mirror of
https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
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jackandGitHub
820c933958
Centralize PTT and voice audio-session ownership, harden courier/bridge/outbox delivery and recovery, correct location and delivery-state races, add privacy/release metadata, and ship reproducible universal Arti slices with Release CI coverage. Validated by the full iOS suite, repeated audio/fragment/performance regressions, BitFoundation tests, strict lint and dead-code analysis, universal iOS Release builds, and iOS/macOS archives.
727 lines
31 KiB
Swift
727 lines
31 KiB
Swift
//
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// BLEServiceCoreTests.swift
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// bitchatTests
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//
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// Focused BLEService tests for packet handling behavior.
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//
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import Testing
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import Foundation
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import CoreBluetooth
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import BitFoundation
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@testable import bitchat
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struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
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@Test
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func duplicatePacket_isDeduped() async throws {
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let ble = makeService()
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let delegate = PublicCaptureDelegate()
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ble.delegate = delegate
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// Public messages must carry a valid signature from the claimed sender;
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// sign the packet and preseed the sender's signing key so the receiver
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// can verify it (production `sendMessage` signs public broadcasts too).
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let signer = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let sender = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let timestamp = UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
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let unsigned = makePublicPacket(content: "Hello", sender: sender, timestamp: timestamp)
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let packet = try #require(signer.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign public message")
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let signingKey = signer.getSigningPublicKeyData()
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ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender, signingPublicKey: signingKey)
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let receivedFirst = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{ delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().count == 1 },
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timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
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)
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#expect(receivedFirst)
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ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender, signingPublicKey: signingKey)
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let receivedDuplicate = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{ delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().count > 1 },
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timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout
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)
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#expect(!receivedDuplicate)
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let messages = delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot()
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#expect(messages.count == 1)
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#expect(messages.first?.content == "Hello")
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}
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@Test
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func staleBroadcast_isIgnored() async {
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let ble = makeService()
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let delegate = PublicCaptureDelegate()
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ble.delegate = delegate
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let sender = PeerID(str: "A1B2C3D4E5F60708")
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let oldTimestamp = UInt64(Date().addingTimeInterval(-901).timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
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let packet = makePublicPacket(content: "Old", sender: sender, timestamp: oldTimestamp)
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ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender)
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let didReceive = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ !delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().isEmpty }, timeout: 0.3)
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#expect(!didReceive)
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#expect(delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().isEmpty)
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}
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@Test
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func announceSenderMismatch_isRejected() async throws {
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let ble = makeService()
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let signer = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
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nickname: "Spoof",
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noisePublicKey: signer.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
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signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
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directNeighbors: nil
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)
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let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
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let derivedPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
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let wrongFirst = derivedPeerID.bare.first == "0" ? "1" : "0"
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let wrongBare = String(wrongFirst) + String(derivedPeerID.bare.dropFirst())
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let wrongPeerID = PeerID(str: wrongBare)
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let packet = BitchatPacket(
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type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
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senderID: Data(hexString: wrongPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
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recipientID: nil,
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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payload: payload,
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signature: nil,
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ttl: 7
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)
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let signed = try #require(signer.signPacket(packet), "Failed to sign announce packet")
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ble._test_handlePacket(signed, fromPeerID: wrongPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
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_ = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ !ble.currentPeerSnapshots().isEmpty }, timeout: 0.3)
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#expect(ble.currentPeerSnapshots().isEmpty)
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}
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@Test
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func ingressAllowsRelayedSenderOnBoundLink() async throws {
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let ble = makeService()
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let boundPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let relayedSender = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
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let packet = makePublicPacket(
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content: "Relayed",
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sender: relayedSender,
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
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)
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#expect(ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: boundPeer))
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}
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@Test
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func ingressAllowsDirectAnnounceThatConflictsWithBoundLink() async throws {
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// Peer-ID rotation heal: the announce must reach signature
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// verification, which decides whether the link rebinds.
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let ble = makeService()
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let boundPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let claimedPeer = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
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let packet = BitchatPacket(
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type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
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senderID: Data(hexString: claimedPeer.id) ?? Data(),
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recipientID: nil,
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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payload: Data(),
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signature: nil,
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ttl: 7
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)
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#expect(ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: boundPeer))
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}
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@Test
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func ingressRejectsRequestSyncThatConflictsWithBoundLink() async throws {
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let ble = makeService()
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let boundPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let claimedPeer = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
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let packet = BitchatPacket(
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type: MessageType.requestSync.rawValue,
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senderID: Data(hexString: claimedPeer.id) ?? Data(),
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recipientID: nil,
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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payload: Data(),
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signature: nil,
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ttl: 0
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)
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#expect(!ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: boundPeer))
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}
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@Test
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func verifiedDirectAnnounceRebindsRotatedLinkAndRetiresOldPeer() async throws {
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let ble = makeService()
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let oldPeerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let centralUUID = "central-rotation"
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// A connected peer whose link binding predates its relaunch.
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ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(oldPeerID, nickname: "alice")
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ble._test_bindCentral(centralUUID, to: oldPeerID)
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// The relaunched device re-announces its rotated identity over the
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// still-open link.
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let signer = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
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nickname: "alice",
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noisePublicKey: signer.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
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signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
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directNeighbors: nil
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)
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let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
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let newPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
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let unsigned = BitchatPacket(
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type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
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senderID: Data(hexString: newPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
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recipientID: nil,
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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payload: payload,
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signature: nil,
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ttl: 7
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)
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let packet = try #require(signer.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign announce packet")
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#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: centralUUID))
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ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: newPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
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let rebound = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{ ble._test_centralBinding(centralUUID) == newPeerID },
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timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
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)
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#expect(rebound)
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let retired = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{
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let peerIDs = ble.currentPeerSnapshots().map(\.peerID)
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return peerIDs.contains(newPeerID) && !peerIDs.contains(oldPeerID)
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},
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timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
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)
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#expect(retired)
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}
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@Test
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func replayedDirectAnnounceCannotStealBoundIdentity() async throws {
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let ble = makeService()
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let attackerPeerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let victimLink = "central-victim"
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let attackerLink = "central-attacker"
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// The victim's identity, genuinely bound on its own link.
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let victimSigner = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
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nickname: "victim",
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noisePublicKey: victimSigner.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
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signingPublicKey: victimSigner.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
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directNeighbors: nil
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)
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let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
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let victimPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
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let courierStore = CourierStore(persistsToDisk: false)
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ble.courierStore = courierStore
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let carriedEnvelope = CourierEnvelope(
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recipientTag: CourierEnvelope.recipientTag(
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noiseStaticKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
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epochDay: CourierEnvelope.epochDay(for: Date())
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),
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expiry: UInt64(Date().addingTimeInterval(3600).timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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ciphertext: Data(repeating: 0xA5, count: 128)
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)
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#expect(courierStore.deposit(
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carriedEnvelope,
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from: Data(repeating: 0xC0, count: 32),
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tier: .favorite
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))
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let sprayRecipientKey = Data(repeating: 0xB4, count: 32)
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let sprayEnvelope = CourierEnvelope(
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recipientTag: CourierEnvelope.recipientTag(
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noiseStaticKey: sprayRecipientKey,
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epochDay: CourierEnvelope.epochDay(for: Date())
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),
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expiry: UInt64(Date().addingTimeInterval(3600).timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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ciphertext: Data(repeating: 0xB5, count: 128),
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copies: 4
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)
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#expect(courierStore.deposit(
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sprayEnvelope,
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from: Data(repeating: 0xC0, count: 32),
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tier: .favorite
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))
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ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(victimPeerID, nickname: "victim")
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ble._test_bindCentral(victimLink, to: victimPeerID)
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ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(attackerPeerID, nickname: "attacker")
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ble._test_bindCentral(attackerLink, to: attackerPeerID)
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// Preserve the hard case: a valid victim session still exists on the
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// victim's own physical link when the announce is replayed elsewhere.
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let message1 = try ble._test_noiseInitiateHandshake(with: victimPeerID)
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let message2 = try #require(
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try victimSigner.processHandshakeMessage(from: ble.myPeerID, message: message1)
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)
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let message3 = try #require(
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try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(from: victimPeerID, message: message2)
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)
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_ = try victimSigner.processHandshakeMessage(from: ble.myPeerID, message: message3)
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#expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
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ble._test_markNoiseAuthenticatedCentral(victimLink, to: victimPeerID)
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// The victim's fresh signed announce replayed on the attacker's bound
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// link with its direct TTL restored (TTL is excluded from signing, so
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// the signature still verifies).
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let unsigned = BitchatPacket(
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type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
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senderID: Data(hexString: victimPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
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recipientID: nil,
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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payload: payload,
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signature: nil,
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ttl: 7
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)
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let packet = try #require(victimSigner.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign announce packet")
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#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: attackerLink))
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ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: victimPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
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// The rebind must be refused: the identity already owns a live link.
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let stolen = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{ ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == victimPeerID },
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timeout: 0.3
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)
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#expect(!stolen)
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#expect(ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == attackerPeerID)
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#expect(ble._test_centralBinding(victimLink) == victimPeerID)
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// A valid signature authenticates the announce contents, not the
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// unsigned direct TTL. Without a Noise-authenticated session on the
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// ingress link, the replay must not retire mail or consume spray state.
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#expect(!courierStore.isEmpty)
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await Task.yield()
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await Task.yield()
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let stillEligibleForSpray = courierStore.takeSprayCopies(for: announcement.noisePublicKey)
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#expect(stillEligibleForSpray.map(\.copies) == [2])
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#expect(courierStore.takeEnvelopes(for: announcement.noisePublicKey) == [carriedEnvelope])
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#expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
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// And the replay must not retire the link's real bound peer.
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#expect(ble.currentPeerSnapshots().map(\.peerID).contains(attackerPeerID))
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}
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@Test
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func replayedDirectAnnounceForAbsentPeerNeverYieldsSecureDelivery() async throws {
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// Residual heal-path gap: the victim has NO live link, so the
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// identity-owns-a-link containment cannot refuse the rebind. The
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// replay steals the link binding, and because a successful rebind
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// promotes its new owner to connected (a legitimate rotation heal
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// requires that), the absent victim may read as connected. That
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// forged presence is display-only and accepted — the invariant that
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// holds is that the stolen link can never produce an established
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// Noise session, so MessageRouter's canDeliverSecurely gate routes
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// DMs through retain + courier instead of trusting it outright.
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let ble = makeService()
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let attackerPeerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let attackerLink = "central-attacker-absent-victim"
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ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(attackerPeerID, nickname: "attacker")
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ble._test_bindCentral(attackerLink, to: attackerPeerID)
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// The absent victim's fresh signed announce, replayed on the
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// attacker's bound link with its direct TTL restored.
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let victimSigner = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
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nickname: "victim",
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noisePublicKey: victimSigner.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
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signingPublicKey: victimSigner.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
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directNeighbors: nil
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)
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let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
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let victimPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
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let unsigned = BitchatPacket(
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type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
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senderID: Data(hexString: victimPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
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recipientID: nil,
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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payload: payload,
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signature: nil,
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ttl: 7
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)
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let packet = try #require(victimSigner.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign announce packet")
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#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: attackerLink))
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ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: victimPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
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// The rebind steals the link (no live link owns the victim's
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// identity, so containment cannot refuse) …
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let rebound = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{ ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == victimPeerID },
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timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
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)
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#expect(rebound)
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// … and the promote marks the absent victim connected: the accepted,
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// display-only forged-presence residue (documented at
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// BLEAnnounceHandler's linkBoundToOtherPeer check) …
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let forgedPresence = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{ ble.isPeerConnected(victimPeerID) },
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timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
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)
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#expect(forgedPresence)
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// … but secure delivery stays impossible — the DM gate holds, and
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// MessageRouter retains + couriers instead of trusting the link.
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#expect(!ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
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}
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@Test
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func replayedDirectAnnounceWithStaleVictimSessionCannotBridgeThroughForeignLink() async throws {
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let ble = makeService()
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// Keep announce handling out of the carried-mail path: the regression
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// is specifically BridgeCourierService's direct delivery preflight.
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ble.courierStore = CourierStore(persistsToDisk: false)
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let attackerPeerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let attackerLink = "central-attacker-stale-victim-session"
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ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(attackerPeerID, nickname: "attacker")
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ble._test_bindCentral(attackerLink, to: attackerPeerID)
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let victim = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
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nickname: "victim",
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noisePublicKey: victim.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
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signingPublicKey: victim.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
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directNeighbors: nil
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)
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let victimPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
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// Establish a real peer-level victim session without associating it
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// with the attacker's physical link. This is the stale-session case
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// that a plain `canDeliverSecurely` check cannot distinguish.
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let message1 = try ble._test_noiseInitiateHandshake(with: victimPeerID)
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let message2 = try #require(
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try victim.processHandshakeMessage(from: ble.myPeerID, message: message1)
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)
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let message3 = try #require(
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try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(from: victimPeerID, message: message2)
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)
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_ = try victim.processHandshakeMessage(from: ble.myPeerID, message: message3)
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#expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
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let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
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let unsigned = BitchatPacket(
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type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
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senderID: Data(hexString: victimPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
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recipientID: nil,
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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payload: payload,
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signature: nil,
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ttl: 7
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)
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let replay = try #require(victim.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign replayed announce")
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#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: replay, linkID: attackerLink))
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ble._test_handlePacket(replay, fromPeerID: victimPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
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let rebound = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{ ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == victimPeerID },
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timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
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)
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#expect(rebound)
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#expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
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let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
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ble._test_onOutboundPacket = { outbound.record($0) }
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let envelope = CourierEnvelope(
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recipientTag: CourierEnvelope.recipientTag(
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noiseStaticKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
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epochDay: CourierEnvelope.epochDay(for: Date())
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),
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expiry: UInt64(Date().addingTimeInterval(3600).timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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ciphertext: Data(repeating: 0xA5, count: 128)
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)
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#expect(!ble.deliverBridgedEnvelope(envelope, to: victimPeerID))
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// Reject before even entering the outbound pipeline: otherwise a
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// real attacker CBCentral could accept the opaque courier packet and
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// cause the relay drop's persisted seen ID to be consumed forever.
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#expect(outbound.count(ofType: .courierEnvelope) == 0)
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}
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/// A legitimate rotation announce necessarily arrives on a link still
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/// bound to the OLD ID, so its registry upsert stores the new peer
|
|
/// disconnected. The successful rebind must promote it: a healed
|
|
/// rotation with a live link has to read as connected again for routing
|
|
/// and outbox flushes.
|
|
@Test
|
|
func rotationHealPromotesRotatedPeerToConnected() async throws {
|
|
let ble = makeService()
|
|
let oldPeerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
|
|
let centralUUID = "central-rotation-promote"
|
|
|
|
ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(oldPeerID, nickname: "alice")
|
|
ble._test_bindCentral(centralUUID, to: oldPeerID)
|
|
|
|
let signer = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
|
|
let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
|
|
nickname: "alice",
|
|
noisePublicKey: signer.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
|
|
signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
|
|
directNeighbors: nil
|
|
)
|
|
let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
|
|
let newPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
|
|
let unsigned = BitchatPacket(
|
|
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
|
|
senderID: Data(hexString: newPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
|
|
recipientID: nil,
|
|
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
|
|
payload: payload,
|
|
signature: nil,
|
|
ttl: 7
|
|
)
|
|
let packet = try #require(signer.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign announce packet")
|
|
|
|
#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: centralUUID))
|
|
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: newPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
|
|
|
|
let rebound = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
|
|
{ ble._test_centralBinding(centralUUID) == newPeerID },
|
|
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
|
|
)
|
|
#expect(rebound)
|
|
|
|
let connected = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
|
|
{ ble.isPeerConnected(newPeerID) },
|
|
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
|
|
)
|
|
#expect(connected)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Noise sessions are keyed by the short wire ID, but routers may key
|
|
/// sends by the full 64-hex Noise key (favorites resolution does). The
|
|
/// secure-delivery gate must normalize like isPeerConnected, or an
|
|
/// established session is misread as insecure and every DM needlessly
|
|
/// retains + couriers until an ack.
|
|
@Test
|
|
func canDeliverSecurelyNormalizesFullNoiseKeyPeerIDs() async throws {
|
|
let ble = makeService()
|
|
let remote = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
|
|
let remoteKey = remote.getStaticPublicKeyData()
|
|
let shortID = PeerID(publicKey: remoteKey)
|
|
let fullKeyID = PeerID(hexData: remoteKey)
|
|
#expect(fullKeyID.toShort() == shortID)
|
|
#expect(!ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: shortID))
|
|
|
|
// Full XX handshake; the local side keys the session by the short
|
|
// wire ID, exactly as packets present it in production.
|
|
let m1 = try ble._test_noiseInitiateHandshake(with: shortID)
|
|
let m2 = try #require(try remote.processHandshakeMessage(from: ble.myPeerID, message: m1))
|
|
let m3 = try #require(try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(from: shortID, message: m2))
|
|
_ = try remote.processHandshakeMessage(from: ble.myPeerID, message: m3)
|
|
|
|
#expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: shortID))
|
|
#expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: fullKeyID))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func ingressRejectsSelfLoopbackBeforeSpoofChecks() async throws {
|
|
let ble = makeService()
|
|
let packet = makePublicPacket(
|
|
content: "Loopback",
|
|
sender: ble.myPeerID,
|
|
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
#expect(!ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func ingressAllowsSelfAuthoredRSRWithTTLZeroFromBoundPeer() async throws {
|
|
let ble = makeService()
|
|
var packet = makePublicPacket(
|
|
content: "Recovered by sync",
|
|
sender: ble.myPeerID,
|
|
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
|
|
)
|
|
packet.isRSR = true
|
|
packet.ttl = 0
|
|
|
|
#expect(ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func ingressRecordSuppressesSecondLinkDuplicate() async throws {
|
|
let ble = makeService()
|
|
let packet = makePublicPacket(
|
|
content: "Duplicate link copy",
|
|
sender: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788"),
|
|
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: "central-a"))
|
|
#expect(!ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: "central-b"))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func panicReset_rotatesPeerIDDerivedFromNewNoiseFingerprint() async throws {
|
|
let ble = makeService()
|
|
let originalPeerID = ble.myPeerID
|
|
let originalFingerprint = ble.noiseIdentityFingerprint()
|
|
#expect(originalPeerID == PeerID(str: originalFingerprint.prefix(16)))
|
|
|
|
ble.resetIdentityForPanic(currentNickname: "anon")
|
|
|
|
// The Noise identity is regenerated and the peer ID swaps with it
|
|
// (atomically, behind a messageQueue barrier).
|
|
let newFingerprint = ble.noiseIdentityFingerprint()
|
|
#expect(newFingerprint != originalFingerprint)
|
|
#expect(ble.myPeerID != originalPeerID)
|
|
#expect(ble.myPeerID == PeerID(str: newFingerprint.prefix(16)))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func modifiedServices_rediscoverWhenBitChatServiceIsInvalidated() async throws {
|
|
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
|
|
|
|
#expect(BLEService._test_shouldRediscoverBitChatService(
|
|
invalidatedServiceUUIDs: [BLEService.serviceUUID],
|
|
cachedServiceUUIDs: [otherService]
|
|
))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func modifiedServices_rediscoverWhenCachedServicesNoLongerIncludeBitChat() async throws {
|
|
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
|
|
|
|
#expect(BLEService._test_shouldRediscoverBitChatService(
|
|
invalidatedServiceUUIDs: [otherService],
|
|
cachedServiceUUIDs: [otherService]
|
|
))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func modifiedServices_ignoreUnrelatedInvalidationWhenBitChatIsStillCached() async throws {
|
|
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
|
|
|
|
#expect(!BLEService._test_shouldRediscoverBitChatService(
|
|
invalidatedServiceUUIDs: [otherService],
|
|
cachedServiceUUIDs: [BLEService.serviceUUID, otherService]
|
|
))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Pings are unsigned, so their claimed sender is attacker-controlled.
|
|
/// The pong budget must be keyed on the ingress link (the directly
|
|
/// connected peer that delivered the packet): rotating forged sender IDs
|
|
/// over one link exhausts one budget instead of resetting it, so a single
|
|
/// malicious link cannot turn /ping into an amplification primitive.
|
|
@Test
|
|
func meshPingResponseBudget_isPerIngressLinkNotClaimedSender() async throws {
|
|
let ble = makeService()
|
|
let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
|
|
ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
|
|
|
|
let link = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
|
|
let budget = TransportConfig.meshPingInboundMaxPerLink
|
|
let myRecipientData = try #require(Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id))
|
|
|
|
for i in 0..<(budget * 2) {
|
|
// A fresh forged sender for every ping, all arriving on one link.
|
|
let forgedSender = PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", 0xA0_0000 + i))
|
|
var nonce = Data(repeating: 0, count: MeshPingPayload.nonceLength)
|
|
nonce[0] = UInt8(i)
|
|
let payload = try #require(MeshPingPayload(nonce: nonce, originTTL: 7))
|
|
let packet = BitchatPacket(
|
|
type: MessageType.ping.rawValue,
|
|
senderID: Data(hexString: forgedSender.id) ?? Data(),
|
|
recipientID: myRecipientData,
|
|
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
|
|
payload: payload.encode(),
|
|
signature: nil,
|
|
ttl: 7
|
|
)
|
|
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: link, preseedPeer: false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let reachedBudget = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
|
|
{ outbound.count(ofType: .pong) >= budget },
|
|
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
|
|
)
|
|
#expect(reachedBudget)
|
|
// Give any over-budget pong a chance to surface, then confirm the
|
|
// rotated sender IDs never bought a sixth response.
|
|
let exceededBudget = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
|
|
{ outbound.count(ofType: .pong) > budget },
|
|
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout
|
|
)
|
|
#expect(!exceededBudget)
|
|
#expect(outbound.count(ofType: .pong) == budget)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Thread-safe capture of packets leaving the service under test.
|
|
private final class OutboundPacketTap {
|
|
private let lock = NSLock()
|
|
private var packets: [BitchatPacket] = []
|
|
|
|
func record(_ packet: BitchatPacket) {
|
|
lock.lock(); packets.append(packet); lock.unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func count(ofType type: MessageType) -> Int {
|
|
lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
|
|
return packets.filter { $0.type == type.rawValue }.count
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func makeService() -> BLEService {
|
|
let keychain = MockKeychain()
|
|
let identityManager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
|
|
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: MockKeychainHelper())
|
|
return BLEService(
|
|
keychain: keychain,
|
|
idBridge: idBridge,
|
|
identityManager: identityManager,
|
|
initializeBluetoothManagers: false
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func makePublicPacket(content: String, sender: PeerID, timestamp: UInt64) -> BitchatPacket {
|
|
BitchatPacket(
|
|
type: MessageType.message.rawValue,
|
|
senderID: Data(hexString: sender.id) ?? Data(),
|
|
recipientID: nil,
|
|
timestamp: timestamp,
|
|
payload: Data(content.utf8),
|
|
signature: nil,
|
|
ttl: 3
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private final class PublicCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
|
|
private let lock = NSLock()
|
|
private(set) var publicMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
|
|
|
|
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
|
|
let message = BitchatMessage(
|
|
id: messageID,
|
|
sender: nickname,
|
|
content: content,
|
|
timestamp: timestamp,
|
|
isRelay: false,
|
|
originalSender: nil,
|
|
isPrivate: false,
|
|
recipientNickname: nil,
|
|
senderPeerID: peerID,
|
|
mentions: nil
|
|
)
|
|
lock.lock()
|
|
publicMessages.append(message)
|
|
lock.unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {}
|
|
func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
|
|
func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
|
|
func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {}
|
|
func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState) {}
|
|
|
|
func publicMessagesSnapshot() -> [BitchatMessage] {
|
|
lock.lock()
|
|
defer { lock.unlock() }
|
|
return publicMessages
|
|
}
|
|
}
|