Files
bitchat/bitchat/Identity/IdentityModels.swift
T
96c6fc0c0d Improve mesh relaying, presence, and DM robustness; signed public msgs; reachability UI; quicker announces; store-and-forward (#527)
* Sign public broadcasts; verify relayed messages via persisted signing keys; keep scheduled relays in sparse graphs and speed their jitter; persist announce signing key for offline auth; add short backoff after disconnect errors to reduce reconnect thrash

* Add connected vs reachable model: retain peers after link drop, expire after reachability window; expose all peers in snapshots; compute isReachable in UI; add meshReachable state and sorting; avoid removing peers on link events; notify UI on stale removals

* ContentView: handle new .meshReachable connection state in header icon switch (exhaustive switch fix)

* Logs: tag relayed announces as 'Reachable via mesh' and annotate public message logs with (direct|mesh) path for easier field analysis

* Fix syntax error: remove stray else/log inserted into writeOrEnqueue; keep logs clean

* UI: use 'point.3.connected.trianglepath.dotted' for mesh-reachable; change people count to include connected+reachable (exclude Nostr-only)

* UI: switch to 'point.3.filled.connected.trianglepath.dotted' for mesh-reachable icons in list and header

* Reachability: reduce retention to 21s for all peers (verified and unverified) to minimize stale presence

* mesh DMs/acks: route to reachable peers; queue READ/DELIVERED until handshake; add Transport.isPeerReachable; UI: hide offline non-mutuals; DM header: better name fallback + show transport + encryption icons; fix NostrTransport conformance

* Verification sheet: compute encryption status and fingerprint using short mesh ID mapping (fix 'not encrypted/handshake' for DMs with stable key)

* Announce cadence: faster discovery (4s), sparse 15±4s, dense 30±8s; initial 0.6s; post-subscribe 50ms; min-force 150ms; maintenance 5s; proactive announces on handshake + recent-traffic nudge

* Relay: increase broadcast TTL cap in sparse graphs to 6; tighten jitter for handshake (10–35ms) and directed (20–60ms) relays

* Range/robustness: store-and-forward for directed packets (15s) with flush on new links + periodic; announces: no subset + afterglow re-announce on first-seen; adaptive scanning: force ON when <=2 neighbors or recent traffic

* Fix warnings: remove unused msgID and unused mutable var in directed spool flush

* Announces: TTL 7 (sparse only) via RelayController; no fanout subset for announces; neighbor-change rebroadcast of last 2–3 announces. Fragments: faster pacing (5ms global, 4ms directed).

* Peer list: real-time icon updates by publishing snapshots on connectivity checks; add unread message indicator (envelope) next to peers with unread DMs

* UI: unread envelope uses orange; hasUnreadMessages checks Nostr conv key for peers with known Nostr pubkeys (geohash DM consistency)

* Logs/robustness: debounce disconnect notifications (1.5s), debounce 'reconnected' logs (2s), add weak-link cooldown after timeouts on very weak RSSI (<= -90)

* Peer icons: faster, accurate reachability\n\n- Run connectivity checks every maintenance tick (5s)\n- Publish peer snapshots on central unsubscribe for instant UI refresh\n- Lower inactivity timeout to 8s and disconnect debounce to 0.9s\n- Gate reachability on mesh-attached (>=1 direct link); no links => no reachable peers\n- Keep 21s retention for verified/unverified, but only when attached to mesh\n\nImproves list responsiveness when walking out of range and prevents stale 'reachable' states when isolated.

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Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-08-26 17:28:08 +02:00

182 lines
5.9 KiB
Swift

//
// IdentityModels.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
///
/// # IdentityModels
///
/// Defines BitChat's innovative three-layer identity model that balances
/// privacy, security, and usability in a decentralized mesh network.
///
/// ## Overview
/// BitChat's identity system separates concerns across three distinct layers:
/// 1. **Ephemeral Identity**: Short-lived, rotatable peer IDs for privacy
/// 2. **Cryptographic Identity**: Long-term Noise static keys for security
/// 3. **Social Identity**: User-assigned names and trust relationships
///
/// This separation allows users to maintain stable cryptographic identities
/// while frequently rotating their network identifiers for privacy.
///
/// ## Three-Layer Architecture
///
/// ### Layer 1: Ephemeral Identity
/// - Random 8-byte peer IDs that rotate periodically
/// - Provides network-level privacy and prevents tracking
/// - Changes don't affect cryptographic relationships
/// - Includes handshake state tracking
///
/// ### Layer 2: Cryptographic Identity
/// - Based on Noise Protocol static key pairs
/// - Fingerprint derived from SHA256 of public key
/// - Enables end-to-end encryption and authentication
/// - Persists across peer ID rotations
///
/// ### Layer 3: Social Identity
/// - User-assigned names (petnames) for contacts
/// - Trust levels from unknown to verified
/// - Favorite/blocked status
/// - Personal notes and metadata
///
/// ## Privacy Design
/// The model is designed with privacy-first principles:
/// - No mandatory persistent storage
/// - Optional identity caching with user consent
/// - Ephemeral IDs prevent long-term tracking
/// - Social mappings stored locally only
///
/// ## Trust Model
/// Four levels of trust:
/// 1. **Unknown**: New or unverified peers
/// 2. **Casual**: Basic interaction history
/// 3. **Trusted**: User has explicitly trusted
/// 4. **Verified**: Cryptographic verification completed
///
/// ## Identity Resolution
/// When a peer rotates their ephemeral ID:
/// 1. Cryptographic handshake reveals their fingerprint
/// 2. System looks up social identity by fingerprint
/// 3. UI seamlessly maintains user relationships
/// 4. Historical messages remain properly attributed
///
/// ## Conflict Resolution
/// Handles edge cases like:
/// - Multiple peers claiming same nickname
/// - Nickname changes and conflicts
/// - Identity rotation during active chats
/// - Network partitions and rejoins
///
/// ## Usage Example
/// ```swift
/// // When peer connects with new ID
/// let ephemeral = EphemeralIdentity(peerID: "abc123", ...)
/// // After handshake
/// let crypto = CryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: "sha256...", ...)
/// // User assigns name
/// let social = SocialIdentity(localPetname: "Alice", ...)
/// ```
///
import Foundation
// MARK: - Three-Layer Identity Model
/// Represents the ephemeral layer of identity - short-lived peer IDs that provide network privacy.
/// These IDs rotate periodically to prevent tracking while maintaining cryptographic relationships.
struct EphemeralIdentity {
let peerID: String // 8 random bytes
let sessionStart: Date
var handshakeState: HandshakeState
}
enum HandshakeState {
case none
case initiated
case inProgress
case completed(fingerprint: String)
case failed(reason: String)
}
/// Represents the cryptographic layer of identity - the stable Noise Protocol static key pair.
/// This identity persists across ephemeral ID rotations and enables secure communication.
/// The fingerprint serves as the permanent identifier for a peer's cryptographic identity.
struct CryptographicIdentity: Codable {
let fingerprint: String // SHA256 of public key
let publicKey: Data // Noise static public key
// Optional Ed25519 signing public key (used to authenticate public messages)
var signingPublicKey: Data? = nil
let firstSeen: Date
let lastHandshake: Date?
}
/// Represents the social layer of identity - user-assigned names and trust relationships.
/// This layer provides human-friendly identification and relationship management.
/// All data in this layer is local-only and never transmitted over the network.
struct SocialIdentity: Codable {
let fingerprint: String
var localPetname: String? // User's name for this peer
var claimedNickname: String // What peer calls themselves
var trustLevel: TrustLevel
var isFavorite: Bool
var isBlocked: Bool
var notes: String?
}
enum TrustLevel: String, Codable {
case unknown = "unknown"
case casual = "casual"
case trusted = "trusted"
case verified = "verified"
}
// MARK: - Identity Cache
/// Persistent storage for identity mappings and relationships.
/// Provides efficient lookup between fingerprints, nicknames, and social identities.
/// Storage is optional and controlled by user privacy settings.
struct IdentityCache: Codable {
// Fingerprint -> Social mapping
var socialIdentities: [String: SocialIdentity] = [:]
// Nickname -> [Fingerprints] reverse index
// Multiple fingerprints can claim same nickname
var nicknameIndex: [String: Set<String>] = [:]
// Verified fingerprints (cryptographic proof)
var verifiedFingerprints: Set<String> = []
// Last interaction timestamps (privacy: optional)
var lastInteractions: [String: Date] = [:]
// Blocked Nostr pubkeys (lowercased hex) for geohash chats
var blockedNostrPubkeys: Set<String> = []
// Schema version for future migrations
var version: Int = 1
}
// MARK: - Identity Resolution
enum IdentityHint {
case unknown
case likelyKnown(fingerprint: String)
case ambiguous(candidates: Set<String>)
case verified(fingerprint: String)
}
// MARK: - Pending Actions
struct PendingActions {
var toggleFavorite: Bool?
var setTrustLevel: TrustLevel?
var setPetname: String?
}
//
// MARK: - Migration Support
//