Files
bitchat/bitchatTests/Mocks/MockTransport.swift
b7c6f42b3a Close forged-directness link-rebind DoS on DM routing (#1421)
* Gate connected-link trust on a secure session; deny forged direct announces the connected shortcut

Residual gap after the rotation-heal containment (#1401): "verified
direct" announces prove the signature but not directness — TTL is
unsigned — so a malicious connected peer can replay a victim's fresh
announce with its TTL restored. When the victim has no live link, the
replayer's link rebinds to the victim's ID and reads as "connected",
and MessageRouter's connected fast-path then trusts it outright: every
DM stalls on a Noise handshake the replayer can never complete and is
silently lost while showing "sent".

Router-level trust gate (no wire change):
- Transport gains canDeliverSecurely(to:) — BLE answers with an
  established Noise session; Nostr keeps its prompt-delivery predicate;
  the protocol default forwards to canDeliverPromptly for transports
  without a forgeable link layer.
- MessageRouter.sendPrivate only trusts a connected link outright when
  it can deliver securely; otherwise it still sends (kicking the
  handshake on a genuine link) but retains a copy and hands a sealed
  copy to couriers, like the reachable path. flushOutbox gets the same
  gate so a flush over an insecure link resends instead of dropping the
  retained copy.

Presence hardening (defense in depth): a "direct" announce arriving on
a link already bound to a different peer no longer shortcuts the
claimed peer into "connected" — only real link state does. Genuine
first-contact and direct announces are unaffected; only the ambiguous
heal path loses the forgeable shortcut.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Harden the insecure-link outbox bound; document the second-replay presence gap and the courier metadata tradeoff

Review follow-ups on the canDeliverSecurely gate:

- flushOutbox no longer counts connected-but-insecure flushes toward the
  maxSendAttempts drop: the message was actually transmitted over a live
  link, so a peer whose Noise handshake stalls across reconnect flapping
  must not burn through the cap and lose the store-and-forward copy the
  gate exists to preserve. Retention stays bounded by the 24h outbox TTL
  and the per-peer FIFO cap; acks still clear it. Attempt-counting stays
  for reachable-only (heuristic) sends. Regression test: >8 connected-
  insecure flushes keep the retained copy, drop callback never fires.

- Document the known second-replay presence gap: linkBoundToOtherPeer
  reads the binding before rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirectAnnounce steals
  the link, so once a first replay has rebound a link to an absent
  victim's ID, a second replay marks the victim connected. Presence
  display only — DMs stay on the retain+courier path via the router
  gate. Not closed at the announce layer because the post-rebind state
  is indistinguishable from a legitimate rotation/reconnect heal (a
  supported, field-verified flow). Covered by a two-announce test.

- Note the accepted courier-spray metadata tradeoff at the connected-
  insecure send: nearby verified peers receive a sealed copy (they learn
  a DM exists, never its content), cleared on ack.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Promote a healed rotation to connected; normalize the secure-delivery probe; retain Codable properties in Periphery

Codex review follow-ups on 5017c232:

- P1: a legitimate rotation announce necessarily arrives on a link still
  bound to the OLD peer ID, so the linkBoundToOtherPeer denial stored the
  new identity as disconnected — and the rebind only fixed link state,
  never the registry. A healed rotation then read as disconnected until
  the peer happened to announce again. rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirect-
  Announce now promotes the rebound identity to connected after the
  containment checks pass (registry markConnected + topology/snapshot/
  peer-list refresh; the .peerConnected UI event already fired from the
  announce path). This consciously moves the forged-presence residue
  from second-replay to first-successful-rebind — bounded by the rebind
  containment (never steals a live identity, one rebind per link per
  cooldown) and still display-only: DMs stay gated on canDeliverSecurely.
  Comments and the pinned tests updated; new regression test covers
  rotate-on-open-link -> rebind -> isPeerConnected(new) == true.

- P2: BLEService.canDeliverSecurely probed the Noise session with the
  peer ID as given, but sessions are keyed by the short wire ID — a send
  keyed by the full 64-hex Noise key (favorites resolution) misread an
  established session as insecure and needlessly retained + couriered
  every DM until ack. Normalize with toShort() like isPeerConnected.
  Test drives a real XX handshake and asserts both ID forms pass.

- Periphery: the PrekeyBundleStore.StoredBundle.noiseKey "assign-only"
  flake fired again and slipped past its baselined USR (read exists in
  loadFromDisk; the indexer intermittently misses it). Replace the
  baseline entry with retain_codable_properties: true — deterministic,
  and a truly-dead Codable field is a persisted-format change anyway.
  Local periphery scan --strict: no unused code detected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 16:46:33 +02:00

320 lines
11 KiB
Swift

//
// MockTransport.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Mock Transport implementation for unit testing ChatViewModel.
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
//
import Foundation
import Combine
import CoreBluetooth
import BitFoundation
@testable import bitchat
/// Mock Transport implementation for testing ChatViewModel in isolation.
/// Records all method calls and allows test code to verify interactions.
final class MockTransport: Transport {
// MARK: - Protocol Properties
weak var delegate: BitchatDelegate?
weak var eventDelegate: TransportEventDelegate?
weak var peerEventsDelegate: TransportPeerEventsDelegate?
var myPeerID: PeerID = PeerID(str: "TESTPEER")
var myNickname: String = "TestUser"
private let peerSnapshotSubject = CurrentValueSubject<[TransportPeerSnapshot], Never>([])
// MARK: - Recording Properties (for test assertions)
private(set) var sentMessages: [(content: String, mentions: [String], messageID: String?, timestamp: Date?)] = []
private(set) var sentPrivateMessages: [(content: String, peerID: PeerID, recipientNickname: String, messageID: String)] = []
private(set) var sentReadReceipts: [(receipt: ReadReceipt, peerID: PeerID)] = []
private(set) var sentDeliveryAcks: [(messageID: String, peerID: PeerID)] = []
private(set) var sentFavoriteNotifications: [(peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool)] = []
private(set) var sentBroadcastFiles: [(packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferID: String)] = []
private(set) var sentPrivateFiles: [(packet: BitchatFilePacket, peerID: PeerID, transferID: String)] = []
private(set) var cancelledTransfers: [String] = []
private(set) var sentVerifyChallenges: [(peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)] = []
private(set) var sentVerifyResponses: [(peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)] = []
private(set) var sentCourierMessages: [(content: String, messageID: String, recipientNoiseKey: Data, couriers: [PeerID])] = []
private(set) var startServicesCallCount = 0
private(set) var stopServicesCallCount = 0
private(set) var emergencyDisconnectCallCount = 0
private(set) var broadcastAnnounceCallCount = 0
private(set) var triggeredHandshakes: [PeerID] = []
private(set) var purgedArchivePeers: [PeerID] = []
// MARK: - Configurable Mock State
var connectedPeers: Set<PeerID> = []
var reachablePeers: Set<PeerID> = []
/// Peers with an established secure session. `nil` mirrors the protocol
/// default (prompt delivery), so connected peers stay "secure" for tests
/// that never care about the distinction.
var securePeers: Set<PeerID>?
var peerNicknames: [PeerID: String] = [:]
var peerFingerprints: [PeerID: String] = [:]
var peerNoiseStates: [PeerID: LazyHandshakeState] = [:]
private let mockKeychain = MockKeychain()
// MARK: - Transport Protocol Implementation
func currentPeerSnapshots() -> [TransportPeerSnapshot] {
peerSnapshotSubject.value
}
func setNickname(_ nickname: String) {
myNickname = nickname
}
func startServices() {
startServicesCallCount += 1
}
func stopServices() {
stopServicesCallCount += 1
}
func emergencyDisconnectAll() {
emergencyDisconnectCallCount += 1
connectedPeers.removeAll()
reachablePeers.removeAll()
}
func isPeerConnected(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
connectedPeers.contains(peerID)
}
func isPeerReachable(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
reachablePeers.contains(peerID) || connectedPeers.contains(peerID)
}
func canDeliverSecurely(to peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
securePeers?.contains(peerID) ?? canDeliverPromptly(to: peerID)
}
func peerNickname(peerID: PeerID) -> String? {
peerNicknames[peerID]
}
func getPeerNicknames() -> [PeerID: String] {
peerNicknames
}
func getFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? {
peerFingerprints[peerID]
}
func getNoiseSessionState(for peerID: PeerID) -> LazyHandshakeState {
peerNoiseStates[peerID] ?? .none
}
func triggerHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) {
triggeredHandshakes.append(peerID)
}
func purgeArchivedPublicMessages(from peerID: PeerID) {
purgedArchivePeers.append(peerID)
}
// Noise identity wrappers backed by a mock-keychain encryption service
// (mirrors the previous `getNoiseService()` placeholder behavior: a real
// identity, but no peer sessions). Exposed so tests can assert against
// the same identity the wrappers use.
private(set) lazy var mockNoiseService = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: mockKeychain)
func noiseSessionPublicKeyData(for peerID: PeerID) -> Data? {
mockNoiseService.getPeerPublicKeyData(peerID)
}
func noiseIdentityFingerprint() -> String {
mockNoiseService.getIdentityFingerprint()
}
func noiseStaticPublicKeyData() -> Data {
mockNoiseService.getStaticPublicKeyData()
}
func noiseSigningPublicKeyData() -> Data {
mockNoiseService.getSigningPublicKeyData()
}
func noiseSignData(_ data: Data) -> Data? {
mockNoiseService.signData(data)
}
func noiseVerifySignature(_ signature: Data, for data: Data, publicKey: Data) -> Bool {
mockNoiseService.verifySignature(signature, for: data, publicKey: publicKey)
}
// MARK: - Messaging
func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String]) {
sentMessages.append((content, mentions, nil, nil))
}
func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String], messageID: String, timestamp: Date) {
sentMessages.append((content, mentions, messageID, timestamp))
}
func sendPrivateMessage(_ content: String, to peerID: PeerID, recipientNickname: String, messageID: String) {
sentPrivateMessages.append((content, peerID, recipientNickname, messageID))
}
func sendReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID) {
sentReadReceipts.append((receipt, peerID))
}
func sendFavoriteNotification(to peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool) {
sentFavoriteNotifications.append((peerID, isFavorite))
}
func sendBroadcastAnnounce() {
broadcastAnnounceCallCount += 1
}
func sendDeliveryAck(for messageID: String, to peerID: PeerID) {
sentDeliveryAcks.append((messageID, peerID))
}
func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) {
sentBroadcastFiles.append((packet, transferId))
}
func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String) {
sentPrivateFiles.append((packet, peerID, transferId))
}
func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String) {
cancelledTransfers.append(transferId)
}
func sendVerifyChallenge(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data) {
sentVerifyChallenges.append((peerID, noiseKeyHex, nonceA))
}
func sendVerifyResponse(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data) {
sentVerifyResponses.append((peerID, noiseKeyHex, nonceA))
}
var courierSendResult = true
func sendCourierMessage(_ content: String, messageID: String, recipientNoiseKey: Data, via couriers: [PeerID]) -> Bool {
sentCourierMessages.append((content, messageID, recipientNoiseKey, couriers))
return courierSendResult
}
// MARK: - Mesh Diagnostics
private(set) var sentMeshPings: [PeerID] = []
var meshPingResult: MeshPingResult?
var meshPaths: [PeerID: [PeerID]] = [:]
var meshTopologySnapshot: MeshTopologySnapshot?
func sendMeshPing(to peerID: PeerID, completion: @escaping @MainActor (MeshPingResult?) -> Void) {
sentMeshPings.append(peerID)
let result = meshPingResult
Task { @MainActor in completion(result) }
}
func computeMeshPath(to peerID: PeerID) -> [PeerID]? {
meshPaths[peerID]
}
func currentMeshTopology() -> MeshTopologySnapshot? {
meshTopologySnapshot
}
// MARK: - Test Helpers
/// Clears all recorded method calls for fresh assertions
func resetRecordings() {
sentMessages.removeAll()
sentPrivateMessages.removeAll()
sentReadReceipts.removeAll()
sentDeliveryAcks.removeAll()
sentFavoriteNotifications.removeAll()
sentBroadcastFiles.removeAll()
sentPrivateFiles.removeAll()
cancelledTransfers.removeAll()
sentVerifyChallenges.removeAll()
sentVerifyResponses.removeAll()
startServicesCallCount = 0
stopServicesCallCount = 0
emergencyDisconnectCallCount = 0
broadcastAnnounceCallCount = 0
triggeredHandshakes.removeAll()
}
/// Simulates a peer connecting
func simulateConnect(_ peerID: PeerID, nickname: String? = nil) {
connectedPeers.insert(peerID)
if let nickname = nickname {
peerNicknames[peerID] = nickname
}
delegate?.didConnectToPeer(peerID)
delegate?.didUpdatePeerList(Array(connectedPeers))
publishPeerSnapshots()
}
/// Simulates a peer disconnecting
func simulateDisconnect(_ peerID: PeerID) {
connectedPeers.remove(peerID)
peerNicknames.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
delegate?.didDisconnectFromPeer(peerID)
delegate?.didUpdatePeerList(Array(connectedPeers))
publishPeerSnapshots()
}
/// Simulates receiving a message
func simulateIncomingMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
delegate?.didReceiveMessage(message)
}
/// Simulates receiving a public message
func simulateIncomingPublicMessage(
from peerID: PeerID,
nickname: String,
content: String,
timestamp: Date = Date(),
messageID: String? = nil
) {
delegate?.didReceivePublicMessage(
from: peerID,
nickname: nickname,
content: content,
timestamp: timestamp,
messageID: messageID
)
}
/// Simulates Bluetooth state change
func simulateBluetoothStateChange(_ state: CBManagerState) {
delegate?.didUpdateBluetoothState(state)
}
/// Updates the peer snapshot publisher
func updatePeerSnapshots(_ snapshots: [TransportPeerSnapshot]) {
peerSnapshotSubject.send(snapshots)
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
self?.peerEventsDelegate?.didUpdatePeerSnapshots(snapshots)
}
}
private func publishPeerSnapshots() {
let now = Date()
let snapshots = connectedPeers.map { peerID in
TransportPeerSnapshot(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: peerNicknames[peerID] ?? "",
isConnected: true,
noisePublicKey: Data(hexString: peerID.bare),
lastSeen: now
)
}
updatePeerSnapshots(snapshots)
}
}