Bound egress canary probes with a watchdog and cancel them on invalidate

The Tor egress self-check probe had no outer bound: the proxied session
sets waitsForConnectivity = true, which can defer the per-request timer
indefinitely, leaving a canary request bounded only by URLSession's
default 7-day resource timeout. Because verify() joins concurrent
callers on the in-flight task and invalidate() neither cancelled nor
cleared it, one hung probe wedged every subsequent verify() caller --
even across a Tor restart -- parking awaitingTorForConnections in
NostrRelayManager until process restart.

Fixes (liveness only; the fail-closed policy is unchanged):
- Race every probe against an independent async watchdog
  (probeTimeout, default 20s = the live probe's request timeout, via
  TorEgressVerifier.defaultProbeTimeout). On timeout the probe task is
  cancelled (cooperatively cancelling the underlying URLSessionTask),
  the verdict is the fail-closed .unreachable, and the in-flight slot
  is cleared so the next verify() starts fresh.
- invalidate() now cancels the in-flight probe and clears it (plus the
  throttle timestamp it already cleared), so Tor restart/dormant/
  shutdown genuinely resets the verifier.
- A probe generation counter keeps actor reentrancy safe: a cancelled/
  superseded probe cannot re-seed the throttle/cache that invalidate()
  just cleared or clobber a fresh probe's in-flight slot; its awaiting
  callers resolve promptly as false.

Concurrent-caller join semantics are preserved (one shared probe), and
the race resolves exactly once behind an NSLock never held across an
await. Tests cover the hung-probe timeout bound, invalidate-cancels-
in-flight, post-restart recovery, and the shared-probe invariant, all
with the injected probe/clock harness (no real network).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitignore

@@ -80,4 +80,3 @@ build.log
 
 # Local configs
 Local.xcconfig
-*.profraw

bitchat/Identity/IdentityModels.swift

@@ -141,44 +141,22 @@ enum TrustLevel: String, Codable {
 struct IdentityCache: Codable {
     // Fingerprint -> Social mapping
     var socialIdentities: [String: SocialIdentity] = [:]
-
+    
     // Nickname -> [Fingerprints] reverse index
     // Multiple fingerprints can claim same nickname
     var nicknameIndex: [String: Set<String>] = [:]
-
+    
     // Verified fingerprints (cryptographic proof)
     var verifiedFingerprints: Set<String> = []
-
+    
     // Last interaction timestamps (privacy: optional)
-    var lastInteractions: [String: Date] = [:]
+    var lastInteractions: [String: Date] = [:] 
-
+    
     // Blocked Nostr pubkeys (lowercased hex) for geohash chats
     var blockedNostrPubkeys: Set<String> = []
-
+    
-    // Fingerprint -> Cryptographic identity (noise + pinned signing key).
-    // Persisting the signing-key pin is security-critical: it must survive
-    // app restarts so an attacker cannot replay a known peer's
-    // noiseKey/peerID with their own signing key and be treated as first
-    // contact (TOFU downgrade).
-    var cryptographicIdentities: [String: CryptographicIdentity] = [:]
-
     // Schema version for future migrations
     var version: Int = 1
-
-    init() {}
-
-    // Custom decoding so caches written by older builds (without
-    // `cryptographicIdentities`) still load instead of being discarded.
-    init(from decoder: Decoder) throws {
-        let container = try decoder.container(keyedBy: CodingKeys.self)
-        socialIdentities = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: SocialIdentity].self, forKey: .socialIdentities) ?? [:]
-        nicknameIndex = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: Set<String>].self, forKey: .nicknameIndex) ?? [:]
-        verifiedFingerprints = try container.decodeIfPresent(Set<String>.self, forKey: .verifiedFingerprints) ?? []
-        lastInteractions = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: Date].self, forKey: .lastInteractions) ?? [:]
-        blockedNostrPubkeys = try container.decodeIfPresent(Set<String>.self, forKey: .blockedNostrPubkeys) ?? []
-        cryptographicIdentities = try container.decodeIfPresent([String: CryptographicIdentity].self, forKey: .cryptographicIdentities) ?? [:]
-        version = try container.decodeIfPresent(Int.self, forKey: .version) ?? 1
-    }
 }
 
 //

bitchat/Identity/SecureIdentityStateManager.swift

@@ -145,29 +145,18 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     
     // In-memory state
     private var ephemeralSessions: [PeerID: EphemeralIdentity] = [:]
-    // Cryptographic identities (including pinned signing keys) live inside
+    private var cryptographicIdentities: [String: CryptographicIdentity] = [:]
-    // `cache` so they persist across app restarts; see IdentityCache.
     private var cache: IdentityCache = IdentityCache()
     
     // Thread safety
     private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "bitchat.identity.state", attributes: .concurrent)
     
     // Pending-save coalescing flag. Reads/writes are serialized on `queue`.
-    //
+    // Persistence is done with a fire-and-forget `queue.async(.barrier)` rather
-    // Persistence is SYNCHRONOUS: every mutating API runs its mutate + encrypt
+    // than a retained DispatchSourceTimer: a lingering, never-cancelled timer
-    // + keychain write inside `queue.sync(flags: .barrier)`, so when the call
+    // keeps the dispatch machinery alive and prevents the unit-test process from
-    // returns the write is already complete and NOTHING is left scheduled on
+    // exiting. (The original code used Timer.scheduledTimer on a GCD queue with
-    // the queue. This is deliberate — a retained DispatchSourceTimer (the
+    // no run loop, so saves never actually fired.)
-    // original design) kept the dispatch machinery alive and prevented the
-    // unit-test process from exiting, and fire-and-forget `queue.async(.barrier)`
-    // (a later design) left a backlog of instrumented barrier saves still
-    // draining when LLVM's `--enable-code-coverage` `atexit` handler dumped
-    // `.profraw`, deadlocking the process at teardown on the constrained CI
-    // runner. Synchronous persistence has zero outstanding dispatch at exit, so
-    // neither failure mode is possible. `pendingSave` is now effectively always
-    // false after any mutation (saveIdentityCache persists inline and clears
-    // it); it remains only as a belt-and-suspenders flag read by `forceSave`
-    // and `deinit`.
     private var pendingSave = false
 
     // Encryption key
@@ -227,22 +216,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     }
     
     deinit {
-        // Do NOT dispatch onto `queue` here. `deinit` can run on any thread
+        forceSave()
-        // (including one draining `queue`), and the object is being
-        // deallocated: a `queue.sync` risks a re-entrant same-queue wait
-        // (deadlock) and a `queue.async` schedules work that resurrects `self`
-        // and may not drain before process exit.
-        //
-        // A flush here is redundant anyway: every mutating API already
-        // persists inline within its own barrier, so the keychain is already
-        // up to date. As a queue-free best-effort belt-and-suspenders, only
-        // flush if something is still pending. This is a direct read of
-        // in-hand state — safe because a deallocating object has no other
-        // live references, so nothing can be mutating `cache` concurrently.
-        if pendingSave {
-            pendingSave = false
-            persist(snapshot: cache)
-        }
     }
     
     // MARK: - Secure Loading/Saving
@@ -267,27 +241,21 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
         }
     }
     
-    /// Persists the cache. Always invoked on `queue` under a barrier (its
+    /// Persists the cache. Always invoked on `queue` under a barrier (its callers
-    /// callers run inside `queue.sync(flags: .barrier)`), so `cache` is read
+    /// run inside `queue.async(.barrier)`), so it simply marks the cache dirty
-    /// while serialized. The encode + keychain write are done here (already on
+    /// and persists it on the same serialized context — no timer, nothing left
-    /// the exclusive barrier context), synchronously, so no separate hop is
+    /// scheduled to keep the process alive.
-    /// scheduled and nothing is left to keep the process alive.
     private func saveIdentityCache() {
         pendingSave = true
-        // On the barrier context already: snapshot is trivially consistent.
+        performSave()
-        persist(snapshot: cache)
-        pendingSave = false
     }
 
-    /// Encodes, seals, and writes a *snapshot* of the cache to the keychain.
+    /// Writes the cache to the keychain. Must run on `queue` with exclusive
-    ///
+    /// (barrier) access.
-    /// Takes the cache by value so callers can capture a consistent snapshot
+    private func performSave() {
-    /// under `queue` and then encode without holding it. Reading `cache`
+        guard pendingSave else { return }
-    /// concurrently with a barrier writer would be a data race on the
+        pendingSave = false
-    /// dictionary storage, which — because `JSONEncoder` walks that storage —
+
-    /// can spin forever (observed as a CI test-suite hang), so the snapshot
-    /// must be taken on `queue`, never off it.
-    private func persist(snapshot: IdentityCache) {
         // Never persist under an ephemeral key — it would overwrite the real
         // cache with data the next launch cannot decrypt.
         guard !encryptionKeyIsEphemeral else {
@@ -296,7 +264,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
         }
 
         do {
-            let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(snapshot)
+            let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(cache)
             let sealedBox = try AES.GCM.seal(data, using: encryptionKey)
             let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(sealedBox.combined!, forKey: cacheKey)
             if saved {
@@ -307,26 +275,14 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
         }
     }
 
-    // Force a flush (for app-termination / lifecycle events — NOT from
+    // Force immediate save (for app termination / lifecycle events). Mutations
-    // `deinit`, which persists inline; see the deinit note). Every mutating
+    // already persist synchronously via saveIdentityCache, so this is normally a
-    // API already persists inline inside its own barrier via
+    // no-op (performSave early-returns when nothing is pending). Runs directly on
-    // `saveIdentityCache`, so by the time this is called the keychain is
+    // the caller's thread — deliberately NOT a `queue.sync(barrier)`, which is
-    // already up to date and this is normally a no-op; it exists as a
+    // reachable from `deinit` and from async tests on the swift-concurrency
-    // belt-and-suspenders flush of any `pendingSave` left set.
+    // cooperative pool where a blocking barrier-sync can starve/deadlock it.
-    //
-    // Runs synchronously inside a `queue.sync(flags: .barrier)`: the barrier
-    // makes the `cache` read race-free (a plain off-queue read races in-flight
-    // barrier writers — JSONEncoder walking a concurrently-mutated dictionary
-    // can spin forever, which surfaced as a CI hang), and being synchronous it
-    // leaves nothing scheduled to keep the process alive at teardown. Safe
-    // against re-entrant deadlock because this is never invoked from `deinit`
-    // (the only path that can run *on* `queue`).
     func forceSave() {
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        performSave()
-            guard pendingSave else { return }
-            pendingSave = false
-            persist(snapshot: cache)
-        }
     }
     
     // MARK: - Social Identity Management
@@ -340,33 +296,15 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     // MARK: - Cryptographic Identities
 
     /// Insert or update a cryptographic identity and optionally persist its signing key and claimed nickname.
-    ///
-    /// TOFU signing-key pinning: once a signing key has been persisted for a
-    /// fingerprint, an update carrying a *different* signing key is refused in
-    /// full (including the claimed-nickname update) and security-logged. This
-    /// mirrors `BLEPeerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce` — without it, an
-    /// attacker replaying a victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own signing
-    /// key could overwrite the victim's persisted identity while the victim is
-    /// offline or after an app restart. The refusal is permanent: there is
-    /// currently no targeted in-app way to reset the pin (`setVerified` does
-    /// not touch it). Recovering from a legitimate signing re-key requires the
-    /// peer to establish a new noise identity (new peerID) or the local user
-    /// to wipe all identity data (`clearAllIdentityData`, e.g. panic wipe).
     /// - Parameters:
     ///   - fingerprint: SHA-256 hex of the Noise static public key
     ///   - noisePublicKey: Noise static public key data
     ///   - signingPublicKey: Optional Ed25519 signing public key for authenticating public messages
     ///   - claimedNickname: Optional latest claimed nickname to persist into social identity
     func upsertCryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: String, noisePublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data?, claimedNickname: String? = nil) {
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             let now = Date()
-            if var existing = self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] {
+            if var existing = self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] {
-                if let pinnedSigningKey = existing.signingPublicKey,
-                   let announcedSigningKey = signingPublicKey,
-                   pinnedSigningKey != announcedSigningKey {
-                    SecureLogger.warning("🚨 Refusing to replace pinned signing key for \(fingerprint.prefix(8))… (possible impersonation attempt)", category: .security)
-                    return
-                }
                 // Update keys if changed
                 if existing.publicKey != noisePublicKey {
                     existing = CryptographicIdentity(
@@ -376,7 +314,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
                         firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
                         lastHandshake: now
                     )
-                    self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing
+                    self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing
                 } else {
                     // Update signing key and lastHandshake
                     existing.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey
@@ -387,7 +325,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
                         firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
                         lastHandshake: now
                     )
-                    self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = updated
+                    self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = updated
                 }
                 // Persist updated state (already assigned in branches above)
             } else {
@@ -399,7 +337,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
                     firstSeen: now,
                     lastHandshake: now
                 )
-                self.cache.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = entry
+                self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = entry
             }
 
             // Optionally persist claimed nickname into social identity
@@ -431,12 +369,12 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
         queue.sync {
             // Defensive: ensure hex and correct length
             guard peerID.isShort else { return [] }
-            return cache.cryptographicIdentities.values.filter { $0.fingerprint.hasPrefix(peerID.id) }
+            return cryptographicIdentities.values.filter { $0.fingerprint.hasPrefix(peerID.id) }
         }
     }
     
     func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) {
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             let previousClaimedNickname = self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint]?.claimedNickname
             self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint] = identity
             
@@ -472,7 +410,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     }
     
     func setFavorite(_ fingerprint: String, isFavorite: Bool) {
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             if var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] {
                 identity.isFavorite = isFavorite
                 self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
@@ -510,7 +448,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     func setBlocked(_ fingerprint: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
         SecureLogger.info("User \(isBlocked ? "blocked" : "unblocked"): \(fingerprint)", category: .security)
         
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             if var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] {
                 identity.isBlocked = isBlocked
                 if isBlocked {
@@ -544,7 +482,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     
     func setNostrBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
         let key = pubkeyHexLowercased.lowercased()
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             if isBlocked {
                 self.cache.blockedNostrPubkeys.insert(key)
             } else {
@@ -561,7 +499,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     // MARK: - Ephemeral Session Management
     
     func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState = .none) {
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             self.ephemeralSessions[peerID] = EphemeralIdentity(
                 peerID: peerID,
                 sessionStart: Date(),
@@ -571,7 +509,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     }
     
     func updateHandshakeState(peerID: PeerID, state: HandshakeState) {
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             self.ephemeralSessions[peerID]?.handshakeState = state
             
             // If handshake completed, update last interaction
@@ -587,10 +525,11 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     func clearAllIdentityData() {
         SecureLogger.warning("Clearing all identity data", category: .security)
         
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             self.cache = IdentityCache()
             self.ephemeralSessions.removeAll()
-
+            self.cryptographicIdentities.removeAll()
+            
             // Delete from keychain
             let deleted = self.keychain.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: self.cacheKey)
             SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.delete, keyType: "identity cache", success: deleted)
@@ -598,7 +537,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     }
     
     func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID) {
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             self.ephemeralSessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
         }
     }
@@ -608,7 +547,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
     func setVerified(fingerprint: String, verified: Bool) {
         SecureLogger.info("Fingerprint \(verified ? "verified" : "unverified"): \(fingerprint)", category: .security)
         
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+        queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
             if verified {
                 self.cache.verifiedFingerprints.insert(fingerprint)
             } else {

bitchat/Nostr/GeoRelayDirectory.swift

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ private extension GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
             refreshCheckInterval: TransportConfig.geoRelayRefreshCheckIntervalSeconds,
             retryInitialSeconds: TransportConfig.geoRelayRetryInitialSeconds,
             retryMaxSeconds: TransportConfig.geoRelayRetryMaxSeconds,
-            awaitTorReady: { await TorManager.shared.awaitReady() },
+            awaitTorReady: { await TorManager.shared.awaitEgressReady() },
             makeFetchData: {
                 let session = TorURLSession.shared.session
                 return { request in

bitchat/Nostr/NostrRelayManager.swift

@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ struct NostrRelayManagerDependencies {
     var locationPermissionPublisher: AnyPublisher<LocationChannelManager.PermissionState, Never>
     var torEnforced: () -> Bool
     var torIsReady: () -> Bool
+    /// Synchronous cached egress-gate check: `true` only while a positive Tor
+    /// egress verification is within its TTL (or Tor is not enforced). When
+    /// `false`, connections must be queued behind `awaitTorReady`, which runs
+    /// the async egress self-check.
+    var torEgressVerified: () -> Bool
     var torIsForeground: () -> Bool
     var awaitTorReady: (@escaping (Bool) -> Void) -> Void
     var makeSession: () -> NostrRelaySessionProtocol
@@ -83,10 +88,14 @@ private extension NostrRelayManagerDependencies {
             locationPermissionPublisher: LocationChannelManager.shared.$permissionState.eraseToAnyPublisher(),
             torEnforced: { TorManager.shared.torEnforced },
             torIsReady: { TorManager.shared.isReady },
+            torEgressVerified: { TorManager.shared.isEgressVerified },
             torIsForeground: { TorManager.shared.isForeground() },
             awaitTorReady: { completion in
                 Task.detached {
-                    let ready = await TorManager.shared.awaitReady()
+                    // Require both Tor bootstrap AND a positive egress self-check
+                    // so relay sockets never open unless traffic is proven to
+                    // route through Tor (fail-closed).
+                    let ready = await TorManager.shared.awaitEgressReady()
                     await MainActor.run {
                         completion(ready)
                     }
@@ -625,8 +634,14 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
     
     // MARK: - Private Methods
 
+    /// Every path that opens a relay socket funnels through this check (initial
+    /// connect, reconnect backoff timers, subscription-triggered connects,
+    /// manual retry). It must hold connections back when Tor isn't bootstrapped
+    /// OR when the runtime egress self-check has no fresh positive verdict —
+    /// otherwise the already-bootstrapped path would open sockets without ever
+    /// running the egress canary.
     private var shouldWaitForTorBeforeConnecting: Bool {
-        shouldUseTor && !dependencies.torIsReady()
+        shouldUseTor && (!dependencies.torIsReady() || !dependencies.torEgressVerified())
     }
 
     private func connectToRelays(_ relayUrls: [String], shouldLog: Bool = false) {
@@ -674,16 +689,20 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
             guard ready else {
                 self.torReadyWaitAttempts += 1
                 if self.torReadyWaitAttempts < TransportConfig.nostrTorReadyMaxWaitAttempts {
-                    SecureLogger.warning("Tor not ready; re-queueing \(pending.count) relay connection(s) (attempt \(self.torReadyWaitAttempts))", category: .session)
+                    SecureLogger.warning("Tor not ready or egress unverified; re-queueing \(pending.count) relay connection(s) (attempt \(self.torReadyWaitAttempts))", category: .session)
                     self.queueConnectionsUntilTorReady(pending)
                 } else {
                     // Still fail-closed (no network), but unblock any callers
                     // waiting on EOSE so the UI doesn't hang indefinitely.
-                    // Queued subscriptions/sends are kept and flush if a later
+                    // Queued subscriptions/sends are kept; a bounded-cadence
-                    // trigger (e.g. app foreground) brings Tor up.
+                    // retry (below) re-enters the gate so a transient failure
-                    SecureLogger.error("❌ Tor not ready after \(self.torReadyWaitAttempts) wait(s); aborting relay connections (fail-closed)", category: .session)
+                    // (Tor stall, canary outage keeping the egress unverified)
+                    // recovers automatically, and any later trigger (e.g. app
+                    // foreground) also re-enters it.
+                    SecureLogger.error("❌ Tor not ready or egress unverified after \(self.torReadyWaitAttempts) wait(s); relays stay closed (fail-closed), retrying in \(Int(TransportConfig.nostrTorGateRetrySeconds))s", category: .session)
                     self.torReadyWaitAttempts = 0
                     self.unblockPendingEOSECallbacks(reason: "tor-unavailable")
+                    self.scheduleTorGateRetry(pending)
                 }
                 return
             }
@@ -693,6 +712,24 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
         }
     }
 
+    /// After the Tor-gate wait attempts are exhausted, keep a low-frequency
+    /// retry alive so the gate re-opens without an external trigger once the
+    /// transient failure clears. Bounded cadence: one wait cycle per
+    /// `nostrTorGateRetrySeconds`; the egress verifier additionally throttles
+    /// actual canary probes to one per its `minRetryInterval`.
+    private func scheduleTorGateRetry(_ relayUrls: [String]) {
+        guard !relayUrls.isEmpty else { return }
+        let generation = connectionGeneration
+        dependencies.scheduleAfter(TransportConfig.nostrTorGateRetrySeconds) { [weak self] in
+            Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
+                guard let self else { return }
+                // Void after disconnect/reset: those paths bump the generation.
+                guard generation == self.connectionGeneration else { return }
+                self.queueConnectionsUntilTorReady(relayUrls)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Park an EOSE callback while Tor is not yet ready, and schedule the same
     /// fallback timeout `startEOSETracking` uses. Without it, a parked callback
     /// would only be unblocked by Tor-readiness retry exhaustion (several

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEAnnounceHandler.swift

@@ -14,14 +14,8 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
     let messageTTL: UInt8
     /// Current time source.
     let now: () -> Date
-    /// Noise and signing public keys already recorded for the peer, if any
+    /// Noise public key already recorded for the peer, if any (registry read).
-    /// (single registry read so both come from one consistent snapshot).
+    let existingNoisePublicKey: (PeerID) -> Data?
-    let existingPeerKeys: (PeerID) -> (noisePublicKey: Data?, signingPublicKey: Data?)
-    /// Signing key from the persisted cryptographic identity for the peer, if
-    /// any. Registry pins do not survive app restarts or offline-peer
-    /// eviction; this fallback keeps the TOFU signing-key pin effective for
-    /// returning peers.
-    let persistedSigningPublicKey: (PeerID) -> Data?
     /// Verifies the packet signature against the announced signing key.
     let verifySignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool
     /// Direct link state for the peer (BLE-queue read).
@@ -29,15 +23,13 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
     /// Runs the registry mutation phase under the collections barrier.
     let withRegistryBarrier: (() -> Void) -> Void
     /// Upserts the verified announce into the peer registry.
-    /// Returns `nil` when the registry refuses the announce because it carries
-    /// a signing key different from the one already pinned for this peer.
     /// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
     let upsertVerifiedAnnounce: (
         _ peerID: PeerID,
         _ announcement: AnnouncementPacket,
         _ isConnected: Bool,
         _ now: Date
-    ) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate?
+    ) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate
     /// Debounced reconnect-log decision.
     /// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
     let shouldEmitReconnectLog: (_ peerID: PeerID, _ now: Date) -> Bool
@@ -107,16 +99,7 @@ final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
         // Suppress announce logs to reduce noise
 
         // Precompute signature verification outside barrier to reduce contention
-        var existingPeerKeys = env.existingPeerKeys(peerID)
+        let existingNoisePublicKey = env.existingNoisePublicKey(peerID)
-        if existingPeerKeys.signingPublicKey == nil {
-            // The registry entry (and its signing-key pin) is dropped on app
-            // restart and offline-peer eviction, but the persisted
-            // cryptographic identity survives both. Fall back to it so a
-            // returning peer is not treated as first contact — otherwise an
-            // attacker could replay the peer's noiseKey/peerID with their own
-            // signing key and re-pin the identity (TOFU downgrade).
-            existingPeerKeys.signingPublicKey = env.persistedSigningPublicKey(peerID)
-        }
         let hasSignature = packet.signature != nil
         let signatureValid: Bool
         if hasSignature {
@@ -130,18 +113,13 @@ final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
         let trustDecision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
             hasSignature: hasSignature,
             signatureValid: signatureValid,
-            existingNoisePublicKey: existingPeerKeys.noisePublicKey,
+            existingNoisePublicKey: existingNoisePublicKey,
-            announcedNoisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
+            announcedNoisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey
-            existingSigningPublicKey: existingPeerKeys.signingPublicKey,
-            announcedSigningPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey
         )
         if case .reject(.keyMismatch) = trustDecision {
             SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce key mismatch for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — keeping unverified", category: .security)
         }
-        if case .reject(.signingKeyMismatch) = trustDecision {
+        let verifiedAnnounce = trustDecision.isVerified
-            SecureLogger.warning("🚨 Announce signing-key mismatch for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — refusing to replace pinned signing key (possible impersonation attempt)", category: .security)
-        }
-        var verifiedAnnounce = trustDecision.isVerified
 
         var isNewPeer = false
         var isReconnectedPeer = false
@@ -161,22 +139,12 @@ final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
                 return
             }
 
-            // The registry re-checks the signing-key pin inside the barrier.
+            let update = env.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
-            // The pre-barrier trust check reads the registry outside the
-            // barrier, so this closes the race where two announces for the
-            // same peer are evaluated concurrently.
-            guard let update = env.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
                 peerID,
                 announcement,
                 isDirectAnnounce || hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription,
                 now
-            ) else {
+            )
-                SecureLogger.warning("🚨 Registry refused announce for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — signing key differs from pinned key", category: .security)
-                verifiedAnnounce = false
-                isNewPeer = false
-                isReconnectedPeer = false
-                return
-            }
             isNewPeer = update.isNewPeer
             isReconnectedPeer = update.wasDisconnected
 

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicy.swift

@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ enum BLEAnnounceTrustRejection: Equatable {
     case missingSignature
     case invalidSignature
     case keyMismatch
-    case signingKeyMismatch
 }
 
 enum BLEAnnounceTrustDecision: Equatable {
@@ -73,25 +72,12 @@ enum BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy {
         hasSignature: Bool,
         signatureValid: Bool,
         existingNoisePublicKey: Data?,
-        announcedNoisePublicKey: Data,
+        announcedNoisePublicKey: Data
-        existingSigningPublicKey: Data?,
-        announcedSigningPublicKey: Data
     ) -> BLEAnnounceTrustDecision {
         if let existingNoisePublicKey, existingNoisePublicKey != announcedNoisePublicKey {
             return .reject(.keyMismatch)
         }
 
-        // TOFU signing-key pinning. The packet signature only proves the
-        // announce is self-consistent — it is verified against the Ed25519 key
-        // carried *inside the same announce*. Since peerIDs derive from the
-        // broadcast (public) noise key, an attacker can replay a victim's
-        // peerID+noiseKey with their own signing key and a valid
-        // self-signature. Once we have bound a signing key to this peer,
-        // refuse to silently replace it.
-        if let existingSigningPublicKey, existingSigningPublicKey != announcedSigningPublicKey {
-            return .reject(.signingKeyMismatch)
-        }
-
         guard hasSignature else {
             return .reject(.missingSignature)
         }

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEPeerRegistry.swift

@@ -150,14 +150,6 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
         peers[peerID] = peer
     }
 
-    /// Applies a verified announce to the registry.
-    ///
-    /// TOFU signing-key pinning: once a signing key has been bound to this
-    /// peer entry, an announce carrying a *different* signing key is refused
-    /// (returns `nil`) and the existing record is left untouched. PeerIDs are
-    /// derived from the (public) noise key, so without pinning an attacker
-    /// could replay a victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own signing key and
-    /// silently take over the victim's mesh identity and nickname.
     mutating func upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
         peerID: PeerID,
         nickname: String,
@@ -165,15 +157,8 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
         signingPublicKey: Data?,
         isConnected: Bool,
         now: Date
-    ) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate? {
+    ) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate {
         let existing = peers[peerID]
-
-        if let pinnedSigningKey = existing?.signingPublicKey,
-           let announcedSigningKey = signingPublicKey,
-           pinnedSigningKey != announcedSigningKey {
-            return nil
-        }
-
         let update = BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(
             isNewPeer: existing == nil,
             wasDisconnected: existing?.isConnected == false,
@@ -185,8 +170,7 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
             nickname: nickname,
             isConnected: isConnected,
             noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
-            // Never drop an already-pinned signing key.
+            signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
-            signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey ?? existing?.signingPublicKey,
             isVerifiedNickname: true,
             lastSeen: now
         )

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift

@@ -3028,21 +3028,9 @@ extension BLEService {
             },
             messageTTL: messageTTL,
             now: { Date() },
-            existingPeerKeys: { [weak self] peerID in
+            existingNoisePublicKey: { [weak self] peerID in
-                guard let self = self else { return (nil, nil) }
-                return self.collectionsQueue.sync {
-                    let info = self.peerRegistry.info(for: peerID)
-                    return (info?.noisePublicKey, info?.signingPublicKey)
-                }
-            },
-            persistedSigningPublicKey: { [weak self] peerID in
-                // Same synchronous identity-manager read pattern as
-                // signedSenderDisplayName(for:from:); the manager serializes
-                // access on its own internal queue.
                 guard let self = self else { return nil }
-                return self.identityManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID)
+                return self.collectionsQueue.sync { self.peerRegistry.info(for: peerID)?.noisePublicKey }
-                    .compactMap { $0.signingPublicKey }
-                    .first
             },
             verifySignature: { [weak self] packet, signingPublicKey in
                 self?.noiseService.verifyPacketSignature(packet, publicKey: signingPublicKey) ?? false
@@ -3055,17 +3043,14 @@ extension BLEService {
             },
             upsertVerifiedAnnounce: { [weak self] peerID, announcement, isConnected, now in
                 // Called from inside withRegistryBarrier; access registry directly.
-                guard let self = self else {
+                self?.peerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
-                    return BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(isNewPeer: false, wasDisconnected: false, previousNickname: nil)
-                }
-                return self.peerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
                     peerID: peerID,
                     nickname: announcement.nickname,
                     noisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
                     signingPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey,
                     isConnected: isConnected,
                     now: now
-                )
+                ) ?? BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(isNewPeer: false, wasDisconnected: false, previousNickname: nil)
             },
             shouldEmitReconnectLog: { [weak self] peerID, now in
                 // Called from inside withRegistryBarrier; access debouncer directly.

bitchat/Services/TransportConfig.swift

@@ -171,6 +171,10 @@ enum TransportConfig {
     // How many consecutive Tor-readiness waits (each bounded by TorManager's
     // bootstrap deadline) to attempt before unblocking pending EOSE callers.
     static let nostrTorReadyMaxWaitAttempts: Int = 3
+    // After Tor-gate wait attempts are exhausted (Tor never ready, or egress
+    // self-check unverified), retry the whole gate at this bounded cadence so
+    // a transient failure (e.g. canary outage) recovers without user action.
+    static let nostrTorGateRetrySeconds: TimeInterval = 30.0
     static let nostrPendingSendQueueCap: Int = 200
     // Sample interval for the send-queue overflow warning (first + every Nth
     // dropped event). Drops are ephemeral presence/geo traffic — log-only.

bitchatTests/Nostr/TorEgressVerifierTests.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
+//
+// TorEgressVerifierTests.swift
+// bitchatTests
+//
+// Unit tests for the runtime Tor-egress self-check policy/caching. The network
+// probe is injected, so these tests are deterministic and offline.
+//
+
+import Testing
+import Foundation
+@testable import bitchat
+import Tor
+
+@Suite(.serialized)
+struct TorEgressVerifierTests {
+
+    /// Deterministic, controllable clock + probe.
+    private final class Harness: @unchecked Sendable {
+        private let lock = NSLock()
+        private var _now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000_000)
+        private var _result: TorEgressVerifier.ProbeResult = .verifiedTor
+        private var _hanging = false
+        private var _gated = false
+        private var _released = false
+        private var _probeCount = 0
+        private var _cancelledCount = 0
+
+        var now: Date {
+            lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }; return _now
+        }
+        var probeCount: Int {
+            lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }; return _probeCount
+        }
+        /// Number of hung probes that observed cooperative cancellation.
+        var cancelledCount: Int {
+            lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }; return _cancelledCount
+        }
+        func advance(_ seconds: TimeInterval) {
+            lock.lock(); _now = _now.addingTimeInterval(seconds); lock.unlock()
+        }
+        func setResult(_ r: TorEgressVerifier.ProbeResult) {
+            lock.lock(); _result = r; lock.unlock()
+        }
+        /// When `true`, probes park forever and only exit via cooperative
+        /// cancellation — models a canary request wedged by
+        /// `waitsForConnectivity` deferring the request timer.
+        func setHanging(_ hanging: Bool) {
+            lock.lock(); _hanging = hanging; lock.unlock()
+        }
+        /// When `true`, probes wait for `release()` before returning — models
+        /// a slow-but-completing canary for join-semantics tests.
+        func setGated(_ gated: Bool) {
+            lock.lock(); _gated = gated; lock.unlock()
+        }
+        func release() {
+            lock.lock(); _released = true; lock.unlock()
+        }
+        /// Suspends until at least `n` probes have started.
+        func waitUntilProbeCount(atLeast n: Int) async {
+            while probeCount < n {
+                try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_000_000)
+            }
+        }
+        func makeProbe() -> @Sendable () async -> TorEgressVerifier.ProbeResult {
+            return { [self] in
+                lock.lock()
+                _probeCount += 1
+                let r = _result
+                let hang = _hanging
+                let gated = _gated
+                lock.unlock()
+                if hang {
+                    // Park until cancelled (verifier watchdog or invalidate());
+                    // cancellation-responsive so no task outlives the test.
+                    while !Task.isCancelled {
+                        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 2_000_000)
+                    }
+                    lock.lock(); _cancelledCount += 1; lock.unlock()
+                    return .unreachable("hung probe cancelled")
+                }
+                if gated {
+                    while !Task.isCancelled {
+                        lock.lock(); let released = _released; lock.unlock()
+                        if released { break }
+                        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_000_000)
+                    }
+                }
+                return r
+            }
+        }
+        func nowProvider() -> @Sendable () -> Date {
+            return { [self] in self.now }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func makeVerifier(
+        _ h: Harness,
+        ttl: TimeInterval = 300,
+        minRetry: TimeInterval = 5,
+        probeTimeout: TimeInterval = TorEgressVerifier.defaultProbeTimeout
+    ) -> TorEgressVerifier {
+        TorEgressVerifier(
+            ttl: ttl,
+            minRetryInterval: minRetry,
+            probeTimeout: probeTimeout,
+            now: h.nowProvider(),
+            probe: h.makeProbe()
+        )
+    }
+
+    @Test("verifiedTor allows and is cached within TTL (single probe)")
+    func verifiedIsCached() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        // Second call within TTL must not re-probe.
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 1)
+    }
+
+    @Test("cache expires after TTL and re-probes")
+    func cacheExpires() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 1)
+
+        h.advance(301)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 2)
+    }
+
+    @Test("notTor refuses (leak detected) and is never cached as allowed")
+    func notTorRefuses() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.notTor)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 0)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        // A subsequent success recovers.
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test("unreachable refuses: an unverified egress must not proceed (fail-closed)")
+    func unreachableRefuses() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.unreachable("down"))
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 0)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test("unreachable-then-reachable recovers via retry")
+    func unreachableRecoversWhenCanaryReturns() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.unreachable("down"))
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 5)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 1)
+
+        // Canary comes back; the next probe (after the retry throttle window)
+        // verifies and allows again.
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        h.advance(5)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 2)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test("cached verifiedTor within TTL allows during a canary blip without re-probing")
+    func cachedVerifiedAllowsDuringCanaryBlip() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 0)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 1)
+
+        // The canary goes down inside the TTL window: the cached positive
+        // verdict is authoritative, no probe runs, traffic stays allowed.
+        h.setResult(.unreachable("down"))
+        h.advance(100)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 1)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test("TTL expiry + unreachable refuses until a probe succeeds again")
+    func expiredCacheWithUnreachableRefuses() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 0)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+
+        // Past the TTL the old verdict no longer stands: an unreachable canary
+        // means unverified egress, so connection opens are refused.
+        h.setResult(.unreachable("down"))
+        h.advance(301)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == false)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 2)
+
+        // A subsequent successful probe restores service.
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test("minRetryInterval bounds re-probing while unverified (no canary hammering)")
+    func throttleReprobe() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.unreachable("down"))
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 5)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 1)
+        // Within minRetry window: reuse last (refusing) decision, no new probe.
+        h.advance(1)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 1)
+        // After the window: re-probe.
+        h.advance(5)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 2)
+    }
+
+    @Test("invalidate clears the synchronous cache snapshot")
+    func invalidateClearsSnapshot() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == true)
+        await v.invalidate()
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test("notTor drops any cached verification snapshot")
+    func notTorClearsSnapshot() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 0)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == true)
+
+        h.setResult(.notTor)
+        h.advance(301)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test("invalidate forces a fresh probe")
+    func invalidateForcesReprobe() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300)
+
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 1)
+        await v.invalidate()
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 2)
+    }
+
+    @Test("lastProbeResult reflects the most recent outcome")
+    func lastResultTracked() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.notTor)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 0)
+        _ = await v.verify()
+        #expect(await v.lastProbeResult() == .notTor)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Liveness (probe timeout watchdog + invalidate cancellation)
+
+    @Test("a probe that never completes is bounded by probeTimeout and fails closed")
+    func hungProbeIsBoundedByTimeout() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setHanging(true)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 0, probeTimeout: 0.05)
+
+        // Without the watchdog this would wedge: waitsForConnectivity can
+        // defer the request timer, leaving the canary bounded only by the
+        // 7-day resource timeout.
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        let last = await v.lastProbeResult()
+        switch last {
+        case .unreachable:
+            break // fail-closed timeout verdict recorded
+        default:
+            Issue.record("expected .unreachable after probe timeout, got \(String(describing: last))")
+        }
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == false)
+
+        // The hung probe task itself was cancelled (URLSession task would be
+        // torn down), not abandoned.
+        while h.cancelledCount < 1 {
+            try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_000_000)
+        }
+        #expect(h.cancelledCount == 1)
+
+        // The in-flight slot was cleared: the next verify() starts a fresh
+        // probe (does not join the hung one) and recovers.
+        h.setHanging(false)
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 2)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test("invalidate() cancels the in-flight probe and the awaiting caller fails closed")
+    func invalidateCancelsInFlightProbe() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setHanging(true)
+        // Long (real-time) timeout and throttle: only invalidate() can
+        // unblock the caller, and only invalidate() clearing the throttle
+        // lets the follow-up probe run without advancing the clock.
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 600, probeTimeout: 600)
+
+        let first = Task { await v.verify() }
+        await h.waitUntilProbeCount(atLeast: 1)
+        await v.invalidate()
+
+        // The awaiting caller resolves promptly (no 600s wait) and refuses.
+        #expect(await first.value == false)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == false)
+
+        // The hung probe observed cancellation (a Tor restart genuinely
+        // shakes the wedged canary request).
+        while h.cancelledCount < 1 {
+            try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_000_000)
+        }
+
+        // Recovery: a fresh verify() runs a NEW probe — it neither joins the
+        // cancelled one nor inherits its throttle/last-result state.
+        h.setHanging(false)
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 2)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test("recovery after a hung probe survives invalidate + Tor restart cycle")
+    func hungThenInvalidatedThenRecovers() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setHanging(true)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 5, probeTimeout: 600)
+
+        // Wedge one probe, then simulate a Tor restart mid-flight.
+        let wedged = Task { await v.verify() }
+        await h.waitUntilProbeCount(atLeast: 1)
+        await v.invalidate()
+        #expect(await wedged.value == false)
+
+        // Canary still down right after restart: fresh probe, fail closed —
+        // and the throttle applies to the FRESH result (bounded retry intact).
+        h.setHanging(false)
+        h.setResult(.unreachable("circuit not built"))
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 2)
+        h.advance(1)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == false)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 2) // throttled, no hammering
+
+        // Canary returns after the retry window: verification recovers.
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        h.advance(5)
+        #expect(await v.verify() == true)
+        #expect(v.hasFreshVerification == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test("concurrent verify() callers still share a single in-flight probe")
+    func concurrentCallersShareOneProbe() async {
+        let h = Harness()
+        h.setResult(.verifiedTor)
+        h.setGated(true)
+        let v = makeVerifier(h, ttl: 300, minRetry: 0)
+
+        let t1 = Task { await v.verify() }
+        await h.waitUntilProbeCount(atLeast: 1)
+        let t2 = Task { await v.verify() }
+        // Give t2 a chance to join the in-flight probe before releasing it.
+        // Either way the invariant holds: t2 joins the shared probe, or (if
+        // scheduled after completion) hits the fresh TTL cache — exactly one
+        // probe runs.
+        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 20_000_000)
+        h.release()
+
+        #expect(await t1.value == true)
+        #expect(await t2.value == true)
+        #expect(h.probeCount == 1)
+    }
+}

bitchatTests/Services/BLEAnnounceHandlerTests.swift

@@ -6,12 +6,9 @@ import Testing
 struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
     private final class Recorder {
         var existingNoisePublicKey: Data?
-        var existingSigningPublicKey: Data?
-        var persistedSigningPublicKey: Data?
-        var persistedSigningKeyQueries: [PeerID] = []
         var signatureValid = true
         var linkState: (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool) = (false, false)
-        var upsertResult: BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate? = BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(isNewPeer: false, wasDisconnected: false, previousNickname: nil)
+        var upsertResult = BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(isNewPeer: false, wasDisconnected: false, previousNickname: nil)
         var dedupSeenIDs: Set<String> = []
         var shouldEmitReconnectLogResult = true
 
@@ -38,11 +35,7 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
             localPeerID: { localPeerID },
             messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
             now: { now },
-            existingPeerKeys: { _ in (recorder.existingNoisePublicKey, recorder.existingSigningPublicKey) },
+            existingNoisePublicKey: { _ in recorder.existingNoisePublicKey },
-            persistedSigningPublicKey: { peerID in
-                recorder.persistedSigningKeyQueries.append(peerID)
-                return recorder.persistedSigningPublicKey
-            },
             verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in
                 recorder.verifySignatureCalls.append((packet, signingPublicKey))
                 return recorder.signatureValid
@@ -375,168 +368,6 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.first?.neighbors == neighbors)
     }
 
-    @Test
-    func matchingPinnedSigningKeyIsAccepted() throws {
-        let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9A, count: 32)
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
-        let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            peerID: peerID,
-            timestamp: timestamp(now),
-            signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
-        )
-
-        let recorder = Recorder()
-        recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = noiseKey
-        // Matches the signing key encoded by makeAnnouncePacket.
-        recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
-        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
-
-        handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
-
-        #expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
-        #expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
-    }
-
-    @Test
-    func signingKeyMismatchWithPinnedKeySkipsUpsertAndIdentityPersistence() throws {
-        let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9B, count: 32)
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
-        // Attacker announce: victim's noiseKey/peerID, attacker's signing key
-        // (0x99 from makeAnnouncePacket) with a "valid" self-signature.
-        let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            peerID: peerID,
-            timestamp: timestamp(now),
-            signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
-        )
-
-        let recorder = Recorder()
-        recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = noiseKey
-        recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32) // victim's pinned key
-        recorder.signatureValid = true
-        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
-
-        handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
-
-        #expect(recorder.upsertCalls.isEmpty)
-        #expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.isEmpty)
-        #expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.isEmpty)
-        #expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.count == 1)
-        #expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
-    }
-
-    @Test
-    func persistedSigningKeyMismatchWithoutRegistryEntryIsRejected() throws {
-        // Registry has no entry (app restart or offline-peer eviction), but
-        // the persisted cryptographic identity still pins the victim's
-        // signing key. An attacker replaying the victim's noiseKey/peerID
-        // with their own signing key must not be treated as first contact.
-        let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9D, count: 32)
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
-        let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            peerID: peerID,
-            timestamp: timestamp(now),
-            signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
-        )
-
-        let recorder = Recorder()
-        recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = nil
-        recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = nil
-        recorder.persistedSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32) // victim's persisted pin
-        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
-
-        handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
-
-        #expect(recorder.persistedSigningKeyQueries == [peerID])
-        #expect(recorder.upsertCalls.isEmpty)
-        #expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.isEmpty)
-        #expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.isEmpty)
-        #expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.count == 1)
-        #expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
-    }
-
-    @Test
-    func persistedSigningKeyMatchWithoutRegistryEntryIsAccepted() throws {
-        // Legitimate returning peer: registry entry evicted, persisted pin
-        // matches the announced signing key — accepted like a normal announce.
-        let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9E, count: 32)
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
-        let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            peerID: peerID,
-            timestamp: timestamp(now),
-            signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
-        )
-
-        let recorder = Recorder()
-        // Matches the signing key encoded by makeAnnouncePacket.
-        recorder.persistedSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
-        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
-
-        handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
-
-        #expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
-        #expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
-    }
-
-    @Test
-    func registryPinnedSigningKeySkipsPersistedLookup() throws {
-        let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9F, count: 32)
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
-        let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            peerID: peerID,
-            timestamp: timestamp(now),
-            signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
-        )
-
-        let recorder = Recorder()
-        recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = noiseKey
-        recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
-        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
-
-        handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
-
-        #expect(recorder.persistedSigningKeyQueries.isEmpty)
-        #expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
-    }
-
-    @Test
-    func registryPinRejectionSkipsTopologyAndIdentityPersistence() throws {
-        let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9C, count: 32)
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
-        let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            peerID: peerID,
-            timestamp: timestamp(now),
-            signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64),
-            directNeighbors: [Data(repeating: 0xAB, count: 8)]
-        )
-
-        // Pre-barrier trust check sees no pinned key (e.g. concurrent race),
-        // but the registry itself refuses to replace its pinned signing key.
-        let recorder = Recorder()
-        recorder.upsertResult = nil
-        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
-
-        handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
-
-        #expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
-        #expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.isEmpty)
-        #expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.isEmpty)
-        #expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.count == 1)
-        #expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
-        #expect(recorder.afterglowDelays.isEmpty)
-    }
-
     @Test
     func keyMismatchWithExistingPeerKeepsAnnounceUnverified() throws {
         let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
@@ -560,251 +391,6 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
     }
 
-    @Test
-    func attackerReplayingVictimNoiseKeyWithOwnSigningKeyIsRejectedEndToEnd() throws {
-        // Real crypto: the attacker crafts a fully self-consistent announce
-        // (victim's noiseKey/peerID, attacker's signing key and nickname,
-        // valid packet signature made with the attacker's key). Without
-        // signing-key pinning this used to overwrite the victim's registry
-        // entry and persisted identity.
-        let victim = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
-        let attacker = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
-        let victimNoiseKey = victim.getStaticPublicKeyData()
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: victimNoiseKey)
-        let now = Date()
-
-        final class RegistryBox {
-            var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
-            var persistedIdentities: [AnnouncementPacket] = []
-        }
-        let box = RegistryBox()
-
-        let environment = BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment(
-            localPeerID: { PeerID(str: "0102030405060708") },
-            messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
-            now: { now },
-            existingPeerKeys: { peerID in
-                let info = box.registry.info(for: peerID)
-                return (info?.noisePublicKey, info?.signingPublicKey)
-            },
-            persistedSigningPublicKey: { _ in nil },
-            verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in
-                victim.verifyPacketSignature(packet, publicKey: signingPublicKey)
-            },
-            linkState: { _ in (hasPeripheral: true, hasCentral: false) },
-            withRegistryBarrier: { body in body() },
-            upsertVerifiedAnnounce: { peerID, announcement, isConnected, now in
-                box.registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
-                    peerID: peerID,
-                    nickname: announcement.nickname,
-                    noisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
-                    signingPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey,
-                    isConnected: isConnected,
-                    now: now
-                )
-            },
-            shouldEmitReconnectLog: { _, _ in false },
-            updateTopology: { _, _ in },
-            persistIdentity: { announcement in
-                box.persistedIdentities.append(announcement)
-            },
-            dedupContains: { _ in true },
-            dedupMarkProcessed: { _ in },
-            deliverAnnounceUIEvents: { _, _, _ in },
-            trackPacketSeen: { _ in },
-            sendAnnounceBack: {},
-            scheduleAfterglow: { _ in }
-        )
-        let handler = BLEAnnounceHandler(environment: environment)
-
-        func makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: String, signer: NoiseEncryptionService) throws -> BitchatPacket {
-            let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
-                nickname: nickname,
-                noisePublicKey: victimNoiseKey,
-                signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
-                directNeighbors: nil
-            )
-            let payload = try #require(announcement.encode())
-            let packet = BitchatPacket(
-                type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
-                senderID: Data(hexString: peerID.id) ?? Data(),
-                recipientID: nil,
-                timestamp: UInt64(now.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
-                payload: payload,
-                signature: nil,
-                ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
-            )
-            return try #require(signer.signPacket(packet))
-        }
-
-        // Legitimate announce from the victim is accepted and pinned.
-        let victimAnnounce = try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim", signer: victim)
-        handler.handle(victimAnnounce, from: peerID)
-
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim")
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
-        #expect(box.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
-
-        // Attacker announce with a valid self-signature must be rejected.
-        let attackerAnnounce = try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "attacker", signer: attacker)
-        handler.handle(attackerAnnounce, from: peerID)
-
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim")
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
-        #expect(box.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
-
-        // The victim's subsequent announces (same pinned key) still work.
-        let victimRename = try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim-renamed", signer: victim)
-        handler.handle(victimRename, from: peerID)
-
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim-renamed")
-        #expect(box.persistedIdentities.count == 2)
-    }
-
-    @Test
-    func signingKeyPinSurvivesRegistryEvictionAndRestartEndToEnd() throws {
-        // Real crypto + real persistence: the victim announces and gets
-        // pinned, then the registry entry disappears (offline-peer eviction
-        // via reconcileConnectivity, or app restart which starts with an
-        // empty registry). The attacker replays the victim's
-        // noiseKey/peerID with their own signing key and a valid
-        // self-signature — the persisted identity must still block the
-        // takeover, and must not be overwritten. The victim (same signing
-        // key) must be re-accepted.
-        let victim = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
-        let attacker = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
-        let victimNoiseKey = victim.getStaticPublicKeyData()
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: victimNoiseKey)
-        let now = Date()
-
-        let identityKeychain = MockKeychain()
-        let identityManager = SecureIdentityStateManager(identityKeychain)
-
-        final class RegistryBox {
-            var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
-        }
-        let box = RegistryBox()
-
-        func makeEnvironment(identityManager: SecureIdentityStateManager) -> BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
-            BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment(
-                localPeerID: { PeerID(str: "0102030405060708") },
-                messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
-                now: { now },
-                existingPeerKeys: { peerID in
-                    let info = box.registry.info(for: peerID)
-                    return (info?.noisePublicKey, info?.signingPublicKey)
-                },
-                // Mirrors the BLEService wiring: fall back to the persisted
-                // cryptographic identity.
-                persistedSigningPublicKey: { peerID in
-                    identityManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID)
-                        .compactMap { $0.signingPublicKey }
-                        .first
-                },
-                verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in
-                    victim.verifyPacketSignature(packet, publicKey: signingPublicKey)
-                },
-                linkState: { _ in (hasPeripheral: true, hasCentral: false) },
-                withRegistryBarrier: { body in body() },
-                upsertVerifiedAnnounce: { peerID, announcement, isConnected, now in
-                    box.registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
-                        peerID: peerID,
-                        nickname: announcement.nickname,
-                        noisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
-                        signingPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey,
-                        isConnected: isConnected,
-                        now: now
-                    )
-                },
-                shouldEmitReconnectLog: { _, _ in false },
-                updateTopology: { _, _ in },
-                persistIdentity: { announcement in
-                    identityManager.upsertCryptographicIdentity(
-                        fingerprint: announcement.noisePublicKey.sha256Fingerprint(),
-                        noisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
-                        signingPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey,
-                        claimedNickname: announcement.nickname
-                    )
-                },
-                dedupContains: { _ in true },
-                dedupMarkProcessed: { _ in },
-                deliverAnnounceUIEvents: { _, _, _ in },
-                trackPacketSeen: { _ in },
-                sendAnnounceBack: {},
-                scheduleAfterglow: { _ in }
-            )
-        }
-        let handler = BLEAnnounceHandler(environment: makeEnvironment(identityManager: identityManager))
-
-        func makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: String, signer: NoiseEncryptionService) throws -> BitchatPacket {
-            let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
-                nickname: nickname,
-                noisePublicKey: victimNoiseKey,
-                signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
-                directNeighbors: nil
-            )
-            let payload = try #require(announcement.encode())
-            let packet = BitchatPacket(
-                type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
-                senderID: Data(hexString: peerID.id) ?? Data(),
-                recipientID: nil,
-                timestamp: UInt64(now.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
-                payload: payload,
-                signature: nil,
-                ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
-            )
-            return try #require(signer.signPacket(packet))
-        }
-
-        func persistedIdentity() -> CryptographicIdentity? {
-            // queue.sync read; fences the manager's pending barrier writes.
-            identityManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first
-        }
-
-        // 1. Victim announces: pinned in the registry and persisted.
-        handler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim", signer: victim), from: peerID)
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
-        #expect(persistedIdentity()?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
-
-        // 2. Registry entry disappears (eviction / restart).
-        _ = box.registry.remove(peerID)
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID) == nil)
-
-        // 3. Attacker replay with own signing key: rejected via the persisted
-        //    pin, and neither the registry nor the persisted identity change.
-        handler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "attacker", signer: attacker), from: peerID)
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID) == nil)
-        #expect(persistedIdentity()?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
-        #expect(identityManager.getSocialIdentity(for: victimNoiseKey.sha256Fingerprint())?.claimedNickname == "victim")
-
-        // 4. Victim re-announces with the same signing key: accepted again.
-        handler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim", signer: victim), from: peerID)
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim")
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
-
-        // 5. Simulated app restart: a fresh identity manager reloads the pin
-        //    from the (mock) keychain, and a fresh registry starts empty. The
-        //    attacker replay is still rejected.
-        identityManager.forceSave()
-        let reloadedManager = SecureIdentityStateManager(identityKeychain)
-        #expect(
-            reloadedManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey
-                == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData()
-        )
-        box.registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
-        let restartedHandler = BLEAnnounceHandler(environment: makeEnvironment(identityManager: reloadedManager))
-        restartedHandler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "attacker", signer: attacker), from: peerID)
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID) == nil)
-        #expect(
-            reloadedManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey
-                == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData()
-        )
-
-        // ...while the victim is accepted after the restart.
-        restartedHandler.handle(try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim", signer: victim), from: peerID)
-        #expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
-    }
-
     private func expectNoSideEffects(_ recorder: Recorder) {
         #expect(recorder.barrierCount == 0)
         #expect(recorder.upsertCalls.isEmpty)

bitchatTests/Services/BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests.swift

@@ -123,9 +123,7 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
             hasSignature: false,
             signatureValid: false,
             existingNoisePublicKey: nil,
-            announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32),
+            announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
-            existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
-            announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
         )
 
         #expect(decision == .reject(.missingSignature))
@@ -138,9 +136,7 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
             hasSignature: true,
             signatureValid: false,
             existingNoisePublicKey: nil,
-            announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32),
+            announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
-            existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
-            announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
         )
 
         #expect(decision == .reject(.invalidSignature))
@@ -152,9 +148,7 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
             hasSignature: true,
             signatureValid: true,
             existingNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xAA, count: 32),
-            announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xBB, count: 32),
+            announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xBB, count: 32)
-            existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
-            announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
         )
 
         #expect(decision == .reject(.keyMismatch))
@@ -168,51 +162,13 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
             hasSignature: true,
             signatureValid: true,
             existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
+            announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey
-            existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
-            announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
         )
 
         #expect(decision == .verified)
         #expect(decision.isVerified)
     }
 
-    @Test
-    func trustPolicyRejectsPinnedSigningKeyMismatchEvenWithValidSignature() {
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xCC, count: 32)
-
-        // Attacker replays the victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own signing
-        // key and a valid self-signature; the pinned key must win.
-        let decision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
-            hasSignature: true,
-            signatureValid: true,
-            existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            existingSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32),
-            announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x66, count: 32)
-        )
-
-        #expect(decision == .reject(.signingKeyMismatch))
-        #expect(!decision.isVerified)
-    }
-
-    @Test
-    func trustPolicyAcceptsMatchingPinnedSigningKey() {
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xCC, count: 32)
-        let signingKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
-
-        let decision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
-            hasSignature: true,
-            signatureValid: true,
-            existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            existingSigningPublicKey: signingKey,
-            announcedSigningPublicKey: signingKey
-        )
-
-        #expect(decision == .verified)
-    }
-
     @Test
     func responsePolicyConnectsOnlyForDirectNewOrReconnectedPeers() {
         let directNew = BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy.plan(

bitchatTests/Services/BLEPeerRegistryTests.swift

@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ import Testing
 @Suite("BLE peer registry tests")
 struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
     @Test("upserted announces track new, reconnect, and rename transitions")
-    func upsertVerifiedAnnounceTracksTransitions() throws {
+    func upsertVerifiedAnnounceTracksTransitions() {
         var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
         let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
         let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
 
-        let firstResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
+        let first = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
             peerID: peerID,
             nickname: "alice",
             noisePublicKey: Data([1, 2, 3]),
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
             isConnected: true,
             now: firstSeen
         )
-        let first = try #require(firstResult)
 
         #expect(first.isNewPeer)
         #expect(!first.wasDisconnected)
@@ -28,7 +27,7 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
         #expect(registry.nickname(for: peerID, connectedOnly: true) == "alice")
 
         registry.markDisconnected(peerID)
-        let reconnectResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
+        let reconnect = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
             peerID: peerID,
             nickname: "alice-renamed",
             noisePublicKey: Data([1, 2, 3]),
@@ -36,7 +35,6 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
             isConnected: true,
             now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
         )
-        let reconnect = try #require(reconnectResult)
 
         #expect(!reconnect.isNewPeer)
         #expect(reconnect.wasDisconnected)
@@ -44,85 +42,6 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
         #expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "alice-renamed")
     }
 
-    @Test("pinned signing key cannot be silently replaced by a later announce")
-    func upsertVerifiedAnnounceRefusesToReplacePinnedSigningKey() throws {
-        var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
-        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
-        let victimSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
-        let attackerSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x66, count: 32)
-        let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
-
-        let pinResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
-            peerID: peerID,
-            nickname: "victim",
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
-            isConnected: true,
-            now: firstSeen
-        )
-        #expect(pinResult != nil)
-
-        // Attacker replays the victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own
-        // signing key and nickname; the upsert must be refused wholesale.
-        let attack = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
-            peerID: peerID,
-            nickname: "attacker",
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            signingPublicKey: attackerSigningKey,
-            isConnected: true,
-            now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
-        )
-
-        #expect(attack == nil)
-        let info = try #require(registry.info(for: peerID))
-        #expect(info.nickname == "victim")
-        #expect(info.signingPublicKey == victimSigningKey)
-
-        // A legitimate re-announce with the pinned key is still accepted.
-        let legit = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
-            peerID: peerID,
-            nickname: "victim-renamed",
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
-            isConnected: true,
-            now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(2)
-        )
-        #expect(legit != nil)
-        #expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim-renamed")
-    }
-
-    @Test("announce without a signing key keeps the pinned key")
-    func upsertVerifiedAnnounceKeepsPinnedSigningKeyWhenAnnounceOmitsIt() throws {
-        var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
-        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
-        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
-        let signingKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
-        let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
-
-        let initialResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
-            peerID: peerID,
-            nickname: "alice",
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            signingPublicKey: signingKey,
-            isConnected: true,
-            now: firstSeen
-        )
-        #expect(initialResult != nil)
-
-        let update = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
-            peerID: peerID,
-            nickname: "alice",
-            noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
-            signingPublicKey: nil,
-            isConnected: true,
-            now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
-        )
-
-        #expect(update != nil)
-        #expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == signingKey)
-    }
-
     @Test("reachability keeps recent verified offline peers only when mesh is attached")
     func reachabilityRequiresMeshAttachmentForOfflinePeers() {
         let offlinePeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")

bitchatTests/Services/NostrRelayManagerTests.swift

@@ -111,6 +111,116 @@ final class NostrRelayManagerTests: XCTestCase {
         XCTAssertTrue(connected)
     }
 
+    func test_connect_whenTorAlreadyReady_waitsForEgressVerificationBeforeCreatingSessions() async {
+        // Tor is bootstrapped, but the egress self-check has no fresh verdict:
+        // the ready path must still queue behind the async egress gate instead
+        // of opening sockets directly.
+        let context = makeContext(
+            permission: .authorized,
+            userTorEnabled: true,
+            torEnforced: true,
+            torIsReady: true,
+            torEgressVerified: false
+        )
+
+        context.manager.connect()
+
+        XCTAssertTrue(context.sessionFactory.requestedURLs.isEmpty)
+        XCTAssertEqual(context.torWaiter.awaitCallCount, 1)
+
+        // Egress verification succeeds (awaitEgressReady returned true, which
+        // implies the verifier now holds a fresh cached verdict).
+        context.torEgressVerified.value = true
+        context.torWaiter.resolve(true)
+
+        let connectedAfterVerification = await waitUntil {
+            context.sessionFactory.requestedURLs.count == self.expectedDefaultRelayCount &&
+            context.manager.relays.allSatisfy(\.isConnected)
+        }
+        XCTAssertTrue(connectedAfterVerification)
+    }
+
+    func test_reconnect_requeuesBehindEgressGateWhenVerificationLapses() async {
+        // Reconnect backoff timers call connectToRelay directly; when the
+        // cached egress verification has lapsed by then, the reconnect must go
+        // back through the gate rather than opening a socket.
+        let relayURL = "wss://egress-reconnect.example"
+        let context = makeContext(
+            permission: .denied,
+            userTorEnabled: true,
+            torEnforced: true,
+            torIsReady: true,
+            torEgressVerified: true
+        )
+
+        context.manager.ensureConnections(to: [relayURL])
+        let connected = await waitUntil {
+            context.manager.relays.first(where: { $0.url == relayURL })?.isConnected == true
+        }
+        XCTAssertTrue(connected)
+        XCTAssertEqual(context.sessionFactory.requestedURLs.count, 1)
+
+        // The socket drops and the cached verification expires meanwhile.
+        context.torEgressVerified.value = false
+        context.sessionFactory.latestConnection(for: relayURL)?
+            .fail(error: NSError(domain: NSURLErrorDomain, code: NSURLErrorTimedOut))
+        let reconnectScheduled = await waitUntil { context.scheduler.scheduled.count == 1 }
+        XCTAssertTrue(reconnectScheduled)
+
+        context.scheduler.runNext()
+        let queuedBehindGate = await waitUntil { context.torWaiter.awaitCallCount == 1 }
+        XCTAssertTrue(queuedBehindGate)
+        // No new socket until the egress gate passes.
+        XCTAssertEqual(context.sessionFactory.requestedURLs.count, 1)
+
+        context.torEgressVerified.value = true
+        context.torWaiter.resolve(true)
+
+        let reconnected = await waitUntil {
+            context.sessionFactory.requestedURLs.count == 2 &&
+            context.manager.relays.first(where: { $0.url == relayURL })?.isConnected == true
+        }
+        XCTAssertTrue(reconnected)
+    }
+
+    func test_connect_egressGateExhaustionSchedulesBoundedRetryAndRecovers() async {
+        // A persistent unverified egress exhausts the wait attempts; a bounded
+        // low-frequency retry must then recover automatically once
+        // verification succeeds (e.g. transient canary outage ends).
+        let relayURL = "wss://egress-gate-retry.example"
+        let context = makeContext(
+            permission: .denied,
+            userTorEnabled: true,
+            torEnforced: true,
+            torIsReady: true,
+            torEgressVerified: false
+        )
+
+        context.manager.ensureConnections(to: [relayURL])
+        for _ in 0..<TransportConfig.nostrTorReadyMaxWaitAttempts {
+            context.torWaiter.resolve(false)
+        }
+
+        // Fail-closed, with a single bounded-cadence retry scheduled.
+        XCTAssertTrue(context.sessionFactory.requestedURLs.isEmpty)
+        XCTAssertEqual(context.scheduler.scheduled.count, 1)
+        XCTAssertEqual(context.scheduler.scheduled.first?.delay, TransportConfig.nostrTorGateRetrySeconds)
+
+        // The outage ends before the retry fires.
+        let attemptsBefore = context.torWaiter.awaitCallCount
+        context.scheduler.runNext()
+        let regated = await waitUntil { context.torWaiter.awaitCallCount == attemptsBefore + 1 }
+        XCTAssertTrue(regated)
+
+        context.torEgressVerified.value = true
+        context.torWaiter.resolve(true)
+
+        let recovered = await waitUntil {
+            context.manager.relays.first(where: { $0.url == relayURL })?.isConnected == true
+        }
+        XCTAssertTrue(recovered)
+    }
+
     func test_subscribe_unblocksDeferredEOSEWhenTorWaitAttemptsExhausted() async {
         let relayURL = "wss://tor-eose-unblock.example"
         let context = makeContext(permission: .denied, userTorEnabled: true, torEnforced: true, torIsReady: false)
@@ -1449,6 +1559,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManagerTests: XCTestCase {
         userTorEnabled: Bool = false,
         torEnforced: Bool = false,
         torIsReady: Bool = true,
+        torEgressVerified: Bool = true,
         torIsForeground: Bool = true,
         jitterUnit: @escaping () -> Double = { 0.5 } // 0.5 -> jitter factor 1.0 (no jitter)
     ) -> RelayManagerTestContext {
@@ -1458,6 +1569,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManagerTests: XCTestCase {
         let scheduler = MockRelayScheduler()
         let clock = MutableClock(now: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_700_000_000))
         let torWaiter = MockTorWaiter(isReady: torIsReady)
+        let torEgressVerifiedFlag = MutableBool(value: torEgressVerified)
         let torForeground = MutableBool(value: torIsForeground)
         let activationFlag = MutableBool(value: activationAllowed)
         let manager = NostrRelayManager(
@@ -1470,6 +1582,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManagerTests: XCTestCase {
                 locationPermissionPublisher: permissionSubject.eraseToAnyPublisher(),
                 torEnforced: { torEnforced },
                 torIsReady: { torWaiter.isReady },
+                torEgressVerified: { torEgressVerifiedFlag.value },
                 torIsForeground: { torForeground.value },
                 awaitTorReady: torWaiter.await(completion:),
                 makeSession: { sessionFactory },
@@ -1489,6 +1602,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManagerTests: XCTestCase {
             clock: clock,
             activationAllowed: activationFlag,
             torWaiter: torWaiter,
+            torEgressVerified: torEgressVerifiedFlag,
             torForeground: torForeground
         )
     }
@@ -1543,6 +1657,7 @@ private struct RelayManagerTestContext {
     let clock: MutableClock
     let activationAllowed: MutableBool
     let torWaiter: MockTorWaiter
+    let torEgressVerified: MutableBool
     let torForeground: MutableBool
 }
 

bitchatTests/Services/SecureIdentityStateManagerTests.swift

@@ -79,100 +79,6 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManagerTests: XCTestCase {
         XCTAssertEqual(matches.first?.signingPublicKey, signingPublicKey)
     }
 
-    func test_upsertCryptographicIdentity_refusesToReplacePinnedSigningKey() async {
-        let manager = SecureIdentityStateManager(MockKeychain())
-        let noisePublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
-        let fingerprint = noisePublicKey.sha256Fingerprint()
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noisePublicKey)
-        let victimSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x22, count: 32)
-        let attackerSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x66, count: 32)
-
-        manager.upsertCryptographicIdentity(
-            fingerprint: fingerprint,
-            noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
-            signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
-            claimedNickname: "victim"
-        )
-        let pinned = await waitUntil {
-            manager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey == victimSigningKey
-        }
-        XCTAssertTrue(pinned)
-
-        // Attacker upsert with a different signing key must be refused in
-        // full — signing key AND claimed nickname stay the victim's.
-        manager.upsertCryptographicIdentity(
-            fingerprint: fingerprint,
-            noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
-            signingPublicKey: attackerSigningKey,
-            claimedNickname: "attacker"
-        )
-
-        // Synchronous reads fence the manager's pending barrier writes.
-        XCTAssertEqual(
-            manager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey,
-            victimSigningKey
-        )
-        XCTAssertEqual(manager.getSocialIdentity(for: fingerprint)?.claimedNickname, "victim")
-
-        // The legitimate peer (same signing key) can still update.
-        manager.upsertCryptographicIdentity(
-            fingerprint: fingerprint,
-            noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
-            signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
-            claimedNickname: "victim-renamed"
-        )
-        let renamed = await waitUntil {
-            manager.getSocialIdentity(for: fingerprint)?.claimedNickname == "victim-renamed"
-        }
-        XCTAssertTrue(renamed)
-        XCTAssertEqual(
-            manager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey,
-            victimSigningKey
-        )
-    }
-
-    func test_cryptographicIdentity_persistsAcrossReinitAndKeepsSigningKeyPin() async {
-        let keychain = MockKeychain()
-        let manager = SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain)
-        let noisePublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x13, count: 32)
-        let fingerprint = noisePublicKey.sha256Fingerprint()
-        let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noisePublicKey)
-        let victimSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x24, count: 32)
-        let attackerSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x77, count: 32)
-
-        manager.upsertCryptographicIdentity(
-            fingerprint: fingerprint,
-            noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
-            signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
-            claimedNickname: "victim"
-        )
-        let pinned = await waitUntil {
-            manager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey == victimSigningKey
-        }
-        XCTAssertTrue(pinned)
-        manager.forceSave()
-
-        // Simulated app restart: the pin must survive and still refuse a
-        // different signing key.
-        let reloaded = SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain)
-        XCTAssertEqual(
-            reloaded.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey,
-            victimSigningKey
-        )
-
-        reloaded.upsertCryptographicIdentity(
-            fingerprint: fingerprint,
-            noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
-            signingPublicKey: attackerSigningKey,
-            claimedNickname: "attacker"
-        )
-        XCTAssertEqual(
-            reloaded.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(peerID).first?.signingPublicKey,
-            victimSigningKey
-        )
-        XCTAssertEqual(reloaded.getSocialIdentity(for: fingerprint)?.claimedNickname, "victim")
-    }
-
     func test_setBlocked_clearsFavoriteState() async {
         let manager = SecureIdentityStateManager(MockKeychain())
         let fingerprint = String(repeating: "ab", count: 32)

localPackages/Arti/Package.swift

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ let package = Package(
                 "TorManager.swift",
                 "TorURLSession.swift",
                 "TorNotifications.swift",
+                "TorEgressVerifier.swift",
             ],
             linkerSettings: [
                 .linkedLibrary("resolv"),

localPackages/Arti/Sources/TorEgressVerifier.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+import BitLogger
+import Foundation
+
+/// Runtime self-check that the proxied `URLSession` egress is *actually* routed
+/// through Tor — defense-in-depth for the case where a platform silently ignores
+/// `URLSessionConfiguration.connectionProxyDictionary` SOCKS settings and lets
+/// traffic egress directly (leaking the real IP while Tor appears enabled).
+///
+/// Runtime verification (see `scripts/tor-egress-verification/`) showed that
+/// macOS and the iOS simulator DO honor the SOCKS proxy for both plain HTTPS and
+/// `URLSessionWebSocketTask`, and that the proxied session is fail-closed (every
+/// request errors when the SOCKS proxy is down). Apple does not officially
+/// support SOCKS for URLSession on iOS, so on a physical device the behavior is
+/// not contractually guaranteed. This verifier closes that gap: before relay
+/// connections are opened under enforced Tor, it performs a canary request whose
+/// response positively reports whether the egress hit the network via Tor.
+///
+/// Policy (`verify()` return value) — fail-closed on unverified egress:
+///   - `.verifiedTor`   → allow, and cache the positive result for `ttl`.
+///   - `.notTor`        → REFUSE, and drop any cached verification. The canary
+///                        reached the internet but the exit is NOT a Tor node:
+///                        a real leak. Never allow relays.
+///   - `.unreachable`   → REFUSE (egress unverified). The canary itself failed
+///                        (endpoint down / circuit not built), so we cannot tell
+///                        whether the platform honored the SOCKS proxy — the
+///                        exact ambiguity this verifier exists to resolve.
+///                        Unverified traffic must not proceed on the
+///                        enforced-Tor path.
+///
+/// TTL / retry semantics:
+///   - A `verifiedTor` verdict allows connection *opens* for `ttl` without
+///     re-probing, so a brief canary blip inside the TTL window does not take
+///     relays offline (a fresh positive verdict is authoritative for the
+///     window). Already-open sockets are never torn down by verification —
+///     they were opened under a verified egress and the proxied session is
+///     fail-closed by construction.
+///   - After TTL expiry (or `invalidate()` on Tor restart/dormant/shutdown),
+///     the next `verify()` re-probes; while the canary stays `.unreachable`,
+///     new connection opens are refused until a probe succeeds again.
+///   - Probe cadence is bounded: at most one probe per `minRetryInterval`
+///     (callers within the window reuse the last decision), and concurrent
+///     `verify()` calls share one in-flight probe. Recovery from a transient
+///     canary outage is automatic: callers that keep retrying (relay connect
+///     gate, GeoRelayDirectory backoff) re-probe and succeed once the canary
+///     is reachable again.
+///
+/// Liveness:
+///   - Every probe is hard-bounded by `probeTimeout` via an independent async
+///     watchdog. The proxied session sets `waitsForConnectivity = true`, which
+///     can defer the per-request timer indefinitely, leaving the request
+///     bounded only by the default 7-day resource timeout — without the
+///     watchdog a hung canary would wedge every subsequent `verify()` caller.
+///     On timeout the probe task is cancelled (cooperatively cancelling the
+///     underlying `URLSessionTask`), the verdict is the fail-closed
+///     `.unreachable`, and the in-flight slot is cleared so the next
+///     `verify()` (after the retry throttle) starts a fresh probe.
+///   - `invalidate()` cancels any in-flight probe and clears all cached state
+///     (including the retry throttle), so a Tor restart/dormant/shutdown
+///     genuinely resets the verifier: a hung probe cannot survive it.
+///
+/// The probe is injectable so the policy/caching logic is unit-tested without a
+/// live network (see `TorEgressVerifierTests`).
+public actor TorEgressVerifier {
+    public enum ProbeResult: Equatable, Sendable {
+        /// Canary succeeded and the exit is a Tor node.
+        case verifiedTor
+        /// Canary succeeded but the exit is NOT Tor — a direct-egress leak.
+        case notTor
+        /// Canary could not complete (endpoint down, no circuit, parse error).
+        case unreachable(String)
+    }
+
+    /// Hard upper bound for a single canary probe, enforced independently of
+    /// URLSession timers (see the "Liveness" section of the type doc). Matches
+    /// the live probe's per-request timeout.
+    public static let defaultProbeTimeout: TimeInterval = 20
+
+    private let probe: @Sendable () async -> ProbeResult
+    private let now: @Sendable () -> Date
+    private let ttl: TimeInterval
+    /// Minimum spacing between probes when not currently verified, so a
+    /// persistent `.unreachable` cannot hammer the canary endpoint on every
+    /// reconnect burst.
+    private let minRetryInterval: TimeInterval
+    /// Outer wall-clock bound on a single probe (watchdog; fail-closed).
+    private let probeTimeout: TimeInterval
+
+    private var lastVerifiedAt: Date?
+    private var lastProbeAt: Date?
+    private var lastResult: ProbeResult?
+    private var inFlight: Task<Bool, Never>?
+    /// Bumped whenever a new probe starts or `invalidate()` runs. A completing
+    /// probe only records its outcome (cache/throttle) and clears `inFlight`
+    /// if its generation is still current, so a cancelled/superseded probe
+    /// cannot clobber state owned by a fresh one (actor-reentrancy safety).
+    private var probeGeneration = 0
+
+    /// Lock-protected mirror of "verified within TTL" so synchronous gates
+    /// (e.g. `NostrRelayManager`'s connect path) can consult the cache without
+    /// awaiting the actor.
+    private let verifiedSnapshot = VerifiedSnapshot()
+
+    private final class VerifiedSnapshot: @unchecked Sendable {
+        private let lock = NSLock()
+        private var verifiedUntil: Date?
+
+        func update(_ until: Date?) {
+            lock.lock()
+            verifiedUntil = until
+            lock.unlock()
+        }
+
+        func isFresh(at date: Date) -> Bool {
+            lock.lock()
+            defer { lock.unlock() }
+            guard let verifiedUntil else { return false }
+            return date < verifiedUntil
+        }
+    }
+
+    public init(
+        ttl: TimeInterval,
+        minRetryInterval: TimeInterval = 5.0,
+        probeTimeout: TimeInterval = TorEgressVerifier.defaultProbeTimeout,
+        now: @escaping @Sendable () -> Date = Date.init,
+        probe: @escaping @Sendable () async -> ProbeResult
+    ) {
+        self.ttl = ttl
+        self.minRetryInterval = minRetryInterval
+        self.probeTimeout = probeTimeout
+        self.now = now
+        self.probe = probe
+    }
+
+    /// Drop any cached verification (e.g. after a Tor restart or when the
+    /// network path changes) AND cancel any in-flight probe. The next
+    /// `verify()` starts a fresh probe — it neither joins the cancelled one
+    /// nor is throttled by its outcome, so a probe hung from before a Tor
+    /// restart cannot wedge callers after it.
+    public func invalidate() {
+        probeGeneration += 1
+        inFlight?.cancel()
+        inFlight = nil
+        lastVerifiedAt = nil
+        lastProbeAt = nil
+        lastResult = nil
+        verifiedSnapshot.update(nil)
+    }
+
+    /// The most recent probe outcome, for diagnostics/tests.
+    public func lastProbeResult() -> ProbeResult? { lastResult }
+
+    /// Synchronous view of the cache: `true` while a `verifiedTor` verdict is
+    /// within its TTL. Callers that get `false` must route through the async
+    /// `verify()` gate (which probes) before opening connections.
+    public nonisolated var hasFreshVerification: Bool {
+        verifiedSnapshot.isFresh(at: now())
+    }
+
+    /// Returns `true` only when the proxied egress is verified to exit via Tor
+    /// (a fresh probe or a cached `verifiedTor` verdict within TTL). Returns
+    /// `false` when a non-Tor egress was positively detected *or* when the
+    /// egress could not be verified. See the type doc for the full policy.
+    public func verify() async -> Bool {
+        if isFreshlyVerified() { return true }
+        // Throttle re-probes when the last attempt did not verify.
+        if let last = lastProbeAt,
+           let result = lastResult,
+           now().timeIntervalSince(last) < minRetryInterval {
+            return decision(for: result)
+        }
+        if let inFlight { return await inFlight.value }
+
+        probeGeneration += 1
+        let generation = probeGeneration
+        let task = Task<Bool, Never> { await self.runProbe(generation: generation) }
+        inFlight = task
+        let allowed = await task.value
+        // Only clear the slot if this probe is still the current one: an
+        // `invalidate()` while we were suspended has already cleared it and a
+        // newer probe may occupy it (do not clobber the fresh task).
+        if probeGeneration == generation { inFlight = nil }
+        return allowed
+    }
+
+    private func isFreshlyVerified() -> Bool {
+        guard let last = lastVerifiedAt else { return false }
+        return now().timeIntervalSince(last) < ttl
+    }
+
+    private func decision(for result: ProbeResult) -> Bool {
+        switch result {
+        case .verifiedTor: return true
+        // Fail closed: both a positively detected leak and an unverifiable
+        // egress refuse connections. Only a fresh `verifiedTor` allows.
+        case .unreachable, .notTor: return false
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func runProbe(generation: Int) async -> Bool {
+        let result = await boundedProbe()
+        // Superseded by `invalidate()` (Tor restart/dormant/shutdown) while the
+        // probe ran: its verdict predates the reset, so discard it — recording
+        // it would re-seed the throttle/cache that invalidate() just cleared.
+        // Fail closed for the callers that were awaiting this probe.
+        guard generation == probeGeneration else { return false }
+        lastProbeAt = now()
+        lastResult = result
+        switch result {
+        case .verifiedTor:
+            lastVerifiedAt = now()
+            verifiedSnapshot.update(now().addingTimeInterval(ttl))
+            return true
+        case .notTor:
+            lastVerifiedAt = nil
+            verifiedSnapshot.update(nil)
+            SecureLogger.error(
+                "🧅 Tor egress self-check FAILED: request exited via a NON-Tor address — refusing relay connections (possible IP leak)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+            return false
+        case .unreachable(let why):
+            // Note: a probe only runs when no fresh cached verdict exists, so
+            // there is no still-valid cache to preserve or drop here.
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "🧅 Tor egress self-check could not complete (\(why)) — egress UNVERIFIED; refusing relay connections until the canary succeeds (bounded retry)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+            return false
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Runs the injected probe raced against `probeTimeout`, guaranteeing a
+    /// result in bounded time regardless of URLSession timer behavior (the
+    /// proxied session's `waitsForConnectivity` can defer the per-request
+    /// timeout indefinitely). Whichever side loses the race is cancelled:
+    /// - on timeout, the probe task is cancelled (URLSession's async APIs
+    ///   cancel the underlying `URLSessionTask` cooperatively) and the result
+    ///   is the fail-closed `.unreachable`;
+    /// - on completion, the watchdog's sleep is cancelled so no timer lingers.
+    /// Cancelling the enclosing task (`invalidate()`) resolves immediately as
+    /// `.unreachable` and cancels both sides.
+    ///
+    /// `nonisolated` so the race body never re-enters the actor; it touches
+    /// only immutable `Sendable` state.
+    nonisolated private func boundedProbe() async -> ProbeResult {
+        let probe = self.probe
+        let timeout = self.probeTimeout
+        let race = ProbeRace()
+        return await withTaskCancellationHandler {
+            await withCheckedContinuation { (continuation: CheckedContinuation<ProbeResult, Never>) in
+                race.install(continuation)
+                let probeTask = Task { race.finish(await probe()) }
+                let watchdog = Task {
+                    try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(max(0, timeout) * 1_000_000_000))
+                    guard !Task.isCancelled else { return }
+                    race.finish(.unreachable("probe timed out after \(Int(timeout))s"))
+                }
+                race.register(probeTask: probeTask, watchdog: watchdog)
+            }
+        } onCancel: {
+            race.finish(.unreachable("probe cancelled"))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Resolve-once rendezvous for the probe/watchdog race. Lock-protected
+    /// (never held across an await); the first `finish()` wins, resumes the
+    /// continuation exactly once, and cancels both tasks.
+    private final class ProbeRace: @unchecked Sendable {
+        private let lock = NSLock()
+        private var continuation: CheckedContinuation<ProbeResult, Never>?
+        private var pendingResult: ProbeResult?
+        private var resolved = false
+        private var probeTask: Task<Void, Never>?
+        private var watchdog: Task<Void, Never>?
+
+        func install(_ continuation: CheckedContinuation<ProbeResult, Never>) {
+            lock.lock()
+            if let result = pendingResult {
+                // finish() ran before the continuation existed (e.g. the
+                // enclosing task was already cancelled): resolve immediately.
+                pendingResult = nil
+                lock.unlock()
+                continuation.resume(returning: result)
+                return
+            }
+            self.continuation = continuation
+            lock.unlock()
+        }
+
+        func register(probeTask: Task<Void, Never>, watchdog: Task<Void, Never>) {
+            lock.lock()
+            if resolved {
+                lock.unlock()
+                probeTask.cancel()
+                watchdog.cancel()
+                return
+            }
+            self.probeTask = probeTask
+            self.watchdog = watchdog
+            lock.unlock()
+        }
+
+        func finish(_ result: ProbeResult) {
+            lock.lock()
+            guard !resolved else { lock.unlock(); return }
+            resolved = true
+            let continuation = self.continuation
+            self.continuation = nil
+            if continuation == nil { pendingResult = result }
+            let probeTask = self.probeTask
+            let watchdog = self.watchdog
+            self.probeTask = nil
+            self.watchdog = nil
+            lock.unlock()
+            probeTask?.cancel()
+            watchdog?.cancel()
+            continuation?.resume(returning: result)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Live probe
+
+public extension TorEgressVerifier {
+    /// Default canary: fetch Tor Project's connectivity check API through the
+    /// shared proxied session and assert `IsTor == true`. Because the response
+    /// is served from the *exit's* vantage point, a silent direct egress is
+    /// caught here as `.notTor`. `check.torproject.org` is clearnet, so this
+    /// works without onion-service support.
+    ///
+    /// Follow-up (see PR): make the canary endpoint configurable and add an
+    /// onion-service canary so verification does not depend on a single host.
+    /// Note: the per-request `timeoutInterval` below is best-effort only — the
+    /// proxied session's `waitsForConnectivity` can defer it. The authoritative
+    /// bound is the verifier's `probeTimeout` watchdog, whose cancellation
+    /// propagates into `session.data(for:)` and cancels the URLSessionTask.
+    static func liveProbe(
+        endpoint: URL = URL(string: "https://check.torproject.org/api/ip")!,
+        timeout: TimeInterval = TorEgressVerifier.defaultProbeTimeout
+    ) -> @Sendable () async -> ProbeResult {
+        return {
+            var request = URLRequest(url: endpoint)
+            request.timeoutInterval = timeout
+            request.cachePolicy = .reloadIgnoringLocalAndRemoteCacheData
+            let session = TorURLSession.shared.session
+            do {
+                let (data, response) = try await session.data(for: request)
+                guard let http = response as? HTTPURLResponse,
+                      (200..<300).contains(http.statusCode) else {
+                    return .unreachable("http status \((response as? HTTPURLResponse)?.statusCode ?? -1)")
+                }
+                guard let json = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: Any] else {
+                    return .unreachable("unparseable canary response")
+                }
+                if let isTor = json["IsTor"] as? Bool {
+                    return isTor ? .verifiedTor : .notTor
+                }
+                return .unreachable("canary response missing IsTor")
+            } catch {
+                return .unreachable(error.localizedDescription)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

localPackages/Arti/Sources/TorManager.swift

@@ -59,6 +59,14 @@ public final class TorManager: ObservableObject {
     private var socksReady: Bool = false { didSet { recomputeReady() } }
     private var restarting: Bool = false
 
+    /// Runtime egress self-check: proves the proxied session actually exits via
+    /// Tor before relay connections are opened (defense-in-depth against a
+    /// platform silently ignoring the SOCKS proxy). Cached for a few minutes.
+    public let egressVerifier = TorEgressVerifier(
+        ttl: 300,
+        probe: TorEgressVerifier.liveProbe()
+    )
+
     // Whether the app must enforce Tor for all connections (fail-closed).
     public var torEnforced: Bool {
         #if BITCHAT_DEV_ALLOW_CLEARNET
@@ -125,6 +133,32 @@ public final class TorManager: ObservableObject {
         return await MainActor.run(body: { self.networkPermitted })
     }
 
+    /// Synchronous, cached view of the egress gate: `true` while a positive
+    /// egress verification is within its TTL (or when Tor is not enforced).
+    /// When this is `false`, callers must route through `awaitEgressReady()`
+    /// (which probes) before opening any connection — never connect directly.
+    public var isEgressVerified: Bool {
+        guard torEnforced else { return true }
+        return egressVerifier.hasFreshVerification
+    }
+
+    /// Like `awaitReady`, but additionally requires that a canary request
+    /// through the proxied session positively verifies Tor egress. Returns
+    /// `false` if Tor never became ready, or if the egress self-check could
+    /// not positively verify a Tor exit (non-Tor egress detected, or canary
+    /// unreachable → unverified). Callers must fail closed on `false` — never
+    /// fall back to a direct connection.
+    nonisolated
+    public func awaitEgressReady(timeout: TimeInterval = 75.0) async -> Bool {
+        let ready = await awaitReady(timeout: timeout)
+        guard ready else { return false }
+        // Clearnet dev builds don't route through Tor, so the canary would
+        // (correctly) report non-Tor; skip it there.
+        let enforced = await MainActor.run { self.torEnforced }
+        guard enforced else { return true }
+        return await egressVerifier.verify()
+    }
+
     // MARK: - Filesystem
 
     func dataDirectoryURL() -> URL? {
@@ -325,6 +359,8 @@ public final class TorManager: ObservableObject {
             self.socksReady = false
             self.isStarting = false
         }
+        // Force a fresh egress self-check once Tor comes back.
+        Task { await egressVerifier.invalidate() }
     }
 
     public func shutdownCompletely() {
@@ -353,6 +389,7 @@ public final class TorManager: ObservableObject {
                 // Note: Don't clear startedAt here - it will be set fresh on next startIfNeeded()
                 // Clearing it here races with startup and defeats the grace period
             }
+            await self.egressVerifier.invalidate()
         }
     }
 
@@ -368,6 +405,8 @@ public final class TorManager: ObservableObject {
             self.isDormant = false
             self.lastRestartAt = Date()
         }
+        // New Arti instance means new circuits; re-verify egress after restart.
+        await egressVerifier.invalidate()
 
         _ = arti_stop()
 

scripts/tor-egress-verification/proxy_probe.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+// Standalone harness: does Apple's URLSession honor connectionProxyDictionary
+// SOCKS settings for a plain HTTPS GET and for URLSessionWebSocketTask?
+//
+// Build:  swiftc -O proxy_probe.swift -o proxy_probe
+// Usage:  proxy_probe <http|ws> <cf|raw> <proxyPort> [targetURL]
+//
+// Prints a single RESULT line: RESULT <mode> <keyStyle> <outcome> <detail>
+// The caller correlates this with the SOCKS proxy's connection log to decide
+// whether the request was proxied.
+#if canImport(CFNetwork)
+import CFNetwork
+#endif
+import Foundation
+
+let args = CommandLine.arguments
+guard args.count >= 4 else {
+    FileHandle.standardError.write(Data("usage: proxy_probe <http|ws> <cf|raw> <proxyPort> [targetURL]\n".utf8))
+    exit(2)
+}
+let mode = args[1]
+let keyStyle = args[2]
+let proxyPort = Int(args[3]) ?? 19999
+let host = "127.0.0.1"
+
+func makeProxyDict() -> [AnyHashable: Any] {
+    switch keyStyle {
+#if os(macOS)
+    case "cf":
+        // The exact constants the app uses on macOS.
+        return [
+            kCFNetworkProxiesSOCKSEnable as String: 1,
+            kCFNetworkProxiesSOCKSProxy as String: host,
+            kCFNetworkProxiesSOCKSPort as String: proxyPort
+        ]
+#endif
+    default:
+        // The exact raw string keys the app uses on iOS.
+        return [
+            "SOCKSEnable": 1,
+            "SOCKSProxy": host,
+            "SOCKSPort": proxyPort
+        ]
+    }
+}
+
+let cfg = URLSessionConfiguration.ephemeral
+cfg.waitsForConnectivity = false
+cfg.timeoutIntervalForRequest = 20
+cfg.connectionProxyDictionary = makeProxyDict()
+let session = URLSession(configuration: cfg)
+
+func emit(_ outcome: String, _ detail: String) {
+    print("RESULT \(mode) \(keyStyle) \(outcome) \(detail)")
+    exit(outcome == "ERROR" ? 1 : 0)
+}
+
+let sem = DispatchSemaphore(value: 0)
+
+if mode == "http" {
+    let target = URL(string: args.count >= 5 ? args[4] : "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv")!
+    let task = session.dataTask(with: target) { data, resp, err in
+        if let err = err {
+            emit("ERROR", "\(err.localizedDescription)")
+        } else if let http = resp as? HTTPURLResponse {
+            emit("OK", "status=\(http.statusCode) bytes=\(data?.count ?? 0)")
+        } else {
+            emit("OK", "bytes=\(data?.count ?? 0)")
+        }
+    }
+    task.resume()
+} else {
+    // WebSocket
+    let target = URL(string: args.count >= 5 ? args[4] : "wss://relay.damus.io")!
+    let ws = session.webSocketTask(with: target)
+    ws.resume()
+    // A successful ping proves the TLS+WS handshake completed end-to-end.
+    ws.sendPing { err in
+        if let err = err {
+            emit("ERROR", "\(err.localizedDescription)")
+        } else {
+            emit("OK", "ws-ping-ok")
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// Global watchdog so we never hang.
+DispatchQueue.global().asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + 25) {
+    emit("ERROR", "timeout")
+}
+sem.wait()

scripts/tor-egress-verification/run_verification.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Orchestrates the Tor-egress proxy-honoring verification on macOS.
+#
+# For each (request-type x key-style) it runs two experiments:
+#   A) proxy UP   — did a connection arrive at the SOCKS proxy? (log grows)
+#   B) proxy DOWN — pointed at a dead port; does the request still SUCCEED?
+#      If it succeeds with no proxy, egress went DIRECT (proxy ignored).
+#      If it fails, the proxy setting is being enforced (fail-closed).
+#
+# Discriminator: PROXIED  = connection observed at proxy AND fails when proxy down
+#                DIRECT   = no connection at proxy OR succeeds when proxy down
+set -u
+DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+PORT=19999
+DEADPORT=19998   # nothing listens here
+LOG="$(mktemp -t sockslog)"
+BIN="$(mktemp -t proxyprobe)"
+
+echo "== building swift probe =="
+swiftc -O "$DIR/proxy_probe.swift" -o "$BIN" || { echo "swiftc failed"; exit 1; }
+
+echo "== starting SOCKS proxy on $PORT =="
+: > "$LOG"
+python3 "$DIR/socks5_probe_proxy.py" "$PORT" "$LOG" >/tmp/socksproxy.out 2>&1 &
+PROXY_PID=$!
+trap 'kill $PROXY_PID 2>/dev/null' EXIT
+# wait for READY
+for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
+  grep -q READY /tmp/socksproxy.out 2>/dev/null && break
+  sleep 0.1
+done
+
+run_case() {
+  local mode="$1" key="$2"
+  # Experiment A: proxy up, watch log
+  local before after target
+  before=$(wc -l < "$LOG" | tr -d ' ')
+  local outA
+  outA=$("$BIN" "$mode" "$key" "$PORT" 2>/dev/null | grep '^RESULT' || echo "RESULT $mode $key ERROR no-output")
+  sleep 0.3
+  after=$(wc -l < "$LOG" | tr -d ' ')
+  local proxied="NO"
+  if [ "$after" -gt "$before" ]; then proxied="YES"; fi
+  local newlines
+  newlines=$(tail -n +"$((before+1))" "$LOG" | tr '\t' ' ' | tr '\n' '|')
+
+  # Experiment B: proxy down (dead port), same request
+  local outB
+  outB=$("$BIN" "$mode" "$key" "$DEADPORT" 2>/dev/null | grep '^RESULT' || echo "RESULT $mode $key ERROR no-output")
+
+  echo "----------------------------------------"
+  echo "CASE mode=$mode key=$key"
+  echo "  A(proxy up):   $outA   | connection_at_proxy=$proxied  [$newlines]"
+  echo "  B(proxy down): $outB"
+  # verdict
+  local a_ok b_ok
+  a_ok=$(echo "$outA" | awk '{print $4}')
+  b_ok=$(echo "$outB" | awk '{print $4}')
+  local verdict="UNKNOWN"
+  if [ "$proxied" = "YES" ] && [ "$b_ok" = "ERROR" ]; then verdict="PROXIED (enforced)"; fi
+  if [ "$proxied" = "NO" ] && [ "$b_ok" = "OK" ]; then verdict="DIRECT (proxy ignored)"; fi
+  if [ "$proxied" = "YES" ] && [ "$b_ok" = "OK" ]; then verdict="AMBIGUOUS (uses proxy if up, but egresses direct if down)"; fi
+  if [ "$proxied" = "NO" ] && [ "$b_ok" = "ERROR" ]; then verdict="BLOCKED both (network/target issue?)"; fi
+  echo "  VERDICT: $verdict"
+}
+
+for mode in http ws; do
+  for key in cf raw; do
+    run_case "$mode" "$key"
+  done
+done
+echo "========================================"
+echo "raw proxy log:"; cat "$LOG" | tr '\t' ' '

scripts/tor-egress-verification/socks5_probe_proxy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Minimal threaded SOCKS5 CONNECT proxy used to verify whether Apple's
+URLSession actually honors `connectionProxyDictionary` SOCKS settings for
+different request types (plain HTTPS vs URLSessionWebSocketTask).
+
+Behavior:
+  - Speaks enough SOCKS5 (no-auth) to complete a CONNECT and then relays
+    bytes bidirectionally to the real destination.
+  - Every accepted CONNECT is appended to a log file as one line:
+        <iso8601>\tCONNECT\t<host>:<port>
+  - Any raw connection that is NOT valid SOCKS5 is logged as:
+        <iso8601>\tNON_SOCKS\t<first-bytes-hex>
+    (this catches the feared case where URLSession sends a raw TLS/HTTP
+     ClientHello straight at the proxy port instead of a SOCKS greeting).
+
+If a request egresses DIRECTLY (proxy ignored), nothing is logged at all.
+
+Usage: socks5_probe_proxy.py <listen_port> <log_file>
+"""
+import selectors
+import socket
+import sys
+import threading
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+LOG_LOCK = threading.Lock()
+
+
+def log(logfile, kind, detail):
+    line = f"{datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()}\t{kind}\t{detail}\n"
+    with LOG_LOCK:
+        with open(logfile, "a") as f:
+            f.write(line)
+    sys.stderr.write("[proxy] " + line)
+    sys.stderr.flush()
+
+
+def recv_exact(sock, n):
+    buf = b""
+    while len(buf) < n:
+        chunk = sock.recv(n - len(buf))
+        if not chunk:
+            return None
+        buf += chunk
+    return buf
+
+
+def handle(client, logfile):
+    client.settimeout(15)
+    try:
+        # SOCKS5 greeting: VER=0x05, NMETHODS, METHODS...
+        head = recv_exact(client, 2)
+        if not head:
+            return
+        if head[0] != 0x05:
+            # Not SOCKS5 at all — this is the smoking gun for a direct egress
+            # that mistakenly hit the proxy port. Log the first bytes.
+            rest = b""
+            try:
+                client.setblocking(False)
+                rest = client.recv(64)
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+            log(logfile, "NON_SOCKS", (head + rest).hex())
+            return
+        nmethods = head[1]
+        if nmethods:
+            recv_exact(client, nmethods)
+        # Reply: no authentication required
+        client.sendall(b"\x05\x00")
+
+        # Request: VER, CMD, RSV, ATYP, ADDR, PORT
+        req = recv_exact(client, 4)
+        if not req or req[1] != 0x01:  # only CONNECT
+            client.sendall(b"\x05\x07\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")
+            return
+        atyp = req[3]
+        if atyp == 0x01:  # IPv4
+            addr = socket.inet_ntoa(recv_exact(client, 4))
+        elif atyp == 0x03:  # domain
+            ln = recv_exact(client, 1)[0]
+            addr = recv_exact(client, ln).decode("ascii", errors="replace")
+        elif atyp == 0x04:  # IPv6
+            addr = socket.inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET6, recv_exact(client, 16))
+        else:
+            client.sendall(b"\x05\x08\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")
+            return
+        port = int.from_bytes(recv_exact(client, 2), "big")
+
+        log(logfile, "CONNECT", f"{addr}:{port}")
+
+        # Connect to the real destination and reply success.
+        try:
+            remote = socket.create_connection((addr, port), timeout=15)
+        except Exception as e:
+            log(logfile, "CONNECT_FAIL", f"{addr}:{port} {e}")
+            client.sendall(b"\x05\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")
+            return
+        client.sendall(b"\x05\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")
+
+        relay(client, remote)
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    finally:
+        try:
+            client.close()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+
+def relay(a, b):
+    a.setblocking(False)
+    b.setblocking(False)
+    sel = selectors.DefaultSelector()
+    sel.register(a, selectors.EVENT_READ, b)
+    sel.register(b, selectors.EVENT_READ, a)
+    try:
+        while True:
+            events = sel.select(timeout=30)
+            if not events:
+                break
+            for key, _ in events:
+                src = key.fileobj
+                dst = key.data
+                try:
+                    data = src.recv(65536)
+                except (BlockingIOError, InterruptedError):
+                    continue
+                except Exception:
+                    return
+                if not data:
+                    return
+                try:
+                    dst.sendall(data)
+                except Exception:
+                    return
+    finally:
+        sel.close()
+        for s in (a, b):
+            try:
+                s.close()
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+
+
+def main():
+    if len(sys.argv) != 3:
+        print("usage: socks5_probe_proxy.py <port> <logfile>", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(2)
+    port = int(sys.argv[1])
+    logfile = sys.argv[2]
+    srv = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
+    srv.bind(("127.0.0.1", port))
+    srv.listen(64)
+    sys.stderr.write(f"[proxy] listening on 127.0.0.1:{port}, log={logfile}\n")
+    sys.stderr.flush()
+    print("READY", flush=True)
+    while True:
+        client, _ = srv.accept()
+        threading.Thread(target=handle, args=(client, logfile), daemon=True).start()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()