jackandClaude Opus 5 dc7475a0ba Harden what a locked or seized device gives away
The realistic compromise for many of the people this app is built for is
not interception but a phone taken, and often unlocked under coercion.
Content encryption is in good shape; these are the gaps around it.

Hide notification previews, by default. Notification content is rendered
by the system on the lock screen, so it was readable without unlocking:
DM alerts carried the sender's nickname and the full message body, and
geohash alerts put the geohash in the title. Alerts now state that a DM,
mention, or location-channel activity arrived and withhold the rest until
the app is opened. userInfo still carries the routing peer ID and deep
link, neither of which the system displays, so taps land where they did.
A settings toggle restores full previews for anyone who wants them.
Default-on is the deliberate part: a phone face-up on a table should not
narrate conversations, and someone who wants previews can say so.

Cover the window on willResignActive, so the snapshot iOS stores for the
app switcher shows a placeholder rather than an open conversation. Opaque
rather than blurred, because blurred large text stays partly legible and
the snapshot goes to disk. Added synchronously from a UIKit notification
with queue: nil, since the capture follows shortly after and an
OperationQueue hop or a SwiftUI state change can lose that race. Panic
wipe already deleted snapshots already on disk; this stops new ones from
being worth deleting.

Bound media by age as well as size. The 100 MB quota only ever considered
incoming files, so outgoing media had no lifetime at all and a received
photo could outlive its conversation indefinitely. A launch-time sweep now
deletes managed media older than seven days, incoming and outgoing, with
the same exemptions quota eviction honors: in-flight live captures and
files reserved by a delivery or deletion in progress.

Make /clear tell the truth on the mesh timeline. It recorded an echo
watermark and left the gossip archive on disk for up to 6 hours, so
someone who cleared before a police stop had deleted nothing. Clearing now
erases the archive too. The watermark still matters: it suppresses
pre-clear messages this device hears again from peers. The cost is that
the device stops serving recent public backlog until it hears fresh
traffic, which is a fair reading of what clearing a timeline means.

Documented in PRIVACY_POLICY.md and the privacy assessment, including a
new section on what is deliberately NOT addressed: there is still no
duress mechanism of any kind (no decoy passphrase, no wipe-on-failed-auth,
no app lock), macOS gets no file-protection classes, and media is not
sealed at the app layer. The duress question is a product decision as much
as an engineering one, since in some jurisdictions destroying data on
demand is itself an offence and hiding may protect someone better than
destroying, so it is called out rather than guessed at.

Three findings from the audit that prompted this work turned out to be
already fixed on main and are not included: keychain accessibility is
AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly with a retrying migration, the panic media
wipe uses a two-location durable marker transaction, and panic already
discards staged share-extension content.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 17:31:30 +02:00

icon_128x128@2x

bitchat

A decentralized peer-to-peer messaging app with dual transport architecture: local Bluetooth mesh networks for offline communication and internet-based Nostr protocol for global reach. No accounts, no phone numbers, no central servers. It's the side-groupchat.

bitchat.free

📲 App Store

License

This project is released into the public domain. See the LICENSE file for details.

Features

  • Dual Transport Architecture: Bluetooth mesh for offline + Nostr protocol for internet-based messaging
  • Location-Based Channels: Geographic chat rooms using geohash coordinates over global Nostr relays
  • Intelligent Message Routing: Automatically chooses best transport (Bluetooth → Nostr fallback)
  • Decentralized Mesh Network: Automatic peer discovery and multi-hop message relay over Bluetooth LE
  • Privacy First: No accounts, no phone numbers, no persistent identifiers
  • Private Message End-to-End Encryption: Noise Protocol for mesh, BitChat private envelopes for Nostr fallback
  • IRC-Style Commands: Familiar /slap, /msg, /who style interface
  • Universal App: Native support for iOS and macOS
  • Emergency Wipe: Triple-tap to instantly clear all data
  • Performance Optimizations: LZ4 message compression, adaptive battery modes, and optimized networking

Technical Architecture

BitChat uses a hybrid messaging architecture with two complementary transport layers:

Bluetooth Mesh Network (Offline)

  • Local Communication: Direct peer-to-peer within Bluetooth range
  • Multi-hop Relay: Messages route through nearby devices (max 7 hops)
  • No Internet Required: Works completely offline in disaster scenarios
  • Noise Protocol Encryption: End-to-end encryption with forward secrecy
  • Binary Protocol: Compact packet format optimized for Bluetooth LE constraints
  • Automatic Discovery: Peer discovery and connection management
  • Adaptive Power: Battery-optimized duty cycling

Nostr Protocol (Internet)

  • Global Reach: Connect with users worldwide via internet relays
  • Location Channels: Geographic chat rooms using geohash coordinates
  • 290+ Relay Network: Distributed across the globe for reliability
  • BitChat Private Envelopes: App-specific encrypted private messages over Nostr relays
  • Ephemeral Keys: Fresh cryptographic identity per geohash area

BitChat's private-envelope format is proprietary and is not NIP-17, NIP-44, or NIP-59 compatible. It uses Nostr as a relay transport but only interoperates with BitChat clients: private payloads travel inside kind-1059 events whose v2:-prefixed content is a BitChat-specific XChaCha20-Poly1305 construction, not NIP-44 encryption.

Channel Types

mesh #bluetooth

  • Transport: Bluetooth Low Energy mesh network
  • Scope: Local devices within multi-hop range
  • Internet: Not required
  • Use Case: Offline communication, protests, disasters, remote areas

Location Channels (block #dr5rsj7, neighborhood #dr5rs, country #dr)

  • Transport: Nostr protocol over internet
  • Scope: Geographic areas defined by geohash precision
    • block (7 chars): City block level
    • neighborhood (6 chars): District/neighborhood
    • city (5 chars): City level
    • province (4 chars): State/province
    • region (2 chars): Country/large region
  • Internet: Required (connects to Nostr relays)
  • Use Case: Location-based community chat, local events, regional discussions

Direct Message Routing

Private messages use intelligent transport selection:

  1. Bluetooth First (preferred when available)

    • Direct connection with established Noise session
    • Fastest and most private option
  2. Nostr Fallback (when Bluetooth unavailable)

    • Uses recipient's Nostr public key
    • BitChat's app-specific private-envelope encryption
    • Routes through global relay network
  3. Smart Queuing (when neither available)

    • Messages queued until transport becomes available
    • Automatic delivery when connection established

For detailed protocol documentation, see the Technical Whitepaper.

Setup

Option 1: Using Xcode

open bitchat.xcodeproj

For a signed device build, create your ignored local configuration and replace the example team ID with your Apple Developer Team ID:

cp Configs/Local.xcconfig.example Configs/Local.xcconfig

Local.xcconfig.example derives unique app and App Group identifiers from that team ID. The entitlement files already reference $(APP_GROUP_ID), so tracked project or entitlement files do not need to be edited.

Useful command-line checks from the repository root:

# macOS Debug build without signing
xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" \
  -configuration Debug CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build

# Full SwiftPM test suite
swift test

# iOS simulator tests
xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \
  -sdk iphonesimulator \
  -destination 'platform=iOS Simulator,name=iPhone 17' test

If iPhone 17 is unavailable, choose an installed simulator from:

xcodebuild -showdestinations -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (iOS)"

Option 2: Using just

brew install just
just check
just run

just build and just run use the current bitchat (macOS) scheme and keep Xcode output in the ignored .DerivedData/ directory. They never patch source, project, configuration, or entitlement files.

just clean removes only .DerivedData/ and .build/. It does not invoke Git or restore tracked files, so uncommitted work is preserved. just test runs the SwiftPM suite and just test-ios runs the iPhone 17 simulator suite.

Localization

  • App localizations live in bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings.
  • Share extension strings are separate in bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Localizable.xcstrings.
  • Prefer keys that describe intent (app_info.features.offline.title) and reuse existing ones where possible.
  • Run xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build to compile-check any localization updates.
S
Description
bluetooth mesh chat, IRC vibes
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