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454 changed files with 18693 additions and 121777 deletions
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@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Prevent Github Languages stats skewing:
# Binaries and assets
**/*.xcframework/** linguist-vendored
**/*.xcassets/** linguist-vendored
# Generated files
**/*.pbxproj linguist-generated
**/*.storyboard linguist-generated
Package.resolved linguist-generated
# Downloaded CSVs
relays/online_relays_gps.csv linguist-vendored
# Docs
**/*.md linguist-documentation
# Configs
Configs/*.xcconfig linguist-documentation
**/*.plist linguist-documentation
-85
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@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
name: Arti Binary Provenance
# The Arti xcframework is a vendored binary; these checks turn the policy in
# docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md into an enforced gate:
# 1. The checked-in binary must match the hash manifest in the provenance doc.
# 2. A PR that changes the binary must also change at least one provenance
# input (Rust source, lockfile, build script, or the doc itself).
on:
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- "localPackages/Arti/**"
- "docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md"
pull_request:
paths:
- "localPackages/Arti/**"
- "docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md"
jobs:
verify-hashes:
name: Verify xcframework hashes against provenance doc
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Compare artifact hashes with manifest
run: |
set -euo pipefail
doc="docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md"
# Extract the manifest: lines of "<sha256> <path>" from the doc.
grep -E '^[0-9a-f]{64} localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti\.xcframework/' "$doc" \
| sort -k2 > expected.txt
if [ ! -s expected.txt ]; then
echo "::error::No hash manifest found in $doc"
exit 1
fi
# Hash the same file set the doc documents.
find localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti.xcframework -maxdepth 3 -type f -print0 \
| sort -z | xargs -0 sha256sum | sed 's/ \.\// /' | sort -k2 > actual.txt
if ! diff -u expected.txt actual.txt; then
echo "::error::Checked-in arti.xcframework does not match the manifest in $doc. If the binary change is intentional, rebuild per the doc and update the manifest in the same PR."
exit 1
fi
echo "All $(wc -l < actual.txt) artifact hashes match the provenance manifest."
require-provenance-evidence:
name: Binary changes must ship with provenance inputs
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Check changed files
run: |
set -euo pipefail
base="origin/${{ github.base_ref }}"
git fetch --no-tags --depth=1 origin "${{ github.base_ref }}"
changed=$(git diff --name-only "$base"...HEAD)
echo "Changed files:"
echo "$changed"
if ! echo "$changed" | grep -q '^localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti\.xcframework/'; then
echo "No binary artifact changes; nothing to verify."
exit 0
fi
if echo "$changed" | grep -Eq '^(localPackages/Arti/(Cargo\.(toml|lock)|build-ios\.sh|arti-bitchat/)|docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE\.md)'; then
echo "Binary change is accompanied by provenance inputs."
exit 0
fi
echo "::error::arti.xcframework changed without matching source, lockfile, build-script, or provenance-doc changes. See docs/ARTI-BINARY-PROVENANCE.md (\"Do not accept an xcframework-only update\")."
exit 1
-42
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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
name: Fetch GeoRelays Data
on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 6 * * 0'
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
update-relay-data:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Fetch GeoRelays
run: |
wget -q https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv
mv nostr_relays.csv ./relays/online_relays_gps.csv
- name: Check for changes
id: git-check
run: |
git diff --exit-code || echo "changes=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Commit and push changes
if: steps.git-check.outputs.changes == 'true'
run: |
git config --local user.email "action@github.com"
git config --local user.name "GitHub Action"
git add relays/online_relays_gps.csv
git commit -m "Automated update of relay data - $(date -u)"
git push
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-179
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@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
name: Build & Test
on:
push:
branches:
- main
pull_request:
jobs:
test:
name: Run Swift Tests (${{ matrix.name }})
runs-on: macos-latest
# A hung test must fail fast, not hold a runner for GitHub's 360-minute
# default (observed: intermittent app-suite hangs starving the queue).
# The long steps carry tighter individual bounds (5-minute test watchdog,
# 6-minute benchmark step, 10-minute floor gate that may re-run the
# benchmarks up to twice on a noisy runner); this is the backstop.
timeout-minutes: 25
strategy:
fail-fast: false # Don't cancel other matrix jobs when one fails
matrix:
include:
- name: app
path: .
- name: BitLogger
path: localPackages/BitLogger
- name: BitFoundation
path: localPackages/BitFoundation
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
# Use the Xcode-bundled Swift toolchain: it always matches the SDK on
# the runner image. A standalone swift.org toolchain (setup-swift) broke
# whenever the image's Xcode moved ahead of it ("this SDK is not
# supported by the compiler").
- name: Note toolchain version (cache key)
id: swift-version
run: echo "version=$(swift --version 2>/dev/null | head -1 | shasum | cut -c1-12)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Cache build artifacts
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ${{ matrix.path }}/.build
key: ${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.swift-version.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.name }}-${{ hashFiles(format('{0}/**/*.swift', matrix.path), format('{0}/**/Package.resolved', matrix.path)) }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.swift-version.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.name }}-${{ hashFiles(format('{0}/**/Package.resolved', matrix.path)) }}
${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.swift-version.outputs.version }}-${{ matrix.name }}-
- name: Build tests
# Built separately so the hang watchdog below times only test
# execution: a cold-cache coverage build on a slow runner can
# legitimately take several minutes, and is already bounded by the
# 15-minute job timeout.
run: swift build --build-tests --enable-code-coverage --package-path ${{ matrix.path }}
- name: Run Tests
# Perf benchmarks are excluded here and run in their own serial step
# below: measuring while parallel test processes contend for cores
# produces noisy numbers, and the XCTest measure machinery has hung
# intermittently under parallel workers on loaded runners. Excluded
# via --skip (not just the env guard): every app run since the
# baselines landed timed out at the 15-minute job limit with the
# baseline tests dispatched into the parallel phase.
#
# The watchdog samples any still-running test processes after 5
# minutes (the suite passes in seconds when healthy; the build is
# done by this step) and kills the run, so a hang fails fast with
# stacks in the log instead of a silent timeout.
env:
BITCHAT_SKIP_PERF_BASELINES: "1"
run: |
swift test --skip-build --parallel --quiet --enable-code-coverage \
--skip PerformanceBaselineTests \
--package-path ${{ matrix.path }} &
test_pid=$!
(
sleep 300
if kill -0 "$test_pid" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "::group::Tests still running after 5 minutes — sampling before kill"
for pid in $(pgrep -if 'swiftpm-testing|xctest|PackageTests' || true); do
echo "--- sample of pid $pid ---"
sample "$pid" 5 2>/dev/null || true
done
echo "::endgroup::"
pkill -KILL -P "$test_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
kill -KILL "$test_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
) &
watchdog_pid=$!
wait "$test_pid" && status=0 || status=$?
kill "$watchdog_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
exit "$status"
# Benchmarks run serially on an otherwise idle runner for stable
# numbers; BITCHAT_PERF_LOG captures the PERF[...] lines for the gate.
- name: Run performance benchmarks (serial)
if: matrix.name == 'app'
timeout-minutes: 6
env:
BITCHAT_PERF_LOG: ${{ github.workspace }}/perf-output.log
run: swift test --quiet --filter PerformanceBaselineTests
# Order-of-magnitude performance regression gate. Floors are deliberately
# generous (see bitchatTests/Performance/perf-floors.json) so this
# catches algorithmic regressions, never runner variance. If a metric
# still lands below floor (a saturated runner can dip one), the script
# re-runs the benchmarks — appending to the same log and keeping each
# benchmark's best value per metric — so noise clears on retry while a
# real regression fails every attempt. Floors are never lowered by this.
- name: Performance floor gate
if: matrix.name == 'app'
timeout-minutes: 10
run: ./scripts/check-perf-floors.sh perf-output.log
# Informational only: surfaces per-file and total line coverage in the
# job log so coverage trends are visible on every PR. No thresholds —
# this must never be the reason a build goes red.
- name: Coverage summary
run: |
BIN_PATH=$(swift build --show-bin-path --package-path ${{ matrix.path }})
PROF="$BIN_PATH/codecov/default.profdata"
XCTEST=$(find "$BIN_PATH" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.xctest' | head -1)
BINARY="$XCTEST/Contents/MacOS/$(basename "$XCTEST" .xctest)"
if [ -f "$PROF" ] && [ -f "$BINARY" ]; then
xcrun llvm-cov report "$BINARY" -instr-profile "$PROF" \
-ignore-filename-regex='(Tests|\.build|checkouts|Mocks|_PreviewHelpers)' || true
else
echo "No coverage data found; skipping summary."
fi
# SPM tests above only compile the macOS slice; this job covers the
# iOS-conditional code paths (UIKit, CoreBluetooth restoration, etc.).
ios-build:
name: Build iOS app (simulator)
runs-on: macos-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Build iOS (simulator, no signing)
# arm64 only: the vendored arti.xcframework has no x86_64 simulator slice.
run: |
set -o pipefail
xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj \
-scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \
-sdk iphonesimulator \
-destination 'generic/platform=iOS Simulator' \
ARCHS=arm64 \
CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
build
# Advisory only: SwiftLint reports style violations without ever failing the
# build. Runs in a pinned container (no Xcode plugin, no pbxproj changes) so
# it can never break the documented xcodebuild path or block a merge.
lint:
name: SwiftLint (advisory)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
# This job runs a third-party container image, so give it the least
# privilege we can: a read-only token, and no credentials left in the
# checkout for the container to find.
permissions:
contents: read
container:
# Tag for readability, digest for immutability (tags can be repointed).
# Bump both together, deliberately — never a floating tag.
image: ghcr.io/realm/swiftlint:0.65.0@sha256:a482729f4b58741875af1566f23397f3f6db300372756fc31606d0a4527fab9e
continue-on-error: true
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Run SwiftLint
run: swiftlint lint --reporter github-actions-logging
+4 -13
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@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ plans/
## AI
CLAUDE.md
AGENTS.md
.claude/
## User settings
xcuserdata/
## compatibility with Xcode 8 and earlier (ignoring not required starting Xcode 9)
*.xcscmblueprint
@@ -55,8 +57,7 @@ iOSInjectionProject/
## Xcode project
*.xcodeproj/project.xcworkspace/
## Xcode User settings
xcuserdata/
*.xcodeproj/xcshareddata/
## Python
__pycache__/
@@ -67,16 +68,6 @@ __pycache__/
*.tmp
*.temp
## Cache
.cache/
# Local build results
.Result*/
.Result*.xcresult/
TestResult.xcresult/
*.xcresult/
build.log
*.log
# Local configs
Local.xcconfig
-33
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@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
# Build artifacts and generated sources; keeps local `swiftlint` runs clean
# (CI checkouts are fresh, so this only matters in a working tree).
excluded:
- .build
- .swiftpm
- .DerivedData
- DerivedData
- build
- localPackages/*/.build
disabled_rules:
- line_length
- type_name
- identifier_name
- statement_position
- implicit_optional_initialization
- force_try
- vertical_whitespace
- for_where
- control_statement
- void_function_in_ternary
- redundant_discardable_let # SwiftUI breaks without it
# To be enabled as we fix the issues
- trailing_whitespace
- cyclomatic_complexity
- function_body_length
- function_parameter_count
- type_body_length
- file_length
- large_tuple
- force_cast
- multiple_closures_with_trailing_closure
- nesting
+3 -3
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@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ This three-message pattern provides:
#### NoiseEncryptionService
The main service managing all Noise operations:
```swift
final class NoiseEncryptionService {
class NoiseEncryptionService {
private let staticIdentityKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey
private let sessionManager: NoiseSessionManager
private let channelEncryption = NoiseChannelEncryption()
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
#### NoiseSession
Individual session state for each peer:
```swift
final class NoiseSession {
class NoiseSession {
private var handshakeState: NoiseHandshakeState?
private var sendCipher: NoiseCipherState?
private var receiveCipher: NoiseCipherState?
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ final class NoiseSession {
#### NoiseSessionManager
Thread-safe session management:
```swift
final class NoiseSessionManager {
class NoiseSessionManager {
private var sessions: [String: NoiseSession] = [:]
private let sessionsQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "noise.sessions", attributes: .concurrent)
}
-4
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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
#include "Release.xcconfig"
// Optional include of local configs
#include? "Local.xcconfig"
-5
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@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
// Your Apple Developer Team ID - https://stackoverflow.com/a/18727947
DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = ABC123
// Unique bundle id to be able to register and run locally
PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = chat.bitchat.$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)
-12
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@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.3
CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION = 1
IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = 16.0
MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = 13.0
SWIFT_VERSION = 5.0
DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = L3N5LHJD5Y
CODE_SIGN_STYLE = Automatic
PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = chat.bitchat
APP_GROUP_ID = group.chat.bitchat
+17 -8
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@@ -14,16 +14,16 @@ default:
# Check prerequisites
check:
@echo "Checking prerequisites..."
@command -v xcodebuild >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ xcodebuild not found. Install Xcode from App Store" && exit 1)
@xcode-select -p | grep -q "Xcode.app" || (echo "❌ Full Xcode required, not just command line tools. Install from App Store and run:\n sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer" && exit 1)
@test -d "/Applications/Xcode.app" || (echo "❌ Xcode.app not found in Applications folder. Install from App Store" && exit 1)
@xcodebuild -version >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ Xcode not properly configured. Try:\n sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer" && exit 1)
@security find-identity -v -p codesigning | grep -q "Apple Development\|Developer ID" || (echo "⚠️ No Developer ID found - code signing may fail" && exit 0)
@command -v xcodegen >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ XcodeGen not found. Install with: brew install xcodegen" && exit 1)
@command -v xcodebuild >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ Xcode not found. Install Xcode from App Store" && exit 1)
@security find-identity -v -p codesigning | grep -q "Developer ID" || (echo "⚠️ No Developer ID found - code signing may fail" && exit 0)
@echo "✅ All prerequisites met"
# Backup original files
backup:
@echo "Backing up original project configuration..."
@cp project.yml project.yml.backup 2>/dev/null || true
@# Backup other files that get modified by xcodegen
@if [ -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj ]; then cp bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup; fi
@if [ -f bitchat/Info.plist ]; then cp bitchat/Info.plist bitchat/Info.plist.backup; fi
@@ -44,8 +44,13 @@ patch-for-macos: backup
@# Move iOS-specific files out of the way temporarily
@if [ -f bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard ]; then mv bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios; fi
# Generate Xcode project with patches
generate: patch-for-macos
@echo "Generating Xcode project..."
@xcodegen generate
# Build the macOS app
build: #check generate
build: check generate
@echo "Building BitChat for macOS..."
@xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS="" build
@@ -70,7 +75,9 @@ clean: restore
# Quick run without cleaning (for development)
dev-run: check
@echo "Quick development build..."
@xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat_macOS" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS="" build
@if [ ! -f project.yml.backup ]; then just patch-for-macos; fi
@xcodegen generate
@xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS="" build
@find ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData -name "bitchat.app" -path "*/Debug/*" -not -path "*/Index.noindex/*" | head -1 | xargs -I {} open "{}"
# Show app info
@@ -99,9 +106,11 @@ nuke:
@echo "🧨 Nuclear clean - removing all build artifacts and backups..."
@rm -rf ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData/bitchat-* 2>/dev/null || true
@rm -rf bitchat.xcodeproj 2>/dev/null || true
@rm -f project.yml.backup 2>/dev/null || true
@rm -f project-macos.yml 2>/dev/null || true
@rm -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup 2>/dev/null || true
@rm -f bitchat/Info.plist.backup 2>/dev/null || true
@# Restore iOS-specific files if they were moved
@if [ -f bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios ]; then mv bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard; fi
@git checkout bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj bitchat/Info.plist 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️ Not a git repo or no changes to restore"
@git checkout -- project.yml bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj bitchat/Info.plist 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️ Not a git repo or no changes to restore"
@echo "✅ Nuclear clean complete"
+16 -42
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# bitchat Privacy Policy
*Last updated: June 2026*
*Last updated: January 2025*
## Our Commitment
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ bitchat is designed with privacy as its foundation. We believe private communica
## Summary
- **No personal data collection** - We don't collect names, emails, or phone numbers
- **No accounts or company servers** - Mesh chat works peer-to-peer; optional Nostr features use public or user-selected relays
- **No servers** - Everything happens on your device and through peer-to-peer connections
- **No tracking** - We have no analytics, telemetry, or user tracking
- **Open source** - You can verify these claims by reading our code
@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ bitchat is designed with privacy as its foundation. We believe private communica
### On Your Device Only
1. **Identity Keys**
- Cryptographic private keys generated on first launch or when optional Nostr identities are created
1. **Identity Key**
- A cryptographic key generated on first launch
- Stored locally in your device's secure storage
- Allows you to maintain "favorite" relationships across app restarts
- Private keys never leave your device; public keys are shared when needed for messaging
- Never leaves your device
2. **Nickname**
- The display name you choose (or auto-generated)
@@ -38,19 +38,12 @@ bitchat is designed with privacy as its foundation. We believe private communica
- Stored only on your device
- Allows you to recognize these peers in future sessions
5. **Optional Location Channel State**
- Your selected geohash channel, bookmarked geohashes, teleport flags, and bookmark display names
- Stored locally on your device so the location-channel UI can restore your choices
- Per-geohash Nostr identities are derived locally from a device seed stored in secure storage
- Exact latitude and longitude are not persisted by bitchat
### Temporary Session Data
During each session, bitchat temporarily maintains:
- Active peer connections (forgotten when app closes)
- Routing information for message delivery
- Cached messages for offline peers (12 hours max)
- Your current location while optional location channels are enabled, used locally to compute geohash channels and friendly place names
## What Information is Shared
@@ -69,21 +62,13 @@ When you join a password-protected room:
- Your nickname appears in the member list
- Room owners can see you've joined
### With Nostr Relays (Optional Features)
If you enable Nostr-backed features:
- Private fallback messages to mutual favorites are sent as encrypted NIP-17 gift wraps. Relays can see event metadata, but not message content.
- Public location-channel messages, location notes, and presence are scoped with geohash tags. Relays and other participants can see the geohash tag, event kind, timestamp, and public key used for that geohash.
- Exact GPS coordinates are not included in Nostr events by bitchat. The geohash precision you choose can still reveal an approximate area, from region-level to building-level.
- Automatic presence heartbeats are limited to low-precision geohashes (region, province, and city). More precise geohash posts happen only when you use those channels or location notes.
## What We DON'T Do
bitchat **never**:
- Collects personal information
- Sells or shares your exact GPS location
- Stores data on servers we operate
- Sells your data to advertisers or data brokers
- Tracks your location
- Stores data on servers
- Shares data with third parties
- Uses analytics or telemetry
- Creates user profiles
- Requires registration
@@ -99,27 +84,19 @@ All private messages use end-to-end encryption:
## Your Rights
You have complete control:
- **Delete Local State**: Triple-tap the logo to instantly wipe local keys, sessions, caches, and preferences
- **Leave Anytime**: Close the app and local presence stops; relay-backed presence ages out
- **No Account**: No account record exists for you to delete from us
- **Portability**: Your local state stays on your device unless you send messages, use optional relay-backed features, or export it
- **Delete Everything**: Triple-tap the logo to instantly wipe all data
- **Leave Anytime**: Close the app and your presence disappears
- **No Account**: Nothing to delete from servers because there are none
- **Portability**: Your data never leaves your device unless you export it
## Bluetooth & Permissions
bitchat requires Bluetooth permission to function:
- Used only for peer-to-peer communication
- No location data is accessed or stored
- Bluetooth is not used for tracking
- You can revoke this permission at any time in system settings
## Location Permission
Location permission is optional and is used only for location channels:
- Used to compute local geohash channels and display names
- Requested as when-in-use permission
- Exact coordinates are not shared in messages or stored by bitchat
- Selected and bookmarked geohashes may persist locally until you remove them, use panic wipe, or delete the app
- You can revoke this permission at any time in system settings
## Children's Privacy
bitchat does not knowingly collect information from children. The app has no age verification because it collects no personal information from anyone.
@@ -129,15 +106,12 @@ bitchat does not knowingly collect information from children. The app has no age
- **Messages**: Deleted from memory when app closes (unless room retention is enabled)
- **Identity Key**: Persists until you delete the app
- **Favorites**: Persist until you remove them or delete the app
- **Location channel choices**: Selected/bookmarked geohashes persist locally until removed, panic-wiped, or the app is deleted
- **Nostr relay data**: Public geohash events and encrypted gift wraps may be retained by relays according to each relay's policy
- **Everything Else**: Exists only during active sessions
## Security Measures
- All communication is encrypted
- No accounts or company servers
- Optional Nostr relays receive only the events needed for Nostr-backed private fallback or public location channels
- No data transmitted to servers (there are none)
- Open source code for public audit
- Regular security updates
- Cryptographic signatures prevent tampering
@@ -147,7 +121,7 @@ bitchat does not knowingly collect information from children. The app has no age
If we update this policy:
- The "Last updated" date will change
- The updated policy will be included in the app
- No retroactive changes can make us collect data already held only in your app
- No retroactive changes can affect data (since we don't collect any)
## Contact
@@ -158,7 +132,7 @@ bitchat is an open source project. For privacy questions:
## Philosophy
Privacy isn't just a feature—it's the entire point. bitchat proves that modern communication doesn't require surrendering your privacy. No accounts, no company servers, no analytics. Just people talking freely.
Privacy isn't just a feature—it's the entire point. bitchat proves that modern communication doesn't require surrendering your privacy. No accounts, no servers, no surveillance. Just people talking freely.
---
+5 -39
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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import PackageDescription
let package = Package(
name: "bitchat",
defaultLocalization: "en",
platforms: [
.iOS(.v16),
.macOS(.v13)
@@ -13,58 +12,25 @@ let package = Package(
.executable(
name: "bitchat",
targets: ["bitchat"]
)
),
],
dependencies: [
.package(path: "localPackages/Arti"),
.package(path: "localPackages/BitFoundation"),
.package(path: "localPackages/BitLogger"),
.package(url: "https://github.com/21-DOT-DEV/swift-secp256k1", exact: "0.21.1")
dependencies:[
.package(url: "https://github.com/21-DOT-DEV/swift-secp256k1", exact: "0.21.1"),
],
targets: [
.executableTarget(
name: "bitchat",
dependencies: [
.product(name: "P256K", package: "swift-secp256k1"),
.product(name: "BitFoundation", package: "BitFoundation"),
.product(name: "BitLogger", package: "BitLogger"),
.product(name: "Tor", package: "Arti")
.product(name: "P256K", package: "swift-secp256k1")
],
path: "bitchat",
exclude: [
"Info.plist",
"Assets.xcassets",
"_PreviewHelpers/PreviewAssets.xcassets",
"bitchat.entitlements",
"bitchat-macOS.entitlements",
"LaunchScreen.storyboard",
"ViewModels/Extensions/README.md"
],
resources: [
.process("Localizable.xcstrings")
"LaunchScreen.storyboard"
]
),
.testTarget(
name: "bitchatTests",
dependencies: [
"bitchat",
.product(name: "BitFoundation", package: "BitFoundation")
],
path: "bitchatTests",
exclude: [
"Info.plist",
"README.md",
// CI perf gate data (read by scripts/check-perf-floors.sh),
// not a test resource.
"Performance/perf-floors.json"
],
resources: [
.process("Localization"),
// Only the vector fixture: declaring the whole "Noise"
// directory would claim its .swift test files as resources
// and silently drop them from compilation.
.process("Noise/NoiseTestVectors.json")
]
)
]
)
+47 -81
View File
@@ -2,121 +2,87 @@
## bitchat
A decentralized peer-to-peer messaging app with dual transport architecture: local Bluetooth mesh networks for offline communication and internet-based Nostr protocol for global reach. No accounts, no phone numbers, no central servers. It's the side-groupchat.
A decentralized peer-to-peer messaging app that works over Bluetooth mesh networks. No internet required, no servers, no phone numbers. It's the side-groupchat.
[bitchat.free](http://bitchat.free)
📲 [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/bitchat-mesh/id6748219622)
> [!WARNING]
> Private messages have not received external security review and may contain vulnerabilities. Do not use for sensitive use cases, and do not rely on its security until it has been reviewed. Now uses the [Noise Protocol](http://www.noiseprotocol.org) for identity and encryption. Public local chat (the main feature) has no security concerns.
## License
This project is released into the public domain. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.
## Features
- **Dual Transport Architecture**: Bluetooth mesh for offline + Nostr protocol for internet-based messaging
- **Location-Based Channels**: Geographic chat rooms using geohash coordinates over global Nostr relays
- **Intelligent Message Routing**: Automatically chooses best transport (Bluetooth → Nostr fallback)
- **Decentralized Mesh Network**: Automatic peer discovery and multi-hop message relay over Bluetooth LE
- **Privacy First**: No accounts, no phone numbers, no persistent identifiers
- **Private Message End-to-End Encryption**: [Noise Protocol](https://noiseprotocol.org) for mesh, NIP-17 for Nostr
- **Private Message End-to-End Encryption**: [Noise Protocol](http://noiseprotocol.org)
- **IRC-Style Commands**: Familiar `/slap`, `/msg`, `/who` style interface
- **Universal App**: Native support for iOS and macOS
- **Emergency Wipe**: Triple-tap to instantly clear all data
- **Performance Optimizations**: LZ4 message compression, adaptive battery modes, and optimized networking
## [Technical Architecture](https://deepwiki.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat)
BitChat uses a **hybrid messaging architecture** with two complementary transport layers:
### Binary Protocol
bitchat uses an efficient binary protocol optimized for Bluetooth LE:
- Compact packet format with 1-byte type field
- TTL-based message routing (max 7 hops)
- Automatic fragmentation for large messages
- Message deduplication via unique IDs
### Bluetooth Mesh Network (Offline)
- **Local Communication**: Direct peer-to-peer within Bluetooth range
- **Multi-hop Relay**: Messages route through nearby devices (max 7 hops)
- **No Internet Required**: Works completely offline in disaster scenarios
- **Noise Protocol Encryption**: End-to-end encryption with forward secrecy
- **Binary Protocol**: Compact packet format optimized for Bluetooth LE constraints
- **Automatic Discovery**: Peer discovery and connection management
- **Adaptive Power**: Battery-optimized duty cycling
### Nostr Protocol (Internet)
- **Global Reach**: Connect with users worldwide via internet relays
- **Location Channels**: Geographic chat rooms using geohash coordinates
- **290+ Relay Network**: Distributed across the globe for reliability
- **NIP-17 Encryption**: Gift-wrapped private messages for internet privacy
- **Ephemeral Keys**: Fresh cryptographic identity per geohash area
### Channel Types
#### `mesh #bluetooth`
- **Transport**: Bluetooth Low Energy mesh network
- **Scope**: Local devices within multi-hop range
- **Internet**: Not required
- **Use Case**: Offline communication, protests, disasters, remote areas
#### Location Channels (`block #dr5rsj7`, `neighborhood #dr5rs`, `country #dr`)
- **Transport**: Nostr protocol over internet
- **Scope**: Geographic areas defined by geohash precision
- `block` (7 chars): City block level
- `neighborhood` (6 chars): District/neighborhood
- `city` (5 chars): City level
- `province` (4 chars): State/province
- `region` (2 chars): Country/large region
- **Internet**: Required (connects to Nostr relays)
- **Use Case**: Location-based community chat, local events, regional discussions
### Direct Message Routing
Private messages use **intelligent transport selection**:
1. **Bluetooth First** (preferred when available)
- Direct connection with established Noise session
- Fastest and most private option
2. **Nostr Fallback** (when Bluetooth unavailable)
- Uses recipient's Nostr public key
- NIP-17 gift-wrapping for privacy
- Routes through global relay network
3. **Smart Queuing** (when neither available)
- Messages queued until transport becomes available
- Automatic delivery when connection established
### Mesh Networking
- Each device acts as both client and peripheral
- Automatic peer discovery and connection management
- Adaptive duty cycling for battery optimization
For detailed protocol documentation, see the [Technical Whitepaper](WHITEPAPER.md).
## Setup
### Option 1: Using Xcode
### Option 1: Using XcodeGen (Recommended)
1. Install XcodeGen if you haven't already:
```bash
brew install xcodegen
```
2. Generate the Xcode project:
```bash
cd bitchat
xcodegen generate
```
3. Open the generated project:
```bash
open bitchat.xcodeproj
```
To run on a device there're a few steps to prepare the code:
- Clone the local configs: `cp Configs/Local.xcconfig.example Configs/Local.xcconfig`
- Add your Developer Team ID into the newly created `Configs/Local.xcconfig`
- Bundle ID would be set to `chat.bitchat.<team_id>` (unless you set to something else)
- Entitlements need to be updated manually (TODO: Automate):
- Search and replace `group.chat.bitchat` with `group.<your_bundle_id>` (e.g. `group.chat.bitchat.ABC123`)
### Option 2: Using `just`
### Option 2: Using Swift Package Manager
1. Open the project in Xcode:
```bash
brew install just
cd bitchat
open Package.swift
```
Want to try this on macos: `just run` will set it up and run from source.
2. Select your target device and run
### Option 3: Manual Xcode Project
1. Open Xcode and create a new iOS/macOS App
2. Copy all Swift files from the `bitchat` directory into your project
3. Update Info.plist with Bluetooth permissions
4. Set deployment target to iOS 16.0 / macOS 13.0
### Option 4: just
Want to try this on macos: `just run` will set it up and run from source.
Run `just clean` afterwards to restore things to original state for mobile app building and development.
## Localization
- Base app resources live under `bitchat/Localization/Base.lproj/`. Add new copy to `Localizable.strings` and plural rules to `Localizable.stringsdict`.
- Share extension strings are separate in `bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Base.lproj/Localizable.strings`.
- Prefer keys that describe intent (`app_info.features.offline.title`) and reuse existing ones where possible.
- Run `xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build` to compile-check any localization updates.
-41
View File
@@ -184,28 +184,6 @@ To minimize bandwidth, `BitchatPacket`s are serialized into a compact binary for
**Padding:** All packets are padded to the next standard block size (256, 512, 1024, or 2048 bytes) using a PKCS#7-style scheme to obscure the true message length from network observers.
```mermaid
---
config:
theme: dark
---
---
title: "BitchatPacket"
---
packet
+8: "Version"
+8: "Type"
+8: "TTL"
+64: "Timestamp"
+8: "Flags"
+16: "Payload Length"
+64: "Sender ID"
+64: "Recipient ID (optional)"
+48: "Payload (variable)"
+64: "Signature (optional)"
```
_A representation of the sizes of the fields in `BitchatPacket`_
### 6.2. Application Message Format (`BitchatMessage`)
For packets of type `message`, the payload is a binary-serialized `BitchatMessage` containing the chat content.
@@ -220,25 +198,6 @@ For packets of type `message`, the payload is a binary-serialized `BitchatMessag
| Original Sender | 1 + len (opt)| Nickname of the original sender if the message is a relay. |
| Recipient Nickname | 1 + len (opt)| Nickname of the recipient for private messages. |
```mermaid
---
config:
theme: dark
---
---
title: "BitchatMessage"
---
packet
+8: "Flags"
+64: "Timestamp"
+24: "ID (variable)"
+32: "Sender (variable)"
+32: "Content (variable)"
+32: "Original Sender (variable) (optional)"
+32: "Recipient Nickname (variable) (optional)"
```
_A representation of the sizes of the fields in `BitchatMessage`_
---
## 7. Message Routing and Propagation
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Scheme
LastUpgradeVersion = "2650"
version = "1.3">
<BuildAction
parallelizeBuildables = "YES"
buildImplicitDependencies = "YES">
<BuildActionEntries>
<BuildActionEntry
buildForTesting = "YES"
buildForRunning = "YES"
buildForProfiling = "YES"
buildForArchiving = "YES"
buildForAnalyzing = "YES">
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "57CA17A36A2532A6CFF367BB"
BuildableName = "bitchatShareExtension.appex"
BlueprintName = "bitchatShareExtension"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</BuildActionEntry>
<BuildActionEntry
buildForTesting = "YES"
buildForRunning = "YES"
buildForProfiling = "YES"
buildForArchiving = "YES"
buildForAnalyzing = "YES">
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "AF077EA0474EDEDE2C72716C"
BuildableName = "bitchat.app"
BlueprintName = "bitchat_iOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</BuildActionEntry>
</BuildActionEntries>
</BuildAction>
<TestAction
buildConfiguration = "Debug"
selectedDebuggerIdentifier = "Xcode.DebuggerFoundation.Debugger.LLDB"
selectedLauncherIdentifier = "Xcode.DebuggerFoundation.Launcher.LLDB"
shouldUseLaunchSchemeArgsEnv = "YES"
codeCoverageEnabled = "YES"
onlyGenerateCoverageForSpecifiedTargets = "YES">
<MacroExpansion>
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "AF077EA0474EDEDE2C72716C"
BuildableName = "bitchat.app"
BlueprintName = "bitchat_iOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</MacroExpansion>
<CodeCoverageTargets>
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "AF077EA0474EDEDE2C72716C"
BuildableName = "bitchat.app"
BlueprintName = "bitchat_iOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</CodeCoverageTargets>
<Testables>
<TestableReference
skipped = "NO"
parallelizable = "YES"
testExecutionOrdering = "random">
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "6CB97DF2EA57234CB3E563B8"
BuildableName = "bitchatTests_iOS.xctest"
BlueprintName = "bitchatTests_iOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</TestableReference>
</Testables>
</TestAction>
<LaunchAction
buildConfiguration = "Debug"
selectedDebuggerIdentifier = "Xcode.DebuggerFoundation.Debugger.LLDB"
selectedLauncherIdentifier = "Xcode.DebuggerFoundation.Launcher.LLDB"
launchStyle = "0"
useCustomWorkingDirectory = "NO"
ignoresPersistentStateOnLaunch = "NO"
debugDocumentVersioning = "YES"
debugServiceExtension = "internal"
allowLocationSimulation = "YES">
<BuildableProductRunnable
runnableDebuggingMode = "0">
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "AF077EA0474EDEDE2C72716C"
BuildableName = "bitchat.app"
BlueprintName = "bitchat_iOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</BuildableProductRunnable>
<EnvironmentVariables>
<EnvironmentVariable
key = "BITCHAT_LOG_LEVEL"
value = "debug"
isEnabled = "YES">
</EnvironmentVariable>
</EnvironmentVariables>
</LaunchAction>
<ProfileAction
buildConfiguration = "Release"
shouldUseLaunchSchemeArgsEnv = "YES"
savedToolIdentifier = ""
useCustomWorkingDirectory = "NO"
debugDocumentVersioning = "YES">
<BuildableProductRunnable
runnableDebuggingMode = "0">
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "AF077EA0474EDEDE2C72716C"
BuildableName = "bitchat.app"
BlueprintName = "bitchat_iOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</BuildableProductRunnable>
</ProfileAction>
<AnalyzeAction
buildConfiguration = "Debug">
</AnalyzeAction>
<ArchiveAction
buildConfiguration = "Release"
revealArchiveInOrganizer = "YES">
</ArchiveAction>
</Scheme>
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Scheme
LastUpgradeVersion = "2650"
version = "1.3">
<BuildAction
parallelizeBuildables = "YES"
buildImplicitDependencies = "YES">
<BuildActionEntries>
<BuildActionEntry
buildForTesting = "YES"
buildForRunning = "YES"
buildForProfiling = "YES"
buildForArchiving = "YES"
buildForAnalyzing = "YES">
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "0576A29205865664C0937536"
BuildableName = "bitchat.app"
BlueprintName = "bitchat_macOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</BuildActionEntry>
</BuildActionEntries>
</BuildAction>
<TestAction
buildConfiguration = "Debug"
selectedDebuggerIdentifier = "Xcode.DebuggerFoundation.Debugger.LLDB"
selectedLauncherIdentifier = "Xcode.DebuggerFoundation.Launcher.LLDB"
shouldUseLaunchSchemeArgsEnv = "YES">
<MacroExpansion>
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "0576A29205865664C0937536"
BuildableName = "bitchat.app"
BlueprintName = "bitchat_macOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</MacroExpansion>
<Testables>
<TestableReference
skipped = "NO"
parallelizable = "NO">
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "47FF23248747DD7CB666CB91"
BuildableName = "bitchatTests_macOS.xctest"
BlueprintName = "bitchatTests_macOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</TestableReference>
</Testables>
</TestAction>
<LaunchAction
buildConfiguration = "Debug"
selectedDebuggerIdentifier = "Xcode.DebuggerFoundation.Debugger.LLDB"
selectedLauncherIdentifier = "Xcode.DebuggerFoundation.Launcher.LLDB"
launchStyle = "0"
useCustomWorkingDirectory = "NO"
ignoresPersistentStateOnLaunch = "NO"
debugDocumentVersioning = "YES"
debugServiceExtension = "internal"
allowLocationSimulation = "YES">
<BuildableProductRunnable
runnableDebuggingMode = "0">
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "0576A29205865664C0937536"
BuildableName = "bitchat.app"
BlueprintName = "bitchat_macOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</BuildableProductRunnable>
<EnvironmentVariables>
<EnvironmentVariable
key = "BITCHAT_LOG_LEVEL"
value = "debug"
isEnabled = "YES">
</EnvironmentVariable>
</EnvironmentVariables>
</LaunchAction>
<ProfileAction
buildConfiguration = "Release"
shouldUseLaunchSchemeArgsEnv = "YES"
savedToolIdentifier = ""
useCustomWorkingDirectory = "NO"
debugDocumentVersioning = "YES">
<BuildableProductRunnable
runnableDebuggingMode = "0">
<BuildableReference
BuildableIdentifier = "primary"
BlueprintIdentifier = "0576A29205865664C0937536"
BuildableName = "bitchat.app"
BlueprintName = "bitchat_macOS"
ReferencedContainer = "container:bitchat.xcodeproj">
</BuildableReference>
</BuildableProductRunnable>
</ProfileAction>
<AnalyzeAction
buildConfiguration = "Debug">
</AnalyzeAction>
<ArchiveAction
buildConfiguration = "Release"
revealArchiveInOrganizer = "YES">
</ArchiveAction>
</Scheme>
-102
View File
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Combine
import Foundation
enum SharedContentKind: String, Sendable, Equatable {
case text
case url
}
enum RuntimeScenePhase: String, Sendable, Equatable {
case active
case inactive
case background
}
enum TorLifecycleEvent: String, Sendable, Equatable {
case willStart
case willRestart
case didBecomeReady
case preferenceChanged
}
enum AppEvent: Sendable, Equatable {
case launched
case startupCompleted
case scenePhaseChanged(RuntimeScenePhase)
case openedURL(String)
case sharedContentAccepted(SharedContentKind)
case notificationOpened(peerID: PeerID?)
case deepLinkOpened(String)
case torLifecycleChanged(TorLifecycleEvent)
case nostrRelayConnectionChanged(Bool)
case terminationRequested
}
actor AppEventStream {
private var continuations: [UUID: AsyncStream<AppEvent>.Continuation] = [:]
func stream() -> AsyncStream<AppEvent> {
let id = UUID()
return AsyncStream { continuation in
continuations[id] = continuation
continuation.onTermination = { [id] _ in
Task {
await self.removeContinuation(id)
}
}
}
}
func emit(_ event: AppEvent) {
for continuation in continuations.values {
continuation.yield(event)
}
}
func finish() {
for continuation in continuations.values {
continuation.finish()
}
continuations.removeAll()
}
private func removeContinuation(_ id: UUID) {
continuations.removeValue(forKey: id)
}
}
/// Identity key for a direct conversation. Equality and hashing use the
/// canonical `id` only; `routingPeerID` carries the transport-level peer ID
/// the conversation is keyed under (see `ConversationID.directPeer`).
struct PeerHandle: Sendable, Identifiable {
let id: String
let routingPeerID: PeerID
}
extension PeerHandle: Equatable {
static func == (lhs: PeerHandle, rhs: PeerHandle) -> Bool {
lhs.id == rhs.id
}
}
extension PeerHandle: Hashable {
func hash(into hasher: inout Hasher) {
hasher.combine(id)
}
}
enum ConversationID: Hashable, Sendable {
case mesh
case geohash(String)
case direct(PeerHandle)
init(channelID: ChannelID) {
switch channelID {
case .mesh:
self = .mesh
case .location(let channel):
self = .geohash(channel.geohash.lowercased())
}
}
}
-100
View File
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Combine
import CoreBluetooth
import Foundation
@MainActor
final class AppChromeModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var hasUnreadPrivateMessages = false
@Published var nickname: String
@Published var showingFingerprintFor: PeerID?
@Published var isAppInfoPresented = false
@Published var isLocationChannelsSheetPresented = false
@Published var showBluetoothAlert = false
@Published var bluetoothAlertMessage = ""
@Published var bluetoothState: CBManagerState = .unknown
@Published var showScreenshotPrivacyWarning = false
private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
init(chatViewModel: ChatViewModel, privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel) {
self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
self.nickname = chatViewModel.nickname
bind(privateInboxModel: privateInboxModel)
}
var shouldSuppressScreenshotNotification: Bool {
isLocationChannelsSheetPresented || isAppInfoPresented
}
func setNickname(_ nickname: String) {
self.nickname = nickname
if chatViewModel.nickname != nickname {
chatViewModel.nickname = nickname
}
}
func validateAndSaveNickname() {
chatViewModel.validateAndSaveNickname()
if nickname != chatViewModel.nickname {
nickname = chatViewModel.nickname
}
}
func openMostRelevantPrivateChat() {
chatViewModel.openMostRelevantPrivateChat()
}
func showFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) {
showingFingerprintFor = peerID
}
func clearFingerprint() {
showingFingerprintFor = nil
}
func presentAppInfo() {
isAppInfoPresented = true
}
func triggerScreenshotPrivacyWarning() {
showScreenshotPrivacyWarning = true
}
func panicClearAllData() {
chatViewModel.panicClearAllData()
}
private func bind(privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel) {
privateInboxModel.$unreadPeerIDs
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] unreadPeerIDs in
self?.hasUnreadPrivateMessages = !unreadPeerIDs.isEmpty
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
chatViewModel.$nickname
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] nickname in
guard let self, self.nickname != nickname else { return }
self.nickname = nickname
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
chatViewModel.$showBluetoothAlert
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$showBluetoothAlert)
chatViewModel.$bluetoothAlertMessage
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$bluetoothAlertMessage)
chatViewModel.$bluetoothState
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$bluetoothState)
hasUnreadPrivateMessages = !privateInboxModel.unreadPeerIDs.isEmpty
}
}
-388
View File
@@ -1,388 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Combine
import Foundation
import SwiftUI
import Tor
import UserNotifications
#if os(iOS)
import UIKit
#elseif os(macOS)
import AppKit
#endif
@MainActor
final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
let events = AppEventStream()
/// Single source of truth for conversation message state and selection
/// (docs/CONVERSATION-STORE-DESIGN.md). Owned here; the feature models
/// and `ChatViewModel` observe and mutate it through its intent API.
let conversations: ConversationStore
let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
let locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore
let publicChatModel: PublicChatModel
let privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel
let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel
let verificationModel: VerificationModel
let conversationUIModel: ConversationUIModel
let locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel
let peerListModel: PeerListModel
let appChromeModel: AppChromeModel
private let idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
private var started = false
private var lastNostrRelayConnectedState = false
private var didHandleInitialNostrConnection = false
#if os(iOS)
private var didHandleInitialActive = false
private var didEnterBackground = false
#endif
init(
keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager(),
idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge = NostrIdentityBridge()
) {
self.idBridge = idBridge
let conversations = ConversationStore()
let peerIdentityStore = PeerIdentityStore()
let locationPresenceStore = LocationPresenceStore()
let locationManager = LocationChannelManager.shared
self.conversations = conversations
self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore
self.locationPresenceStore = locationPresenceStore
self.chatViewModel = ChatViewModel(
keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain),
conversations: conversations,
peerIdentityStore: peerIdentityStore,
locationPresenceStore: locationPresenceStore,
locationManager: locationManager
)
self.publicChatModel = PublicChatModel(conversations: conversations)
self.privateInboxModel = PrivateInboxModel(conversations: conversations)
self.locationChannelsModel = LocationChannelsModel(manager: locationManager)
self.privateConversationModel = PrivateConversationModel(
chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
conversations: conversations,
locationChannelsModel: self.locationChannelsModel,
peerIdentityStore: peerIdentityStore
)
self.verificationModel = VerificationModel(
chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
privateConversationModel: self.privateConversationModel,
peerIdentityStore: peerIdentityStore
)
self.conversationUIModel = ConversationUIModel(
chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
privateConversationModel: self.privateConversationModel,
conversations: conversations
)
self.peerListModel = PeerListModel(
chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
conversations: conversations,
locationChannelsModel: self.locationChannelsModel,
peerIdentityStore: peerIdentityStore,
locationPresenceStore: locationPresenceStore
)
self.appChromeModel = AppChromeModel(
chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
privateInboxModel: self.privateInboxModel
)
GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded()
bindRuntimeObservers()
NotificationDelegate.shared.runtime = self
}
func start() {
guard !started else {
checkForSharedContent()
return
}
started = true
NotificationDelegate.shared.runtime = self
VerificationService.shared.configure(with: chatViewModel.meshService)
announceInitialTorStatusIfNeeded()
Task(priority: .utility) { [weak self] in
guard let self else { return }
let nickname = await MainActor.run { self.chatViewModel.nickname }
let npub = await MainActor.run {
try? self.idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity()?.npub
}
await MainActor.run {
_ = VerificationService.shared.buildMyQRString(nickname: nickname, npub: npub)
}
}
NetworkActivationService.shared.start()
GeohashPresenceService.shared.start()
checkForSharedContent()
record(.launched)
record(.startupCompleted)
}
func handleOpenURL(_ url: URL) {
record(.openedURL(url.absoluteString))
if url.scheme == "bitchat", url.host == "share" {
checkForSharedContent()
}
}
func handleDidBecomeActiveNotification() {
chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
checkForSharedContent()
}
#if os(macOS)
func handleMacDidBecomeActiveNotification() {
record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active))
chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
checkForSharedContent()
}
#endif
#if os(iOS)
func handleScenePhaseChange(_ newPhase: ScenePhase) {
switch newPhase {
case .background:
record(.scenePhaseChanged(.background))
TorManager.shared.setAppForeground(false)
TorManager.shared.goDormantOnBackground()
chatViewModel.endGeohashSampling()
NostrRelayManager.shared.disconnect()
didEnterBackground = true
case .active:
record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active))
chatViewModel.meshService.startServices()
TorManager.shared.setAppForeground(true)
let shouldRefreshNostrConnections = didHandleInitialActive && didEnterBackground
if didHandleInitialActive && didEnterBackground {
if TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() && !TorManager.shared.isReady {
TorManager.shared.ensureRunningOnForeground()
}
} else {
didHandleInitialActive = true
}
didEnterBackground = false
if shouldRefreshNostrConnections && TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() {
Task.detached {
let _ = await TorManager.shared.awaitReady(timeout: 60)
await MainActor.run {
TorURLSession.shared.rebuild()
NostrRelayManager.shared.resetAllConnections()
}
}
}
chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
checkForSharedContent()
case .inactive:
record(.scenePhaseChanged(.inactive))
@unknown default:
break
}
}
#endif
func applicationWillTerminate() {
record(.terminationRequested)
chatViewModel.applicationWillTerminate()
}
func handleNotificationResponse(identifier: String, userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any]) {
if identifier.hasPrefix("private-"), let peerID = PeerID(str: userInfo["peerID"] as? String) {
record(.notificationOpened(peerID: peerID))
chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
}
if let deepLink = userInfo["deeplink"] as? String, let url = URL(string: deepLink) {
record(.deepLinkOpened(deepLink))
openExternalURL(url)
}
}
func presentationOptions(
forNotificationIdentifier identifier: String,
userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any]
) async -> UNNotificationPresentationOptions {
if identifier.hasPrefix("private-"), let peerID = PeerID(str: userInfo["peerID"] as? String) {
if conversations.selectedPrivatePeerID == peerID {
return []
}
return [.banner, .sound]
}
if identifier.hasPrefix("geo-activity-"),
let deepLink = userInfo["deeplink"] as? String,
let geohash = deepLink.components(separatedBy: "/").last,
case .location(let channel) = locationChannelsModel.selectedChannel,
channel.geohash == geohash {
return []
}
return [.banner, .sound]
}
}
private extension AppRuntime {
func bindRuntimeObservers() {
NostrRelayManager.shared.$isConnected
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] isConnected in
self?.handleNostrRelayConnectionChanged(isConnected)
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillRestart)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willRestart))
self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillRestart()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorDidBecomeReady)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.didBecomeReady))
self?.chatViewModel.handleTorDidBecomeReady()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillStart)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willStart))
self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillStart()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorUserPreferenceChanged)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] notification in
self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.preferenceChanged))
self?.chatViewModel.handleTorPreferenceChanged(notification)
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
#if os(iOS)
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: UIApplication.userDidTakeScreenshotNotification)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.handleScreenshotCaptured()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
#endif
}
func checkForSharedContent() {
guard let userDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: BitchatApp.groupID),
let sharedContent = userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContent"),
let sharedDate = userDefaults.object(forKey: "sharedContentDate") as? Date else {
return
}
guard Date().timeIntervalSince(sharedDate) < TransportConfig.uiShareAcceptWindowSeconds else {
return
}
let contentKind = SharedContentKind(rawValue: userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContentType") ?? "") ?? .text
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContent")
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentType")
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentDate")
switch contentKind {
case .url:
if let data = sharedContent.data(using: .utf8),
let urlData = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: String],
let url = urlData["url"] {
chatViewModel.sendMessage(url)
} else {
chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
}
case .text:
chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
}
record(.sharedContentAccepted(contentKind))
}
func handleNostrRelayConnectionChanged(_ isConnected: Bool) {
record(.nostrRelayConnectionChanged(isConnected))
let becameConnected = isConnected && !lastNostrRelayConnectedState
lastNostrRelayConnectedState = isConnected
guard started, becameConnected else { return }
let isInitialConnection = !didHandleInitialNostrConnection
didHandleInitialNostrConnection = true
if !chatViewModel.nostrHandlersSetup {
chatViewModel.setupNostrMessageHandling()
chatViewModel.nostrHandlersSetup = true
}
guard !isInitialConnection else { return }
chatViewModel.resubscribeCurrentGeohash()
chatViewModel.geoChannelCoordinator?.refreshSampling()
}
func announceInitialTorStatusIfNeeded() {
if TorManager.shared.torEnforced &&
!chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced &&
TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() {
chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
String(localized: "system.tor.starting", comment: "System message when Tor is starting")
)
} else if !TorManager.shared.torEnforced && !chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced {
chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
String(localized: "system.tor.dev_bypass", comment: "System message when Tor bypass is enabled in development")
)
}
}
func handleScreenshotCaptured() {
if appChromeModel.isLocationChannelsSheetPresented {
appChromeModel.triggerScreenshotPrivacyWarning()
return
}
if appChromeModel.isAppInfoPresented {
return
}
chatViewModel.handleScreenshotCaptured()
}
func openExternalURL(_ url: URL) {
#if os(iOS)
UIApplication.shared.open(url)
#else
NSWorkspace.shared.open(url)
#endif
}
func record(_ event: AppEvent) {
Task {
await events.emit(event)
}
}
}
-918
View File
@@ -1,918 +0,0 @@
//
// ConversationStore.swift
// bitchat
//
// Single source of truth for conversation message state (see
// docs/CONVERSATION-STORE-DESIGN.md). One `Conversation` object per
// `ConversationID`; all mutations flow through the store's intent API and
// every mutation emits a `ConversationChange` after state is consistent.
//
// The store also owns conversation selection: the active public channel and
// the selected private peer (the two UI selection axes) plus the derived
// `selectedConversationID`.
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitFoundation
import BitLogger
import Combine
import Foundation
// MARK: - Conversation
/// A single conversation timeline (`.mesh`, `.geohash`, or `.direct`).
///
/// Publishing granularity is per conversation: views observe ONE
/// `Conversation` object, so an append to chat A never invalidates observers
/// of chat B.
///
/// Mutations are `fileprivate` by design only `ConversationStore`'s intent
/// API may mutate a conversation, keeping the store the sole writer.
@MainActor
final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
let id: ConversationID
/// Maximum retained messages; oldest are trimmed on overflow.
let cap: Int
@Published private(set) var messages: [BitchatMessage] = []
@Published private(set) var isUnread: Bool = false
/// Incrementally-maintained message-ID index map for O(1) dedup and
/// delivery-status lookup. Kept in sync on every mutation:
/// - tail append: single insert
/// - out-of-order insert: suffix reindex from the insertion point
/// - trim: full rebuild `removeFirst(k)` is already O(n), so the
/// rebuild does not change the asymptotics, and trim only happens once
/// the cap (1337) is reached. Simple and correct beats the
/// offset-tracking alternative here.
private var indexByMessageID: [String: Int] = [:]
fileprivate init(id: ConversationID, cap: Int) {
self.id = id
self.cap = max(1, cap)
}
// MARK: Reads
func containsMessage(withID messageID: String) -> Bool {
indexByMessageID[messageID] != nil
}
func message(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return nil }
return messages[index]
}
/// All message IDs currently in this conversation (unordered).
var messageIDs: Dictionary<String, Int>.Keys {
indexByMessageID.keys
}
// MARK: Store-internal mutations
/// Result of an ordered insert. `trimmedMessageIDs` reports messages
/// evicted by the cap so the store can keep its message-ID
/// conversation map exact.
fileprivate struct InsertResult {
let inserted: Bool
let trimmedMessageIDs: [String]
static let duplicate = InsertResult(inserted: false, trimmedMessageIDs: [])
}
fileprivate enum UpsertOutcome {
case appended(trimmedMessageIDs: [String])
case updated
}
/// Inserts a message in timestamp order, deduplicating by message ID.
/// Fast path appends when the timestamp is >= the current tail;
/// otherwise a binary search finds the upper-bound insertion point so
/// arrival order is preserved among equal timestamps.
/// Reports `inserted: false` if a message with the same ID already exists.
fileprivate func insert(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> InsertResult {
guard indexByMessageID[message.id] == nil else { return .duplicate }
if let last = messages.last, message.timestamp < last.timestamp {
let index = insertionIndex(for: message.timestamp)
messages.insert(message, at: index)
reindex(from: index)
} else {
messages.append(message)
indexByMessageID[message.id] = messages.count - 1
}
return InsertResult(inserted: true, trimmedMessageIDs: trimIfNeeded())
}
/// Replace-or-append by message ID. An existing message keeps its
/// timeline position (in-place updates like media progress reuse the
/// original timestamp); a new message goes through ordered insertion.
fileprivate func upsert(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> UpsertOutcome {
if let index = indexByMessageID[message.id] {
messages[index] = message
return .updated
}
let result = insert(message)
return .appended(trimmedMessageIDs: result.trimmedMessageIDs)
}
/// Applies a delivery status keyed by message ID, honoring the
/// no-downgrade rule (the SOLE enforcement point every delivery
/// update flows through the store): equal statuses are skipped, and
/// `.read` is never downgraded to `.delivered` or `.sent`.
/// Returns `true` when the status was applied.
fileprivate func applyDeliveryStatus(_ status: DeliveryStatus, forMessageID messageID: String) -> Bool {
guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return false }
let message = messages[index]
guard !Self.shouldSkipStatusUpdate(current: message.deliveryStatus, new: status) else { return false }
message.deliveryStatus = status
// BitchatMessage is a reference type; write back through the
// subscript so the @Published wrapper emits.
messages[index] = message
return true
}
/// Republishes a message without changing state. Used for mirrored
/// copies that share a BitchatMessage instance: the first conversation's
/// status apply mutated the shared object, so this conversation's
/// observers still need an @Published emission to re-render.
@discardableResult
fileprivate func republishMessage(withID messageID: String) -> Bool {
guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return false }
messages[index] = messages[index]
return true
}
@discardableResult
fileprivate func setUnread(_ unread: Bool) -> Bool {
guard isUnread != unread else { return false }
isUnread = unread
return true
}
/// Removes a single message by ID. Returns the removed message, or
/// `nil` when no message with that ID exists.
fileprivate func remove(messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
guard let index = indexByMessageID[messageID] else { return nil }
let removed = messages.remove(at: index)
indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
reindex(from: index)
return removed
}
/// Removes every message matching `predicate`. Returns the removed
/// message IDs (empty when nothing matched).
fileprivate func removeAll(where predicate: (BitchatMessage) -> Bool) -> [String] {
var removedIDs: [String] = []
messages.removeAll { message in
guard predicate(message) else { return false }
removedIDs.append(message.id)
return true
}
guard !removedIDs.isEmpty else { return [] }
for id in removedIDs {
indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: id)
}
reindex(from: 0)
return removedIDs
}
fileprivate func clearMessages() {
messages.removeAll()
indexByMessageID.removeAll()
}
// MARK: Diagnostics
/// Appends human-readable invariant violations for this conversation
/// (empty when healthy): the ID index must be the exact inverse of the
/// messages array, the cap must hold, and timestamps must be
/// non-decreasing (equal timestamps keep arrival order, so only strict
/// inversions are violations). O(messages); allocates only on violation.
fileprivate func collectInvariantViolations(into violations: inout [String], label: String) {
if indexByMessageID.count != messages.count {
violations.append("\(label): index has \(indexByMessageID.count) entries for \(messages.count) messages")
}
if messages.count > cap {
violations.append("\(label): \(messages.count) messages exceeds cap \(cap)")
}
var previousTimestamp: Date?
for position in messages.indices {
let message = messages[position]
// Count equality + every message resolving to its own position
// proves the index is exactly the inverse map (no stale extras).
if let index = indexByMessageID[message.id] {
if index != position {
violations.append("\(label): message \(message.id.prefix(8))… at \(position) indexed at \(index)")
}
} else {
violations.append("\(label): message \(message.id.prefix(8))… at \(position) missing from index")
}
if let previousTimestamp, message.timestamp < previousTimestamp {
violations.append("\(label): timestamp order violated at \(position)")
}
previousTimestamp = message.timestamp
}
}
// MARK: Internals
static func shouldSkipStatusUpdate(current: DeliveryStatus?, new: DeliveryStatus) -> Bool {
guard let current else { return false }
if current == new { return true }
switch (current, new) {
case (.read, .delivered), (.read, .sent):
return true
default:
return false
}
}
/// Upper-bound binary search: first index whose timestamp is strictly
/// greater than `timestamp`, so equal-timestamp messages keep arrival
/// order.
private func insertionIndex(for timestamp: Date) -> Int {
var low = 0
var high = messages.count
while low < high {
let mid = (low + high) / 2
if messages[mid].timestamp <= timestamp {
low = mid + 1
} else {
high = mid
}
}
return low
}
private func reindex(from start: Int) {
for index in start..<messages.count {
indexByMessageID[messages[index].id] = index
}
}
/// Trims oldest messages over the cap; returns the trimmed message IDs.
private func trimIfNeeded() -> [String] {
guard messages.count > cap else { return [] }
let overflow = messages.count - cap
let trimmedIDs = messages.prefix(overflow).map(\.id)
for id in trimmedIDs {
indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: id)
}
messages.removeFirst(overflow)
reindex(from: 0)
return trimmedIDs
}
}
// MARK: - ConversationChange
/// Typed mutation events for non-UI consumers (delivery tracking,
/// notifications, sync) that need "something changed in conversation X"
/// without subscribing to whole message arrays. Emitted on the store's
/// `changes` subject AFTER the corresponding state is consistent.
enum ConversationChange {
case appended(ConversationID, BitchatMessage)
case updated(ConversationID, messageID: String)
case statusChanged(ConversationID, messageID: String, DeliveryStatus)
case messageRemoved(ConversationID, messageID: String)
case cleared(ConversationID)
case removed(ConversationID)
case migrated(from: ConversationID, to: ConversationID)
case unreadChanged(ConversationID, isUnread: Bool)
}
// MARK: - ConversationStore
/// Sole writer and sole holder of conversation message state. All mutations
/// go through the intent API below; backing collections are `private(set)`.
/// Reads are synchronous writers and readers share the main actor, so
/// after an intent returns every observer sees the result.
@MainActor
final class ConversationStore: ObservableObject {
/// Conversation creation order; published so list-style consumers can
/// observe conversations appearing/disappearing without rebuilding from
/// the dictionary.
@Published private(set) var conversationIDs: [ConversationID] = []
@Published private(set) var selectedConversationID: ConversationID?
@Published private(set) var unreadConversations: Set<ConversationID> = []
// MARK: Selection state
// The two UI selection axes: which public channel is active, and which
// private chat (if any) is open on top of it. `selectedConversationID`
// is derived: the open private chat wins, otherwise the active public
// channel's conversation. Mutate via `setActiveChannel` /
// `setSelectedPrivatePeer` only.
@Published private(set) var activeChannel: ChannelID = .mesh
@Published private(set) var selectedPrivatePeerID: PeerID?
private(set) var conversationsByID: [ConversationID: Conversation] = [:]
/// Store-level message-ID conversation-membership map for ID-only
/// lookups (delivery receipts arrive with a message ID, not a
/// conversation). Maintained incrementally at every mutation point
/// all mutation is centralized in the intent API below, so the map is
/// exact, never scanned or rebuilt.
///
/// The value is a `Set` because a private message can legitimately live
/// in TWO direct conversations: step 2's raw per-peer keying mirrors a
/// message into both the stable-key and ephemeral-peer chats
/// (`mirrorToEphemeralIfNeeded`). A delivery update must reach both
/// copies.
private var conversationIDsByMessageID: [String: Set<ConversationID>] = [:]
/// Monotonic count of messages inserted into any conversation (appends,
/// upsert-appends, migration inserts). Field-observability only: the
/// periodic store audit folds the delta into its heartbeat line so logs
/// carry throughput context. Never read on a hot path.
private(set) var appendCount: Int = 0
/// Sample counter for the mirrored-republish debug log in the ID-only
/// `setDeliveryStatus` fan-out (first + every Nth occurrence).
private var mirroredRepublishLogCount = 0
let changes = PassthroughSubject<ConversationChange, Never>()
// MARK: Intent API
/// Returns the conversation for `id`, creating it (with the cap policy
/// for its kind) on first access.
@discardableResult
func conversation(for id: ConversationID) -> Conversation {
if let existing = conversationsByID[id] {
return existing
}
let conversation = Conversation(id: id, cap: Self.cap(for: id))
conversationsByID[id] = conversation
conversationIDs.append(id)
return conversation
}
/// Appends a message in timestamp order. Returns `false` (and emits
/// nothing) if a message with the same ID is already present.
@discardableResult
func append(_ message: BitchatMessage, to id: ConversationID) -> Bool {
let conversation = conversation(for: id)
let result = conversation.insert(message)
guard result.inserted else { return false }
registerMessageID(message.id, in: id)
unregisterMessageIDs(result.trimmedMessageIDs, from: id)
changes.send(.appended(id, message))
return true
}
/// Replace-or-append by message ID (media progress, edits).
func upsertByID(_ message: BitchatMessage, in id: ConversationID) {
let conversation = conversation(for: id)
switch conversation.upsert(message) {
case .appended(let trimmedMessageIDs):
registerMessageID(message.id, in: id)
unregisterMessageIDs(trimmedMessageIDs, from: id)
changes.send(.appended(id, message))
case .updated:
changes.send(.updated(id, messageID: message.id))
}
}
/// Applies a delivery status keyed by message ID. Returns `false` when
/// the message is unknown or the update would downgrade the status
/// (read beats delivered beats sent).
@discardableResult
func setDeliveryStatus(_ status: DeliveryStatus, forMessageID messageID: String, in id: ConversationID) -> Bool {
guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id],
conversation.applyDeliveryStatus(status, forMessageID: messageID) else {
return false
}
changes.send(.statusChanged(id, messageID: messageID, status))
return true
}
/// Applies a delivery status to EVERY conversation containing
/// `messageID` (ID-only delivery receipts don't know conversations;
/// mirrored private copies live in two direct chats). Returns `false`
/// when the message is unknown or no copy changed (equal status or
/// downgrade read beats delivered beats sent).
///
/// `BitchatMessage` is a reference type, so mirrored copies sharing one
/// instance are mutated by the first conversation's apply. The skipped
/// conversations still hold the changed message, so they get an explicit
/// republish and `.statusChanged` event - otherwise a view observing the
/// mirrored conversation would render stale status. Distinct copies whose
/// update was genuinely rejected (downgrade) are left untouched, guarded
/// by status equality.
@discardableResult
func setDeliveryStatus(_ status: DeliveryStatus, forMessageID messageID: String) -> Bool {
guard let ids = conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] else { return false }
var applied = false
var skipped: [ConversationID] = []
for id in ids {
if setDeliveryStatus(status, forMessageID: messageID, in: id) {
applied = true
} else {
skipped.append(id)
}
}
guard applied else { return false }
for id in skipped {
guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id],
conversation.message(withID: messageID)?.deliveryStatus == status,
conversation.republishMessage(withID: messageID) else { continue }
// Field proof the mirrored-copy republish path actually fires;
// sampled (first + every Nth) so mirrored chats can't spam logs.
mirroredRepublishLogCount += 1
if mirroredRepublishLogCount == 1
|| mirroredRepublishLogCount.isMultiple(of: TransportConfig.conversationStoreMirroredRepublishLogInterval) {
SecureLogger.debug(
"mirrored republish #\(mirroredRepublishLogCount) for \(messageID.prefix(8))… in \(id.auditDescription)",
category: .session
)
}
changes.send(.statusChanged(id, messageID: messageID, status))
}
return true
}
/// Current delivery status of `messageID` in whichever conversation
/// holds it (mirrored copies share status see `setDeliveryStatus`).
func deliveryStatus(forMessageID messageID: String) -> DeliveryStatus? {
guard let ids = conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] else { return nil }
for id in ids {
if let status = conversationsByID[id]?.message(withID: messageID)?.deliveryStatus {
return status
}
}
return nil
}
/// Every conversation currently containing `messageID` (empty when the
/// message is unknown).
func conversationIDs(forMessageID messageID: String) -> Set<ConversationID> {
conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] ?? []
}
func markRead(_ id: ConversationID) {
guard unreadConversations.contains(id) else { return }
unreadConversations.remove(id)
conversationsByID[id]?.setUnread(false)
changes.send(.unreadChanged(id, isUnread: false))
}
func markUnread(_ id: ConversationID) {
guard !unreadConversations.contains(id) else { return }
let conversation = conversation(for: id)
unreadConversations.insert(id)
conversation.setUnread(true)
changes.send(.unreadChanged(id, isUnread: true))
}
/// Selects a conversation (creating it if needed) or clears the
/// selection with `nil`.
func select(_ id: ConversationID?) {
if let id {
conversation(for: id)
}
guard selectedConversationID != id else { return }
selectedConversationID = id
}
/// Switches the active public channel. While no private chat is open
/// the selection follows the channel.
func setActiveChannel(_ channelID: ChannelID) {
if activeChannel != channelID {
activeChannel = channelID
}
refreshDerivedSelection()
}
/// Opens a private chat (`nil` closes it, returning the selection to the
/// active public channel's conversation).
func setSelectedPrivatePeer(_ peerID: PeerID?) {
if selectedPrivatePeerID != peerID {
selectedPrivatePeerID = peerID
}
refreshDerivedSelection()
}
private func refreshDerivedSelection() {
if let peerID = selectedPrivatePeerID {
select(.directPeer(peerID))
} else {
select(ConversationID(channelID: activeChannel))
}
}
/// Moves all messages from `source` into `destination` (the
/// ephemeralstable peer-ID handoff): dedups by message ID, preserves
/// timestamp order, carries unread state over, and hands off the
/// selection mirroring `ChatPrivateConversationCoordinator`'s
/// migration semantics. The source conversation is removed. Emits a
/// single `.migrated(from:to:)` once the whole move is consistent.
func migrateConversation(from source: ConversationID, to destination: ConversationID) {
guard source != destination, let sourceConversation = conversationsByID[source] else { return }
let destinationConversation = conversation(for: destination)
for message in sourceConversation.messages {
let result = destinationConversation.insert(message)
guard result.inserted else { continue }
registerMessageID(message.id, in: destination)
unregisterMessageIDs(result.trimmedMessageIDs, from: destination)
}
for messageID in sourceConversation.messageIDs {
unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: source)
}
let wasUnread = unreadConversations.contains(source)
let wasSelected = selectedConversationID == source
conversationsByID.removeValue(forKey: source)
conversationIDs.removeAll { $0 == source }
unreadConversations.remove(source)
if wasUnread, !unreadConversations.contains(destination) {
unreadConversations.insert(destination)
destinationConversation.setUnread(true)
}
if wasSelected {
selectedConversationID = destination
// Keep the private-peer selection axis consistent with the
// handed-off selection.
if let peerID = selectedPrivatePeerID,
source == .directPeer(peerID),
case .direct(let destinationHandle) = destination {
selectedPrivatePeerID = destinationHandle.routingPeerID
}
}
changes.send(.migrated(from: source, to: destination))
}
/// Removes a single message by ID from a conversation. Returns the
/// removed message, or `nil` (emitting nothing) when the conversation or
/// message is unknown.
@discardableResult
func removeMessage(withID messageID: String, from id: ConversationID) -> BitchatMessage? {
guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id],
let removed = conversation.remove(messageID: messageID) else {
return nil
}
unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: id)
changes.send(.messageRemoved(id, messageID: messageID))
return removed
}
/// Removes every message matching `predicate` from a conversation,
/// emitting one `.messageRemoved` per removed message after the
/// conversation is consistent. No-op for unknown conversations.
func removeMessages(from id: ConversationID, where predicate: (BitchatMessage) -> Bool) {
guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id] else { return }
let removedIDs = conversation.removeAll(where: predicate)
unregisterMessageIDs(removedIDs, from: id)
for messageID in removedIDs {
changes.send(.messageRemoved(id, messageID: messageID))
}
}
/// Empties a conversation's timeline but keeps the conversation (and
/// its unread/selection state) alive.
func clear(_ id: ConversationID) {
guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id] else { return }
for messageID in conversation.messageIDs {
unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: id)
}
conversation.clearMessages()
changes.send(.cleared(id))
}
/// Removes a conversation entirely, including unread state; clears the
/// selection if it pointed at the removed conversation.
func removeConversation(_ id: ConversationID) {
guard let conversation = conversationsByID.removeValue(forKey: id) else { return }
for messageID in conversation.messageIDs {
unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: id)
}
conversationIDs.removeAll { $0 == id }
unreadConversations.remove(id)
if selectedConversationID == id {
selectedConversationID = nil
}
changes.send(.removed(id))
}
func clearAll() {
let removedIDs = conversationIDs
guard !removedIDs.isEmpty || selectedConversationID != nil else { return }
conversationsByID.removeAll()
conversationIDs.removeAll()
unreadConversations.removeAll()
conversationIDsByMessageID.removeAll()
if selectedConversationID != nil {
selectedConversationID = nil
}
for id in removedIDs {
changes.send(.removed(id))
}
}
// MARK: Diagnostics
/// Total messages across all conversations. O(#conversations) heartbeat
/// logging only, never a hot path.
var totalMessageCount: Int {
conversationsByID.values.reduce(0) { $0 + $1.messages.count }
}
/// Number of distinct message IDs in the store-level membership map.
var messageIDMapCount: Int {
conversationIDsByMessageID.count
}
/// Verifies the store's correctness invariants and returns human-readable
/// violations (empty = healthy). Intended for a periodic field audit:
/// O(total messages) and allocation-free while healthy. Checks:
/// - the `conversationIDs` ordering array matches `conversationsByID`
/// - per conversation: ID index exact, cap held, timestamp order
/// (see `Conversation.collectInvariantViolations`)
/// - the message-ID conversation map matches reality exactly: every
/// mapped membership points at a live conversation actually holding
/// the message, and total memberships equal total messages (with the
/// forward check, equality proves no conversation message is missing
/// from the map)
/// - `unreadConversations` only references existing conversations
/// - `selectedConversationID`, when set, references an existing
/// conversation (`select(_:)` creates on selection and
/// `removeConversation`/`clearAll` clear it, so existence is the
/// invariant for both the channel-derived and direct-peer cases)
func auditInvariants() -> [String] {
var violations: [String] = []
if conversationIDs.count != conversationsByID.count {
violations.append("conversationIDs lists \(conversationIDs.count) conversations but dictionary holds \(conversationsByID.count)")
}
for id in conversationIDs where conversationsByID[id] == nil {
violations.append("conversationIDs lists \(id.auditDescription) but no conversation exists")
}
var totalMessages = 0
for (id, conversation) in conversationsByID {
totalMessages += conversation.messages.count
conversation.collectInvariantViolations(into: &violations, label: id.auditDescription)
}
var totalMappedMemberships = 0
for (messageID, ids) in conversationIDsByMessageID {
totalMappedMemberships += ids.count
if ids.isEmpty {
violations.append("message map: \(messageID.prefix(8))… has an empty membership set")
}
for id in ids {
guard let conversation = conversationsByID[id] else {
violations.append("message map: \(messageID.prefix(8))… claims unknown conversation \(id.auditDescription)")
continue
}
if !conversation.containsMessage(withID: messageID) {
violations.append("message map: \(messageID.prefix(8))… not present in claimed conversation \(id.auditDescription)")
}
}
}
if totalMappedMemberships != totalMessages {
violations.append("message map holds \(totalMappedMemberships) memberships but conversations hold \(totalMessages) messages")
}
for id in unreadConversations where conversationsByID[id] == nil {
violations.append("unreadConversations contains unknown conversation \(id.auditDescription)")
}
if let selected = selectedConversationID, conversationsByID[selected] == nil {
violations.append("selectedConversationID \(selected.auditDescription) has no conversation")
}
return violations
}
// MARK: Internals
private func registerMessageID(_ messageID: String, in id: ConversationID) {
conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID, default: []].insert(id)
// Single choke point for every successful insertion (append, upsert
// append, migration insert) the audit heartbeat's throughput delta.
appendCount += 1
}
private func unregisterMessageID(_ messageID: String, from id: ConversationID) {
guard var ids = conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] else { return }
ids.remove(id)
if ids.isEmpty {
conversationIDsByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
} else {
conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID] = ids
}
}
private func unregisterMessageIDs(_ messageIDs: [String], from id: ConversationID) {
for messageID in messageIDs {
unregisterMessageID(messageID, from: id)
}
}
private static func cap(for id: ConversationID) -> Int {
switch id {
case .mesh:
return TransportConfig.meshTimelineCap
case .geohash:
return TransportConfig.geoTimelineCap
case .direct:
return TransportConfig.privateChatCap
}
}
}
// MARK: - Direct-conversation keying + derived views
extension ConversationID {
/// Direct-conversation ID keyed by the *raw* routing peer ID.
///
/// Direct conversations are deliberately keyed per `PeerID`, not per
/// resolved identity: the private-chat coordinators mirror messages into
/// both the ephemeral and stable peer's conversations
/// (`mirrorToEphemeralIfNeeded`) and consolidate/migrate between them
/// explicitly, so a raw lookup by whichever peer ID is selected always
/// finds the right timeline without an identity-resolution layer.
static func directPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) -> ConversationID {
.direct(PeerHandle(id: "peer:\(peerID.id)", routingPeerID: peerID))
}
}
extension ConversationStore {
/// All direct conversations' messages keyed by routing peer ID the
/// shape `ChatViewModel.privateChats` exposes to the coordinators.
/// Values are the conversations' backing arrays (COW), so building this
/// is O(#conversations), not O(#messages).
func directMessagesByRoutingPeerID() -> [PeerID: [BitchatMessage]] {
var messagesByPeerID: [PeerID: [BitchatMessage]] = [:]
messagesByPeerID.reserveCapacity(conversationsByID.count)
for (id, conversation) in conversationsByID {
guard case .direct(let handle) = id else { continue }
messagesByPeerID[handle.routingPeerID] = conversation.messages
}
return messagesByPeerID
}
/// Unread direct conversations as routing peer IDs the shape
/// `ChatViewModel.unreadPrivateMessages` exposes to the coordinators.
func unreadDirectRoutingPeerIDs() -> Set<PeerID> {
var peerIDs = Set<PeerID>()
for id in unreadConversations {
guard case .direct(let handle) = id else { continue }
peerIDs.insert(handle.routingPeerID)
}
return peerIDs
}
/// `true` when any direct conversation contains a message with `messageID`
/// (O(1) via the store-level message-ID conversation map).
func directConversationsContainMessage(withID messageID: String) -> Bool {
conversationIDs(forMessageID: messageID).contains { id in
if case .direct = id { return true }
return false
}
}
/// Message IDs across all direct conversations (read-receipt pruning
/// keeps only receipts whose messages still exist).
func directMessageIDs() -> Set<String> {
var messageIDs = Set<String>()
for (id, conversation) in conversationsByID {
guard case .direct = id else { continue }
messageIDs.formUnion(conversation.messageIDs)
}
return messageIDs
}
/// Removes every direct conversation (panic clear).
func removeAllDirectConversations() {
let directIDs = conversationIDs.filter { id in
if case .direct = id { return true }
return false
}
for id in directIDs {
removeConversation(id)
}
}
}
// MARK: - Diagnostics support
extension ConversationID {
/// Short, log-safe description for audit/diagnostic lines. Direct
/// conversations truncate the handle so full peer keys never hit logs.
fileprivate var auditDescription: String {
switch self {
case .mesh:
return "mesh"
case .geohash(let geohash):
return "geo:\(geohash)"
case .direct(let handle):
return "direct:\(handle.id.prefix(13))"
}
}
}
#if DEBUG
// Test-only corruption hooks for `auditInvariants()` tests. The store is the
// sole writer by design `Conversation`'s mutators are fileprivate and the
// store's backing collections are private so the inconsistent states the
// audit exists to catch CANNOT be manufactured through the intent API. These
// DEBUG-only hooks deliberately bypass that lockdown to inject exactly those
// impossible states. Never call them outside tests.
extension Conversation {
/// Points an existing message's index entry at the wrong position
/// (positions 0 and 1 swap their index entries). Requires >= 2 messages.
func _testCorruptIndexEntries() {
guard messages.count >= 2 else { return }
indexByMessageID[messages[0].id] = 1
indexByMessageID[messages[1].id] = 0
}
/// Drops a message's index entry entirely (count mismatch + missing).
func _testRemoveIndexEntry(forMessageID messageID: String) {
indexByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
}
/// Swaps the first and last messages while keeping the index consistent,
/// so ONLY the timestamp-order invariant is violated (requires the two
/// messages to have distinct timestamps).
func _testCorruptOrderingPreservingIndex() {
guard messages.count >= 2 else { return }
messages.swapAt(0, messages.count - 1)
indexByMessageID[messages[0].id] = 0
indexByMessageID[messages[messages.count - 1].id] = messages.count - 1
}
}
extension ConversationStore {
/// Adds a map membership that the conversation does not actually hold.
func _testRegisterPhantomMessageID(_ messageID: String, in id: ConversationID) {
conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID, default: []].insert(id)
}
/// Drops a real map membership (conversation message missing from map).
func _testUnregisterMessageID(_ messageID: String, from id: ConversationID) {
conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID]?.remove(id)
if conversationIDsByMessageID[messageID]?.isEmpty == true {
conversationIDsByMessageID.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
}
}
/// Appends past the conversation cap, bypassing trim (map kept exact so
/// only the cap invariant is violated).
func _testAppendBypassingCap(_ message: BitchatMessage, to id: ConversationID) {
let conversation = conversation(for: id)
conversation._testAppendBypassingTrim(message)
conversationIDsByMessageID[message.id, default: []].insert(id)
}
/// Marks a nonexistent conversation unread without creating it.
func _testInsertUnreadConversationID(_ id: ConversationID) {
unreadConversations.insert(id)
}
/// Sets the selection directly, without `select(_:)`'s create-on-select.
func _testSetSelectedConversationID(_ id: ConversationID?) {
selectedConversationID = id
}
}
extension Conversation {
fileprivate func _testAppendBypassingTrim(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
messages.append(message)
indexByMessageID[message.id] = messages.count - 1
}
}
#endif
// MARK: - Public timeline derived views
extension ConversationStore {
/// Removes a message by ID from whichever public (mesh/geohash)
/// conversation contains it. Returns the removed message, if any.
@discardableResult
func removePublicMessage(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
for id in conversationIDs(forMessageID: messageID) {
switch id {
case .mesh, .geohash:
return removeMessage(withID: messageID, from: id)
case .direct:
continue
}
}
return nil
}
}
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import BitFoundation
import Combine
import SwiftUI
#if os(iOS)
import UIKit
#endif
@MainActor
final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var showAutocomplete = false
@Published private(set) var autocompleteSuggestions: [String] = []
@Published private(set) var currentNickname: String
@Published private(set) var isBatchingPublic = false
@Published private(set) var canSendMediaInCurrentContext = true
private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
private let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel
private let conversations: ConversationStore
private var activeChannel: ChannelID
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
init(
chatViewModel: ChatViewModel,
privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel,
conversations: ConversationStore
) {
self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
self.privateConversationModel = privateConversationModel
self.conversations = conversations
self.activeChannel = conversations.activeChannel
self.currentNickname = chatViewModel.nickname
self.isBatchingPublic = chatViewModel.isBatchingPublic
self.showAutocomplete = chatViewModel.showAutocomplete
self.autocompleteSuggestions = chatViewModel.autocompleteSuggestions
self.canSendMediaInCurrentContext = chatViewModel.canSendMediaInCurrentContext
bind()
}
func setCurrentColorScheme(_ colorScheme: ColorScheme) {
chatViewModel.currentColorScheme = colorScheme
}
func setCurrentTheme(_ theme: AppTheme) {
chatViewModel.currentTheme = theme
}
func sendMessage(_ message: String) {
chatViewModel.sendMessage(message)
}
/// Resends a failed private message through the normal send path,
/// removing the failed original so the re-submission replaces it
/// instead of stacking a duplicate under the red bubble.
func resendFailedPrivateMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
chatViewModel.removePrivateMessage(withID: message.id)
chatViewModel.sendMessage(message.content)
}
func clearCurrentConversation() {
chatViewModel.sendMessage("/clear")
}
func sendHug(to sender: String) {
chatViewModel.sendMessage("/hug @\(sender)")
}
func sendSlap(to sender: String) {
chatViewModel.sendMessage("/slap @\(sender)")
}
func block(peerID: PeerID?, displayName: String?) {
guard let displayName else { return }
if let peerID, peerID.isGeoChat,
let full = chatViewModel.fullNostrHex(forSenderPeerID: peerID) {
chatViewModel.blockGeohashUser(pubkeyHexLowercased: full, displayName: displayName)
} else if let peerID, !peerID.isGeoDM, !peerID.isGeoChat {
// Mesh: block the peer's stable Noise identity resolved from the
// tapped peerID rather than re-resolving a display-name string.
chatViewModel.blockMeshPeer(peerID: peerID, displayName: displayName)
} else {
chatViewModel.sendMessage("/block \(displayName)")
}
}
/// Mesh counterpart of `block(peerID:displayName:)`. Resolves the unblock by
/// the tapped peer's stable identity so the exact row is unblocked this
/// also works for offline peers, which the `/unblock <displayName>` command
/// cannot resolve.
func unblock(peerID: PeerID, displayName: String) {
chatViewModel.unblockMeshPeer(peerID: peerID, displayName: displayName)
}
func updateAutocomplete(for text: String, cursorPosition: Int) {
chatViewModel.updateAutocomplete(for: text, cursorPosition: cursorPosition)
}
func completeNickname(_ nickname: String, in text: inout String) -> Int {
chatViewModel.completeNickname(nickname, in: &text)
}
func formatMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage, colorScheme: ColorScheme, theme: AppTheme? = nil) -> AttributedString {
chatViewModel.formatMessageAsText(message, colorScheme: colorScheme, theme: theme)
}
func formatMessageHeader(_ message: BitchatMessage, colorScheme: ColorScheme, theme: AppTheme? = nil) -> AttributedString {
chatViewModel.formatMessageHeader(message, colorScheme: colorScheme, theme: theme)
}
func mediaAttachment(for message: BitchatMessage) -> BitchatMessage.Media? {
message.mediaAttachment(for: currentNickname)
}
func isSelfSender(peerID: PeerID?, displayName: String?) -> Bool {
chatViewModel.isSelfSender(peerID: peerID, displayName: displayName)
}
func isSentByCurrentUser(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
message.sender == currentNickname || message.sender.hasPrefix(currentNickname + "#")
}
func isMediaMessageFromCurrentUser(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
message.sender == currentNickname || message.senderPeerID == chatViewModel.meshService.myPeerID
}
func senderDisplayName(for peerID: PeerID, fallbackMessages: [BitchatMessage]) -> String? {
if peerID.isGeoDM || peerID.isGeoChat {
return chatViewModel.geohashDisplayName(for: peerID)
}
if let nickname = chatViewModel.meshService.peerNickname(peerID: peerID) {
return nickname
}
return fallbackMessages.last(where: { $0.senderPeerID == peerID && $0.sender != "system" })?.sender
}
#if os(iOS)
func processSelectedImage(_ image: UIImage?) {
chatViewModel.processThenSendImage(image)
}
#endif
func processSelectedImage(from url: URL?) {
#if os(macOS)
chatViewModel.processThenSendImage(from: url)
#endif
}
func sendVoiceNote(at url: URL) {
chatViewModel.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
}
func cancelMediaSend(messageID: String) {
chatViewModel.cancelMediaSend(messageID: messageID)
}
func deleteMediaMessage(messageID: String) {
chatViewModel.deleteMediaMessage(messageID: messageID)
}
private func bind() {
chatViewModel.$nickname
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$currentNickname)
chatViewModel.$showAutocomplete
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$showAutocomplete)
chatViewModel.$autocompleteSuggestions
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$autocompleteSuggestions)
chatViewModel.$isBatchingPublic
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$isBatchingPublic)
conversations.$activeChannel
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] channel in
self?.activeChannel = channel
self?.refreshComputedState()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
privateConversationModel.$selectedPeerID
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refreshComputedState()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
}
private func refreshComputedState() {
if let selectedPeerID = privateConversationModel.selectedPeerID {
canSendMediaInCurrentContext = !(selectedPeerID.isGeoDM || selectedPeerID.isGeoChat)
return
}
switch activeChannel {
case .mesh:
canSendMediaInCurrentContext = true
case .location:
canSendMediaInCurrentContext = false
}
}
}
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import BitFoundation
import Combine
import Foundation
@MainActor
final class LocationChannelsModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var permissionState: LocationChannelManager.PermissionState
@Published private(set) var availableChannels: [GeohashChannel]
@Published private(set) var selectedChannel: ChannelID
@Published private(set) var teleported: Bool
@Published private(set) var bookmarks: [String]
@Published private(set) var bookmarkNames: [String: String]
@Published private(set) var locationNames: [GeohashChannelLevel: String]
@Published private(set) var userTorEnabled: Bool
private let manager: LocationChannelManager
private let network: NetworkActivationService
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
init(
manager: LocationChannelManager? = nil,
network: NetworkActivationService? = nil
) {
let manager = manager ?? .shared
let network = network ?? .shared
self.manager = manager
self.network = network
self.permissionState = manager.permissionState
self.availableChannels = manager.availableChannels
self.selectedChannel = manager.selectedChannel
self.teleported = manager.teleported
self.bookmarks = manager.bookmarks
self.bookmarkNames = manager.bookmarkNames
self.locationNames = manager.locationNames
self.userTorEnabled = network.userTorEnabled
bind()
}
var currentBuildingGeohash: String? {
availableChannels.first(where: { $0.level == .building })?.geohash
}
func isSelected(_ channel: GeohashChannel) -> Bool {
guard case .location(let selected) = selectedChannel else { return false }
return selected == channel
}
func isBookmarked(_ geohash: String) -> Bool {
manager.isBookmarked(geohash)
}
func enableLocationChannels() {
manager.enableLocationChannels()
}
func refreshChannels() {
manager.refreshChannels()
}
func enableAndRefresh() {
manager.enableLocationChannels()
manager.refreshChannels()
}
func beginLiveRefresh() {
manager.beginLiveRefresh()
}
func endLiveRefresh() {
manager.endLiveRefresh()
}
func select(_ channel: ChannelID) {
manager.select(channel)
}
func markTeleported(for geohash: String, _ flag: Bool) {
manager.markTeleported(for: geohash, flag)
}
func toggleBookmark(_ geohash: String) {
manager.toggleBookmark(geohash)
}
func resolveBookmarkNameIfNeeded(for geohash: String) {
manager.resolveBookmarkNameIfNeeded(for: geohash)
}
func locationName(for level: GeohashChannelLevel) -> String? {
locationNames[level]
}
func setUserTorEnabled(_ enabled: Bool) {
network.setUserTorEnabled(enabled)
}
func refreshMeshChannelsIfNeeded() {
guard case .mesh = selectedChannel,
permissionState == .authorized,
availableChannels.isEmpty else {
return
}
refreshChannels()
}
func openLocationChannel(for geohash: String) {
let normalized = geohash.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).lowercased()
let allowed = Set("0123456789bcdefghjkmnpqrstuvwxyz")
guard (2...12).contains(normalized.count),
normalized.allSatisfy({ allowed.contains($0) }) else {
return
}
let channel = GeohashChannel(level: level(forLength: normalized.count), geohash: normalized)
let isRegional = availableChannels.contains { $0.geohash == normalized }
if !isRegional && !availableChannels.isEmpty {
markTeleported(for: normalized, true)
}
select(.location(channel))
}
func teleport(to geohash: String) {
let normalized = geohash.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines).lowercased()
let channel = GeohashChannel(level: level(forLength: normalized.count), geohash: normalized)
markTeleported(for: normalized, true)
select(.location(channel))
}
private func bind() {
manager.$permissionState
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$permissionState)
manager.$availableChannels
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$availableChannels)
manager.$selectedChannel
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$selectedChannel)
manager.$teleported
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$teleported)
manager.$bookmarks
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$bookmarks)
manager.$bookmarkNames
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$bookmarkNames)
manager.$locationNames
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$locationNames)
network.$userTorEnabled
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$userTorEnabled)
}
private func level(forLength length: Int) -> GeohashChannelLevel {
switch length {
case 0...2: return .region
case 3...4: return .province
case 5: return .city
case 6: return .neighborhood
case 7: return .block
case 8...12: return .building
default: return .block
}
}
}
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import Combine
import Foundation
@MainActor
final class LocationPresenceStore: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var currentGeohash: String?
@Published private(set) var geoNicknames: [String: String] = [:]
@Published private(set) var teleportedGeo: Set<String> = []
func setCurrentGeohash(_ geohash: String?) {
currentGeohash = geohash?.lowercased()
}
func setNickname(_ nickname: String, for pubkeyHex: String) {
geoNicknames[pubkeyHex.lowercased()] = nickname
}
func replaceGeoNicknames(_ nicknames: [String: String]) {
geoNicknames = Dictionary(
uniqueKeysWithValues: nicknames.map { key, value in
(key.lowercased(), value)
}
)
}
func clearGeoNicknames() {
geoNicknames.removeAll()
}
func markTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) {
teleportedGeo.insert(pubkeyHex.lowercased())
}
func clearTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) {
teleportedGeo.remove(pubkeyHex.lowercased())
}
func replaceTeleportedGeo(_ pubkeys: Set<String>) {
teleportedGeo = Set(pubkeys.map { $0.lowercased() })
}
func clearTeleportedGeo() {
teleportedGeo.removeAll()
}
func reset() {
currentGeohash = nil
geoNicknames.removeAll()
teleportedGeo.removeAll()
}
}
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import BitFoundation
import Combine
import Foundation
@MainActor
final class PeerIdentityStore: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var encryptionStatuses: [PeerID: EncryptionStatus] = [:]
@Published private(set) var verifiedFingerprints: Set<String> = []
private(set) var peerFingerprintsByPeerID: [PeerID: String] = [:]
private(set) var selectedPrivateChatFingerprint: String?
private var stablePeerIDsByShortID: [PeerID: PeerID] = [:]
private var encryptionStatusCache: [PeerID: EncryptionStatus] = [:]
func stablePeerID(forShortID peerID: PeerID) -> PeerID? {
stablePeerIDsByShortID[peerID]
}
func shortPeerID(forStablePeerID stablePeerID: PeerID) -> PeerID? {
stablePeerIDsByShortID.first(where: { $0.value == stablePeerID })?.key
}
func setStablePeerID(_ stablePeerID: PeerID, forShortID peerID: PeerID) {
stablePeerIDsByShortID[peerID] = stablePeerID
}
func replaceStablePeerIDs(_ mappings: [PeerID: PeerID]) {
stablePeerIDsByShortID = mappings
}
func fingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? {
peerFingerprintsByPeerID[peerID]
}
func setFingerprint(_ fingerprint: String?, for peerID: PeerID) {
if let fingerprint {
peerFingerprintsByPeerID[peerID] = fingerprint
} else {
peerFingerprintsByPeerID.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
}
func replaceFingerprintMappings(_ mappings: [PeerID: String]) {
peerFingerprintsByPeerID = mappings
}
@discardableResult
func migrateFingerprintMapping(
from oldPeerID: PeerID,
to newPeerID: PeerID,
fallback: String? = nil
) -> String? {
let fingerprint = peerFingerprintsByPeerID.removeValue(forKey: oldPeerID) ?? fallback
if let fingerprint {
peerFingerprintsByPeerID[newPeerID] = fingerprint
if selectedPrivateChatFingerprint == nil {
selectedPrivateChatFingerprint = fingerprint
}
}
return fingerprint
}
func setSelectedPrivateChatFingerprint(_ fingerprint: String?) {
selectedPrivateChatFingerprint = fingerprint
}
func cachedEncryptionStatus(for peerID: PeerID) -> EncryptionStatus? {
encryptionStatusCache[peerID]
}
func setCachedEncryptionStatus(_ status: EncryptionStatus, for peerID: PeerID) {
encryptionStatusCache[peerID] = status
}
func invalidateEncryptionCache(for peerID: PeerID? = nil) {
if let peerID {
encryptionStatusCache.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
} else {
encryptionStatusCache.removeAll()
}
}
func encryptionStatus(for peerID: PeerID) -> EncryptionStatus? {
encryptionStatuses[peerID]
}
func setEncryptionStatus(_ status: EncryptionStatus?, for peerID: PeerID) {
if let status {
encryptionStatuses[peerID] = status
} else {
encryptionStatuses.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
invalidateEncryptionCache(for: peerID)
}
func replaceEncryptionStatuses(_ statuses: [PeerID: EncryptionStatus]) {
encryptionStatuses = statuses
}
func setVerifiedFingerprints(_ fingerprints: Set<String>) {
verifiedFingerprints = fingerprints
}
func setVerified(_ fingerprint: String, verified: Bool) {
if verified {
verifiedFingerprints.insert(fingerprint)
} else {
verifiedFingerprints.remove(fingerprint)
}
}
func isVerified(_ fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
verifiedFingerprints.contains(fingerprint)
}
func clearAll() {
encryptionStatuses.removeAll()
verifiedFingerprints.removeAll()
peerFingerprintsByPeerID.removeAll()
selectedPrivateChatFingerprint = nil
stablePeerIDsByShortID.removeAll()
encryptionStatusCache.removeAll()
}
}
-260
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import BitFoundation
import Combine
import SwiftUI
struct MeshPeerRow: Identifiable, Equatable {
let peerID: PeerID
let displayName: String
let isMe: Bool
let hasUnread: Bool
let isBlocked: Bool
let isFavorite: Bool
let isConnected: Bool
let isReachable: Bool
let isMutualFavorite: Bool
let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus
let showsVerifiedBadgeWhenOffline: Bool
var id: String { peerID.id }
}
struct GeohashPersonRow: Identifiable, Equatable {
let id: String
let displayName: String
let isMe: Bool
let isTeleported: Bool
let isBlocked: Bool
}
@MainActor
final class PeerListModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var allPeers: [BitchatPeer] = []
@Published private(set) var meshRows: [MeshPeerRow] = []
@Published private(set) var geohashPeople: [GeohashPersonRow] = []
@Published private(set) var reachableMeshPeerCount = 0
@Published private(set) var connectedMeshPeerCount = 0
@Published private(set) var visibleGeohashPeerCount = 0
@Published private(set) var renderID = ""
private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
private let conversations: ConversationStore
private let locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel
private let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
private let locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
init(
chatViewModel: ChatViewModel,
conversations: ConversationStore,
locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel? = nil,
peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore? = nil,
locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore? = nil
) {
self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
self.conversations = conversations
self.locationChannelsModel = locationChannelsModel ?? LocationChannelsModel()
self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore ?? chatViewModel.peerIdentityStore
self.locationPresenceStore = locationPresenceStore ?? chatViewModel.locationPresenceStore
self.allPeers = chatViewModel.allPeers
bind()
refresh()
}
func colorForMeshPeer(id peerID: PeerID, isDark: Bool) -> Color {
chatViewModel.colorForMeshPeer(id: peerID, isDark: isDark)
}
func colorForGeohashPerson(id: String, isDark: Bool) -> Color {
chatViewModel.colorForNostrPubkey(id, isDark: isDark)
}
func participantCount(for geohash: String) -> Int {
chatViewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: geohash)
}
func startConversation(with peerID: PeerID) {
chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
}
func toggleFavorite(peerID: PeerID) {
chatViewModel.toggleFavorite(peerID: peerID)
}
func openGeohashDirectMessage(with pubkeyHex: String) {
chatViewModel.startGeohashDM(withPubkeyHex: pubkeyHex)
}
func blockGeohashUser(pubkeyHexLowercased: String, displayName: String) {
chatViewModel.blockGeohashUser(
pubkeyHexLowercased: pubkeyHexLowercased,
displayName: displayName
)
}
func unblockGeohashUser(pubkeyHexLowercased: String, displayName: String) {
chatViewModel.unblockGeohashUser(
pubkeyHexLowercased: pubkeyHexLowercased,
displayName: displayName
)
}
private func bind() {
chatViewModel.$allPeers
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] peers in
self?.allPeers = peers
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
chatViewModel.$nickname
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
locationPresenceStore.$teleportedGeo
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
conversations.$unreadConversations
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
peerIdentityStore.$encryptionStatuses
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
peerIdentityStore.$verifiedFingerprints
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: Notification.Name("peerStatusUpdated"))
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
chatViewModel.participantTracker.$visiblePeople
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
locationChannelsModel.$selectedChannel
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
locationChannelsModel.$teleported
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
locationChannelsModel.$availableChannels
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refresh()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
}
private func refresh() {
let myPeerID = chatViewModel.meshService.myPeerID
let meshRows = allPeers.map { peer in
let isMe = peer.peerID == myPeerID
let verifiedBadge: Bool
if !isMe && !peer.isConnected,
let fingerprint = chatViewModel.getFingerprint(for: peer.peerID) {
verifiedBadge = peerIdentityStore.isVerified(fingerprint)
} else {
verifiedBadge = false
}
return MeshPeerRow(
peerID: peer.peerID,
displayName: isMe ? chatViewModel.nickname : peer.nickname,
isMe: isMe,
hasUnread: chatViewModel.hasUnreadMessages(for: peer.peerID),
isBlocked: !isMe && chatViewModel.isPeerBlocked(peer.peerID),
isFavorite: peer.favoriteStatus?.isFavorite ?? false,
isConnected: peer.isConnected,
isReachable: peer.isReachable,
isMutualFavorite: peer.isMutualFavorite,
encryptionStatus: chatViewModel.getEncryptionStatus(for: peer.peerID),
showsVerifiedBadgeWhenOffline: verifiedBadge
)
}
let meshCounts = meshRows.reduce(into: (reachable: 0, connected: 0)) { counts, row in
guard !row.isMe else { return }
if row.isConnected {
counts.connected += 1
counts.reachable += 1
} else if row.isReachable {
counts.reachable += 1
}
}
let geohashPeople = buildGeohashPeople()
self.meshRows = meshRows
reachableMeshPeerCount = meshCounts.reachable
connectedMeshPeerCount = meshCounts.connected
self.geohashPeople = geohashPeople
visibleGeohashPeerCount = geohashPeople.count
renderID = (
meshRows.map {
"\($0.id)-\($0.isConnected)-\($0.isReachable)-\($0.hasUnread)-\($0.isFavorite)-\($0.isBlocked)"
} +
geohashPeople.map {
"geo:\($0.id)-\($0.isTeleported)-\($0.isBlocked)-\($0.displayName)"
}
).joined(separator: "|")
}
private func buildGeohashPeople() -> [GeohashPersonRow] {
let myHex = currentGeohashIdentityHex()
let teleportedSet = Set(locationPresenceStore.teleportedGeo.map { $0.lowercased() })
return chatViewModel.visibleGeohashPeople().map { person in
let isMe = person.id == myHex
return GeohashPersonRow(
id: person.id,
displayName: person.displayName,
isMe: isMe,
isTeleported: teleportedSet.contains(person.id.lowercased()) || (isMe && locationChannelsModel.teleported),
isBlocked: !isMe && chatViewModel.isGeohashUserBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: person.id)
)
}
}
private func currentGeohashIdentityHex() -> String? {
guard case .location(let channel) = locationChannelsModel.selectedChannel,
let identity = try? chatViewModel.idBridge.deriveIdentity(forGeohash: channel.geohash) else {
return nil
}
return identity.publicKeyHex.lowercased()
}
}
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import BitFoundation
import Combine
import Foundation
/// Feature model for private (direct) conversations.
///
/// Reads the single-writer `ConversationStore` directly: `messages(for:)`
/// returns the peer's conversation backing array (no mirror dictionary), and
/// the store's typed `changes` subject drives invalidation a change in the
/// SELECTED peer's conversation republishes this model, while appends to
/// other private chats only surface through the unread set. Direct
/// conversations are keyed by raw routing peer ID; the coordinators'
/// ephemeral/stable mirroring guarantees the selected peer's key always
/// holds the full timeline (see `ConversationID.directPeer`).
@MainActor
final class PrivateInboxModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var selectedPeerID: PeerID?
@Published private(set) var unreadPeerIDs: Set<PeerID> = []
private let conversations: ConversationStore
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
init(conversations: ConversationStore) {
self.conversations = conversations
self.selectedPeerID = conversations.selectedPrivatePeerID
self.unreadPeerIDs = conversations.unreadDirectRoutingPeerIDs()
bind()
}
func messages(for peerID: PeerID?) -> [BitchatMessage] {
guard let peerID else { return [] }
return conversations.conversationsByID[.directPeer(peerID)]?.messages ?? []
}
private func bind() {
conversations.$selectedPrivatePeerID
.dropFirst()
.sink { [weak self] peerID in
guard let self, self.selectedPeerID != peerID else { return }
self.selectedPeerID = peerID
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
conversations.changes
.sink { [weak self] change in
self?.apply(change)
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
}
private func apply(_ change: ConversationChange) {
switch change {
case .appended(let id, _),
.updated(let id, _),
.statusChanged(let id, _, _),
.messageRemoved(let id, _),
.cleared(let id):
republishIfSelected(id)
case .unreadChanged(let id, _):
guard isDirect(id) else { return }
refreshUnreadPeerIDs()
case .removed(let id):
guard isDirect(id) else { return }
refreshUnreadPeerIDs()
republishIfSelected(id)
case .migrated(let source, let destination):
guard isDirect(source) || isDirect(destination) else { return }
refreshUnreadPeerIDs()
republishIfSelected(source)
republishIfSelected(destination)
}
}
private func republishIfSelected(_ id: ConversationID) {
guard let selectedPeerID, id == .directPeer(selectedPeerID) else { return }
objectWillChange.send()
}
private func refreshUnreadPeerIDs() {
let next = conversations.unreadDirectRoutingPeerIDs()
guard unreadPeerIDs != next else { return }
unreadPeerIDs = next
}
private func isDirect(_ id: ConversationID) -> Bool {
if case .direct = id { return true }
return false
}
}
enum PrivateConversationAvailability: Equatable {
case bluetoothConnected
case meshReachable
case nostrAvailable
case offline
}
struct PrivateConversationHeaderState: Equatable {
let conversationPeerID: PeerID
let headerPeerID: PeerID
let displayName: String
let availability: PrivateConversationAvailability
let isFavorite: Bool
let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus?
var supportsFavoriteToggle: Bool {
!conversationPeerID.isGeoDM
}
}
@MainActor
final class PrivateConversationModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var selectedPeerID: PeerID?
@Published private(set) var selectedHeaderState: PrivateConversationHeaderState?
private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
private let conversations: ConversationStore
private let locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel
private let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
init(
chatViewModel: ChatViewModel,
conversations: ConversationStore,
locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel? = nil,
peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore? = nil
) {
self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
self.conversations = conversations
self.locationChannelsModel = locationChannelsModel ?? LocationChannelsModel()
self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore ?? chatViewModel.peerIdentityStore
let initialPeerID = conversations.selectedPrivatePeerID
self.selectedPeerID = initialPeerID
self.selectedHeaderState = initialPeerID.flatMap { peerID in
makeHeaderState(for: peerID)
}
bind()
}
func startConversation(with peerID: PeerID) {
chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
refreshSelectedConversation()
}
func openConversation(for peerID: PeerID) {
if peerID.isGeoChat {
guard let full = chatViewModel.fullNostrHex(forSenderPeerID: peerID) else { return }
chatViewModel.startGeohashDM(withPubkeyHex: full)
} else {
chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
}
refreshSelectedConversation()
}
func endConversation() {
chatViewModel.endPrivateChat()
refreshSelectedConversation()
}
func toggleFavorite(peerID: PeerID) {
chatViewModel.toggleFavorite(peerID: peerID)
refreshSelectedConversation()
}
func toggleFavoriteForSelectedConversation() {
guard let headerPeerID = selectedHeaderState?.headerPeerID else { return }
toggleFavorite(peerID: headerPeerID)
}
func markMessagesAsRead(from peerID: PeerID) {
chatViewModel.markPrivateMessagesAsRead(from: peerID)
}
private func bind() {
conversations.$selectedPrivatePeerID
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
chatViewModel.$allPeers
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
peerIdentityStore.$encryptionStatuses
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .favoriteStatusChanged)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: Notification.Name("peerStatusUpdated"))
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
locationChannelsModel.$selectedChannel
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.refreshSelectedConversation()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
}
private func refreshSelectedConversation() {
selectedPeerID = conversations.selectedPrivatePeerID
selectedHeaderState = selectedPeerID.flatMap { peerID in
makeHeaderState(for: peerID)
}
}
private func makeHeaderState(for conversationPeerID: PeerID) -> PrivateConversationHeaderState {
let headerPeerID = chatViewModel.getShortIDForNoiseKey(conversationPeerID)
let peer = chatViewModel.getPeer(byID: headerPeerID)
let displayName = resolveDisplayName(for: conversationPeerID, headerPeerID: headerPeerID, peer: peer)
// Geo DMs are always routed over Nostr (NIP-17); their nostr_ keys
// never resolve to a reachable mesh peer, so resolveAvailability would
// report .offline. Report .nostrAvailable so the header shows the
// globe instead of a misleading "offline" tag.
let availability = conversationPeerID.isGeoDM
? .nostrAvailable
: resolveAvailability(for: headerPeerID, peer: peer)
let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus? = conversationPeerID.isGeoDM
? nil
: chatViewModel.getEncryptionStatus(for: headerPeerID)
return PrivateConversationHeaderState(
conversationPeerID: conversationPeerID,
headerPeerID: headerPeerID,
displayName: displayName,
availability: availability,
isFavorite: chatViewModel.isFavorite(peerID: headerPeerID),
encryptionStatus: encryptionStatus
)
}
private func resolveDisplayName(
for conversationPeerID: PeerID,
headerPeerID: PeerID,
peer: BitchatPeer?
) -> String {
if conversationPeerID.isGeoDM, case .location(let channel) = locationChannelsModel.selectedChannel {
return "#\(channel.geohash)/@\(chatViewModel.geohashDisplayName(for: conversationPeerID))"
}
if let displayName = peer?.displayName {
return displayName
}
if let nickname = chatViewModel.meshService.peerNickname(peerID: headerPeerID) {
return nickname
}
if let favorite = FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.getFavoriteStatus(
for: Data(hexString: headerPeerID.id) ?? Data()
), !favorite.peerNickname.isEmpty {
return favorite.peerNickname
}
if headerPeerID.id.count == 16 {
let candidates = chatViewModel.identityManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(headerPeerID)
if let identity = candidates.first,
let social = chatViewModel.identityManager.getSocialIdentity(for: identity.fingerprint) {
if let pet = social.localPetname, !pet.isEmpty {
return pet
}
if !social.claimedNickname.isEmpty {
return social.claimedNickname
}
}
} else if let noiseKey = headerPeerID.noiseKey {
let fingerprint = noiseKey.sha256Fingerprint()
if let social = chatViewModel.identityManager.getSocialIdentity(for: fingerprint) {
if let pet = social.localPetname, !pet.isEmpty {
return pet
}
if !social.claimedNickname.isEmpty {
return social.claimedNickname
}
}
}
return String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer")
}
private func resolveAvailability(for headerPeerID: PeerID, peer: BitchatPeer?) -> PrivateConversationAvailability {
if let connectionState = peer?.connectionState {
switch connectionState {
case .bluetoothConnected:
return .bluetoothConnected
case .meshReachable:
return .meshReachable
case .nostrAvailable:
return .nostrAvailable
case .offline:
return .offline
}
}
if chatViewModel.meshService.isPeerReachable(headerPeerID) {
return .meshReachable
}
if let noiseKey = Data(hexString: headerPeerID.id),
let favoriteStatus = FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.getFavoriteStatus(for: noiseKey),
favoriteStatus.isMutual {
return .nostrAvailable
}
if chatViewModel.meshService.isPeerConnected(headerPeerID) || chatViewModel.connectedPeers.contains(headerPeerID) {
return .bluetoothConnected
}
return .offline
}
}
-77
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@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Combine
import SwiftUI
/// Feature model for the active public (mesh/geohash) timeline.
///
/// Observes ONE `Conversation` object in the single-writer
/// `ConversationStore` the active channel's so appends to background
/// conversations (other geohashes, private chats) never invalidate it.
/// `messages` reads the observed conversation's backing array directly;
/// there is no mirror copy.
@MainActor
final class PublicChatModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var activeChannel: ChannelID
/// The active public conversation's timeline.
var messages: [BitchatMessage] { activeConversation.messages }
private let conversations: ConversationStore
private var activeConversation: Conversation
private var activeConversationCancellable: AnyCancellable?
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
init(conversations: ConversationStore) {
let channel = conversations.activeChannel
self.conversations = conversations
self.activeChannel = channel
self.activeConversation = conversations.conversation(for: ConversationID(channelID: channel))
observeActiveConversation()
bind()
}
private func bind() {
conversations.$activeChannel
.dropFirst()
.sink { [weak self] channel in
guard let self else { return }
self.activeChannel = channel
self.retargetActiveConversation(to: channel)
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
// The store replaces a conversation's object when it is removed
// (panic clear); retarget to the fresh instance so the observation
// never goes stale.
conversations.changes
.sink { [weak self] change in
guard let self,
case .removed(let id) = change,
id == self.activeConversation.id else { return }
self.retargetActiveConversation(to: self.activeChannel)
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
}
private func retargetActiveConversation(to channel: ChannelID) {
let conversation = conversations.conversation(for: ConversationID(channelID: channel))
guard conversation !== activeConversation else {
// Same object (e.g. re-selected channel): keep the existing
// observation, but `messages` may still differ from what views
// last rendered, so republish.
objectWillChange.send()
return
}
objectWillChange.send()
activeConversation = conversation
observeActiveConversation()
}
private func observeActiveConversation() {
activeConversationCancellable = activeConversation.objectWillChange
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.objectWillChange.send()
}
}
}
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@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Combine
import Foundation
struct FingerprintPresentationState: Equatable {
let statusPeerID: PeerID
let peerNickname: String
let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus
let theirFingerprint: String?
let myFingerprint: String
let isVerified: Bool
var canToggleVerification: Bool {
encryptionStatus == .noiseSecured || encryptionStatus == .noiseVerified
}
}
enum VerificationScanOutcome: Equatable {
case requested(String)
case notFound
case invalid
}
@MainActor
final class VerificationModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var currentNickname: String
@Published private(set) var selectedPeerID: PeerID?
private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
private let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
init(
chatViewModel: ChatViewModel,
privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel,
peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore? = nil
) {
self.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore ?? chatViewModel.peerIdentityStore
self.currentNickname = chatViewModel.nickname
self.selectedPeerID = privateConversationModel.selectedPeerID
bind(privateConversationModel: privateConversationModel)
}
func myQRString() -> String {
let npub = try? chatViewModel.idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity()?.npub
return VerificationService.shared.buildMyQRString(nickname: currentNickname, npub: npub) ?? ""
}
func beginQRVerification(with qr: VerificationService.VerificationQR) -> Bool {
chatViewModel.beginQRVerification(with: qr)
}
func verifyScannedPayload(_ payload: String) -> VerificationScanOutcome {
guard let qr = VerificationService.shared.verifyScannedQR(payload) else {
return .invalid
}
guard chatViewModel.beginQRVerification(with: qr) else {
return .notFound
}
return .requested(qr.nickname)
}
func verifyFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) {
chatViewModel.verifyFingerprint(for: peerID)
}
func unverifyFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) {
chatViewModel.unverifyFingerprint(for: peerID)
}
func isVerified(peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
guard let fingerprint = chatViewModel.getFingerprint(for: peerID) else { return false }
return peerIdentityStore.isVerified(fingerprint)
}
func fingerprintPresentation(for peerID: PeerID) -> FingerprintPresentationState {
let statusPeerID = chatViewModel.getShortIDForNoiseKey(peerID)
let encryptionStatus = chatViewModel.getEncryptionStatus(for: statusPeerID)
let theirFingerprint = chatViewModel.getFingerprint(for: statusPeerID)
let peerNickname = resolveDisplayName(for: peerID, statusPeerID: statusPeerID)
return FingerprintPresentationState(
statusPeerID: statusPeerID,
peerNickname: peerNickname,
encryptionStatus: encryptionStatus,
theirFingerprint: theirFingerprint,
myFingerprint: chatViewModel.getMyFingerprint(),
isVerified: theirFingerprint.map { peerIdentityStore.isVerified($0) } ?? false
)
}
private func bind(privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel) {
chatViewModel.$nickname
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$currentNickname)
privateConversationModel.$selectedPeerID
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$selectedPeerID)
peerIdentityStore.$encryptionStatuses
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.objectWillChange.send()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
peerIdentityStore.$verifiedFingerprints
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.objectWillChange.send()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
chatViewModel.$allPeers
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in
self?.objectWillChange.send()
}
.store(in: &cancellables)
}
private func resolveDisplayName(for peerID: PeerID, statusPeerID: PeerID) -> String {
if let peer = chatViewModel.getPeer(byID: statusPeerID) {
return peer.displayName
}
if let name = chatViewModel.meshService.peerNickname(peerID: statusPeerID) {
return name
}
if let data = peerID.noiseKey {
if let favorite = FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.getFavoriteStatus(for: data),
!favorite.peerNickname.isEmpty {
return favorite.peerNickname
}
let fingerprint = data.sha256Fingerprint()
if let social = chatViewModel.identityManager.getSocialIdentity(for: fingerprint) {
if let pet = social.localPetname, !pet.isEmpty {
return pet
}
if !social.claimedNickname.isEmpty {
return social.claimedNickname
}
}
}
return String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Label for an unknown peer")
}
}
@@ -1,9 +1,111 @@
{
"images" : [
{
"filename" : "icon_20x20@2x.png",
"idiom" : "iphone",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "20x20"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_20x20@3x.png",
"idiom" : "iphone",
"scale" : "3x",
"size" : "20x20"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_29x29@2x.png",
"idiom" : "iphone",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "29x29"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_29x29@3x.png",
"idiom" : "iphone",
"scale" : "3x",
"size" : "29x29"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_40x40@2x.png",
"idiom" : "iphone",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "40x40"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_40x40@3x.png",
"idiom" : "iphone",
"scale" : "3x",
"size" : "40x40"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_60x60@2x.png",
"idiom" : "iphone",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "60x60"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_60x60@3x.png",
"idiom" : "iphone",
"scale" : "3x",
"size" : "60x60"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_20x20.png",
"idiom" : "ipad",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "20x20"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_20x20@2x.png",
"idiom" : "ipad",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "20x20"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_29x29.png",
"idiom" : "ipad",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "29x29"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_29x29@2x.png",
"idiom" : "ipad",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "29x29"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_40x40.png",
"idiom" : "ipad",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "40x40"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_40x40@2x.png",
"idiom" : "ipad",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "40x40"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_76x76.png",
"idiom" : "ipad",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "76x76"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_76x76@2x.png",
"idiom" : "ipad",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "76x76"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_83.5x83.5@2x.png",
"idiom" : "ipad",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "83.5x83.5"
},
{
"filename" : "icon_1024x1024.png",
"idiom" : "universal",
"platform" : "ios",
"idiom" : "ios-marketing",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "1024x1024"
},
{
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@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
{
"images" : [
{
"filename" : "image-1024.png",
"idiom" : "universal",
"platform" : "ios",
"size" : "1024x1024"
},
{
"appearances" : [
{
"appearance" : "luminosity",
"value" : "dark"
}
],
"idiom" : "universal",
"platform" : "ios",
"size" : "1024x1024"
},
{
"appearances" : [
{
"appearance" : "luminosity",
"value" : "tinted"
}
],
"idiom" : "universal",
"platform" : "ios",
"size" : "1024x1024"
}
],
"info" : {
"author" : "xcode",
"version" : 1
}
}
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+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@
"author" : "xcode",
"version" : 1
}
}
}
+136 -52
View File
@@ -11,52 +11,60 @@ import UserNotifications
@main
struct BitchatApp: App {
static let bundleID = Bundle.main.bundleIdentifier ?? "chat.bitchat"
static let groupID = "group.\(bundleID)"
@StateObject private var runtime: AppRuntime
@AppStorage(AppTheme.storageKey) private var appThemeRawValue = AppTheme.matrix.rawValue
@StateObject private var chatViewModel = ChatViewModel()
#if os(iOS)
@Environment(\.scenePhase) var scenePhase
@UIApplicationDelegateAdaptor(AppDelegate.self) var appDelegate
#elseif os(macOS)
@NSApplicationDelegateAdaptor(MacAppDelegate.self) var appDelegate
#endif
init() {
_runtime = StateObject(wrappedValue: AppRuntime())
UNUserNotificationCenter.current().delegate = NotificationDelegate.shared
// Warm up georelay directory and refresh if stale (once/day)
GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded()
}
var body: some Scene {
WindowGroup {
ContentView()
.environment(\.appTheme, AppTheme(rawValue: appThemeRawValue) ?? .matrix)
.environmentObject(runtime.publicChatModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.privateInboxModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.privateConversationModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.verificationModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.conversationUIModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.locationChannelsModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.peerListModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.appChromeModel)
.environmentObject(chatViewModel)
.onAppear {
appDelegate.runtime = runtime
runtime.start()
NotificationDelegate.shared.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
#if os(iOS)
appDelegate.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
#elseif os(macOS)
appDelegate.chatViewModel = chatViewModel
#endif
// Check for shared content
checkForSharedContent()
}
.onOpenURL { url in
runtime.handleOpenURL(url)
handleURL(url)
}
#if os(iOS)
.onChange(of: scenePhase) { newPhase in
runtime.handleScenePhaseChange(newPhase)
switch newPhase {
case .background:
// Keep BLE mesh running in background; BLEService adapts scanning automatically
break
case .active:
// Restart services when becoming active
chatViewModel.meshService.startServices()
checkForSharedContent()
case .inactive:
break
@unknown default:
break
}
}
.onReceive(NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: UIApplication.didBecomeActiveNotification)) { _ in
runtime.handleDidBecomeActiveNotification()
// Check for shared content when app becomes active
checkForSharedContent()
}
#elseif os(macOS)
.onReceive(NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: NSApplication.didBecomeActiveNotification)) { _ in
runtime.handleMacDidBecomeActiveNotification()
// App became active
}
#endif
}
@@ -65,18 +73,74 @@ struct BitchatApp: App {
.windowResizability(.contentSize)
#endif
}
private func handleURL(_ url: URL) {
if url.scheme == "bitchat" && url.host == "share" {
// Handle shared content
checkForSharedContent()
}
}
private func checkForSharedContent() {
// Check app group for shared content from extension
guard let userDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: "group.chat.bitchat") else {
return
}
guard let sharedContent = userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContent"),
let sharedDate = userDefaults.object(forKey: "sharedContentDate") as? Date else {
return
}
// Only process if shared within last 30 seconds
if Date().timeIntervalSince(sharedDate) < 30 {
let contentType = userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContentType") ?? "text"
// Clear the shared content
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContent")
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentType")
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentDate")
userDefaults.synchronize()
// Show notification about shared content
DispatchQueue.main.async {
// Add system message about sharing
let systemMessage = BitchatMessage(
sender: "system",
content: "preparing to share \(contentType)...",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false
)
self.chatViewModel.messages.append(systemMessage)
}
// Send the shared content after a short delay
DispatchQueue.main.asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + 1.0) {
if contentType == "url" {
// Try to parse as JSON first
if let data = sharedContent.data(using: .utf8),
let urlData = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [String: String],
let url = urlData["url"] {
// Send plain URL
self.chatViewModel.sendMessage(url)
} else {
// Fallback to simple URL
self.chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
}
} else {
self.chatViewModel.sendMessage(sharedContent)
}
}
}
}
}
#if os(iOS)
final class AppDelegate: NSObject, UIApplicationDelegate {
weak var runtime: AppRuntime?
func application(_ application: UIApplication, didFinishLaunchingWithOptions launchOptions: [UIApplication.LaunchOptionsKey: Any]? = nil) -> Bool {
true
}
func applicationWillTerminate(_ application: UIApplication) {
runtime?.applicationWillTerminate()
class AppDelegate: NSObject, UIApplicationDelegate {
weak var chatViewModel: ChatViewModel?
func application(_ application: UIApplication, didFinishLaunchingWithOptions launchOptions: [UIApplication.LaunchOptionsKey : Any]? = nil) -> Bool {
return true
}
}
#endif
@@ -84,43 +148,63 @@ final class AppDelegate: NSObject, UIApplicationDelegate {
#if os(macOS)
import AppKit
final class MacAppDelegate: NSObject, NSApplicationDelegate {
weak var runtime: AppRuntime?
class MacAppDelegate: NSObject, NSApplicationDelegate {
weak var chatViewModel: ChatViewModel?
func applicationWillTerminate(_ notification: Notification) {
runtime?.applicationWillTerminate()
chatViewModel?.applicationWillTerminate()
}
func applicationShouldTerminateAfterLastWindowClosed(_ sender: NSApplication) -> Bool {
true
return true
}
}
#endif
final class NotificationDelegate: NSObject, UNUserNotificationCenterDelegate {
class NotificationDelegate: NSObject, UNUserNotificationCenterDelegate {
static let shared = NotificationDelegate()
weak var runtime: AppRuntime?
weak var chatViewModel: ChatViewModel?
func userNotificationCenter(_ center: UNUserNotificationCenter, didReceive response: UNNotificationResponse, withCompletionHandler completionHandler: @escaping () -> Void) {
let identifier = response.notification.request.identifier
let userInfo = response.notification.request.content.userInfo
Task { @MainActor in
self.runtime?.handleNotificationResponse(identifier: identifier, userInfo: userInfo)
// Check if this is a private message notification
if identifier.hasPrefix("private-") {
// Get peer ID from userInfo
if let peerID = userInfo["peerID"] as? String {
DispatchQueue.main.async {
self.chatViewModel?.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
}
}
}
completionHandler()
}
func userNotificationCenter(_ center: UNUserNotificationCenter, willPresent notification: UNNotification, withCompletionHandler completionHandler: @escaping (UNNotificationPresentationOptions) -> Void) {
let identifier = notification.request.identifier
let userInfo = notification.request.content.userInfo
Task {
let options = await self.runtime?.presentationOptions(
forNotificationIdentifier: identifier,
userInfo: userInfo
) ?? [.banner, .sound]
completionHandler(options)
// Check if this is a private message notification
if identifier.hasPrefix("private-") {
// Get peer ID from userInfo
if let peerID = userInfo["peerID"] as? String {
// Don't show notification if the private chat is already open
if chatViewModel?.selectedPrivateChatPeer == peerID {
completionHandler([])
return
}
}
}
// Show notification in all other cases
completionHandler([.banner, .sound])
}
}
extension String {
var nilIfEmpty: String? {
self.isEmpty ? nil : self
}
}
-217
View File
@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
import ImageIO
import UniformTypeIdentifiers
#if os(iOS)
import UIKit
#else
import AppKit
#endif
enum ImageUtilsError: Error {
case invalidImage
case encodingFailed
}
enum ImageUtils {
private static let compressionQuality: CGFloat = 0.82
private static let targetImageBytes: Int = 45_000
private static let maxSourceImageBytes: Int = 10 * 1024 * 1024
static func processImage(at url: URL, maxDimension: CGFloat = 448, outputDirectory: URL? = nil) throws -> URL {
try validateImageSource(at: url)
let data = try Data(contentsOf: url)
#if os(iOS)
guard let image = UIImage(data: data) else { throw ImageUtilsError.invalidImage }
return try processImage(image, maxDimension: maxDimension, outputDirectory: outputDirectory)
#else
guard let image = NSImage(data: data) else { throw ImageUtilsError.invalidImage }
return try processImage(image, maxDimension: maxDimension, outputDirectory: outputDirectory)
#endif
}
static func validateImageSource(at url: URL) throws {
// Security H1: Check file size BEFORE reading into memory.
let attrs = try FileManager.default.attributesOfItem(atPath: url.path)
guard let fileSize = attrs[.size] as? Int,
fileSize > 0,
fileSize <= maxSourceImageBytes else {
throw ImageUtilsError.invalidImage
}
let options = [kCGImageSourceShouldCache: false] as CFDictionary
guard let source = CGImageSourceCreateWithURL(url as CFURL, options),
CGImageSourceGetType(source) != nil else {
throw ImageUtilsError.invalidImage
}
}
#if os(iOS)
static func processImage(_ image: UIImage, maxDimension: CGFloat = 448, outputDirectory: URL? = nil) throws -> URL {
return try autoreleasepool {
// Scale the image first
let scaled = scaledImage(image, maxDimension: maxDimension)
// Get CGImage from UIImage - this is the key to stripping metadata
guard let cgImage = scaled.cgImage else {
throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
}
// Use CGImageDestination to encode without metadata (same as macOS)
var quality = compressionQuality
guard var jpegData = encodeJPEG(from: cgImage, quality: quality) else {
throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
}
// Compress to target size
while jpegData.count > targetImageBytes && quality > 0.3 {
quality -= 0.1
autoreleasepool {
if let next = encodeJPEG(from: cgImage, quality: quality) {
jpegData = next
}
}
}
let outputURL = try makeOutputURL(outputDirectory: outputDirectory)
try jpegData.write(to: outputURL, options: .atomic)
return outputURL
}
}
private static func scaledImage(_ image: UIImage, maxDimension: CGFloat) -> UIImage {
let size = image.size
let maxSide = max(size.width, size.height)
guard maxSide > maxDimension else { return image }
let scale = maxDimension / maxSide
let newSize = CGSize(width: size.width * scale, height: size.height * scale)
// Draw into a new context to get a clean CGImage without metadata
UIGraphicsBeginImageContextWithOptions(newSize, true, 1.0)
image.draw(in: CGRect(origin: .zero, size: newSize))
let rendered = UIGraphicsGetImageFromCurrentImageContext()
UIGraphicsEndImageContext()
return rendered ?? image
}
// Shared EXIF-stripping JPEG encoder for both iOS and macOS
private static func encodeJPEG(from cgImage: CGImage, quality: CGFloat) -> Data? {
guard let data = CFDataCreateMutable(nil, 0) else {
return nil
}
guard let destination = CGImageDestinationCreateWithData(data, UTType.jpeg.identifier as CFString, 1, nil) else {
return nil
}
// Security: Strip ALL metadata (EXIF, GPS, TIFF, IPTC, XMP)
// By only specifying compression quality and no metadata keys,
// we ensure a clean JPEG with no privacy-leaking information
let options: [CFString: Any] = [
kCGImageDestinationLossyCompressionQuality: quality
]
CGImageDestinationAddImage(destination, cgImage, options as CFDictionary)
guard CGImageDestinationFinalize(destination) else {
return nil
}
return data as Data
}
#else
static func processImage(_ image: NSImage, maxDimension: CGFloat = 448, outputDirectory: URL? = nil) throws -> URL {
return try autoreleasepool {
let scaled = scaledImage(image, maxDimension: maxDimension)
guard let inputCG = scaled.cgImage(forProposedRect: nil, context: nil, hints: nil) else {
throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
}
let width = inputCG.width
let height = inputCG.height
let colorSpace = CGColorSpace(name: CGColorSpace.sRGB) ?? CGColorSpaceCreateDeviceRGB()
guard let context = CGContext(
data: nil,
width: width,
height: height,
bitsPerComponent: 8,
bytesPerRow: 0,
space: colorSpace,
bitmapInfo: CGImageAlphaInfo.premultipliedLast.rawValue
) else {
throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
}
context.draw(inputCG, in: CGRect(x: 0, y: 0, width: width, height: height))
guard let cgImage = context.makeImage() else {
throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
}
var quality = compressionQuality
guard var jpegData = encodeJPEG(from: cgImage, quality: quality) else {
throw ImageUtilsError.encodingFailed
}
while jpegData.count > targetImageBytes && quality > 0.3 {
quality -= 0.1
autoreleasepool {
if let next = encodeJPEG(from: cgImage, quality: quality) {
jpegData = next
}
}
}
let outputURL = try makeOutputURL(outputDirectory: outputDirectory)
try jpegData.write(to: outputURL, options: .atomic)
return outputURL
}
}
private static func scaledImage(_ image: NSImage, maxDimension: CGFloat) -> NSImage {
let size = image.size
let maxSide = max(size.width, size.height)
guard maxSide > maxDimension else { return image }
let scale = maxDimension / maxSide
let newSize = NSSize(width: size.width * scale, height: size.height * scale)
let scaledImage = NSImage(size: newSize)
scaledImage.lockFocus()
image.draw(in: NSRect(origin: .zero, size: newSize),
from: NSRect(origin: .zero, size: size),
operation: .copy,
fraction: 1.0)
scaledImage.unlockFocus()
return scaledImage
}
// Shared EXIF-stripping JPEG encoder for both iOS and macOS
private static func encodeJPEG(from cgImage: CGImage, quality: CGFloat) -> Data? {
guard let data = CFDataCreateMutable(nil, 0) else {
return nil
}
guard let destination = CGImageDestinationCreateWithData(data, UTType.jpeg.identifier as CFString, 1, nil) else {
return nil
}
// Security: Strip ALL metadata (EXIF, GPS, TIFF, IPTC, XMP)
// By only specifying compression quality and no metadata keys,
// we ensure a clean JPEG with no privacy-leaking information
let options: [CFString: Any] = [
kCGImageDestinationLossyCompressionQuality: quality
]
CGImageDestinationAddImage(destination, cgImage, options as CFDictionary)
guard CGImageDestinationFinalize(destination) else {
return nil
}
return data as Data
}
#endif
private static func makeOutputURL(outputDirectory: URL? = nil) throws -> URL {
let formatter = DateFormatter()
formatter.dateFormat = "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
let fileName = "img_\(formatter.string(from: Date()))_\(UUID().uuidString).jpg"
let directory: URL
if let outputDirectory {
directory = outputDirectory
} else {
directory = try applicationFilesDirectory().appendingPathComponent("images/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
}
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: directory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
return directory.appendingPathComponent(fileName)
}
private static func applicationFilesDirectory() throws -> URL {
let base = try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
return base.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
}
}
@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
import AVFoundation
import BitLogger
/// Controls playback for a single voice note and coordinates exclusive playback across the app.
final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlayerDelegate {
@Published private(set) var isPlaying: Bool = false
@Published private(set) var currentTime: TimeInterval = 0
@Published private(set) var duration: TimeInterval = 0
@Published private(set) var progress: Double = 0
/// rounded so 4.9s shows "00:05"
var roundedDuration: Int {
guard duration.isFinite else { return 0 }
return Int(duration.rounded())
}
/// ceil so "00:01" stays visible until playback ends, capped to rounded duration
var remainingSeconds: Int {
let remaining = max(0, duration - currentTime)
return min(roundedDuration, Int(ceil(remaining)))
}
private var player: AVAudioPlayer?
private var timer: Timer?
private var url: URL
init(url: URL) {
self.url = url
super.init()
// Don't load anything eagerly - wait until user interaction or view is fully displayed
}
func loadDuration() {
guard duration == 0 else { return }
DispatchQueue.global(qos: .utility).async { [weak self] in
guard let self = self else { return }
do {
let player = try AVAudioPlayer(contentsOf: self.url)
let loadedDuration = player.duration
DispatchQueue.main.async { [weak self] in
guard let self = self, self.duration == 0 else { return }
self.duration = loadedDuration
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to load audio duration: \(error)", category: .session)
}
}
}
deinit {
timer?.invalidate()
}
func replaceURL(_ url: URL) {
guard url != self.url else { return }
stop()
self.url = url
player = nil
duration = 0
// Duration will be loaded on demand when needed
}
func togglePlayback() {
isPlaying ? pause() : play()
}
func play() {
guard ensurePlayerReady() else { return }
VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.activate(self)
player?.play()
startTimer()
updateProgress()
isPlaying = true
}
func pause() {
player?.pause()
stopTimer()
updateProgress()
isPlaying = false
}
func stop() {
player?.stop()
player?.currentTime = 0
stopTimer()
updateProgress()
isPlaying = false
VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.deactivate(self)
}
func seek(to fraction: Double) {
guard ensurePlayerReady() else { return }
let clamped = max(0, min(1, fraction))
if let player = player {
player.currentTime = clamped * player.duration
if isPlaying {
player.play()
}
updateProgress()
}
}
// MARK: - AVAudioPlayerDelegate
func audioPlayerDidFinishPlaying(_ player: AVAudioPlayer, successfully flag: Bool) {
// Delegate callback may be on background thread - ensure main thread for UI updates
DispatchQueue.main.async { [weak self] in
guard let self = self else { return }
self.stopTimer()
self.updateProgress()
self.isPlaying = false
VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.deactivate(self)
}
}
// MARK: - Private Helpers
private func preparePlayer(for url: URL) {
// Prepare player synchronously (only called when playback is requested)
do {
let player = try AVAudioPlayer(contentsOf: url)
player.delegate = self
player.prepareToPlay()
self.player = player
duration = player.duration
currentTime = player.currentTime
progress = duration > 0 ? currentTime / duration : 0
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Voice note playback failed for \(url.lastPathComponent): \(error)", category: .session)
player = nil
duration = 0
currentTime = 0
progress = 0
}
}
private func ensurePlayerReady() -> Bool {
if player == nil {
preparePlayer(for: url)
}
#if os(iOS)
let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
do {
try session.setCategory(.playback, mode: .spokenAudio, options: [.mixWithOthers])
try session.setActive(true, options: [])
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to activate audio session: \(error)", category: .session)
}
#endif
return player != nil
}
private func startTimer() {
if timer != nil { return }
timer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: 0.05, repeats: true) { [weak self] _ in
self?.updateProgress()
}
if let timer = timer {
RunLoop.main.add(timer, forMode: .common)
}
}
private func stopTimer() {
timer?.invalidate()
timer = nil
}
private func updateProgress() {
guard let player = player else {
currentTime = 0
duration = 0
progress = 0
return
}
currentTime = player.currentTime
duration = player.duration
progress = duration > 0 ? currentTime / duration : 0
}
}
/// Ensures only one voice note plays at a time.
final class VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator {
static let shared = VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator()
private weak var activeController: VoiceNotePlaybackController?
private init() {}
func activate(_ controller: VoiceNotePlaybackController) {
if activeController === controller {
return
}
activeController?.pause()
activeController = controller
}
func deactivate(_ controller: VoiceNotePlaybackController) {
if activeController === controller {
activeController = nil
}
}
}
-155
View File
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
import AVFoundation
/// Manages audio capture for mesh voice notes with predictable encoding settings.
actor VoiceRecorder {
enum RecorderError: Error {
case microphoneAccessDenied
case recorderInitializationFailed
case recordingInProgress
}
static let shared = VoiceRecorder()
private let paddingInterval: TimeInterval = 0.5
private let maxRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 120
static let minRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 1
private var recorder: AVAudioRecorder?
private var currentURL: URL?
// MARK: - Permissions
nonisolated
func requestPermission() async -> Bool {
#if os(iOS)
return await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().requestRecordPermission { granted in
continuation.resume(returning: granted)
}
}
#elseif os(macOS)
return await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
AVCaptureDevice.requestAccess(for: .audio) { granted in
continuation.resume(returning: granted)
}
}
#else
return true
#endif
}
// MARK: - Recording Lifecycle
@discardableResult
func startRecording() throws -> URL {
if recorder?.isRecording == true {
throw RecorderError.recordingInProgress
}
#if os(iOS)
let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
guard session.recordPermission == .granted else {
throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied
}
#if targetEnvironment(simulator)
// allowBluetoothHFP is not available on iOS Simulator
try session.setCategory(
.playAndRecord,
mode: .default,
options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP]
)
#else
try session.setCategory(
.playAndRecord,
mode: .default,
options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP, .allowBluetoothHFP]
)
#endif
try session.setActive(true, options: .notifyOthersOnDeactivation)
#endif
#if os(macOS)
guard AVCaptureDevice.authorizationStatus(for: .audio) == .authorized else {
throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied
}
#endif
let outputURL = try makeOutputURL()
let settings: [String: Any] = [
AVFormatIDKey: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
AVSampleRateKey: 16_000,
AVNumberOfChannelsKey: 1,
AVEncoderBitRateKey: 16_000
]
let audioRecorder = try AVAudioRecorder(url: outputURL, settings: settings)
audioRecorder.isMeteringEnabled = true
audioRecorder.prepareToRecord()
audioRecorder.record(forDuration: maxRecordingDuration)
recorder = audioRecorder
currentURL = outputURL
return outputURL
}
func stopRecording() async -> URL? {
guard let recorder, recorder.isRecording else {
return currentURL
}
let sessionURL = currentURL
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(paddingInterval * 1_000_000_000))
recorder.stop()
// A new session may have started during the sleep don't touch its state
if self.recorder === recorder {
cleanupSession()
self.recorder = nil
currentURL = nil
}
return sessionURL
}
func cancelRecording() {
if let recorder, recorder.isRecording {
recorder.stop()
}
cleanupSession()
if let currentURL {
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: currentURL)
}
recorder = nil
currentURL = nil
}
// MARK: - Helpers
private func makeOutputURL() throws -> URL {
let formatter = DateFormatter()
formatter.dateFormat = "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
let fileName = "voice_\(formatter.string(from: Date())).m4a"
let baseDirectory = try applicationFilesDirectory().appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: baseDirectory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
return baseDirectory.appendingPathComponent(fileName)
}
private func applicationFilesDirectory() throws -> URL {
#if os(iOS)
return try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
#else
let base = try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
return base.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
#endif
}
private func cleanupSession() {
#if os(iOS)
try? AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().setActive(false, options: .notifyOthersOnDeactivation)
#endif
}
}
-113
View File
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
import AVFoundation
import Foundation
import BitLogger
/// Generates and caches downsampled waveforms for audio files so UI rendering is cheap.
final class WaveformCache {
static let shared = WaveformCache()
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "com.bitchat.waveform-cache", attributes: .concurrent)
private var cache: [URL: (waveform: [Float], lastAccess: Date)] = [:]
private let maxCacheSize = 20 // Limit cache to prevent unbounded memory growth
private init() {}
func cachedWaveform(for url: URL) -> [Float]? {
queue.sync {
guard let entry = cache[url] else { return nil }
return entry.waveform
}
}
func waveform(for url: URL, bins: Int = 120, completion: @escaping ([Float]) -> Void) {
queue.async { [weak self] in
guard let self = self else { return }
// Check cache (read-only, no update needed on cache hit for performance)
if let entry = self.cache[url] {
DispatchQueue.main.async { completion(entry.waveform) }
return
}
guard let computed = self.computeWaveform(url: url, bins: bins) else {
DispatchQueue.main.async { completion([]) }
return
}
self.queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
guard let self = self else { return }
// Evict oldest entry if cache is full
if self.cache.count >= self.maxCacheSize {
if let oldest = self.cache.min(by: { $0.value.lastAccess < $1.value.lastAccess }) {
self.cache.removeValue(forKey: oldest.key)
}
}
self.cache[url] = (computed, Date())
}
DispatchQueue.main.async { completion(computed) }
}
}
func purge(url: URL) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
self?.cache.removeValue(forKey: url)
}
}
func purgeAll() {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
self?.cache.removeAll()
}
}
private func computeWaveform(url: URL, bins: Int) -> [Float]? {
guard bins > 0 else { return nil }
// Use autoreleasepool to manage memory from audio buffer allocations
return autoreleasepool {
do {
let audioFile = try AVAudioFile(forReading: url)
let length = Int(audioFile.length)
guard length > 0 else { return nil }
guard let buffer = AVAudioPCMBuffer(pcmFormat: audioFile.processingFormat, frameCapacity: AVAudioFrameCount(length)) else {
return nil
}
try audioFile.read(into: buffer, frameCount: AVAudioFrameCount(length))
guard let channelData = buffer.floatChannelData else { return nil }
let channelCount = Int(audioFile.processingFormat.channelCount)
let frameLength = Int(buffer.frameLength)
let samplesPerBin = max(1, frameLength / bins)
var magnitudes: [Float] = Array(repeating: 0, count: bins)
for bin in 0..<bins {
let start = bin * samplesPerBin
let end = min(frameLength, start + samplesPerBin)
if start >= end { break }
var sum: Float = 0
var sampleCount = 0
for frame in start..<end {
var sampleValue: Float = 0
for channel in 0..<channelCount {
sampleValue += fabsf(channelData[channel][frame])
}
sum += sampleValue / Float(channelCount)
sampleCount += 1
}
magnitudes[bin] = sampleCount > 0 ? sum / Float(sampleCount) : 0
}
if let maxMagnitude = magnitudes.max(), maxMagnitude > 0 {
magnitudes = magnitudes.map { min($0 / maxMagnitude, 1.0) }
}
return magnitudes
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Waveform extraction failed for \(url.lastPathComponent): \(error)", category: .session)
return nil
}
}
}
}
+73 -10
View File
@@ -81,14 +81,13 @@
///
import Foundation
import BitFoundation
// MARK: - Three-Layer Identity Model
/// Represents the ephemeral layer of identity - short-lived peer IDs that provide network privacy.
/// These IDs rotate periodically to prevent tracking while maintaining cryptographic relationships.
struct EphemeralIdentity {
let peerID: PeerID // 8 random bytes
let peerID: String // 8 random bytes
let sessionStart: Date
var handshakeState: HandshakeState
}
@@ -107,8 +106,6 @@ enum HandshakeState {
struct CryptographicIdentity: Codable {
let fingerprint: String // SHA256 of public key
let publicKey: Data // Noise static public key
// Optional Ed25519 signing public key (used to authenticate public messages)
var signingPublicKey: Data? = nil
let firstSeen: Date
let lastHandshake: Date?
}
@@ -127,10 +124,10 @@ struct SocialIdentity: Codable {
}
enum TrustLevel: String, Codable {
case unknown
case casual
case trusted
case verified
case unknown = "unknown"
case casual = "casual"
case trusted = "trusted"
case verified = "verified"
}
// MARK: - Identity Cache
@@ -159,7 +156,73 @@ struct IdentityCache: Codable {
var version: Int = 1
}
//
// MARK: - Identity Resolution
enum IdentityHint {
case unknown
case likelyKnown(fingerprint: String)
case ambiguous(candidates: Set<String>)
case verified(fingerprint: String)
}
// MARK: - Pending Actions
struct PendingActions {
var toggleFavorite: Bool?
var setTrustLevel: TrustLevel?
var setPetname: String?
}
// MARK: - Privacy Settings
struct PrivacySettings: Codable {
// Level 1: Maximum privacy (default)
var persistIdentityCache = false
var showLastSeen = false
// Level 2: Convenience
var autoAcceptKnownFingerprints = false
var rememberNicknameHistory = false
// Level 3: Social
var shareTrustNetworkHints = false // "3 mutual contacts trust this person"
}
// MARK: - Conflict Resolution
/// Strategies for resolving identity conflicts in the decentralized network.
/// Handles cases where multiple peers claim the same nickname or when
/// identity mappings become ambiguous due to network partitions.
enum ConflictResolution {
case acceptNew(petname: String) // "John (2)"
case rejectNew
case blockFingerprint(String)
case alertUser(message: String)
}
// MARK: - UI State
struct PeerUIState {
let peerID: String
let nickname: String
var identityState: IdentityState
var connectionQuality: ConnectionQuality
enum IdentityState {
case unknown // Gray - No identity info
case unverifiedKnown(String) // Blue - Handshake done, matches cache
case verified(String) // Green - Cryptographically verified
case conflict(String, String) // Red - Nickname doesn't match fingerprint
case pending // Yellow - Handshake in progress
}
}
enum ConnectionQuality {
case excellent
case good
case poor
case disconnected
}
// MARK: - Migration Support
//
// Removed LegacyFavorite - no longer needed
+140 -239
View File
@@ -90,138 +90,65 @@
/// - Advanced conflict resolution
///
import BitLogger
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
protocol SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
// MARK: Secure Loading/Saving
func forceSave()
// MARK: Social Identity Management
func getSocialIdentity(for fingerprint: String) -> SocialIdentity?
// MARK: Cryptographic Identities
func upsertCryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: String, noisePublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data?, claimedNickname: String?)
func getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(_ peerID: PeerID) -> [CryptographicIdentity]
func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity)
// MARK: Favorites Management
func getFavorites() -> Set<String>
func setFavorite(_ fingerprint: String, isFavorite: Bool)
func isFavorite(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
// MARK: Blocked Users Management
func isBlocked(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
func setBlocked(_ fingerprint: String, isBlocked: Bool)
// MARK: Geohash (Nostr) Blocking
func isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool
func setNostrBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String, isBlocked: Bool)
func getBlockedNostrPubkeys() -> Set<String>
// MARK: Ephemeral Session Management
func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState)
func updateHandshakeState(peerID: PeerID, state: HandshakeState)
// MARK: Cleanup
func clearAllIdentityData()
func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID)
// MARK: Verification
func setVerified(fingerprint: String, verified: Bool)
func isVerified(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
func getVerifiedFingerprints() -> Set<String>
}
/// Singleton manager for secure identity state persistence and retrieval.
/// Provides thread-safe access to identity mappings with encryption at rest.
/// All identity data is stored encrypted in the device Keychain for security.
final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
class SecureIdentityStateManager {
static let shared = SecureIdentityStateManager()
private let keychain = KeychainManager.shared
private let cacheKey = "bitchat.identityCache.v2"
private let encryptionKeyName = "identityCacheEncryptionKey"
// In-memory state
private var ephemeralSessions: [PeerID: EphemeralIdentity] = [:]
private var ephemeralSessions: [String: EphemeralIdentity] = [:]
private var cryptographicIdentities: [String: CryptographicIdentity] = [:]
private var cache: IdentityCache = IdentityCache()
// Pending actions before handshake
private var pendingActions: [String: PendingActions] = [:]
// Thread safety
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "bitchat.identity.state", attributes: .concurrent)
// Pending-save coalescing flag. Reads/writes are serialized on `queue`.
// Persistence is done with a fire-and-forget `queue.async(.barrier)` rather
// than a retained DispatchSourceTimer: a lingering, never-cancelled timer
// keeps the dispatch machinery alive and prevents the unit-test process from
// exiting. (The original code used Timer.scheduledTimer on a GCD queue with
// no run loop, so saves never actually fired.)
// Debouncing for keychain saves
private var saveTimer: Timer?
private let saveDebounceInterval: TimeInterval = 2.0 // Save at most once every 2 seconds
private var pendingSave = false
// Encryption key
private let encryptionKey: SymmetricKey
/// True when `encryptionKey` is a throwaway generated this session because the
/// persisted key could not be read (device locked / access denied). In that
/// state we must NOT persist (it would overwrite the real cache with data the
/// next launch can't decrypt) and must NOT delete the existing cache.
private let encryptionKeyIsEphemeral: Bool
init(_ keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
self.keychain = keychain
// Retrieve (or, only on genuine first run, generate) the cache
// encryption key. We MUST distinguish "key doesn't exist yet" from a
// transient failure (device locked / access denied): the legacy
// getIdentityKey(forKey:) collapses both to nil, and generating+saving a
// new key deletes the existing one first permanently orphaning the
// encrypted cache on a launch that merely couldn't read the key.
private init() {
// Generate or retrieve encryption key from keychain
let loadedKey: SymmetricKey
let keyIsEphemeral: Bool
switch keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: encryptionKeyName) {
case .success(let keyData):
// Try to load from keychain
if let keyData = keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: encryptionKeyName) {
loadedKey = SymmetricKey(data: keyData)
keyIsEphemeral = false
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "identity cache encryption key", success: true)
case .itemNotFound:
// Genuine first run: generate and persist a new key.
let newKey = SymmetricKey(size: .bits256)
let keyData = newKey.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: encryptionKeyName)
loadedKey = newKey
// If even the save failed, treat the key as ephemeral so we don't
// later try to persist a cache the next launch can't read.
keyIsEphemeral = !saved
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.generate, keyType: "identity cache encryption key", success: saved)
case .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed, .accessDenied, .otherError:
// Transient/critical read failure. Do NOT overwrite the persisted
// key. Use a session-only ephemeral key; the real key and cache are
// left intact for a healthy launch.
SecureLogger.warning("Identity cache key unavailable; using ephemeral key for this session (not persisting)", category: .security)
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation("load", keyType: "identity cache encryption key", success: true)
}
// Generate new key if needed
else {
loadedKey = SymmetricKey(size: .bits256)
keyIsEphemeral = true
let keyData = loadedKey.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
// Save to keychain
let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: encryptionKeyName)
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation("generate", keyType: "identity cache encryption key", success: saved)
}
self.encryptionKey = loadedKey
self.encryptionKeyIsEphemeral = keyIsEphemeral
// Only read the persisted cache when we hold the real key; with an
// ephemeral key the decrypt would fail and discard the real cache.
if !keyIsEphemeral {
loadIdentityCache()
}
}
deinit {
forceSave()
// Load identity cache on init
loadIdentityCache()
}
// MARK: - Secure Loading/Saving
private func loadIdentityCache() {
func loadIdentityCache() {
guard let encryptedData = keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: cacheKey) else {
// No existing cache, start fresh
return
@@ -232,57 +159,67 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
let decryptedData = try AES.GCM.open(sealedBox, using: encryptionKey)
cache = try JSONDecoder().decode(IdentityCache.self, from: decryptedData)
} catch {
cache = IdentityCache()
let deleted = keychain.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: cacheKey)
SecureLogger.warning(
"Discarded unreadable identity cache; starting fresh (deleted=\(deleted), error=\(error.localizedDescription))",
category: .security
)
// Log error but continue with empty cache
SecureLogger.logError(error, context: "Failed to load identity cache", category: SecureLogger.security)
}
}
/// Persists the cache. Always invoked on `queue` under a barrier (its callers
/// run inside `queue.async(.barrier)`), so it simply marks the cache dirty
/// and persists it on the same serialized context no timer, nothing left
/// scheduled to keep the process alive.
private func saveIdentityCache() {
pendingSave = true
performSave()
deinit {
// Force save any pending changes
forceSave()
}
/// Writes the cache to the keychain. Must run on `queue` with exclusive
/// (barrier) access.
func saveIdentityCache() {
// Mark that we need to save
pendingSave = true
// Cancel any existing timer
saveTimer?.invalidate()
// Schedule a new save after the debounce interval
saveTimer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: saveDebounceInterval, repeats: false) { [weak self] _ in
self?.performSave()
}
}
private func performSave() {
guard pendingSave else { return }
pendingSave = false
// Never persist under an ephemeral key it would overwrite the real
// cache with data the next launch cannot decrypt.
guard !encryptionKeyIsEphemeral else {
SecureLogger.debug("Skipping identity cache save (ephemeral key this session)", category: .security)
return
}
do {
let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(cache)
let sealedBox = try AES.GCM.seal(data, using: encryptionKey)
let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(sealedBox.combined!, forKey: cacheKey)
if saved {
SecureLogger.debug("Identity cache saved to keychain", category: .security)
SecureLogger.log("Identity cache saved to keychain", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .debug)
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.error(error, context: "Failed to save identity cache", category: .security)
SecureLogger.logError(error, context: "Failed to save identity cache", category: SecureLogger.security)
}
}
// Force immediate save (for app termination / lifecycle events). Mutations
// already persist synchronously via saveIdentityCache, so this is normally a
// no-op (performSave early-returns when nothing is pending). Runs directly on
// the caller's thread deliberately NOT a `queue.sync(barrier)`, which is
// reachable from `deinit` and from async tests on the swift-concurrency
// cooperative pool where a blocking barrier-sync can starve/deadlock it.
// Force immediate save (for app termination)
func forceSave() {
performSave()
saveTimer?.invalidate()
if pendingSave {
performSave()
}
}
// MARK: - Identity Resolution
func resolveIdentity(peerID: String, claimedNickname: String) -> IdentityHint {
queue.sync {
// Check if we have candidates based on nickname
if let fingerprints = cache.nicknameIndex[claimedNickname] {
if fingerprints.count == 1 {
return .likelyKnown(fingerprint: fingerprints.first!)
} else {
return .ambiguous(candidates: fingerprints)
}
}
return .unknown
}
}
// MARK: - Social Identity Management
@@ -292,98 +229,25 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
return cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint]
}
}
// MARK: - Cryptographic Identities
/// Insert or update a cryptographic identity and optionally persist its signing key and claimed nickname.
/// - Parameters:
/// - fingerprint: SHA-256 hex of the Noise static public key
/// - noisePublicKey: Noise static public key data
/// - signingPublicKey: Optional Ed25519 signing public key for authenticating public messages
/// - claimedNickname: Optional latest claimed nickname to persist into social identity
func upsertCryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: String, noisePublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data?, claimedNickname: String? = nil) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
let now = Date()
if var existing = self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] {
// Update keys if changed
if existing.publicKey != noisePublicKey {
existing = CryptographicIdentity(
fingerprint: fingerprint,
publicKey: noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey,
firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
lastHandshake: now
)
self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing
} else {
// Update signing key and lastHandshake
existing.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey
let updated = CryptographicIdentity(
fingerprint: existing.fingerprint,
publicKey: existing.publicKey,
signingPublicKey: existing.signingPublicKey,
firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
lastHandshake: now
)
self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = updated
}
// Persist updated state (already assigned in branches above)
} else {
// New entry
let entry = CryptographicIdentity(
fingerprint: fingerprint,
publicKey: noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
firstSeen: now,
lastHandshake: now
)
self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = entry
}
// Optionally persist claimed nickname into social identity
if let claimed = claimedNickname {
var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] ?? SocialIdentity(
fingerprint: fingerprint,
localPetname: nil,
claimedNickname: claimed,
trustLevel: .unknown,
isFavorite: false,
isBlocked: false,
notes: nil
)
// Update claimed nickname if changed
if identity.claimedNickname != claimed {
identity.claimedNickname = claimed
self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
} else if self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] == nil {
self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
}
}
self.saveIdentityCache()
}
}
/// Find cryptographic identities whose fingerprint prefix matches a peerID (16-hex) short ID
func getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(_ peerID: PeerID) -> [CryptographicIdentity] {
func getAllSocialIdentities() -> [SocialIdentity] {
queue.sync {
// Defensive: ensure hex and correct length
guard peerID.isShort else { return [] }
return cryptographicIdentities.values.filter { $0.fingerprint.hasPrefix(peerID.id) }
return Array(cache.socialIdentities.values)
}
}
func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
let previousClaimedNickname = self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint]?.claimedNickname
self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint] = identity
// Update nickname index
if let previousClaimedNickname,
previousClaimedNickname != identity.claimedNickname {
self.cache.nicknameIndex[previousClaimedNickname]?.remove(identity.fingerprint)
if self.cache.nicknameIndex[previousClaimedNickname]?.isEmpty == true {
self.cache.nicknameIndex.removeValue(forKey: previousClaimedNickname)
if let existingIdentity = self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint] {
// Remove old nickname from index if changed
if existingIdentity.claimedNickname != identity.claimedNickname {
self.cache.nicknameIndex[existingIdentity.claimedNickname]?.remove(identity.fingerprint)
if self.cache.nicknameIndex[existingIdentity.claimedNickname]?.isEmpty == true {
self.cache.nicknameIndex.removeValue(forKey: existingIdentity.claimedNickname)
}
}
}
@@ -446,7 +310,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
}
func setBlocked(_ fingerprint: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
SecureLogger.info("User \(isBlocked ? "blocked" : "unblocked"): \(fingerprint)", category: .security)
SecureLogger.log("User \(isBlocked ? "blocked" : "unblocked"): \(fingerprint)", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .info)
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
if var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] {
@@ -498,7 +362,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
// MARK: - Ephemeral Session Management
func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState = .none) {
func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: String, handshakeState: HandshakeState = .none) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.ephemeralSessions[peerID] = EphemeralIdentity(
peerID: peerID,
@@ -508,7 +372,7 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
}
}
func updateHandshakeState(peerID: PeerID, state: HandshakeState) {
func updateHandshakeState(peerID: String, state: HandshakeState) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.ephemeralSessions[peerID]?.handshakeState = state
@@ -520,32 +384,81 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
}
}
func getHandshakeState(peerID: String) -> HandshakeState? {
queue.sync {
return ephemeralSessions[peerID]?.handshakeState
}
}
// MARK: - Pending Actions
func setPendingAction(peerID: String, action: PendingActions) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.pendingActions[peerID] = action
}
}
func applyPendingActions(peerID: String, fingerprint: String) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
guard let actions = self.pendingActions[peerID] else { return }
// Get or create social identity
var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] ?? SocialIdentity(
fingerprint: fingerprint,
localPetname: nil,
claimedNickname: "Unknown",
trustLevel: .unknown,
isFavorite: false,
isBlocked: false,
notes: nil
)
// Apply pending actions
if let toggleFavorite = actions.toggleFavorite {
identity.isFavorite = toggleFavorite
}
if let trustLevel = actions.setTrustLevel {
identity.trustLevel = trustLevel
}
if let petname = actions.setPetname {
identity.localPetname = petname
}
// Save updated identity
self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
self.pendingActions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
self.saveIdentityCache()
}
}
// MARK: - Cleanup
func clearAllIdentityData() {
SecureLogger.warning("Clearing all identity data", category: .security)
SecureLogger.log("Clearing all identity data", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .warning)
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.cache = IdentityCache()
self.ephemeralSessions.removeAll()
self.cryptographicIdentities.removeAll()
self.pendingActions.removeAll()
// Delete from keychain
let deleted = self.keychain.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: self.cacheKey)
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.delete, keyType: "identity cache", success: deleted)
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation("delete", keyType: "identity cache", success: deleted)
}
}
func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID) {
func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: String) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.ephemeralSessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
self.pendingActions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
}
// MARK: - Verification
func setVerified(fingerprint: String, verified: Bool) {
SecureLogger.info("Fingerprint \(verified ? "verified" : "unverified"): \(fingerprint)", category: .security)
SecureLogger.log("Fingerprint \(verified ? "verified" : "unverified"): \(fingerprint)", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .info)
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
if verified {
@@ -575,16 +488,4 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
return cache.verifiedFingerprints
}
}
var debugNicknameIndex: [String: Set<String>] {
queue.sync { cache.nicknameIndex }
}
func debugEphemeralSession(for peerID: PeerID) -> EphemeralIdentity? {
queue.sync { ephemeralSessions[peerID] }
}
func debugLastInteraction(for fingerprint: String) -> Date? {
queue.sync { cache.lastInteractions[fingerprint] }
}
}
-8
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>AppGroupID</key>
<string>$(APP_GROUP_ID)</string>
<key>CFBundleDevelopmentRegion</key>
<string>$(DEVELOPMENT_LANGUAGE)</string>
<key>CFBundleDisplayName</key>
@@ -37,14 +35,8 @@
<string>bitchat uses Bluetooth to create a secure mesh network for chatting with nearby users.</string>
<key>NSBluetoothPeripheralUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses Bluetooth to discover and connect with other bitchat users nearby.</string>
<key>NSCameraUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses the camera to scan QR codes to verify peers.</string>
<key>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses your approximate location to compute local geohash channels for optional public chats. Exact GPS is never shared.</string>
<key>NSMicrophoneUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses the microphone to record voice notes that relay across the mesh.</string>
<key>NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat lets you pick images from your photo library to share with nearby peers.</string>
<key>UIBackgroundModes</key>
<array>
<string>bluetooth-central</string>
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-69
View File
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
//
// BitchatMessage+Media.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
extension BitchatMessage {
enum Media {
case voice(URL)
case image(URL)
var url: URL {
switch self {
case .voice(let url), .image(let url):
return url
}
}
}
// Cache the directory lookup to avoid repeated FileManager calls during view rendering
private struct Cache {
let filesDir: URL?
static let shared = Cache()
private init() {
do {
let base = try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
let filesDir = base.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: filesDir, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
self.filesDir = filesDir
} catch {
filesDir = nil
}
}
}
func mediaAttachment(for nickname: String) -> Media? {
guard let baseDirectory = Cache.shared.filesDir else { return nil }
func url(for category: MimeType.Category) -> URL? {
guard content.hasPrefix(category.messagePrefix),
let filename = String(content.dropFirst(category.messagePrefix.count)).trimmedOrNilIfEmpty
else {
return nil
}
// Check outgoing first for sent messages, incoming for received
let subdir = sender == nickname ? "\(category.mediaDir)/outgoing" : "\(category.mediaDir)/incoming"
// Construct URL directly without fileExists check (avoids blocking disk I/O in view body)
// Files are checked during playback/display, so missing files fail gracefully
let directory = baseDirectory.appendingPathComponent(subdir, isDirectory: true)
return directory.appendingPathComponent(filename)
}
if let url = url(for: .audio) {
return .voice(url)
}
if let url = url(for: .image) {
return .image(url)
}
return nil
}
}
+224 -16
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,13 @@
import Foundation
import CoreBluetooth
import BitFoundation
/// Represents a peer in the BitChat network with all associated metadata
struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
let peerID: PeerID // Hex-encoded peer ID
struct BitchatPeer: Identifiable, Equatable {
let id: String // Hex-encoded peer ID
let noisePublicKey: Data
let nickname: String
let lastSeen: Date
let isConnected: Bool
let isReachable: Bool
// Favorite-related properties
var favoriteStatus: FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship?
@@ -20,7 +18,6 @@ struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
// Connection state
enum ConnectionState {
case bluetoothConnected
case meshReachable // Seen via mesh recently, not directly connected
case nostrAvailable // Mutual favorite, reachable via Nostr
case offline // Not connected via any transport
}
@@ -28,8 +25,6 @@ struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
var connectionState: ConnectionState {
if isConnected {
return .bluetoothConnected
} else if isReachable {
return .meshReachable
} else if favoriteStatus?.isMutual == true {
// Mutual favorites can communicate via Nostr when offline
return .nostrAvailable
@@ -52,15 +47,13 @@ struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
// Display helpers
var displayName: String {
nickname.isEmpty ? String(peerID.id.prefix(8)) : nickname
nickname.isEmpty ? String(id.prefix(8)) : nickname
}
var statusIcon: String {
switch connectionState {
case .bluetoothConnected:
return "📻" // Radio icon for mesh connection
case .meshReachable:
return "📡" // Antenna for mesh reachable
case .nostrAvailable:
return "🌐" // Purple globe for Nostr
case .offline:
@@ -74,19 +67,17 @@ struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
// Initialize from mesh service data
init(
peerID: PeerID,
id: String,
noisePublicKey: Data,
nickname: String,
lastSeen: Date = Date(),
isConnected: Bool = false,
isReachable: Bool = false
isConnected: Bool = false
) {
self.peerID = peerID
self.id = id
self.noisePublicKey = noisePublicKey
self.nickname = nickname
self.lastSeen = lastSeen
self.isConnected = isConnected
self.isReachable = isReachable
// Load favorite status - will be set later by the manager
self.favoriteStatus = nil
@@ -94,6 +85,223 @@ struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
}
static func == (lhs: BitchatPeer, rhs: BitchatPeer) -> Bool {
lhs.peerID == rhs.peerID
lhs.id == rhs.id
}
}
// MARK: - Peer Manager
/// Manages the collection of peers and their states
@MainActor
class PeerManager: ObservableObject {
@Published var peers: [BitchatPeer] = []
@Published var favorites: [BitchatPeer] = []
@Published var mutualFavorites: [BitchatPeer] = []
private let meshService: Transport
private let favoritesService = FavoritesPersistenceService.shared
init(meshService: Transport) {
self.meshService = meshService
updatePeers()
// Listen for updates
NotificationCenter.default.addObserver(
self,
selector: #selector(handleFavoriteChanged),
name: .favoriteStatusChanged,
object: nil
)
}
@objc private func handleFavoriteChanged() {
SecureLogger.log("⭐ Favorite status changed notification received, updating peers",
category: SecureLogger.session, level: .debug)
updatePeers()
}
deinit {
NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(self)
}
func updatePeers() {
// Reduce log verbosity - only log when count changes
let previousCount = peers.count
// Get current mesh peers
let meshPeers = meshService.getPeerNicknames()
// Build peer list
var allPeers: [BitchatPeer] = []
var connectedNicknames: Set<String> = []
var addedPeerIDs: Set<String> = []
// Add connected mesh peers (only if actually connected or relay connected)
for (peerID, nickname) in meshPeers {
guard let noiseKey = Data(hexString: peerID) else { continue }
// Safety check: Never add our own peer ID
if peerID == meshService.myPeerID {
continue
}
// Check if this peer is actually connected
let isConnected = meshService.isPeerConnected(peerID)
// Skip disconnected peers unless they're favorites (handled later)
if !isConnected {
continue
}
if isConnected {
connectedNicknames.insert(nickname)
}
// Track that we've added this peer ID
addedPeerIDs.insert(peerID)
var peer = BitchatPeer(
id: peerID,
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
nickname: nickname,
isConnected: isConnected
)
// Set favorite status - check both by current noise key and by nickname
if let favoriteStatus = favoritesService.getFavoriteStatus(for: noiseKey) {
peer.favoriteStatus = favoriteStatus
peer.nostrPublicKey = favoriteStatus.peerNostrPublicKey
} else {
// Check if we have a favorite for this nickname (peer may have reconnected with new ID)
let favoriteByNickname = favoritesService.favorites.values.first { $0.peerNickname == nickname }
if let favorite = favoriteByNickname {
SecureLogger.log("🔄 Found favorite for '\(nickname)' by nickname, updating noise key",
category: SecureLogger.session, level: .info)
// Update the favorite's noise key to match the current connection
favoritesService.updateNoisePublicKey(from: favorite.peerNoisePublicKey, to: noiseKey, peerNickname: nickname)
// Get the updated favorite with the new key
peer.favoriteStatus = favoritesService.getFavoriteStatus(for: noiseKey)
peer.nostrPublicKey = peer.favoriteStatus?.peerNostrPublicKey ?? favorite.peerNostrPublicKey
}
}
allPeers.append(peer)
}
// Add offline favorites (only those not currently connected AND that we actively favorite)
for (favoriteKey, favorite) in favoritesService.favorites {
let favoriteID = favorite.peerNoisePublicKey.hexEncodedString()
// Skip if this peer is already connected (by nickname)
if connectedNicknames.contains(favorite.peerNickname) {
// Skipping favorite - already connected
continue
}
// Skip if we already added a peer with this ID (prevents duplicates)
if addedPeerIDs.contains(favoriteID) {
// Skipping favorite - peer ID already added
continue
}
// Only add peers that WE favorite (not just ones who favorite us)
if !favorite.isFavorite {
// Skipping - we don't favorite them
continue
}
// Add this favorite as an offline peer
SecureLogger.log(" - Adding offline favorite '\(favorite.peerNickname)' (key: \(favoriteKey.hexEncodedString()), ID: \(favoriteID), mutual: \(favorite.isMutual))",
category: SecureLogger.session, level: .info)
var peer = BitchatPeer(
id: favoriteID,
noisePublicKey: favorite.peerNoisePublicKey,
nickname: favorite.peerNickname,
isConnected: false
)
// Set favorite status
peer.favoriteStatus = favorite
peer.nostrPublicKey = favorite.peerNostrPublicKey
addedPeerIDs.insert(favoriteID) // Track that we've added this ID
allPeers.append(peer)
}
// Filter out "Unknown" peers unless they are favorites or have a favorite relationship
allPeers = allPeers.filter { peer in
!(peer.displayName == "Unknown" && peer.favoriteStatus == nil)
}
// Sort: Connected first, then favorites, then alphabetical
allPeers.sort { lhs, rhs in
// Direct connections first
if lhs.isConnected != rhs.isConnected {
return lhs.isConnected
}
// Then favorites
if lhs.isFavorite != rhs.isFavorite {
return lhs.isFavorite
}
// Finally alphabetical
return lhs.displayName < rhs.displayName
}
// Single pass to compute all subsets and counts
var favorites: [BitchatPeer] = []
var mutualFavorites: [BitchatPeer] = []
var connectedCount = 0
var offlineCount = 0
for peer in allPeers {
if peer.isFavorite {
favorites.append(peer)
}
if peer.isMutualFavorite {
mutualFavorites.append(peer)
}
if peer.isConnected {
connectedCount += 1
} else {
offlineCount += 1
}
}
// Final safety check: ensure no duplicate IDs
var finalPeers: [BitchatPeer] = []
var seenIDs: Set<String> = []
for peer in allPeers {
if !seenIDs.contains(peer.id) {
seenIDs.insert(peer.id)
finalPeers.append(peer)
} else {
SecureLogger.log("⚠️ Removing duplicate peer ID in final check: \(peer.id) (\(peer.displayName))",
category: SecureLogger.session, level: .warning)
}
}
self.peers = finalPeers
self.favorites = favorites
self.mutualFavorites = mutualFavorites
// Log peer list summary sparingly at debug level
if favoritesService.favorites.count > 0 {
SecureLogger.log("📊 Peer list update: \(allPeers.count) total (\(connectedCount) connected, \(offlineCount) offline), \(favorites.count) favorites, \(mutualFavorites.count) mutual",
category: SecureLogger.session, level: .debug)
} else if previousCount != allPeers.count {
SecureLogger.log("✅ Updated peer list: \(allPeers.count) total peers",
category: SecureLogger.session, level: .debug)
}
}
func toggleFavorite(_ peer: BitchatPeer) {
if peer.isFavorite {
favoritesService.removeFavorite(peerNoisePublicKey: peer.noisePublicKey)
} else {
favoritesService.addFavorite(
peerNoisePublicKey: peer.noisePublicKey,
peerNostrPublicKey: peer.nostrPublicKey,
peerNickname: peer.nickname
)
}
updatePeers()
}
}
-65
View File
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
//
// CommandsInfo.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
// MARK: - CommandInfo Enum
enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
// Raw values must match the aliases CommandProcessor actually accepts
// the suggestion panel is the app's only command-discovery surface, and
// suggesting a spelling the processor rejects teaches users dead ends.
case block
case clear
case help
case hug
case message = "msg"
case slap
case unblock
case who
case favorite = "fav"
case unfavorite = "unfav"
var id: String { rawValue }
var alias: String { "/" + rawValue }
var placeholder: String? {
switch self {
case .block, .hug, .message, .slap, .unblock, .favorite, .unfavorite:
return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.nickname_placeholder") + ">"
case .clear, .help, .who:
return nil
}
}
var description: String {
switch self {
case .block: String(localized: "content.commands.block")
case .clear: String(localized: "content.commands.clear")
case .help: String(localized: "content.commands.help")
case .hug: String(localized: "content.commands.hug")
case .message: String(localized: "content.commands.message")
case .slap: String(localized: "content.commands.slap")
case .unblock: String(localized: "content.commands.unblock")
case .who: String(localized: "content.commands.who")
case .favorite: String(localized: "content.commands.favorite")
case .unfavorite: String(localized: "content.commands.unfavorite")
}
}
static func all(isGeoPublic: Bool, isGeoDM: Bool) -> [CommandInfo] {
let baseCommands: [CommandInfo] = [.block, .unblock, .clear, .help, .hug, .message, .slap, .who]
// The processor rejects favorites in geohash contexts, so only
// suggest them where they actually work: mesh.
if isGeoPublic || isGeoDM {
return baseCommands
}
return baseCommands + [.favorite, .unfavorite]
}
}
-41
View File
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
//
// NoisePayload.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
/// Helper to create typed Noise payloads
struct NoisePayload {
let type: NoisePayloadType
let data: Data
/// Encode payload with type prefix
func encode() -> Data {
var encoded = Data()
encoded.append(type.rawValue)
encoded.append(data)
return encoded
}
/// Decode payload from data
static func decode(_ data: Data) -> NoisePayload? {
// Ensure we have at least 1 byte for the type
guard !data.isEmpty else {
return nil
}
// Safely get the first byte
let firstByte = data[data.startIndex]
guard let type = NoisePayloadType(rawValue: firstByte) else {
return nil
}
// Create a proper Data copy (not a subsequence) for thread safety
let payloadData = data.count > 1 ? Data(data.dropFirst()) : Data()
return NoisePayload(type: type, data: payloadData)
}
}
-96
View File
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
//
// ReadReceipt.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
import BitFoundation
struct ReadReceipt: Codable {
let originalMessageID: String
let receiptID: String
var readerID: PeerID // Who read it
let readerNickname: String
let timestamp: Date
init(originalMessageID: String, readerID: PeerID, readerNickname: String) {
self.originalMessageID = originalMessageID
self.receiptID = UUID().uuidString
self.readerID = readerID
self.readerNickname = readerNickname
self.timestamp = Date()
}
// For binary decoding
private init(originalMessageID: String, receiptID: String, readerID: PeerID, readerNickname: String, timestamp: Date) {
self.originalMessageID = originalMessageID
self.receiptID = receiptID
self.readerID = readerID
self.readerNickname = readerNickname
self.timestamp = timestamp
}
func encode() -> Data? {
try? JSONEncoder().encode(self)
}
static func decode(from data: Data) -> ReadReceipt? {
try? JSONDecoder().decode(ReadReceipt.self, from: data)
}
// MARK: - Binary Encoding
func toBinaryData() -> Data {
var data = Data()
data.appendUUID(originalMessageID)
data.appendUUID(receiptID)
// ReaderID as 8-byte hex string
var readerData = Data()
var tempID = readerID.id
while tempID.count >= 2 && readerData.count < 8 {
let hexByte = String(tempID.prefix(2))
if let byte = UInt8(hexByte, radix: 16) {
readerData.append(byte)
}
tempID = String(tempID.dropFirst(2))
}
while readerData.count < 8 {
readerData.append(0)
}
data.append(readerData)
data.appendDate(timestamp)
data.appendString(readerNickname)
return data
}
static func fromBinaryData(_ data: Data) -> ReadReceipt? {
// Create defensive copy
let dataCopy = Data(data)
// Minimum size: 2 UUIDs (32) + readerID (8) + timestamp (8) + min nickname
guard dataCopy.count >= 49 else { return nil }
var offset = 0
guard let originalMessageID = dataCopy.readUUID(at: &offset),
let receiptID = dataCopy.readUUID(at: &offset) else { return nil }
guard let readerIDData = dataCopy.readFixedBytes(at: &offset, count: 8) else { return nil }
let readerID = PeerID(hexData: readerIDData)
guard readerID.isValid else { return nil }
guard let timestamp = dataCopy.readDate(at: &offset),
InputValidator.validateTimestamp(timestamp),
let readerNicknameRaw = dataCopy.readString(at: &offset),
let readerNickname = InputValidator.validateNickname(readerNicknameRaw) else { return nil }
return ReadReceipt(originalMessageID: originalMessageID,
receiptID: receiptID,
readerID: readerID,
readerNickname: readerNickname,
timestamp: timestamp)
}
}
-102
View File
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
// REQUEST_SYNC payload TLV (type, length16, value)
// - 0x01: P (uint8) Golomb-Rice parameter
// - 0x02: M (uint32, big-endian) hash range (N * 2^P)
// - 0x03: data (opaque) GR bitstream bytes (MSB-first)
struct RequestSyncPacket {
let p: Int
let m: UInt32
let data: Data
let types: SyncTypeFlags?
let sinceTimestamp: UInt64?
let fragmentIdFilter: String?
init(p: Int, m: UInt32, data: Data, types: SyncTypeFlags? = nil, sinceTimestamp: UInt64? = nil, fragmentIdFilter: String? = nil) {
self.p = p
self.m = m
self.data = data
self.types = types
self.sinceTimestamp = sinceTimestamp
self.fragmentIdFilter = fragmentIdFilter
}
func encode() -> Data {
var out = Data()
func putTLV(_ t: UInt8, _ v: Data) {
out.append(t)
let len = UInt16(v.count)
out.append(UInt8((len >> 8) & 0xFF))
out.append(UInt8(len & 0xFF))
out.append(v)
}
// P
putTLV(0x01, Data([UInt8(p & 0xFF)]))
// M (uint32)
var mBE = m.bigEndian
putTLV(0x02, withUnsafeBytes(of: &mBE) { Data($0) })
// data
putTLV(0x03, data)
if let typesData = types?.toData() {
putTLV(0x04, typesData)
}
if let ts = sinceTimestamp {
var tsBE = ts.bigEndian
putTLV(0x05, withUnsafeBytes(of: &tsBE) { Data($0) })
}
if let fid = fragmentIdFilter, let fidData = fid.data(using: .utf8) {
putTLV(0x06, fidData)
}
return out
}
static func decode(from data: Data, maxAcceptBytes: Int = 1024) -> RequestSyncPacket? {
var off = 0
var p: Int? = nil
var m: UInt32? = nil
var payload: Data? = nil
var types: SyncTypeFlags? = nil
var sinceTimestamp: UInt64? = nil
var fragmentIdFilter: String? = nil
while off + 3 <= data.count {
let t = Int(data[off]); off += 1
guard off + 2 <= data.count else { return nil }
let len = (Int(data[off]) << 8) | Int(data[off+1]); off += 2
guard off + len <= data.count else { return nil }
let v = data.subdata(in: off..<(off+len)); off += len
switch t {
case 0x01:
if v.count == 1 { p = Int(v[0]) }
case 0x02:
if v.count == 4 {
var mm: UInt32 = 0
for b in v { mm = (mm << 8) | UInt32(b) }
m = mm
}
case 0x03:
if v.count > maxAcceptBytes { return nil }
payload = v
case 0x04:
if let decoded = SyncTypeFlags.decode(v) {
types = decoded
}
case 0x05:
if v.count == 8 {
var ts: UInt64 = 0
for b in v { ts = (ts << 8) | UInt64(b) }
sinceTimestamp = ts
}
case 0x06:
if let fid = String(data: v, encoding: .utf8) {
fragmentIdFilter = fid
}
default:
break // forward compatible; ignore unknown TLVs
}
}
guard let pp = p, let mm = m, let dd = payload, pp >= 1, pp <= GCSFilter.maxP, mm > 0 else { return nil }
return RequestSyncPacket(p: pp, m: mm, data: dd, types: types, sinceTimestamp: sinceTimestamp, fragmentIdFilter: fragmentIdFilter)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
//
// NoiseHandshakeCoordinator.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
/// Coordinates Noise handshakes to prevent race conditions and ensure reliable encryption establishment
class NoiseHandshakeCoordinator {
// MARK: - Handshake State
enum HandshakeState: Equatable {
case idle
case waitingToInitiate(since: Date)
case initiating(attempt: Int, lastAttempt: Date)
case responding(since: Date)
case waitingForResponse(messagesSent: [Data], timeout: Date)
case established(since: Date)
case failed(reason: String, canRetry: Bool, lastAttempt: Date)
var isActive: Bool {
switch self {
case .idle, .established, .failed:
return false
default:
return true
}
}
}
// MARK: - Properties
private var handshakeStates: [String: HandshakeState] = [:]
private var handshakeQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.handshake", attributes: .concurrent)
// Configuration
private let maxHandshakeAttempts = 3
private let handshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 10.0
private let retryDelay: TimeInterval = 2.0
private let minTimeBetweenHandshakes: TimeInterval = 1.0 // Reduced from 5.0 for faster recovery
private let establishedSessionTTL: TimeInterval = 300.0 // 5 minutes - sessions older than this can be cleaned up
private let maxEstablishedSessions = 50 // Limit total established sessions
// Track handshake messages to detect duplicates
private var processedHandshakeMessages: Set<Data> = []
private let messageHistoryLimit = 100
// MARK: - Role Determination
/// Deterministically determine who should initiate the handshake
/// Lower peer ID becomes the initiator to prevent simultaneous attempts
func determineHandshakeRole(myPeerID: String, remotePeerID: String) -> NoiseRole {
// Use simple string comparison for deterministic ordering
return myPeerID < remotePeerID ? .initiator : .responder
}
/// Check if we should initiate handshake with a peer
func shouldInitiateHandshake(myPeerID: String, remotePeerID: String, forceIfStale: Bool = false) -> Bool {
return handshakeQueue.sync {
// Check if we're already in an active handshake
if let state = handshakeStates[remotePeerID], state.isActive {
// Check if the handshake is stale and we should force a new one
if forceIfStale {
switch state {
case .initiating(_, let lastAttempt):
if Date().timeIntervalSince(lastAttempt) > handshakeTimeout {
SecureLogger.log("Forcing new handshake with \(remotePeerID) - previous stuck in initiating",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .warning)
return true
}
default:
break
}
}
SecureLogger.log("Already in active handshake with \(remotePeerID), state: \(state)",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .debug)
return false
}
// Check role
let role = determineHandshakeRole(myPeerID: myPeerID, remotePeerID: remotePeerID)
if role != .initiator {
return false
}
// Check if we've failed recently and can't retry yet
if case .failed(_, let canRetry, let lastAttempt) = handshakeStates[remotePeerID] {
if !canRetry {
return false
}
if Date().timeIntervalSince(lastAttempt) < retryDelay {
return false
}
}
return true
}
}
/// Record that we're initiating a handshake
func recordHandshakeInitiation(peerID: String) {
handshakeQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
let attempt = self.getCurrentAttempt(for: peerID) + 1
self.handshakeStates[peerID] = .initiating(attempt: attempt, lastAttempt: Date())
SecureLogger.log("Recording handshake initiation with \(peerID), attempt \(attempt)",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .info)
}
}
/// Record that we're responding to a handshake
func recordHandshakeResponse(peerID: String) {
handshakeQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.handshakeStates[peerID] = .responding(since: Date())
SecureLogger.log("Recording handshake response to \(peerID)",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .info)
}
}
/// Record successful handshake completion
func recordHandshakeSuccess(peerID: String) {
handshakeQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.handshakeStates[peerID] = .established(since: Date())
SecureLogger.log("Handshake successfully established with \(peerID)",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .info)
}
}
/// Record handshake failure
func recordHandshakeFailure(peerID: String, reason: String) {
handshakeQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
let attempts = self.getCurrentAttempt(for: peerID)
let canRetry = attempts < self.maxHandshakeAttempts
self.handshakeStates[peerID] = .failed(reason: reason, canRetry: canRetry, lastAttempt: Date())
SecureLogger.log("Handshake failed with \(peerID): \(reason), canRetry: \(canRetry)",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .warning)
}
}
/// Check if we should accept an incoming handshake initiation
func shouldAcceptHandshakeInitiation(myPeerID: String, remotePeerID: String) -> Bool {
return handshakeQueue.sync {
// If we're already established, reject new handshakes
if case .established = handshakeStates[remotePeerID] {
SecureLogger.log("Rejecting handshake from \(remotePeerID) - already established",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .debug)
return false
}
let role = determineHandshakeRole(myPeerID: myPeerID, remotePeerID: remotePeerID)
// If we're the initiator and already initiating, this is a race condition
if role == .initiator {
if case .initiating = handshakeStates[remotePeerID] {
// They shouldn't be initiating, but accept it to recover from race condition
SecureLogger.log("Accepting handshake from \(remotePeerID) despite being initiator (race condition recovery)",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .warning)
return true
}
}
// If we're the responder, we should accept
return true
}
}
/// Check if this is a duplicate handshake message
func isDuplicateHandshakeMessage(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
return handshakeQueue.sync {
if processedHandshakeMessages.contains(data) {
return true
}
// Add to processed messages with size limit
if processedHandshakeMessages.count >= messageHistoryLimit {
processedHandshakeMessages.removeAll()
}
processedHandshakeMessages.insert(data)
return false
}
}
/// Get time to wait before next handshake attempt
func getRetryDelay(for peerID: String) -> TimeInterval? {
return handshakeQueue.sync {
guard let state = handshakeStates[peerID] else { return nil }
switch state {
case .failed(_, let canRetry, let lastAttempt):
if !canRetry { return nil }
let timeSinceFailure = Date().timeIntervalSince(lastAttempt)
if timeSinceFailure >= retryDelay {
return 0
}
return retryDelay - timeSinceFailure
case .initiating(_, let lastAttempt):
let timeSinceAttempt = Date().timeIntervalSince(lastAttempt)
if timeSinceAttempt >= minTimeBetweenHandshakes {
return 0
}
return minTimeBetweenHandshakes - timeSinceAttempt
default:
return nil
}
}
}
/// Reset handshake state for a peer
func resetHandshakeState(for peerID: String) {
handshakeQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.handshakeStates.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
SecureLogger.log("Reset handshake state for \(peerID)",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .debug)
}
}
/// Clean up stale handshake states and old established sessions
func cleanupStaleHandshakes(staleTimeout: TimeInterval = 30.0) -> [String] {
return handshakeQueue.sync {
let now = Date()
var stalePeerIDs: [String] = []
var establishedSessions: [(peerID: String, since: Date)] = []
for (peerID, state) in handshakeStates {
var isStale = false
switch state {
case .initiating(_, let lastAttempt):
if now.timeIntervalSince(lastAttempt) > staleTimeout {
isStale = true
}
case .responding(let since):
if now.timeIntervalSince(since) > staleTimeout {
isStale = true
}
case .waitingForResponse(_, let timeout):
if now > timeout {
isStale = true
}
case .established(let since):
// Track established sessions for potential cleanup
establishedSessions.append((peerID, since))
// Clean up very old established sessions
if now.timeIntervalSince(since) > establishedSessionTTL {
isStale = true
}
default:
break
}
if isStale {
stalePeerIDs.append(peerID)
SecureLogger.log("Found stale handshake state for \(peerID): \(state)",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .warning)
}
}
// If we have too many established sessions, clean up the oldest ones
if establishedSessions.count > maxEstablishedSessions {
// Sort by age (oldest first)
let sortedSessions = establishedSessions.sorted { $0.since < $1.since }
let sessionsToRemove = sortedSessions.count - maxEstablishedSessions
for i in 0..<sessionsToRemove {
let peerID = sortedSessions[i].peerID
stalePeerIDs.append(peerID)
SecureLogger.log("Removing old established session for \(peerID) to maintain session limit",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .info)
}
}
// Clean up stale states
for peerID in stalePeerIDs {
handshakeStates.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
if !stalePeerIDs.isEmpty {
SecureLogger.log("Cleaned up \(stalePeerIDs.count) stale handshake states",
category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .info)
}
return stalePeerIDs
}
}
/// Get current handshake state
func getHandshakeState(for peerID: String) -> HandshakeState {
return handshakeQueue.sync {
return handshakeStates[peerID] ?? .idle
}
}
/// Get current retry count for a peer
func getRetryCount(for peerID: String) -> Int {
return handshakeQueue.sync {
switch handshakeStates[peerID] {
case .initiating(let attempt, _):
return attempt - 1 // Attempts start at 1, retries start at 0
default:
return 0
}
}
}
/// Increment retry count for a peer
func incrementRetryCount(for peerID: String) {
handshakeQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
let currentAttempt = self.getCurrentAttempt(for: peerID)
self.handshakeStates[peerID] = .initiating(attempt: currentAttempt + 1, lastAttempt: Date())
}
}
// MARK: - Private Helpers
private func getCurrentAttempt(for peerID: String) -> Int {
switch handshakeStates[peerID] {
case .initiating(let attempt, _):
return attempt
case .failed(_, _, _):
// Count previous attempts
return 1 // Simplified for now
default:
return 0
}
}
/// Log current handshake states for debugging
func logHandshakeStates() {
handshakeQueue.sync {
SecureLogger.log("=== Handshake States ===", category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .debug)
for (peerID, state) in handshakeStates {
let stateDesc: String
switch state {
case .idle:
stateDesc = "idle"
case .waitingToInitiate(let since):
stateDesc = "waiting to initiate (since \(since))"
case .initiating(let attempt, let lastAttempt):
stateDesc = "initiating (attempt \(attempt), last: \(lastAttempt))"
case .responding(let since):
stateDesc = "responding (since: \(since))"
case .waitingForResponse(let messages, let timeout):
stateDesc = "waiting for response (\(messages.count) messages, timeout: \(timeout))"
case .established(let since):
stateDesc = "established (since \(since))"
case .failed(let reason, let canRetry, let lastAttempt):
stateDesc = "failed: \(reason) (canRetry: \(canRetry), last: \(lastAttempt))"
}
SecureLogger.log(" \(peerID): \(stateDesc)", category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .debug)
}
SecureLogger.log("========================", category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .debug)
}
}
/// Clear all handshake states - used during panic mode
func clearAllHandshakeStates() {
handshakeQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
SecureLogger.log("Clearing all handshake states for panic mode", category: SecureLogger.handshake, level: .warning)
self.handshakeStates.removeAll()
self.processedHandshakeMessages.removeAll()
}
}
}
+74 -220
View File
@@ -77,10 +77,9 @@
/// - Noise Specification: http://www.noiseprotocol.org/noise.html
///
import BitLogger
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
import os.log
// Core Noise Protocol implementation
// Based on the Noise Protocol Framework specification
@@ -93,7 +92,6 @@ enum NoisePattern {
case XX // Most versatile, mutual authentication
case IK // Initiator knows responder's static key
case NK // Anonymous initiator
case X // One-way: single message to a known static key (no response)
}
enum NoiseRole {
@@ -129,7 +127,7 @@ struct NoiseProtocolName {
/// Handles ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD encryption with automatic nonce management
/// and replay protection using a sliding window algorithm.
/// - Warning: Nonce reuse would be catastrophic for security
final class NoiseCipherState {
class NoiseCipherState {
// Constants for replay protection
private static let NONCE_SIZE_BYTES = 4
private static let REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE = 1024
@@ -167,23 +165,19 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
// MARK: - Sliding Window Replay Protection
/// Check if nonce is valid for replay protection
/// BCH-01-010: Use safe arithmetic to prevent integer overflow
private func isValidNonce(_ receivedNonce: UInt64) -> Bool {
// Safe overflow check: instead of (receivedNonce + WINDOW_SIZE <= highest)
// use (highest >= WINDOW_SIZE && receivedNonce <= highest - WINDOW_SIZE)
let windowSize = UInt64(Self.REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE)
if highestReceivedNonce >= windowSize && receivedNonce <= highestReceivedNonce - windowSize {
if receivedNonce + UInt64(Self.REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE) <= highestReceivedNonce {
return false // Too old, outside window
}
if receivedNonce > highestReceivedNonce {
return true // Always accept newer nonces
}
let offset = Int(highestReceivedNonce - receivedNonce)
let byteIndex = offset / 8
let bitIndex = offset % 8
return (replayWindow[byteIndex] & (1 << bitIndex)) == 0 // Not yet seen
}
@@ -228,7 +222,7 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
guard combinedPayload.count >= Self.NONCE_SIZE_BYTES else {
return nil
}
// Extract 4-byte nonce (big-endian)
let nonceData = combinedPayload.prefix(Self.NONCE_SIZE_BYTES)
let extractedNonce = nonceData.withUnsafeBytes { (bytes: UnsafeRawBufferPointer) -> UInt64 in
@@ -239,18 +233,18 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
}
return result
}
// Extract ciphertext (remaining bytes)
let ciphertext = combinedPayload.dropFirst(Self.NONCE_SIZE_BYTES)
return (nonce: extractedNonce, ciphertext: Data(ciphertext))
}
/// Convert nonce to 4-byte array (big-endian)
private func nonceToBytes(_ nonce: UInt64) -> Data {
var bytes = Data(count: Self.NONCE_SIZE_BYTES)
withUnsafeBytes(of: nonce.bigEndian) { ptr in
// Copy only the last 4 bytes from the 8-byte UInt64
// Copy only the last 4 bytes from the 8-byte UInt64
let sourceBytes = ptr.bindMemory(to: UInt8.self)
bytes.replaceSubrange(0..<Self.NONCE_SIZE_BYTES, with: sourceBytes.suffix(Self.NONCE_SIZE_BYTES))
}
@@ -279,7 +273,7 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
let sealedBox = try ChaChaPoly.seal(plaintext, using: key, nonce: ChaChaPoly.Nonce(data: nonceData), authenticating: associatedData)
// increment local nonce
nonce += 1
// Create combined payload: <nonce><ciphertext>
let combinedPayload: Data
if (useExtractedNonce) {
@@ -291,9 +285,9 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
// Log high nonce values that might indicate issues
if currentNonce > Self.HIGH_NONCE_WARNING_THRESHOLD {
SecureLogger.warning("High nonce value detected: \(currentNonce) - consider rekeying", category: .encryption)
SecureLogger.log("High nonce value detected: \(currentNonce) - consider rekeying", category: SecureLogger.encryption, level: .warning)
}
return combinedPayload
}
@@ -313,23 +307,16 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
if useExtractedNonce {
// Extract nonce and ciphertext from combined payload
guard let (extractedNonce, actualCiphertext) = try extractNonceFromCiphertextPayload(ciphertext) else {
SecureLogger.debug("Decrypt failed: Could not extract nonce from payload")
SecureLogger.log("Decrypt failed: Could not extract nonce from payload")
throw NoiseError.invalidCiphertext
}
// Validate nonce with sliding window replay protection
guard isValidNonce(extractedNonce) else {
SecureLogger.debug("Replay attack detected: nonce \(extractedNonce) rejected")
SecureLogger.log("Replay attack detected: nonce \(extractedNonce) rejected")
throw NoiseError.replayDetected
}
// The 4-byte nonce prefix has been stripped, so the remaining bytes
// must still hold at least the 16-byte Poly1305 tag. The up-front
// `ciphertext.count >= 16` guard is not sufficient here (it counts
// the nonce), and `prefix(count - 16)` would trap on a short payload.
guard actualCiphertext.count >= 16 else {
throw NoiseError.invalidCiphertext
}
// Split ciphertext and tag
encryptedData = actualCiphertext.prefix(actualCiphertext.count - 16)
tag = actualCiphertext.suffix(16)
@@ -355,26 +342,22 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
// Log high nonce values that might indicate issues
if decryptionNonce > Self.HIGH_NONCE_WARNING_THRESHOLD {
SecureLogger.warning("High nonce value detected: \(decryptionNonce) - consider rekeying", category: .encryption)
SecureLogger.log("High nonce value detected: \(decryptionNonce) - consider rekeying", category: SecureLogger.encryption, level: .warning)
}
do {
let plaintext = try ChaChaPoly.open(sealedBox, using: key, authenticating: associatedData)
// BCH-01-010: Atomic nonce state update
// Both replay window marking and nonce increment must complete together
// to prevent state desynchronization. We perform both after successful
// decryption only, ensuring state consistency on any failure path.
if useExtractedNonce {
// Mark nonce as seen after successful decryption
markNonceAsSeen(decryptionNonce)
}
nonce += 1
return plaintext
} catch {
// Decryption failed - nonce state remains unchanged (atomic rollback)
SecureLogger.debug("Decrypt failed: \(error) for nonce \(decryptionNonce)")
SecureLogger.error("Decryption failed at nonce \(decryptionNonce)", category: .encryption)
SecureLogger.log("Decrypt failed: \(error) for nonce \(decryptionNonce)")
// Log authentication failures with nonce info
SecureLogger.log("Decryption failed at nonce \(decryptionNonce)", category: SecureLogger.encryption, level: .error)
throw error
}
}
@@ -393,16 +376,6 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
replayWindow[i] = 0
}
}
#if DEBUG
func setNonceForTesting(_ nonce: UInt64) {
self.nonce = nonce
}
func extractNonceFromCiphertextPayloadForTesting(_ combinedPayload: Data) throws -> (nonce: UInt64, ciphertext: Data)? {
try extractNonceFromCiphertextPayload(combinedPayload)
}
#endif
}
// MARK: - Symmetric State
@@ -411,7 +384,7 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
/// Responsible for key derivation, protocol name hashing, and maintaining
/// the chaining key that provides key separation between handshake messages.
/// - Note: This class implements the SymmetricState object from the Noise spec
final class NoiseSymmetricState {
class NoiseSymmetricState {
private var cipherState: NoiseCipherState
private var chainingKey: Data
private var hash: Data
@@ -424,7 +397,7 @@ final class NoiseSymmetricState {
if nameData.count <= 32 {
self.hash = nameData + Data(repeating: 0, count: 32 - nameData.count)
} else {
self.hash = nameData.sha256Hash()
self.hash = Data(SHA256.hash(data: nameData))
}
self.chainingKey = self.hash
}
@@ -437,7 +410,7 @@ final class NoiseSymmetricState {
}
func mixHash(_ data: Data) {
hash = (hash + data).sha256Hash()
hash = Data(SHA256.hash(data: hash + data))
}
func mixKeyAndHash(_ inputKeyMaterial: Data) {
@@ -478,40 +451,17 @@ final class NoiseSymmetricState {
}
}
func split(useExtractedNonce: Bool) -> (NoiseCipherState, NoiseCipherState) {
func split() -> (NoiseCipherState, NoiseCipherState) {
let output = hkdf(chainingKey: chainingKey, inputKeyMaterial: Data(), numOutputs: 2)
let tempKey1 = SymmetricKey(data: output[0])
let tempKey2 = SymmetricKey(data: output[1])
let c1 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey1, useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
let c2 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey2, useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
// BCH-01-010: Clear symmetric state after split per Noise spec
// The chaining key and hash should not be retained after handshake completes
clearSensitiveData()
let c1 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey1, useExtractedNonce: true)
let c2 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey2, useExtractedNonce: true)
return (c1, c2)
}
/// BCH-01-010: Securely clear sensitive cryptographic state
/// Called after split() to clear chaining key and hash per Noise spec
func clearSensitiveData() {
// Clear chaining key by overwriting with zeros
let chainingKeyCount = chainingKey.count
chainingKey = Data(repeating: 0, count: chainingKeyCount)
// Clear hash by overwriting with zeros
let hashCount = hash.count
hash = Data(repeating: 0, count: hashCount)
// Clear the internal cipher state
cipherState.clearSensitiveData()
}
deinit {
clearSensitiveData()
}
// HKDF implementation
private func hkdf(chainingKey: Data, inputKeyMaterial: Data, numOutputs: Int) -> [Data] {
let tempKey = HMAC<SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: inputKeyMaterial, using: SymmetricKey(data: chainingKey))
@@ -538,10 +488,9 @@ final class NoiseSymmetricState {
/// This is the main interface for establishing encrypted sessions between peers.
/// Manages the handshake state machine, message patterns, and key derivation.
/// - Important: Each handshake instance should only be used once
final class NoiseHandshakeState {
class NoiseHandshakeState {
private let role: NoiseRole
private let pattern: NoisePattern
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
private var symmetricState: NoiseSymmetricState
// Keys
@@ -557,24 +506,9 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
private var messagePatterns: [[NoiseMessagePattern]] = []
private var currentPattern = 0
// Test support: predetermined ephemeral keys for test vectors
private var predeterminedEphemeralKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey?
private var prologueData: Data
init(
role: NoiseRole,
pattern: NoisePattern,
keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey? = nil,
remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? = nil,
prologue: Data = Data(),
predeterminedEphemeralKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey? = nil
) {
init(role: NoiseRole, pattern: NoisePattern, localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey? = nil, remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? = nil) {
self.role = role
self.pattern = pattern
self.keychain = keychain
self.prologueData = prologue
self.predeterminedEphemeralKey = predeterminedEphemeralKey
// Initialize static keys
if let localKey = localStaticKey {
@@ -595,18 +529,17 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
}
private func mixPreMessageKeys() {
// Mix prologue
symmetricState.mixHash(self.prologueData)
// Mix prologue (empty for XX pattern normally)
symmetricState.mixHash(Data()) // Empty prologue for XX pattern
// For XX pattern, no pre-message keys
// For IK/NK patterns, we'd mix the responder's static key here
switch pattern {
case .XX:
break // No pre-message keys
case .IK, .NK, .X:
case .IK, .NK:
if role == .initiator, let remoteStatic = remoteStaticPublic {
_ = symmetricState.getHandshakeHash()
symmetricState.mixHash(remoteStatic.rawRepresentation)
} else if role == .responder, let localStatic = localStaticPublic {
symmetricState.mixHash(localStatic.rawRepresentation)
}
}
}
@@ -615,20 +548,15 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
guard currentPattern < messagePatterns.count else {
throw NoiseError.handshakeComplete
}
var messageBuffer = Data()
let patterns = messagePatterns[currentPattern]
for pattern in patterns {
switch pattern {
case .e:
// Generate ephemeral key (or use predetermined key for tests)
if let predetermined = predeterminedEphemeralKey {
localEphemeralPrivate = predetermined
predeterminedEphemeralKey = nil
} else {
localEphemeralPrivate = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
}
// Generate ephemeral key
localEphemeralPrivate = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
localEphemeralPublic = localEphemeralPrivate!.publicKey
messageBuffer.append(localEphemeralPublic!.rawRepresentation)
symmetricState.mixHash(localEphemeralPublic!.rawRepresentation)
@@ -651,7 +579,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
KeychainManager.secureClear(&sharedData)
case .es:
// DH(ephemeral, static) - direction depends on role
@@ -661,20 +589,14 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localEphemeral.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteStatic)
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
} else {
guard let localStatic = localStaticPrivate,
let remoteEphemeral = remoteEphemeralPublic else {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localStatic.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteEphemeral)
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
}
case .se:
@@ -685,20 +607,14 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localStatic.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteEphemeral)
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
} else {
guard let localEphemeral = localEphemeralPrivate,
let remoteStatic = remoteStaticPublic else {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localEphemeral.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteStatic)
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
}
case .ss:
@@ -711,7 +627,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
KeychainManager.secureClear(&sharedData)
}
}
@@ -728,7 +644,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
guard currentPattern < messagePatterns.count else {
throw NoiseError.handshakeComplete
}
var buffer = message
let patterns = messagePatterns[currentPattern]
@@ -745,7 +661,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
do {
remoteEphemeralPublic = try NoiseHandshakeState.validatePublicKey(ephemeralData)
} catch {
SecureLogger.warning("Invalid ephemeral public key received", category: .security)
SecureLogger.log("Invalid ephemeral public key received", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .warning)
throw NoiseError.invalidMessage
}
symmetricState.mixHash(ephemeralData)
@@ -762,7 +678,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
let decrypted = try symmetricState.decryptAndHash(staticData)
remoteStaticPublic = try NoiseHandshakeState.validatePublicKey(decrypted)
} catch {
SecureLogger.error(.authenticationFailed(peerID: "Unknown - handshake"))
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.authenticationFailed(peerID: "Unknown - handshake"), level: .error)
throw NoiseError.authenticationFailure
}
@@ -787,11 +703,8 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localEphemeral.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteEphemeral)
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
case .es:
if role == .initiator {
guard let localEphemeral = localEphemeralPrivate,
@@ -802,7 +715,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
KeychainManager.secureClear(&sharedData)
} else {
guard let localStatic = localStaticPrivate,
let remoteEphemeral = remoteEphemeralPublic else {
@@ -812,7 +725,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
KeychainManager.secureClear(&sharedData)
}
case .se:
@@ -825,7 +738,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
KeychainManager.secureClear(&sharedData)
} else {
guard let localEphemeral = localEphemeralPrivate,
let remoteStatic = remoteStaticPublic else {
@@ -835,7 +748,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
KeychainManager.secureClear(&sharedData)
}
case .ss:
@@ -844,12 +757,9 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
throw NoiseError.missingKeys
}
let shared = try localStatic.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(with: remoteStatic)
var sharedData = shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
symmetricState.mixKey(sharedData)
// Clear sensitive shared secret
keychain.secureClear(&sharedData)
case .e, .s:
symmetricState.mixKey(shared.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) })
default:
break
}
}
@@ -858,20 +768,16 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
return currentPattern >= messagePatterns.count
}
func getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: Bool) throws -> (send: NoiseCipherState, receive: NoiseCipherState, handshakeHash: Data) {
func getTransportCiphers() throws -> (send: NoiseCipherState, receive: NoiseCipherState) {
guard isHandshakeComplete() else {
throw NoiseError.handshakeNotComplete
}
// BCH-01-010: Capture handshake hash BEFORE split() clears symmetric state
let finalHandshakeHash = symmetricState.getHandshakeHash()
let (c1, c2) = symmetricState.split(useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
let (c1, c2) = symmetricState.split()
// Initiator uses c1 for sending, c2 for receiving
// Responder uses c2 for sending, c1 for receiving
let ciphers = role == .initiator ? (c1, c2) : (c2, c1)
return (send: ciphers.0, receive: ciphers.1, handshakeHash: finalHandshakeHash)
return role == .initiator ? (c1, c2) : (c2, c1)
}
func getRemoteStaticPublicKey() -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? {
@@ -881,20 +787,6 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
func getHandshakeHash() -> Data {
return symmetricState.getHandshakeHash()
}
#if DEBUG
func performDHOperationForTesting(_ pattern: NoiseMessagePattern) throws {
try performDHOperation(pattern)
}
func setCurrentPatternForTesting(_ currentPattern: Int) {
self.currentPattern = currentPattern
}
func setRemoteEphemeralPublicKeyForTesting(_ key: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey?) {
self.remoteEphemeralPublic = key
}
#endif
}
// MARK: - Pattern Extensions
@@ -905,7 +797,6 @@ extension NoisePattern {
case .XX: return "XX"
case .IK: return "IK"
case .NK: return "NK"
case .X: return "X"
}
}
@@ -927,10 +818,6 @@ extension NoisePattern {
[.e, .es], // -> e, es
[.e, .ee] // <- e, ee
]
case .X:
return [
[.e, .es, .s, .ss] // -> e, es, s, ss (single one-way message)
]
}
}
}
@@ -951,47 +838,22 @@ enum NoiseError: Error {
case nonceExceeded
}
// MARK: - Constant-Time Operations
/// BCH-01-010: Constant-time comparison to prevent timing side-channel attacks
/// This function compares two Data objects in constant time, preventing
/// information leakage via timing analysis.
private func constantTimeCompare(_ a: Data, _ b: Data) -> Bool {
guard a.count == b.count else { return false }
var result: UInt8 = 0
for i in 0..<a.count {
result |= a[a.startIndex.advanced(by: i)] ^ b[b.startIndex.advanced(by: i)]
}
return result == 0
}
/// BCH-01-010: Constant-time check if all bytes are zero
private func constantTimeIsZero(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
var result: UInt8 = 0
for byte in data {
result |= byte
}
return result == 0
}
// MARK: - Key Validation
extension NoiseHandshakeState {
/// Validate a Curve25519 public key
/// Checks for weak/invalid keys that could compromise security
/// BCH-01-010: Uses constant-time operations to prevent timing side-channels
static func validatePublicKey(_ keyData: Data) throws -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey {
// Check key length
guard keyData.count == 32 else {
throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
}
// BCH-01-010: Constant-time check for all-zero key (point at infinity)
if constantTimeIsZero(keyData) {
// Check for all-zero key (point at infinity)
if keyData.allSatisfy({ $0 == 0 }) {
throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
}
// Check for low-order points that could enable small subgroup attacks
// These are the known bad points for Curve25519
let lowOrderPoints: [Data] = [
@@ -1012,28 +874,20 @@ extension NoiseHandshakeState {
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff]) // Another bad point
]
// BCH-01-010: Constant-time check against known bad points
// We check all points and accumulate matches to avoid early exit timing leaks
var foundBadPoint = false
for badPoint in lowOrderPoints {
if constantTimeCompare(keyData, badPoint) {
foundBadPoint = true
}
}
if foundBadPoint {
SecureLogger.warning("Low-order point detected", category: .security)
// Check against known bad points
if lowOrderPoints.contains(keyData) {
SecureLogger.log("Low-order point detected", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .warning)
throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
}
// Try to create the key - CryptoKit will validate curve points internally
do {
let publicKey = try Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey(rawRepresentation: keyData)
return publicKey
} catch {
// If CryptoKit rejects it, it's invalid
SecureLogger.warning("CryptoKit validation failed", category: .security)
SecureLogger.log("CryptoKit validation failed", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .warning)
throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
}
}
-96
View File
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
//
// NoiseRateLimiter.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitLogger
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
final class NoiseRateLimiter {
private var handshakeTimestamps: [PeerID: [Date]] = [:]
private var messageTimestamps: [PeerID: [Date]] = [:]
// Global rate limiting
private var globalHandshakeTimestamps: [Date] = []
private var globalMessageTimestamps: [Date] = []
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.ratelimit", attributes: .concurrent)
func allowHandshake(from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
return queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
let now = Date()
let oneMinuteAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-60)
// Check global rate limit first
globalHandshakeTimestamps = globalHandshakeTimestamps.filter { $0 > oneMinuteAgo }
if globalHandshakeTimestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute {
SecureLogger.warning("Global handshake rate limit exceeded: \(globalHandshakeTimestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute) per minute", category: .security)
return false
}
// Check per-peer rate limit
var timestamps = handshakeTimestamps[peerID] ?? []
timestamps = timestamps.filter { $0 > oneMinuteAgo }
if timestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakesPerMinute {
SecureLogger.warning("Per-peer handshake rate limit exceeded for \(peerID): \(timestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakesPerMinute) per minute", category: .security)
return false
}
// Record new handshake
timestamps.append(now)
handshakeTimestamps[peerID] = timestamps
globalHandshakeTimestamps.append(now)
return true
}
}
func allowMessage(from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
return queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
let now = Date()
let oneSecondAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-1)
// Check global rate limit first
globalMessageTimestamps = globalMessageTimestamps.filter { $0 > oneSecondAgo }
if globalMessageTimestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond {
SecureLogger.warning("Global message rate limit exceeded: \(globalMessageTimestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond) per second", category: .security)
return false
}
// Check per-peer rate limit
var timestamps = messageTimestamps[peerID] ?? []
timestamps = timestamps.filter { $0 > oneSecondAgo }
if timestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSecond {
SecureLogger.warning("Per-peer message rate limit exceeded for \(peerID): \(timestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSecond) per second", category: .security)
return false
}
// Record new message
timestamps.append(now)
messageTimestamps[peerID] = timestamps
globalMessageTimestamps.append(now)
return true
}
}
func reset(for peerID: PeerID) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.handshakeTimestamps.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
self.messageTimestamps.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
}
func resetAll() {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.handshakeTimestamps.removeAll()
self.messageTimestamps.removeAll()
self.globalHandshakeTimestamps.removeAll()
self.globalMessageTimestamps.removeAll()
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
//
// NoiseSecurityConsiderations.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
// MARK: - Security Constants
enum NoiseSecurityConstants {
// Maximum message size to prevent memory exhaustion
static let maxMessageSize = 65535 // 64KB as per Noise spec
// Maximum handshake message size
static let maxHandshakeMessageSize = 2048 // 2KB to accommodate XX pattern
// Session timeout - sessions older than this should be renegotiated
static let sessionTimeout: TimeInterval = 86400 // 24 hours
// Maximum number of messages before rekey (2^64 - 1 is the nonce limit)
static let maxMessagesPerSession: UInt64 = 1_000_000_000 // 1 billion messages
// Handshake timeout - abandon incomplete handshakes
static let handshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 60 // 1 minute
// Maximum concurrent sessions per peer
static let maxSessionsPerPeer = 3
// Rate limiting
static let maxHandshakesPerMinute = 10
static let maxMessagesPerSecond = 100
// Global rate limiting (across all peers)
static let maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute = 30
static let maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond = 500
}
// MARK: - Security Validations
struct NoiseSecurityValidator {
/// Validate message size
static func validateMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
}
/// Validate handshake message size
static func validateHandshakeMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakeMessageSize
}
/// Validate peer ID format using unified validator
static func validatePeerID(_ peerID: String) -> Bool {
return InputValidator.validatePeerID(peerID)
}
}
// MARK: - Enhanced Noise Session with Security
class SecureNoiseSession: NoiseSession {
private(set) var messageCount: UInt64 = 0
private let sessionStartTime = Date()
private(set) var lastActivityTime = Date()
override func encrypt(_ plaintext: Data) throws -> Data {
// Check session age
if Date().timeIntervalSince(sessionStartTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
}
// Check message count
if messageCount >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSession {
throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExhausted
}
// Validate message size
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(plaintext) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
let encrypted = try super.encrypt(plaintext)
messageCount += 1
lastActivityTime = Date()
return encrypted
}
override func decrypt(_ ciphertext: Data) throws -> Data {
// Check session age
if Date().timeIntervalSince(sessionStartTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
}
// Validate message size
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(ciphertext) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
let decrypted = try super.decrypt(ciphertext)
lastActivityTime = Date()
return decrypted
}
func needsRenegotiation() -> Bool {
// Check if we've used more than 90% of message limit
let messageThreshold = UInt64(Double(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSession) * 0.9)
if messageCount >= messageThreshold {
return true
}
// Check if last activity was more than 30 minutes ago
if Date().timeIntervalSince(lastActivityTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
return true
}
return false
}
// MARK: - Testing Support
#if DEBUG
func setLastActivityTimeForTesting(_ date: Date) {
lastActivityTime = date
}
func setMessageCountForTesting(_ count: UInt64) {
messageCount = count
}
#endif
}
// MARK: - Rate Limiter
class NoiseRateLimiter {
private var handshakeTimestamps: [String: [Date]] = [:] // peerID -> timestamps
private var messageTimestamps: [String: [Date]] = [:] // peerID -> timestamps
// Global rate limiting
private var globalHandshakeTimestamps: [Date] = []
private var globalMessageTimestamps: [Date] = []
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.ratelimit", attributes: .concurrent)
func allowHandshake(from peerID: String) -> Bool {
return queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
let now = Date()
let oneMinuteAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-60)
// Check global rate limit first
globalHandshakeTimestamps = globalHandshakeTimestamps.filter { $0 > oneMinuteAgo }
if globalHandshakeTimestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute {
SecureLogger.log("Global handshake rate limit exceeded: \(globalHandshakeTimestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute) per minute", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .warning)
return false
}
// Check per-peer rate limit
var timestamps = handshakeTimestamps[peerID] ?? []
timestamps = timestamps.filter { $0 > oneMinuteAgo }
if timestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakesPerMinute {
SecureLogger.log("Per-peer handshake rate limit exceeded for \(peerID): \(timestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakesPerMinute) per minute", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .warning)
return false
}
// Record new handshake
timestamps.append(now)
handshakeTimestamps[peerID] = timestamps
globalHandshakeTimestamps.append(now)
return true
}
}
func allowMessage(from peerID: String) -> Bool {
return queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
let now = Date()
let oneSecondAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-1)
// Check global rate limit first
globalMessageTimestamps = globalMessageTimestamps.filter { $0 > oneSecondAgo }
if globalMessageTimestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond {
SecureLogger.log("Global message rate limit exceeded: \(globalMessageTimestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond) per second", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .warning)
return false
}
// Check per-peer rate limit
var timestamps = messageTimestamps[peerID] ?? []
timestamps = timestamps.filter { $0 > oneSecondAgo }
if timestamps.count >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSecond {
SecureLogger.log("Per-peer message rate limit exceeded for \(peerID): \(timestamps.count)/\(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSecond) per second", category: SecureLogger.security, level: .warning)
return false
}
// Record new message
timestamps.append(now)
messageTimestamps[peerID] = timestamps
globalMessageTimestamps.append(now)
return true
}
}
func reset(for peerID: String) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.handshakeTimestamps.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
self.messageTimestamps.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
}
}
// MARK: - Security Errors
enum NoiseSecurityError: Error {
case sessionExpired
case sessionExhausted
case messageTooLarge
case invalidPeerID
case rateLimitExceeded
case handshakeTimeout
}
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
//
// NoiseSecurityConstants.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
enum NoiseSecurityConstants {
// Maximum message size to prevent memory exhaustion
static let maxMessageSize = 65535 // 64KB as per Noise spec
// Maximum handshake message size
static let maxHandshakeMessageSize = 2048 // 2KB to accommodate XX pattern
// Session timeout - sessions older than this should be renegotiated
static let sessionTimeout: TimeInterval = 86400 // 24 hours
// Maximum number of messages before rekey (2^64 - 1 is the nonce limit)
static let maxMessagesPerSession: UInt64 = 1_000_000_000 // 1 billion messages
// Handshake timeout - abandon incomplete handshakes
static let handshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 60 // 1 minute
// Maximum concurrent sessions per peer
static let maxSessionsPerPeer = 3
// Rate limiting
static let maxHandshakesPerMinute = 10
static let maxMessagesPerSecond = 100
// Global rate limiting (across all peers)
static let maxGlobalHandshakesPerMinute = 30
static let maxGlobalMessagesPerSecond = 500
}
-18
View File
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
//
// NoiseSecurityError.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
enum NoiseSecurityError: Error {
case sessionExpired
case sessionExhausted
case messageTooLarge
case invalidPeerID
case rateLimitExceeded
case handshakeTimeout
}
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
//
// NoiseSecurityValidator.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
struct NoiseSecurityValidator {
/// Validate message size
static func validateMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
}
/// Validate handshake message size
static func validateHandshakeMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxHandshakeMessageSize
}
}
+287 -40
View File
@@ -6,15 +6,37 @@
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitLogger
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
import BitFoundation
import os.log
// MARK: - Noise Session State
enum NoiseSessionState: Equatable {
case uninitialized
case handshaking
case established
case failed(Error)
static func == (lhs: NoiseSessionState, rhs: NoiseSessionState) -> Bool {
switch (lhs, rhs) {
case (.uninitialized, .uninitialized),
(.handshaking, .handshaking),
(.established, .established):
return true
case (.failed, .failed):
return true // We don't compare the errors
default:
return false
}
}
}
// MARK: - Noise Session
class NoiseSession {
let peerID: PeerID
let peerID: String
let role: NoiseRole
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
private var state: NoiseSessionState = .uninitialized
private var handshakeState: NoiseHandshakeState?
private var sendCipher: NoiseCipherState?
@@ -31,16 +53,9 @@ class NoiseSession {
// Thread safety
private let sessionQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.session", attributes: .concurrent)
init(
peerID: PeerID,
role: NoiseRole,
keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey,
remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? = nil
) {
init(peerID: String, role: NoiseRole, localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey, remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? = nil) {
self.peerID = peerID
self.role = role
self.keychain = keychain
self.localStaticKey = localStaticKey
self.remoteStaticPublicKey = remoteStaticKey
}
@@ -57,7 +72,6 @@ class NoiseSession {
handshakeState = NoiseHandshakeState(
role: role,
pattern: .XX,
keychain: keychain,
localStaticKey: localStaticKey,
remoteStaticKey: nil
)
@@ -78,19 +92,18 @@ class NoiseSession {
func processHandshakeMessage(_ message: Data) throws -> Data? {
return try sessionQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
SecureLogger.debug("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Processing handshake message, current state: \(state), role: \(role)")
SecureLogger.log("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Processing handshake message, current state: \(state), role: \(role)", category: SecureLogger.noise, level: .debug)
// Initialize handshake state if needed (for responders)
if state == .uninitialized && role == .responder {
handshakeState = NoiseHandshakeState(
role: role,
pattern: .XX,
keychain: keychain,
localStaticKey: localStaticKey,
remoteStaticKey: nil
)
state = .handshaking
SecureLogger.debug("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Initialized handshake state for responder")
SecureLogger.log("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Initialized handshake state for responder", category: SecureLogger.noise, level: .debug)
}
guard case .handshaking = state, let handshake = handshakeState else {
@@ -99,52 +112,52 @@ class NoiseSession {
// Process incoming message
_ = try handshake.readMessage(message)
SecureLogger.debug("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Read handshake message, checking if complete")
SecureLogger.log("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Read handshake message, checking if complete", category: SecureLogger.noise, level: .debug)
// Check if handshake is complete
if handshake.isHandshakeComplete() {
// Get transport ciphers and handshake hash (hash captured before split clears state)
let (send, receive, hash) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
// Get transport ciphers
let (send, receive) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers()
sendCipher = send
receiveCipher = receive
// Store remote static key
remoteStaticPublicKey = handshake.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
// Store handshake hash for channel binding
handshakeHash = hash
handshakeHash = handshake.getHandshakeHash()
state = .established
handshakeState = nil // Clear handshake state
SecureLogger.debug("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Handshake complete (no response needed), transitioning to established")
SecureLogger.info(.handshakeCompleted(peerID: peerID.id))
SecureLogger.log("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Handshake complete (no response needed), transitioning to established", category: SecureLogger.noise, level: .debug)
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.handshakeCompleted(peerID: peerID))
return nil
} else {
// Generate response
let response = try handshake.writeMessage()
sentHandshakeMessages.append(response)
SecureLogger.debug("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Generated handshake response of size \(response.count)")
SecureLogger.log("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Generated handshake response of size \(response.count)", category: SecureLogger.noise, level: .debug)
// Check if handshake is complete after writing
if handshake.isHandshakeComplete() {
// Get transport ciphers and handshake hash (hash captured before split clears state)
let (send, receive, hash) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
// Get transport ciphers
let (send, receive) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers()
sendCipher = send
receiveCipher = receive
// Store remote static key
remoteStaticPublicKey = handshake.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
// Store handshake hash for channel binding
handshakeHash = hash
handshakeHash = handshake.getHandshakeHash()
state = .established
handshakeState = nil // Clear handshake state
SecureLogger.debug("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Handshake complete after writing response, transitioning to established")
SecureLogger.info(.handshakeCompleted(peerID: peerID.id))
SecureLogger.log("NoiseSession[\(peerID)]: Handshake complete after writing response, transitioning to established", category: SecureLogger.noise, level: .debug)
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.handshakeCompleted(peerID: peerID))
}
return response
@@ -197,6 +210,12 @@ class NoiseSession {
}
}
func getHandshakeHash() -> Data? {
return sessionQueue.sync {
return handshakeHash
}
}
func reset() {
sessionQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
let wasEstablished = state == .established
@@ -212,19 +231,247 @@ class NoiseSession {
// Clear sent handshake messages
for i in 0..<sentHandshakeMessages.count {
var message = sentHandshakeMessages[i]
keychain.secureClear(&message)
KeychainManager.secureClear(&message)
}
sentHandshakeMessages.removeAll()
// Clear handshake hash
if var hash = handshakeHash {
keychain.secureClear(&hash)
KeychainManager.secureClear(&hash)
}
handshakeHash = nil
if wasEstablished {
SecureLogger.info(.sessionExpired(peerID: peerID.id))
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.sessionExpired(peerID: peerID))
}
}
}
}
// MARK: - Session Manager
class NoiseSessionManager {
private var sessions: [String: NoiseSession] = [:]
private let localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey
private let managerQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.manager", attributes: .concurrent)
// Callbacks
var onSessionEstablished: ((String, Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey) -> Void)?
var onSessionFailed: ((String, Error) -> Void)?
init(localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey) {
self.localStaticKey = localStaticKey
}
// MARK: - Session Management
func createSession(for peerID: String, role: NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession {
return managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
let session = SecureNoiseSession(
peerID: peerID,
role: role,
localStaticKey: localStaticKey
)
sessions[peerID] = session
return session
}
}
func getSession(for peerID: String) -> NoiseSession? {
return managerQueue.sync {
return sessions[peerID]
}
}
func removeSession(for peerID: String) {
managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
if let session = sessions[peerID] {
if session.isEstablished() {
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.sessionExpired(peerID: peerID))
}
// Clear sensitive data before removing
session.reset()
}
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
}
func getEstablishedSessions() -> [String: NoiseSession] {
return managerQueue.sync {
return sessions.filter { $0.value.isEstablished() }
}
}
// MARK: - Handshake Helpers
func initiateHandshake(with peerID: String) throws -> Data {
return try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
// Check if we already have an established session
if let existingSession = sessions[peerID], existingSession.isEstablished() {
// Session already established, don't recreate
throw NoiseSessionError.alreadyEstablished
}
// Remove any existing non-established session
if let existingSession = sessions[peerID], !existingSession.isEstablished() {
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
// Create new initiator session
let session = SecureNoiseSession(
peerID: peerID,
role: .initiator,
localStaticKey: localStaticKey
)
sessions[peerID] = session
do {
let handshakeData = try session.startHandshake()
return handshakeData
} catch {
// Clean up failed session
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.handshakeFailed(peerID: peerID, error: error.localizedDescription), level: .error)
throw error
}
}
}
func handleIncomingHandshake(from peerID: String, message: Data) throws -> Data? {
// Process everything within the synchronized block to prevent race conditions
return try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
var shouldCreateNew = false
var existingSession: NoiseSession? = nil
if let existing = sessions[peerID] {
// If we have an established session, the peer must have cleared their session
// for a good reason (e.g., decryption failure, restart, etc.)
// We should accept the new handshake to re-establish encryption
if existing.isEstablished() {
SecureLogger.log("Accepting handshake from \(peerID) despite existing session - peer likely cleared their session",
category: SecureLogger.session, level: .info)
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
shouldCreateNew = true
} else {
// If we're in the middle of a handshake and receive a new initiation,
// reset and start fresh (the other side may have restarted)
if existing.getState() == .handshaking && message.count == 32 {
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
shouldCreateNew = true
} else {
existingSession = existing
}
}
} else {
shouldCreateNew = true
}
// Get or create session
let session: NoiseSession
if shouldCreateNew {
let newSession = SecureNoiseSession(
peerID: peerID,
role: .responder,
localStaticKey: localStaticKey
)
sessions[peerID] = newSession
session = newSession
} else {
session = existingSession!
}
// Process the handshake message within the synchronized block
do {
let response = try session.processHandshakeMessage(message)
// Check if session is established after processing
if session.isEstablished() {
if let remoteKey = session.getRemoteStaticPublicKey() {
// Schedule callback outside the synchronized block to prevent deadlock
DispatchQueue.global().async { [weak self] in
self?.onSessionEstablished?(peerID, remoteKey)
}
}
}
return response
} catch {
// Reset the session on handshake failure so next attempt can start fresh
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
// Schedule callback outside the synchronized block to prevent deadlock
DispatchQueue.global().async { [weak self] in
self?.onSessionFailed?(peerID, error)
}
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.handshakeFailed(peerID: peerID, error: error.localizedDescription), level: .error)
throw error
}
}
}
// MARK: - Encryption/Decryption
func encrypt(_ plaintext: Data, for peerID: String) throws -> Data {
guard let session = getSession(for: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSessionError.sessionNotFound
}
return try session.encrypt(plaintext)
}
func decrypt(_ ciphertext: Data, from peerID: String) throws -> Data {
guard let session = getSession(for: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSessionError.sessionNotFound
}
return try session.decrypt(ciphertext)
}
// MARK: - Key Management
func getRemoteStaticKey(for peerID: String) -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? {
return getSession(for: peerID)?.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
}
func getHandshakeHash(for peerID: String) -> Data? {
return getSession(for: peerID)?.getHandshakeHash()
}
// MARK: - Session Rekeying
func getSessionsNeedingRekey() -> [(peerID: String, needsRekey: Bool)] {
return managerQueue.sync {
var needingRekey: [(peerID: String, needsRekey: Bool)] = []
for (peerID, session) in sessions {
if let secureSession = session as? SecureNoiseSession,
secureSession.isEstablished(),
secureSession.needsRenegotiation() {
needingRekey.append((peerID: peerID, needsRekey: true))
}
}
return needingRekey
}
}
func initiateRekey(for peerID: String) throws {
// Remove old session
removeSession(for: peerID)
// Initiate new handshake
_ = try initiateHandshake(with: peerID)
}
}
// MARK: - Errors
enum NoiseSessionError: Error {
case invalidState
case notEstablished
case sessionNotFound
case handshakeFailed(Error)
case alreadyEstablished
}
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
//
// NoiseSessionError.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
enum NoiseSessionError: Error, Equatable {
case invalidState
case notEstablished
case sessionNotFound
case alreadyEstablished
}
-223
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@@ -1,223 +0,0 @@
//
// NoiseSessionManager.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitLogger
import CryptoKit
import Foundation
import BitFoundation
final class NoiseSessionManager {
private var sessions: [PeerID: NoiseSession] = [:]
private let localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
private let sessionFactory: (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
private let managerQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.manager", attributes: .concurrent)
// Callbacks
var onSessionEstablished: ((PeerID, Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey) -> Void)?
var onSessionFailed: ((PeerID, Error) -> Void)?
init(localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey, keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
self.localStaticKey = localStaticKey
self.keychain = keychain
self.sessionFactory = { peerID, role in
SecureNoiseSession(
peerID: peerID,
role: role,
keychain: keychain,
localStaticKey: localStaticKey
)
}
}
#if DEBUG
init(
localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey,
keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
sessionFactory: @escaping (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
) {
self.localStaticKey = localStaticKey
self.keychain = keychain
self.sessionFactory = sessionFactory
}
#endif
// MARK: - Session Management
func getSession(for peerID: PeerID) -> NoiseSession? {
return managerQueue.sync {
return sessions[peerID]
}
}
func removeSession(for peerID: PeerID) {
managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
if let session = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
session.reset() // Clear sensitive data before removing
}
}
}
func removeAllSessions() {
managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
for (_, session) in sessions {
session.reset()
}
sessions.removeAll()
}
}
// MARK: - Handshake Helpers
func initiateHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
return try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
// Check if we already have an established session
if let existingSession = sessions[peerID], existingSession.isEstablished() {
// Session already established, don't recreate
throw NoiseSessionError.alreadyEstablished
}
// Remove any existing non-established session
if let existingSession = sessions[peerID], !existingSession.isEstablished() {
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
// Create new initiator session
let session = sessionFactory(peerID, .initiator)
sessions[peerID] = session
do {
let handshakeData = try session.startHandshake()
return handshakeData
} catch {
// Clean up failed session
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
SecureLogger.error(.handshakeFailed(peerID: peerID.id, error: error.localizedDescription))
throw error
}
}
}
func handleIncomingHandshake(from peerID: PeerID, message: Data) throws -> Data? {
// Process everything within the synchronized block to prevent race conditions
return try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
var shouldCreateNew = false
var existingSession: NoiseSession? = nil
if let existing = sessions[peerID] {
// If we have an established session, the peer must have cleared their session
// for a good reason (e.g., decryption failure, restart, etc.)
// We should accept the new handshake to re-establish encryption
if existing.isEstablished() {
SecureLogger.info("Accepting handshake from \(peerID) despite existing session - peer likely cleared their session", category: .session)
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
shouldCreateNew = true
} else {
// If we're in the middle of a handshake and receive a new initiation,
// reset and start fresh (the other side may have restarted)
if existing.getState() == .handshaking && message.count == 32 {
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
shouldCreateNew = true
} else {
existingSession = existing
}
}
} else {
shouldCreateNew = true
}
// Get or create session
let session: NoiseSession
if shouldCreateNew {
let newSession = sessionFactory(peerID, .responder)
sessions[peerID] = newSession
session = newSession
} else {
session = existingSession!
}
// Process the handshake message within the synchronized block
do {
let response = try session.processHandshakeMessage(message)
// Check if session is established after processing
if session.isEstablished() {
if let remoteKey = session.getRemoteStaticPublicKey() {
// Schedule callback outside the synchronized block to prevent deadlock
DispatchQueue.global().async { [weak self] in
self?.onSessionEstablished?(peerID, remoteKey)
}
}
}
return response
} catch {
// Reset the session on handshake failure so next attempt can start fresh
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
// Schedule callback outside the synchronized block to prevent deadlock
DispatchQueue.global().async { [weak self] in
self?.onSessionFailed?(peerID, error)
}
SecureLogger.error(.handshakeFailed(peerID: peerID.id, error: error.localizedDescription))
throw error
}
}
}
// MARK: - Encryption/Decryption
func encrypt(_ plaintext: Data, for peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
guard let session = getSession(for: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSessionError.sessionNotFound
}
return try session.encrypt(plaintext)
}
func decrypt(_ ciphertext: Data, from peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
guard let session = getSession(for: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSessionError.sessionNotFound
}
return try session.decrypt(ciphertext)
}
// MARK: - Key Management
func getRemoteStaticKey(for peerID: PeerID) -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? {
return getSession(for: peerID)?.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
}
// MARK: - Session Rekeying
func getSessionsNeedingRekey() -> [(peerID: PeerID, needsRekey: Bool)] {
return managerQueue.sync {
var needingRekey: [(peerID: PeerID, needsRekey: Bool)] = []
for (peerID, session) in sessions {
if let secureSession = session as? SecureNoiseSession,
secureSession.isEstablished(),
secureSession.needsRenegotiation() {
needingRekey.append((peerID: peerID, needsRekey: true))
}
}
return needingRekey
}
}
func initiateRekey(for peerID: PeerID) throws {
// Remove old session
removeSession(for: peerID)
// Initiate new handshake
_ = try initiateHandshake(with: peerID)
}
}
-13
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
//
// NoiseSessionState.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
enum NoiseSessionState: Equatable {
case uninitialized
case handshaking
case established
}
-85
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@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
//
// SecureNoiseSession.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
final class SecureNoiseSession: NoiseSession {
private(set) var messageCount: UInt64 = 0
private var sessionStartTime = Date()
private(set) var lastActivityTime = Date()
override func encrypt(_ plaintext: Data) throws -> Data {
// Check session age
if Date().timeIntervalSince(sessionStartTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
}
// Check message count
if messageCount >= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSession {
throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExhausted
}
// Validate message size
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(plaintext) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
let encrypted = try super.encrypt(plaintext)
messageCount += 1
lastActivityTime = Date()
return encrypted
}
override func decrypt(_ ciphertext: Data) throws -> Data {
// Check session age
if Date().timeIntervalSince(sessionStartTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
}
// Validate message size
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(ciphertext) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
let decrypted = try super.decrypt(ciphertext)
lastActivityTime = Date()
return decrypted
}
func needsRenegotiation() -> Bool {
// Check if we've used more than 90% of message limit
let messageThreshold = UInt64(Double(NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSession) * 0.9)
if messageCount >= messageThreshold {
return true
}
// Check if last activity was more than 30 minutes ago
if Date().timeIntervalSince(lastActivityTime) > NoiseSecurityConstants.sessionTimeout {
return true
}
return false
}
// MARK: - Testing Support
#if DEBUG
func setLastActivityTimeForTesting(_ date: Date) {
lastActivityTime = date
}
func setMessageCountForTesting(_ count: UInt64) {
messageCount = count
}
func setSessionStartTimeForTesting(_ date: Date) {
sessionStartTime = date
}
#endif
}
-22
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@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
enum Base64URLCoding {
static func encode(_ data: Data) -> String {
data.base64EncodedString()
.replacingOccurrences(of: "+", with: "-")
.replacingOccurrences(of: "/", with: "_")
.replacingOccurrences(of: "=", with: "")
}
static func decode(_ string: String) -> Data? {
var base64 = string
let padding = (4 - (base64.count % 4)) % 4
if padding > 0 {
base64 += String(repeating: "=", count: padding)
}
base64 = base64
.replacingOccurrences(of: "-", with: "+")
.replacingOccurrences(of: "_", with: "/")
return Data(base64Encoded: base64)
}
}
-135
View File
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
/// Bech32 encoding for Nostr (minimal implementation)
enum Bech32 {
private static let charset = "qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l"
private static let generator = [0x3b6a57b2, 0x26508e6d, 0x1ea119fa, 0x3d4233dd, 0x2a1462b3]
static func encode(hrp: String, data: Data) throws -> String {
let values = convertBits(from: 8, to: 5, pad: true, data: Array(data))
let checksum = createChecksum(hrp: hrp, values: values)
let combined = values + checksum
return hrp + "1" + combined.map {
let index = charset.index(charset.startIndex, offsetBy: Int($0))
return String(charset[index])
}.joined()
}
static func decode(_ bech32String: String) throws -> (hrp: String, data: Data) {
// Find the last occurrence of '1'
guard let separatorIndex = bech32String.lastIndex(of: "1") else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidFormat
}
let hrp = String(bech32String[..<separatorIndex])
// Validate HRP contains only ASCII characters
for char in hrp {
guard char.asciiValue != nil else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidCharacter
}
}
let dataString = String(bech32String[bech32String.index(after: separatorIndex)...])
// Convert characters to values
var values = [UInt8]()
for char in dataString {
guard let index = charset.firstIndex(of: char) else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidCharacter
}
values.append(UInt8(charset.distance(from: charset.startIndex, to: index)))
}
// Verify checksum
guard values.count >= 6 else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidChecksum
}
let payloadValues = Array(values.dropLast(6))
let checksum = Array(values.suffix(6))
let expectedChecksum = createChecksum(hrp: hrp, values: payloadValues)
guard checksum == expectedChecksum else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidChecksum
}
// Convert back to bytes
let bytes = convertBits(from: 5, to: 8, pad: false, data: payloadValues)
return (hrp: hrp, data: Data(bytes))
}
enum Bech32Error: Error {
case invalidFormat
case invalidCharacter
case invalidChecksum
}
private static func convertBits(from: Int, to: Int, pad: Bool, data: [UInt8]) -> [UInt8] {
var acc = 0
var bits = 0
var result = [UInt8]()
let maxv = (1 << to) - 1
for value in data {
acc = (acc << from) | Int(value)
bits += from
while bits >= to {
bits -= to
result.append(UInt8((acc >> bits) & maxv))
}
}
if pad && bits > 0 {
result.append(UInt8((acc << (to - bits)) & maxv))
}
return result
}
private static func createChecksum(hrp: String, values: [UInt8]) -> [UInt8] {
let checksumValues = hrpExpand(hrp) + values + [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
let polymod = polymod(checksumValues) ^ 1
var checksum = [UInt8]()
for i in 0..<6 {
checksum.append(UInt8((polymod >> (5 * (5 - i))) & 31))
}
return checksum
}
private static func hrpExpand(_ hrp: String) -> [UInt8] {
var result = [UInt8]()
for c in hrp {
guard let asciiValue = c.asciiValue else {
return [] // Return empty array for invalid input
}
result.append(UInt8(asciiValue >> 5))
}
result.append(0)
for c in hrp {
guard let asciiValue = c.asciiValue else {
return [] // Return empty array for invalid input
}
result.append(UInt8(asciiValue & 31))
}
return result
}
private static func polymod(_ values: [UInt8]) -> Int {
var chk = 1
for value in values {
let b = chk >> 25
chk = (chk & 0x1ffffff) << 5 ^ Int(value)
for i in 0..<5 {
if (b >> i) & 1 == 1 {
chk ^= generator[i]
}
}
}
return chk
}
}
+64 -352
View File
@@ -1,166 +1,26 @@
import BitLogger
import Foundation
import Tor
#if os(iOS)
import UIKit
#elseif os(macOS)
import AppKit
#endif
extension Notification.Name {
/// Posted after the geo relay directory successfully refreshes its entries.
static let geoRelayDirectoryDidRefresh = Notification.Name("bitchat.geoRelayDirectoryDidRefresh")
}
/// Directory of online Nostr relays with approximate GPS locations, used for geohash routing.
struct GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
var userDefaults: UserDefaults
var notificationCenter: NotificationCenter
var now: () -> Date
var remoteURL: URL
var fetchInterval: TimeInterval
var refreshCheckInterval: TimeInterval
var retryInitialSeconds: TimeInterval
var retryMaxSeconds: TimeInterval
var awaitTorReady: @Sendable () async -> Bool
var makeFetchData: @MainActor @Sendable () -> (@Sendable (URLRequest) async throws -> Data)
var readData: (URL) -> Data?
var writeData: (Data, URL) throws -> Void
var cacheURL: () -> URL?
var bundledCSVURLs: () -> [URL]
var currentDirectoryPath: () -> String?
var retrySleep: (TimeInterval) async -> Void
var activeNotificationName: Notification.Name?
var autoStart: Bool
}
private extension GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies {
@MainActor
static func live() -> Self {
#if os(iOS)
let activeNotificationName: Notification.Name? = UIApplication.didBecomeActiveNotification
#elseif os(macOS)
let activeNotificationName: Notification.Name? = NSApplication.didBecomeActiveNotification
#else
let activeNotificationName: Notification.Name? = nil
#endif
return Self(
userDefaults: .standard,
notificationCenter: .default,
now: Date.init,
remoteURL: URL(string: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv")!,
fetchInterval: TransportConfig.geoRelayFetchIntervalSeconds,
refreshCheckInterval: TransportConfig.geoRelayRefreshCheckIntervalSeconds,
retryInitialSeconds: TransportConfig.geoRelayRetryInitialSeconds,
retryMaxSeconds: TransportConfig.geoRelayRetryMaxSeconds,
awaitTorReady: { await TorManager.shared.awaitReady() },
makeFetchData: {
let session = TorURLSession.shared.session
return { request in
let (data, _) = try await session.data(for: request)
return data
}
},
readData: { try? Data(contentsOf: $0) },
writeData: { data, url in
try data.write(to: url, options: .atomic)
},
cacheURL: {
do {
let base = try FileManager.default.url(
for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
in: .userDomainMask,
appropriateFor: nil,
create: true
)
let dir = base.appendingPathComponent("bitchat", isDirectory: true)
try? FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: dir, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
return dir.appendingPathComponent("georelays_cache.csv")
} catch {
return nil
}
},
bundledCSVURLs: {
[
Bundle.main.url(forResource: "nostr_relays", withExtension: "csv"),
Bundle.main.url(forResource: "online_relays_gps", withExtension: "csv"),
Bundle.main.url(forResource: "online_relays_gps", withExtension: "csv", subdirectory: "relays")
].compactMap { $0 }
},
currentDirectoryPath: { FileManager.default.currentDirectoryPath },
retrySleep: { delay in
let nanoseconds = UInt64(delay * 1_000_000_000)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: nanoseconds)
},
activeNotificationName: activeNotificationName,
autoStart: true
)
}
}
@MainActor
final class GeoRelayDirectory {
private final class CleanupState {
let notificationCenter: NotificationCenter
var observers: [NSObjectProtocol] = []
var refreshTimer: Timer?
var retryTask: Task<Void, Never>?
init(notificationCenter: NotificationCenter) {
self.notificationCenter = notificationCenter
}
deinit {
observers.forEach { notificationCenter.removeObserver($0) }
refreshTimer?.invalidate()
retryTask?.cancel()
}
}
struct Entry: Hashable, Sendable {
struct Entry: Hashable {
let host: String
let lat: Double
let lon: Double
}
private enum DetachedFetchOutcome: Sendable {
case success(entries: [Entry], csv: String)
case torNotReady
case invalidData
case network(String)
}
static let shared = GeoRelayDirectory()
private(set) var entries: [Entry] = []
private let cacheFileName = "georelays_cache.csv"
private let lastFetchKey = "georelay.lastFetchAt"
private let dependencies: GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies
private let cleanupState: CleanupState
private var retryAttempt: Int = 0
private var isFetching: Bool = false
private let remoteURL = URL(string: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv")!
private let fetchInterval: TimeInterval = 60 * 60 * 24 // 24h
private init() {
self.dependencies = .live()
self.cleanupState = CleanupState(notificationCenter: dependencies.notificationCenter)
entries = loadLocalEntries()
if dependencies.autoStart {
registerObservers()
startRefreshTimer()
prefetchIfNeeded()
}
}
internal init(dependencies: GeoRelayDirectoryDependencies) {
self.dependencies = dependencies
self.cleanupState = CleanupState(notificationCenter: dependencies.notificationCenter)
entries = loadLocalEntries()
if dependencies.autoStart {
registerObservers()
startRefreshTimer()
prefetchIfNeeded()
}
// Load cached or bundled data synchronously
self.entries = self.loadLocalEntries()
// Fire-and-forget remote refresh if stale
prefetchIfNeeded()
}
/// Returns up to `count` relay URLs (wss://) closest to the geohash center.
@@ -170,263 +30,115 @@ final class GeoRelayDirectory {
}
/// Returns up to `count` relay URLs (wss://) closest to the given coordinate.
/// Ties break by host so every device with the same directory picks the
/// same relay set publishers and subscribers must agree on relays.
func closestRelays(toLat lat: Double, lon: Double, count: Int = 5) -> [String] {
guard !entries.isEmpty, count > 0 else { return [] }
return entries
.map { (entry: $0, distance: haversineKm(lat, lon, $0.lat, $0.lon)) }
.sorted { ($0.distance, $0.entry.host) < ($1.distance, $1.entry.host) }
guard !entries.isEmpty else { return [] }
let sorted = entries
.sorted { a, b in
haversineKm(lat, lon, a.lat, a.lon) < haversineKm(lat, lon, b.lat, b.lon)
}
.prefix(count)
.map { "wss://\($0.entry.host)" }
return sorted.map { "wss://\($0.host)" }
}
// MARK: - Remote Fetch
func prefetchIfNeeded(force: Bool = false) {
guard !isFetching else { return }
let now = dependencies.now()
let last = dependencies.userDefaults.object(forKey: lastFetchKey) as? Date ?? .distantPast
if !force {
guard now.timeIntervalSince(last) >= dependencies.fetchInterval else { return }
} else if last != .distantPast,
now.timeIntervalSince(last) < dependencies.retryInitialSeconds {
// Skip forced fetches if we just refreshed moments ago.
return
}
cancelRetry()
func prefetchIfNeeded() {
let now = Date()
let last = UserDefaults.standard.object(forKey: lastFetchKey) as? Date ?? .distantPast
guard now.timeIntervalSince(last) >= fetchInterval else { return }
fetchRemote()
}
private func fetchRemote() {
guard !isFetching else { return }
isFetching = true
let request = URLRequest(
url: dependencies.remoteURL,
cachePolicy: .reloadIgnoringLocalCacheData,
timeoutInterval: 15
)
let awaitTorReady = dependencies.awaitTorReady
let fetchData = dependencies.makeFetchData()
Task { [weak self] in
guard let self else { return }
let outcome = await Self.fetchRemoteOutcome(
request: request,
awaitTorReady: awaitTorReady,
fetchData: fetchData
)
switch outcome {
case .success(let parsed, let csv):
self.handleFetchSuccess(entries: parsed, csv: csv)
case .torNotReady:
self.handleFetchFailure(.torNotReady)
case .invalidData:
self.handleFetchFailure(.invalidData)
case .network(let description):
self.handleFetchFailure(.network(description))
}
}
}
nonisolated private static func fetchRemoteOutcome(
request: URLRequest,
awaitTorReady: @escaping @Sendable () async -> Bool,
fetchData: @escaping @Sendable (URLRequest) async throws -> Data
) async -> DetachedFetchOutcome {
await Task.detached(priority: .utility) {
let ready = await awaitTorReady()
guard ready else { return .torNotReady }
do {
let data = try await fetchData(request)
guard let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) else {
return .invalidData
let req = URLRequest(url: remoteURL, cachePolicy: .reloadIgnoringLocalCacheData, timeoutInterval: 15)
let task = URLSession.shared.dataTask(with: req) { [weak self] data, _, error in
guard let self = self else { return }
if let data = data, error == nil, let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
let parsed = GeoRelayDirectory.parseCSV(text)
if !parsed.isEmpty {
Task { @MainActor in
self.entries = parsed
self.persistCache(text)
UserDefaults.standard.set(Date(), forKey: self.lastFetchKey)
SecureLogger.log("GeoRelayDirectory: refreshed \(parsed.count) relays from remote", category: SecureLogger.session, level: .info)
}
return
}
let parsed = Self.parseCSV(text)
guard !parsed.isEmpty else {
return .invalidData
}
return .success(entries: parsed, csv: text)
} catch {
return .network(error.localizedDescription)
}
}.value
}
private enum FetchFailure {
case torNotReady
case invalidData
case network(String)
}
@MainActor
private func handleFetchSuccess(entries parsed: [Entry], csv: String) {
entries = parsed
persistCache(csv)
dependencies.userDefaults.set(dependencies.now(), forKey: lastFetchKey)
SecureLogger.info("GeoRelayDirectory: refreshed \(parsed.count) relays from remote", category: .session)
isFetching = false
retryAttempt = 0
cancelRetry()
// Let waiters (e.g. location notes stuck in a "no relays" state) retry.
dependencies.notificationCenter.post(name: .geoRelayDirectoryDidRefresh, object: nil)
}
@MainActor
private func handleFetchFailure(_ reason: FetchFailure) {
switch reason {
case .torNotReady:
SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: Tor not ready; scheduling retry", category: .session)
case .invalidData:
SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: remote fetch returned invalid data; scheduling retry", category: .session)
case .network(let errorDescription):
SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: remote fetch failed with error: \(errorDescription)", category: .session)
SecureLogger.log("GeoRelayDirectory: remote fetch failed; keeping local entries", category: SecureLogger.session, level: .warning)
}
isFetching = false
scheduleRetry()
}
@MainActor
private func scheduleRetry() {
retryAttempt = min(retryAttempt + 1, 10)
let base = dependencies.retryInitialSeconds
let maxDelay = dependencies.retryMaxSeconds
let multiplier = pow(2.0, Double(max(retryAttempt - 1, 0)))
let calculated = base * multiplier
let delay = min(maxDelay, max(base, calculated))
cancelRetry()
cleanupState.retryTask = Task { [weak self] in
guard let self else { return }
await self.dependencies.retrySleep(delay)
guard !Task.isCancelled else { return }
await MainActor.run {
self.prefetchIfNeeded(force: true)
}
}
}
@MainActor
private func cancelRetry() {
cleanupState.retryTask?.cancel()
cleanupState.retryTask = nil
task.resume()
}
private func persistCache(_ text: String) {
guard let url = dependencies.cacheURL() else { return }
guard let data = text.data(using: .utf8) else { return }
guard let url = cacheURL() else { return }
do {
try dependencies.writeData(data, url)
try text.data(using: .utf8)?.write(to: url, options: .atomic)
} catch {
SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: failed to write cache: \(error)", category: .session)
SecureLogger.log("GeoRelayDirectory: failed to write cache: \(error)", category: SecureLogger.session, level: .warning)
}
}
// MARK: - Loading
private func loadLocalEntries() -> [Entry] {
// Prefer cached file if present
if let cache = dependencies.cacheURL(),
let data = dependencies.readData(cache),
if let cache = self.cacheURL(),
let data = try? Data(contentsOf: cache),
let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
let arr = Self.parseCSV(text)
if !arr.isEmpty { return arr }
}
// Try bundled resource(s)
let bundleCandidates = dependencies.bundledCSVURLs()
let bundleCandidates = [
Bundle.main.url(forResource: "nostr_relays", withExtension: "csv"),
Bundle.main.url(forResource: "online_relays_gps", withExtension: "csv"),
Bundle.main.url(forResource: "online_relays_gps", withExtension: "csv", subdirectory: "relays")
].compactMap { $0 }
for url in bundleCandidates {
if let data = dependencies.readData(url),
let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
if let data = try? Data(contentsOf: url), let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
let arr = Self.parseCSV(text)
if !arr.isEmpty { return arr }
}
}
// Try filesystem path (development/test)
if let cwd = dependencies.currentDirectoryPath(),
let data = dependencies.readData(URL(fileURLWithPath: cwd).appendingPathComponent("relays/online_relays_gps.csv")),
if let cwd = FileManager.default.currentDirectoryPath as String?,
let data = try? Data(contentsOf: URL(fileURLWithPath: cwd).appendingPathComponent("relays/online_relays_gps.csv")),
let text = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
return Self.parseCSV(text)
}
SecureLogger.warning("GeoRelayDirectory: no local CSV found; entries empty", category: .session)
SecureLogger.log("GeoRelayDirectory: no local CSV found; entries empty", category: SecureLogger.session, level: .warning)
return []
}
nonisolated static func parseCSV(_ text: String) -> [Entry] {
var result: Set<Entry> = []
let lines = text.split(whereSeparator: { $0.isNewline })
// Skip header if present
for (idx, raw) in lines.enumerated() {
guard let line = raw.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty else { continue }
let line = raw.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
if line.isEmpty { continue }
if idx == 0 && line.lowercased().contains("relay url") { continue }
let parts = line.split(separator: ",").map { $0.trimmed }
let parts = line.split(separator: ",").map { String($0).trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespaces) }
guard parts.count >= 3 else { continue }
guard let host = NostrRelayURL.directoryAddress(parts[0]) else { continue }
var host = parts[0]
host = host.replacingOccurrences(of: "https://", with: "")
host = host.replacingOccurrences(of: "http://", with: "")
host = host.replacingOccurrences(of: "wss://", with: "")
host = host.replacingOccurrences(of: "ws://", with: "")
host = host.trimmingCharacters(in: CharacterSet(charactersIn: "/"))
guard let lat = Double(parts[1]), let lon = Double(parts[2]) else { continue }
result.insert(Entry(host: host, lat: lat, lon: lon))
}
return Array(result)
}
// MARK: - Observers & Timers
private func registerObservers() {
let center = dependencies.notificationCenter
let torReady = center.addObserver(
forName: .TorDidBecomeReady,
object: nil,
queue: .main
) { [weak self] _ in
guard let self else { return }
Task { @MainActor in
self.prefetchIfNeeded(force: true)
}
}
cleanupState.observers.append(torReady)
if let activeNotificationName = dependencies.activeNotificationName {
let didBecomeActive = center.addObserver(
forName: activeNotificationName,
object: nil,
queue: .main
) { [weak self] _ in
guard let self else { return }
Task { @MainActor in
self.prefetchIfNeeded()
}
}
cleanupState.observers.append(didBecomeActive)
}
private func cacheURL() -> URL? {
do {
let base = try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
let dir = base.appendingPathComponent("bitchat", isDirectory: true)
try? FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: dir, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
return dir.appendingPathComponent(cacheFileName)
} catch { return nil }
}
private func startRefreshTimer() {
cleanupState.refreshTimer?.invalidate()
let interval = dependencies.refreshCheckInterval
guard interval > 0 else { return }
let timer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: interval, repeats: true) { [weak self] _ in
guard let self else { return }
Task { @MainActor in
self.prefetchIfNeeded()
}
}
cleanupState.refreshTimer = timer
RunLoop.main.add(timer, forMode: .common)
}
var debugRetryAttempt: Int { retryAttempt }
var debugHasRetryTask: Bool { cleanupState.retryTask != nil }
var debugObserverCount: Int { cleanupState.observers.count }
}
// MARK: - Distance
+15 -16
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
import Foundation
import BitFoundation
// MARK: - BitChat-over-Nostr Adapter
struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
/// Build a `bitchat1:` base64url-encoded BitChat packet carrying a private message for Nostr DMs.
static func encodePMForNostr(content: String, messageID: String, recipientPeerID: PeerID, senderPeerID: PeerID) -> String? {
static func encodePMForNostr(content: String, messageID: String, recipientPeerID: String, senderPeerID: String) -> String? {
// TLV-encode the private message
let pm = PrivateMessagePacket(messageID: messageID, content: content)
guard let tlv = pm.encode() else { return nil }
@@ -15,12 +14,12 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
payload.append(tlv)
// Determine 8-byte recipient ID to embed
let recipientID = normalizeRecipientPeerID(recipientPeerID)
let recipientIDHex: String = normalizeRecipientPeerID(recipientPeerID)
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: recipientID.id),
senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID) ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: recipientIDHex),
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
@@ -32,18 +31,18 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
}
/// Build a `bitchat1:` base64url-encoded BitChat packet carrying a delivery/read ack for Nostr DMs.
static func encodeAckForNostr(type: NoisePayloadType, messageID: String, recipientPeerID: PeerID, senderPeerID: PeerID) -> String? {
static func encodeAckForNostr(type: NoisePayloadType, messageID: String, recipientPeerID: String, senderPeerID: String) -> String? {
guard type == .delivered || type == .readReceipt else { return nil }
var payload = Data([type.rawValue])
payload.append(Data(messageID.utf8))
let recipientID = normalizeRecipientPeerID(recipientPeerID)
let recipientIDHex: String = normalizeRecipientPeerID(recipientPeerID)
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: recipientID.id),
senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID) ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: recipientIDHex),
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
@@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
}
/// Build a `bitchat1:` ACK (delivered/read) without an embedded recipient peer ID (geohash DMs).
static func encodeAckForNostrNoRecipient(type: NoisePayloadType, messageID: String, senderPeerID: PeerID) -> String? {
static func encodeAckForNostrNoRecipient(type: NoisePayloadType, messageID: String, senderPeerID: String) -> String? {
guard type == .delivered || type == .readReceipt else { return nil }
var payload = Data([type.rawValue])
@@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
@@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
}
/// Build a `bitchat1:` payload without an embedded recipient peer ID (used for geohash DMs).
static func encodePMForNostrNoRecipient(content: String, messageID: String, senderPeerID: PeerID) -> String? {
static func encodePMForNostrNoRecipient(content: String, messageID: String, senderPeerID: String) -> String? {
let pm = PrivateMessagePacket(messageID: messageID, content: content)
guard let tlv = pm.encode() else { return nil }
@@ -85,7 +84,7 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
senderID: Data(hexString: senderPeerID) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
@@ -97,11 +96,11 @@ struct NostrEmbeddedBitChat {
return "bitchat1:" + base64URLEncode(data)
}
private static func normalizeRecipientPeerID(_ recipientPeerID: PeerID) -> PeerID {
if let maybeData = Data(hexString: recipientPeerID.id) {
private static func normalizeRecipientPeerID(_ recipientPeerID: String) -> String {
if let maybeData = Data(hexString: recipientPeerID) {
if maybeData.count == 32 {
// Treat as Noise static public key; derive peerID from fingerprint
return PeerID(publicKey: maybeData)
return PeerIDUtils.derivePeerID(fromPublicKey: maybeData)
} else if maybeData.count == 8 {
// Already an 8-byte peer ID
return recipientPeerID
+293
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,50 @@
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
import P256K
import Security
// Keychain helper for secure storage
struct KeychainHelper {
static func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString? = nil) {
var query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecValueData as String: data
]
if let accessible = accessible {
query[kSecAttrAccessible as String] = accessible
}
SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
}
static func load(key: String, service: String) -> Data? {
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecReturnData as String: true
]
var result: AnyObject?
let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
guard status == errSecSuccess else { return nil }
return result as? Data
}
static func delete(key: String, service: String) {
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: service,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key
]
SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
}
}
/// Manages Nostr identity (secp256k1 keypair) for NIP-17 private messaging
struct NostrIdentity: Codable {
@@ -58,3 +103,251 @@ struct NostrIdentity: Codable {
return publicKey.hexEncodedString()
}
}
/// Bridge between Noise and Nostr identities
struct NostrIdentityBridge {
private static let keychainService = "chat.bitchat.nostr"
private static let currentIdentityKey = "nostr-current-identity"
private static let deviceSeedKey = "nostr-device-seed"
// In-memory cache to avoid transient keychain access issues
private static var deviceSeedCache: Data?
/// Get or create the current Nostr identity
static func getCurrentNostrIdentity() throws -> NostrIdentity? {
// Check if we already have a Nostr identity
if let existingData = KeychainHelper.load(key: currentIdentityKey, service: keychainService),
let identity = try? JSONDecoder().decode(NostrIdentity.self, from: existingData) {
return identity
}
// Generate new Nostr identity
let nostrIdentity = try NostrIdentity.generate()
// Store it
let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(nostrIdentity)
KeychainHelper.save(key: currentIdentityKey, data: data, service: keychainService)
return nostrIdentity
}
/// Associate a Nostr identity with a Noise public key (for favorites)
static func associateNostrIdentity(_ nostrPubkey: String, with noisePublicKey: Data) {
let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
if let data = nostrPubkey.data(using: .utf8) {
KeychainHelper.save(key: key, data: data, service: keychainService)
}
}
/// Get Nostr public key associated with a Noise public key
static func getNostrPublicKey(for noisePublicKey: Data) -> String? {
let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
guard let data = KeychainHelper.load(key: key, service: keychainService),
let pubkey = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) else {
return nil
}
return pubkey
}
/// Clear all Nostr identity associations and current identity
static func clearAllAssociations() {
// Delete current Nostr identity
KeychainHelper.delete(key: currentIdentityKey, service: keychainService)
KeychainHelper.delete(key: deviceSeedKey, service: keychainService)
// Note: We can't efficiently delete all noise-nostr associations
// without tracking them, but they'll be orphaned and eventually cleaned up
// The important part is deleting the current identity so a new one is generated
}
// MARK: - Per-Geohash Identities (Location Channels)
/// Returns a stable device seed used to derive unlinkable per-geohash identities.
/// Stored only on device keychain.
private static func getOrCreateDeviceSeed() -> Data {
if let cached = deviceSeedCache { return cached }
if let existing = KeychainHelper.load(key: deviceSeedKey, service: keychainService) {
// Migrate to AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly for stability during lock
KeychainHelper.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: existing, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
deviceSeedCache = existing
return existing
}
var seed = Data(count: 32)
_ = seed.withUnsafeMutableBytes { ptr in
SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, 32, ptr.baseAddress!)
}
// Ensure availability after first unlock to prevent unintended rotation when locked
KeychainHelper.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: seed, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
deviceSeedCache = seed
return seed
}
/// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a given geohash.
/// Uses HMAC-SHA256(deviceSeed, geohash) as private key material, with fallback rehashing
/// if the candidate is not a valid secp256k1 private key.
static func deriveIdentity(forGeohash geohash: String) throws -> NostrIdentity {
let seed = getOrCreateDeviceSeed()
guard let msg = geohash.data(using: .utf8) else {
throw NSError(domain: "NostrIdentity", code: -1, userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "Invalid geohash string"])
}
func candidateKey(iteration: UInt32) -> Data {
var input = Data(msg)
var iterBE = iteration.bigEndian
withUnsafeBytes(of: &iterBE) { bytes in
input.append(contentsOf: bytes)
}
let code = CryptoKit.HMAC<CryptoKit.SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: input, using: SymmetricKey(data: seed))
return Data(code)
}
// Try a few iterations to ensure a valid key can be formed
for i in 0..<10 {
let keyData = candidateKey(iteration: UInt32(i))
if let identity = try? NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: keyData) {
return identity
}
}
// As a final fallback, hash the seed+msg and try again
var combined = Data()
combined.append(seed)
combined.append(msg)
let fallback = Data(CryptoKit.SHA256.hash(data: combined))
return try NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: fallback)
}
}
// Bech32 encoding for Nostr (minimal implementation)
enum Bech32 {
private static let charset = "qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l"
private static let generator = [0x3b6a57b2, 0x26508e6d, 0x1ea119fa, 0x3d4233dd, 0x2a1462b3]
static func encode(hrp: String, data: Data) throws -> String {
let values = convertBits(from: 8, to: 5, pad: true, data: Array(data))
let checksum = createChecksum(hrp: hrp, values: values)
let combined = values + checksum
return hrp + "1" + combined.map {
let index = charset.index(charset.startIndex, offsetBy: Int($0))
return String(charset[index])
}.joined()
}
static func decode(_ bech32String: String) throws -> (hrp: String, data: Data) {
// Find the last occurrence of '1'
guard let separatorIndex = bech32String.lastIndex(of: "1") else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidFormat
}
let hrp = String(bech32String[..<separatorIndex])
// Validate HRP contains only ASCII characters
for char in hrp {
guard char.asciiValue != nil else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidCharacter
}
}
let dataString = String(bech32String[bech32String.index(after: separatorIndex)...])
// Convert characters to values
var values = [UInt8]()
for char in dataString {
guard let index = charset.firstIndex(of: char) else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidCharacter
}
values.append(UInt8(charset.distance(from: charset.startIndex, to: index)))
}
// Verify checksum
guard values.count >= 6 else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidChecksum
}
let payloadValues = Array(values.dropLast(6))
let checksum = Array(values.suffix(6))
let expectedChecksum = createChecksum(hrp: hrp, values: payloadValues)
guard checksum == expectedChecksum else {
throw Bech32Error.invalidChecksum
}
// Convert back to bytes
let bytes = convertBits(from: 5, to: 8, pad: false, data: payloadValues)
return (hrp: hrp, data: Data(bytes))
}
enum Bech32Error: Error {
case invalidFormat
case invalidCharacter
case invalidChecksum
}
private static func convertBits(from: Int, to: Int, pad: Bool, data: [UInt8]) -> [UInt8] {
var acc = 0
var bits = 0
var result = [UInt8]()
let maxv = (1 << to) - 1
for value in data {
acc = (acc << from) | Int(value)
bits += from
while bits >= to {
bits -= to
result.append(UInt8((acc >> bits) & maxv))
}
}
if pad && bits > 0 {
result.append(UInt8((acc << (to - bits)) & maxv))
}
return result
}
private static func createChecksum(hrp: String, values: [UInt8]) -> [UInt8] {
let checksumValues = hrpExpand(hrp) + values + [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
let polymod = polymod(checksumValues) ^ 1
var checksum = [UInt8]()
for i in 0..<6 {
checksum.append(UInt8((polymod >> (5 * (5 - i))) & 31))
}
return checksum
}
private static func hrpExpand(_ hrp: String) -> [UInt8] {
var result = [UInt8]()
for c in hrp {
guard let asciiValue = c.asciiValue else {
return [] // Return empty array for invalid input
}
result.append(UInt8(asciiValue >> 5))
}
result.append(0)
for c in hrp {
guard let asciiValue = c.asciiValue else {
return [] // Return empty array for invalid input
}
result.append(UInt8(asciiValue & 31))
}
return result
}
private static func polymod(_ values: [UInt8]) -> Int {
var chk = 1
for value in values {
let b = chk >> 25
chk = (chk & 0x1ffffff) << 5 ^ Int(value)
for i in 0..<5 {
if (b >> i) & 1 == 1 {
chk ^= generator[i]
}
}
}
return chk
}
}
// Data hex encoding extension moved to BinaryEncodingUtils.swift to avoid duplication
-165
View File
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
/// Bridge between Noise and Nostr identities
final class NostrIdentityBridge {
private let keychainService = "chat.bitchat.nostr"
private let currentIdentityKey = "nostr-current-identity"
private let deviceSeedKey = "nostr-device-seed"
// In-memory cache to avoid transient keychain access issues
private var deviceSeedCache: Data?
// Cache derived identities to avoid repeated crypto during view rendering
private var derivedIdentityCache: [String: NostrIdentity] = [:]
private let cacheLock = NSLock()
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager()) {
self.keychain = keychain
}
/// Get or create the current Nostr identity
func getCurrentNostrIdentity() throws -> NostrIdentity? {
// Check if we already have a Nostr identity
if let existingData = keychain.load(key: currentIdentityKey, service: keychainService),
let identity = try? JSONDecoder().decode(NostrIdentity.self, from: existingData) {
return identity
}
// Generate new Nostr identity
let nostrIdentity = try NostrIdentity.generate()
// Store it
let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(nostrIdentity)
keychain.save(key: currentIdentityKey, data: data, service: keychainService, accessible: nil)
return nostrIdentity
}
/// Associate a Nostr identity with a Noise public key (for favorites)
func associateNostrIdentity(_ nostrPubkey: String, with noisePublicKey: Data) {
let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
if let data = nostrPubkey.data(using: .utf8) {
keychain.save(key: key, data: data, service: keychainService, accessible: nil)
}
}
/// Get Nostr public key associated with a Noise public key
func getNostrPublicKey(for noisePublicKey: Data) -> String? {
let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
guard let data = keychain.load(key: key, service: keychainService),
let pubkey = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) else {
return nil
}
return pubkey
}
/// Clear all Nostr identity associations and current identity
func clearAllAssociations() {
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: keychainService,
kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitAll,
kSecReturnAttributes as String: true
]
var result: AnyObject?
let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
if status == errSecSuccess, let items = result as? [[String: Any]] {
for item in items {
var deleteQuery: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: keychainService
]
if let account = item[kSecAttrAccount as String] as? String {
deleteQuery[kSecAttrAccount as String] = account
}
SecItemDelete(deleteQuery as CFDictionary)
}
} else if status == errSecItemNotFound {
// nothing persisted; no action needed
}
deviceSeedCache = nil
// Also drop the in-memory derived per-geohash identities. These hold the
// actual secp256k1 private keys; if left cached, post-panic geohash
// messages would still be signed with pre-panic keys (linkable across the
// wipe) until the app is force-quit.
cacheLock.lock()
derivedIdentityCache.removeAll()
cacheLock.unlock()
}
// MARK: - Per-Geohash Identities (Location Channels)
/// Returns a stable device seed used to derive unlinkable per-geohash identities.
/// Stored only on device keychain.
private func getOrCreateDeviceSeed() -> Data {
if let cached = deviceSeedCache { return cached }
if let existing = keychain.load(key: deviceSeedKey, service: keychainService) {
// Migrate to AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly for stability during lock
keychain.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: existing, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
deviceSeedCache = existing
return existing
}
var seed = Data(count: 32)
_ = seed.withUnsafeMutableBytes { ptr in
SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, 32, ptr.baseAddress!)
}
// Ensure availability after first unlock to prevent unintended rotation when locked
keychain.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: seed, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
deviceSeedCache = seed
return seed
}
/// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a given geohash.
/// Uses HMAC-SHA256(deviceSeed, geohash) as private key material, with fallback rehashing
/// if the candidate is not a valid secp256k1 private key.
func deriveIdentity(forGeohash geohash: String) throws -> NostrIdentity {
// Check cache first to avoid repeated crypto + keychain I/O during view rendering
cacheLock.lock()
if let cached = derivedIdentityCache[geohash] {
cacheLock.unlock()
return cached
}
cacheLock.unlock()
let seed = getOrCreateDeviceSeed()
guard let msg = geohash.data(using: .utf8) else {
throw NSError(domain: "NostrIdentity", code: -1, userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "Invalid geohash string"])
}
func candidateKey(iteration: UInt32) -> Data {
var input = Data(msg)
var iterBE = iteration.bigEndian
withUnsafeBytes(of: &iterBE) { bytes in
input.append(contentsOf: bytes)
}
let code = HMAC<SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: input, using: SymmetricKey(data: seed))
return Data(code)
}
// Try a few iterations to ensure a valid key can be formed
for i in 0..<10 {
let keyData = candidateKey(iteration: UInt32(i))
if let identity = try? NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: keyData) {
// Cache the result
cacheLock.lock()
derivedIdentityCache[geohash] = identity
cacheLock.unlock()
return identity
}
}
// As a final fallback, hash the seed+msg and try again
let fallback = (seed + msg).sha256Hash()
let identity = try NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: fallback)
// Cache the result
cacheLock.lock()
derivedIdentityCache[geohash] = identity
cacheLock.unlock()
return identity
}
}
+59 -157
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
import BitLogger
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
import P256K
@@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
case seal = 13 // NIP-17 sealed event
case giftWrap = 1059 // NIP-59 gift wrap
case ephemeralEvent = 20000
case geohashPresence = 20001
}
/// Create a NIP-17 private message
@@ -39,23 +37,22 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
content: content
)
// 2. Seal the rumor (encrypt to recipient) and sign it with the SENDER'S
// real identity key. NIP-17 requires the seal be signed by the sender
// so the recipient can authenticate who sent the message; signing with
// a throwaway key leaves DMs forgeable/impersonatable.
let senderKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
// 2. Create ephemeral key for this message
let ephemeralKey = try P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey()
// Created ephemeral key for seal
// 3. Seal the rumor (encrypt to recipient)
let sealedEvent = try createSeal(
rumor: rumor,
recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
senderKey: senderKey
senderKey: ephemeralKey
)
// 3. Gift wrap the sealed event with a throwaway ephemeral key (the wrap
// layer hides the sender's identity from relays; createGiftWrap mints
// its own ephemeral key internally).
// 4. Gift wrap the sealed event (encrypt to recipient again)
let giftWrap = try createGiftWrap(
seal: sealedEvent,
recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey
recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
senderKey: ephemeralKey
)
// Created gift wrap
@@ -81,19 +78,12 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
)
// Successfully unwrapped gift wrap
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to unwrap gift wrap: \(error)", category: .session)
SecureLogger.log("❌ Failed to unwrap gift wrap: \(error)",
category: SecureLogger.session, level: .error)
throw error
}
// 2. Authenticate the seal. The seal MUST be signed by the sender's real
// identity key (NIP-17); without this check a DM is forgeable by anyone
// who knows the recipient's npub. Verify the seal's own signature.
guard seal.isValidSignature() else {
SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: seal signature is missing or invalid", category: .session)
throw NostrError.invalidEvent
}
// 3. Open the seal
// 2. Open the seal
let rumor: NostrEvent
do {
rumor = try openSeal(
@@ -102,66 +92,14 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
)
// Successfully opened seal
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to open seal: \(error)", category: .session)
SecureLogger.log("❌ Failed to open seal: \(error)",
category: SecureLogger.session, level: .error)
throw error
}
// 4. The sender claimed inside the rumor must match the key that actually
// signed the seal, otherwise the sender field is unauthenticated and
// spoofable.
guard seal.pubkey == rumor.pubkey else {
SecureLogger.error("❌ Rejecting DM: rumor pubkey does not match seal signer", category: .session)
throw NostrError.invalidEvent
}
// Return the seal signer's pubkey as the authenticated sender.
return (content: rumor.content, senderPubkey: seal.pubkey, timestamp: rumor.created_at)
return (content: rumor.content, senderPubkey: rumor.pubkey, timestamp: rumor.created_at)
}
#if DEBUG
static func createPrivateMessageWithInvalidSealSignatureForTesting(
content: String,
recipientPubkey: String,
senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
) throws -> NostrEvent {
let rumor = NostrEvent(
pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .dm,
tags: [],
content: content
)
var seal = try createSeal(
rumor: rumor,
recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
senderKey: senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
)
seal.sig = String(repeating: "0", count: 128)
return try createGiftWrap(seal: seal, recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey)
}
static func createPrivateMessageWithMismatchedSealRumorPubkeyForTesting(
content: String,
recipientPubkey: String,
rumorIdentity: NostrIdentity,
sealSignerIdentity: NostrIdentity
) throws -> NostrEvent {
let rumor = NostrEvent(
pubkey: rumorIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .dm,
tags: [],
content: content
)
let seal = try createSeal(
rumor: rumor,
recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey,
senderKey: sealSignerIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
)
return try createGiftWrap(seal: seal, recipientPubkey: recipientPubkey)
}
#endif
/// Create a geohash-scoped ephemeral public message (kind 20000)
static func createEphemeralGeohashEvent(
content: String,
@@ -171,7 +109,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
teleported: Bool = false
) throws -> NostrEvent {
var tags = [["g", geohash]]
if let nickname = nickname?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty {
if let nickname = nickname, !nickname.isEmpty {
tags.append(["n", nickname])
}
if teleported {
@@ -184,48 +122,8 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
tags: tags,
content: content
)
let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
}
/// Create a geohash presence heartbeat (kind 20001)
/// Must contain empty content and NO nickname tag
static func createGeohashPresenceEvent(
geohash: String,
senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
) throws -> NostrEvent {
let tags = [["g", geohash]]
let event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .geohashPresence,
tags: tags,
content: ""
)
let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
}
/// Create a persistent location note (kind 1: text note) tagged to a street-level geohash.
static func createGeohashTextNote(
content: String,
geohash: String,
senderIdentity: NostrIdentity,
nickname: String? = nil
) throws -> NostrEvent {
var tags = [["g", geohash]]
if let nickname = nickname?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty {
tags.append(["n", nickname])
}
let event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .textNote,
tags: tags,
content: content
)
let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
let signingKey = try senderIdentity.signingKey()
return try event.sign(with: signingKey)
}
// MARK: - Private Methods
@@ -251,15 +149,17 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
content: encrypted
)
// Sign the seal with the sender's Schnorr private key
return try seal.sign(with: senderKey)
// Convert to P256K.Signing.PrivateKey for signing (temporary until we update sign method)
let signingKey = try P256K.Signing.PrivateKey(dataRepresentation: senderKey.dataRepresentation)
return try seal.sign(with: signingKey)
}
private static func createGiftWrap(
seal: NostrEvent,
recipientPubkey: String
recipientPubkey: String,
senderKey: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey // This is the ephemeral key used for the seal
) throws -> NostrEvent {
let sealJSON = try seal.jsonString()
// Create new ephemeral key for gift wrap
@@ -281,8 +181,9 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
content: encrypted
)
// Sign the gift wrap with the wrap Schnorr private key
return try giftWrap.sign(with: wrapKey)
// Convert to P256K.Signing.PrivateKey for signing (temporary until we update sign method)
let signingKey = try P256K.Signing.PrivateKey(dataRepresentation: wrapKey.dataRepresentation)
return try giftWrap.sign(with: signingKey)
}
private static func unwrapGiftWrap(
@@ -364,7 +265,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
combined.append(nonce24)
combined.append(sealed.ciphertext)
combined.append(sealed.tag)
return "v2:" + Base64URLCoding.encode(combined)
return "v2:" + base64URLEncode(combined)
}
private static func decrypt(
@@ -375,7 +276,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
// Expect NIP-44 v2 format
guard ciphertext.hasPrefix("v2:") else { throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext }
let encoded = String(ciphertext.dropFirst(3))
guard let data = Base64URLCoding.decode(encoded),
guard let data = base64URLDecode(encoded),
data.count > (24 + 16),
let senderPubkeyData = Data(hexString: senderPubkey) else {
throw NostrError.invalidCiphertext
@@ -515,7 +416,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
// Log with explicit UTC and local time for debugging
let formatter = DateFormatter()
//
// Removed unnecessary date formatting operations
formatter.dateFormat = "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
formatter.timeZone = TimeZone(abbreviation: "UTC")
@@ -571,16 +472,19 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
self.sig = dict["sig"] as? String
}
func sign(with key: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey) throws -> NostrEvent {
func sign(with key: P256K.Signing.PrivateKey) throws -> NostrEvent {
let (eventId, eventIdHash) = try calculateEventId()
// Sign with Schnorr (BIP-340)
// Convert to Schnorr key for Nostr signing
let schnorrKey = try P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey(dataRepresentation: key.dataRepresentation)
// Sign with Schnorr
var messageBytes = [UInt8](eventIdHash)
var auxRand = [UInt8](repeating: 0, count: 32)
_ = auxRand.withUnsafeMutableBytes { ptr in
SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, 32, ptr.baseAddress!)
}
let schnorrSignature = try key.signature(message: &messageBytes, auxiliaryRand: &auxRand)
let schnorrSignature = try schnorrKey.signature(message: &messageBytes, auxiliaryRand: &auxRand)
let signatureHex = schnorrSignature.dataRepresentation.hexEncodedString()
@@ -589,26 +493,6 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
signed.sig = signatureHex
return signed
}
/// Validate that the event ID and Schnorr signature match the content and pubkey.
/// Returns false when the signature is missing, malformed, or does not verify.
func isValidSignature() -> Bool {
guard let sig = sig,
let sigData = Data(hexString: sig),
let pubData = Data(hexString: pubkey),
sigData.count == 64,
pubData.count == 32,
let signature = try? P256K.Schnorr.SchnorrSignature(dataRepresentation: sigData),
let (expectedId, eventHash) = try? calculateEventId(),
expectedId == id
else {
return false
}
var messageBytes = [UInt8](eventHash)
let xonly = P256K.Schnorr.XonlyKey(dataRepresentation: pubData)
return xonly.isValid(signature, for: &messageBytes)
}
private func calculateEventId() throws -> (String, Data) {
let serialized = [
@@ -621,7 +505,10 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
] as [Any]
let data = try JSONSerialization.data(withJSONObject: serialized, options: [.withoutEscapingSlashes])
return (data.sha256Fingerprint(), data.sha256Hash())
let hash = CryptoKit.SHA256.hash(data: data)
let hashData = Data(hash)
let hashHex = hash.compactMap { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
return (hashHex, hashData)
}
func jsonString() throws -> String {
@@ -641,14 +528,29 @@ enum NostrError: Error {
case encryptionFailed
}
// MARK: - NIP-44 v2 helpers (XChaCha20-Poly1305)
// MARK: - NIP-44 v2 helpers (XChaCha20-Poly1305 + base64url)
private extension NostrProtocol {
static func base64URLEncode(_ data: Data) -> String {
return data.base64EncodedString()
.replacingOccurrences(of: "+", with: "-")
.replacingOccurrences(of: "/", with: "_")
.replacingOccurrences(of: "=", with: "")
}
static func base64URLDecode(_ s: String) -> Data? {
var str = s
let pad = (4 - (str.count % 4)) % 4
if pad > 0 { str += String(repeating: "=", count: pad) }
str = str.replacingOccurrences(of: "-", with: "+").replacingOccurrences(of: "_", with: "/")
return Data(base64Encoded: str)
}
static func deriveNIP44V2Key(from sharedSecretData: Data) throws -> Data {
let derivedKey = HKDF<CryptoKit.SHA256>.deriveKey(
inputKeyMaterial: SymmetricKey(data: sharedSecretData),
salt: Data(),
info: Data("nip44-v2".utf8),
info: "nip44-v2".data(using: .utf8)!,
outputByteCount: 32
)
return derivedKey.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-51
View File
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
enum NostrRelayURL {
static func normalized(_ rawValue: String, defaultScheme: String? = nil) -> String? {
var value = rawValue.trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespacesAndNewlines)
guard !value.isEmpty else { return nil }
if !value.contains("://"), let defaultScheme {
value = "\(defaultScheme)://\(value)"
}
guard var components = URLComponents(string: value),
let rawScheme = components.scheme?.lowercased(),
let rawHost = components.host?.lowercased(),
!rawHost.isEmpty else {
return nil
}
switch rawScheme {
case "wss", "https":
components.scheme = "wss"
if components.port == 443 {
components.port = nil
}
case "ws", "http":
components.scheme = "ws"
if components.port == 80 {
components.port = nil
}
default:
return nil
}
components.host = rawHost
if components.path == "/" {
components.path = ""
}
components.fragment = nil
return components.string
}
static func directoryAddress(_ rawValue: String) -> String? {
guard var normalized = normalized(rawValue, defaultScheme: "wss") else { return nil }
for prefix in ["wss://", "ws://"] where normalized.hasPrefix(prefix) {
normalized.removeFirst(prefix.count)
break
}
return normalized
}
}
+10 -28
View File
@@ -5,27 +5,16 @@ import CryptoKit
/// Implements HChaCha20 to derive a subkey and reduces the 24-byte nonce to a 12-byte nonce
/// as per XChaCha20 construction.
enum XChaCha20Poly1305Compat {
/// Errors that can occur during XChaCha20-Poly1305 operations
enum Error: Swift.Error {
case invalidKeyLength(expected: Int, got: Int)
case invalidNonceLength(expected: Int, got: Int)
}
struct SealBox {
let ciphertext: Data
let tag: Data
}
static func seal(plaintext: Data, key: Data, nonce24: Data, aad: Data? = nil) throws -> SealBox {
guard key.count == 32 else {
throw Error.invalidKeyLength(expected: 32, got: key.count)
}
guard nonce24.count == 24 else {
throw Error.invalidNonceLength(expected: 24, got: nonce24.count)
}
precondition(key.count == 32, "XChaCha20 key must be 32 bytes")
precondition(nonce24.count == 24, "XChaCha20 nonce must be 24 bytes")
let subkey = try hchacha20(key: key, nonce16: Data(nonce24.prefix(16)))
let subkey = hchacha20(key: key, nonce16: nonce24.prefix(16))
let nonce12 = derive12ByteNonce(from24: nonce24)
let chachaKey = SymmetricKey(data: subkey)
let nonce = try ChaChaPoly.Nonce(data: nonce12)
@@ -34,14 +23,10 @@ enum XChaCha20Poly1305Compat {
}
static func open(ciphertext: Data, tag: Data, key: Data, nonce24: Data, aad: Data? = nil) throws -> Data {
guard key.count == 32 else {
throw Error.invalidKeyLength(expected: 32, got: key.count)
}
guard nonce24.count == 24 else {
throw Error.invalidNonceLength(expected: 24, got: nonce24.count)
}
precondition(key.count == 32, "XChaCha20 key must be 32 bytes")
precondition(nonce24.count == 24, "XChaCha20 nonce must be 24 bytes")
let subkey = try hchacha20(key: key, nonce16: Data(nonce24.prefix(16)))
let subkey = hchacha20(key: key, nonce16: nonce24.prefix(16))
let nonce12 = derive12ByteNonce(from24: nonce24)
let chachaKey = SymmetricKey(data: subkey)
let box = try ChaChaPoly.SealedBox(nonce: ChaChaPoly.Nonce(data: nonce12), ciphertext: ciphertext, tag: tag)
@@ -58,14 +43,10 @@ enum XChaCha20Poly1305Compat {
return out
}
private static func hchacha20(key: Data, nonce16: Data) throws -> Data {
private static func hchacha20(key: Data, nonce16: Data) -> Data {
// HChaCha20 based on the original ChaCha20 core with a 16-byte nonce.
guard key.count == 32 else {
throw Error.invalidKeyLength(expected: 32, got: key.count)
}
guard nonce16.count == 16 else {
throw Error.invalidNonceLength(expected: 16, got: nonce16.count)
}
precondition(key.count == 32)
precondition(nonce16.count == 16)
// Constants "expand 32-byte k"
var state: [UInt32] = [
@@ -132,3 +113,4 @@ private extension Data {
replaceSubrange(offset..<(offset+4), with: bytes)
}
}
@@ -5,37 +5,64 @@
// Binary encoding utilities for efficient protocol messages
//
import struct Foundation.Data
import struct Foundation.Date
import Foundation
// MARK: - Hex Encoding/Decoding
extension Data {
func hexEncodedString() -> String {
if self.isEmpty {
return ""
}
return self.map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
}
init?(hexString: String) {
let len = hexString.count / 2
var data = Data(capacity: len)
var index = hexString.startIndex
for _ in 0..<len {
let nextIndex = hexString.index(index, offsetBy: 2)
guard let byte = UInt8(String(hexString[index..<nextIndex]), radix: 16) else {
return nil
}
data.append(byte)
index = nextIndex
}
self = data
}
}
// MARK: - Binary Encoding Utilities
extension Data {
// MARK: Writing
@inlinable public mutating func appendUInt8(_ value: UInt8) {
mutating func appendUInt8(_ value: UInt8) {
self.append(value)
}
@inlinable mutating func appendUInt16(_ value: UInt16) {
mutating func appendUInt16(_ value: UInt16) {
self.append(UInt8((value >> 8) & 0xFF))
self.append(UInt8(value & 0xFF))
}
@inlinable mutating func appendUInt32(_ value: UInt32) {
mutating func appendUInt32(_ value: UInt32) {
self.append(UInt8((value >> 24) & 0xFF))
self.append(UInt8((value >> 16) & 0xFF))
self.append(UInt8((value >> 8) & 0xFF))
self.append(UInt8(value & 0xFF))
}
@inlinable mutating func appendUInt64(_ value: UInt64) {
mutating func appendUInt64(_ value: UInt64) {
for i in (0..<8).reversed() {
self.append(UInt8((value >> (i * 8)) & 0xFF))
}
}
public mutating func appendString(_ string: String, maxLength: Int = 255) {
mutating func appendString(_ string: String, maxLength: Int = 255) {
guard let data = string.data(using: .utf8) else { return }
let length = Swift.min(data.count, maxLength)
@@ -48,7 +75,7 @@ extension Data {
self.append(data.prefix(length))
}
public mutating func appendData(_ data: Data, maxLength: Int = 65535) {
mutating func appendData(_ data: Data, maxLength: Int = 65535) {
let length = Swift.min(data.count, maxLength)
if maxLength <= 255 {
@@ -60,12 +87,12 @@ extension Data {
self.append(data.prefix(length))
}
public mutating func appendDate(_ date: Date) {
mutating func appendDate(_ date: Date) {
let timestamp = UInt64(date.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000) // milliseconds
self.appendUInt64(timestamp)
}
public mutating func appendUUID(_ uuid: String) {
mutating func appendUUID(_ uuid: String) {
// Convert UUID string to 16 bytes
var uuidData = Data(count: 16)
@@ -86,21 +113,21 @@ extension Data {
// MARK: Reading
@inlinable public func readUInt8(at offset: inout Int) -> UInt8? {
func readUInt8(at offset: inout Int) -> UInt8? {
guard offset >= 0 && offset < self.count else { return nil }
let value = self[offset]
offset += 1
return value
}
@inlinable func readUInt16(at offset: inout Int) -> UInt16? {
func readUInt16(at offset: inout Int) -> UInt16? {
guard offset + 2 <= self.count else { return nil }
let value = UInt16(self[offset]) << 8 | UInt16(self[offset + 1])
offset += 2
return value
}
@inlinable func readUInt32(at offset: inout Int) -> UInt32? {
func readUInt32(at offset: inout Int) -> UInt32? {
guard offset + 4 <= self.count else { return nil }
let value = UInt32(self[offset]) << 24 |
UInt32(self[offset + 1]) << 16 |
@@ -110,7 +137,7 @@ extension Data {
return value
}
@inlinable func readUInt64(at offset: inout Int) -> UInt64? {
func readUInt64(at offset: inout Int) -> UInt64? {
guard offset + 8 <= self.count else { return nil }
var value: UInt64 = 0
for i in 0..<8 {
@@ -120,7 +147,7 @@ extension Data {
return value
}
public func readString(at offset: inout Int, maxLength: Int = 255) -> String? {
func readString(at offset: inout Int, maxLength: Int = 255) -> String? {
let length: Int
if maxLength <= 255 {
@@ -139,7 +166,7 @@ extension Data {
return String(data: stringData, encoding: .utf8)
}
public func readData(at offset: inout Int, maxLength: Int = 65535) -> Data? {
func readData(at offset: inout Int, maxLength: Int = 65535) -> Data? {
let length: Int
if maxLength <= 255 {
@@ -158,19 +185,19 @@ extension Data {
return data
}
public func readDate(at offset: inout Int) -> Date? {
func readDate(at offset: inout Int) -> Date? {
guard let timestamp = readUInt64(at: &offset) else { return nil }
return Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(timestamp) / 1000.0)
}
public func readUUID(at offset: inout Int) -> String? {
func readUUID(at offset: inout Int) -> String? {
guard offset + 16 <= self.count else { return nil }
let uuidData = self[offset..<offset + 16]
offset += 16
// Convert 16 bytes to UUID string format
let uuid = uuidData.hexEncodedString()
let uuid = uuidData.map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
// Insert hyphens at proper positions: 8-4-4-4-12
var result = ""
@@ -184,7 +211,7 @@ extension Data {
return result.uppercased()
}
public func readFixedBytes(at offset: inout Int, count: Int) -> Data? {
func readFixedBytes(at offset: inout Int, count: Int) -> Data? {
guard offset + count <= self.count else { return nil }
let data = self[offset..<offset + count]
@@ -193,3 +220,4 @@ extension Data {
return data
}
}
+588
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
//
// BinaryProtocol.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
///
/// # BinaryProtocol
///
/// Low-level binary encoding and decoding for BitChat protocol messages.
/// Optimized for Bluetooth LE's limited bandwidth and MTU constraints.
///
/// ## Overview
/// BinaryProtocol implements an efficient binary wire format that minimizes
/// overhead while maintaining extensibility. It handles:
/// - Compact binary encoding with fixed headers
/// - Optional field support via flags
/// - Automatic compression for large payloads
/// - Endianness handling for cross-platform compatibility
///
/// ## Wire Format
/// ```
/// Header (Fixed 13 bytes):
/// +--------+------+-----+-----------+-------+----------------+
/// |Version | Type | TTL | Timestamp | Flags | PayloadLength |
/// |1 byte |1 byte|1byte| 8 bytes | 1 byte| 2 bytes |
/// +--------+------+-----+-----------+-------+----------------+
///
/// Variable sections:
/// +----------+-------------+---------+------------+
/// | SenderID | RecipientID | Payload | Signature |
/// | 8 bytes | 8 bytes* | Variable| 64 bytes* |
/// +----------+-------------+---------+------------+
/// * Optional fields based on flags
/// ```
///
/// ## Design Rationale
/// The protocol is designed for:
/// - **Efficiency**: Minimal overhead for small messages
/// - **Flexibility**: Optional fields via flag bits
/// - **Compatibility**: Network byte order (big-endian)
/// - **Performance**: Zero-copy where possible
///
/// ## Compression Strategy
/// - Automatic compression for payloads > 256 bytes
/// - zlib compression for broad compatibility on Apple platforms
/// - Original size stored for decompression
/// - Flag bit indicates compressed payload
///
/// ## Flag Bits
/// - Bit 0: Has recipient ID (directed message)
/// - Bit 1: Has signature (authenticated message)
/// - Bit 2: Is compressed (LZ4 compression applied)
/// - Bits 3-7: Reserved for future use
///
/// ## Size Constraints
/// - Maximum packet size: 65,535 bytes (16-bit length field)
/// - Typical packet size: < 512 bytes (BLE MTU)
/// - Minimum packet size: 21 bytes (header + sender ID)
///
/// ## Encoding Process
/// 1. Construct header with fixed fields
/// 2. Set appropriate flags
/// 3. Compress payload if beneficial
/// 4. Append variable-length fields
/// 5. Calculate and append signature if needed
///
/// ## Decoding Process
/// 1. Validate minimum packet size
/// 2. Parse fixed header
/// 3. Extract flags and determine field presence
/// 4. Parse variable fields based on flags
/// 5. Decompress payload if compressed
/// 6. Verify signature if present
///
/// ## Error Handling
/// - Graceful handling of malformed packets
/// - Clear error messages for debugging
/// - No crashes on invalid input
/// - Logging of protocol violations
///
/// ## Performance Notes
/// - Allocation-free for small messages
/// - Streaming support for large payloads
/// - Efficient bit manipulation
/// - Platform-optimized byte swapping
///
import Foundation
extension Data {
func trimmingNullBytes() -> Data {
// Find the first null byte
if let nullIndex = self.firstIndex(of: 0) {
return self.prefix(nullIndex)
}
return self
}
}
/// Implements binary encoding and decoding for BitChat protocol messages.
/// Provides static methods for converting between BitchatPacket objects and
/// their binary wire format representation.
/// - Note: All multi-byte values use network byte order (big-endian)
struct BinaryProtocol {
static let headerSize = 13
static let senderIDSize = 8
static let recipientIDSize = 8
static let signatureSize = 64
struct Flags {
static let hasRecipient: UInt8 = 0x01
static let hasSignature: UInt8 = 0x02
static let isCompressed: UInt8 = 0x04
}
// Encode BitchatPacket to binary format
static func encode(_ packet: BitchatPacket, padding: Bool = true) -> Data? {
var data = Data()
// Try to compress payload if beneficial
var payload = packet.payload
var originalPayloadSize: UInt16? = nil
var isCompressed = false
if CompressionUtil.shouldCompress(payload) {
if let compressedPayload = CompressionUtil.compress(payload) {
// Store original size for decompression (2 bytes after payload)
originalPayloadSize = UInt16(payload.count)
payload = compressedPayload
isCompressed = true
} else {
}
} else {
}
// Header
data.append(packet.version)
data.append(packet.type)
data.append(packet.ttl)
// Timestamp (8 bytes, big-endian)
for i in (0..<8).reversed() {
data.append(UInt8((packet.timestamp >> (i * 8)) & 0xFF))
}
// Flags
var flags: UInt8 = 0
if packet.recipientID != nil {
flags |= Flags.hasRecipient
}
if packet.signature != nil {
flags |= Flags.hasSignature
}
if isCompressed {
flags |= Flags.isCompressed
}
data.append(flags)
// Payload length (2 bytes, big-endian) - includes original size if compressed
let payloadDataSize = payload.count + (isCompressed ? 2 : 0)
let payloadLength = UInt16(payloadDataSize)
data.append(UInt8((payloadLength >> 8) & 0xFF))
data.append(UInt8(payloadLength & 0xFF))
// SenderID (exactly 8 bytes)
let senderBytes = packet.senderID.prefix(senderIDSize)
data.append(senderBytes)
if senderBytes.count < senderIDSize {
data.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: senderIDSize - senderBytes.count))
}
// RecipientID (if present)
if let recipientID = packet.recipientID {
let recipientBytes = recipientID.prefix(recipientIDSize)
data.append(recipientBytes)
if recipientBytes.count < recipientIDSize {
data.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: recipientIDSize - recipientBytes.count))
}
}
// Payload (with original size prepended if compressed)
if isCompressed, let originalSize = originalPayloadSize {
// Prepend original size (2 bytes, big-endian)
data.append(UInt8((originalSize >> 8) & 0xFF))
data.append(UInt8(originalSize & 0xFF))
}
data.append(payload)
// Signature (if present)
if let signature = packet.signature {
data.append(signature.prefix(signatureSize))
}
// Apply padding to standard block sizes for traffic analysis resistance
if padding {
let optimalSize = MessagePadding.optimalBlockSize(for: data.count)
let paddedData = MessagePadding.pad(data, toSize: optimalSize)
return paddedData
} else {
// Caller explicitly requested no padding (e.g., BLE write path)
return data
}
}
// Decode binary data to BitchatPacket
static func decode(_ data: Data) -> BitchatPacket? {
// Try decode as-is first (robust when padding wasn't applied)
if let pkt = decodeCore(data) { return pkt }
// If that fails, try after removing padding
let unpadded = MessagePadding.unpad(data)
if unpadded as NSData === data as NSData { return nil }
return decodeCore(unpadded)
}
// Core decoding implementation used by decode(_:) with and without padding removal
private static func decodeCore(_ raw: Data) -> BitchatPacket? {
// Minimum size check: header + senderID
guard raw.count >= headerSize + senderIDSize else {
return nil
}
// Convert to array for safer indexed access
let dataArray = Array(raw)
var offset = 0
// Header parsing with bounds checks
guard offset < dataArray.count else { return nil }
let version = dataArray[offset]; offset += 1
// Check if version is 1 (only supported version)
guard version == 1 else {
return nil
}
guard offset < dataArray.count else { return nil }
let type = dataArray[offset]; offset += 1
guard offset < dataArray.count else { return nil }
let ttl = dataArray[offset]; offset += 1
// Timestamp - need 8 bytes
guard offset + 8 <= dataArray.count else { return nil }
let timestampData = Data(dataArray[offset..<offset+8])
let timestamp = timestampData.reduce(0) { result, byte in
(result << 8) | UInt64(byte)
}
offset += 8
// Flags
guard offset < dataArray.count else { return nil }
let flags = dataArray[offset]; offset += 1
let hasRecipient = (flags & Flags.hasRecipient) != 0
let hasSignature = (flags & Flags.hasSignature) != 0
let isCompressed = (flags & Flags.isCompressed) != 0
// Payload length - need 2 bytes
guard offset + 2 <= dataArray.count else { return nil }
let payloadLengthData = Data(dataArray[offset..<offset+2])
let payloadLength = payloadLengthData.reduce(0) { result, byte in
(result << 8) | UInt16(byte)
}
offset += 2
// Validate payloadLength is reasonable (prevent integer overflow)
guard payloadLength <= 65535 else { return nil }
// SenderID - need 8 bytes
guard offset + senderIDSize <= dataArray.count else { return nil }
let senderID = Data(dataArray[offset..<offset+senderIDSize])
offset += senderIDSize
// RecipientID if present
var recipientID: Data?
if hasRecipient {
guard offset + recipientIDSize <= dataArray.count else { return nil }
recipientID = Data(dataArray[offset..<offset+recipientIDSize])
offset += recipientIDSize
}
// Payload handling with comprehensive bounds checking
let payload: Data
if isCompressed {
// Compressed payload needs at least 2 bytes for original size
guard Int(payloadLength) >= 2 else { return nil }
// Check we have enough data for the original size prefix
guard offset + 2 <= dataArray.count else { return nil }
let originalSizeData = Data(dataArray[offset..<offset+2])
let originalSize = Int(originalSizeData.reduce(0) { result, byte in
(result << 8) | UInt16(byte)
})
offset += 2
// Validate original size is reasonable
guard originalSize >= 0 && originalSize <= 1048576 else { return nil } // Max 1MB
// Check we have enough data for the compressed payload
let compressedPayloadSize = Int(payloadLength) - 2
guard compressedPayloadSize >= 0 && offset + compressedPayloadSize <= dataArray.count else {
return nil
}
let compressedPayload = Data(dataArray[offset..<offset+compressedPayloadSize])
offset += compressedPayloadSize
// Decompress with error handling
guard let decompressedPayload = CompressionUtil.decompress(compressedPayload, originalSize: originalSize) else {
return nil
}
// Verify decompressed size matches expected
guard decompressedPayload.count == originalSize else {
return nil
}
payload = decompressedPayload
} else {
// Uncompressed payload
guard Int(payloadLength) >= 0 && offset + Int(payloadLength) <= dataArray.count else {
return nil
}
payload = Data(dataArray[offset..<offset+Int(payloadLength)])
offset += Int(payloadLength)
}
// Signature if present
var signature: Data?
if hasSignature {
guard offset + signatureSize <= dataArray.count else { return nil }
signature = Data(dataArray[offset..<offset+signatureSize])
offset += signatureSize
}
// Final validation: ensure we haven't gone past the end
guard offset <= dataArray.count else { return nil }
return BitchatPacket(
type: type,
senderID: senderID,
recipientID: recipientID,
timestamp: timestamp,
payload: payload,
signature: signature,
ttl: ttl
)
}
}
// Binary encoding for BitchatMessage
extension BitchatMessage {
func toBinaryPayload() -> Data? {
var data = Data()
// Message format:
// - Flags: 1 byte (bit 0: isRelay, bit 1: isPrivate, bit 2: hasOriginalSender, bit 3: hasRecipientNickname, bit 4: hasSenderPeerID, bit 5: hasMentions)
// - Timestamp: 8 bytes (seconds since epoch)
// - ID length: 1 byte
// - ID: variable
// - Sender length: 1 byte
// - Sender: variable
// - Content length: 2 bytes
// - Content: variable
// Optional fields based on flags:
// - Original sender length + data
// - Recipient nickname length + data
// - Sender peer ID length + data
// - Mentions array
var flags: UInt8 = 0
if isRelay { flags |= 0x01 }
if isPrivate { flags |= 0x02 }
if originalSender != nil { flags |= 0x04 }
if recipientNickname != nil { flags |= 0x08 }
if senderPeerID != nil { flags |= 0x10 }
if mentions != nil && !mentions!.isEmpty { flags |= 0x20 }
data.append(flags)
// Timestamp (in milliseconds)
let timestampMillis = UInt64(timestamp.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
// Encode as 8 bytes, big-endian
for i in (0..<8).reversed() {
data.append(UInt8((timestampMillis >> (i * 8)) & 0xFF))
}
// ID
if let idData = id.data(using: .utf8) {
data.append(UInt8(min(idData.count, 255)))
data.append(idData.prefix(255))
} else {
data.append(0)
}
// Sender
if let senderData = sender.data(using: .utf8) {
data.append(UInt8(min(senderData.count, 255)))
data.append(senderData.prefix(255))
} else {
data.append(0)
}
// Content
if let contentData = content.data(using: .utf8) {
let length = UInt16(min(contentData.count, 65535))
// Encode length as 2 bytes, big-endian
data.append(UInt8((length >> 8) & 0xFF))
data.append(UInt8(length & 0xFF))
data.append(contentData.prefix(Int(length)))
} else {
data.append(contentsOf: [0, 0])
}
// Optional fields
if let originalSender = originalSender, let origData = originalSender.data(using: .utf8) {
data.append(UInt8(min(origData.count, 255)))
data.append(origData.prefix(255))
}
if let recipientNickname = recipientNickname, let recipData = recipientNickname.data(using: .utf8) {
data.append(UInt8(min(recipData.count, 255)))
data.append(recipData.prefix(255))
}
if let senderPeerID = senderPeerID, let peerData = senderPeerID.data(using: .utf8) {
data.append(UInt8(min(peerData.count, 255)))
data.append(peerData.prefix(255))
}
// Mentions array
if let mentions = mentions {
data.append(UInt8(min(mentions.count, 255))) // Number of mentions
for mention in mentions.prefix(255) {
if let mentionData = mention.data(using: .utf8) {
data.append(UInt8(min(mentionData.count, 255)))
data.append(mentionData.prefix(255))
} else {
data.append(0)
}
}
}
return data
}
static func fromBinaryPayload(_ data: Data) -> BitchatMessage? {
// Create an immutable copy to prevent threading issues
let dataCopy = Data(data)
guard dataCopy.count >= 13 else {
return nil
}
var offset = 0
// Flags
guard offset < dataCopy.count else {
return nil
}
let flags = dataCopy[offset]; offset += 1
let isRelay = (flags & 0x01) != 0
let isPrivate = (flags & 0x02) != 0
let hasOriginalSender = (flags & 0x04) != 0
let hasRecipientNickname = (flags & 0x08) != 0
let hasSenderPeerID = (flags & 0x10) != 0
let hasMentions = (flags & 0x20) != 0
// Timestamp
guard offset + 8 <= dataCopy.count else {
return nil
}
let timestampData = dataCopy[offset..<offset+8]
let timestampMillis = timestampData.reduce(0) { result, byte in
(result << 8) | UInt64(byte)
}
offset += 8
let timestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(timestampMillis) / 1000.0)
// ID
guard offset < dataCopy.count else {
return nil
}
let idLength = Int(dataCopy[offset]); offset += 1
guard offset + idLength <= dataCopy.count else {
return nil
}
let id = String(data: dataCopy[offset..<offset+idLength], encoding: .utf8) ?? UUID().uuidString
offset += idLength
// Sender
guard offset < dataCopy.count else {
return nil
}
let senderLength = Int(dataCopy[offset]); offset += 1
guard offset + senderLength <= dataCopy.count else {
return nil
}
let sender = String(data: dataCopy[offset..<offset+senderLength], encoding: .utf8) ?? "unknown"
offset += senderLength
// Content
guard offset + 2 <= dataCopy.count else {
return nil
}
let contentLengthData = dataCopy[offset..<offset+2]
let contentLength = Int(contentLengthData.reduce(0) { result, byte in
(result << 8) | UInt16(byte)
})
offset += 2
guard offset + contentLength <= dataCopy.count else {
return nil
}
let content = String(data: dataCopy[offset..<offset+contentLength], encoding: .utf8) ?? ""
offset += contentLength
// Optional fields
var originalSender: String?
if hasOriginalSender && offset < dataCopy.count {
let length = Int(dataCopy[offset]); offset += 1
if offset + length <= dataCopy.count {
originalSender = String(data: dataCopy[offset..<offset+length], encoding: .utf8)
offset += length
}
}
var recipientNickname: String?
if hasRecipientNickname && offset < dataCopy.count {
let length = Int(dataCopy[offset]); offset += 1
if offset + length <= dataCopy.count {
recipientNickname = String(data: dataCopy[offset..<offset+length], encoding: .utf8)
offset += length
}
}
var senderPeerID: String?
if hasSenderPeerID && offset < dataCopy.count {
let length = Int(dataCopy[offset]); offset += 1
if offset + length <= dataCopy.count {
senderPeerID = String(data: dataCopy[offset..<offset+length], encoding: .utf8)
offset += length
}
}
// Mentions array
var mentions: [String]?
if hasMentions && offset < dataCopy.count {
let mentionCount = Int(dataCopy[offset]); offset += 1
if mentionCount > 0 {
mentions = []
for _ in 0..<mentionCount {
if offset < dataCopy.count {
let length = Int(dataCopy[offset]); offset += 1
if offset + length <= dataCopy.count {
if let mention = String(data: dataCopy[offset..<offset+length], encoding: .utf8) {
mentions?.append(mention)
}
offset += length
}
}
}
}
}
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: id,
sender: sender,
content: content,
timestamp: timestamp,
isRelay: isRelay,
originalSender: originalSender,
isPrivate: isPrivate,
recipientNickname: recipientNickname,
senderPeerID: senderPeerID,
mentions: mentions
)
return message
}
}
-156
View File
@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
//
// BitchatFilePacket.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
import BitFoundation
import BitLogger
/// TLV payload for Bluetooth mesh file transfers (voice notes, images, generic files).
/// Mirrors the Android client specification to ensure cross-platform interoperability.
struct BitchatFilePacket {
var fileName: String?
var fileSize: UInt64?
var mimeType: String?
var content: Data
/// Canonical TLV tags defined by the Android implementation.
private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
case fileName = 0x01
case fileSize = 0x02
case mimeType = 0x03
case content = 0x04
}
/// Encodes the packet using v2 canonical TLVs (4-byte FILE_SIZE, 4-byte CONTENT length).
/// Returns `nil` when fields exceed protocol limits (e.g., content > UInt32.max).
func encode() -> Data? {
let resolvedSize = fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count)
guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(UInt32.max) else { return nil }
guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) else { return nil }
guard content.count <= Int(UInt32.max) else { return nil }
guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count) else { return nil }
func appendBE<T: FixedWidthInteger>(_ value: T, into data: inout Data) {
var big = value.bigEndian
withUnsafeBytes(of: &big) { data.append(contentsOf: $0) }
}
var encoded = Data()
if let name = fileName, let nameData = name.data(using: .utf8), nameData.count <= Int(UInt16.max) {
encoded.append(TLVType.fileName.rawValue)
appendBE(UInt16(nameData.count), into: &encoded)
encoded.append(nameData)
}
encoded.append(TLVType.fileSize.rawValue)
appendBE(UInt16(4), into: &encoded)
appendBE(UInt32(resolvedSize), into: &encoded)
if let mime = mimeType, let mimeData = mime.data(using: .utf8), mimeData.count <= Int(UInt16.max) {
encoded.append(TLVType.mimeType.rawValue)
appendBE(UInt16(mimeData.count), into: &encoded)
encoded.append(mimeData)
}
encoded.append(TLVType.content.rawValue)
appendBE(UInt32(content.count), into: &encoded)
encoded.append(content)
return encoded
}
/// Decodes TLV payloads, tolerating legacy encodings (FILE_SIZE len=8, CONTENT len=2) when possible.
static func decode(_ data: Data) -> BitchatFilePacket? {
var cursor = data.startIndex
let end = data.endIndex
var fileName: String?
var fileSize: UInt64?
var mimeType: String?
var content = Data()
while cursor < end {
let typeRaw = data[cursor]
cursor = data.index(after: cursor)
guard cursor <= end else { return nil }
let tlvType = TLVType(rawValue: typeRaw)
func readBigEndianLength(bytes: Int) -> Int? {
guard data.distance(from: cursor, to: end) >= bytes else { return nil }
// Use UInt64 to prevent integer overflow during shift operations
var result: UInt64 = 0
for _ in 0..<bytes {
result = (result << 8) | UInt64(data[cursor])
cursor = data.index(after: cursor)
}
// Safely convert to Int with overflow check
guard result <= Int.max else { return nil }
return Int(result)
}
let length: Int?
if tlvType == .content {
let snapshot = cursor
let canonical = readBigEndianLength(bytes: 4)
if let canonical = canonical,
canonical <= data.distance(from: cursor, to: end) {
length = canonical
} else {
cursor = snapshot
length = readBigEndianLength(bytes: 2)
}
} else {
length = readBigEndianLength(bytes: 2)
}
guard let tlvLength = length, tlvLength >= 0 else { return nil }
guard data.distance(from: cursor, to: end) >= tlvLength else { return nil }
let valueStart = cursor
cursor = data.index(cursor, offsetBy: tlvLength)
let value = data[valueStart..<cursor]
switch tlvType {
case .fileName:
fileName = String(data: Data(value), encoding: .utf8)
case .fileSize:
if tlvLength == 4 || tlvLength == 8 {
var size: UInt64 = 0
for byte in value {
size = (size << 8) | UInt64(byte)
}
if size > UInt64(FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) {
return nil
}
fileSize = size
}
case .mimeType:
mimeType = String(data: Data(value), encoding: .utf8)
case .content:
let proposedSize = content.count + value.count
if proposedSize > FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes {
return nil
}
content.append(contentsOf: value)
case nil:
continue
}
}
guard !content.isEmpty else { return nil }
guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count) else { return nil }
return BitchatFilePacket(
fileName: fileName,
fileSize: fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count),
mimeType: mimeType,
content: content
)
}
}
+408 -19
View File
@@ -59,8 +59,91 @@
///
import Foundation
import CoreBluetooth
import BitFoundation
import CryptoKit
// MARK: - Message Padding
/// Provides privacy-preserving message padding to obscure actual content length.
/// Uses PKCS#7-style padding with random bytes to prevent traffic analysis.
struct MessagePadding {
// Standard block sizes for padding
static let blockSizes = [256, 512, 1024, 2048]
// Add PKCS#7-style padding to reach target size
static func pad(_ data: Data, toSize targetSize: Int) -> Data {
guard data.count < targetSize else { return data }
let paddingNeeded = targetSize - data.count
// Constrain to 255 to fit a single-byte pad length marker
guard paddingNeeded > 0 && paddingNeeded <= 255 else { return data }
var padded = data
// PKCS#7: All pad bytes are equal to the pad length
padded.append(contentsOf: Array(repeating: UInt8(paddingNeeded), count: paddingNeeded))
return padded
}
// Remove padding from data
static func unpad(_ data: Data) -> Data {
guard !data.isEmpty else { return data }
let last = data.last!
let paddingLength = Int(last)
// Must have at least 1 pad byte and not exceed data length
guard paddingLength > 0 && paddingLength <= data.count else { return data }
// Verify PKCS#7: all last N bytes equal to pad length
let start = data.count - paddingLength
let tail = data[start...]
for b in tail { if b != last { return data } }
return Data(data[..<start])
}
// Find optimal block size for data
static func optimalBlockSize(for dataSize: Int) -> Int {
// Account for encryption overhead (~16 bytes for AES-GCM tag)
let totalSize = dataSize + 16
// Find smallest block that fits
for blockSize in blockSizes {
if totalSize <= blockSize {
return blockSize
}
}
// For very large messages, just use the original size
// (will be fragmented anyway)
return dataSize
}
}
// MARK: - Message Types
/// Simplified BitChat protocol message types.
/// Reduced from 24 types to just 6 essential ones.
/// All private communication metadata (receipts, status) is embedded in noiseEncrypted payloads.
enum MessageType: UInt8 {
// Public messages (unencrypted)
case announce = 0x01 // "I'm here" with nickname
case message = 0x02 // Public chat message
case leave = 0x03 // "I'm leaving"
// Noise encryption
case noiseHandshake = 0x10 // Handshake (init or response determined by payload)
case noiseEncrypted = 0x11 // All encrypted payloads (messages, receipts, etc.)
// Fragmentation (simplified)
case fragment = 0x20 // Single fragment type for large messages
var description: String {
switch self {
case .announce: return "announce"
case .message: return "message"
case .leave: return "leave"
case .noiseHandshake: return "noiseHandshake"
case .noiseEncrypted: return "noiseEncrypted"
case .fragment: return "fragment"
}
}
}
// MARK: - Noise Payload Types
@@ -72,17 +155,12 @@ enum NoisePayloadType: UInt8 {
case privateMessage = 0x01 // Private chat message
case readReceipt = 0x02 // Message was read
case delivered = 0x03 // Message was delivered
// Verification (QR-based OOB binding)
case verifyChallenge = 0x10 // Verification challenge
case verifyResponse = 0x11 // Verification response
var description: String {
switch self {
case .privateMessage: return "privateMessage"
case .readReceipt: return "readReceipt"
case .delivered: return "delivered"
case .verifyChallenge: return "verifyChallenge"
case .verifyResponse: return "verifyResponse"
}
}
}
@@ -98,25 +176,302 @@ enum LazyHandshakeState {
case failed(Error) // Handshake failed
}
// MARK: - Special Recipients (removed)
// Previously defined broadcast identifiers were unused; removed for simplicity.
// MARK: - Core Protocol Structures
/// The core packet structure for all BitChat protocol messages.
/// Encapsulates all data needed for routing through the mesh network,
/// including TTL for hop limiting and optional encryption.
/// - Note: Packets larger than BLE MTU (512 bytes) are automatically fragmented
struct BitchatPacket: Codable {
let version: UInt8
let type: UInt8
let senderID: Data
let recipientID: Data?
let timestamp: UInt64
let payload: Data
var signature: Data?
var ttl: UInt8
init(type: UInt8, senderID: Data, recipientID: Data?, timestamp: UInt64, payload: Data, signature: Data?, ttl: UInt8) {
self.version = 1
self.type = type
self.senderID = senderID
self.recipientID = recipientID
self.timestamp = timestamp
self.payload = payload
self.signature = signature
self.ttl = ttl
}
// Convenience initializer for new binary format
init(type: UInt8, ttl: UInt8, senderID: String, payload: Data) {
self.version = 1
self.type = type
// Convert hex string peer ID to binary data (8 bytes)
var senderData = Data()
var tempID = senderID
while tempID.count >= 2 {
let hexByte = String(tempID.prefix(2))
if let byte = UInt8(hexByte, radix: 16) {
senderData.append(byte)
}
tempID = String(tempID.dropFirst(2))
}
self.senderID = senderData
self.recipientID = nil
self.timestamp = UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000) // milliseconds
self.payload = payload
self.signature = nil
self.ttl = ttl
}
var data: Data? {
BinaryProtocol.encode(self)
}
func toBinaryData(padding: Bool = true) -> Data? {
BinaryProtocol.encode(self, padding: padding)
}
// Backward-compatible helper (defaults to padded encoding)
func toBinaryData() -> Data? {
toBinaryData(padding: true)
}
/// Create binary representation for signing (without signature and TTL fields)
/// TTL is excluded because it changes during packet relay operations
func toBinaryDataForSigning() -> Data? {
// Create a copy without signature and with fixed TTL for signing
// TTL must be excluded because it changes during relay
let unsignedPacket = BitchatPacket(
type: type,
senderID: senderID,
recipientID: recipientID,
timestamp: timestamp,
payload: payload,
signature: nil, // Remove signature for signing
ttl: 0 // Use fixed TTL=0 for signing to ensure relay compatibility
)
return BinaryProtocol.encode(unsignedPacket)
}
static func from(_ data: Data) -> BitchatPacket? {
BinaryProtocol.decode(data)
}
}
// MARK: - Delivery Acknowledgments (removed)
// Legacy DeliveryAck structures are no longer used; delivery status flows via Noise payloads.
// MARK: - Read Receipts
// Read receipt structure
struct ReadReceipt: Codable {
let originalMessageID: String
let receiptID: String
var readerID: String // Who read it
let readerNickname: String
let timestamp: Date
init(originalMessageID: String, readerID: String, readerNickname: String) {
self.originalMessageID = originalMessageID
self.receiptID = UUID().uuidString
self.readerID = readerID
self.readerNickname = readerNickname
self.timestamp = Date()
}
// For binary decoding
private init(originalMessageID: String, receiptID: String, readerID: String, readerNickname: String, timestamp: Date) {
self.originalMessageID = originalMessageID
self.receiptID = receiptID
self.readerID = readerID
self.readerNickname = readerNickname
self.timestamp = timestamp
}
func encode() -> Data? {
try? JSONEncoder().encode(self)
}
static func decode(from data: Data) -> ReadReceipt? {
try? JSONDecoder().decode(ReadReceipt.self, from: data)
}
// MARK: - Binary Encoding
func toBinaryData() -> Data {
var data = Data()
data.appendUUID(originalMessageID)
data.appendUUID(receiptID)
// ReaderID as 8-byte hex string
var readerData = Data()
var tempID = readerID
while tempID.count >= 2 && readerData.count < 8 {
let hexByte = String(tempID.prefix(2))
if let byte = UInt8(hexByte, radix: 16) {
readerData.append(byte)
}
tempID = String(tempID.dropFirst(2))
}
while readerData.count < 8 {
readerData.append(0)
}
data.append(readerData)
data.appendDate(timestamp)
data.appendString(readerNickname)
return data
}
static func fromBinaryData(_ data: Data) -> ReadReceipt? {
// Create defensive copy
let dataCopy = Data(data)
// Minimum size: 2 UUIDs (32) + readerID (8) + timestamp (8) + min nickname
guard dataCopy.count >= 49 else { return nil }
var offset = 0
guard let originalMessageID = dataCopy.readUUID(at: &offset),
let receiptID = dataCopy.readUUID(at: &offset) else { return nil }
guard let readerIDData = dataCopy.readFixedBytes(at: &offset, count: 8) else { return nil }
let readerID = readerIDData.hexEncodedString()
guard InputValidator.validatePeerID(readerID) else { return nil }
guard let timestamp = dataCopy.readDate(at: &offset),
InputValidator.validateTimestamp(timestamp),
let readerNicknameRaw = dataCopy.readString(at: &offset),
let readerNickname = InputValidator.validateNickname(readerNicknameRaw) else { return nil }
return ReadReceipt(originalMessageID: originalMessageID,
receiptID: receiptID,
readerID: readerID,
readerNickname: readerNickname,
timestamp: timestamp)
}
}
// PeerIdentityBinding removed (unused).
// MARK: - Delivery Status
// Delivery status for messages
enum DeliveryStatus: Codable, Equatable {
case sending
case sent // Left our device
case delivered(to: String, at: Date) // Confirmed by recipient
case read(by: String, at: Date) // Seen by recipient
case failed(reason: String)
case partiallyDelivered(reached: Int, total: Int) // For rooms
var displayText: String {
switch self {
case .sending:
return "Sending..."
case .sent:
return "Sent"
case .delivered(let nickname, _):
return "Delivered to \(nickname)"
case .read(let nickname, _):
return "Read by \(nickname)"
case .failed(let reason):
return "Failed: \(reason)"
case .partiallyDelivered(let reached, let total):
return "Delivered to \(reached)/\(total)"
}
}
}
// MARK: - Message Model
/// Represents a user-visible message in the BitChat system.
/// Handles both broadcast messages and private encrypted messages,
/// with support for mentions, replies, and delivery tracking.
/// - Note: This is the primary data model for chat messages
class BitchatMessage: Codable {
let id: String
let sender: String
let content: String
let timestamp: Date
let isRelay: Bool
let originalSender: String?
let isPrivate: Bool
let recipientNickname: String?
let senderPeerID: String?
let mentions: [String]? // Array of mentioned nicknames
var deliveryStatus: DeliveryStatus? // Delivery tracking
// Cached formatted text (not included in Codable)
private var _cachedFormattedText: [String: AttributedString] = [:]
func getCachedFormattedText(isDark: Bool, isSelf: Bool) -> AttributedString? {
return _cachedFormattedText["\(isDark)-\(isSelf)"]
}
func setCachedFormattedText(_ text: AttributedString, isDark: Bool, isSelf: Bool) {
_cachedFormattedText["\(isDark)-\(isSelf)"] = text
}
// Codable implementation
enum CodingKeys: String, CodingKey {
case id, sender, content, timestamp, isRelay, originalSender
case isPrivate, recipientNickname, senderPeerID, mentions, deliveryStatus
}
init(id: String? = nil, sender: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, isRelay: Bool, originalSender: String? = nil, isPrivate: Bool = false, recipientNickname: String? = nil, senderPeerID: String? = nil, mentions: [String]? = nil, deliveryStatus: DeliveryStatus? = nil) {
self.id = id ?? UUID().uuidString
self.sender = sender
self.content = content
self.timestamp = timestamp
self.isRelay = isRelay
self.originalSender = originalSender
self.isPrivate = isPrivate
self.recipientNickname = recipientNickname
self.senderPeerID = senderPeerID
self.mentions = mentions
self.deliveryStatus = deliveryStatus ?? (isPrivate ? .sending : nil)
}
}
// Equatable conformance for BitchatMessage
extension BitchatMessage: Equatable {
static func == (lhs: BitchatMessage, rhs: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
return lhs.id == rhs.id &&
lhs.sender == rhs.sender &&
lhs.content == rhs.content &&
lhs.timestamp == rhs.timestamp &&
lhs.isRelay == rhs.isRelay &&
lhs.originalSender == rhs.originalSender &&
lhs.isPrivate == rhs.isPrivate &&
lhs.recipientNickname == rhs.recipientNickname &&
lhs.senderPeerID == rhs.senderPeerID &&
lhs.mentions == rhs.mentions &&
lhs.deliveryStatus == rhs.deliveryStatus
}
}
// MARK: - Delegate Protocol
protocol BitchatDelegate: AnyObject {
func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage)
func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID)
func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID)
func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID])
func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: String)
func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: String)
func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [String])
// Optional method to check if a fingerprint belongs to a favorite peer
func isFavorite(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
func didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus(_ messageID: String, status: DeliveryStatus)
// Low-level events for better separation of concerns
func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
// Bluetooth state updates for user notifications
func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState)
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?)
func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: String, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: String, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date)
}
// Provide default implementation to make it effectively optional
@@ -129,11 +484,45 @@ extension BitchatDelegate {
// Default empty implementation
}
func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: String, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
// Default empty implementation
}
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: String, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date) {
// Default empty implementation
}
}
// MARK: - Noise Payload Helpers
/// Helper to create typed Noise payloads
struct NoisePayload {
let type: NoisePayloadType
let data: Data
/// Encode payload with type prefix
func encode() -> Data {
var encoded = Data()
encoded.append(type.rawValue)
encoded.append(data)
return encoded
}
/// Decode payload from data
static func decode(_ data: Data) -> NoisePayload? {
// Ensure we have at least 1 byte for the type
guard !data.isEmpty else {
return nil
}
// Safely get the first byte
let firstByte = data[data.startIndex]
guard let type = NoisePayloadType(rawValue: firstByte) else {
return nil
}
// Create a proper Data copy (not a subsequence) for thread safety
let payloadData = data.count > 1 ? Data(data.dropFirst()) : Data()
return NoisePayload(type: type, data: payloadData)
}
}
-85
View File
@@ -10,14 +10,6 @@ enum Geohash {
return map
}()
/// Validates a geohash string for building-level precision (8 characters).
/// - Parameter geohash: The geohash string to validate
/// - Returns: true if valid 8-character base32 geohash, false otherwise
static func isValidBuildingGeohash(_ geohash: String) -> Bool {
guard geohash.count == 8 else { return false }
return geohash.lowercased().allSatisfy { base32Map[$0] != nil }
}
/// Encodes the provided coordinates into a geohash string.
/// - Parameters:
/// - latitude: Latitude in degrees (-90...90)
@@ -95,81 +87,4 @@ enum Geohash {
let lon = (lonInterval.0 + lonInterval.1) / 2
return (lat, lon)
}
/// Decodes a geohash into its latitude and longitude bounds.
/// - Parameter geohash: Base32 geohash string.
/// - Returns: (latMin, latMax, lonMin, lonMax)
static func decodeBounds(_ geohash: String) -> (latMin: Double, latMax: Double, lonMin: Double, lonMax: Double) {
var latInterval: (Double, Double) = (-90.0, 90.0)
var lonInterval: (Double, Double) = (-180.0, 180.0)
var isEven = true
for ch in geohash.lowercased() {
guard let cd = base32Map[ch] else { continue }
for mask in [16, 8, 4, 2, 1] {
if isEven {
let mid = (lonInterval.0 + lonInterval.1) / 2
if (cd & mask) != 0 { lonInterval.0 = mid } else { lonInterval.1 = mid }
} else {
let mid = (latInterval.0 + latInterval.1) / 2
if (cd & mask) != 0 { latInterval.0 = mid } else { latInterval.1 = mid }
}
isEven.toggle()
}
}
return (latInterval.0, latInterval.1, lonInterval.0, lonInterval.1)
}
/// Returns all 8 neighboring geohash cells at the same precision.
/// - Parameter geohash: Base32 geohash string.
/// - Returns: Array of 8 neighboring geohashes (N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, NW order).
static func neighbors(of geohash: String) -> [String] {
guard !geohash.isEmpty else { return [] }
let precision = geohash.count
let bounds = decodeBounds(geohash)
let center = decodeCenter(geohash)
// Calculate cell dimensions
let latHeight = bounds.latMax - bounds.latMin
let lonWidth = bounds.lonMax - bounds.lonMin
// Helper to wrap longitude around ±180
func wrapLongitude(_ lon: Double) -> Double {
var wrapped = lon
while wrapped > 180.0 { wrapped -= 360.0 }
while wrapped < -180.0 { wrapped += 360.0 }
return wrapped
}
// Helper to clamp latitude to ±90
func clampLatitude(_ lat: Double) -> Double {
return max(-90.0, min(90.0, lat))
}
// Calculate 8 neighbor centers
let neighbors: [(lat: Double, lon: Double)] = [
(center.lat + latHeight, center.lon), // N
(center.lat + latHeight, center.lon + lonWidth), // NE
(center.lat, center.lon + lonWidth), // E
(center.lat - latHeight, center.lon + lonWidth), // SE
(center.lat - latHeight, center.lon), // S
(center.lat - latHeight, center.lon - lonWidth), // SW
(center.lat, center.lon - lonWidth), // W
(center.lat + latHeight, center.lon - lonWidth) // NW
]
// Encode each neighbor, handling boundary conditions
return neighbors.compactMap { neighbor in
let lat = clampLatitude(neighbor.lat)
let lon = wrapLongitude(neighbor.lon)
// Skip if we've crossed a pole (latitude clamped to boundary)
if (neighbor.lat > 90.0 || neighbor.lat < -90.0) {
return nil
}
return encode(latitude: lat, longitude: lon, precision: precision)
}
}
}
+7 -33
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import Foundation
/// Levels of location channels mapped to geohash precisions.
enum GeohashChannelLevel: CaseIterable, Codable, Equatable {
case building
case block
case neighborhood
case city
@@ -12,39 +11,30 @@ enum GeohashChannelLevel: CaseIterable, Codable, Equatable {
/// Geohash length used for this level.
var precision: Int {
switch self {
case .building: return 8
case .block: return 7
case .neighborhood: return 6
case .city: return 5
case .province: return 4
case .region: return 2
}
}
}
var displayName: String {
switch self {
case .building:
return String(localized: "location_levels.building", comment: "Name for building-level location channel")
case .block:
return String(localized: "location_levels.block", comment: "Name for block-level location channel")
case .neighborhood:
return String(localized: "location_levels.neighborhood", comment: "Name for neighborhood-level location channel")
case .city:
return String(localized: "location_levels.city", comment: "Name for city-level location channel")
case .province:
return String(localized: "location_levels.province", comment: "Name for province-level location channel")
case .region:
return String(localized: "location_levels.region", comment: "Name for region-level location channel")
}
case .block: return "Block"
case .neighborhood: return "Neighborhood"
case .city: return "City"
case .province: return "Province"
case .region: return "Region"
}
}
}
// Backward-compatible Codable for renamed cases
extension GeohashChannelLevel {
init(from decoder: Decoder) throws {
let container = try decoder.singleValueContainer()
if let raw = try? container.decode(String.self) {
switch raw {
case "building": self = .building
case "block": self = .block
case "neighborhood": self = .neighborhood
case "city": self = .city
@@ -56,7 +46,6 @@ extension GeohashChannelLevel {
}
} else if let precision = try? container.decode(Int.self) {
switch precision {
case 8: self = .building
case 7: self = .block
case 6: self = .neighborhood
case 5: self = .city
@@ -72,7 +61,6 @@ extension GeohashChannelLevel {
func encode(to encoder: Encoder) throws {
var container = encoder.singleValueContainer()
switch self {
case .building: try container.encode("building")
case .block: try container.encode("block")
case .neighborhood: try container.encode("neighborhood")
case .city: try container.encode("city")
@@ -116,18 +104,4 @@ enum ChannelID: Equatable, Codable {
case .location(let ch): return ch.geohash
}
}
var isMesh: Bool {
switch self {
case .mesh: true
case .location: false
}
}
var isLocation: Bool {
switch self {
case .mesh: false
case .location: true
}
}
}
+1 -29
View File
@@ -6,19 +6,15 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
let nickname: String
let noisePublicKey: Data // Noise static public key (Curve25519.KeyAgreement)
let signingPublicKey: Data // Ed25519 public key for signing
let directNeighbors: [Data]? // 8-byte peer IDs
private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
case nickname = 0x01
case noisePublicKey = 0x02
case signingPublicKey = 0x03
case directNeighbors = 0x04
}
func encode() -> Data? {
var data = Data()
// Reserve: TLVs for nickname (2 + n), noise key (2 + 32), signing key (2 + 32)
data.reserveCapacity(2 + min(nickname.count, 255) + 2 + noisePublicKey.count + 2 + signingPublicKey.count)
// TLV for nickname
guard let nicknameData = nickname.data(using: .utf8), nicknameData.count <= 255 else { return nil }
@@ -37,16 +33,6 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
data.append(TLVType.signingPublicKey.rawValue)
data.append(UInt8(signingPublicKey.count))
data.append(signingPublicKey)
// TLV for direct neighbors (optional)
if let neighbors = directNeighbors, !neighbors.isEmpty {
let neighborsData = neighbors.prefix(10).reduce(Data()) { $0 + $1 }
if !neighborsData.isEmpty && neighborsData.count % 8 == 0 {
data.append(TLVType.directNeighbors.rawValue)
data.append(UInt8(neighborsData.count))
data.append(neighborsData)
}
}
return data
}
@@ -56,7 +42,6 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
var nickname: String?
var noisePublicKey: Data?
var signingPublicKey: Data?
var directNeighbors: [Data]?
while offset + 2 <= data.count {
let typeRaw = data[offset]
@@ -76,17 +61,6 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
noisePublicKey = Data(value)
case .signingPublicKey:
signingPublicKey = Data(value)
case .directNeighbors:
if length > 0 && length % 8 == 0 {
var neighbors = [Data]()
let count = length / 8
for i in 0..<count {
let start = value.startIndex + i * 8
let end = start + 8
neighbors.append(Data(value[start..<end]))
}
directNeighbors = neighbors
}
}
} else {
// Unknown TLV; skip (tolerant decoder for forward compatibility)
@@ -98,8 +72,7 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
return AnnouncementPacket(
nickname: nickname,
noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
directNeighbors: directNeighbors
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey
)
}
}
@@ -115,7 +88,6 @@ struct PrivateMessagePacket {
func encode() -> Data? {
var data = Data()
data.reserveCapacity(2 + min(messageID.count, 255) + 2 + min(content.count, 255))
// TLV for messageID
guard let messageIDData = messageID.data(using: .utf8), messageIDData.count <= 255 else { return nil }
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
// MARK: - Peer ID Utilities
struct PeerIDUtils {
/// Derive the stable 16-hex peer ID from a Noise static public key
static func derivePeerID(fromPublicKey publicKey: Data) -> String {
let digest = SHA256.hash(data: publicKey)
let hex = digest.map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
return String(hex.prefix(16))
}
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@
import Foundation
/// Manages autocomplete functionality for chat
final class AutocompleteService {
class AutocompleteService {
private let mentionRegex = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "@([\\p{L}0-9_]*)$", options: [])
private let commandRegex = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "^/([a-z]*)$", options: [])
private let commands = [
"/msg", "/who", "/clear",
"/msg", "/who", "/clear", "/help",
"/hug", "/slap", "/fav", "/unfav",
"/block", "/unblock"
]
@@ -95,10 +95,10 @@ final class AutocompleteService {
private func needsArgument(command: String) -> Bool {
switch command {
case "/who", "/clear":
case "/who", "/clear", "/help":
return false
default:
return true
}
}
}
}
@@ -1,231 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import BitLogger
import Foundation
/// Narrow environment for `BLEAnnounceHandler`.
///
/// All queue hops (collections barrier, BLE-queue link-state reads, main-actor
/// UI notification, delayed re-announce) live inside the closures supplied by
/// `BLEService`, keeping the handler queue-agnostic and synchronously testable.
struct BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
/// Local peer identity at the time the announce is handled.
let localPeerID: () -> PeerID
/// TTL value used for direct (non-relayed) packets.
let messageTTL: UInt8
/// Current time source.
let now: () -> Date
/// Noise public key already recorded for the peer, if any (registry read).
let existingNoisePublicKey: (PeerID) -> Data?
/// Verifies the packet signature against the announced signing key.
let verifySignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool
/// Direct link state for the peer (BLE-queue read).
let linkState: (PeerID) -> (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool)
/// Runs the registry mutation phase under the collections barrier.
let withRegistryBarrier: (() -> Void) -> Void
/// Upserts the verified announce into the peer registry.
/// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
let upsertVerifiedAnnounce: (
_ peerID: PeerID,
_ announcement: AnnouncementPacket,
_ isConnected: Bool,
_ now: Date
) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate
/// Debounced reconnect-log decision.
/// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
let shouldEmitReconnectLog: (_ peerID: PeerID, _ now: Date) -> Bool
/// Records verified direct-neighbor claims in the mesh topology.
let updateTopology: (_ peerID: PeerID, _ neighbors: [Data]) -> Void
/// Persists the announced cryptographic identity for offline verification.
let persistIdentity: (AnnouncementPacket) -> Void
/// Announce-back dedup check.
let dedupContains: (String) -> Bool
/// Announce-back dedup marking.
let dedupMarkProcessed: (String) -> Void
/// Delivers the announce UI events as one ordered main-actor hop:
/// `.peerConnected` (if flagged) initial gossip sync scheduling (if
/// flagged) peer-ID snapshot + data publish + `.peerListUpdated`.
/// A single closure keeps the original in-order delivery guarantee that
/// separate unstructured tasks would not provide.
let deliverAnnounceUIEvents: (
_ peerID: PeerID,
_ notifyPeerConnected: Bool,
_ scheduleInitialSync: Bool
) -> Void
/// Tracks the announce packet for gossip sync.
let trackPacketSeen: (BitchatPacket) -> Void
/// Reciprocates the announce for bidirectional discovery.
let sendAnnounceBack: () -> Void
/// Schedules a delayed re-announce (afterglow) after the given delay.
let scheduleAfterglow: (TimeInterval) -> Void
}
/// Outcome of an accepted announce, surfaced so the service can run
/// follow-up work (e.g. courier handover) that keys off the announce.
struct BLEAnnounceHandlingResult {
let peerID: PeerID
let announcement: AnnouncementPacket
let isDirectAnnounce: Bool
let isVerified: Bool
}
/// Orchestrates inbound announce packets: preflight validation, signature
/// trust, registry/topology updates, identity persistence, UI notification,
/// gossip tracking, and the reciprocal announce response.
final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
private let environment: BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment
init(environment: BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment) {
self.environment = environment
}
@discardableResult
func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) -> BLEAnnounceHandlingResult? {
let env = environment
let now = env.now()
let preflight = BLEAnnouncePreflightPolicy.evaluate(
packet: packet,
from: peerID,
localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
now: now
)
let announcement: AnnouncementPacket
switch preflight {
case .accept(let acceptance):
announcement = acceptance.announcement
case .reject(.malformed):
SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decode announce packet from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .session)
return nil
case .reject(.senderMismatch(let derivedFromKey)):
SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce sender mismatch: derived \(derivedFromKey.id.prefix(8))… vs packet \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security)
return nil
case .reject(.selfAnnounce):
return nil
case .reject(.stale(let ageSeconds)):
SecureLogger.debug("⏰ Ignoring stale announce from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… (age: \(ageSeconds)s)", category: .session)
return nil
}
// Suppress announce logs to reduce noise
// Precompute signature verification outside barrier to reduce contention
let existingNoisePublicKey = env.existingNoisePublicKey(peerID)
let hasSignature = packet.signature != nil
let signatureValid: Bool
if hasSignature {
signatureValid = env.verifySignature(packet, announcement.signingPublicKey)
if !signatureValid {
SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Signature verification for announce failed \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security)
}
} else {
signatureValid = false
}
let trustDecision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
hasSignature: hasSignature,
signatureValid: signatureValid,
existingNoisePublicKey: existingNoisePublicKey,
announcedNoisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey
)
if case .reject(.keyMismatch) = trustDecision {
SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce key mismatch for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — keeping unverified", category: .security)
}
let verifiedAnnounce = trustDecision.isVerified
var isNewPeer = false
var isReconnectedPeer = false
let directLinkState = env.linkState(peerID)
let isDirectAnnounce = packet.ttl == env.messageTTL
env.withRegistryBarrier {
let hasPeripheralConnection = directLinkState.hasPeripheral
let hasCentralSubscription = directLinkState.hasCentral
// Require verified announce; ignore otherwise (no backward compatibility)
if !verifiedAnnounce {
SecureLogger.warning("❌ Ignoring unverified announce from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security)
// Reset flags to prevent post-barrier code from acting on unverified announces
isNewPeer = false
isReconnectedPeer = false
return
}
let update = env.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID,
announcement,
isDirectAnnounce || hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription,
now
)
isNewPeer = update.isNewPeer
isReconnectedPeer = update.wasDisconnected
// Log connection status only for direct connectivity changes; debounce to reduce spam
if isDirectAnnounce || hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription {
let now = env.now()
if update.isNewPeer {
SecureLogger.debug("🆕 New peer: \(announcement.nickname)", category: .session)
} else if update.wasDisconnected {
if env.shouldEmitReconnectLog(peerID, now) {
SecureLogger.debug("🔄 Peer \(announcement.nickname) reconnected", category: .session)
}
} else if let previousNickname = update.previousNickname, previousNickname != announcement.nickname {
SecureLogger.debug("🔄 Peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… changed nickname: \(previousNickname) -> \(announcement.nickname)", category: .session)
}
}
}
// Update topology with verified neighbor claims (only for authenticated announces)
if verifiedAnnounce, let neighbors = announcement.directNeighbors {
env.updateTopology(peerID, neighbors)
}
// Persist cryptographic identity and signing key for robust offline
// verification only for verified announces. Persisting unverified
// announces would let an attacker who replays a victim's noisePublicKey
// overwrite the victim's stored signing key/nickname (identity poisoning).
if verifiedAnnounce {
env.persistIdentity(announcement)
}
let announceBackID = "announce-back-\(peerID)"
let shouldSendBack = !env.dedupContains(announceBackID)
if shouldSendBack {
env.dedupMarkProcessed(announceBackID)
}
let responsePlan = BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy.plan(
isDirectAnnounce: isDirectAnnounce,
isNewPeer: isNewPeer,
isReconnectedPeer: isReconnectedPeer,
shouldSendAnnounceBack: shouldSendBack
)
// Only notify of connection for new or reconnected peers when it is a
// direct announce; the list update always follows in the same hop.
env.deliverAnnounceUIEvents(
peerID,
responsePlan.shouldNotifyPeerConnected,
responsePlan.shouldNotifyPeerConnected && responsePlan.shouldScheduleInitialSync
)
// Track for sync (include our own and others' announces)
env.trackPacketSeen(packet)
if responsePlan.shouldSendAnnounceBack {
// Reciprocate announce for bidirectional discovery
// Force send to ensure the peer receives our announce
env.sendAnnounceBack()
}
// Afterglow: on first-seen peers, schedule a short re-announce to push presence one more hop
if responsePlan.shouldScheduleAfterglow {
let delay = Double.random(in: 0.3...0.6)
env.scheduleAfterglow(delay)
}
return BLEAnnounceHandlingResult(
peerID: peerID,
announcement: announcement,
isDirectAnnounce: isDirectAnnounce,
isVerified: verifiedAnnounce
)
}
}
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
struct BLEAnnouncePreflightAcceptance {
let announcement: AnnouncementPacket
let derivedPeerID: PeerID
}
enum BLEAnnouncePreflightRejection: Equatable {
case malformed
case senderMismatch(derivedPeerID: PeerID)
case selfAnnounce
case stale(ageSeconds: Double)
}
enum BLEAnnouncePreflightDecision {
case accept(BLEAnnouncePreflightAcceptance)
case reject(BLEAnnouncePreflightRejection)
}
enum BLEAnnouncePreflightPolicy {
static func evaluate(
packet: BitchatPacket,
from peerID: PeerID,
localPeerID: PeerID,
now: Date
) -> BLEAnnouncePreflightDecision {
guard let announcement = AnnouncementPacket.decode(from: packet.payload) else {
return .reject(.malformed)
}
let derivedPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
guard derivedPeerID == peerID else {
return .reject(.senderMismatch(derivedPeerID: derivedPeerID))
}
guard peerID != localPeerID else {
return .reject(.selfAnnounce)
}
guard !BLEPacketFreshnessPolicy.isStale(timestampMilliseconds: packet.timestamp, now: now) else {
return .reject(.stale(ageSeconds: BLEPacketFreshnessPolicy.ageSeconds(
timestampMilliseconds: packet.timestamp,
now: now
)))
}
return .accept(BLEAnnouncePreflightAcceptance(
announcement: announcement,
derivedPeerID: derivedPeerID
))
}
}
enum BLEAnnounceTrustRejection: Equatable {
case missingSignature
case invalidSignature
case keyMismatch
}
enum BLEAnnounceTrustDecision: Equatable {
case verified
case reject(BLEAnnounceTrustRejection)
var isVerified: Bool {
self == .verified
}
}
enum BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy {
static func evaluate(
hasSignature: Bool,
signatureValid: Bool,
existingNoisePublicKey: Data?,
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data
) -> BLEAnnounceTrustDecision {
if let existingNoisePublicKey, existingNoisePublicKey != announcedNoisePublicKey {
return .reject(.keyMismatch)
}
guard hasSignature else {
return .reject(.missingSignature)
}
guard signatureValid else {
return .reject(.invalidSignature)
}
return .verified
}
}
struct BLEAnnounceResponsePlan: Equatable {
let shouldNotifyPeerConnected: Bool
let shouldScheduleInitialSync: Bool
let shouldSendAnnounceBack: Bool
let shouldScheduleAfterglow: Bool
}
enum BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy {
static func plan(
isDirectAnnounce: Bool,
isNewPeer: Bool,
isReconnectedPeer: Bool,
shouldSendAnnounceBack: Bool
) -> BLEAnnounceResponsePlan {
let shouldNotifyPeerConnected = isDirectAnnounce && (isNewPeer || isReconnectedPeer)
return BLEAnnounceResponsePlan(
shouldNotifyPeerConnected: shouldNotifyPeerConnected,
shouldScheduleInitialSync: shouldNotifyPeerConnected,
shouldSendAnnounceBack: shouldSendAnnounceBack,
shouldScheduleAfterglow: isNewPeer
)
}
}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
struct BLEAnnounceThrottle {
private var lastSent: Date
private let normalMinimumInterval: TimeInterval
private let forcedMinimumInterval: TimeInterval
init(
lastSent: Date = .distantPast,
normalMinimumInterval: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.bleAnnounceMinInterval,
forcedMinimumInterval: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.bleForceAnnounceMinIntervalSeconds
) {
self.lastSent = lastSent
self.normalMinimumInterval = normalMinimumInterval
self.forcedMinimumInterval = forcedMinimumInterval
}
func elapsed(since now: Date) -> TimeInterval {
now.timeIntervalSince(lastSent)
}
mutating func shouldSend(force: Bool, now: Date) -> Bool {
let minimumInterval = force ? forcedMinimumInterval : normalMinimumInterval
guard elapsed(since: now) >= minimumInterval else {
return false
}
lastSent = now
return true
}
}
@@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
struct BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral> {
let peripheral: Peripheral
let peripheralID: String
let rssi: Int
let name: String
let isConnectable: Bool
let discoveredAt: Date
}
struct BLEExistingConnectionState {
let isConnecting: Bool
let isConnected: Bool
let lastConnectionAttempt: Date?
}
enum BLEPeripheralConnectionState {
case disconnected
case connecting
case connected
}
enum BLEDiscoveryDecision: Equatable {
case ignore
case queued
case scheduleRetry(after: TimeInterval)
case cancelStaleConnection
case connectNow
}
enum BLEConnectionQueueDecision<Peripheral> {
case none
case retryAfter(TimeInterval)
case connect(BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>)
}
final class BLEConnectionScheduler<Peripheral> {
private let maxCentralLinks: Int
private let connectRateLimitInterval: TimeInterval
private let candidateCap: Int
private let weakLinkCooldownSeconds: TimeInterval
private let weakLinkRSSICutoff: Int
private var lastGlobalConnectAttempt: Date = .distantPast
private var candidates: [BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>] = []
private var failureCounts: [String: Int] = [:]
private var recentConnectTimeouts: [String: Date] = [:]
// Tracked separately from connect timeouts: a peer we held a connection
// with and lost (walked out of range) usually comes back, so it only gets
// a brief rediscovery ignore not the timeout backoff/cooldown treatment
// reserved for peers that never answered a connect attempt.
private var recentDisconnects: [String: Date] = [:]
private var lastIsolatedAt: Date?
private let initialDynamicRSSIThreshold: Int
private(set) var dynamicRSSIThreshold: Int
var candidateCount: Int {
candidates.count
}
init(
maxCentralLinks: Int = TransportConfig.bleMaxCentralLinks,
connectRateLimitInterval: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.bleConnectRateLimitInterval,
candidateCap: Int = TransportConfig.bleConnectionCandidatesMax,
weakLinkCooldownSeconds: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.bleWeakLinkCooldownSeconds,
weakLinkRSSICutoff: Int = TransportConfig.bleWeakLinkRSSICutoff,
dynamicRSSIThreshold: Int = TransportConfig.bleDynamicRSSIThresholdDefault
) {
self.maxCentralLinks = maxCentralLinks
self.connectRateLimitInterval = connectRateLimitInterval
self.candidateCap = candidateCap
self.weakLinkCooldownSeconds = weakLinkCooldownSeconds
self.weakLinkRSSICutoff = weakLinkRSSICutoff
self.initialDynamicRSSIThreshold = dynamicRSSIThreshold
self.dynamicRSSIThreshold = dynamicRSSIThreshold
}
func handleDiscovery(
_ candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>,
connectedOrConnectingCount: Int,
existingState: BLEExistingConnectionState?,
peripheralState: BLEPeripheralConnectionState,
now: Date
) -> BLEDiscoveryDecision {
guard candidate.isConnectable else { return .ignore }
if candidate.rssi <= dynamicRSSIThreshold {
enqueue(candidate)
return .queued
}
if connectedOrConnectingCount >= maxCentralLinks {
enqueue(candidate)
return .queued
}
if let retryDelay = rateLimitRetryDelay(now: now) {
enqueue(candidate)
return .scheduleRetry(after: retryDelay)
}
if let existingState {
if existingState.isConnected || existingState.isConnecting {
return .ignore
}
if let lastAttempt = existingState.lastConnectionAttempt,
now.timeIntervalSince(lastAttempt) < 2.0 {
return .ignore
}
}
if let lastTimeout = recentConnectTimeouts[candidate.peripheralID],
now.timeIntervalSince(lastTimeout) < TransportConfig.bleTimeoutDiscoveryIgnoreSeconds {
return .ignore
}
if let lastDisconnect = recentDisconnects[candidate.peripheralID],
now.timeIntervalSince(lastDisconnect) < TransportConfig.bleDisconnectDiscoveryIgnoreSeconds {
return .ignore
}
switch peripheralState {
case .disconnected:
return .connectNow
case .connecting, .connected:
return .cancelStaleConnection
}
}
func enqueue(_ candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>) {
if let existingIndex = candidates.firstIndex(where: { $0.peripheralID == candidate.peripheralID }) {
candidates[existingIndex] = candidate
} else {
candidates.append(candidate)
}
candidates.sort {
if $0.rssi != $1.rssi { return $0.rssi > $1.rssi }
return $0.discoveredAt < $1.discoveredAt
}
if candidates.count > candidateCap {
candidates.removeLast(candidates.count - candidateCap)
}
}
func nextCandidate(
connectedOrConnectingCount: Int,
isAlreadyConnectingOrConnected: (String) -> Bool,
now: Date
) -> BLEConnectionQueueDecision<Peripheral> {
guard connectedOrConnectingCount < maxCentralLinks else { return .none }
if let retryDelay = rateLimitRetryDelay(now: now) {
return .retryAfter(retryDelay)
}
while !candidates.isEmpty {
candidates.sort { score($0, now: now) > score($1, now: now) }
let candidate = candidates.removeFirst()
guard candidate.isConnectable else { continue }
if let delay = weakLinkRetryDelay(for: candidate, now: now) {
enqueue(candidate)
return .retryAfter(delay)
}
if let delay = disconnectSettleDelay(for: candidate, now: now) {
enqueue(candidate)
return .retryAfter(delay)
}
if isAlreadyConnectingOrConnected(candidate.peripheralID) {
continue
}
return .connect(candidate)
}
return .none
}
func recordConnectionAttempt(at now: Date) {
lastGlobalConnectAttempt = now
}
func recordConnectionSuccess(peripheralID: String) {
failureCounts[peripheralID] = 0
recentConnectTimeouts.removeValue(forKey: peripheralID)
recentDisconnects.removeValue(forKey: peripheralID)
}
func recordConnectionFailure(peripheralID: String) {
failureCounts[peripheralID, default: 0] += 1
}
func recordDisconnectError(peripheralID: String, at now: Date) {
recentDisconnects[peripheralID] = now
}
func recordConnectionTimeout(peripheralID: String, at now: Date) {
recentConnectTimeouts[peripheralID] = now
recordConnectionFailure(peripheralID: peripheralID)
}
func pruneConnectionTimeouts(before cutoff: Date) {
recentConnectTimeouts = recentConnectTimeouts.filter { $0.value >= cutoff }
recentDisconnects = recentDisconnects.filter { $0.value >= cutoff }
}
func reset() {
lastGlobalConnectAttempt = .distantPast
candidates.removeAll()
failureCounts.removeAll()
recentConnectTimeouts.removeAll()
recentDisconnects.removeAll()
lastIsolatedAt = nil
dynamicRSSIThreshold = initialDynamicRSSIThreshold
}
@discardableResult
func updateRSSIThreshold(
connectedCount: Int,
connectedOrConnectingLinkCount: Int,
now: Date
) -> Int {
if connectedCount == 0 {
if lastIsolatedAt == nil { lastIsolatedAt = now }
let isolatedAt = lastIsolatedAt ?? now
let elapsed = now.timeIntervalSince(isolatedAt)
dynamicRSSIThreshold = elapsed > TransportConfig.bleIsolationRelaxThresholdSeconds
? TransportConfig.bleRSSIIsolatedRelaxed
: TransportConfig.bleRSSIIsolatedBase
return dynamicRSSIThreshold
}
lastIsolatedAt = nil
// Flaky links are handled per-peripheral (weak-link cooldown, discovery
// ignore window, score bias) never globally, so one flaky distant peer
// can't blind us to every other edge-of-range peer.
var threshold = TransportConfig.bleDynamicRSSIThresholdDefault
if connectedOrConnectingLinkCount >= maxCentralLinks || candidates.count >= candidateCap {
threshold = TransportConfig.bleRSSIConnectedThreshold
}
dynamicRSSIThreshold = threshold
return threshold
}
private func rateLimitRetryDelay(now: Date) -> TimeInterval? {
let elapsed = now.timeIntervalSince(lastGlobalConnectAttempt)
guard elapsed < connectRateLimitInterval else { return nil }
return connectRateLimitInterval - elapsed + 0.05
}
private func weakLinkRetryDelay(
for candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>,
now: Date
) -> TimeInterval? {
guard let lastTimeout = recentConnectTimeouts[candidate.peripheralID] else { return nil }
let elapsed = now.timeIntervalSince(lastTimeout)
guard elapsed < weakLinkCooldownSeconds && candidate.rssi <= weakLinkRSSICutoff else { return nil }
let remaining = weakLinkCooldownSeconds - elapsed
return min(max(2.0, remaining), 15.0)
}
// The disconnect settle window must hold on the queue path too: a stale
// candidate enqueued while the peripheral was still connected would
// otherwise reconnect immediately via the post-disconnect queue drain,
// bypassing the window and recreating reconnect/cancel thrash.
private func disconnectSettleDelay(
for candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>,
now: Date
) -> TimeInterval? {
guard let lastDisconnect = recentDisconnects[candidate.peripheralID] else { return nil }
let remaining = TransportConfig.bleDisconnectDiscoveryIgnoreSeconds - now.timeIntervalSince(lastDisconnect)
guard remaining > 0 else { return nil }
return remaining + 0.05
}
private func score(_ candidate: BLEConnectionCandidate<Peripheral>, now: Date) -> Int {
let failures = failureCounts[candidate.peripheralID] ?? 0
let penalty = min(20, 1 << min(4, failures))
let timeoutBias = recentConnectTimeouts[candidate.peripheralID].map {
now.timeIntervalSince($0) < 60 ? 10 : 0
} ?? 0
let base = (candidate.isConnectable ? 1000 : 0) + (candidate.rssi + 100) * 2
let recency = -Int(now.timeIntervalSince(candidate.discoveredAt) * 10)
return base + recency - penalty - timeoutBias
}
}
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
struct BLEDirectedRelaySpoolEntry {
let recipient: PeerID
let packet: BitchatPacket
}
struct BLEDirectedRelaySpool {
private struct StoredPacket {
let packet: BitchatPacket
let enqueuedAt: Date
}
private var packetsByRecipient: [PeerID: [String: StoredPacket]] = [:]
var isEmpty: Bool {
packetsByRecipient.isEmpty
}
var count: Int {
packetsByRecipient.values.reduce(0) { $0 + $1.count }
}
@discardableResult
mutating func enqueue(
packet: BitchatPacket,
recipient: PeerID,
messageID: String,
enqueuedAt: Date
) -> Bool {
var packets = packetsByRecipient[recipient] ?? [:]
guard packets[messageID] == nil else {
return false
}
packets[messageID] = StoredPacket(packet: packet, enqueuedAt: enqueuedAt)
packetsByRecipient[recipient] = packets
return true
}
mutating func drainUnexpired(now: Date, window: TimeInterval) -> [BLEDirectedRelaySpoolEntry] {
var entries: [BLEDirectedRelaySpoolEntry] = []
for (recipient, packets) in packetsByRecipient {
for stored in packets.values where now.timeIntervalSince(stored.enqueuedAt) <= window {
entries.append(BLEDirectedRelaySpoolEntry(recipient: recipient, packet: stored.packet))
}
}
packetsByRecipient.removeAll()
return entries
}
mutating func pruneExpired(now: Date, window: TimeInterval) {
guard !packetsByRecipient.isEmpty else { return }
var pruned: [PeerID: [String: StoredPacket]] = [:]
for (recipient, packets) in packetsByRecipient {
let freshPackets = packets.filter { now.timeIntervalSince($0.value.enqueuedAt) <= window }
if !freshPackets.isEmpty {
pruned[recipient] = freshPackets
}
}
packetsByRecipient = pruned
}
mutating func removeAll() {
packetsByRecipient.removeAll()
}
}
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import CryptoKit
import Foundation
struct BLEFanoutSelection: Equatable {
let peripheralIDs: Set<String>
let centralIDs: Set<String>
}
enum BLEFanoutSelector {
static func selectLinks(
peripheralIDs: [String],
centralIDs: [String],
ingressLink: BLEIngressLinkID?,
excludedLinks: Set<BLEIngressLinkID> = [],
peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
directedPeerHint: PeerID?,
packetType: UInt8,
messageID: String
) -> BLEFanoutSelection {
let rawAllowed = allowedLinks(
peripheralIDs: peripheralIDs,
centralIDs: centralIDs,
ingressLink: ingressLink,
excludedLinks: excludedLinks
)
if let directedPeerHint,
let directedSelection = directLinks(
to: directedPeerHint,
links: rawAllowed,
peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
) {
return directedSelection
}
if let directedPeerHint,
hasBoundLink(
to: directedPeerHint,
peripheralIDs: peripheralIDs,
centralIDs: centralIDs,
peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
) {
return BLEFanoutSelection(peripheralIDs: [], centralIDs: [])
}
let allowed = collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
rawAllowed,
peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
)
guard shouldSubset(packetType: packetType, directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint) else {
return BLEFanoutSelection(
peripheralIDs: Set(allowed.peripheralIDs),
centralIDs: Set(allowed.centralIDs)
)
}
return BLEFanoutSelection(
peripheralIDs: deterministicSubset(
ids: allowed.peripheralIDs,
k: subsetSize(for: allowed.peripheralIDs.count),
seed: messageID
),
centralIDs: deterministicSubset(
ids: allowed.centralIDs,
k: subsetSize(for: allowed.centralIDs.count),
seed: messageID
)
)
}
private static func allowedLinks(
peripheralIDs: [String],
centralIDs: [String],
ingressLink: BLEIngressLinkID?,
excludedLinks: Set<BLEIngressLinkID>
) -> (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]) {
var allowedPeripheralIDs = peripheralIDs
var allowedCentralIDs = centralIDs
var blockedLinks = excludedLinks
if let ingressLink {
blockedLinks.insert(ingressLink)
}
allowedPeripheralIDs.removeAll { blockedLinks.contains(.peripheral($0)) }
allowedCentralIDs.removeAll { blockedLinks.contains(.central($0)) }
return (allowedPeripheralIDs, allowedCentralIDs)
}
private static func directLinks(
to peerID: PeerID,
links: (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]),
peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID]
) -> BLEFanoutSelection? {
let directLinks = collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
(
peripheralIDs: links.peripheralIDs.filter { peripheralPeerBindings[$0] == peerID },
centralIDs: links.centralIDs.filter { centralPeerBindings[$0] == peerID }
),
peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
)
guard !directLinks.peripheralIDs.isEmpty || !directLinks.centralIDs.isEmpty else {
return nil
}
return BLEFanoutSelection(
peripheralIDs: Set(directLinks.peripheralIDs),
centralIDs: Set(directLinks.centralIDs)
)
}
private static func hasBoundLink(
to peerID: PeerID,
peripheralIDs: [String],
centralIDs: [String],
peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID]
) -> Bool {
peripheralIDs.contains { peripheralPeerBindings[$0] == peerID }
|| centralIDs.contains { centralPeerBindings[$0] == peerID }
}
// Dual-role pairs hold two live links (we-as-central writing to their
// peripheral, and they-as-central subscribed to ours). Sending the same
// packet down both doubles airtime for nothing the receiver's assembler
// and deduplicator just discard the copy. Keep one link per bound peer,
// preferring the peripheral (write) side: it has per-link flow control
// via canSendWriteWithoutResponse, while notifications share the
// peripheral manager's update queue across all centrals. Links with no
// bound peer yet (pre-announce) pass through untouched.
private static func collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
_ links: (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]),
peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID]
) -> (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]) {
guard !peripheralPeerBindings.isEmpty || !centralPeerBindings.isEmpty else {
return links
}
var seenPeers = Set<PeerID>()
var keptPeripheralIDs: [String] = []
for id in links.peripheralIDs {
if let peer = peripheralPeerBindings[id], !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted {
continue
}
keptPeripheralIDs.append(id)
}
var keptCentralIDs: [String] = []
for id in links.centralIDs {
if let peer = centralPeerBindings[id], !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted {
continue
}
keptCentralIDs.append(id)
}
return (keptPeripheralIDs, keptCentralIDs)
}
private static func shouldSubset(packetType: UInt8, directedPeerHint: PeerID?) -> Bool {
directedPeerHint == nil
&& packetType != MessageType.fragment.rawValue
&& packetType != MessageType.announce.rawValue
&& packetType != MessageType.requestSync.rawValue
}
private static func subsetSize(for count: Int) -> Int {
guard count > 0 else { return 0 }
if count <= 2 { return count }
var value = count - 1
var bits = 0
while value > 0 {
value >>= 1
bits += 1
}
return min(count, max(1, bits + 1))
}
private static func deterministicSubset(ids: [String], k: Int, seed: String) -> Set<String> {
guard k > 0 && ids.count > k else { return Set(ids) }
var scored: [(score: [UInt8], id: String)] = []
for id in ids {
let data = (seed + "::" + id).data(using: .utf8) ?? Data()
let digest = Array(SHA256.hash(data: data))
scored.append((digest, id))
}
scored.sort { lhs, rhs in
for index in 0..<min(lhs.score.count, rhs.score.count) {
if lhs.score[index] != rhs.score[index] {
return lhs.score[index] < rhs.score[index]
}
}
return lhs.id < rhs.id
}
return Set(scored.prefix(k).map(\.id))
}
}

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