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* Heal peer-ID rotation: rebind link on verified announce, retire ghost When a peer relaunches it rotates its ephemeral peer ID, but a still-open BLE connection kept its stale peripheral/central→peerID binding for the reachability retention window (~45-60s). Until it aged out, the other side showed a duplicate ghost peer and dropped the rotated peer's direct announces as spoofing attempts. Root cause: the ingress guard rejected a direct announce whose claimed sender differed from the link binding before signature verification could ever see it, so the binding could never heal. - Ingress guard: let a mismatched direct announce through, attributed to the claimed sender; REQUEST_SYNC keeps the strict binding check. - Bind sites: raw (pre-verification) announces may only bind unbound links, never rebind bound ones — rebinding now requires the announce handler's signature verification to pass. - On a verified direct announce whose ingress link is bound to a different peer, rebind the link to the announced ID and retire the rotated-away ID immediately (registry + gossip + UI), mirroring handleLeave. - BLELinkStateStore.bindPeripheral: drop the previous peer's reverse mapping on rebind so the retired ID no longer claims the link. Fixes #1387 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Contain forged-directness rebinds: no identity steal, per-link cooldown The announce signature does not authenticate directness (TTL is excluded from signing because relays mutate it), so a bound peer could replay another peer's fresh signed announce with its TTL restored and reach the rotation rebind path. Contain what such a replay can do: - Refuse a rebind when the claimed identity already owns another live link — a replayed announce can no longer steal a connected peer's binding or route its directed traffic to the replaying link. - Allow at most one rebind per link per cooldown window (60s) so two identities cannot fight over a link in a replay flip-flop, with each flip retiring the other peer. A replay against an identity with no live link remains possible, but that capability already exists today on unbound links, where any raw direct announce binds pre-verification. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
187 lines
6.7 KiB
Swift
187 lines
6.7 KiB
Swift
import BitFoundation
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import Foundation
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import Testing
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@testable import bitchat
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@Suite("BLE ingress packet guard tests")
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struct BLEIngressPacketGuardTests {
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@Test("valid packets return the received and validation peer context")
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func validPacketsReturnContext() throws {
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let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
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let bound = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let sender = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
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let packet = makePacket(sender: sender, timestamp: 1_000)
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let context = try #require(success(BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
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packet: packet,
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claimedSenderID: sender,
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boundPeerID: bound,
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localPeerID: local,
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directAnnounceTTL: 7,
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nowMs: 1_000,
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isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
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)))
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#expect(context.receivedFromPeerID == bound)
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#expect(context.validationPeerID == sender)
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}
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@Test("self loopback and request-sync spoofing are rejected before timestamp checks")
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func linkBindingRejectionsWinBeforeTimestampChecks() {
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let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
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let bound = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let claimed = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
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let selfPacket = makePacket(sender: local, timestamp: 0)
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let spoofedRequestSync = makePacket(type: .requestSync, sender: claimed, timestamp: 0, ttl: 0)
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let selfResult = BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
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packet: selfPacket,
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claimedSenderID: local,
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boundPeerID: bound,
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localPeerID: local,
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directAnnounceTTL: 7,
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nowMs: 1_000_000,
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isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
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)
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let spoofResult = BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
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packet: spoofedRequestSync,
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claimedSenderID: claimed,
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boundPeerID: bound,
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localPeerID: local,
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directAnnounceTTL: 7,
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nowMs: 1_000_000,
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isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
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)
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#expect(selfResult == .failure(.selfLoopback(packetType: MessageType.message.rawValue)))
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#expect(spoofResult == .failure(.directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: bound, claimedSenderID: claimed)))
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}
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@Test("direct announce with a mismatched binding flows through to normal validation")
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func directAnnounceMismatchStillValidatesTimestamp() throws {
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// Rotation heal path: the announce passes the binding check attributed
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// to the claimed sender, but stays subject to timestamp validation.
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let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
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let bound = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let claimed = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
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let freshAnnounce = makePacket(type: .announce, sender: claimed, timestamp: 1_000_000, ttl: 7)
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let staleAnnounce = makePacket(type: .announce, sender: claimed, timestamp: 0, ttl: 7)
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let freshContext = try #require(success(BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
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packet: freshAnnounce,
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claimedSenderID: claimed,
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boundPeerID: bound,
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localPeerID: local,
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directAnnounceTTL: 7,
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nowMs: 1_000_000,
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isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
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)))
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let staleResult = BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
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packet: staleAnnounce,
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claimedSenderID: claimed,
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boundPeerID: bound,
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localPeerID: local,
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directAnnounceTTL: 7,
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nowMs: 1_000_000,
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isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
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)
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#expect(freshContext.receivedFromPeerID == claimed)
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#expect(freshContext.validationPeerID == claimed)
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#expect(staleResult == .failure(.timestampSkew(
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peerID: claimed,
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skewMs: 1_000_000,
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maxSkewMs: 120_000
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)))
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}
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@Test("timestamp skew outside the window is rejected")
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func timestampSkewIsRejected() {
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let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
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let sender = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let packet = makePacket(sender: sender, timestamp: 1_000)
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let result = BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
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packet: packet,
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claimedSenderID: sender,
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boundPeerID: nil,
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localPeerID: local,
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directAnnounceTTL: 7,
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nowMs: 200_000,
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maxTimestampSkewMs: 120_000,
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isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
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)
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#expect(result == .failure(.timestampSkew(
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peerID: sender,
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skewMs: 199_000,
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maxSkewMs: 120_000
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)))
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}
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@Test("valid RSR packets use bound peer validation and bypass timestamp skew")
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func validRSRUsesBoundPeerAndBypassesTimestamp() throws {
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let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
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let bound = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let sender = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
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var packet = makePacket(sender: sender, timestamp: 1)
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packet.isRSR = true
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let context = try #require(success(BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
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packet: packet,
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claimedSenderID: sender,
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boundPeerID: bound,
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localPeerID: local,
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directAnnounceTTL: 7,
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nowMs: 1_000_000,
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isValidSyncResponse: { $0 == bound }
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)))
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#expect(context.receivedFromPeerID == bound)
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#expect(context.validationPeerID == bound)
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}
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@Test("invalid RSR packets are rejected")
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func invalidRSRIsRejected() {
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let local = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
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let bound = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let sender = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
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var packet = makePacket(sender: sender, timestamp: 1)
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packet.isRSR = true
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let result = BLEIngressPacketGuard.evaluate(
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packet: packet,
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claimedSenderID: sender,
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boundPeerID: bound,
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localPeerID: local,
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directAnnounceTTL: 7,
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nowMs: 1_000_000,
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isValidSyncResponse: { _ in false }
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)
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#expect(result == .failure(.invalidRSR(peerID: bound)))
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}
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private func makePacket(
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type: MessageType = .message,
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sender: PeerID,
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timestamp: UInt64,
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ttl: UInt8 = 3
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) -> BitchatPacket {
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BitchatPacket(
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type: type.rawValue,
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senderID: Data(hexString: sender.id) ?? Data(),
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recipientID: nil,
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timestamp: timestamp,
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payload: Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03]),
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signature: nil,
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ttl: ttl
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)
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}
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private func success(_ result: Result<BLEIngressPacketContext, BLEIngressPacketGuard.Rejection>) -> BLEIngressPacketContext? {
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guard case .success(let context) = result else { return nil }
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return context
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}
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}
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