-17 private messaging
 struct NostrIdentity: Codable {
@@ -103,266 +58,3 @@ struct NostrIdentity: Codable {
         return publicKey.hexEncodedString()
     }
 }
-
-/// Bridge between Noise and Nostr identities
-struct NostrIdentityBridge {
-    private static let keychainService = "chat.bitchat.nostr"
-    private static let currentIdentityKey = "nostr-current-identity"
-    private static let deviceSeedKey = "nostr-device-seed"
-    // In-memory cache to avoid transient keychain access issues
-    private static var deviceSeedCache: Data?
-    
-    /// Get or create the current Nostr identity
-    static func getCurrentNostrIdentity() throws -> NostrIdentity? {
-        // Check if we already have a Nostr identity
-        if let existingData = KeychainHelper.load(key: currentIdentityKey, service: keychainService),
-           let identity = try? JSONDecoder().decode(NostrIdentity.self, from: existingData) {
-            return identity
-        }
-        
-        // Generate new Nostr identity
-        let nostrIdentity = try NostrIdentity.generate()
-        
-        // Store it
-        let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(nostrIdentity)
-        KeychainHelper.save(key: currentIdentityKey, data: data, service: keychainService)
-        
-        return nostrIdentity
-    }
-    
-    /// Associate a Nostr identity with a Noise public key (for favorites)
-    static func associateNostrIdentity(_ nostrPubkey: String, with noisePublicKey: Data) {
-        let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
-        if let data = nostrPubkey.data(using: .utf8) {
-            KeychainHelper.save(key: key, data: data, service: keychainService)
-        }
-    }
-    
-    /// Get Nostr public key associated with a Noise public key
-    static func getNostrPublicKey(for noisePublicKey: Data) -> String? {
-        let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
-        guard let data = KeychainHelper.load(key: key, service: keychainService),
-              let pubkey = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) else {
-            return nil
-        }
-        return pubkey
-    }
-    
-    /// Clear all Nostr identity associations and current identity
-    static func clearAllAssociations() {
-        let query: [String: Any] = [
-            kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
-            kSecAttrService as String: keychainService,
-            kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitAll,
-            kSecReturnAttributes as String: true
-        ]
-
-        var result: AnyObject?
-        let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
-        if status == errSecSuccess, let items = result as? [[String: Any]] {
-            for item in items {
-                var deleteQuery: [String: Any] = [
-                    kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
-                    kSecAttrService as String: keychainService
-                ]
-                if let account = item[kSecAttrAccount as String] as? String {
-                    deleteQuery[kSecAttrAccount as String] = account
-                }
-                SecItemDelete(deleteQuery as CFDictionary)
-            }
-        } else if status == errSecItemNotFound {
-            // nothing persisted; no action needed
-        }
-
-        deviceSeedCache = nil
-    }
-
-    // MARK: - Per-Geohash Identities (Location Channels)
-
-    /// Returns a stable device seed used to derive unlinkable per-geohash identities.
-    /// Stored only on device keychain.
-    private static func getOrCreateDeviceSeed() -> Data {
-        if let cached = deviceSeedCache { return cached }
-        if let existing = KeychainHelper.load(key: deviceSeedKey, service: keychainService) {
-            // Migrate to AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly for stability during lock
-            KeychainHelper.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: existing, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
-            deviceSeedCache = existing
-            return existing
-        }
-        var seed = Data(count: 32)
-        _ = seed.withUnsafeMutableBytes { ptr in
-            SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, 32, ptr.baseAddress!)
-        }
-        // Ensure availability after first unlock to prevent unintended rotation when locked
-        KeychainHelper.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: seed, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
-        deviceSeedCache = seed
-        return seed
-    }
-
-    /// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a given geohash.
-    /// Uses HMAC-SHA256(deviceSeed, geohash) as private key material, with fallback rehashing
-    /// if the candidate is not a valid secp256k1 private key.
-    static func deriveIdentity(forGeohash geohash: String) throws -> NostrIdentity {
-        let seed = getOrCreateDeviceSeed()
-        guard let msg = geohash.data(using: .utf8) else {
-            throw NSError(domain: "NostrIdentity", code: -1, userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "Invalid geohash string"])
-        }
-
-        func candidateKey(iteration: UInt32) -> Data {
-            var input = Data(msg)
-            var iterBE = iteration.bigEndian
-            withUnsafeBytes(of: &iterBE) { bytes in
-                input.append(contentsOf: bytes)
-            }
-            let code = CryptoKit.HMAC<CryptoKit.SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: input, using: SymmetricKey(data: seed))
-            return Data(code)
-        }
-
-        // Try a few iterations to ensure a valid key can be formed
-        for i in 0..<10 {
-            let keyData = candidateKey(iteration: UInt32(i))
-            if let identity = try? NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: keyData) {
-                return identity
-            }
-        }
-        // As a final fallback, hash the seed+msg and try again
-        let fallback = (seed + msg).sha256Hash()
-        return try NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: fallback)
-    }
-}
-
-// Bech32 encoding for Nostr (minimal implementation)
-enum Bech32 {
-    private static let charset = "qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l"
-    private static let generator = [0x3b6a57b2, 0x26508e6d, 0x1ea119fa, 0x3d4233dd, 0x2a1462b3]
-    
-    static func encode(hrp: String, data: Data) throws -> String {
-        let values = convertBits(from: 8, to: 5, pad: true, data: Array(data))
-        let checksum = createChecksum(hrp: hrp, values: values)
-        let combined = values + checksum
-        
-        return hrp + "1" + combined.map { 
-            let index = charset.index(charset.startIndex, offsetBy: Int($0))
-            return String(charset[index])
-        }.joined()
-    }
-    
-    static func decode(_ bech32String: String) throws -> (hrp: String, data: Data) {
-        // Find the last occurrence of '1'
-        guard let separatorIndex = bech32String.lastIndex(of: "1") else {
-            throw Bech32Error.invalidFormat
-        }
-        
-        let hrp = String(bech32String[..<separatorIndex])
-        
-        // Validate HRP contains only ASCII characters
-        for char in hrp {
-            guard char.asciiValue != nil else {
-                throw Bech32Error.invalidCharacter
-            }
-        }
-        
-        let dataString = String(bech32String[bech32String.index(after: separatorIndex)...])
-        
-        // Convert characters to values
-        var values = [UInt8]()
-        for char in dataString {
-            guard let index = charset.firstIndex(of: char) else {
-                throw Bech32Error.invalidCharacter
-            }
-            values.append(UInt8(charset.distance(from: charset.startIndex, to: index)))
-        }
-        
-        // Verify checksum
-        guard values.count >= 6 else {
-            throw Bech32Error.invalidChecksum
-        }
-        
-        let payloadValues = Array(values.dropLast(6))
-        let checksum = Array(values.suffix(6))
-        let expectedChecksum = createChecksum(hrp: hrp, values: payloadValues)
-        
-        guard checksum == expectedChecksum else {
-            throw Bech32Error.invalidChecksum
-        }
-        
-        // Convert back to bytes
-        let bytes = convertBits(from: 5, to: 8, pad: false, data: payloadValues)
-        return (hrp: hrp, data: Data(bytes))
-    }
-    
-    enum Bech32Error: Error {
-        case invalidFormat
-        case invalidCharacter
-        case invalidChecksum
-    }
-    
-    private static func convertBits(from: Int, to: Int, pad: Bool, data: [UInt8]) -> [UInt8] {
-        var acc = 0
-        var bits = 0
-        var result = [UInt8]()
-        let maxv = (1 << to) - 1
-        
-        for value in data {
-            acc = (acc << from) | Int(value)
-            bits += from
-            
-            while bits >= to {
-                bits -= to
-                result.append(UInt8((acc >> bits) & maxv))
-            }
-        }
-        
-        if pad && bits > 0 {
-            result.append(UInt8((acc << (to - bits)) & maxv))
-        }
-        
-        return result
-    }
-    
-    private static func createChecksum(hrp: String, values: [UInt8]) -> [UInt8] {
-        let checksumValues = hrpExpand(hrp) + values + [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
-        let polymod = polymod(checksumValues) ^ 1
-        var checksum = [UInt8]()
-        
-        for i in 0..<6 {
-            checksum.append(UInt8((polymod >> (5 * (5 - i))) & 31))
-        }
-        
-        return checksum
-    }
-    
-    private static func hrpExpand(_ hrp: String) -> [UInt8] {
-        var result = [UInt8]()
-        for c in hrp {
-            guard let asciiValue = c.asciiValue else {
-                return [] // Return empty array for invalid input
-            }
-            result.append(UInt8(asciiValue >> 5))
-        }
-        result.append(0)
-        for c in hrp {
-            guard let asciiValue = c.asciiValue else {
-                return [] // Return empty array for invalid input
-            }
-            result.append(UInt8(asciiValue & 31))
-        }
-        return result
-    }
-    
-    private static func polymod(_ values: [UInt8]) -> Int {
-        var chk = 1
-        for value in values {
-            let b = chk >> 25
-            chk = (chk & 0x1ffffff) << 5 ^ Int(value)
-            for i in 0..<5 {
-                if (b >> i) & 1 == 1 {
-                    chk ^= generator[i]
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        return chk
-    }
-}
-
-// Data hex encoding extension moved to BinaryEncodingUtils.swift to avoid duplication

bitchat/Nostr/NostrIdentityBridge.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+import CryptoKit
+
+/// Bridge between Noise and Nostr identities
+final class NostrIdentityBridge {
+    private let keychainService = "chat.bitchat.nostr"
+    private let currentIdentityKey = "nostr-current-identity"
+    private let deviceSeedKey = "nostr-device-seed"
+    // In-memory cache to avoid transient keychain access issues
+    private var deviceSeedCache: Data?
+    // Cache derived identities to avoid repeated crypto during view rendering
+    private var derivedIdentityCache: [String: NostrIdentity] = [:]
+    private let cacheLock = NSLock()
+
+    private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
+
+    init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager()) {
+        self.keychain = keychain
+    }
+    
+    /// Get or create the current Nostr identity
+    func getCurrentNostrIdentity() throws -> NostrIdentity? {
+        // Check if we already have a Nostr identity
+        if let existingData = keychain.load(key: currentIdentityKey, service: keychainService),
+           let identity = try? JSONDecoder().decode(NostrIdentity.self, from: existingData) {
+            return identity
+        }
+        
+        // Generate new Nostr identity
+        let nostrIdentity = try NostrIdentity.generate()
+        
+        // Store it
+        let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(nostrIdentity)
+        keychain.save(key: currentIdentityKey, data: data, service: keychainService, accessible: nil)
+        
+        return nostrIdentity
+    }
+    
+    /// Associate a Nostr identity with a Noise public key (for favorites)
+    func associateNostrIdentity(_ nostrPubkey: String, with noisePublicKey: Data) {
+        let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
+        if let data = nostrPubkey.data(using: .utf8) {
+            keychain.save(key: key, data: data, service: keychainService, accessible: nil)
+        }
+    }
+    
+    /// Get Nostr public key associated with a Noise public key
+    func getNostrPublicKey(for noisePublicKey: Data) -> String? {
+        let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
+        guard let data = keychain.load(key: key, service: keychainService),
+              let pubkey = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return pubkey
+    }
+    
+    /// Clear all Nostr identity associations and current identity
+    func clearAllAssociations() {
+        let query: [String: Any] = [
+            kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
+            kSecAttrService as String: keychainService,
+            kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitAll,
+            kSecReturnAttributes as String: true
+        ]
+
+        var result: AnyObject?
+        let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
+        if status == errSecSuccess, let items = result as? [[String: Any]] {
+            for item in items {
+                var deleteQuery: [String: Any] = [
+                    kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
+                    kSecAttrService as String: keychainService
+                ]
+                if let account = item[kSecAttrAccount as String] as? String {
+                    deleteQuery[kSecAttrAccount as String] = account
+                }
+                SecItemDelete(deleteQuery as CFDictionary)
+            }
+        } else if status == errSecItemNotFound {
+            // nothing persisted; no action needed
+        }
+
+        deviceSeedCache = nil
+        // Also drop the in-memory derived per-geohash identities. These hold the
+        // actual secp256k1 private keys; if left cached, post-panic geohash
+        // messages would still be signed with pre-panic keys (linkable across the
+        // wipe) until the app is force-quit.
+        cacheLock.lock()
+        derivedIdentityCache.removeAll()
+        cacheLock.unlock()
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Per-Geohash Identities (Location Channels)
+
+    /// Returns a stable device seed used to derive unlinkable per-geohash identities.
+    /// Stored only on device keychain.
+    private func getOrCreateDeviceSeed() -> Data {
+        if let cached = deviceSeedCache { return cached }
+        if let existing = keychain.load(key: deviceSeedKey, service: keychainService) {
+            // Migrate to AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly for stability during lock
+            keychain.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: existing, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
+            deviceSeedCache = existing
+            return existing
+        }
+        var seed = Data(count: 32)
+        _ = seed.withUnsafeMutableBytes { ptr in
+            SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, 32, ptr.baseAddress!)
+        }
+        // Ensure availability after first unlock to prevent unintended rotation when locked
+        keychain.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: seed, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
+        deviceSeedCache = seed
+        return seed
+    }
+
+    /// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a given geohash.
+    /// Uses HMAC-SHA256(deviceSeed, geohash) as private key material, with fallback rehashing
+    /// if the candidate is not a valid secp256k1 private key.
+    func deriveIdentity(forGeohash geohash: String) throws -> NostrIdentity {
+        // Check cache first to avoid repeated crypto + keychain I/O during view rendering
+        cacheLock.lock()
+        if let cached = derivedIdentityCache[geohash] {
+            cacheLock.unlock()
+            return cached
+        }
+        cacheLock.unlock()
+
+        let seed = getOrCreateDeviceSeed()
+        guard let msg = geohash.data(using: .utf8) else {
+            throw NSError(domain: "NostrIdentity", code: -1, userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "Invalid geohash string"])
+        }
+
+        func candidateKey(iteration: UInt32) -> Data {
+            var input = Data(msg)
+            var iterBE = iteration.bigEndian
+            withUnsafeBytes(of: &iterBE) { bytes in
+                input.append(contentsOf: bytes)
+            }
+            let code = HMAC<SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: input, using: SymmetricKey(data: seed))
+            return Data(code)
+        }
+
+        // Try a few iterations to ensure a valid key can be formed
+        for i in 0..<10 {
+            let keyData = candidateKey(iteration: UInt32(i))
+            if let identity = try? NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: keyData) {
+                // Cache the result
+                cacheLock.lock()
+                derivedIdentityCache[geohash] = identity
+                cacheLock.unlock()
+                return identity
+            }
+        }
+        // As a final fallback, hash the seed+msg and try again
+        let fallback = (seed + msg).sha256Hash()
+        let identity = try NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: fallback)
+
+        // Cache the result
+        cacheLock.lock()
+        derivedIdentityCache[geohash] = identity
+        cacheLock.unlock()
+
+        return identity
+    }
+}

bitchat/Nostr/NostrProtocol.swift

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
         case seal = 13 // NIP-17 sealed event
         case giftWrap = 1059 // NIP-59 gift wrap
         case ephemeralEvent = 20000
+        case geohashPresence = 20001
     }
     
     /// Create a NIP-17 private message
@@ -38,22 +39,23 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
             content: content
         )
         
-        // 2. Create ephemeral key for this message
+        // 2. Seal the rumor (encrypt to recipient) and sign it with the SENDER'S
-        let ephemeralKey = try P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey()
+        //    real identity key. NIP-17 requires the seal be signed by the sender
-        // Created ephemeral key for seal
+        //    so the recipient can authenticate who sent the message; signing with
-        
+        //    a throwaway key leaves DMs forgeable/impersonatable.
-        // 3. Seal the rumor (encrypt to recipient)
+        let senderKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
         let sealedEvent = try createSeal(
             rumor: rumor,
             recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
-            senderKey: ephemeralKey
+            senderKey: senderKey
         )
 
-        // 4. Gift wrap the sealed event (encrypt to recipient again)
+        // 3. Gift wrap the sealed event with a throwaway ephemeral key (the wrap
+        //    layer hides the sender's identity from relays; createGiftWrap mints
+        //    its own ephemeral key internally).
         let giftWrap = try createGiftWrap(
             seal: sealedEvent,
-            recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
+            recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey
-            senderKey: ephemeralKey
         )
         
         // Created gift wrap
@@ -83,7 +85,15 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
             throw error
         }
         
-        // 2. Open the seal
+        // 2. Authenticate the seal. The seal MUST be signed by the sender's real
+        //    identity key (NIP-17); without this check a DM is forgeable by anyone
+        //    who knows the recipient's npub. Verify the seal's own signature.
+        guard seal.isValidSignature() else {
+            SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: seal signature is missing or invalid", category: .session)
+            throw NostrError.invalidEvent
+        }
+
+        // 3. Open the seal
         let rumor: NostrEvent
         do {
             rumor = try openSeal(
@@ -96,9 +106,62 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
             throw error
         }
 
-        return (content: rumor.content, senderPubkey: rumor.pubkey, timestamp: rumor.created_at)
+        // 4. The sender claimed inside the rumor must match the key that actually
+        //    signed the seal, otherwise the sender field is unauthenticated and
+        //    spoofable.
+        guard seal.pubkey == rumor.pubkey else {
+            SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: rumor pubkey does not match seal signer", category: .session)
+            throw NostrError.invalidEvent
         }
 
+        // Return the seal signer's pubkey as the authenticated sender.
+        return (content: rumor.content, senderPubkey: seal.pubkey, timestamp: rumor.created_at)
+    }
+
+    #if DEBUG
+    static func createPrivateMessageWithInvalidSealSignatureForTesting(
+        content: String,
+        recipientPubkey: String,
+        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
+    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
+        let rumor = NostrEvent(
+            pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
+            createdAt: Date(),
+            kind: .dm,
+            tags: [],
+            content: content
+        )
+        var seal = try createSeal(
+            rumor: rumor,
+            recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
+            senderKey: senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
+        )
+        seal.sig = String(repeating: "0", count: 128)
+        return try createGiftWrap(seal: seal, recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey)
+    }
+
+    static func createPrivateMessageWithMismatchedSealRumorPubkeyForTesting(
+        content: String,
+        recipientPubkey: String,
+        rumorIdentity: NostrIdentity,
+        sealSignerIdentity: NostrIdentity
+    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
+        let rumor = NostrEvent(
+            pubkey: rumorIdentity.publicKeyHex,
+            createdAt: Date(),
+            kind: .dm,
+            tags: [],
+            content: content
+        )
+        let seal = try createSeal(
+            rumor: rumor,
+            recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
+            senderKey: sealSignerIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
+        )
+        return try createGiftWrap(seal: seal, recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey)
+    }
+    #endif
+
     /// Create a geohash-scoped ephemeral public message (kind 20000)
     static func createEphemeralGeohashEvent(
         content: String,
@@ -108,7 +171,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
         teleported: Bool = false
     ) throws -> NostrEvent {
         var tags = [["g", geohash]]
-        if let nickname = nickname?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines), !nickname.isEmpty {
+        if let nickname = nickname?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty {
             tags.append(["n", nickname])
         }
         if teleported {
@@ -125,6 +188,24 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
         return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
     }
 
+    /// Create a geohash presence heartbeat (kind 20001)
+    /// Must contain empty content and NO nickname tag
+    static func createGeohashPresenceEvent(
+        geohash: String,
+        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
+    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
+        let tags = [["g", geohash]]
+        let event = NostrEvent(
+            pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
+            createdAt: Date(),
+            kind: .geohashPresence,
+            tags: tags,
+            content: ""
+        )
+        let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
+        return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
+    }
+
     /// Create a persistent location note (kind 1: text note) tagged to a street-level geohash.
     static func createGeohashTextNote(
         content: String,
@@ -133,7 +214,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
         nickname: String? = nil
     ) throws -> NostrEvent {
         var tags = [["g", geohash]]
-        if let nickname = nickname?.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines), !nickname.isEmpty {
+        if let nickname = nickname?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty {
             tags.append(["n", nickname])
         }
         let event = NostrEvent(
@@ -176,8 +257,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
     
     private static func createGiftWrap(
         seal: NostrEvent,
-        recipientPubkey: String,
+        recipientPubkey: String
-        senderKey: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey  // This is the ephemeral key used for the seal
     ) throws -> NostrEvent {
 
         let sealJSON = try seal.jsonString()
@@ -248,26 +328,46 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
         return try NostrEvent(from: rumorDict)
     }
     
-    // MARK: - Encryption (NIP-44 v2)
+    // MARK: - Encryption (NIP-44 v2/v3)
 
-    private static func encrypt(
+    /// Whether outgoing DMs use the padded "v3:" envelope.
+    ///
+    /// TWO-PHASE ROLLOUT — DO NOT FLIP YET. Deployed clients hard-reject any
+    /// ciphertext that does not start with "v2:" (`decrypt` below, as shipped,
+    /// throws `invalidCiphertext` on unknown version prefixes), and the "v2:"
+    /// payload is the raw UTF-8 rumor JSON, so a padded payload cannot be
+    /// smuggled inside "v2:" without breaking old receivers either. Enabling
+    /// this today would strand every client in the field.
+    ///
+    /// Phase 1 (this change): ship decrypt-side support for "v3:" everywhere.
+    /// Phase 2 (future release, once phase-1 clients are widely deployed):
+    /// set this to true so outgoing DMs stop leaking plaintext length to
+    /// relays.
+    static let sendPaddedEnvelope = false
+
+    /// Internal (rather than private) so tests can exercise both envelope
+    /// versions directly.
+    static func encrypt(
         plaintext: String,
         recipientPubkey: String,
-        senderKey: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey
+        senderKey: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey,
+        padded: Bool = NostrProtocol.sendPaddedEnvelope
     ) throws -> String {
 
         guard let recipientPubkeyData = Data(hexString: recipientPubkey) else {
             throw NostrError.invalidPublicKey
         }
 
-        // Encrypting message (NIP-44 v2: XChaCha20-Poly1305, versioned)
+        // Encrypting message (XChaCha20-Poly1305, versioned envelope)
 
         // Derive shared secret
         let sharedSecret = try deriveSharedSecret(
             privateKey: senderKey,
             publicKey: recipientPubkeyData
         )
-        // Derive NIP-44 v2 symmetric key (HKDF-SHA256 with label in info)
+        // Derive NIP-44 v2 symmetric key (HKDF-SHA256 with label in info).
+        // The v3 envelope deliberately reuses the same key derivation; it only
+        // changes the payload framing (length prefix + padding).
         let key = try deriveNIP44V2Key(from: sharedSecret)
 
         // 24-byte random nonce for XChaCha20-Poly1305
@@ -276,26 +376,39 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
             SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, 24, ptr.baseAddress!)
         }
 
+        // v2 payload: raw UTF-8 plaintext (length leaks to relays)
+        // v3 payload: NIP-44 style [2-byte BE length][plaintext][zero padding]
         let pt = Data(plaintext.utf8)
-        let sealed = try XChaCha20Poly1305Compat.seal(plaintext: pt, key: key, nonce24: nonce24)
+        let payload = padded ? try NIP44Padding.pad(pt) : pt
+        let sealed = try XChaCha20Poly1305Compat.seal(plaintext: payload, key: key, nonce24: nonce24)
 
-        // v2: base64url(nonce24 || ciphertext || tag)
+        // version prefix + base64url(nonce24 || ciphertext || tag)
         var combined = Data()
         combined.append(nonce24)
         combined.append(sealed.ciphertext)
         combined.append(sealed.tag)
-        return "v2:" + base64URLEncode(combined)
+        return (padded ? "v3:" : "v2:") + Base64URLCoding.encode(combined)
     }
 
-    private static func decrypt(
+    /// Internal (rather than private) so tests can exercise both envelope
+    /// versions directly.
+    static func decrypt(
         ciphertext: String,
         senderPubkey: String,
         recipientKey: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey
     ) throws -> String {
-        // Expect NIP-44 v2 format
+        // Accept both the legacy unpadded "v2:" envelope and the padded "v3:"
-        guard ciphertext.hasPrefix("v2:") else { throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext }
+        // envelope (see `sendPaddedEnvelope` for the rollout plan).
+        let isPadded: Bool
+        if ciphertext.hasPrefix("v2:") {
+            isPadded = false
+        } else if ciphertext.hasPrefix("v3:") {
+            isPadded = true
+        } else {
+            throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext
+        }
         let encoded = String(ciphertext.dropFirst(3))
-        guard let data = base64URLDecode(encoded),
+        guard let data = Base64URLCoding.decode(encoded),
               data.count > (24 + 16),
               let senderPubkeyData = Data(hexString: senderPubkey) else {
             throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext
@@ -319,18 +432,23 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
         }
 
         // If 32 bytes (x-only) try both parities, otherwise single try
+        let payload: Data
         if senderPubkeyData.count == 32 {
             let even = Data([0x02]) + senderPubkeyData
             if let pt = try? attemptDecrypt(using: even) {
-                return String(data: pt, encoding: .utf8) ?? ""
+                payload = pt
-            }
-            let odd = Data([0x03]) + senderPubkeyData
-            let pt = try attemptDecrypt(using: odd)
-            return String(data: pt, encoding: .utf8) ?? ""
             } else {
-            let pt = try attemptDecrypt(using: senderPubkeyData)
+                let odd = Data([0x03]) + senderPubkeyData
-            return String(data: pt, encoding: .utf8) ?? ""
+                payload = try attemptDecrypt(using: odd)
             }
+        } else {
+            payload = try attemptDecrypt(using: senderPubkeyData)
+        }
+
+        // The AEAD tag has already authenticated the payload; unpadding
+        // failures here mean a malformed sender, not a wrong key.
+        let plaintextData = isPadded ? try NIP44Padding.unpad(payload) : payload
+        return String(data: plaintextData, encoding: .utf8) ?? ""
     }
     
     private static func deriveSharedSecret(
@@ -510,6 +628,26 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
         return signed
     }
 
+    /// Validate that the event ID and Schnorr signature match the content and pubkey.
+    /// Returns false when the signature is missing, malformed, or does not verify.
+    func isValidSignature() -> Bool {
+        guard let sig = sig,
+              let sigData = Data(hexString: sig),
+              let pubData = Data(hexString: pubkey),
+              sigData.count == 64,
+              pubData.count == 32,
+              let signature = try? P256K.Schnorr.SchnorrSignature(dataRepresentation: sigData),
+              let (expectedId, eventHash) = try? calculateEventId(),
+              expectedId == id
+        else {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        var messageBytes = [UInt8](eventHash)
+        let xonly = P256K.Schnorr.XonlyKey(dataRepresentation: pubData)
+        return xonly.isValid(signature, for: &messageBytes)
+    }
+    
     private func calculateEventId() throws -> (String, Data) {
         let serialized = [
             0,
@@ -541,24 +679,63 @@ enum NostrError: Error {
     case encryptionFailed
 }
 
-// MARK: - NIP-44 v2 helpers (XChaCha20-Poly1305 + base64url)
+// MARK: - NIP-44 style padding (v3 envelope payload framing)
+
+/// Payload framing for the padded "v3:" envelope, modeled on NIP-44 v2:
+/// `[2-byte big-endian plaintext length][plaintext][zero padding]`, where the
+/// total is padded to `paddedLength(for:)` — power-of-two-derived buckets with
+/// a 32-byte minimum — so ciphertext length no longer reveals exact plaintext
+/// length to relays.
+enum NIP44Padding {
+    static let minPaddedLength = 32
+    static let maxPlaintextLength = 65535
+
+    /// NIP-44's calc_padded_len: pad to 32 bytes minimum, then to a chunk
+    /// granularity of max(32, nextPowerOfTwo/8).
+    static func paddedLength(for unpaddedLength: Int) -> Int {
+        guard unpaddedLength > minPaddedLength else { return minPaddedLength }
+        // Smallest power of two strictly greater than (unpaddedLength - 1).
+        let nextPower = 1 << (Int.bitWidth - (unpaddedLength - 1).leadingZeroBitCount)
+        let chunk = nextPower <= 256 ? 32 : nextPower / 8
+        return chunk * ((unpaddedLength - 1) / chunk + 1)
+    }
+
+    /// Prefix plaintext with its 2-byte big-endian length and zero-pad to the
+    /// bucketed length. Rejects empty plaintexts and plaintexts that do not
+    /// fit the 16-bit length prefix.
+    static func pad(_ plaintext: Data) throws -> Data {
+        let length = plaintext.count
+        guard length >= 1, length <= maxPlaintextLength else {
+            throw NostrError.encryptionFailed
+        }
+        let padded = paddedLength(for: length)
+        var result = Data(capacity: 2 + padded)
+        result.append(UInt8(length >> 8))
+        result.append(UInt8(length & 0xFF))
+        result.append(plaintext)
+        result.append(Data(count: padded - length))
+        return result
+    }
+
+    /// Read the 2-byte length prefix, validate the total padded size matches
+    /// it exactly, and return the plaintext. Throws on any inconsistency so a
+    /// malformed (already-authenticated) payload can never over- or
+    /// under-read.
+    static func unpad(_ padded: Data) throws -> Data {
+        guard padded.count >= 2 else { throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext }
+        let start = padded.startIndex
+        let length = Int(padded[start]) << 8 | Int(padded[start + 1])
+        guard length >= 1,
+              padded.count == 2 + paddedLength(for: length) else {
+            throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext
+        }
+        return padded.subdata(in: (start + 2)..<(start + 2 + length))
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - NIP-44 v2 helpers (XChaCha20-Poly1305)
 
 private extension NostrProtocol {
-    static func base64URLEncode(_ data: Data) -> String {
-        return data.base64EncodedString()
-            .replacingOccurrences(of: "+", with: "-")
-            .replacingOccurrences(of: "/", with: "_")
-            .replacingOccurrences(of: "=", with: "")
-    }
-
-    static func base64URLDecode(_ s: String) -> Data? {
-        var str = s
-        let pad = (4 - (str.count % 4)) % 4
-        if pad > 0 { str += String(repeating: "=", count: pad) }
-        str = str.replacingOccurrences(of: "-", with: "+").replacingOccurrences(of: "_", with: "/")
-        return Data(base64Encoded: str)
-    }
-
     static func deriveNIP44V2Key(from sharedSecretData: Data) throws -> Data {
         let derivedKey = HKDF<CryptoKit.SHA256>.deriveKey(
             inputKeyMaterial: SymmetricKey(data: sharedSecretData),

bitchat/Nostr/NostrRelayURL.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+import Foundation
+
+enum NostrRelayURL {
+    static func normalized(_ rawValue: String, defaultScheme: String? = nil) -> String? {
+        var value = rawValue.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
+        guard !value.isEmpty else { return nil }
+
+        if !value.contains("://"), let defaultScheme {
+            value = "\(defaultScheme)://\(value)"
+        }
+
+        guard var components = URLComponents(string: value),
+              let rawScheme = components.scheme?.lowercased(),
+              let rawHost = components.host?.lowercased(),
+              !rawHost.isEmpty else {
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        switch rawScheme {
+        case "wss", "https":
+            components.scheme = "wss"
+            if components.port == 443 {
+                components.port = nil
+            }
+        case "ws", "http":
+            components.scheme = "ws"
+            if components.port == 80 {
+                components.port = nil
+            }
+        default:
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        components.host = rawHost
+        if components.path == "/" {
+            components.path = ""
+        }
+        components.fragment = nil
+
+        return components.string
+    }
+
+    static func directoryAddress(_ rawValue: String) -> String? {
+        guard var normalized = normalized(rawValue, defaultScheme: "wss") else { return nil }
+        for prefix in ["wss://", "ws://"] where normalized.hasPrefix(prefix) {
+            normalized.removeFirst(prefix.count)
+            break
+        }
+        return normalized
+    }
+}

bitchat/Nostr/XChaCha20Poly1305Compat.swift

@@ -5,16 +5,27 @@ import CryptoKit
 /// Implements HChaCha20 to derive a subkey and reduces the 24-byte nonce to a 12-byte nonce
 /// as per XChaCha20 construction.
 enum XChaCha20Poly1305Compat {
+
+    /// Errors that can occur during XChaCha20-Poly1305 operations
+    enum Error: Swift.Error {
+        case invalidKeyLength(expected: Int, got: Int)
+        case invalidNonceLength(expected: Int, got: Int)
+    }
+
     struct SealBox {
         let ciphertext: Data
         let tag: Data
     }
 
     static func seal(plaintext: Data, key: Data, nonce24: Data, aad: Data? = nil) throws -> SealBox {
-        precondition(key.count == 32, "XChaCha20 key must be 32 bytes")
+        guard key.count == 32 else {
-        precondition(nonce24.count == 24, "XChaCha20 nonce must be 24 bytes")
+            throw Error.invalidKeyLength(expected: 32, got: key.count)
+        }
+        guard nonce24.count == 24 else {
+            throw Error.invalidNonceLength(expected: 24, got: nonce24.count)
+        }
 
-        let subkey = hchacha20(key: key, nonce16: nonce24.prefix(16))
+        let subkey = try hchacha20(key: key, nonce16: Data(nonce24.prefix(16)))
         let nonce12 = derive12ByteNonce(from24: nonce24)
         let chachaKey = SymmetricKey(data: subkey)
         let nonce = try ChaChaPoly.Nonce(data: nonce12)
@@ -23,10 +34,14 @@ enum XChaCha20Poly1305Compat {
     }
 
     static func open(ciphertext: Data, tag: Data, key: Data, nonce24: Data, aad: Data? = nil) throws -> Data {
-        precondition(key.count == 32, "XChaCha20 key must be 32 bytes")
+        guard key.count == 32 else {
-        precondition(nonce24.count == 24, "XChaCha20 nonce must be 24 bytes")
+            throw Error.invalidKeyLength(expected: 32, got: key.count)
+        }
+        guard nonce24.count == 24 else {
+            throw Error.invalidNonceLength(expected: 24, got: nonce24.count)
+        }
 
-        let subkey = hchacha20(key: key, nonce16: nonce24.prefix(16))
+        let subkey = try hchacha20(key: key, nonce16: Data(nonce24.prefix(16)))
         let nonce12 = derive12ByteNonce(from24: nonce24)
         let chachaKey = SymmetricKey(data: subkey)
         let box = try ChaChaPoly.SealedBox(nonce: ChaChaPoly.Nonce(data: nonce12), ciphertext: ciphertext, tag: tag)
@@ -43,10 +58,14 @@ enum XChaCha20Poly1305Compat {
         return out
     }
 
-    private static func hchacha20(key: Data, nonce16: Data) -> Data {
+    private static func hchacha20(key: Data, nonce16: Data) throws -> Data {
         // HChaCha20 based on the original ChaCha20 core with a 16-byte nonce.
-        precondition(key.count == 32)
+        guard key.count == 32 else {
-        precondition(nonce16.count == 16)
+            throw Error.invalidKeyLength(expected: 32, got: key.count)
+        }
+        guard nonce16.count == 16 else {
+            throw Error.invalidNonceLength(expected: 16, got: nonce16.count)
+        }
 
         // Constants "expand 32-byte k"
         var state: [UInt32] = [

bitchat/Protocols/BinaryProtocol.swift

@@ -1,330 +0,0 @@
-//
-// BinaryProtocol.swift
-// bitchat
-//
-// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
-// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
-//
-
-///
-/// # BinaryProtocol
-///
-/// Low-level binary encoding and decoding for BitChat protocol messages.
-/// Optimized for Bluetooth LE's limited bandwidth and MTU constraints.
-///
-/// ## Overview
-/// BinaryProtocol implements an efficient binary wire format that minimizes
-/// overhead while maintaining extensibility. It handles:
-/// - Compact binary encoding with fixed headers
-/// - Optional field support via flags
-/// - Automatic compression for large payloads
-/// - Endianness handling for cross-platform compatibility
-///
-/// ## Wire Format
-/// ```
-/// Header (Fixed 13 bytes):
-/// +--------+------+-----+-----------+-------+----------------+
-/// |Version | Type | TTL | Timestamp | Flags | PayloadLength  |
-/// |1 byte  |1 byte|1byte| 8 bytes   | 1 byte| 2 bytes        |
-/// +--------+------+-----+-----------+-------+----------------+
-///
-/// Variable sections:
-/// +----------+-------------+---------+------------+
-/// | SenderID | RecipientID | Payload | Signature  |
-/// | 8 bytes  | 8 bytes*    | Variable| 64 bytes*  |
-/// +----------+-------------+---------+------------+
-/// * Optional fields based on flags
-/// ```
-///
-/// ## Design Rationale
-/// The protocol is designed for:
-/// - **Efficiency**: Minimal overhead for small messages
-/// - **Flexibility**: Optional fields via flag bits
-/// - **Compatibility**: Network byte order (big-endian)
-/// - **Performance**: Zero-copy where possible
-///
-/// ## Compression Strategy
-/// - Automatic compression for payloads > 256 bytes
-/// - zlib compression for broad compatibility on Apple platforms
-/// - Original size stored for decompression
-/// - Flag bit indicates compressed payload
-///
-/// ## Flag Bits
-/// - Bit 0: Has recipient ID (directed message)
-/// - Bit 1: Has signature (authenticated message)
-/// - Bit 2: Is compressed (LZ4 compression applied)
-/// - Bits 3-7: Reserved for future use
-///
-/// ## Size Constraints
-/// - Maximum packet size: 65,535 bytes (16-bit length field)
-/// - Typical packet size: < 512 bytes (BLE MTU)
-/// - Minimum packet size: 21 bytes (header + sender ID)
-///
-/// ## Encoding Process
-/// 1. Construct header with fixed fields
-/// 2. Set appropriate flags
-/// 3. Compress payload if beneficial
-/// 4. Append variable-length fields
-/// 5. Calculate and append signature if needed
-///
-/// ## Decoding Process
-/// 1. Validate minimum packet size
-/// 2. Parse fixed header
-/// 3. Extract flags and determine field presence
-/// 4. Parse variable fields based on flags
-/// 5. Decompress payload if compressed
-/// 6. Verify signature if present
-///
-/// ## Error Handling
-/// - Graceful handling of malformed packets
-/// - Clear error messages for debugging
-/// - No crashes on invalid input
-/// - Logging of protocol violations
-///
-/// ## Performance Notes
-/// - Allocation-free for small messages
-/// - Streaming support for large payloads
-/// - Efficient bit manipulation
-/// - Platform-optimized byte swapping
-///
-
-import Foundation
-
-extension Data {
-    func trimmingNullBytes() -> Data {
-        // Find the first null byte
-        if let nullIndex = self.firstIndex(of: 0) {
-            return self.prefix(nullIndex)
-        }
-        return self
-    }
-}
-
-/// Implements binary encoding and decoding for BitChat protocol messages.
-/// Provides static methods for converting between BitchatPacket objects and
-/// their binary wire format representation.
-/// - Note: All multi-byte values use network byte order (big-endian)
-struct BinaryProtocol {
-    static let headerSize = 13
-    static let senderIDSize = 8
-    static let recipientIDSize = 8
-    static let signatureSize = 64
-    
-    struct Flags {
-        static let hasRecipient: UInt8 = 0x01
-        static let hasSignature: UInt8 = 0x02
-        static let isCompressed: UInt8 = 0x04
-    }
-    
-    // Encode BitchatPacket to binary format
-    static func encode(_ packet: BitchatPacket, padding: Bool = true) -> Data? {
-        var data = Data()
-        
-        
-        // Try to compress payload if beneficial
-        var payload = packet.payload
-        var originalPayloadSize: UInt16? = nil
-        var isCompressed = false
-        
-        if CompressionUtil.shouldCompress(payload) {
-            if let compressedPayload = CompressionUtil.compress(payload) {
-                // Store original size for decompression (2 bytes after payload)
-                originalPayloadSize = UInt16(payload.count)
-                payload = compressedPayload
-                isCompressed = true
-                
-            } else {
-            }
-        } else {
-        }
-        
-        // Header
-        // Reserve capacity to reduce reallocations. Estimate base size conservatively.
-        // header(13) + sender(8) + opt recipient(8) + opt originalSize(2) + payload + opt signature(64) + up to 255 pad
-        let estimatedPayload = payload.count + (isCompressed ? 2 : 0)
-        let estimated = headerSize + senderIDSize + (packet.recipientID == nil ? 0 : recipientIDSize) + estimatedPayload + (packet.signature == nil ? 0 : signatureSize) + 255
-        data.reserveCapacity(estimated)
-        data.append(packet.version)
-        data.append(packet.type)
-        data.append(packet.ttl)
-        
-        // Timestamp (8 bytes, big-endian)
-        for i in (0..<8).reversed() {
-            data.append(UInt8((packet.timestamp >> (i * 8)) & 0xFF))
-        }
-        
-        // Flags
-        var flags: UInt8 = 0
-        if packet.recipientID != nil {
-            flags |= Flags.hasRecipient
-        }
-        if packet.signature != nil {
-            flags |= Flags.hasSignature
-        }
-        if isCompressed {
-            flags |= Flags.isCompressed
-        }
-        data.append(flags)
-        
-        // Payload length (2 bytes, big-endian) - includes original size if compressed
-        let payloadDataSize = payload.count + (isCompressed ? 2 : 0)
-        let payloadLength = UInt16(payloadDataSize)
-        
-        
-        data.append(UInt8((payloadLength >> 8) & 0xFF))
-        data.append(UInt8(payloadLength & 0xFF))
-        
-        // SenderID (exactly 8 bytes)
-        let senderBytes = packet.senderID.prefix(senderIDSize)
-        data.append(senderBytes)
-        if senderBytes.count < senderIDSize {
-            data.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: senderIDSize - senderBytes.count))
-        }
-        
-        // RecipientID (if present)
-        if let recipientID = packet.recipientID {
-            let recipientBytes = recipientID.prefix(recipientIDSize)
-            data.append(recipientBytes)
-            if recipientBytes.count < recipientIDSize {
-                data.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: recipientIDSize - recipientBytes.count))
-            }
-        }
-        
-        // Payload (with original size prepended if compressed)
-        if isCompressed, let originalSize = originalPayloadSize {
-            // Prepend original size (2 bytes, big-endian)
-            data.append(UInt8((originalSize >> 8) & 0xFF))
-            data.append(UInt8(originalSize & 0xFF))
-        }
-        data.append(payload)
-        
-        // Signature (if present)
-        if let signature = packet.signature {
-            data.append(signature.prefix(signatureSize))
-        }
-        
-        
-        // Apply padding to standard block sizes for traffic analysis resistance
-        if padding {
-            let optimalSize = MessagePadding.optimalBlockSize(for: data.count)
-            let paddedData = MessagePadding.pad(data, toSize: optimalSize)
-            return paddedData
-        } else {
-            // Caller explicitly requested no padding (e.g., BLE write path)
-            return data
-        }
-    }
-    
-    // Decode binary data to BitchatPacket
-    static func decode(_ data: Data) -> BitchatPacket? {
-        // Try decode as-is first (robust when padding wasn't applied)
-        if let pkt = decodeCore(data) { return pkt }
-        // If that fails, try after removing padding
-        let unpadded = MessagePadding.unpad(data)
-        if unpadded as NSData === data as NSData { return nil }
-        return decodeCore(unpadded)
-    }
-
-    // Core decoding implementation used by decode(_:) with and without padding removal
-    private static func decodeCore(_ raw: Data) -> BitchatPacket? {
-        // Minimum size: header + senderID
-        guard raw.count >= headerSize + senderIDSize else { return nil }
-
-        return raw.withUnsafeBytes { (buf: UnsafeRawBufferPointer) -> BitchatPacket? in
-            guard let base = buf.baseAddress else { return nil }
-            var offset = 0
-            func require(_ n: Int) -> Bool { offset + n <= buf.count }
-            // Read single byte
-            func read8() -> UInt8? {
-                guard require(1) else { return nil }
-                let v = base.advanced(by: offset).assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self).pointee
-                offset += 1
-                return v
-            }
-            // Read big-endian 16-bit
-            func read16() -> UInt16? {
-                guard require(2) else { return nil }
-                let p = base.advanced(by: offset).assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self)
-                let v = (UInt16(p[0]) << 8) | UInt16(p[1])
-                offset += 2
-                return v
-            }
-            // Copy N bytes into Data
-            func readData(_ n: Int) -> Data? {
-                guard require(n) else { return nil }
-                let ptr = base.advanced(by: offset)
-                let d = Data(bytes: ptr, count: n)
-                offset += n
-                return d
-            }
-
-            // Version
-            guard let version = read8(), version == 1 else { return nil }
-            guard let type = read8() else { return nil }
-            guard let ttl = read8() else { return nil }
-
-            // Timestamp 8 bytes BE
-            guard require(8) else { return nil }
-            var ts: UInt64 = 0
-            for _ in 0..<8 {
-                guard let b = read8() else { return nil }
-                ts = (ts << 8) | UInt64(b)
-            }
-
-            // Flags
-            guard let flags = read8() else { return nil }
-            let hasRecipient = (flags & Flags.hasRecipient) != 0
-            let hasSignature = (flags & Flags.hasSignature) != 0
-            let isCompressed = (flags & Flags.isCompressed) != 0
-
-            // Payload length
-            guard let payloadLen = read16(), payloadLen <= 65535 else { return nil }
-
-            // SenderID
-            guard let senderID = readData(senderIDSize) else { return nil }
-
-            // Recipient
-            var recipientID: Data? = nil
-            if hasRecipient {
-                recipientID = readData(recipientIDSize)
-                if recipientID == nil { return nil }
-            }
-
-            // Payload
-            let payload: Data
-            if isCompressed {
-                // Need original size (2 bytes)
-                guard let origSize16 = read16() else { return nil }
-                let originalSize = Int(origSize16)
-                guard originalSize >= 0 && originalSize <= 1_048_576 else { return nil }
-                let compSize = Int(payloadLen) - 2
-                guard compSize >= 0, let compressed = readData(compSize) else { return nil }
-                guard let decompressed = CompressionUtil.decompress(compressed, originalSize: originalSize),
-                      decompressed.count == originalSize else { return nil }
-                payload = decompressed
-            } else {
-                guard let p = readData(Int(payloadLen)) else { return nil }
-                payload = p
-            }
-
-            // Signature
-            var signature: Data? = nil
-            if hasSignature {
-                signature = readData(signatureSize)
-                if signature == nil { return nil }
-            }
-
-            guard offset <= buf.count else { return nil }
-
-            return BitchatPacket(
-                type: type,
-                senderID: senderID,
-                recipientID: recipientID,
-                timestamp: ts,
-                payload: payload,
-                signature: signature,
-                ttl: ttl
-            )
-        }
-    }
-}

bitchat/Protocols/BitchatFilePacket.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+//
+// BitchatFilePacket.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import Foundation
+import BitFoundation
+import BitLogger
+
+/// TLV payload for Bluetooth mesh file transfers (voice notes, images, generic files).
+/// Mirrors the Android client specification to ensure cross-platform interoperability.
+struct BitchatFilePacket {
+    var fileName: String?
+    var fileSize: UInt64?
+    var mimeType: String?
+    var content: Data
+
+    /// Canonical TLV tags defined by the Android implementation.
+    private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
+        case fileName = 0x01
+        case fileSize = 0x02
+        case mimeType = 0x03
+        case content = 0x04
+    }
+
+    /// Encodes the packet using v2 canonical TLVs (4-byte FILE_SIZE, 4-byte CONTENT length).
+    /// Returns `nil` when fields exceed protocol limits (e.g., content > UInt32.max).
+    func encode() -> Data? {
+        let resolvedSize = fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count)
+        guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(UInt32.max) else { return nil }
+        guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) else { return nil }
+        guard content.count <= Int(UInt32.max) else { return nil }
+        guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count) else { return nil }
+
+        func appendBE<T: FixedWidthInteger>(_ value: T, into data: inout Data) {
+            var big = value.bigEndian
+            withUnsafeBytes(of: &big) { data.append(contentsOf: $0) }
+        }
+
+        var encoded = Data()
+
+        if let name = fileName, let nameData = name.data(using: .utf8), nameData.count <= Int(UInt16.max) {
+            encoded.append(TLVType.fileName.rawValue)
+            appendBE(UInt16(nameData.count), into: &encoded)
+            encoded.append(nameData)
+        }
+
+        encoded.append(TLVType.fileSize.rawValue)
+        appendBE(UInt16(4), into: &encoded)
+        appendBE(UInt32(resolvedSize), into: &encoded)
+
+        if let mime = mimeType, let mimeData = mime.data(using: .utf8), mimeData.count <= Int(UInt16.max) {
+            encoded.append(TLVType.mimeType.rawValue)
+            appendBE(UInt16(mimeData.count), into: &encoded)
+            encoded.append(mimeData)
+        }
+
+        encoded.append(TLVType.content.rawValue)
+        appendBE(UInt32(content.count), into: &encoded)
+        encoded.append(content)
+
+        return encoded
+    }
+
+    /// Decodes TLV payloads, tolerating legacy encodings (FILE_SIZE len=8, CONTENT len=2) when possible.
+    static func decode(_ data: Data) -> BitchatFilePacket? {
+        var cursor = data.startIndex
+        let end = data.endIndex
+
+        var fileName: String?
+        var fileSize: UInt64?
+        var mimeType: String?
+        var content = Data()
+
+        while cursor < end {
+            let typeRaw = data[cursor]
+            cursor = data.index(after: cursor)
+
+            guard cursor <= end else { return nil }
+            let tlvType = TLVType(rawValue: typeRaw)
+
+            func readBigEndianLength(bytes: Int) -> Int? {
+                guard data.distance(from: cursor, to: end) >= bytes else { return nil }
+                // Use UInt64 to prevent integer overflow during shift operations
+                var result: UInt64 = 0
+                for _ in 0..<bytes {
+                    result = (result << 8) | UInt64(data[cursor])
+                    cursor = data.index(after: cursor)
+                }
+                // Safely convert to Int with overflow check
+                guard result <= Int.max else { return nil }
+                return Int(result)
+            }
+
+            let length: Int?
+            if tlvType == .content {
+                let snapshot = cursor
+                let canonical = readBigEndianLength(bytes: 4)
+                if let canonical = canonical,
+                   canonical <= data.distance(from: cursor, to: end) {
+                    length = canonical
+                } else {
+                    cursor = snapshot
+                    length = readBigEndianLength(bytes: 2)
+                }
+            } else {
+                length = readBigEndianLength(bytes: 2)
+            }
+
+            guard let tlvLength = length, tlvLength >= 0 else { return nil }
+            guard data.distance(from: cursor, to: end) >= tlvLength else { return nil }
+
+            let valueStart = cursor
+            cursor = data.index(cursor, offsetBy: tlvLength)
+            let value = data[valueStart..<cursor]
+
+            switch tlvType {
+            case .fileName:
+                fileName = String(data: Data(value), encoding: .utf8)
+            case .fileSize:
+                if tlvLength == 4 || tlvLength == 8 {
+                    var size: UInt64 = 0
+                    for byte in value {
+                        size = (size << 8) | UInt64(byte)
+                    }
+                    if size > UInt64(FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) {
+                        return nil
+                    }
+                    fileSize = size
+                }
+            case .mimeType:
+                mimeType = String(data: Data(value), encoding: .utf8)
+            case .content:
+                let proposedSize = content.count + value.count
+                if proposedSize > FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes {
+                    return nil
+                }
+                content.append(contentsOf: value)
+            case nil:
+                continue
+            }
+        }
+
+        guard !content.isEmpty else { return nil }
+        guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count) else { return nil }
+        return BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: fileName,
+            fileSize: fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: mimeType,
+            content: content
+        )
+    }
+}

bitchat/Protocols/BitchatProtocol.swift

@@ -60,38 +60,7 @@
 
 import Foundation
 import CoreBluetooth
-
+import BitFoundation
-// MARK: - Message Types
-
-/// Simplified BitChat protocol message types.
-/// Reduced from 24 types to just 6 essential ones.
-/// All private communication metadata (receipts, status) is embedded in noiseEncrypted payloads.
-enum MessageType: UInt8 {
-    // Public messages (unencrypted)
-    case announce = 0x01        // "I'm here" with nickname
-    case message = 0x02         // Public chat message  
-    case leave = 0x03           // "I'm leaving"
-    case requestSync = 0x21     // GCS filter-based sync request (local-only)
-    
-    // Noise encryption
-    case noiseHandshake = 0x10  // Handshake (init or response determined by payload)
-    case noiseEncrypted = 0x11  // All encrypted payloads (messages, receipts, etc.)
-    
-    // Fragmentation (simplified)
-    case fragment = 0x20        // Single fragment type for large messages
-    
-    var description: String {
-        switch self {
-        case .announce: return "announce"
-        case .message: return "message"
-        case .leave: return "leave"
-        case .requestSync: return "requestSync"
-        case .noiseHandshake: return "noiseHandshake"
-        case .noiseEncrypted: return "noiseEncrypted"
-        case .fragment: return "fragment"
-        }
-    }
-}
 
 // MARK: - Noise Payload Types
 
@@ -129,35 +98,6 @@ enum LazyHandshakeState {
     case failed(Error)         // Handshake failed
 }
 
-// MARK: - Delivery Status
-
-// Delivery status for messages
-enum DeliveryStatus: Codable, Equatable, Hashable {
-    case sending
-    case sent  // Left our device
-    case delivered(to: String, at: Date)  // Confirmed by recipient
-    case read(by: String, at: Date)  // Seen by recipient
-    case failed(reason: String)
-    case partiallyDelivered(reached: Int, total: Int)  // For rooms
-    
-    var displayText: String {
-        switch self {
-        case .sending:
-            return "Sending..."
-        case .sent:
-            return "Sent"
-        case .delivered(let nickname, _):
-            return "Delivered to \(nickname)"
-        case .read(let nickname, _):
-            return "Read by \(nickname)"
-        case .failed(let reason):
-            return "Failed: \(reason)"
-        case .partiallyDelivered(let reached, let total):
-            return "Delivered to \(reached)/\(total)"
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 // MARK: - Delegate Protocol
 
 protocol BitchatDelegate: AnyObject {
@@ -176,7 +116,7 @@ protocol BitchatDelegate: AnyObject {
 
     // Bluetooth state updates for user notifications
     func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState)
-    func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date)
+    func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?)
 }
 
 // Provide default implementation to make it effectively optional
@@ -193,7 +133,7 @@ extension BitchatDelegate {
         // Default empty implementation
     }
 
-    func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date) {
+    func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
         // Default empty implementation
     }
 }

bitchat/Protocols/Geohash.swift

@@ -119,4 +119,57 @@ enum Geohash {
         }
         return (latInterval.0, latInterval.1, lonInterval.0, lonInterval.1)
     }
+
+    /// Returns all 8 neighboring geohash cells at the same precision.
+    /// - Parameter geohash: Base32 geohash string.
+    /// - Returns: Array of 8 neighboring geohashes (N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, NW order).
+    static func neighbors(of geohash: String) -> [String] {
+        guard !geohash.isEmpty else { return [] }
+
+        let precision = geohash.count
+        let bounds = decodeBounds(geohash)
+        let center = decodeCenter(geohash)
+
+        // Calculate cell dimensions
+        let latHeight = bounds.latMax - bounds.latMin
+        let lonWidth = bounds.lonMax - bounds.lonMin
+
+        // Helper to wrap longitude around ±180
+        func wrapLongitude(_ lon: Double) -> Double {
+            var wrapped = lon
+            while wrapped > 180.0 { wrapped -= 360.0 }
+            while wrapped < -180.0 { wrapped += 360.0 }
+            return wrapped
+        }
+
+        // Helper to clamp latitude to ±90
+        func clampLatitude(_ lat: Double) -> Double {
+            return max(-90.0, min(90.0, lat))
+        }
+
+        // Calculate 8 neighbor centers
+        let neighbors: [(lat: Double, lon: Double)] = [
+            (center.lat + latHeight, center.lon),                    // N
+            (center.lat + latHeight, center.lon + lonWidth),         // NE
+            (center.lat, center.lon + lonWidth),                     // E
+            (center.lat - latHeight, center.lon + lonWidth),         // SE
+            (center.lat - latHeight, center.lon),                    // S
+            (center.lat - latHeight, center.lon - lonWidth),         // SW
+            (center.lat, center.lon - lonWidth),                     // W
+            (center.lat + latHeight, center.lon - lonWidth)          // NW
+        ]
+
+        // Encode each neighbor, handling boundary conditions
+        return neighbors.compactMap { neighbor in
+            let lat = clampLatitude(neighbor.lat)
+            let lon = wrapLongitude(neighbor.lon)
+
+            // Skip if we've crossed a pole (latitude clamped to boundary)
+            if (neighbor.lat > 90.0 || neighbor.lat < -90.0) {
+                return nil
+            }
+
+            return encode(latitude: lat, longitude: lon, precision: precision)
+        }
+    }
 }

bitchat/Protocols/LocationChannel.swift

@@ -116,4 +116,18 @@ enum ChannelID: Equatable, Codable {
         case .location(let ch): return ch.geohash
         }
     }
+    
+    var isMesh: Bool {
+        switch self {
+        case .mesh:     true
+        case .location: false
+        }
+    }
+    
+    var isLocation: Bool {
+        switch self {
+        case .mesh:     false
+        case .location: true
+        }
+    }
 }

bitchat/Protocols/Packets.swift

@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
     let nickname: String
     let noisePublicKey: Data            // Noise static public key (Curve25519.KeyAgreement)
     let signingPublicKey: Data          // Ed25519 public key for signing
+    let directNeighbors: [Data]?        // 8-byte peer IDs
 
     private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
         case nickname = 0x01
         case noisePublicKey = 0x02
         case signingPublicKey = 0x03
+        case directNeighbors = 0x04
     }
 
     func encode() -> Data? {
@@ -36,6 +38,16 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
         data.append(UInt8(signingPublicKey.count))
         data.append(signingPublicKey)
         
+        // TLV for direct neighbors (optional)
+        if let neighbors = directNeighbors, !neighbors.isEmpty {
+            let neighborsData = neighbors.prefix(10).reduce(Data()) { $0 + $1 }
+            if !neighborsData.isEmpty && neighborsData.count % 8 == 0 {
+                data.append(TLVType.directNeighbors.rawValue)
+                data.append(UInt8(neighborsData.count))
+                data.append(neighborsData)
+            }
+        }
+
         return data
     }
 
@@ -44,6 +56,7 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
         var nickname: String?
         var noisePublicKey: Data?
         var signingPublicKey: Data?
+        var directNeighbors: [Data]?
 
         while offset + 2 <= data.count {
             let typeRaw = data[offset]
@@ -63,6 +76,17 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
                     noisePublicKey = Data(value)
                 case .signingPublicKey:
                     signingPublicKey = Data(value)
+                case .directNeighbors:
+                    if length > 0 && length % 8 == 0 {
+                        var neighbors = [Data]()
+                        let count = length / 8
+                        for i in 0..<count {
+                            let start = value.startIndex + i * 8
+                            let end = start + 8
+                            neighbors.append(Data(value[start..<end]))
+                        }
+                        directNeighbors = neighbors
+                    }
                 }
             } else {
                 // Unknown TLV; skip (tolerant decoder for forward compatibility)
@@ -74,7 +98,8 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
         return AnnouncementPacket(
             nickname: nickname,
             noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
-            signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey
+            signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
+            directNeighbors: directNeighbors
         )
     }
 }

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEAnnounceHandler.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import BitLogger
+import Foundation
+
+/// Narrow environment for `BLEAnnounceHandler`.
+///
+/// All queue hops (collections barrier, BLE-queue link-state reads, main-actor
+/// UI notification, delayed re-announce) live inside the closures supplied by
+/// `BLEService`, keeping the handler queue-agnostic and synchronously testable.
+struct BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
+    /// Local peer identity at the time the announce is handled.
+    let localPeerID: () -> PeerID
+    /// TTL value used for direct (non-relayed) packets.
+    let messageTTL: UInt8
+    /// Current time source.
+    let now: () -> Date
+    /// Noise public key already recorded for the peer, if any (registry read).
+    let existingNoisePublicKey: (PeerID) -> Data?
+    /// Verifies the packet signature against the announced signing key.
+    let verifySignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool
+    /// Direct link state for the peer (BLE-queue read).
+    let linkState: (PeerID) -> (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool)
+    /// Runs the registry mutation phase under the collections barrier.
+    let withRegistryBarrier: (() -> Void) -> Void
+    /// Upserts the verified announce into the peer registry.
+    /// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
+    let upsertVerifiedAnnounce: (
+        _ peerID: PeerID,
+        _ announcement: AnnouncementPacket,
+        _ isConnected: Bool,
+        _ now: Date
+    ) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate
+    /// Debounced reconnect-log decision.
+    /// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
+    let shouldEmitReconnectLog: (_ peerID: PeerID, _ now: Date) -> Bool
+    /// Records verified direct-neighbor claims in the mesh topology.
+    let updateTopology: (_ peerID: PeerID, _ neighbors: [Data]) -> Void
+    /// Persists the announced cryptographic identity for offline verification.
+    let persistIdentity: (AnnouncementPacket) -> Void
+    /// Announce-back dedup check.
+    let dedupContains: (String) -> Bool
+    /// Announce-back dedup marking.
+    let dedupMarkProcessed: (String) -> Void
+    /// Delivers the announce UI events as one ordered main-actor hop:
+    /// `.peerConnected` (if flagged) → initial gossip sync scheduling (if
+    /// flagged) → peer-ID snapshot + data publish + `.peerListUpdated`.
+    /// A single closure keeps the original in-order delivery guarantee that
+    /// separate unstructured tasks would not provide.
+    let deliverAnnounceUIEvents: (
+        _ peerID: PeerID,
+        _ notifyPeerConnected: Bool,
+        _ scheduleInitialSync: Bool
+    ) -> Void
+    /// Tracks the announce packet for gossip sync.
+    let trackPacketSeen: (BitchatPacket) -> Void
+    /// Reciprocates the announce for bidirectional discovery.
+    let sendAnnounceBack: () -> Void
+    /// Schedules a delayed re-announce (afterglow) after the given delay.
+    let scheduleAfterglow: (TimeInterval) -> Void
+}
+
+/// Orchestrates inbound announce packets: preflight validation, signature
+/// trust, registry/topology updates, identity persistence, UI notification,
+/// gossip tracking, and the reciprocal announce response.
+final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
+    private let environment: BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment
+
+    init(environment: BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment) {
+        self.environment = environment
+    }
+
+    func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        let env = environment
+        let now = env.now()
+        let preflight = BLEAnnouncePreflightPolicy.evaluate(
+            packet: packet,
+            from: peerID,
+            localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
+            now: now
+        )
+
+        let announcement: AnnouncementPacket
+        switch preflight {
+        case .accept(let acceptance):
+            announcement = acceptance.announcement
+        case .reject(.malformed):
+            SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decode announce packet from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
+            return
+        case .reject(.senderMismatch(let derivedFromKey)):
+            SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce sender mismatch: derived \(derivedFromKey.id.prefix(8))… vs packet \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .security)
+            return
+        case .reject(.selfAnnounce):
+            return
+        case .reject(.stale(let ageSeconds)):
+            SecureLogger.debug("⏰ Ignoring stale announce from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… (age: \(ageSeconds)s)", category: .session)
+            return
+        }
+
+        // Suppress announce logs to reduce noise
+
+        // Precompute signature verification outside barrier to reduce contention
+        let existingNoisePublicKey = env.existingNoisePublicKey(peerID)
+        let hasSignature = packet.signature != nil
+        let signatureValid: Bool
+        if hasSignature {
+            signatureValid = env.verifySignature(packet, announcement.signingPublicKey)
+            if !signatureValid {
+                SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Signature verification for announce failed \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security)
+            }
+        } else {
+            signatureValid = false
+        }
+        let trustDecision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
+            hasSignature: hasSignature,
+            signatureValid: signatureValid,
+            existingNoisePublicKey: existingNoisePublicKey,
+            announcedNoisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey
+        )
+        if case .reject(.keyMismatch) = trustDecision {
+            SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce key mismatch for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — keeping unverified", category: .security)
+        }
+        let verifiedAnnounce = trustDecision.isVerified
+
+        var isNewPeer = false
+        var isReconnectedPeer = false
+        let directLinkState = env.linkState(peerID)
+        let isDirectAnnounce = packet.ttl == env.messageTTL
+
+        env.withRegistryBarrier {
+            let hasPeripheralConnection = directLinkState.hasPeripheral
+            let hasCentralSubscription = directLinkState.hasCentral
+
+            // Require verified announce; ignore otherwise (no backward compatibility)
+            if !verifiedAnnounce {
+                SecureLogger.warning("❌ Ignoring unverified announce from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .security)
+                // Reset flags to prevent post-barrier code from acting on unverified announces
+                isNewPeer = false
+                isReconnectedPeer = false
+                return
+            }
+
+            let update = env.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
+                peerID,
+                announcement,
+                isDirectAnnounce || hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription,
+                now
+            )
+            isNewPeer = update.isNewPeer
+            isReconnectedPeer = update.wasDisconnected
+
+            // Log connection status only for direct connectivity changes; debounce to reduce spam
+            if isDirectAnnounce || hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription {
+                let now = env.now()
+                if update.isNewPeer {
+                    SecureLogger.debug("🆕 New peer: \(announcement.nickname)", category: .session)
+                } else if update.wasDisconnected {
+                    if env.shouldEmitReconnectLog(peerID, now) {
+                        SecureLogger.debug("🔄 Peer \(announcement.nickname) reconnected", category: .session)
+                    }
+                } else if let previousNickname = update.previousNickname, previousNickname != announcement.nickname {
+                    SecureLogger.debug("🔄 Peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… changed nickname: \(previousNickname) -> \(announcement.nickname)", category: .session)
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Update topology with verified neighbor claims (only for authenticated announces)
+        if verifiedAnnounce, let neighbors = announcement.directNeighbors {
+            env.updateTopology(peerID, neighbors)
+        }
+
+        // Persist cryptographic identity and signing key for robust offline
+        // verification — only for verified announces. Persisting unverified
+        // announces would let an attacker who replays a victim's noisePublicKey
+        // overwrite the victim's stored signing key/nickname (identity poisoning).
+        if verifiedAnnounce {
+            env.persistIdentity(announcement)
+        }
+
+        let announceBackID = "announce-back-\(peerID)"
+        let shouldSendBack = !env.dedupContains(announceBackID)
+        if shouldSendBack {
+            env.dedupMarkProcessed(announceBackID)
+        }
+        let responsePlan = BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy.plan(
+            isDirectAnnounce: isDirectAnnounce,
+            isNewPeer: isNewPeer,
+            isReconnectedPeer: isReconnectedPeer,
+            shouldSendAnnounceBack: shouldSendBack
+        )
+
+        // Only notify of connection for new or reconnected peers when it is a
+        // direct announce; the list update always follows in the same hop.
+        env.deliverAnnounceUIEvents(
+            peerID,
+            responsePlan.shouldNotifyPeerConnected,
+            responsePlan.shouldNotifyPeerConnected && responsePlan.shouldScheduleInitialSync
+        )
+
+        // Track for sync (include our own and others' announces)
+        env.trackPacketSeen(packet)
+
+        if responsePlan.shouldSendAnnounceBack {
+            // Reciprocate announce for bidirectional discovery
+            // Force send to ensure the peer receives our announce
+            env.sendAnnounceBack()
+        }
+
+        // Afterglow: on first-seen peers, schedule a short re-announce to push presence one more hop
+        if responsePlan.shouldScheduleAfterglow {
+            let delay = Double.random(in: 0.3...0.6)
+            env.scheduleAfterglow(delay)
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicy.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEAnnouncePreflightAcceptance {
+    let announcement: AnnouncementPacket
+    let derivedPeerID: PeerID
+}
+
+enum BLEAnnouncePreflightRejection: Equatable {
+    case malformed
+    case senderMismatch(derivedPeerID: PeerID)
+    case selfAnnounce
+    case stale(ageSeconds: Double)
+}
+
+enum BLEAnnouncePreflightDecision {
+    case accept(BLEAnnouncePreflightAcceptance)
+    case reject(BLEAnnouncePreflightRejection)
+}
+
+enum BLEAnnouncePreflightPolicy {
+    static func evaluate(
+        packet: BitchatPacket,
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        localPeerID: PeerID,
+        now: Date
+    ) -> BLEAnnouncePreflightDecision {
+        guard let announcement = AnnouncementPacket.decode(from: packet.payload) else {
+            return .reject(.malformed)
+        }
+
+        let derivedPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
+        guard derivedPeerID == peerID else {
+            return .reject(.senderMismatch(derivedPeerID: derivedPeerID))
+        }
+
+        guard peerID != localPeerID else {
+            return .reject(.selfAnnounce)
+        }
+
+        guard !BLEPacketFreshnessPolicy.isStale(timestampMilliseconds: packet.timestamp, now: now) else {
+            return .reject(.stale(ageSeconds: BLEPacketFreshnessPolicy.ageSeconds(
+                timestampMilliseconds: packet.timestamp,
+                now: now
+            )))
+        }
+
+        return .accept(BLEAnnouncePreflightAcceptance(
+            announcement: announcement,
+            derivedPeerID: derivedPeerID
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+enum BLEAnnounceTrustRejection: Equatable {
+    case missingSignature
+    case invalidSignature
+    case keyMismatch
+}
+
+enum BLEAnnounceTrustDecision: Equatable {
+    case verified
+    case reject(BLEAnnounceTrustRejection)
+
+    var isVerified: Bool {
+        self == .verified
+    }
+}
+
+enum BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy {
+    static func evaluate(
+        hasSignature: Bool,
+        signatureValid: Bool,
+        existingNoisePublicKey: Data?,
+        announcedNoisePublicKey: Data
+    ) -> BLEAnnounceTrustDecision {
+        if let existingNoisePublicKey, existingNoisePublicKey != announcedNoisePublicKey {
+            return .reject(.keyMismatch)
+        }
+
+        guard hasSignature else {
+            return .reject(.missingSignature)
+        }
+
+        guard signatureValid else {
+            return .reject(.invalidSignature)
+        }
+
+        return .verified
+    }
+}
+
+struct BLEAnnounceResponsePlan: Equatable {
+    let shouldNotifyPeerConnected: Bool
+    let shouldScheduleInitialSync: Bool
+    let shouldSendAnnounceBack: Bool
+    let shouldScheduleAfterglow: Bool
+}
+
+enum BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy {
+    static func plan(
+        isDirectAnnounce: Bool,
+        isNewPeer: Bool,
+        isReconnectedPeer: Bool,
+        shouldSendAnnounceBack: Bool
+    ) -> BLEAnnounceResponsePlan {
+        let shouldNotifyPeerConnected = isDirectAnnounce && (isNewPeer || isReconnectedPeer)
+
+        return BLEAnnounceResponsePlan(
+            shouldNotifyPeerConnected: shouldNotifyPeerConnected,
+            shouldScheduleInitialSync: shouldNotifyPeerConnected,
+            shouldSendAnnounceBack: shouldSendAnnounceBack,
+            shouldScheduleAfterglow: isNewPeer
+        )
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEAnnounceThrottle.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEAnnounceThrottle {
+    private var lastSent: Date
+    private let normalMinimumInterval: TimeInterval
+    private let forcedMinimumInterval: TimeInterval
+
+    init(
+        lastSent: Date = .distantPast,
+        normalMinimumInterval: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.bleAnnounceMinInterval,
+        forcedMinimumInterval: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.bleForceAnnounceMinIntervalSeconds
+    ) {
+        self.lastSent = lastSent
+        self.normalMinimumInterval = normalMinimumInterval
+        self.forcedMinimumInterval = forcedMinimumInterval
+    }
+
+    func elapsed(since now: Date) -> TimeInterval {
+        now.timeIntervalSince(lastSent)
+    }
+
+    mutating func shouldSend(force: Bool, now: Date) -> Bool {
+        let minimumInterval = force ? forcedMinimumInterval : normalMinimumInterval
+        guard elapsed(since: now) >= minimumInterval else {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        lastSent = now
+        return true
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEConnectionScheduler.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral> {
+    let peripheral: Peripheral
+    let peripheralID: String
+    let rssi: Int
+    let name: String
+    let isConnectable: Bool
+    let discoveredAt: Date
+}
+
+struct BLEExistingConnectionState {
+    let isConnecting: Bool
+    let isConnected: Bool
+    let lastConnectionAttempt: Date?
+}
+
+enum BLEPeripheralConnectionState {
+    case disconnected
+    case connecting
+    case connected
+}
+
+enum BLEDiscoveryDecision: Equatable {
+    case ignore
+    case queued
+    case scheduleRetry(after: TimeInterval)
+    case cancelStaleConnection
+    case connectNow
+}
+
+enum BLEConnectionQueueDecision<Peripheral> {
+    case none
+    case retryAfter(TimeInterval)
+    case connect(BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>)
+}
+
+final class BLEConnectionScheduler<Peripheral> {
+    private let maxCentralLinks: Int
+    private let connectRateLimitInterval: TimeInterval
+    private let candidateCap: Int
+    private let weakLinkCooldownSeconds: TimeInterval
+    private let weakLinkRSSICutoff: Int
+
+    private var lastGlobalConnectAttempt: Date = .distantPast
+    private var candidates: [BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>] = []
+    private var failureCounts: [String: Int] = [:]
+    private var recentConnectTimeouts: [String: Date] = [:]
+    // Tracked separately from connect timeouts: a peer we held a connection
+    // with and lost (walked out of range) usually comes back, so it only gets
+    // a brief rediscovery ignore — not the timeout backoff/cooldown treatment
+    // reserved for peers that never answered a connect attempt.
+    private var recentDisconnects: [String: Date] = [:]
+    private var lastIsolatedAt: Date?
+
+    private let initialDynamicRSSIThreshold: Int
+    private(set) var dynamicRSSIThreshold: Int
+
+    var candidateCount: Int {
+        candidates.count
+    }
+
+    init(
+        maxCentralLinks: Int = TransportConfig.bleMaxCentralLinks,
+        connectRateLimitInterval: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.bleConnectRateLimitInterval,
+        candidateCap: Int = TransportConfig.bleConnectionCandidatesMax,
+        weakLinkCooldownSeconds: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.bleWeakLinkCooldownSeconds,
+        weakLinkRSSICutoff: Int = TransportConfig.bleWeakLinkRSSICutoff,
+        dynamicRSSIThreshold: Int = TransportConfig.bleDynamicRSSIThresholdDefault
+    ) {
+        self.maxCentralLinks = maxCentralLinks
+        self.connectRateLimitInterval = connectRateLimitInterval
+        self.candidateCap = candidateCap
+        self.weakLinkCooldownSeconds = weakLinkCooldownSeconds
+        self.weakLinkRSSICutoff = weakLinkRSSICutoff
+        self.initialDynamicRSSIThreshold = dynamicRSSIThreshold
+        self.dynamicRSSIThreshold = dynamicRSSIThreshold
+    }
+
+    func handleDiscovery(
+        _ candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>,
+        connectedOrConnectingCount: Int,
+        existingState: BLEExistingConnectionState?,
+        peripheralState: BLEPeripheralConnectionState,
+        now: Date
+    ) -> BLEDiscoveryDecision {
+        guard candidate.isConnectable else { return .ignore }
+
+        if candidate.rssi <= dynamicRSSIThreshold {
+            enqueue(candidate)
+            return .queued
+        }
+
+        if connectedOrConnectingCount >= maxCentralLinks {
+            enqueue(candidate)
+            return .queued
+        }
+
+        if let retryDelay = rateLimitRetryDelay(now: now) {
+            enqueue(candidate)
+            return .scheduleRetry(after: retryDelay)
+        }
+
+        if let existingState {
+            if existingState.isConnected || existingState.isConnecting {
+                return .ignore
+            }
+
+            if let lastAttempt = existingState.lastConnectionAttempt,
+               now.timeIntervalSince(lastAttempt) < 2.0 {
+                return .ignore
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let lastTimeout = recentConnectTimeouts[candidate.peripheralID],
+           now.timeIntervalSince(lastTimeout) < TransportConfig.bleTimeoutDiscoveryIgnoreSeconds {
+            return .ignore
+        }
+
+        if let lastDisconnect = recentDisconnects[candidate.peripheralID],
+           now.timeIntervalSince(lastDisconnect) < TransportConfig.bleDisconnectDiscoveryIgnoreSeconds {
+            return .ignore
+        }
+
+        switch peripheralState {
+        case .disconnected:
+            return .connectNow
+        case .connecting, .connected:
+            return .cancelStaleConnection
+        }
+    }
+
+    func enqueue(_ candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>) {
+        if let existingIndex = candidates.firstIndex(where: { $0.peripheralID == candidate.peripheralID }) {
+            candidates[existingIndex] = candidate
+        } else {
+            candidates.append(candidate)
+        }
+
+        candidates.sort {
+            if $0.rssi != $1.rssi { return $0.rssi > $1.rssi }
+            return $0.discoveredAt < $1.discoveredAt
+        }
+        if candidates.count > candidateCap {
+            candidates.removeLast(candidates.count - candidateCap)
+        }
+    }
+
+    func nextCandidate(
+        connectedOrConnectingCount: Int,
+        isAlreadyConnectingOrConnected: (String) -> Bool,
+        now: Date
+    ) -> BLEConnectionQueueDecision<Peripheral> {
+        guard connectedOrConnectingCount < maxCentralLinks else { return .none }
+
+        if let retryDelay = rateLimitRetryDelay(now: now) {
+            return .retryAfter(retryDelay)
+        }
+
+        while !candidates.isEmpty {
+            candidates.sort { score($0, now: now) > score($1, now: now) }
+            let candidate = candidates.removeFirst()
+            guard candidate.isConnectable else { continue }
+
+            if let delay = weakLinkRetryDelay(for: candidate, now: now) {
+                enqueue(candidate)
+                return .retryAfter(delay)
+            }
+
+            if let delay = disconnectSettleDelay(for: candidate, now: now) {
+                enqueue(candidate)
+                return .retryAfter(delay)
+            }
+
+            if isAlreadyConnectingOrConnected(candidate.peripheralID) {
+                continue
+            }
+
+            return .connect(candidate)
+        }
+
+        return .none
+    }
+
+    func recordConnectionAttempt(at now: Date) {
+        lastGlobalConnectAttempt = now
+    }
+
+    func recordConnectionSuccess(peripheralID: String) {
+        failureCounts[peripheralID] = 0
+        recentConnectTimeouts.removeValue(forKey: peripheralID)
+        recentDisconnects.removeValue(forKey: peripheralID)
+    }
+
+    func recordConnectionFailure(peripheralID: String) {
+        failureCounts[peripheralID, default: 0] += 1
+    }
+
+    func recordDisconnectError(peripheralID: String, at now: Date) {
+        recentDisconnects[peripheralID] = now
+    }
+
+    func recordConnectionTimeout(peripheralID: String, at now: Date) {
+        recentConnectTimeouts[peripheralID] = now
+        recordConnectionFailure(peripheralID: peripheralID)
+    }
+
+    func pruneConnectionTimeouts(before cutoff: Date) {
+        recentConnectTimeouts = recentConnectTimeouts.filter { $0.value >= cutoff }
+        recentDisconnects = recentDisconnects.filter { $0.value >= cutoff }
+    }
+
+    func reset() {
+        lastGlobalConnectAttempt = .distantPast
+        candidates.removeAll()
+        failureCounts.removeAll()
+        recentConnectTimeouts.removeAll()
+        recentDisconnects.removeAll()
+        lastIsolatedAt = nil
+        dynamicRSSIThreshold = initialDynamicRSSIThreshold
+    }
+
+    @discardableResult
+    func updateRSSIThreshold(
+        connectedCount: Int,
+        connectedOrConnectingLinkCount: Int,
+        now: Date
+    ) -> Int {
+        if connectedCount == 0 {
+            if lastIsolatedAt == nil { lastIsolatedAt = now }
+            let isolatedAt = lastIsolatedAt ?? now
+            let elapsed = now.timeIntervalSince(isolatedAt)
+            dynamicRSSIThreshold = elapsed > TransportConfig.bleIsolationRelaxThresholdSeconds
+                ? TransportConfig.bleRSSIIsolatedRelaxed
+                : TransportConfig.bleRSSIIsolatedBase
+            return dynamicRSSIThreshold
+        }
+
+        lastIsolatedAt = nil
+        // Flaky links are handled per-peripheral (weak-link cooldown, discovery
+        // ignore window, score bias) — never globally, so one flaky distant peer
+        // can't blind us to every other edge-of-range peer.
+        var threshold = TransportConfig.bleDynamicRSSIThresholdDefault
+        if connectedOrConnectingLinkCount >= maxCentralLinks || candidates.count >= candidateCap {
+            threshold = TransportConfig.bleRSSIConnectedThreshold
+        }
+
+        dynamicRSSIThreshold = threshold
+        return threshold
+    }
+
+    private func rateLimitRetryDelay(now: Date) -> TimeInterval? {
+        let elapsed = now.timeIntervalSince(lastGlobalConnectAttempt)
+        guard elapsed < connectRateLimitInterval else { return nil }
+        return connectRateLimitInterval - elapsed + 0.05
+    }
+
+    private func weakLinkRetryDelay(
+        for candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>,
+        now: Date
+    ) -> TimeInterval? {
+        guard let lastTimeout = recentConnectTimeouts[candidate.peripheralID] else { return nil }
+        let elapsed = now.timeIntervalSince(lastTimeout)
+        guard elapsed < weakLinkCooldownSeconds && candidate.rssi <= weakLinkRSSICutoff else { return nil }
+        let remaining = weakLinkCooldownSeconds - elapsed
+        return min(max(2.0, remaining), 15.0)
+    }
+
+    // The disconnect settle window must hold on the queue path too: a stale
+    // candidate enqueued while the peripheral was still connected would
+    // otherwise reconnect immediately via the post-disconnect queue drain,
+    // bypassing the window and recreating reconnect/cancel thrash.
+    private func disconnectSettleDelay(
+        for candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>,
+        now: Date
+    ) -> TimeInterval? {
+        guard let lastDisconnect = recentDisconnects[candidate.peripheralID] else { return nil }
+        let remaining = TransportConfig.bleDisconnectDiscoveryIgnoreSeconds - now.timeIntervalSince(lastDisconnect)
+        guard remaining > 0 else { return nil }
+        return remaining + 0.05
+    }
+
+    private func score(_ candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>, now: Date) -> Int {
+        let failures = failureCounts[candidate.peripheralID] ?? 0
+        let penalty = min(20, 1 << min(4, failures))
+        let timeoutBias = recentConnectTimeouts[candidate.peripheralID].map {
+            now.timeIntervalSince($0) < 60 ? 10 : 0
+        } ?? 0
+        let base = (candidate.isConnectable ? 1000 : 0) + (candidate.rssi + 100) * 2
+        let recency = -Int(now.timeIntervalSince(candidate.discoveredAt) * 10)
+        return base + recency - penalty - timeoutBias
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEDirectedRelaySpool.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEDirectedRelaySpoolEntry {
+    let recipient: PeerID
+    let packet: BitchatPacket
+}
+
+struct BLEDirectedRelaySpool {
+    private struct StoredPacket {
+        let packet: BitchatPacket
+        let enqueuedAt: Date
+    }
+
+    private var packetsByRecipient: [PeerID: [String: StoredPacket]] = [:]
+
+    var isEmpty: Bool {
+        packetsByRecipient.isEmpty
+    }
+
+    var count: Int {
+        packetsByRecipient.values.reduce(0) { $0 + $1.count }
+    }
+
+    @discardableResult
+    mutating func enqueue(
+        packet: BitchatPacket,
+        recipient: PeerID,
+        messageID: String,
+        enqueuedAt: Date
+    ) -> Bool {
+        var packets = packetsByRecipient[recipient] ?? [:]
+        guard packets[messageID] == nil else {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        packets[messageID] = StoredPacket(packet: packet, enqueuedAt: enqueuedAt)
+        packetsByRecipient[recipient] = packets
+        return true
+    }
+
+    mutating func drainUnexpired(now: Date, window: TimeInterval) -> [BLEDirectedRelaySpoolEntry] {
+        var entries: [BLEDirectedRelaySpoolEntry] = []
+
+        for (recipient, packets) in packetsByRecipient {
+            for stored in packets.values where now.timeIntervalSince(stored.enqueuedAt) <= window {
+                entries.append(BLEDirectedRelaySpoolEntry(recipient: recipient, packet: stored.packet))
+            }
+        }
+
+        packetsByRecipient.removeAll()
+        return entries
+    }
+
+    mutating func pruneExpired(now: Date, window: TimeInterval) {
+        guard !packetsByRecipient.isEmpty else { return }
+
+        var pruned: [PeerID: [String: StoredPacket]] = [:]
+        for (recipient, packets) in packetsByRecipient {
+            let freshPackets = packets.filter { now.timeIntervalSince($0.value.enqueuedAt) <= window }
+            if !freshPackets.isEmpty {
+                pruned[recipient] = freshPackets
+            }
+        }
+        packetsByRecipient = pruned
+    }
+
+    mutating func removeAll() {
+        packetsByRecipient.removeAll()
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEFanoutSelector.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import CryptoKit
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEFanoutSelection: Equatable {
+    let peripheralIDs: Set<String>
+    let centralIDs: Set<String>
+}
+
+enum BLEFanoutSelector {
+    static func selectLinks(
+        peripheralIDs: [String],
+        centralIDs: [String],
+        ingressLink: BLEIngressLinkID?,
+        excludedLinks: Set<BLEIngressLinkID> = [],
+        peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
+        centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
+        directedPeerHint: PeerID?,
+        packetType: UInt8,
+        messageID: String
+    ) -> BLEFanoutSelection {
+        let allowed = collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
+            allowedLinks(
+                peripheralIDs: peripheralIDs,
+                centralIDs: centralIDs,
+                ingressLink: ingressLink,
+                excludedLinks: excludedLinks
+            ),
+            peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
+            centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
+        )
+
+        guard shouldSubset(packetType: packetType, directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint) else {
+            return BLEFanoutSelection(
+                peripheralIDs: Set(allowed.peripheralIDs),
+                centralIDs: Set(allowed.centralIDs)
+            )
+        }
+
+        return BLEFanoutSelection(
+            peripheralIDs: deterministicSubset(
+                ids: allowed.peripheralIDs,
+                k: subsetSize(for: allowed.peripheralIDs.count),
+                seed: messageID
+            ),
+            centralIDs: deterministicSubset(
+                ids: allowed.centralIDs,
+                k: subsetSize(for: allowed.centralIDs.count),
+                seed: messageID
+            )
+        )
+    }
+
+    private static func allowedLinks(
+        peripheralIDs: [String],
+        centralIDs: [String],
+        ingressLink: BLEIngressLinkID?,
+        excludedLinks: Set<BLEIngressLinkID>
+    ) -> (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]) {
+        var allowedPeripheralIDs = peripheralIDs
+        var allowedCentralIDs = centralIDs
+        var blockedLinks = excludedLinks
+
+        if let ingressLink {
+            blockedLinks.insert(ingressLink)
+        }
+
+        allowedPeripheralIDs.removeAll { blockedLinks.contains(.peripheral($0)) }
+        allowedCentralIDs.removeAll { blockedLinks.contains(.central($0)) }
+
+        return (allowedPeripheralIDs, allowedCentralIDs)
+    }
+
+    // Dual-role pairs hold two live links (we-as-central writing to their
+    // peripheral, and they-as-central subscribed to ours). Sending the same
+    // packet down both doubles airtime for nothing — the receiver's assembler
+    // and deduplicator just discard the copy. Keep one link per bound peer,
+    // preferring the peripheral (write) side: it has per-link flow control
+    // via canSendWriteWithoutResponse, while notifications share the
+    // peripheral manager's update queue across all centrals. Links with no
+    // bound peer yet (pre-announce) pass through untouched.
+    private static func collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
+        _ links: (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]),
+        peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
+        centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID]
+    ) -> (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]) {
+        guard !peripheralPeerBindings.isEmpty || !centralPeerBindings.isEmpty else {
+            return links
+        }
+
+        var seenPeers = Set<PeerID>()
+        var keptPeripheralIDs: [String] = []
+        for id in links.peripheralIDs {
+            if let peer = peripheralPeerBindings[id], !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted {
+                continue
+            }
+            keptPeripheralIDs.append(id)
+        }
+
+        var keptCentralIDs: [String] = []
+        for id in links.centralIDs {
+            if let peer = centralPeerBindings[id], !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted {
+                continue
+            }
+            keptCentralIDs.append(id)
+        }
+
+        return (keptPeripheralIDs, keptCentralIDs)
+    }
+
+    private static func shouldSubset(packetType: UInt8, directedPeerHint: PeerID?) -> Bool {
+        directedPeerHint == nil
+            && packetType != MessageType.fragment.rawValue
+            && packetType != MessageType.announce.rawValue
+            && packetType != MessageType.requestSync.rawValue
+    }
+
+    private static func subsetSize(for count: Int) -> Int {
+        guard count > 0 else { return 0 }
+        if count <= 2 { return count }
+
+        var value = count - 1
+        var bits = 0
+        while value > 0 {
+            value >>= 1
+            bits += 1
+        }
+        return min(count, max(1, bits + 1))
+    }
+
+    private static func deterministicSubset(ids: [String], k: Int, seed: String) -> Set<String> {
+        guard k > 0 && ids.count > k else { return Set(ids) }
+
+        var scored: [(score: [UInt8], id: String)] = []
+        for id in ids {
+            let data = (seed + "::" + id).data(using: .utf8) ?? Data()
+            let digest = Array(SHA256.hash(data: data))
+            scored.append((digest, id))
+        }
+
+        scored.sort { lhs, rhs in
+            for index in 0..<min(lhs.score.count, rhs.score.count) {
+                if lhs.score[index] != rhs.score[index] {
+                    return lhs.score[index] < rhs.score[index]
+                }
+            }
+            return lhs.id < rhs.id
+        }
+
+        return Set(scored.prefix(k).map(\.id))
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEFileTransferHandler.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import BitLogger
+import Foundation
+
+/// Narrow environment for `BLEFileTransferHandler`.
+///
+/// All queue hops (collections registry reads/writes, main-actor UI
+/// notification) live inside the closures supplied by `BLEService`, keeping
+/// the handler queue-agnostic and synchronously testable.
+struct BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment {
+    /// Local peer identity at the time the transfer is handled.
+    let localPeerID: () -> PeerID
+    /// Local nickname used for sender resolution and collision checks.
+    let localNickname: () -> String
+    /// Snapshot of known peers keyed by ID (registry read).
+    let peersSnapshot: () -> [PeerID: BLEPeerInfo]
+    /// Resolves a display name from a verified packet signature for peers missing from the registry.
+    let signedSenderDisplayName: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ peerID: PeerID) -> String?
+    /// Tracks the broadcast file packet for gossip sync.
+    let trackPacketSeen: (BitchatPacket) -> Void
+    /// Enforces the incoming-media storage quota before saving (BCH-01-002).
+    let enforceStorageQuota: (_ reservingBytes: Int) -> Void
+    /// Persists the validated file to the incoming-media store; returns the destination URL.
+    let saveIncomingFile: (
+        _ data: Data,
+        _ preferredName: String?,
+        _ subdirectory: String,
+        _ fallbackExtension: String?,
+        _ defaultPrefix: String
+    ) -> URL?
+    /// Updates the registry last-seen timestamp for the peer (async barrier write).
+    let updatePeerLastSeen: (PeerID) -> Void
+    /// Delivers `.messageReceived` to the UI as one main-actor hop.
+    let deliverMessage: (BitchatMessage) -> Void
+}
+
+/// Orchestrates inbound file transfers: self-echo policy, sender display-name
+/// resolution, delivery planning, payload validation, quota-checked storage,
+/// and UI delivery.
+final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
+    private let environment: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
+
+    init(environment: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment) {
+        self.environment = environment
+    }
+
+    func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        let env = environment
+        if BLEFileTransferPolicy.isSelfEcho(packet: packet, from: peerID, localPeerID: env.localPeerID()) { return }
+
+        let peersSnapshot = env.peersSnapshot()
+        guard let senderNickname = BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.resolveKnownPeer(
+            peerID: peerID,
+            localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
+            localNickname: env.localNickname(),
+            peers: peersSnapshot,
+            allowConnectedUnverified: true
+        ) ?? env.signedSenderDisplayName(packet, peerID) else {
+            SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping file transfer from unverified or unknown peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .security)
+            return
+        }
+
+        guard let deliveryPlan = BLEFileTransferPolicy.deliveryPlan(packet: packet, localPeerID: env.localPeerID()) else {
+            return
+        }
+        if deliveryPlan.shouldTrackForSync {
+            env.trackPacketSeen(packet)
+        }
+
+        let filePacket: BitchatFilePacket
+        let mime: MimeType
+        switch BLEIncomingFileValidator.validate(payload: packet.payload) {
+        case .success(let acceptance):
+            filePacket = acceptance.filePacket
+            mime = acceptance.mime
+        case .failure(.malformedPayload):
+            SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decode file transfer payload", category: .session)
+            return
+        case .failure(.payloadTooLarge(let bytes)):
+            SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping file transfer exceeding size cap (\(bytes) bytes)", category: .security)
+            return
+        case .failure(.unsupportedMime(let mimeType, let bytes)):
+            SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MIME REJECT: '\(mimeType ?? "<empty>")' not supported. Size=\(bytes)b from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security)
+            return
+        case .failure(.magicMismatch(let mime, let bytes, let prefixHex)):
+            SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MAGIC REJECT: MIME='\(mime)' size=\(bytes)b prefix=[\(prefixHex)] from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security)
+            return
+        }
+
+        // BCH-01-002: Enforce storage quota before saving
+        env.enforceStorageQuota(filePacket.content.count)
+
+        guard let destination = env.saveIncomingFile(
+            filePacket.content,
+            filePacket.fileName,
+            "\(mime.category.mediaDir)/incoming",
+            mime.defaultExtension,
+            mime.category.rawValue
+        ) else {
+            return
+        }
+
+        if deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage {
+            env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
+        }
+
+        let ts = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000)
+        let message = BitchatMessage(
+            sender: senderNickname,
+            content: "\(mime.category.messagePrefix)\(destination.lastPathComponent)",
+            timestamp: ts,
+            isRelay: false,
+            originalSender: nil,
+            isPrivate: deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage,
+            recipientNickname: nil,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        )
+
+        SecureLogger.debug("📁 Stored incoming media from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… -> \(destination.lastPathComponent)", category: .session)
+
+        env.deliverMessage(message)
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEFileTransferPolicy.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEFileTransferDeliveryPlan: Equatable {
+    let isPrivateMessage: Bool
+    let shouldTrackForSync: Bool
+}
+
+enum BLEFileTransferPolicy {
+    static func isSelfEcho(packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID, localPeerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
+        peerID == localPeerID && packet.ttl != 0
+    }
+
+    static func deliveryPlan(packet: BitchatPacket, localPeerID: PeerID) -> BLEFileTransferDeliveryPlan? {
+        guard let recipientID = packet.recipientID else {
+            return BLEFileTransferDeliveryPlan(isPrivateMessage: false, shouldTrackForSync: true)
+        }
+
+        let isBroadcast = recipientID.allSatisfy { $0 == 0xFF }
+        if isBroadcast {
+            return BLEFileTransferDeliveryPlan(isPrivateMessage: false, shouldTrackForSync: true)
+        }
+
+        guard PeerID(hexData: recipientID) == localPeerID else {
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        return BLEFileTransferDeliveryPlan(isPrivateMessage: true, shouldTrackForSync: false)
+    }
+}
+
+struct BLEIncomingFileAcceptance {
+    let filePacket: BitchatFilePacket
+    let mime: MimeType
+}
+
+enum BLEIncomingFileRejection: Error, Equatable {
+    case malformedPayload
+    case payloadTooLarge(bytes: Int)
+    case unsupportedMime(mimeType: String?, bytes: Int)
+    case magicMismatch(mime: MimeType, bytes: Int, prefixHex: String)
+}
+
+enum BLEIncomingFileValidator {
+    static func validate(payload: Data) -> Result<BLEIncomingFileAcceptance, BLEIncomingFileRejection> {
+        guard let filePacket = BitchatFilePacket.decode(payload) else {
+            return .failure(.malformedPayload)
+        }
+
+        guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(filePacket.content.count) else {
+            return .failure(.payloadTooLarge(bytes: filePacket.content.count))
+        }
+
+        guard let mime = MimeType(filePacket.mimeType), mime.isAllowed else {
+            return .failure(.unsupportedMime(
+                mimeType: filePacket.mimeType,
+                bytes: filePacket.content.count
+            ))
+        }
+
+        guard mime.matches(data: filePacket.content) else {
+            return .failure(.magicMismatch(
+                mime: mime,
+                bytes: filePacket.content.count,
+                prefixHex: filePacket.content.prefix(20).map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined(separator: " ")
+            ))
+        }
+
+        return .success(BLEIncomingFileAcceptance(filePacket: filePacket, mime: mime))
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEFragmentKey: Hashable, Equatable {
+    let sender: UInt64
+    let id: UInt64
+}
+
+struct BLEFragmentHeader: Equatable {
+    let key: BLEFragmentKey
+    let index: Int
+    let total: Int
+    let originalType: UInt8
+    let fragmentData: Data
+    let isBroadcastFragment: Bool
+
+    var idLogString: String {
+        String(format: "%016llx", key.id)
+    }
+
+    init?(packet: BitchatPacket) {
+        // Minimum header: 8 bytes ID + 2 index + 2 total + 1 type.
+        guard packet.payload.count >= 13 else { return nil }
+
+        var senderU64: UInt64 = 0
+        for byte in packet.senderID.prefix(8) {
+            senderU64 = (senderU64 << 8) | UInt64(byte)
+        }
+
+        var fragmentU64: UInt64 = 0
+        for byte in packet.payload.prefix(8) {
+            fragmentU64 = (fragmentU64 << 8) | UInt64(byte)
+        }
+
+        let index = Int((UInt16(packet.payload[8]) << 8) | UInt16(packet.payload[9]))
+        let total = Int((UInt16(packet.payload[10]) << 8) | UInt16(packet.payload[11]))
+
+        guard total > 0 && total <= 10_000 && index >= 0 && index < total else {
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        let isBroadcastFragment: Bool = {
+            guard let recipient = packet.recipientID else { return true }
+            return recipient.count == 8 && recipient.allSatisfy { $0 == 0xFF }
+        }()
+
+        self.key = BLEFragmentKey(sender: senderU64, id: fragmentU64)
+        self.index = index
+        self.total = total
+        self.originalType = packet.payload[12]
+        self.fragmentData = Data(packet.payload.suffix(from: 13))
+        self.isBroadcastFragment = isBroadcastFragment
+    }
+}
+
+struct BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer {
+    enum AppendResult: Equatable {
+        case stored(header: BLEFragmentHeader, started: Bool)
+        case complete(header: BLEFragmentHeader, reassembledData: Data, started: Bool)
+        case oversized(header: BLEFragmentHeader, projectedSize: Int, limit: Int, started: Bool)
+    }
+
+    private struct Metadata {
+        let type: UInt8
+        let total: Int
+        let timestamp: Date
+    }
+
+    private var fragmentsByKey: [BLEFragmentKey: [Int: Data]] = [:]
+    private var metadataByKey: [BLEFragmentKey: Metadata] = [:]
+
+    mutating func removeAll() {
+        fragmentsByKey.removeAll()
+        metadataByKey.removeAll()
+    }
+
+    @discardableResult
+    mutating func removeExpired(before cutoff: Date) -> Int {
+        let expiredKeys = metadataByKey
+            .filter { $0.value.timestamp < cutoff }
+            .map(\.key)
+
+        for key in expiredKeys {
+            fragmentsByKey.removeValue(forKey: key)
+            metadataByKey.removeValue(forKey: key)
+        }
+
+        return expiredKeys.count
+    }
+
+    mutating func append(
+        _ header: BLEFragmentHeader,
+        maxInFlightAssemblies: Int,
+        now: Date = Date()
+    ) -> AppendResult {
+        let started = startAssemblyIfNeeded(for: header, maxInFlightAssemblies: maxInFlightAssemblies, now: now)
+
+        let currentSize = fragmentsByKey[header.key]?.values.reduce(0) { $0 + $1.count } ?? 0
+        let limit = Self.assemblyLimit(for: header.originalType)
+        let projectedSize = currentSize + header.fragmentData.count
+
+        guard projectedSize <= limit else {
+            fragmentsByKey.removeValue(forKey: header.key)
+            metadataByKey.removeValue(forKey: header.key)
+            return .oversized(header: header, projectedSize: projectedSize, limit: limit, started: started)
+        }
+
+        fragmentsByKey[header.key]?[header.index] = header.fragmentData
+
+        guard let fragments = fragmentsByKey[header.key],
+              fragments.count == header.total else {
+            return .stored(header: header, started: started)
+        }
+
+        let reassembled = (0..<header.total).reduce(into: Data()) { data, index in
+            if let fragment = fragments[index] {
+                data.append(fragment)
+            }
+        }
+
+        fragmentsByKey.removeValue(forKey: header.key)
+        metadataByKey.removeValue(forKey: header.key)
+
+        return .complete(header: header, reassembledData: reassembled, started: started)
+    }
+
+    private mutating func startAssemblyIfNeeded(
+        for header: BLEFragmentHeader,
+        maxInFlightAssemblies: Int,
+        now: Date
+    ) -> Bool {
+        guard fragmentsByKey[header.key] == nil else { return false }
+
+        if fragmentsByKey.count >= maxInFlightAssemblies,
+           let oldest = metadataByKey.min(by: { $0.value.timestamp < $1.value.timestamp })?.key {
+            fragmentsByKey.removeValue(forKey: oldest)
+            metadataByKey.removeValue(forKey: oldest)
+        }
+
+        fragmentsByKey[header.key] = [:]
+        metadataByKey[header.key] = Metadata(type: header.originalType, total: header.total, timestamp: now)
+        return true
+    }
+
+    private static func assemblyLimit(for originalType: UInt8) -> Int {
+        if originalType == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue {
+            // Allow headroom for TLV metadata and binary framing overhead.
+            return FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes
+        }
+
+        return FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEFragmentHandler.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import BitLogger
+import Foundation
+
+/// Narrow environment for `BLEFragmentHandler`.
+///
+/// All queue hops (the message-queue entry hop and the collections barrier
+/// around the assembly buffer) live on the `BLEService` side — the entry hop
+/// in `BLEService.handleFragment`, the barrier inside the supplied closures —
+/// keeping the handler queue-agnostic and synchronously testable.
+struct BLEFragmentHandlerEnvironment {
+    /// Local peer identity at the time the fragment is handled.
+    let localPeerID: () -> PeerID
+    /// Tracks broadcast fragments for gossip sync.
+    let trackPacketSeen: (BitchatPacket) -> Void
+    /// Appends the fragment to the assembly buffer (collections barrier write).
+    let appendFragment: (BLEFragmentHeader) -> BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer.AppendResult
+    /// Ingress acceptance check for the reassembled inner packet.
+    let isAcceptedIngressPayload: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ innerSender: PeerID) -> Bool
+    /// Re-enters the receive pipeline with the reassembled packet (TTL already zeroed).
+    let processReassembledPacket: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ from: PeerID) -> Void
+}
+
+/// Orchestrates inbound fragments: self-fragment suppression, gossip tracking,
+/// assembly-buffer appends, and reassembled-packet validation and re-injection
+/// into the receive pipeline.
+final class BLEFragmentHandler {
+    private let environment: BLEFragmentHandlerEnvironment
+
+    init(environment: BLEFragmentHandlerEnvironment) {
+        self.environment = environment
+    }
+
+    func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        let env = environment
+        // Don't process our own fragments
+        if peerID == env.localPeerID() {
+            return
+        }
+
+        guard let header = BLEFragmentHeader(packet: packet) else { return }
+
+        if header.isBroadcastFragment {
+            env.trackPacketSeen(packet)
+        }
+
+        let assemblyResult = env.appendFragment(header)
+
+        logFragmentAssemblyResult(assemblyResult)
+
+        guard case let .complete(completedHeader, reassembled, _) = assemblyResult else { return }
+
+        // Decode the original packet bytes we reassembled, so flags/compression are preserved
+        if var originalPacket = BinaryProtocol.decode(reassembled) {
+
+            // Reassembled packet validation
+            let innerSender = PeerID(hexData: originalPacket.senderID)
+            if !env.isAcceptedIngressPayload(originalPacket, innerSender) {
+                // Cleanup below
+            } else {
+                SecureLogger.debug("✅ Reassembled packet id=\(completedHeader.idLogString) type=\(originalPacket.type) bytes=\(reassembled.count)", category: .session)
+                originalPacket.ttl = 0
+                env.processReassembledPacket(originalPacket, peerID)
+            }
+        } else {
+            SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decode reassembled packet (type=\(completedHeader.originalType), total=\(completedHeader.total))", category: .session)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func logFragmentAssemblyResult(_ result: BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer.AppendResult) {
+        func logStartedIfNeeded(header: BLEFragmentHeader, started: Bool) {
+            if started {
+                SecureLogger.debug("📦 Started fragment assembly id=\(header.idLogString) total=\(header.total)", category: .session)
+            }
+        }
+
+        switch result {
+        case let .stored(header, started):
+            logStartedIfNeeded(header: header, started: started)
+            SecureLogger.debug("📦 Fragment \(header.index + 1)/\(header.total) (len=\(header.fragmentData.count)) for id=\(header.idLogString)", category: .session)
+
+        case let .complete(header, _, started):
+            logStartedIfNeeded(header: header, started: started)
+            SecureLogger.debug("📦 Fragment \(header.index + 1)/\(header.total) (len=\(header.fragmentData.count)) for id=\(header.idLogString)", category: .session)
+
+        case let .oversized(header, projectedSize, limit, started):
+            logStartedIfNeeded(header: header, started: started)
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "🚫 Fragment assembly exceeds size limit (\(projectedSize) bytes > \(limit)), evicting. Type=\(header.originalType) Index=\(header.index)/\(header.total)",
+                category: .security
+            )
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEInboundWriteBuffer.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEInboundWriteChunk: Equatable {
+    let offset: Int
+    let data: Data
+}
+
+struct BLEInboundWriteAppendMetadata: Equatable {
+    let accumulatedBytes: Int
+    let appendedBytes: Int
+    let offsets: [Int]
+    let packetType: UInt8?
+}
+
+struct BLEInboundWriteBuffer {
+    enum AppendResult {
+        case decoded(packet: BitchatPacket, metadata: BLEInboundWriteAppendMetadata)
+        case waiting(metadata: BLEInboundWriteAppendMetadata)
+        case oversized(metadata: BLEInboundWriteAppendMetadata)
+    }
+
+    private var buffersByCentralID: [String: Data] = [:]
+
+    mutating func removeAll() {
+        buffersByCentralID.removeAll()
+    }
+
+    mutating func append(
+        chunks: [BLEInboundWriteChunk],
+        for centralID: String,
+        capBytes: Int
+    ) -> AppendResult {
+        var combined = buffersByCentralID[centralID] ?? Data()
+        var appendedBytes = 0
+        var offsets: [Int] = []
+
+        for chunk in chunks where !chunk.data.isEmpty {
+            offsets.append(chunk.offset)
+            let end = chunk.offset + chunk.data.count
+
+            if combined.count < end {
+                combined.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: end - combined.count))
+            }
+
+            combined.replaceSubrange(chunk.offset..<end, with: chunk.data)
+            appendedBytes += chunk.data.count
+        }
+
+        let metadata = BLEInboundWriteAppendMetadata(
+            accumulatedBytes: combined.count,
+            appendedBytes: appendedBytes,
+            offsets: offsets,
+            packetType: combined.count >= 2 ? combined[1] : nil
+        )
+
+        if let packet = BinaryProtocol.decode(combined) {
+            buffersByCentralID.removeValue(forKey: centralID)
+            return .decoded(packet: packet, metadata: metadata)
+        }
+
+        guard combined.count <= capBytes else {
+            buffersByCentralID.removeValue(forKey: centralID)
+            return .oversized(metadata: metadata)
+        }
+
+        buffersByCentralID[centralID] = combined
+        return .waiting(metadata: metadata)
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEIncomingFileStore.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+import BitLogger
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
+    private static let quotaBytes: Int64 = 100 * 1024 * 1024
+
+    private let fileManager: FileManager
+    private let baseDirectory: URL?
+    private let dateProvider: () -> Date
+
+    init(fileManager: FileManager = .default, baseDirectory: URL? = nil, dateProvider: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init) {
+        self.fileManager = fileManager
+        self.baseDirectory = baseDirectory
+        self.dateProvider = dateProvider
+    }
+
+    func save(
+        data: Data,
+        preferredName: String?,
+        subdirectory: String,
+        fallbackExtension: String?,
+        defaultPrefix: String
+    ) -> URL? {
+        do {
+            let base = try filesDirectory().appendingPathComponent(subdirectory, isDirectory: true)
+            try fileManager.createDirectory(at: base, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
+            let sanitized = sanitizedFileName(
+                preferredName,
+                defaultName: "\(defaultPrefix)_\(Self.timestampString(from: dateProvider()))",
+                fallbackExtension: fallbackExtension
+            )
+            let destination = uniqueFileURL(in: base, fileName: sanitized)
+            try data.write(to: destination, options: .atomic)
+            return destination
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to persist incoming media: \(error)", category: .session)
+            return nil
+        }
+    }
+
+    func enforceQuota(reservingBytes: Int) {
+        do {
+            let base = try filesDirectory()
+            let incomingDirs = [
+                base.appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/incoming", isDirectory: true),
+                base.appendingPathComponent("images/incoming", isDirectory: true),
+                base.appendingPathComponent("files/incoming", isDirectory: true)
+            ]
+            var allFiles: [(url: URL, size: Int64, modified: Date)] = []
+
+            for dir in incomingDirs where fileManager.fileExists(atPath: dir.path) {
+                guard let contents = try? fileManager.contentsOfDirectory(
+                    at: dir,
+                    includingPropertiesForKeys: [.fileSizeKey, .contentModificationDateKey],
+                    options: [.skipsHiddenFiles]
+                ) else { continue }
+
+                for fileURL in contents {
+                    guard let attrs = try? fileURL.resourceValues(forKeys: [.fileSizeKey, .contentModificationDateKey]),
+                          let size = attrs.fileSize,
+                          let modified = attrs.contentModificationDate else { continue }
+                    allFiles.append((url: fileURL, size: Int64(size), modified: modified))
+                }
+            }
+
+            let currentUsage = allFiles.reduce(0) { $0 + $1.size }
+            let targetUsage = Self.quotaBytes - Int64(reservingBytes)
+            guard currentUsage > targetUsage else { return }
+
+            let needToFree = currentUsage - targetUsage
+            var freedSpace: Int64 = 0
+            for file in allFiles.sorted(by: { $0.modified < $1.modified }) {
+                guard freedSpace < needToFree else { break }
+                do {
+                    try fileManager.removeItem(at: file.url)
+                    freedSpace += file.size
+                    SecureLogger.debug("🗑️ BCH-01-002: Deleted old incoming file to free space: \(file.url.lastPathComponent)", category: .security)
+                } catch {
+                    SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Failed to delete old file for quota: \(error)", category: .security)
+                }
+            }
+
+            if freedSpace > 0 {
+                SecureLogger.info("📊 BCH-01-002: Freed \(ByteCountFormatter.string(fromByteCount: freedSpace, countStyle: .file)) to stay within incoming files quota", category: .security)
+            }
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Could not enforce storage quota: \(error)", category: .security)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func filesDirectory() throws -> URL {
+        let root = try baseDirectory ?? fileManager.url(
+            for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
+            in: .userDomainMask,
+            appropriateFor: nil,
+            create: true
+        )
+        let filesDir = root.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
+        try fileManager.createDirectory(at: filesDir, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
+        return filesDir
+    }
+
+    private func sanitizedFileName(_ name: String?, defaultName: String, fallbackExtension: String?) -> String {
+        var candidate = (name ?? "")
+            .replacingOccurrences(of: "\0", with: "")
+            .precomposedStringWithCanonicalMapping
+            .replacingOccurrences(of: "/", with: "_")
+            .replacingOccurrences(of: "\\", with: "_")
+
+        let invalid = CharacterSet(charactersIn: "<>:\"|?*\0").union(.controlCharacters)
+        candidate = candidate.components(separatedBy: invalid).joined(separator: "_").trimmed
+        if candidate.isEmpty { candidate = defaultName }
+        if candidate.hasPrefix(".") { candidate = "_" + candidate }
+
+        if candidate.count > 120 {
+            let ext = (candidate as NSString).pathExtension
+            let base = (candidate as NSString).deletingPathExtension
+            candidate = ext.isEmpty
+                ? String(candidate.prefix(120))
+                : String(base.prefix(max(10, 120 - ext.count - 1))) + "." + ext
+        }
+
+        if let fallbackExtension, (candidate as NSString).pathExtension.isEmpty {
+            candidate += ".\(fallbackExtension)"
+        }
+
+        return candidate.isEmpty ? defaultName : candidate
+    }
+
+    private func uniqueFileURL(in directory: URL, fileName: String) -> URL {
+        let directoryPath = directory.standardizedFileURL.path
+        func isInsideDirectory(_ url: URL) -> Bool {
+            url.standardizedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(directoryPath + "/")
+        }
+
+        var candidate = directory.appendingPathComponent(fileName)
+        guard isInsideDirectory(candidate) else {
+            SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Path traversal blocked: \(fileName)", category: .security)
+            return directory.appendingPathComponent("blocked_\(UUID().uuidString)")
+        }
+
+        if !fileManager.fileExists(atPath: candidate.path) {
+            return candidate
+        }
+
+        let baseName = (fileName as NSString).deletingPathExtension
+        let ext = (fileName as NSString).pathExtension
+        for counter in 1..<100 {
+            let newName = ext.isEmpty ? "\(baseName) (\(counter))" : "\(baseName) (\(counter)).\(ext)"
+            candidate = directory.appendingPathComponent(newName)
+            guard isInsideDirectory(candidate) else {
+                return directory.appendingPathComponent("blocked_\(UUID().uuidString)")
+            }
+            if !fileManager.fileExists(atPath: candidate.path) {
+                return candidate
+            }
+        }
+
+        return directory.appendingPathComponent("\(baseName)_\(UUID().uuidString).\(ext.isEmpty ? "dat" : ext)")
+    }
+
+    private static func timestampString(from date: Date) -> String {
+        let formatter = DateFormatter()
+        formatter.dateFormat = "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
+        return formatter.string(from: date)
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEIngressLinkRegistry.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+enum BLEIngressLinkID: Hashable, Equatable {
+    case peripheral(String)
+    case central(String)
+}
+
+struct BLEIngressPacketContext: Equatable {
+    let receivedFromPeerID: PeerID
+    let validationPeerID: PeerID
+}
+
+struct BLEIngressLinkRecord: Equatable {
+    let link: BLEIngressLinkID
+    let peerID: PeerID
+    let timestamp: Date
+}
+
+enum BLEIngressRejection: Error, Equatable {
+    case selfLoopback(packetType: UInt8)
+    case directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: PeerID, claimedSenderID: PeerID)
+}
+
+struct BLEIngressLinkRegistry {
+    private var ingressByMessageID: [String: BLEIngressLinkRecord] = [:]
+
+    var isEmpty: Bool {
+        ingressByMessageID.isEmpty
+    }
+
+    mutating func removeAll() {
+        ingressByMessageID.removeAll()
+    }
+
+    func record(for packet: BitchatPacket) -> BLEIngressLinkRecord? {
+        ingressByMessageID[Self.messageID(for: packet)]
+    }
+
+    func link(for packet: BitchatPacket) -> BLEIngressLinkID? {
+        record(for: packet)?.link
+    }
+
+    func peerID(for packet: BitchatPacket) -> PeerID? {
+        record(for: packet)?.peerID
+    }
+
+    mutating func recordIfNew(
+        _ packet: BitchatPacket,
+        link: BLEIngressLinkID,
+        peerID: PeerID,
+        now: Date = Date(),
+        lifetime: TimeInterval
+    ) -> Bool {
+        let messageID = Self.messageID(for: packet)
+        if let existing = ingressByMessageID[messageID],
+           now.timeIntervalSince(existing.timestamp) <= lifetime {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        ingressByMessageID[messageID] = BLEIngressLinkRecord(link: link, peerID: peerID, timestamp: now)
+        return true
+    }
+
+    mutating func prune(before cutoff: Date) {
+        ingressByMessageID = ingressByMessageID.filter { $0.value.timestamp >= cutoff }
+    }
+
+    static func packetContext(
+        for packet: BitchatPacket,
+        claimedSenderID: PeerID,
+        boundPeerID: PeerID?,
+        localPeerID: PeerID,
+        directAnnounceTTL: UInt8
+    ) -> Result<BLEIngressPacketContext, BLEIngressRejection> {
+        if claimedSenderID == localPeerID,
+           !isSelfAuthoredSyncResponse(packet) {
+            return .failure(.selfLoopback(packetType: packet.type))
+        }
+
+        if let boundPeerID,
+           boundPeerID != claimedSenderID,
+           requiresDirectSenderBinding(packet, directAnnounceTTL: directAnnounceTTL) {
+            return .failure(.directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: boundPeerID, claimedSenderID: claimedSenderID))
+        }
+
+        let receivedFromPeerID = boundPeerID ?? claimedSenderID
+        let validationPeerID = packet.isRSR ? receivedFromPeerID : claimedSenderID
+        return .success(BLEIngressPacketContext(
+            receivedFromPeerID: receivedFromPeerID,
+            validationPeerID: validationPeerID
+        ))
+    }
+
+    static func messageID(for packet: BitchatPacket) -> String {
+        let senderID = packet.senderID.hexEncodedString()
+        let digestPrefix = packet.payload.sha256Hash().prefix(4).hexEncodedString()
+        return "\(senderID)-\(packet.timestamp)-\(packet.type)-\(digestPrefix)"
+    }
+
+    private static func requiresDirectSenderBinding(_ packet: BitchatPacket, directAnnounceTTL: UInt8) -> Bool {
+        packet.type == MessageType.announce.rawValue && packet.ttl == directAnnounceTTL
+    }
+
+    private static func isSelfAuthoredSyncResponse(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> Bool {
+        packet.isRSR && packet.ttl == 0
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEIngressPacketGuard.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+enum BLEIngressPacketGuard {
+    enum Rejection: Error, Equatable {
+        case selfLoopback(packetType: UInt8)
+        case directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: PeerID, claimedSenderID: PeerID)
+        case invalidRSR(peerID: PeerID)
+        case timestampSkew(peerID: PeerID, skewMs: UInt64, maxSkewMs: UInt64)
+    }
+
+    static func evaluate(
+        packet: BitchatPacket,
+        claimedSenderID: PeerID,
+        boundPeerID: PeerID?,
+        localPeerID: PeerID,
+        directAnnounceTTL: UInt8,
+        nowMs: UInt64 = UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
+        maxTimestampSkewMs: UInt64 = 120_000,
+        isValidSyncResponse: (PeerID) -> Bool
+    ) -> Result<BLEIngressPacketContext, Rejection> {
+        let contextResult = BLEIngressLinkRegistry.packetContext(
+            for: packet,
+            claimedSenderID: claimedSenderID,
+            boundPeerID: boundPeerID,
+            localPeerID: localPeerID,
+            directAnnounceTTL: directAnnounceTTL
+        )
+
+        let context: BLEIngressPacketContext
+        switch contextResult {
+        case .success(let acceptedContext):
+            context = acceptedContext
+        case .failure(.selfLoopback(let packetType)):
+            return .failure(.selfLoopback(packetType: packetType))
+        case .failure(.directSenderMismatch(let boundPeerID, let claimedSenderID)):
+            return .failure(.directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: boundPeerID, claimedSenderID: claimedSenderID))
+        }
+
+        switch validatePayload(
+            packet,
+            from: context.validationPeerID,
+            nowMs: nowMs,
+            maxTimestampSkewMs: maxTimestampSkewMs,
+            isValidSyncResponse: isValidSyncResponse
+        ) {
+        case .success:
+            return .success(context)
+        case .failure(let rejection):
+            return .failure(rejection)
+        }
+    }
+
+    static func validatePayload(
+        _ packet: BitchatPacket,
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        nowMs: UInt64 = UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
+        maxTimestampSkewMs: UInt64 = 120_000,
+        isValidSyncResponse: (PeerID) -> Bool
+    ) -> Result<Void, Rejection> {
+        if packet.isRSR {
+            guard isValidSyncResponse(peerID) else {
+                return .failure(.invalidRSR(peerID: peerID))
+            }
+            return .success(())
+        }
+
+        let packetTime = packet.timestamp
+        let skew = packetTime > nowMs ? packetTime - nowMs : nowMs - packetTime
+        guard skew <= maxTimestampSkewMs else {
+            return .failure(.timestampSkew(peerID: peerID, skewMs: skew, maxSkewMs: maxTimestampSkewMs))
+        }
+
+        return .success(())
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLELinkStateStore.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import CoreBluetooth
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEPeripheralLinkState {
+    let peripheral: CBPeripheral
+    var characteristic: CBCharacteristic?
+    var peerID: PeerID?
+    var isConnecting: Bool
+    var isConnected: Bool
+    var lastConnectionAttempt: Date?
+    var assembler: NotificationStreamAssembler
+}
+
+struct BLEDirectLinkState: Equatable {
+    let hasPeripheral: Bool
+    let hasCentral: Bool
+}
+
+struct BLESubscribedCentralSnapshot {
+    let centrals: [CBCentral]
+    let peerIDsByCentralUUID: [String: PeerID]
+
+    func central(for peerID: PeerID) -> CBCentral? {
+        centrals.first { peerIDsByCentralUUID[$0.identifier.uuidString] == peerID }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Owns all BLE link state (peripheral connections we hold as central, and
+/// central subscriptions we serve as peripheral). The store has no internal
+/// locking: every access must happen on the single owning queue (the BLE
+/// queue). Other queues must go through BLEService's `readLinkState`, which
+/// hops to that queue. Call `assumeOwnership(of:)` to have debug builds trap
+/// any access from the wrong queue.
+final class BLELinkStateStore {
+    private(set) var peripherals: [String: BLEPeripheralLinkState] = [:]
+    private(set) var peerToPeripheralUUID: [PeerID: String] = [:]
+    private(set) var subscribedCentrals: [CBCentral] = []
+    private(set) var centralToPeerID: [String: PeerID] = [:]
+
+    #if DEBUG
+    private var ownerQueue: DispatchQueue?
+    #endif
+
+    /// Pin the store to its owning queue. Debug-only enforcement; release
+    /// builds are unchanged.
+    func assumeOwnership(of queue: DispatchQueue) {
+        #if DEBUG
+        ownerQueue = queue
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    @inline(__always)
+    private func assertOwned() {
+        #if DEBUG
+        if let queue = ownerQueue {
+            dispatchPrecondition(condition: .onQueue(queue))
+        }
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    var peripheralStates: [BLEPeripheralLinkState] {
+        assertOwned()
+        return Array(peripherals.values)
+    }
+
+    var subscribedCentralSnapshot: BLESubscribedCentralSnapshot {
+        assertOwned()
+        return BLESubscribedCentralSnapshot(
+            centrals: subscribedCentrals,
+            peerIDsByCentralUUID: centralToPeerID
+        )
+    }
+
+    var subscribedCentralCount: Int {
+        assertOwned()
+        return subscribedCentrals.count
+    }
+
+    var connectedOrConnectingPeripheralCount: Int {
+        assertOwned()
+        return peripherals.values.filter { $0.isConnected || $0.isConnecting }.count
+    }
+
+    func state(forPeripheralID peripheralID: String) -> BLEPeripheralLinkState? {
+        assertOwned()
+        return peripherals[peripheralID]
+    }
+
+    func setPeripheralState(_ state: BLEPeripheralLinkState, for peripheralID: String) {
+        assertOwned()
+        peripherals[peripheralID] = state
+    }
+
+    @discardableResult
+    func updatePeripheral(
+        _ peripheralID: String,
+        _ update: (inout BLEPeripheralLinkState) -> Void
+    ) -> BLEPeripheralLinkState? {
+        assertOwned()
+        guard var state = peripherals[peripheralID] else { return nil }
+        update(&state)
+        peripherals[peripheralID] = state
+        return state
+    }
+
+    func beginConnecting(to peripheral: CBPeripheral, at date: Date) {
+        setPeripheralState(
+            BLEPeripheralLinkState(
+                peripheral: peripheral,
+                characteristic: nil,
+                peerID: nil,
+                isConnecting: true,
+                isConnected: false,
+                lastConnectionAttempt: date,
+                assembler: NotificationStreamAssembler()
+            ),
+            for: peripheral.identifier.uuidString
+        )
+    }
+
+    func markConnected(_ peripheral: CBPeripheral) {
+        let peripheralID = peripheral.identifier.uuidString
+        if updatePeripheral(peripheralID, {
+            $0.isConnecting = false
+            $0.isConnected = true
+        }) == nil {
+            setPeripheralState(
+                BLEPeripheralLinkState(
+                    peripheral: peripheral,
+                    characteristic: nil,
+                    peerID: nil,
+                    isConnecting: false,
+                    isConnected: true,
+                    lastConnectionAttempt: nil,
+                    assembler: NotificationStreamAssembler()
+                ),
+                for: peripheralID
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
+    func updateCharacteristic(_ characteristic: CBCharacteristic, forPeripheralID peripheralID: String) {
+        updatePeripheral(peripheralID) {
+            $0.characteristic = characteristic
+        }
+    }
+
+    func directPeripheralState(for peerID: PeerID) -> BLEPeripheralLinkState? {
+        assertOwned()
+        return peerToPeripheralUUID[peerID].flatMap { peripherals[$0] }
+    }
+
+    func directLinkState(for peerID: PeerID) -> BLEDirectLinkState {
+        assertOwned()
+        let peripheralUUID = peerToPeripheralUUID[peerID]
+        let hasPeripheral = peripheralUUID.flatMap { peripherals[$0]?.isConnected } ?? false
+        let hasCentral = centralToPeerID.values.contains(peerID)
+        return BLEDirectLinkState(hasPeripheral: hasPeripheral, hasCentral: hasCentral)
+    }
+
+    func links(to peerID: PeerID?) -> Set<BLEIngressLinkID> {
+        assertOwned()
+        guard let peerID else { return [] }
+
+        var links: Set<BLEIngressLinkID> = []
+        if let peripheralUUID = peerToPeripheralUUID[peerID] {
+            links.insert(.peripheral(peripheralUUID))
+        }
+        for (centralUUID, mappedPeerID) in centralToPeerID where mappedPeerID == peerID {
+            links.insert(.central(centralUUID))
+        }
+        return links
+    }
+
+    func peerID(forPeripheralID peripheralID: String) -> PeerID? {
+        assertOwned()
+        return peripherals[peripheralID]?.peerID
+    }
+
+    func peerID(forCentralUUID centralUUID: String) -> PeerID? {
+        assertOwned()
+        return centralToPeerID[centralUUID]
+    }
+
+    func addSubscribedCentral(_ central: CBCentral) {
+        assertOwned()
+        guard !subscribedCentrals.contains(central) else { return }
+        subscribedCentrals.append(central)
+    }
+
+    func removeSubscribedCentral(_ central: CBCentral) -> PeerID? {
+        assertOwned()
+        let centralUUID = central.identifier.uuidString
+        subscribedCentrals.removeAll { $0.identifier == central.identifier }
+        return centralToPeerID.removeValue(forKey: centralUUID)
+    }
+
+    func bindCentral(_ centralUUID: String, to peerID: PeerID) {
+        assertOwned()
+        centralToPeerID[centralUUID] = peerID
+    }
+
+    func bindPeripheral(_ peripheralUUID: String, to peerID: PeerID) {
+        assertOwned()
+        if updatePeripheral(peripheralUUID, { $0.peerID = peerID }) != nil {
+            peerToPeripheralUUID[peerID] = peripheralUUID
+        }
+    }
+
+    func removePeripheral(_ peripheralID: String) -> PeerID? {
+        assertOwned()
+        let peerID = peripherals.removeValue(forKey: peripheralID)?.peerID
+        if let peerID {
+            peerToPeripheralUUID.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+        }
+        return peerID
+    }
+
+    func clearPeripherals() -> [PeerID] {
+        assertOwned()
+        let peerIDs = peripherals.compactMap { $0.value.peerID }
+        peripherals.removeAll()
+        peerToPeripheralUUID.removeAll()
+        return peerIDs
+    }
+
+    func clearCentrals() -> [PeerID] {
+        assertOwned()
+        let peerIDs = Array(centralToPeerID.values)
+        subscribedCentrals.removeAll()
+        centralToPeerID.removeAll()
+        return peerIDs
+    }
+
+    func clearAll() {
+        assertOwned()
+        peripherals.removeAll()
+        peerToPeripheralUUID.removeAll()
+        subscribedCentrals.removeAll()
+        centralToPeerID.removeAll()
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLELogRateLimiter.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import Foundation
+
+final class BLELogRateLimiter {
+    private let defaultMinimumInterval: TimeInterval
+    private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.ble.log-rate-limiter")
+    private var lastLogTimeByKey: [String: Date] = [:]
+
+    init(defaultMinimumInterval: TimeInterval) {
+        self.defaultMinimumInterval = defaultMinimumInterval
+    }
+
+    func shouldLog(
+        key: String,
+        now: Date = Date(),
+        minimumInterval: TimeInterval? = nil
+    ) -> Bool {
+        queue.sync {
+            let interval = minimumInterval ?? defaultMinimumInterval
+            if let lastLogTime = lastLogTimeByKey[key],
+               now.timeIntervalSince(lastLogTime) < interval {
+                return false
+            }
+            lastLogTimeByKey[key] = now
+            return true
+        }
+    }
+
+    func removeAll() {
+        queue.sync {
+            lastLogTimeByKey.removeAll()
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEMaintenancePolicy.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEMaintenancePlan: Equatable {
+    let shouldSendAnnounce: Bool
+    let shouldEnsureAdvertising: Bool
+    let shouldRunCleanup: Bool
+    let shouldFlushDirectedSpool: Bool
+    let shouldResetCounter: Bool
+}
+
+enum BLEMaintenancePolicy {
+    static func plan(
+        cycle: Int,
+        connectedCount: Int,
+        peerRegistryIsEmpty: Bool,
+        elapsedSinceLastAnnounce: TimeInterval,
+        hasRecentTraffic: Bool,
+        connectedAnnounceJitterOffset: TimeInterval? = nil,
+        highDegreeThreshold: Int = TransportConfig.bleHighDegreeThreshold
+    ) -> BLEMaintenancePlan {
+        BLEMaintenancePlan(
+            shouldSendAnnounce: shouldSendAnnounce(
+                connectedCount: connectedCount,
+                elapsedSinceLastAnnounce: elapsedSinceLastAnnounce,
+                hasRecentTraffic: hasRecentTraffic,
+                connectedAnnounceJitterOffset: connectedAnnounceJitterOffset,
+                highDegreeThreshold: highDegreeThreshold
+            ),
+            shouldEnsureAdvertising: peerRegistryIsEmpty,
+            shouldRunCleanup: cycle.isMultiple(of: 3),
+            shouldFlushDirectedSpool: !cycle.isMultiple(of: 2),
+            shouldResetCounter: cycle >= 6
+        )
+    }
+
+    static func shouldSendAnnounce(
+        connectedCount: Int,
+        elapsedSinceLastAnnounce: TimeInterval,
+        hasRecentTraffic: Bool,
+        connectedAnnounceJitterOffset: TimeInterval? = nil,
+        highDegreeThreshold: Int = TransportConfig.bleHighDegreeThreshold
+    ) -> Bool {
+        if hasRecentTraffic && elapsedSinceLastAnnounce >= 10.0 {
+            return true
+        }
+
+        guard connectedCount > 0 else {
+            return elapsedSinceLastAnnounce >= TransportConfig.bleAnnounceIntervalSeconds
+        }
+
+        let highDegree = connectedCount >= highDegreeThreshold
+        let base = highDegree ?
+            TransportConfig.bleConnectedAnnounceBaseSecondsDense :
+            TransportConfig.bleConnectedAnnounceBaseSecondsSparse
+        let jitter = highDegree ?
+            TransportConfig.bleConnectedAnnounceJitterDense :
+            TransportConfig.bleConnectedAnnounceJitterSparse
+        let jitterOffset = connectedAnnounceJitterOffset ?? Double.random(in: -jitter...jitter)
+
+        return elapsedSinceLastAnnounce >= base + jitterOffset
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLENoisePacketHandler.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import BitLogger
+import Foundation
+
+/// Narrow environment for `BLENoisePacketHandler`.
+///
+/// All queue hops (collections barrier writes, main-actor UI notification)
+/// and every `noiseService.*` crypto call live inside the closures supplied by
+/// `BLEService`, keeping the handler queue-agnostic and synchronously testable.
+struct BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment {
+    /// Local peer identity at the time the packet is handled.
+    let localPeerID: () -> PeerID
+    /// Local peer ID bytes used as the sender of handshake responses.
+    let localPeerIDData: () -> Data
+    /// TTL value used for direct (non-relayed) packets.
+    let messageTTL: UInt8
+    /// Current time source.
+    let now: () -> Date
+    /// Processes an inbound handshake message, returning an optional response payload (crypto).
+    let processHandshakeMessage: (_ peerID: PeerID, _ message: Data) throws -> Data?
+    /// Whether any Noise session (established or pending) exists for the peer (crypto).
+    let hasNoiseSession: (PeerID) -> Bool
+    /// Initiates a fresh Noise handshake with the peer (crypto + send).
+    let initiateHandshake: (PeerID) -> Void
+    /// Broadcasts a packet on the mesh (caller is already on the message queue).
+    let broadcastPacket: (BitchatPacket) -> Void
+    /// Updates the registry last-seen timestamp for the peer (async barrier write).
+    let updatePeerLastSeen: (PeerID) -> Void
+    /// Decrypts an encrypted payload from the peer (crypto).
+    let decrypt: (_ payload: Data, _ peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data
+    /// Clears the peer's Noise session after an unrecoverable decrypt failure (crypto).
+    let clearSession: (PeerID) -> Void
+    /// Delivers `.noisePayloadReceived` to the UI as one main-actor hop.
+    let deliverNoisePayload: (
+        _ peerID: PeerID,
+        _ type: NoisePayloadType,
+        _ payload: Data,
+        _ timestamp: Date
+    ) -> Void
+}
+
+/// Orchestrates the Noise session domain for inbound packets: handshake
+/// processing (with response), encrypted payload decryption and dispatch,
+/// and session recovery on decrypt failure.
+final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
+    private let environment: BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment
+
+    init(environment: BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment) {
+        self.environment = environment
+    }
+
+    func handleHandshake(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        let env = environment
+        // Use NoiseEncryptionService for handshake processing
+        if PeerID(hexData: packet.recipientID) == env.localPeerID() {
+            // Handshake is for us
+            do {
+                if let response = try env.processHandshakeMessage(peerID, packet.payload) {
+                    // Send response
+                    let responsePacket = BitchatPacket(
+                        type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
+                        senderID: env.localPeerIDData(),
+                        recipientID: Data(hexString: peerID.id),
+                        timestamp: UInt64(env.now().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
+                        payload: response,
+                        signature: nil,
+                        ttl: env.messageTTL
+                    )
+                    // We're on messageQueue from delegate callback
+                    env.broadcastPacket(responsePacket)
+                }
+
+                // Session establishment will trigger onPeerAuthenticated callback
+                // which will send any pending messages at the right time
+            } catch {
+                SecureLogger.error("Failed to process handshake: \(error)")
+                // Try initiating a new handshake
+                if !env.hasNoiseSession(peerID) {
+                    env.initiateHandshake(peerID)
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    func handleEncrypted(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        let env = environment
+        guard let recipientID = PeerID(hexData: packet.recipientID) else {
+            SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Encrypted message has no recipient ID", category: .session)
+            return
+        }
+
+        if recipientID != env.localPeerID() {
+            SecureLogger.debug("🔐 Encrypted message not for me (for \(recipientID.id.prefix(8))…, I am \(env.localPeerID().id.prefix(8))…)", category: .session)
+            return
+        }
+
+        // Update lastSeen for the peer we received from (important for private messages)
+        env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
+
+        do {
+            let decrypted = try env.decrypt(packet.payload, peerID)
+            guard decrypted.count > 0 else { return }
+
+            // First byte indicates the payload type
+            let payloadType = decrypted[0]
+            let payloadData = decrypted.dropFirst()
+
+            guard let noisePayloadType = NoisePayloadType(rawValue: payloadType) else {
+                SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Unknown noise payload type: \(payloadType)")
+                return
+            }
+
+            SecureLogger.debug("🔐 Decrypted noise payload type \(noisePayloadType.description) from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
+
+            let ts = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000)
+            env.deliverNoisePayload(peerID, noisePayloadType, Data(payloadData), ts)
+        } catch NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished {
+            // We received an encrypted message before establishing a session with this peer.
+            // Trigger a handshake so future messages can be decrypted.
+            SecureLogger.debug("🔑 Encrypted message from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… without session; initiating handshake")
+            if !env.hasNoiseSession(peerID) {
+                env.initiateHandshake(peerID)
+            }
+        } catch {
+            // Decryption failed - clear the corrupted session and re-initiate handshake
+            // This handles cases where session state got out of sync (nonce mismatch, etc.)
+            SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decrypt message from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…: \(error) - clearing session and re-initiating handshake")
+            env.clearSession(peerID)
+            env.initiateHandshake(peerID)
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLENoisePayloadFactory.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import Foundation
+
+enum BLENoisePayloadFactory {
+    static func privateMessage(content: String, messageID: String) -> Data? {
+        guard let payload = PrivateMessagePacket(messageID: messageID, content: content).encode() else {
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        return typedPayload(.privateMessage, payload: payload)
+    }
+
+    static func readReceipt(originalMessageID: String) -> Data {
+        typedPayload(.readReceipt, payload: Data(originalMessageID.utf8))
+    }
+
+    static func delivered(messageID: String) -> Data {
+        typedPayload(.delivered, payload: Data(messageID.utf8))
+    }
+
+    static func typedPayload(_ type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data) -> Data {
+        var typed = Data([type.rawValue])
+        typed.append(payload)
+        return typed
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLENoiseSessionQueues.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEPendingPrivateMessage: Equatable {
+    let content: String
+    let messageID: String
+}
+
+struct BLENoiseSessionQueues {
+    private var privateMessagesByPeerID: [PeerID: [BLEPendingPrivateMessage]] = [:]
+    private var typedPayloadsByPeerID: [PeerID: [Data]] = [:]
+
+    var isEmpty: Bool {
+        privateMessagesByPeerID.isEmpty && typedPayloadsByPeerID.isEmpty
+    }
+
+    mutating func removeAll() {
+        privateMessagesByPeerID.removeAll()
+        typedPayloadsByPeerID.removeAll()
+    }
+
+    mutating func appendPrivateMessage(content: String, messageID: String, for peerID: PeerID) {
+        privateMessagesByPeerID[peerID, default: []].append(BLEPendingPrivateMessage(content: content, messageID: messageID))
+    }
+
+    mutating func takePrivateMessages(for peerID: PeerID) -> [BLEPendingPrivateMessage] {
+        let messages = privateMessagesByPeerID[peerID] ?? []
+        privateMessagesByPeerID.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+        return messages
+    }
+
+    mutating func prependPrivateMessages(_ messages: [BLEPendingPrivateMessage], for peerID: PeerID) {
+        guard !messages.isEmpty else { return }
+        privateMessagesByPeerID[peerID, default: []].insert(contentsOf: messages, at: 0)
+    }
+
+    mutating func appendTypedPayload(_ payload: Data, for peerID: PeerID) {
+        typedPayloadsByPeerID[peerID, default: []].append(payload)
+    }
+
+    mutating func takeTypedPayloads(for peerID: PeerID) -> [Data] {
+        let payloads = typedPayloadsByPeerID[peerID] ?? []
+        typedPayloadsByPeerID.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+        return payloads
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEOutboundFragmentPlanner.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+
+struct BLEOutboundFragmentPlan {
+    let fragmentPackets: [BitchatPacket]
+    let fragmentVersion: UInt8
+    let chunkSize: Int
+    let spacingMs: Int
+
+    var totalFragments: Int {
+        fragmentPackets.count
+    }
+
+    var shouldPauseScanning: Bool {
+        totalFragments > 4
+    }
+}
+
+enum BLEOutboundFragmentPlanner {
+    private static let minimumChunkSize = 64
+    private static let fragmentIDLength = 8
+
+    static func makePlan(
+        for request: BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest,
+        defaultChunkSize: Int,
+        bleMaxMTU: Int,
+        fragmentID: Data = randomFragmentID()
+    ) -> BLEOutboundFragmentPlan? {
+        guard fragmentID.count == fragmentIDLength,
+              let fullData = request.packet.toBinaryData(padding: request.pad) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        let sizing = sizingPolicy(
+            for: request.packet,
+            requestedMaxChunk: request.maxChunk,
+            defaultChunkSize: defaultChunkSize,
+            bleMaxMTU: bleMaxMTU
+        )
+
+        let chunks = stride(from: 0, to: fullData.count, by: sizing.chunkSize).map { offset in
+            Data(fullData[offset..<min(offset + sizing.chunkSize, fullData.count)])
+        }
+
+        guard !chunks.isEmpty else { return nil }
+
+        let fragmentRecipient: Data? = {
+            if let directedPeer = request.directedPeer {
+                return Data(hexString: directedPeer.id)
+            }
+            return request.packet.recipientID
+        }()
+
+        let fragmentPackets = chunks.enumerated().map { index, chunk in
+            makeFragmentPacket(
+                original: request.packet,
+                fragmentID: fragmentID,
+                index: index,
+                total: chunks.count,
+                fragmentData: chunk,
+                fragmentRecipient: fragmentRecipient,
+                fragmentVersion: sizing.fragmentVersion
+            )
+        }
+
+        return BLEOutboundFragmentPlan(
+            fragmentPackets: fragmentPackets,
+            fragmentVersion: sizing.fragmentVersion,
+            chunkSize: sizing.chunkSize,
+            spacingMs: spacingMs(for: request)
+        )
+    }
+
+    private static func sizingPolicy(
+        for packet: BitchatPacket,
+        requestedMaxChunk: Int?,
+        defaultChunkSize: Int,
+        bleMaxMTU: Int
+    ) -> (fragmentVersion: UInt8, chunkSize: Int) {
+        var fragmentVersion: UInt8 = 1
+        var calculatedChunk = defaultChunkSize
+
+        if let route = packet.route, !route.isEmpty {
+            fragmentVersion = 2
+            let routeSize = 1 + (route.count * 8)
+            let overhead = 16 + 8 + 8 + routeSize + 13 + 16
+            calculatedChunk = max(minimumChunkSize, bleMaxMTU - overhead)
+        }
+
+        return (
+            fragmentVersion: fragmentVersion,
+            chunkSize: max(minimumChunkSize, requestedMaxChunk ?? calculatedChunk)
+        )
+    }
+
+    private static func makeFragmentPacket(
+        original packet: BitchatPacket,
+        fragmentID: Data,
+        index: Int,
+        total: Int,
+        fragmentData: Data,
+        fragmentRecipient: Data?,
+        fragmentVersion: UInt8
+    ) -> BitchatPacket {
+        var payload = Data()
+        payload.append(fragmentID)
+        payload.append(contentsOf: withUnsafeBytes(of: UInt16(index).bigEndian) { Data($0) })
+        payload.append(contentsOf: withUnsafeBytes(of: UInt16(total).bigEndian) { Data($0) })
+        payload.append(packet.type)
+        payload.append(fragmentData)
+
+        return BitchatPacket(
+            type: MessageType.fragment.rawValue,
+            senderID: packet.senderID,
+            recipientID: fragmentRecipient,
+            timestamp: packet.timestamp,
+            payload: payload,
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: packet.ttl,
+            version: fragmentVersion,
+            route: packet.route,
+            isRSR: packet.isRSR
+        )
+    }
+
+    private static func spacingMs(for request: BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest) -> Int {
+        if request.directedPeer != nil || request.packet.recipientID != nil {
+            return TransportConfig.bleFragmentSpacingDirectedMs
+        }
+
+        return TransportConfig.bleFragmentSpacingMs
+    }
+
+    private static func randomFragmentID() -> Data {
+        Data((0..<fragmentIDLength).map { _ in UInt8.random(in: 0...255) })
+    }
+}