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* Add capability bits to announce TLV Announces now carry an optional capabilities TLV (0x05): a little-endian bitfield with named bits for upcoming features (prekeys, wifiBulk, gateway, groups, board, vouch, meshDiagnostics). Old clients skip the unknown TLV; peers without it decode as nil so features can distinguish "legacy peer" from "advertises nothing". PeerCapabilities lives in BitFoundation with a minimal-length encoding that preserves unknown bits for forward compatibility. Peer capabilities are stored in the BLE peer registry on verified announce and exposed via BLEService.peerCapabilities(_:). The local advertisement set is empty until each feature ships its bit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Prekey bundles: forward-secret async first contact for courier mail Courier envelopes were sealed with one-way Noise X to the recipient's long-lived static key, so a later compromise of that key exposed every envelope captured in transit. This adds one-time prekey bundles: - PrekeyBundle (MessageType 0x24): 8 one-time Curve25519 public prekeys bound to the owner's Noise static key by an Ed25519 signature over "bitchat-prekey-bundle-v1" canonical bytes; gossiped mesh-wide on its own 60s sync round (SyncTypeFlags bit 9, 200-peer cap, 24h freshness) and verified against the announce-bound signing key before caching. - Sealed envelope v2: Noise X where the responder static is the one-time prekey, prologue "bitchat-prekey-v1" || prekeyID. Sender identity rides encrypted inside and is authenticated exactly like v1 (blocked-sender check included). CourierEnvelope gains an optional prekeyID TLV that v1 decoders skip as unknown. - Local prekeys live in the Keychain; consumed privates survive a 48h grace window for spray-and-wait redeliveries, then are deleted (the forward-secrecy clock starts at deletion). The batch tops back up and re-gossips when unconsumed count drops below 3, and everything is wiped in panic mode. - Routing: courier sealing picks a cached verified bundle when one exists (one prekey per message, reused across deposit retries), with the advertised .prekeys capability as a veto for on-mesh peers, and falls back to static sealing otherwise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Prekeys: authenticate bundle packets, fix consume-republish, deflake CI Fixes the prekey-bundle PR review + CI failure: - CI root cause: the receive queue (mesh.message) is concurrent, so a gossiped prekey bundle can be processed before the announce that binds its owner's signing key. The old handler dropped such bundles outright, so under CI parallel load the bundle was permanently lost and the cache/gossip tests flaked (verifiedBundleEntersGossipStore, prekeySealedMailTravelsViaCourierAndOpens). Bundles that arrive before their binding are now retained per-owner (bounded) and re-attempted when the verified announce lands, atomically to avoid a check-then-act race. - Authenticate the OUTER prekey-bundle packet (Codex P2 / review MEDIUM): require senderID == PeerID(bundle.noiseStaticPublicKey) and verify the packet's Ed25519 signature (covers senderID + timestamp) against the owner's bound signing key, in addition to the inner bundle signature. Stops replay under a fresh timestamp / fake senderID. - Key the gossip prekey-bundle store/dedup by the bundle's authenticated identity (noiseStaticPublicKey), not the unauthenticated packet senderID, so one valid bundle sprayed under many fabricated sender IDs can't multiply entries and exhaust the 200-owner cap. - Bump published-bundle generatedAt strictly on consume (Codex P1): consuming a prekey shrinks the published bundle, so it now republishes with a strictly newer generatedAt and re-gossips, so peers replace the cached copy and stop assigning the consumed ID before its 48h grace. - Guard the panic/clear detached Application Support tree-deletes behind TestEnvironment.isRunningTests: the SPM test process shares that tree, so the wipe could land mid-test and flake file-dependent tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update sync tests for prekeyBundle as bit 9 / default sync round Prekeys makes bit 9 (prekeyBundle) a known SyncTypeFlags bit and enables a prekey sync round by default. That broke tests authored by other PRs that assumed bit 9 was phantom or that only their own sync round fires: - SyncTypeFlags(Board)Tests: move the "unknown bits" probes to bits 10+ (0xFE -> 0xFC / 0xFD), since bit 9 is now assigned. - GossipSync(Board)Tests + GossipSyncManagerTests: disable the prekey sync round in configs that run maintenance (as they already do for message/ fragment/fileTransfer), so they isolate the behavior under test. Full app suite (1301 tests) green locally via SPM. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
284 lines
13 KiB
Swift
284 lines
13 KiB
Swift
//
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// NoisePrekeyTests.swift
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// bitchat
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//
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// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
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// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
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//
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import Testing
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import Foundation
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import CryptoKit
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import BitFoundation
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@testable import bitchat
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/// Forward-secret one-way Noise X envelopes sealed to one-time prekeys
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/// instead of the recipient's identity static key.
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struct NoisePrekeyTests {
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@Test func sealAndOpenRoundTrip() throws {
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let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bundle = try #require(bob.currentPrekeyBundle())
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let prekey = try #require(bundle.prekeys.first)
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let payload = Data("meet at the north gate".utf8)
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let sealed = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(payload, recipientPrekey: prekey)
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let opened = try bob.openPrekeyPayload(sealed, prekeyID: prekey.id)
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#expect(opened.payload == payload)
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// The X pattern authenticates the sender: Bob learns Alice's real static key.
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#expect(opened.senderStaticKey == alice.getStaticPublicKeyData())
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}
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@Test func wrongPrekeyIDCannotOpen() throws {
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// The prologue binds the ciphertext to a specific prekey ID; opening
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// with a different (existing) prekey must fail.
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let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bundle = try #require(bob.currentPrekeyBundle())
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#expect(bundle.prekeys.count >= 2)
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let sealed = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(Data("secret".utf8), recipientPrekey: bundle.prekeys[0])
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#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
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_ = try bob.openPrekeyPayload(sealed, prekeyID: bundle.prekeys[1].id)
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}
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}
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@Test func unknownPrekeyIDThrows() throws {
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let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bundle = try #require(bob.currentPrekeyBundle())
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let prekey = try #require(bundle.prekeys.first)
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let sealed = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(Data("secret".utf8), recipientPrekey: prekey)
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#expect(throws: NoiseEncryptionError.unknownPrekey) {
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_ = try bob.openPrekeyPayload(sealed, prekeyID: 0xDEAD_BEEF)
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}
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}
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@Test func wrongRecipientCannotOpen() throws {
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let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let carol = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bobBundle = try #require(bob.currentPrekeyBundle())
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// Ensure Carol holds a prekey under the same ID as Bob's.
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_ = try #require(carol.currentPrekeyBundle())
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let prekey = try #require(bobBundle.prekeys.first)
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let sealed = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(Data("secret".utf8), recipientPrekey: prekey)
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#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
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_ = try carol.openPrekeyPayload(sealed, prekeyID: prekey.id)
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}
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}
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@Test func tamperedCiphertextFailsToOpen() throws {
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let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bundle = try #require(bob.currentPrekeyBundle())
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let prekey = try #require(bundle.prekeys.first)
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var sealed = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(Data("secret".utf8), recipientPrekey: prekey)
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sealed[sealed.count - 1] ^= 0x01
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#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
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_ = try bob.openPrekeyPayload(sealed, prekeyID: prekey.id)
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}
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}
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@Test func consumedPrekeyStillOpensRedeliveredCiphertext() throws {
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// Spray-and-wait can deliver the same ciphertext via several couriers
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// days apart; the consumed private survives a grace window for that.
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let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bundle = try #require(bob.currentPrekeyBundle())
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let prekey = try #require(bundle.prekeys.first)
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let sealed = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(Data("hello".utf8), recipientPrekey: prekey)
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let first = try bob.openPrekeyPayload(sealed, prekeyID: prekey.id)
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let second = try bob.openPrekeyPayload(sealed, prekeyID: prekey.id)
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#expect(first.payload == second.payload)
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}
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@Test func prekeyAndStaticSealsAreNotInterchangeable() throws {
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// Domain-separated prologues: a static-sealed envelope must not open
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// via the prekey path and vice versa, even with matching key material.
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let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bundle = try #require(bob.currentPrekeyBundle())
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let prekey = try #require(bundle.prekeys.first)
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let staticSealed = try alice.sealCourierPayload(Data("x".utf8), recipientStaticKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
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#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
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_ = try bob.openPrekeyPayload(staticSealed, prekeyID: prekey.id)
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}
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let prekeySealed = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(Data("x".utf8), recipientPrekey: prekey)
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#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
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_ = try bob.openCourierPayload(prekeySealed)
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}
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}
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@Test func sealRejectsInvalidPrekeyPublicKey() {
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let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
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_ = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(Data("x".utf8), recipientPrekey: PrekeyBundle.Prekey(id: 1, publicKey: Data(repeating: 0, count: 32)))
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}
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#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
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_ = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(Data("x".utf8), recipientPrekey: PrekeyBundle.Prekey(id: 1, publicKey: Data(repeating: 1, count: 8)))
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}
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}
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@Test func sealsAreNotLinkableAcrossSends() throws {
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// Fresh ephemeral per seal even to the same prekey.
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let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
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let bundle = try #require(bob.currentPrekeyBundle())
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let prekey = try #require(bundle.prekeys.first)
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let payload = Data("same message".utf8)
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let a = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(payload, recipientPrekey: prekey)
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let b = try alice.sealPrekeyPayload(payload, recipientPrekey: prekey)
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#expect(a != b)
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#expect(a.prefix(32) != b.prefix(32))
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}
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}
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/// Local one-time prekey lifecycle: batch generation, consumption, the 48h
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/// redelivery grace window, replenishment, and the panic wipe.
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struct LocalPrekeyStoreTests {
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private final class Clock {
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var now: Date
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init(_ now: Date = Date()) { self.now = now }
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}
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private func makeStore(clock: Clock, keychain: MockKeychain = MockKeychain()) -> LocalPrekeyStore {
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LocalPrekeyStore(keychain: keychain, now: { clock.now })
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}
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private func bundle(noiseKey: Data, prekeys: [PrekeyBundle.Prekey], generatedAt: UInt64) -> PrekeyBundle {
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PrekeyBundle(
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noiseStaticPublicKey: noiseKey,
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prekeys: prekeys,
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generatedAt: generatedAt,
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signature: Data(count: PrekeyBundle.signatureLength)
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)
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}
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@Test func mintsFullBatchOnFirstUse() {
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let store = makeStore(clock: Clock())
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let (prekeys, generatedAt) = store.currentBundlePrekeys()
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#expect(prekeys.count == LocalPrekeyStore.Policy.batchSize)
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#expect(generatedAt > 0)
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#expect(Set(prekeys.map(\.id)).count == prekeys.count)
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}
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@Test func consumptionBelowThresholdTriggersReplenishAndBumpsGeneration() {
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let clock = Clock()
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let store = makeStore(clock: clock)
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let (initial, firstGeneratedAt) = store.currentBundlePrekeys()
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// Consuming down to the threshold does not regenerate...
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let keepUnconsumed = LocalPrekeyStore.Policy.replenishThreshold
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for prekey in initial.dropLast(keepUnconsumed) {
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store.markConsumed(prekey.id)
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}
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#expect(!store.replenishIfNeeded())
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#expect(store.unconsumedCount == keepUnconsumed)
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// ...one more consumption does, topping back up to a full batch with
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// a newer generation stamp.
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clock.now = clock.now.addingTimeInterval(60)
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store.markConsumed(initial[initial.count - keepUnconsumed].id)
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#expect(store.replenishIfNeeded())
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let (replenished, secondGeneratedAt) = store.currentBundlePrekeys()
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#expect(replenished.count == LocalPrekeyStore.Policy.batchSize)
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#expect(secondGeneratedAt > firstGeneratedAt)
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// Surviving unconsumed prekeys stay in the fresh bundle.
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let survivorIDs = Set(initial.suffix(keepUnconsumed - 1).map(\.id))
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#expect(survivorIDs.isSubset(of: Set(replenished.map(\.id))))
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}
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@Test func consumingAPrekeyRepublishesANewerBundlePeersAccept() {
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// Codex P1: consuming a prekey (even above the replenish threshold)
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// must republish a strictly newer bundle so a peer that cached the old
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// one replaces it and stops assigning the consumed ID before its 48h
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// grace lapses.
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let clock = Clock()
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let store = makeStore(clock: clock)
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let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xC0, count: 32)
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// Owner publishes; a peer caches it and would assign the first prekey.
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let (initial, firstGeneratedAt) = store.currentBundlePrekeys()
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let peerCache = PrekeyBundleStore(persistsToDisk: false)
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#expect(peerCache.ingest(bundle(noiseKey: noiseKey, prekeys: initial, generatedAt: firstGeneratedAt)))
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let consumedID = initial[0].id
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#expect(peerCache.assignPrekey(messageID: "m1", recipientNoiseKey: noiseKey)?.id == consumedID)
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// The owner opens mail sealed to that prekey: it's retired and the
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// republished bundle is strictly newer and no longer offers the ID.
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#expect(store.markConsumed(consumedID))
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let (afterConsume, secondGeneratedAt) = store.currentBundlePrekeys()
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#expect(secondGeneratedAt > firstGeneratedAt)
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#expect(!afterConsume.contains { $0.id == consumedID })
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// The peer accepts the replacement (a same-generatedAt copy would be
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// rejected) and stops assigning the consumed ID for new mail.
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#expect(peerCache.ingest(bundle(noiseKey: noiseKey, prekeys: afterConsume, generatedAt: secondGeneratedAt)))
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#expect(peerCache.assignPrekey(messageID: "m2", recipientNoiseKey: noiseKey)?.id != consumedID)
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// 48h grace: the owner can still open a redelivery of the in-flight
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// ciphertext sealed to the consumed ID until the window lapses.
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clock.now = clock.now.addingTimeInterval(LocalPrekeyStore.Policy.consumedGraceSeconds - 60)
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#expect(store.privateKey(for: consumedID) != nil)
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clock.now = clock.now.addingTimeInterval(120)
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#expect(store.privateKey(for: consumedID) == nil)
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}
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@Test func consumedPrivateSurvivesGraceWindowThenDies() {
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let clock = Clock()
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let store = makeStore(clock: clock)
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let (prekeys, _) = store.currentBundlePrekeys()
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let id = prekeys[0].id
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store.markConsumed(id)
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// Within the grace window: still retrievable for redeliveries.
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clock.now = clock.now.addingTimeInterval(LocalPrekeyStore.Policy.consumedGraceSeconds - 60)
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#expect(store.privateKey(for: id) != nil)
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// Past the grace window: gone (even before replenish prunes it).
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clock.now = clock.now.addingTimeInterval(120)
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#expect(store.privateKey(for: id) == nil)
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store.replenishIfNeeded()
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#expect(store.privateKey(for: id) == nil)
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}
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@Test func persistsAcrossInstances() {
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let keychain = MockKeychain()
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let clock = Clock()
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let first = LocalPrekeyStore(keychain: keychain, now: { clock.now })
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let (prekeys, generatedAt) = first.currentBundlePrekeys()
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first.markConsumed(prekeys[0].id)
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let second = LocalPrekeyStore(keychain: keychain, now: { clock.now })
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let (reloaded, reloadedGeneratedAt) = second.currentBundlePrekeys()
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// Consuming a prekey shrinks the published bundle, so its generation
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// stamp advances strictly (even without the clock moving) — peers must
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// see a newer bundle to replace the one that still offered the
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// consumed ID.
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#expect(reloadedGeneratedAt > generatedAt)
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#expect(Set(reloaded.map(\.id)) == Set(prekeys.dropFirst().map(\.id)))
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// The consumed key is still openable within grace after a relaunch.
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#expect(second.privateKey(for: prekeys[0].id) != nil)
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}
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@Test func wipeRemovesEverything() {
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let keychain = MockKeychain()
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let store = LocalPrekeyStore(keychain: keychain)
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let (prekeys, _) = store.currentBundlePrekeys()
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store.wipe()
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#expect(store.privateKey(for: prekeys[0].id) == nil)
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#expect(keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: "prekeysV1") == nil)
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}
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}
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