Files
bitchat/bitchatTests/BLEServiceCoreTests.swift
T
f9032cf2b9 Add mesh diagnostics: /ping, /trace, and topology map (#1377)
* Add mesh diagnostics: /ping, /trace, and topology map

- New protocol types ping=0x26 / pong=0x27 (9-byte payload: 8-byte nonce
  + origin TTL) with per-peer inbound rate limiting (5 per 10s)
- /ping @name reports RTT and hop count, 10s timeout
- /trace @name prints the estimated path from gossiped directNeighbors
- Topology map sheet (circular Canvas layout) reachable from App Info
- Ping/pong ride the deterministic directed-relay path like DMs
- Tests: payload round-trip, hop-count math, command output, edge
  normalization, layout

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix CI media-wipe race, per-link ping rate limiting, and /ping output routing

Three fixes for PR #1377 review:

1. CI flake (sendImage_privateChatProcessesAndTransfersImage): the
   panicClearAllData / clearCurrentPublicTimeline detached utility-priority
   tasks delete the real ~/Library/Application Support/files tree, which the
   test process shares. The wipe fires at a nondeterministic time and raced
   the sendImage test's JPEG in files/images/outgoing (write then re-read),
   so prepareImagePacket threw and the test timed out. Both wipes are now
   skipped under tests (existing TestEnvironment.isRunningTests pattern);
   this also stops test runs from deleting the developer's real media.

2. Codex P1: ping packets are unsigned, so keying the pong rate limiter on
   packet.senderID let one connected peer rotate forged sender IDs to bypass
   the 5-per-10s budget. The limiter now keys on the ingress link (the
   directly connected peer that delivered the packet); the pong still goes
   to the claimed sender. Regression test proves rotating senders over one
   link exhaust one budget (fails 10 vs 5 pongs on the old code).

3. Codex P2: /ping output arrived up to 10s later and was routed from
   selectedPrivateChatPeer at callback time, misrouting the result after a
   chat switch. The origin conversation is now captured when the command is
   issued (CommandOutputDestination) and deferred output is routed there:
   a DM result lands in the origin chat's history even if deselected, and a
   mesh-timeline result pins to #mesh instead of the active channel.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* App Info: move NETWORK section under HOW TO USE and uppercase NETWORK/SYMBOLS headers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Conform DiagnosticsMockContext to sendPublicMessage

CommandContextProvider gained sendPublicMessage (Cashu /pay, #1376) after
this branch forked, so the diagnostics test mock no longer conformed once
main was merged in. Add the no-op stub.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 15:08:22 +02:00

342 lines
13 KiB
Swift

//
// BLEServiceCoreTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Focused BLEService tests for packet handling behavior.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
import CoreBluetooth
import BitFoundation
@testable import bitchat
struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
@Test
func duplicatePacket_isDeduped() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let delegate = PublicCaptureDelegate()
ble.delegate = delegate
// Public messages must carry a valid signature from the claimed sender;
// sign the packet and preseed the sender's signing key so the receiver
// can verify it (production `sendMessage` signs public broadcasts too).
let signer = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let sender = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let timestamp = UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
let unsigned = makePublicPacket(content: "Hello", sender: sender, timestamp: timestamp)
let packet = try #require(signer.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign public message")
let signingKey = signer.getSigningPublicKeyData()
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender, signingPublicKey: signingKey)
let receivedFirst = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().count == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.defaultTimeout
)
#expect(receivedFirst)
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender, signingPublicKey: signingKey)
let receivedDuplicate = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().count > 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout
)
#expect(!receivedDuplicate)
let messages = delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot()
#expect(messages.count == 1)
#expect(messages.first?.content == "Hello")
}
@Test
func staleBroadcast_isIgnored() async {
let ble = makeService()
let delegate = PublicCaptureDelegate()
ble.delegate = delegate
let sender = PeerID(str: "A1B2C3D4E5F60708")
let oldTimestamp = UInt64(Date().addingTimeInterval(-901).timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
let packet = makePublicPacket(content: "Old", sender: sender, timestamp: oldTimestamp)
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender)
let didReceive = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ !delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().isEmpty }, timeout: 0.3)
#expect(!didReceive)
#expect(delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().isEmpty)
}
@Test
func announceSenderMismatch_isRejected() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let signer = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
nickname: "Spoof",
noisePublicKey: signer.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
directNeighbors: nil
)
let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
let derivedPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
let wrongFirst = derivedPeerID.bare.first == "0" ? "1" : "0"
let wrongBare = String(wrongFirst) + String(derivedPeerID.bare.dropFirst())
let wrongPeerID = PeerID(str: wrongBare)
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: wrongPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
let signed = try #require(signer.signPacket(packet), "Failed to sign announce packet")
ble._test_handlePacket(signed, fromPeerID: wrongPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
_ = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ !ble.currentPeerSnapshots().isEmpty }, timeout: 0.3)
#expect(ble.currentPeerSnapshots().isEmpty)
}
@Test
func ingressAllowsRelayedSenderOnBoundLink() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let boundPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let relayedSender = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
let packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "Relayed",
sender: relayedSender,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
#expect(ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: boundPeer))
}
@Test
func ingressRejectsDirectAnnounceThatConflictsWithBoundLink() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let boundPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let claimedPeer = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: claimedPeer.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: Data(),
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
#expect(!ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: boundPeer))
}
@Test
func ingressRejectsSelfLoopbackBeforeSpoofChecks() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "Loopback",
sender: ble.myPeerID,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
#expect(!ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")))
}
@Test
func ingressAllowsSelfAuthoredRSRWithTTLZeroFromBoundPeer() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
var packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "Recovered by sync",
sender: ble.myPeerID,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
packet.isRSR = true
packet.ttl = 0
#expect(ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")))
}
@Test
func ingressRecordSuppressesSecondLinkDuplicate() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "Duplicate link copy",
sender: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788"),
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: "central-a"))
#expect(!ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: "central-b"))
}
@Test
func panicReset_rotatesPeerIDDerivedFromNewNoiseFingerprint() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let originalPeerID = ble.myPeerID
let originalFingerprint = ble.noiseIdentityFingerprint()
#expect(originalPeerID == PeerID(str: originalFingerprint.prefix(16)))
ble.resetIdentityForPanic(currentNickname: "anon")
// The Noise identity is regenerated and the peer ID swaps with it
// (atomically, behind a messageQueue barrier).
let newFingerprint = ble.noiseIdentityFingerprint()
#expect(newFingerprint != originalFingerprint)
#expect(ble.myPeerID != originalPeerID)
#expect(ble.myPeerID == PeerID(str: newFingerprint.prefix(16)))
}
@Test
func modifiedServices_rediscoverWhenBitChatServiceIsInvalidated() async throws {
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
#expect(BLEService._test_shouldRediscoverBitChatService(
invalidatedServiceUUIDs: [BLEService.serviceUUID],
cachedServiceUUIDs: [otherService]
))
}
@Test
func modifiedServices_rediscoverWhenCachedServicesNoLongerIncludeBitChat() async throws {
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
#expect(BLEService._test_shouldRediscoverBitChatService(
invalidatedServiceUUIDs: [otherService],
cachedServiceUUIDs: [otherService]
))
}
@Test
func modifiedServices_ignoreUnrelatedInvalidationWhenBitChatIsStillCached() async throws {
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
#expect(!BLEService._test_shouldRediscoverBitChatService(
invalidatedServiceUUIDs: [otherService],
cachedServiceUUIDs: [BLEService.serviceUUID, otherService]
))
}
/// Pings are unsigned, so their claimed sender is attacker-controlled.
/// The pong budget must be keyed on the ingress link (the directly
/// connected peer that delivered the packet): rotating forged sender IDs
/// over one link exhausts one budget instead of resetting it, so a single
/// malicious link cannot turn /ping into an amplification primitive.
@Test
func meshPingResponseBudget_isPerIngressLinkNotClaimedSender() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
let link = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let budget = TransportConfig.meshPingInboundMaxPerLink
let myRecipientData = try #require(Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id))
for i in 0..<(budget * 2) {
// A fresh forged sender for every ping, all arriving on one link.
let forgedSender = PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", 0xA0_0000 + i))
var nonce = Data(repeating: 0, count: MeshPingPayload.nonceLength)
nonce[0] = UInt8(i)
let payload = try #require(MeshPingPayload(nonce: nonce, originTTL: 7))
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.ping.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: forgedSender.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: myRecipientData,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload.encode(),
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: link, preseedPeer: false)
}
let reachedBudget = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .pong) >= budget },
timeout: TestConstants.defaultTimeout
)
#expect(reachedBudget)
// Give any over-budget pong a chance to surface, then confirm the
// rotated sender IDs never bought a sixth response.
let exceededBudget = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .pong) > budget },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout
)
#expect(!exceededBudget)
#expect(outbound.count(ofType: .pong) == budget)
}
}
/// Thread-safe capture of packets leaving the service under test.
private final class OutboundPacketTap {
private let lock = NSLock()
private var packets: [BitchatPacket] = []
func record(_ packet: BitchatPacket) {
lock.lock(); packets.append(packet); lock.unlock()
}
func count(ofType type: MessageType) -> Int {
lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
return packets.filter { $0.type == type.rawValue }.count
}
}
private func makeService() -> BLEService {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let identityManager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: MockKeychainHelper())
return BLEService(
keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: identityManager,
initializeBluetoothManagers: false
)
}
private func makePublicPacket(content: String, sender: PeerID, timestamp: UInt64) -> BitchatPacket {
BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.message.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: sender.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: timestamp,
payload: Data(content.utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 3
)
}
private final class PublicCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
private let lock = NSLock()
private(set) var publicMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: messageID,
sender: nickname,
content: content,
timestamp: timestamp,
isRelay: false,
originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: false,
recipientNickname: nil,
senderPeerID: peerID,
mentions: nil
)
lock.lock()
publicMessages.append(message)
lock.unlock()
}
func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {}
func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {}
func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState) {}
func publicMessagesSnapshot() -> [BitchatMessage] {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
return publicMessages
}
}