Retry confirmed private media after reconnect

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSecurityConstants.swift

@@ -36,6 +36,30 @@ enum NoiseSecurityConstants {
 
     // Noise XX message 1 contains only the initiator's 32-byte ephemeral key.
     static let xxInitialMessageSize = 32
+
+    // Bounds an ordinary initiator whose message 1 or 2 is lost.
+    static let ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 10
+
+    // Bounds the receive-only rollback quarantine created by an unauthenticated
+    // inbound message 1. A lost message 3 must not strand outbound traffic.
+    static let ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 20
+
+    // A released client may immediately retry after both crossed initiators
+    // yielded. Give that unilateral retry a brief head start before the
+    // patched side spends its one bounded recovery.
+    static let handshakeCollisionRecoveryDelay: TimeInterval = 0.2
+
+    // Rate-limited recovery remains actionable without spinning.
+    static let handshakeRateLimitRecoveryDelay: TimeInterval = 60
+
+    // Covers only reordering between a winning message 3 and the losing
+    // crossed message 1.
+    static let recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: TimeInterval = 1
+
+    // After unauthenticated responder rollback, reject another attempt long
+    // enough that paced message 1 traffic cannot keep outbound paused. A
+    // legitimate peer converges through the one manager-owned local retry.
+    static let ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown: TimeInterval = 60
     
     // Session timeout - sessions older than this should be renegotiated
     static let sessionTimeout: TimeInterval = 86400 // 24 hours

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSessionError.swift

@@ -13,3 +13,9 @@ enum NoiseSessionError: Error, Equatable {
     case alreadyEstablished
     case peerIdentityMismatch
 }
+
+/// The manager owns the exact attempt's one bounded recovery. Packet handling
+/// must not launch its historical second, immediate restart for this failure.
+struct NoiseManagedHandshakeFailure: Error {
+    let underlying: Error
+}

bitchat/Protocols/BitchatFilePacket.swift

@@ -154,3 +154,90 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
         )
     }
 }
+
+/// Wire-compatible identity for private media exchanged by clients using the
+/// current iOS entropy-bearing filenames, without extending the deployed file
+/// TLV. Android clients reject unknown file tags, so eligible senders and
+/// receivers derive the receipt key from fields already on the wire.
+///
+/// Locally-created image and voice-note filenames contain a UUID or live-voice
+/// burst ID. Including the normalized direction keeps a reused filename
+/// distinct across chats while allowing short and full Noise-key peer IDs to
+/// converge. Android and older-iOS timestamp-only names remain ineligible and
+/// retain their legacy random local IDs (transfer-compatible, no receipts).
+enum PrivateMediaMessageIdentity {
+    private static let domain = Data("bitchat-private-media-message-v1".utf8)
+    private static let idPrefix = "media-"
+    private static let digestHexLength = 32
+
+    static func isStableID(_ candidate: String) -> Bool {
+        guard candidate.hasPrefix(idPrefix) else { return false }
+        let digest = candidate.dropFirst(idPrefix.count)
+        guard digest.utf8.count == digestHexLength else { return false }
+        return digest.utf8.allSatisfy { byte in
+            (UInt8(ascii: "0")...UInt8(ascii: "9")).contains(byte)
+                || (UInt8(ascii: "a")...UInt8(ascii: "f")).contains(byte)
+        }
+    }
+
+    static func stableID(
+        senderPeerID: PeerID,
+        recipientPeerID: PeerID,
+        fileName: String?
+    ) -> String? {
+        guard let fileName, !fileName.isEmpty else { return nil }
+        let leafName = (fileName as NSString).lastPathComponent
+        guard leafName == fileName else { return nil }
+
+        let path = leafName as NSString
+        let stem = path.deletingPathExtension
+        let fileExtension = path.pathExtension.lowercased()
+        switch true {
+        case stem.hasPrefix("img_"):
+            guard fileExtension == "jpg" || fileExtension == "jpeg" else { return nil }
+        case stem.hasPrefix("voice_"):
+            guard fileExtension == "m4a" else { return nil }
+        default:
+            return nil
+        }
+        let entropyToken = stem.split(separator: "_").last.map(String.init)
+        let hasUUIDEntropy = entropyToken.flatMap(UUID.init(uuidString:)) != nil
+        let voiceBurstID = stem.hasPrefix("voice_")
+            ? String(stem.dropFirst("voice_".count))
+            : ""
+        let hasBurstEntropy = voiceBurstID.count == 16
+            && voiceBurstID.allSatisfy(\.isHexDigit)
+        guard hasUUIDEntropy || hasBurstEntropy else {
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        let fields = [
+            Data(senderPeerID.toShort().bare.utf8),
+            Data(recipientPeerID.toShort().bare.utf8),
+            Data(leafName.utf8)
+        ]
+        var input = domain
+        for field in fields {
+            guard let length = UInt32(exactly: field.count) else { return nil }
+            var bigEndianLength = length.bigEndian
+            withUnsafeBytes(of: &bigEndianLength) {
+                input.append(contentsOf: $0)
+            }
+            input.append(field)
+        }
+
+        return "\(idPrefix)\(input.sha256Hex().prefix(digestHexLength))"
+    }
+
+    static func stableID(
+        for packet: BitchatFilePacket,
+        senderPeerID: PeerID,
+        recipientPeerID: PeerID
+    ) -> String? {
+        stableID(
+            senderPeerID: senderPeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: recipientPeerID,
+            fileName: packet.fileName
+        )
+    }
+}

bitchat/Protocols/PeerCapabilities+Local.swift

@@ -3,5 +3,11 @@ import BitFoundation
 extension PeerCapabilities {
     /// Capabilities this build advertises in its announce packets.
     /// Each feature adds its bit here when it ships.
-    static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [.vouch, .prekeys, .groups, .privateMedia]
+    static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [
+        .vouch,
+        .prekeys,
+        .groups,
+        .privateMedia,
+        .privateMediaReceipts
+    ]
 }

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEFileTransferHandler.swift

@@ -32,10 +32,79 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment {
         _ fallbackExtension: String?,
         _ defaultPrefix: String
     ) -> URL?
+    /// Resolves the durable receiver decision for a stable private-media ID.
+    let privateMediaReceiptState: (
+        _ messageID: String
+    ) -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState
+    /// Atomically records a stable private-media ID after the payload save.
+    let commitPrivateMediaFile: (_ messageID: String, _ storedURL: URL) -> Bool
+    /// Rolls back a saved payload when its durable receipt commit fails.
+    let removeIncomingFile: (_ storedURL: URL) -> Void
+    /// Checks the authenticated sender before any private-media disk work.
+    let isPrivateMediaSenderBlocked: (PeerID) -> Bool
     /// Updates the registry last-seen timestamp for the peer (async barrier write).
     let updatePeerLastSeen: (PeerID) -> Void
-    /// Delivers `.messageReceived` to the UI as one main-actor hop.
-    let deliverMessage: (BitchatMessage) -> Void
+    /// Acknowledges stable private media only after its synchronous
+    /// conversation delivery has completed.
+    let acknowledgePrivateMedia: (_ messageID: String, _ peerID: PeerID) -> Void
+    /// Delivers `.messageReceived` as one main-actor hop while
+    /// `shouldDeliver` remains true before and after the synchronous sink.
+    /// The completion authorizes the stable-media ACK.
+    let deliverMessage: (
+        _ message: BitchatMessage,
+        _ shouldDeliver: @escaping () -> Bool,
+        _ completion: @escaping () -> Void
+    ) -> Void
+}
+
+/// Process-lifetime reservation cache for stable private-media IDs.
+///
+/// The first arrival reserves its ID before quota enforcement. Concurrent
+/// arrivals remain coalesced in memory, while accepted state is resolved from
+/// the durable ID-to-file ledger so it survives relaunch and becomes retryable
+/// if quota cleanup removed the file.
+private final class PrivateMediaArrivalDeduplicator {
+    enum Reservation {
+        case reserved
+        case pending
+        case accepted(URL)
+        case tombstoned
+        case unavailable
+    }
+
+    private let lock = NSLock()
+    private var pending: Set<String> = []
+
+    func reserve(
+        _ messageID: String,
+        receiptState: () -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState
+    ) -> Reservation {
+        lock.lock()
+        defer { lock.unlock() }
+        if pending.contains(messageID) {
+            return .pending
+        }
+
+        switch receiptState() {
+        case .accepted(let existingURL):
+            return .accepted(existingURL)
+        case .tombstoned:
+            return .tombstoned
+        case .unavailable:
+            return .unavailable
+        case .absent:
+            break
+        }
+
+        pending.insert(messageID)
+        return .reserved
+    }
+
+    func finish(_ messageID: String) {
+        lock.lock()
+        defer { lock.unlock() }
+        pending.remove(messageID)
+    }
 }
 
 /// Orchestrates inbound file transfers: self-echo policy, sender display-name
@@ -43,6 +112,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment {
 /// and UI delivery.
 final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
     private let environment: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
+    private let privateMediaArrivals = PrivateMediaArrivalDeduplicator()
 
     init(environment: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment) {
         self.environment = environment
@@ -86,6 +156,7 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             senderNickname: senderNickname,
             timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000),
             isPrivate: deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage,
+            usesDurableReceipts: false,
             env: env
         )
         // Once authenticated, a local decode/quota/save failure is not proof
@@ -116,6 +187,11 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             senderNickname: senderNickname,
             timestamp: timestamp,
             isPrivate: true,
+            // Every authenticated Noise private-file keeps the stable ID/ACK
+            // contract introduced with capability bit 8. Bit 9 advertises
+            // sender-side automatic retry support; it must not downgrade
+            // prior iOS clients to random IDs or single-check delivery.
+            usesDurableReceipts: true,
             env: env
         )
     }
@@ -126,9 +202,11 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
         senderNickname: String,
         timestamp: Date,
         isPrivate: Bool,
+        usesDurableReceipts: Bool,
         env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
     ) -> Bool {
 
+        let localPeerID = env.localPeerID()
         let filePacket: BitchatFilePacket
         let mime: MimeType
         switch BLEIncomingFileValidator.validate(payload: payload) {
@@ -149,6 +227,89 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             return false
         }
 
+        if isPrivate, env.isPrivateMediaSenderBlocked(peerID) {
+            SecureLogger.debug(
+                "🚫 Dropping private media from blocked peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… before disk write",
+                category: .security
+            )
+            return true
+        }
+
+        let messageID = usesDurableReceipts
+            ? PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+                for: filePacket,
+                senderPeerID: peerID,
+                recipientPeerID: localPeerID
+            )
+            : nil
+        if let messageID {
+            switch privateMediaArrivals.reserve(
+                messageID,
+                receiptState: { env.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID) }
+            ) {
+            case .reserved:
+                break
+            case .pending:
+                // The first arrival has not reached durable storage yet.
+                // Coalesce this retry without ACKing so a failed first save
+                // remains retryable by the sender.
+                SecureLogger.debug(
+                    "📁 Coalesced in-flight private media id=\(messageID.prefix(12))… from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return true
+            case .accepted(let existingFile):
+                env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
+                let message = incomingMessage(
+                    messageID: messageID,
+                    senderNickname: senderNickname,
+                    timestamp: timestamp,
+                    isPrivate: true,
+                    peerID: peerID,
+                    destination: existingFile,
+                    category: storedMediaCategory(
+                        for: existingFile,
+                        fallback: mime.category
+                    ),
+                    env: env
+                )
+                SecureLogger.debug(
+                    "📁 Restored durable private media duplicate id=\(messageID.prefix(12))… from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… -> \(existingFile.lastPathComponent)",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                deliverStableMessage(
+                    message,
+                    messageID: messageID,
+                    peerID: peerID,
+                    expectedURL: existingFile,
+                    env: env
+                )
+                return true
+            case .tombstoned:
+                // Explicit deletion is a durable terminal receiver decision.
+                env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
+                env.acknowledgePrivateMedia(messageID, peerID)
+                SecureLogger.debug(
+                    "📁 Dropped explicitly deleted private media id=\(messageID.prefix(12))… from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return true
+            case .unavailable:
+                // Never turn an unreadable ledger into an empty ledger. The
+                // sender can retry after the transient storage failure clears.
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "📁 Withholding private media id=\(messageID.prefix(12))… while durable receipt state is unavailable",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return true
+            }
+        }
+        defer {
+            if let messageID {
+                privateMediaArrivals.finish(messageID)
+            }
+        }
+
         // BCH-01-002: Enforce storage quota before saving
         env.enforceStorageQuota(filePacket.content.count)
 
@@ -162,13 +323,82 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             return false
         }
 
+        if let messageID,
+           !env.commitPrivateMediaFile(messageID, destination) {
+            // A payload without its durable ID mapping cannot safely suppress
+            // a retry after relaunch. Roll it back and withhold UI/ACK.
+            env.removeIncomingFile(destination)
+            return false
+        }
+
         if isPrivate {
             env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
         }
 
-        let message = BitchatMessage(
+        let message = incomingMessage(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            senderNickname: senderNickname,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            isPrivate: isPrivate,
+            peerID: peerID,
+            destination: destination,
+            category: mime.category,
+            env: env
+        )
+
+        SecureLogger.debug("📁 Stored incoming media from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… -> \(destination.lastPathComponent)", category: .session)
+
+        if let messageID {
+            deliverStableMessage(
+                message,
+                messageID: messageID,
+                peerID: peerID,
+                expectedURL: destination,
+                env: env
+            )
+        } else {
+            env.deliverMessage(message, { true }, {})
+        }
+        return true
+    }
+
+    private func deliverStableMessage(
+        _ message: BitchatMessage,
+        messageID: String,
+        peerID: PeerID,
+        expectedURL: URL,
+        env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
+    ) {
+        env.deliverMessage(
+            message,
+            {
+                guard case .accepted(let resolvedURL) =
+                        env.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID) else {
+                    return false
+                }
+                return resolvedURL.standardizedFileURL
+                    == expectedURL.standardizedFileURL
+            },
+            {
+                env.acknowledgePrivateMedia(messageID, peerID)
+            }
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func incomingMessage(
+        messageID: String?,
+        senderNickname: String,
+        timestamp: Date,
+        isPrivate: Bool,
+        peerID: PeerID,
+        destination: URL,
+        category: MimeType.Category,
+        env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
+    ) -> BitchatMessage {
+        BitchatMessage(
+            id: messageID,
             sender: senderNickname,
-            content: "\(mime.category.messagePrefix)\(destination.lastPathComponent)",
+            content: "\(category.messagePrefix)\(destination.lastPathComponent)",
             timestamp: timestamp,
             isRelay: false,
             originalSender: nil,
@@ -176,17 +406,35 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             recipientNickname: nil,
             senderPeerID: peerID,
             // Received messages need an explicit status: BitchatMessage
-            // defaults private messages to .sending, which the media views
-            // render as an in-flight send (empty reveal mask, disabled tap).
+            // defaults private messages to .sending, which media views render
+            // as an in-flight send.
             deliveryStatus: isPrivate
                 ? .delivered(to: env.localNickname(), at: timestamp)
                 : nil
         )
+    }
 
-        SecureLogger.debug("📁 Stored incoming media from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… -> \(destination.lastPathComponent)", category: .session)
-
-        env.deliverMessage(message)
-        return true
+    /// The durable URL is authoritative during reconstruction. A sender that
+    /// reuses a stable filename with a different MIME type must not change how
+    /// the already-stored payload renders.
+    private func storedMediaCategory(
+        for url: URL,
+        fallback: MimeType.Category
+    ) -> MimeType.Category {
+        let mediaDirectory = url
+            .deletingLastPathComponent()
+            .deletingLastPathComponent()
+            .lastPathComponent
+        switch mediaDirectory {
+        case MimeType.Category.audio.mediaDir:
+            return .audio
+        case MimeType.Category.image.mediaDir:
+            return .image
+        case MimeType.Category.file.mediaDir:
+            return .file
+        default:
+            return fallback
+        }
     }
 
     /// Every remaining raw file transfer is signed, regardless of whether it

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEIncomingFileStore.swift

@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
     private let baseDirectory: URL?
     private let dateProvider: () -> Date
     private let panicMarkerWriter: (Data, URL) throws -> Void
+    private let privateMediaReceipts: BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore
 
     init(
         fileManager: FileManager = .default,
@@ -147,6 +148,11 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
         self.baseDirectory = baseDirectory
         self.dateProvider = dateProvider
         self.panicMarkerWriter = panicMarkerWriter
+        self.privateMediaReceipts = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(
+            fileManager: fileManager,
+            baseDirectory: baseDirectory,
+            now: dateProvider
+        )
     }
 
     /// Panic-wipe every managed incoming and outgoing media artifact before
@@ -159,6 +165,11 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
     func panicWipe(
         hasDurablePendingMarker: Bool = false
     ) throws {
+        // The receipt index caches tombstones as well as accepted payloads.
+        // Always invalidate it on return, including partial-failure paths, so
+        // no pre-panic receiver decision survives after identity reset.
+        defer { privateMediaReceipts.resetForPanic() }
+
         let markerError: Error?
         do {
             try markPanicRecoveryPending()
@@ -257,6 +268,35 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
         }
     }
 
+    func privateMediaReceiptState(
+        messageID: String
+    ) -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState {
+        privateMediaReceipts.state(for: messageID)
+    }
+
+    func commitPrivateMediaFile(
+        messageID: String,
+        storedURL: URL
+    ) -> Bool {
+        privateMediaReceipts.commitAccepted(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            storedURL: storedURL
+        )
+    }
+
+    /// Best-effort rollback for a payload whose durable receipt commit failed.
+    func removeIncomingFile(at storedURL: URL) {
+        guard isURLInsideFilesDirectory(storedURL) else { return }
+        do {
+            try fileManager.removeItem(at: storedURL)
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "⚠️ Failed to roll back uncommitted incoming media: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Frees least-recently-modified incoming files until `reservingBytes`
     /// fits under the quota. Files named `voice_live_*` (in-flight live
     /// captures) are never evicted regardless of who triggers enforcement —
@@ -349,6 +389,13 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
         ]
     }
 
+    private func isURLInsideFilesDirectory(_ url: URL) -> Bool {
+        guard let filesDirectory = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
+            return false
+        }
+        return url.standardizedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(filesDirectory.path + "/")
+    }
+
     private func sanitizedFileName(_ name: String?, defaultName: String, fallbackExtension: String?) -> String {
         var candidate = (name ?? "")
             .replacingOccurrences(of: "\0", with: "")

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLENoisePacketHandler.swift

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import BitFoundation
 import BitLogger
+import CryptoKit
 import Foundation
 
 struct BLENoiseHandshakeHandlingResult {
@@ -33,6 +34,8 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment {
             -> NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult
     /// Whether any Noise session (established or pending) exists for the peer (crypto).
     let hasNoiseSession: (PeerID) -> Bool
+    /// Whether an inbound ordinary XX responder is waiting for message 3.
+    let isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion: (PeerID) -> Bool
     /// Initiates a fresh Noise handshake with the peer (crypto + send).
     let initiateHandshake: (PeerID) -> Void
     /// Broadcasts a packet on the mesh (caller is already on the message queue).
@@ -63,15 +66,36 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment {
 /// processing (with response), encrypted payload decryption and dispatch,
 /// and session recovery on decrypt failure.
 final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
+    private struct DeferredCiphertext {
+        let packet: BitchatPacket
+        let receivedAt: Date
+    }
+
+    /// Early post-handshake packets are normally tiny control messages or
+    /// queued DMs. Keep the recovery surface deliberately small so an
+    /// unauthenticated half-handshake cannot create an unbounded memory queue.
+    private static let maxDeferredPacketsPerPeer = 4
+    private static let maxDeferredPacketsGlobal = 32
+    /// One legacy sender can immediately follow message 3 with the largest
+    /// valid private-file ciphertext and has no application-level retry. Keep
+    /// room for that packet plus a small control-message budget.
+    private static let maxDeferredBytes =
+        NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize + 256 * 1024
+    private static let deferredLifetime =
+        NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
+
     private let environment: BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment
+    private let deferredLock = NSLock()
+    private var deferredCiphertexts: [PeerID: [DeferredCiphertext]] = [:]
+    private var deferredCiphertextBytes = 0
 
     init(environment: BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment) {
         self.environment = environment
     }
 
     /// Returns true when the handshake message was processed successfully.
-    /// Callers use this to distinguish an authenticated replacement completion
-    /// from a rejected candidate while an older session remains established.
+    /// Callers use this to distinguish an authenticated reconnect completion
+    /// from a rejected ordinary responder while rollback state is restored.
     @discardableResult
     func handleHandshake(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
         handleHandshakeWithResult(packet, from: peerID).processed
@@ -105,15 +129,23 @@ final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
                     env.broadcastPacket(responsePacket)
                 }
 
-                // Session establishment will trigger onPeerAuthenticated callback
-                // which will send any pending messages at the right time
+                // The serialized authentication callback installs transport
+                // state before it drains any bounded early ciphertext.
                 return BLENoiseHandshakeHandlingResult(
                     processed: true,
                     didEstablishAuthenticatedSession:
                         result.didEstablishAuthenticatedSession
                 )
+            } catch let managedFailure as NoiseManagedHandshakeFailure {
+                SecureLogger.error(
+                    "Failed to process handshake; manager owns recovery: \(managedFailure.underlying)"
+                )
+                return BLENoiseHandshakeHandlingResult(
+                    processed: false,
+                    didEstablishAuthenticatedSession: false
+                )
             } catch NoiseSessionError.peerIdentityMismatch {
-                // The candidate was already discarded by the session manager.
+                // The responder was already discarded by the session manager.
                 // Do not let a spoofed claimed ID trigger a fresh outbound
                 // handshake or recreate state for the attacker-selected ID.
                 SecureLogger.warning(
@@ -143,6 +175,30 @@ final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
     }
 
     func handleEncrypted(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        handleEncrypted(packet, from: peerID, isDeferredRetry: false)
+    }
+
+    /// Called by the transport's serialized authentication callback after it
+    /// has installed state for the promoted or restored session generation.
+    func handleSessionAuthenticated(_ peerID: PeerID) {
+        drainDeferredCiphertextsIfReady(for: peerID)
+    }
+
+    /// Synchronously discards ciphertext retained for a pre-panic Noise
+    /// generation. The handler survives the service's identity replacement,
+    /// so keeping this queue would replay old bytes after post-panic auth.
+    func resetForPanic() {
+        deferredLock.lock()
+        deferredCiphertexts.removeAll(keepingCapacity: false)
+        deferredCiphertextBytes = 0
+        deferredLock.unlock()
+    }
+
+    private func handleEncrypted(
+        _ packet: BitchatPacket,
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        isDeferredRetry: Bool
+    ) {
         let env = environment
         guard let recipientID = PeerID(hexData: packet.recipientID) else {
             SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Encrypted message has no recipient ID", category: .session)
@@ -184,19 +240,205 @@ final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
 
             let ts = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000)
             env.deliverNoisePayload(peerID, noisePayloadType, Data(payloadData), ts)
+        } catch NoiseEncryptionError.transportGenerationNotReady {
+            if isDeferredRetry {
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "Dropping deferred Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… because its authenticated transport generation changed again",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return
+            }
+            // The manager promoted or restored keys before BLE's serialized
+            // callback installed generation-bound transport state. The
+            // manager rejected this before decrypting, so replay is safe.
+            deferCiphertext(packet, from: peerID)
         } catch NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished {
+            if isDeferredRetry {
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "Dropping deferred Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… because the authenticated session is unavailable",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return
+            }
             // We received an encrypted message before establishing a session with this peer.
-            // Trigger a handshake so future messages can be decrypted.
+            // An initiator may already have sent message 3 followed by this
+            // ciphertext, with BLE delivering the ciphertext first.
+            if env.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(peerID) {
+                deferCiphertext(packet, from: peerID)
+                return
+            }
+            // Otherwise trigger a handshake so future messages can decrypt.
             SecureLogger.debug("🔑 Encrypted message from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… without session; initiating handshake")
             if !env.hasNoiseSession(peerID) {
                 env.initiateHandshake(peerID)
             }
         } catch {
+            if isDeferredRetry {
+                // An early packet cannot tear down the authenticated session
+                // merely because its single bounded retry still fails.
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "Dropping deferred Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… after retry failed: \(error)",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return
+            }
+            // A responder may retain an older transport as receive-only
+            // rollback state while ordinary XX waits for message 3. New-key
+            // ciphertext can fail against those retained receive keys first.
+            if env.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(peerID) {
+                if isDeferrableEarlyHandshakeFailure(error) {
+                    deferCiphertext(packet, from: peerID)
+                } else {
+                    SecureLogger.warning(
+                        "Dropping invalid Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… while responder handshake is completing: \(error)",
+                        category: .session
+                    )
+                }
+                return
+            }
+            if isDropOnlyCiphertextFailure(error) {
+                // The packet is attacker-controlled and did not prove a
+                // transport-state failure. Never let malformed, replayed,
+                // forged, oversized, or rate-limited bytes evict working keys.
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "Dropping rejected Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… without clearing its session: \(error)",
+                    category: .security
+                )
+                return
+            }
             // Decryption failed - clear the corrupted session and re-initiate handshake
-            // This handles cases where session state got out of sync (nonce mismatch, etc.)
+            // Only local/session lifecycle failures reach this path.
             SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decrypt message from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…: \(error) - clearing session and re-initiating handshake")
             env.clearSession(peerID)
             env.initiateHandshake(peerID)
         }
     }
+
+    private func isDeferrableEarlyHandshakeFailure(_ error: Error) -> Bool {
+        if let noiseError = error as? NoiseError {
+            switch noiseError {
+            case .authenticationFailure, .replayDetected:
+                return true
+            default:
+                return false
+            }
+        }
+        if let cryptoError = error as? CryptoKitError,
+           case .authenticationFailure = cryptoError {
+            return true
+        }
+        return false
+    }
+
+    private func isDropOnlyCiphertextFailure(_ error: Error) -> Bool {
+        if let securityError = error as? NoiseSecurityError {
+            switch securityError {
+            case .messageTooLarge, .rateLimitExceeded, .invalidPeerID:
+                return true
+            case .sessionExpired, .sessionExhausted:
+                return false
+            }
+        }
+        if let noiseError = error as? NoiseError {
+            switch noiseError {
+            case .invalidCiphertext, .authenticationFailure, .replayDetected:
+                return true
+            case .uninitializedCipher, .handshakeComplete,
+                    .handshakeNotComplete, .missingLocalStaticKey,
+                    .missingKeys, .invalidMessage, .invalidPublicKey,
+                    .nonceExceeded:
+                return false
+            }
+        }
+        return error is CryptoKitError
+    }
+
+    private func deferCiphertext(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(
+            packet.payload
+        ) else {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "Dropping oversized early Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…",
+                category: .security
+            )
+            return
+        }
+
+        let now = environment.now()
+        deferredLock.lock()
+        defer { deferredLock.unlock() }
+        purgeExpiredCiphertextsLocked(now: now)
+
+        let peerCount = deferredCiphertexts[peerID]?.count ?? 0
+        let globalCount = deferredCiphertexts.values.reduce(0) {
+            $0 + $1.count
+        }
+        guard peerCount < Self.maxDeferredPacketsPerPeer,
+              globalCount < Self.maxDeferredPacketsGlobal,
+              deferredCiphertextBytes + packet.payload.count
+                <= Self.maxDeferredBytes else {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "Dropping early Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… because the handshake buffer is full",
+                category: .security
+            )
+            return
+        }
+
+        deferredCiphertexts[peerID, default: []].append(
+            DeferredCiphertext(packet: packet, receivedAt: now)
+        )
+        deferredCiphertextBytes += packet.payload.count
+        SecureLogger.debug(
+            "Deferring early Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… until responder handshake completion",
+            category: .session
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func drainDeferredCiphertextsIfReady(for peerID: PeerID) {
+        let env = environment
+        guard !env.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(peerID),
+              env.hasNoiseSession(peerID) else {
+            return
+        }
+
+        let now = env.now()
+        deferredLock.lock()
+        purgeExpiredCiphertextsLocked(now: now)
+        let deferred = deferredCiphertexts.removeValue(forKey: peerID) ?? []
+        deferredCiphertextBytes -= deferred.reduce(0) {
+            $0 + $1.packet.payload.count
+        }
+        deferredLock.unlock()
+
+        guard !deferred.isEmpty else { return }
+        SecureLogger.debug(
+            "Retrying \(deferred.count) early Noise ciphertext packet(s) from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… after handshake completion",
+            category: .session
+        )
+        for item in deferred {
+            handleEncrypted(item.packet, from: peerID, isDeferredRetry: true)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func purgeExpiredCiphertextsLocked(now: Date) {
+        for peerID in Array(deferredCiphertexts.keys) {
+            guard let items = deferredCiphertexts[peerID] else { continue }
+            let retained = items.filter {
+                now.timeIntervalSince($0.receivedAt) <= Self.deferredLifetime
+            }
+            guard retained.count != items.count else { continue }
+
+            deferredCiphertextBytes -= items.reduce(0) {
+                $0 + $1.packet.payload.count
+            }
+            deferredCiphertextBytes += retained.reduce(0) {
+                $0 + $1.packet.payload.count
+            }
+            if retained.isEmpty {
+                deferredCiphertexts.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+            } else {
+                deferredCiphertexts[peerID] = retained
+            }
+        }
+    }
 }

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLENoiseReconnectPolicy.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+import Foundation
+
+/// Bounds ordinary Noise revalidation to one attempt per physical-link epoch.
+/// A live epoch may retry after the cooldown so a lost handshake cannot leave
+/// the link permanently unauthenticated.
+struct BLENoiseReconnectPolicy {
+    static let minimumRetryInterval: TimeInterval = 60
+
+    private var lastAttemptAt: [BLEIngressLinkID: Date] = [:]
+
+    mutating func shouldRevalidate(
+        on link: BLEIngressLinkID,
+        hasEstablishedSession: Bool,
+        isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: Bool,
+        hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: Bool,
+        now: Date
+    ) -> Bool {
+        guard hasEstablishedSession,
+              !isNoiseAuthenticatedLink,
+              !hasAuthenticatedPeerLink else {
+            return false
+        }
+        if let previous = lastAttemptAt[link],
+           now.timeIntervalSince(previous) < Self.minimumRetryInterval {
+            return false
+        }
+        lastAttemptAt[link] = now
+        return true
+    }
+
+    /// Link identifiers can be stable across CoreBluetooth reconnects, so a
+    /// disconnect explicitly starts a new epoch and permits one fresh attempt.
+    mutating func endLinkEpoch(_ link: BLEIngressLinkID) {
+        lastAttemptAt.removeValue(forKey: link)
+    }
+
+    mutating func removeAll() {
+        lastAttemptAt.removeAll()
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,556 @@
+import BitLogger
+import Foundation
+
+enum BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState: Equatable {
+    /// No durable receiver decision exists for this stable message ID.
+    case absent
+    /// The payload is durably mapped to a file that still exists.
+    case accepted(URL)
+    /// The user explicitly deleted the payload; retries must not resurrect it.
+    case tombstoned
+    /// Durable state could not be read safely. Callers must fail closed and
+    /// must not save, deliver, or acknowledge the payload.
+    case unavailable
+}
+
+/// Durable, per-message receiver decisions for stable private media.
+///
+/// Each ID has its own atomic record so one hot lookup never rewrites or
+/// decodes the entire ledger. The process-lifetime index is installed only
+/// after a complete, successful directory scan. An enumeration, read, decode,
+/// or structural-validation failure therefore remains retryable and cannot be
+/// mistaken for an empty ledger.
+final class BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore: @unchecked Sendable {
+    typealias DirectoryReader = (_ directory: URL) throws -> [URL]
+    typealias DataReader = (_ url: URL) throws -> Data
+    private static let receiptDirectoryName = ".private-media-receipts"
+
+    private struct ReceiptRecord: Codable, Equatable {
+        enum Kind: String, Codable {
+            case accepted
+            case tombstone
+        }
+
+        let kind: Kind
+        /// Path below the app's `files/` root. Absolute application-container
+        /// prefixes are not stable across updates, restores, or reinstalls.
+        let relativePath: String?
+        let recordedAt: Date
+    }
+
+    private final class Runtime: @unchecked Sendable {
+        let lock = NSLock()
+        var records: [String: ReceiptRecord]?
+        var volatileTombstones: [String: Date] = [:]
+    }
+
+    private let fileManager: FileManager
+    private let baseDirectory: URL?
+    private let capacity: Int
+    private let ttl: TimeInterval
+    private let now: () -> Date
+    private let directoryReader: DirectoryReader?
+    private let dataReader: DataReader?
+    private let runtime = Runtime()
+
+    init(
+        fileManager: FileManager = .default,
+        baseDirectory: URL? = nil,
+        capacity: Int = TransportConfig.privateMediaReceivedLedgerCapacity,
+        ttl: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.privateMediaReceivedLedgerTTLSeconds,
+        now: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init,
+        directoryReader: DirectoryReader? = nil,
+        dataReader: DataReader? = nil
+    ) {
+        self.fileManager = fileManager
+        self.baseDirectory = baseDirectory
+        self.capacity = max(1, capacity)
+        self.ttl = max(0, ttl)
+        self.now = now
+        self.directoryReader = directoryReader
+        self.dataReader = dataReader
+    }
+
+    /// Drops process-lifetime decisions after the enclosing media directory
+    /// has been panic-wiped. A later lookup must rebuild from the durable
+    /// ledger instead of retaining an accepted receipt or tombstone whose
+    /// backing files no longer exist.
+    func resetForPanic() {
+        runtime.lock.lock()
+        runtime.records = nil
+        runtime.volatileTombstones.removeAll(keepingCapacity: false)
+        runtime.lock.unlock()
+    }
+
+    func state(for messageID: String) -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState {
+        guard PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(messageID) else {
+            return .absent
+        }
+
+        runtime.lock.lock()
+        defer { runtime.lock.unlock() }
+
+        let date = now()
+        if let tombstonedAt = runtime.volatileTombstones[messageID] {
+            if !isExpired(tombstonedAt, at: date) {
+                return .tombstoned
+            }
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+        }
+
+        guard let directory = resolvedReceiptDirectory(),
+              var records = loadIndexIfNeeded(from: directory, at: date) else {
+            return .unavailable
+        }
+        guard let record = records[messageID] else { return .absent }
+
+        if isExpired(record.recordedAt, at: date) {
+            records.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            runtime.records = records
+            removeRecord(messageID: messageID, from: directory)
+            return .absent
+        }
+
+        switch record.kind {
+        case .tombstone:
+            removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(record)
+            return .tombstoned
+
+        case .accepted:
+            guard let relativePath = record.relativePath,
+                  let existingURL = existingPayload(relativePath: relativePath) else {
+                // Quota cleanup is not explicit deletion. Remove the stale
+                // receipt so a sender retry can restore the payload and bubble.
+                records.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+                runtime.records = records
+                removeRecord(messageID: messageID, from: directory)
+                return .absent
+            }
+            return .accepted(existingURL)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Records an accepted ID only after the payload is on disk. Callers must
+    /// roll the payload back and withhold UI delivery/ACK when this returns
+    /// false.
+    func commitAccepted(messageID: String, storedURL: URL) -> Bool {
+        guard PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(messageID),
+              validExistingPayload(storedURL) != nil,
+              let relativePath = relativePath(for: storedURL) else {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        runtime.lock.lock()
+        defer { runtime.lock.unlock() }
+
+        let date = now()
+        if let tombstonedAt = runtime.volatileTombstones[messageID],
+           !isExpired(tombstonedAt, at: date) {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        guard let directory = resolvedReceiptDirectory(),
+              var records = loadIndexIfNeeded(from: directory, at: date) else {
+            return false
+        }
+        if let existing = records[messageID],
+           existing.kind == .tombstone,
+           !isExpired(existing.recordedAt, at: date) {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        let victim = capacityVictim(
+            for: .accepted,
+            replacing: messageID,
+            in: records
+        )
+        if records[messageID]?.kind != .accepted,
+           records.values.lazy.filter({ $0.kind == .accepted }).count >= capacity,
+           victim == nil {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        let record = ReceiptRecord(
+            kind: .accepted,
+            relativePath: relativePath,
+            recordedAt: date
+        )
+        guard persist(record, messageID: messageID, to: directory) else {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        records[messageID] = record
+        if let victim, victim != messageID {
+            records.removeValue(forKey: victim)
+            removeRecord(messageID: victim, from: directory)
+        }
+        runtime.records = records
+        return true
+    }
+
+    /// Foundation for explicit media deletion. This branch does not wire the
+    /// chat-clear UI; it only makes a tombstone durable and fail closed.
+    func recordDeleted(messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        guard PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(messageID) else {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        runtime.lock.lock()
+        defer { runtime.lock.unlock() }
+
+        let date = now()
+        addVolatileTombstone(messageID, at: date)
+
+        guard let directory = resolvedReceiptDirectory(),
+              var records = loadIndexIfNeeded(from: directory, at: date) else {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            return false
+        }
+        if let existing = records[messageID],
+           existing.kind == .tombstone,
+           !isExpired(existing.recordedAt, at: date) {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(existing)
+            return true
+        }
+
+        let victim = capacityVictim(
+            for: .tombstone,
+            replacing: messageID,
+            in: records
+        )
+        if records[messageID]?.kind != .tombstone,
+           records.values.lazy.filter({ $0.kind == .tombstone }).count >= capacity,
+           victim == nil {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            return false
+        }
+
+        let tombstone = ReceiptRecord(
+            kind: .tombstone,
+            // Retain the accepted path so a crash between the atomic record
+            // write and payload unlink can finish cleanup after relaunch.
+            relativePath: records[messageID]?.relativePath,
+            recordedAt: date
+        )
+        guard persist(tombstone, messageID: messageID, to: directory) else {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            return false
+        }
+
+        records[messageID] = tombstone
+        if let victim, victim != messageID {
+            records.removeValue(forKey: victim)
+            removeRecord(messageID: victim, from: directory)
+        }
+        runtime.records = records
+        runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+        removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(tombstone)
+        return true
+    }
+
+    private func loadIndexIfNeeded(
+        from directory: URL,
+        at date: Date
+    ) -> [String: ReceiptRecord]? {
+        if let records = runtime.records {
+            return records
+        }
+
+        do {
+            try fileManager.createDirectory(
+                at: directory,
+                withIntermediateDirectories: true,
+                attributes: nil
+            )
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error(
+                "❌ Failed to create private-media receipt directory: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        let urls: [URL]
+        do {
+            if let directoryReader {
+                urls = try directoryReader(directory)
+            } else {
+                urls = try fileManager.contentsOfDirectory(
+                    at: directory,
+                    includingPropertiesForKeys: nil,
+                    options: []
+                )
+            }
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error(
+                "❌ Failed to enumerate private-media receipts: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        var records: [String: ReceiptRecord] = [:]
+        var expired: [String] = []
+        var tombstones: [ReceiptRecord] = []
+        for url in urls {
+            guard url.pathExtension == "json" else { continue }
+            let messageID = url.deletingPathExtension().lastPathComponent
+            guard PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(messageID) else {
+                continue
+            }
+
+            let record: ReceiptRecord
+            do {
+                let data = try dataReader?(url) ?? Data(contentsOf: url)
+                record = try JSONDecoder().decode(ReceiptRecord.self, from: data)
+            } catch {
+                // Never delete or skip an unreadable stable-ID record. Treating
+                // it as absent could resurrect accepted or deleted media.
+                SecureLogger.error(
+                    "❌ Failed to read private-media receipt \(messageID.prefix(12))…: \(error)",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return nil
+            }
+
+            guard isStructurallyValid(record) else {
+                SecureLogger.error(
+                    "❌ Invalid private-media receipt \(messageID.prefix(12))…",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return nil
+            }
+            if isExpired(record.recordedAt, at: date) {
+                expired.append(messageID)
+                continue
+            }
+            records[messageID] = record
+            if record.kind == .tombstone {
+                tombstones.append(record)
+            }
+        }
+
+        let overflow = overflowVictims(in: records)
+        for messageID in overflow {
+            records.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+        }
+
+        // Install the index only after every stable-ID record was read and
+        // validated successfully. Cleanup cannot influence a failed scan.
+        runtime.records = records
+
+        for messageID in expired + overflow {
+            removeRecord(messageID: messageID, from: directory)
+        }
+        for tombstone in tombstones {
+            removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(tombstone)
+        }
+        return records
+    }
+
+    private func isStructurallyValid(_ record: ReceiptRecord) -> Bool {
+        switch record.kind {
+        case .tombstone:
+            guard let relativePath = record.relativePath else { return true }
+            return candidatePayload(relativePath: relativePath) != nil
+        case .accepted:
+            guard let relativePath = record.relativePath else { return false }
+            return candidatePayload(relativePath: relativePath) != nil
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func isExpired(_ recordedAt: Date, at date: Date) -> Bool {
+        date.timeIntervalSince(recordedAt) > ttl
+    }
+
+    private func overflowVictims(
+        in records: [String: ReceiptRecord]
+    ) -> [String] {
+        var victims: [String] = []
+        for kind in [ReceiptRecord.Kind.accepted, .tombstone] {
+            let matching = records.filter { $0.value.kind == kind }
+            let overflow = matching.count - capacity
+            guard overflow > 0 else { continue }
+            victims.append(contentsOf: matching.sorted { lhs, rhs in
+                if lhs.value.recordedAt == rhs.value.recordedAt {
+                    return lhs.key < rhs.key
+                }
+                return lhs.value.recordedAt < rhs.value.recordedAt
+            }
+            .prefix(overflow)
+            .map(\.key))
+        }
+        return victims
+    }
+
+    /// Accepted receipts and tombstones have independent capacity. High media
+    /// volume cannot evict explicit deletion intent, and vice versa.
+    private func capacityVictim(
+        for incomingKind: ReceiptRecord.Kind,
+        replacing messageID: String,
+        in records: [String: ReceiptRecord]
+    ) -> String? {
+        guard records[messageID]?.kind != incomingKind else { return nil }
+        let matching = records.filter {
+            $0.key != messageID && $0.value.kind == incomingKind
+        }
+        guard matching.count >= capacity else { return nil }
+        return matching.min { lhs, rhs in
+            if lhs.value.recordedAt == rhs.value.recordedAt {
+                return lhs.key < rhs.key
+            }
+            return lhs.value.recordedAt < rhs.value.recordedAt
+        }?.key
+    }
+
+    private func persist(
+        _ record: ReceiptRecord,
+        messageID: String,
+        to directory: URL
+    ) -> Bool {
+        do {
+            try fileManager.createDirectory(
+                at: directory,
+                withIntermediateDirectories: true,
+                attributes: nil
+            )
+            let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(record)
+            var options: Data.WritingOptions = [.atomic]
+            #if os(iOS)
+            options.insert(.completeFileProtectionUntilFirstUserAuthentication)
+            #endif
+            let url = recordURL(messageID: messageID, in: directory)
+            try data.write(to: url, options: options)
+            return true
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error(
+                "❌ Failed to persist private-media receipt \(messageID.prefix(12))…: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+            return false
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func removeRecord(messageID: String, from directory: URL) {
+        let url = recordURL(messageID: messageID, in: directory)
+        guard fileManager.fileExists(atPath: url.path) else { return }
+        do {
+            try fileManager.removeItem(at: url)
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "⚠️ Failed to prune private-media receipt \(messageID.prefix(12))…: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func recordURL(messageID: String, in directory: URL) -> URL {
+        directory
+            .appendingPathComponent(messageID, isDirectory: false)
+            .appendingPathExtension("json")
+    }
+
+    private func removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(_ record: ReceiptRecord) {
+        guard record.kind == .tombstone,
+              let relativePath = record.relativePath,
+              let payload = candidatePayload(relativePath: relativePath),
+              fileManager.fileExists(atPath: payload.path) else {
+            return
+        }
+        do {
+            try fileManager.removeItem(at: payload)
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "⚠️ Failed to remove explicitly deleted private media: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func addVolatileTombstone(_ messageID: String, at date: Date) {
+        runtime.volatileTombstones[messageID] = date
+        let overflow = runtime.volatileTombstones.count - capacity
+        guard overflow > 0 else { return }
+        let oldest = runtime.volatileTombstones.sorted {
+            if $0.value == $1.value { return $0.key < $1.key }
+            return $0.value < $1.value
+        }
+        for (oldMessageID, _) in oldest.prefix(overflow) {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: oldMessageID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func validExistingPayload(_ url: URL) -> URL? {
+        let standardized = url.standardizedFileURL
+        guard isInsideFilesDirectory(standardized) else { return nil }
+        var isDirectory: ObjCBool = false
+        guard fileManager.fileExists(
+            atPath: standardized.path,
+            isDirectory: &isDirectory
+        ), !isDirectory.boolValue else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return standardized
+    }
+
+    private func relativePath(for url: URL) -> String? {
+        guard let filesRoot = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        let prefix = filesRoot.path + "/"
+        let standardized = url.standardizedFileURL
+        guard standardized.path.hasPrefix(prefix) else { return nil }
+        let relativePath = String(standardized.path.dropFirst(prefix.count))
+        return relativePath.isEmpty ? nil : relativePath
+    }
+
+    private func existingPayload(relativePath: String) -> URL? {
+        guard let candidate = candidatePayload(relativePath: relativePath) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return validExistingPayload(candidate)
+    }
+
+    private func candidatePayload(relativePath: String) -> URL? {
+        guard !relativePath.isEmpty,
+              let filesRoot = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        let candidate = filesRoot
+            .appendingPathComponent(relativePath, isDirectory: false)
+            .standardizedFileURL
+        guard candidate.path.hasPrefix(filesRoot.path + "/") else { return nil }
+        return candidate
+    }
+
+    private func isInsideFilesDirectory(_ url: URL) -> Bool {
+        guard let filesRoot = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
+            return false
+        }
+        return url.standardizedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(filesRoot.path + "/")
+    }
+
+    private func resolvedReceiptDirectory() -> URL? {
+        return try? filesDirectory().appendingPathComponent(
+            Self.receiptDirectoryName,
+            isDirectory: true
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func filesDirectory() throws -> URL {
+        let root = try baseDirectory ?? fileManager.url(
+            for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
+            in: .userDomainMask,
+            appropriateFor: nil,
+            create: true
+        )
+        let files = root.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
+        try fileManager.createDirectory(
+            at: files,
+            withIntermediateDirectories: true,
+            attributes: nil
+        )
+        return files
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift

@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
     // that the session was established *on this current ingress link*, not
     // merely that some session exists for the claimed ID. bleQueue-owned.
     private var noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners: [BLEIngressLinkID: PeerID] = [:]
+    private var noiseReconnectPolicy = BLENoiseReconnectPolicy()
 
     // Rotation-rebind cooldown per link UUID (bleQueue-owned, like the link
     // store): entries older than the cooldown are pruned on insert.
@@ -311,6 +312,9 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
     /// May block in tests to hold the serial message queue immediately before
     /// the deferred private-media admission check.
     var _test_beforePrivateMediaDeferredSend: ((String) -> Void)?
+    /// May block announce handling after verified-link rebind work is queued.
+    /// Tests use this boundary to prove rebind and reconnect are serialized.
+    var _test_afterVerifiedDirectRebindEnqueued: (() -> Void)?
     #endif
     private var selfBroadcastTracker = BLESelfBroadcastTracker()
     private let meshTopology = MeshTopologyTracker()
@@ -703,6 +707,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
     /// or advertising while the full panic transaction is incomplete.
     func suspendForPanicReset() {
         setPanicSuspended(true)
+        noisePacketHandler.resetForPanic()
         gossipSyncManager?.stop()
         gossipSyncManager = nil
         // Stop the radio and drain CoreBluetooth's delegate queue first. A
@@ -713,7 +718,11 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         // Drain every receive/send submitted by callbacks that finished ahead
         // of the radio stop. Later callbacks observe the closed lifecycle, and
         // generation-bound handoffs that raced this barrier reject themselves.
-        messageQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {}
+        // Clear the old identity's bounded early-ciphertext queue again after
+        // those callbacks drain so none can repopulate it after the first wipe.
+        messageQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+            noisePacketHandler.resetForPanic()
+        }
         clearEmergencySessionState()
     }
 
@@ -732,6 +741,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         gossipSyncManager?.stop()
         gossipSyncManager = nil
         messageQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+            noisePacketHandler.resetForPanic()
             pendingNoiseSessionQueues.removeAll()
         }
 
@@ -764,6 +774,8 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
 
         bleQueue.sync {
             pendingWriteBuffers.removeAll()
+            noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeAll()
+            noiseReconnectPolicy.removeAll()
             connectionScheduler.reset()
         }
         disconnectNotifyDebouncer.removeAll()
@@ -1061,6 +1073,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         bleQueue.sync {
             linkStateStore.clearAll()
             noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeAll()
+            noiseReconnectPolicy.removeAll()
             connectionScheduler.reset()
             subscriptionAnnounceLimiter.removeAll()
         }
@@ -1106,6 +1119,51 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         collectionsQueue.sync { peerRegistry.capabilities(for: peerID) }
     }
 
+    func authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+        to peerID: PeerID
+    ) -> UUID? {
+        let normalizedPeerID = peerID.toShort()
+        let currentNoiseGeneration =
+            noiseService.sessionGeneration(for: normalizedPeerID)
+        return collectionsQueue.sync {
+            guard let generation =
+                    privateMediaSessionGenerations[normalizedPeerID],
+                  generation == currentNoiseGeneration,
+                  let authenticated =
+                    authenticatedPeerStates[normalizedPeerID],
+                  authenticated.sessionGeneration == generation,
+                  authenticated.capabilities.contains(.privateMedia),
+                  authenticated.capabilities.contains(
+                    .privateMediaReceipts
+                  ) else {
+                return nil
+            }
+            return generation
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func privateMediaPolicyFingerprint(
+        for peerID: PeerID,
+        expectedSessionGeneration: UUID?
+    ) -> String? {
+        let normalizedPeerID = peerID.toShort()
+        if let expectedSessionGeneration,
+           noiseService.sessionGeneration(for: normalizedPeerID)
+                == expectedSessionGeneration,
+           let fingerprint = noiseService.getPeerFingerprint(normalizedPeerID),
+           noiseService.sessionGeneration(for: normalizedPeerID)
+                == expectedSessionGeneration {
+            // The exact authenticated Noise static key is stronger than a
+            // registry entry populated by a public announce.
+            return fingerprint
+        }
+        return collectionsQueue.sync {
+            peerRegistry.info(for: normalizedPeerID)?
+                .noisePublicKey?
+                .sha256Fingerprint()
+        }
+    }
+
     func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy {
         let normalizedPeerID = peerID.toShort()
         let state: (
@@ -1133,7 +1191,10 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
             return .awaitingCapabilityProof
         }
 
-        guard let fingerprint = state.fingerprint else {
+        guard let fingerprint = privateMediaPolicyFingerprint(
+            for: normalizedPeerID,
+            expectedSessionGeneration: state.sessionGeneration
+        ) ?? state.fingerprint else {
             // A raw fallback must be bound to the stable Noise key from a
             // verified registry entry; a routing ID alone can rotate or be
             // spoofed. Without that key neither proof nor safe migration state
@@ -1187,11 +1248,13 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                 return
             }
 
-            let fingerprint: String? = self.collectionsQueue.sync {
-                self.peerRegistry.info(for: normalizedPeerID)?
-                    .noisePublicKey?
-                    .sha256Fingerprint()
+            let generation = self.collectionsQueue.sync {
+                self.privateMediaSessionGenerations[normalizedPeerID]
             }
+            let fingerprint = self.privateMediaPolicyFingerprint(
+                for: normalizedPeerID,
+                expectedSessionGeneration: generation
+            )
             guard let fingerprint else {
                 self.completePrivateMediaPolicyResolution([completion], with: .blockedDowngrade)
                 return
@@ -1563,6 +1626,36 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         to peerID: PeerID,
         transferId: String,
         allowLegacyFallback: Bool
+    ) {
+        sendFilePrivate(
+            filePacket,
+            to: peerID,
+            transferId: transferId,
+            allowLegacyFallback: allowLegacyFallback,
+            requiresAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts: false
+        )
+    }
+
+    func sendFilePrivateReceiptRetry(
+        _ filePacket: BitchatFilePacket,
+        to peerID: PeerID,
+        transferId: String
+    ) {
+        sendFilePrivate(
+            filePacket,
+            to: peerID,
+            transferId: transferId,
+            allowLegacyFallback: false,
+            requiresAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts: true
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func sendFilePrivate(
+        _ filePacket: BitchatFilePacket,
+        to peerID: PeerID,
+        transferId: String,
+        allowLegacyFallback: Bool,
+        requiresAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts: Bool
     ) {
         // Register before enqueueing onto messageQueue. This closes the window
         // where cancel/delete could run first, observe no scheduler state, and
@@ -1675,6 +1768,25 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                 self.privateMediaTransferAdmissions.finish(transferId)
                 return
             }
+            if requiresAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts,
+               self.authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+                    to: targetID
+               ) == nil {
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "Private media retry blocked without current authenticated receipt support for \(targetID.id.prefix(8))…",
+                    category: .security
+                )
+                TransferProgressManager.shared.rejectBeforeStart(
+                    id: transferId,
+                    reason: String(
+                        localized: "content.delivery.reason.private_media_capability_unresolved",
+                        defaultValue: "Could not confirm encrypted media support",
+                        comment: "Failure reason when private-media capability negotiation did not resolve"
+                    )
+                )
+                self.privateMediaTransferAdmissions.finish(transferId)
+                return
+            }
             guard let typedPayload = BLENoisePayloadFactory.privateFile(filePacket) else {
                 SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to encode file packet for private send", category: .session)
                 TransferProgressManager.shared.rejectBeforeStart(
@@ -1685,6 +1797,21 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                 return
             }
             guard self.noiseService.hasEstablishedSession(with: targetID) else {
+                if requiresAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts {
+                    // A retry belongs to one exact authenticated generation.
+                    // Never let it enter the ordinary pending queue where a
+                    // bit-8-only replacement session could later flush it.
+                    TransferProgressManager.shared.rejectBeforeStart(
+                        id: transferId,
+                        reason: String(
+                            localized: "content.delivery.reason.private_media_capability_unresolved",
+                            defaultValue: "Could not confirm encrypted media support",
+                            comment: "Failure reason when private-media capability negotiation did not resolve"
+                        )
+                    )
+                    self.privateMediaTransferAdmissions.finish(transferId)
+                    return
+                }
                 let queued = self.collectionsQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
                     self.privateMediaTransferAdmissions.withActive(transferId) {
                         self.pendingNoiseSessionQueues.appendTypedPayload(
@@ -1716,7 +1843,12 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                     self.privateMediaTransferAdmissions.finish(transferId)
                     return
                 }
-                let packet = try self.makeEncryptedNoisePacket(typedPayload, to: targetID)
+                let packet = try self.makeEncryptedNoisePacket(
+                    typedPayload,
+                    to: targetID,
+                    requiresAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts:
+                        requiresAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts
+                )
                 guard self.privateMediaTransferAdmissions.isActive(transferId) else {
                     self.privateMediaTransferAdmissions.finish(transferId)
                     return
@@ -1950,26 +2082,15 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         // Encode once using a small per-type padding policy, then delegate by type
         let padForBLE = BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.padsBLEFrame(for: packetToSend.type)
 
-        // The 256-fragment ceiling exists to protect *current Android*
-        // receivers, which only ever receive private media over the directed
-        // raw-file migration fallback (they do not implement the encrypted
-        // 0x20 path). Encrypted private media (`noiseEncrypted`) is sent only to
-        // peers that advertised the `.privateMedia` capability — modern clients
-        // that assemble up to the full receiver ceiling (see
-        // `BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer`'s 10,000-fragment guard) — so forcing them
-        // down to Android's 256 cap would needlessly reject iOS→iOS photos in
-        // the ~120–512 KiB range that work today. Restrict the low cap to the
-        // migration fallback (directed `fileTransfer`); public media is
-        // unaffected. Run the same planner the scheduler will use, after route
-        // application, and reject before reserving a transfer slot or writing
-        // any fragment.
-        // TODO(#1434): negotiate an explicit per-peer fragment limit so a future
-        // Android client that adopts the encrypted 0x20 path but still caps its
-        // reassembler can advertise its own ceiling instead of relying on the
-        // capability/type proxy above.
+        // Cross-platform private-media v1 is bounded by Android's deployed
+        // 256-fragment receive cap. Run the same planner the scheduler will
+        // use, after route application, for both encrypted and consented raw
+        // migration sends. Reject before reserving a transfer slot or writing
+        // any fragment; public media is intentionally unaffected.
         if let transferId,
            let recipientPeerID = PeerID(hexData: packetToSend.recipientID),
-           packetToSend.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue {
+           packetToSend.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue
+                || packetToSend.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue {
             let compatibilityRequest = BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest(
                 packet: packetToSend,
                 pad: padForBLE,
@@ -2525,12 +2646,50 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                     defaultPrefix: defaultPrefix
                 )
             },
+            privateMediaReceiptState: { [weak self] messageID in
+                self?.incomingFileStore.privateMediaReceiptState(
+                    messageID: messageID
+                ) ?? .unavailable
+            },
+            commitPrivateMediaFile: { [weak self] messageID, storedURL in
+                self?.incomingFileStore.commitPrivateMediaFile(
+                    messageID: messageID,
+                    storedURL: storedURL
+                ) ?? false
+            },
+            removeIncomingFile: { [weak self] storedURL in
+                self?.incomingFileStore.removeIncomingFile(at: storedURL)
+            },
+            isPrivateMediaSenderBlocked: { [weak self] peerID in
+                guard let self else { return false }
+                let senderStaticKey = self.noiseService.getPeerPublicKeyData(peerID)
+                    ?? self.collectionsQueue.sync {
+                        self.peerRegistry.info(for: peerID)?.noisePublicKey
+                    }
+                guard let senderStaticKey else { return false }
+                return self.identityManager.isBlocked(
+                    fingerprint: senderStaticKey.sha256Fingerprint()
+                )
+            },
             updatePeerLastSeen: { [weak self] peerID in
                 self?.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
             },
-            deliverMessage: { [weak self] message in
-                // Single main-actor hop delivering `.messageReceived`.
-                self?.emitTransportEvent(.messageReceived(message))
+            acknowledgePrivateMedia: { [weak self] messageID, peerID in
+                guard let self,
+                      let senderStaticKey = self.noiseService.getPeerPublicKeyData(peerID),
+                      !self.identityManager.isBlocked(
+                        fingerprint: senderStaticKey.sha256Fingerprint()
+                      ) else {
+                    return
+                }
+                self.sendDeliveryAck(for: messageID, to: peerID)
+            },
+            deliverMessage: { [weak self] message, shouldDeliver, completion in
+                self?.emitTransportEvent(
+                    .messageReceived(message),
+                    shouldDeliver: shouldDeliver,
+                    completion: completion
+                )
             }
         )
     }
@@ -2628,6 +2787,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
             }
             for link in departedLinks {
                 noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(forKey: link)
+                noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(link)
             }
         }
         _ = collectionsQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
@@ -2940,14 +3100,21 @@ extension BLEService: CBCentralManagerDelegate {
             startScanning()
 
         case .poweredOff:
-            // Bluetooth was turned off - stop scanning and clean up connection state
+            // CoreBluetooth has already transitioned out of poweredOn. Do
+            // not issue stop/cancel commands now; they are rejected as API
+            // misuse. Retire our link state locally instead.
             SecureLogger.info("📴 Bluetooth powered off - cleaning up central state", category: .session)
-            central.stopScan()
-            // Mark all peripheral connections as disconnected (they are now invalid)
             let peripheralStates = linkStateStore.peripheralStates
             let peerIDs: [PeerID] = peripheralStates.compactMap(\.peerID)
             for state in peripheralStates {
-                central.cancelPeripheralConnection(state.peripheral)
+                let peripheralID = state.peripheral.identifier.uuidString
+                collectionsQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+                    pendingPeripheralWrites.discardAll(for: peripheralID)
+                }
+                noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(
+                    forKey: .peripheral(peripheralID)
+                )
+                noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(.peripheral(peripheralID))
             }
             _ = linkStateStore.clearPeripherals()
             // Notify UI of disconnections
@@ -2960,7 +3127,6 @@ extension BLEService: CBCentralManagerDelegate {
         case .unauthorized:
             // User denied Bluetooth permission
             SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Bluetooth unauthorized - user denied permission", category: .session)
-            central.stopScan()
             _ = linkStateStore.clearPeripherals()
 
         case .unsupported:
@@ -3108,6 +3274,7 @@ extension BLEService: CBCentralManagerDelegate {
             pendingPeripheralWrites.discardAll(for: peripheralID)
         }
         noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(forKey: .peripheral(peripheralID))
+        noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(.peripheral(peripheralID))
         _ = linkStateStore.removePeripheral(peripheralID)
         // A duplicate link can drop while the peer stays live on another
         // (the dual-role central link, or a second bound link after a
@@ -3162,6 +3329,7 @@ extension BLEService: CBCentralManagerDelegate {
             pendingPeripheralWrites.discardAll(for: peripheralID)
         }
         noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(forKey: .peripheral(peripheralID))
+        noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(.peripheral(peripheralID))
         _ = linkStateStore.removePeripheral(peripheralID)
         
         SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to connect to peripheral: \(peripheral.name ?? "Unknown") [\(peripheralID)] - Error: \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "Unknown")", category: .session)
@@ -3269,6 +3437,7 @@ extension BLEService {
                 self.pendingPeripheralWrites.discardAll(for: peripheralID)
             }
             self.noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(forKey: .peripheral(peripheralID))
+            self.noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(.peripheral(peripheralID))
             _ = self.linkStateStore.removePeripheral(peripheralID)
             self.connectionScheduler.recordConnectionTimeout(peripheralID: peripheralID, at: Date())
             self.tryConnectFromQueue()
@@ -3550,6 +3719,28 @@ extension BLEService {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Replays the current generation's ready callback. Restore tests use
+    /// this to prove same-generation reconciliation is idempotent.
+    func _test_reconcileCurrentNoiseSession(for peerID: PeerID) {
+        let normalizedPeerID = peerID.toShort()
+        messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
+            guard let self,
+                  let generation = self.noiseService.sessionGeneration(
+                    for: normalizedPeerID
+                  ),
+                  let fingerprint = self.noiseService.getPeerFingerprint(
+                    normalizedPeerID
+                  ) else {
+                return
+            }
+            self.handleNoisePeerAuthenticated(
+                peerID: normalizedPeerID,
+                fingerprint: fingerprint,
+                sessionGeneration: generation
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Builds an authenticated-session packet from an exact typed plaintext.
     /// Compatibility tests use this to model Android's deployed 0x20 file
     /// payload and the short-lived 0x09 prerelease payload without exposing a
@@ -3849,8 +4040,19 @@ extension BLEService: CBPeripheralManagerDelegate {
         case .poweredOff:
             // Bluetooth was turned off - clean up peripheral state
             SecureLogger.info("📴 Bluetooth powered off - cleaning up peripheral state", category: .session)
-            peripheral.stopAdvertising()
             // Clear subscribed centrals (they are now invalid)
+            let centralSnapshot = linkStateStore.subscribedCentralSnapshot
+            for central in centralSnapshot.centrals {
+                let centralID = central.identifier.uuidString
+                noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(
+                    forKey: .central(centralID)
+                )
+                noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(.central(centralID))
+            }
+            collectionsQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+                pendingNotifications.removeAll()
+                pendingWriteBuffers.removeAll()
+            }
             let centralPeerIDs = linkStateStore.clearCentrals()
             subscriptionAnnounceLimiter.removeAll()
             characteristic = nil
@@ -3864,7 +4066,6 @@ extension BLEService: CBPeripheralManagerDelegate {
         case .unauthorized:
             // User denied Bluetooth permission
             SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Bluetooth unauthorized for peripheral role", category: .session)
-            peripheral.stopAdvertising()
             _ = linkStateStore.clearCentrals()
             subscriptionAnnounceLimiter.removeAll()
             characteristic = nil
@@ -3977,6 +4178,7 @@ extension BLEService: CBPeripheralManagerDelegate {
             pendingNotifications.removeTarget { $0.identifier.uuidString == centralID }
         }
         noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(forKey: .central(centralID))
+        noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(.central(centralID))
         let removedPeerID = linkStateStore.removeSubscribedCentral(central)
         
         // Ensure we're still advertising for other devices to find us
@@ -4204,18 +4406,55 @@ extension BLEService {
         }
     }
 
-    private func emitTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) {
+    private func emitTransportEvent(
+        _ event: TransportEvent,
+        shouldDeliver: (() -> Bool)? = nil,
+        completion: (() -> Void)? = nil
+    ) {
         notifyUI { [weak self] in
-            self?.deliverTransportEvent(event)
+            guard let self,
+                  shouldDeliver?() ?? true,
+                  self.deliverTransportEvent(event),
+                  // Quota cleanup can race the asynchronous main-actor hop or
+                  // the synchronous ConversationStore upsert. ACK only while
+                  // the exact durable mapping and file still resolve.
+                  shouldDeliver?() ?? true else {
+                return
+            }
+            completion?()
         }
     }
 
     @MainActor
-    private func deliverTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) {
+    @discardableResult
+    private func deliverTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) -> Bool {
+        if case .messageReceived(let message) = event {
+            if let synchronousDelegate =
+                eventDelegate as? SynchronousMessageTransportEventDelegate {
+                return synchronousDelegate
+                    .didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(message)
+            }
+            if let eventDelegate {
+                eventDelegate.didReceiveTransportEvent(event)
+                return false
+            }
+            if let synchronousDelegate =
+                delegate as? SynchronousMessageTransportEventDelegate {
+                return synchronousDelegate
+                    .didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(message)
+            }
+        }
+
         if let eventDelegate {
             eventDelegate.didReceiveTransportEvent(event)
+            return true
         } else {
-            delegate?.receiveTransportEvent(event)
+            guard let delegate else { return false }
+            delegate.receiveTransportEvent(event)
+            if case .messageReceived = event {
+                return false
+            }
+            return true
         }
     }
 
@@ -4594,11 +4833,48 @@ extension BLEService {
             })
         }
     }
+
+    /// A peer-level session can outlive the physical link that established it.
+    /// Revalidate a fresh direct link with an ordinary XX exchange, retiring
+    /// cached sending keys atomically before message 1 can leave.
+    private func refreshNoiseSessionForVerifiedDirectLink(
+        _ packet: BitchatPacket,
+        peerID: PeerID
+    ) {
+        guard let link = collectionsQueue.sync(execute: { ingressLinks.link(for: packet) }) else {
+            return
+        }
+
+        let hasEstablishedSession = noiseService.hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID)
+        let authenticatedPeerLinks = currentNoiseAuthenticatedLinks(to: peerID)
+        let shouldRevalidate = readLinkState { store in
+            guard boundPeerID(for: link, in: store) == peerID else {
+                return false
+            }
+            return noiseReconnectPolicy.shouldRevalidate(
+                on: link,
+                hasEstablishedSession: hasEstablishedSession,
+                isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners[link] == peerID,
+                hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: !authenticatedPeerLinks.isEmpty,
+                now: Date()
+            )
+        }
+        guard shouldRevalidate else { return }
+
+        SecureLogger.info(
+            "🔄 Revalidating cached Noise session on fresh direct link to \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…",
+            category: .session
+        )
+        initiateNoiseReconnectHandshake(with: peerID)
+    }
     
     private func configureNoiseServiceCallbacks(for service: NoiseEncryptionService) {
         service.onPeerAuthenticatedWithGeneration = { [weak self] peerID, fingerprint, generation in
             SecureLogger.debug("🔐 Noise session authenticated with \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…, fingerprint: \(fingerprint.prefix(16))…")
-            self?.messageQueue.async { [weak self] in
+            // Authentication can be reported while an initiator is still
+            // returning XX message 3. Serialize generation-bound state and
+            // every post-handshake drain behind the handshake packet handler.
+            self?.messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
                 self?.handleNoisePeerAuthenticated(
                     peerID: peerID,
                     fingerprint: fingerprint,
@@ -4606,13 +4882,96 @@ extension BLEService {
                 )
             }
         }
-        service.onRekeyHandshakeReady = { [weak self] peerID, message in
-            self?.messageQueue.async { [weak self] in
-                guard let self else { return }
+        service.onRekeyHandshakeReady = {
+            [weak self, weak service] peerID, initiation in
+            self?.messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+                [weak self, weak service] in
+                guard let self,
+                      let service,
+                      self.noiseService === service else {
+                    return
+                }
                 self.noteNoiseSessionCleared(for: peerID)
+                guard let message = service.claimHandshakeInitiation(
+                    initiation,
+                    for: peerID
+                ) else {
+                    return
+                }
                 self.broadcastNoiseHandshake(message, to: peerID)
             }
         }
+        service.onHandshakeRecoveryRequired = {
+            [weak self, weak service] request in
+            guard let self, let service else { return }
+            self.messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+                [weak self, weak service] in
+                guard let self,
+                      let service,
+                      self.noiseService === service else {
+                    return
+                }
+                let peerID = request.peerID
+                guard self.isPeerReachable(peerID) else {
+                    service.cancelHandshakeRecovery(request)
+                    return
+                }
+
+                do {
+                    guard let preparation =
+                        try service.prepareHandshakeRecovery(request) else {
+                        return
+                    }
+                    switch preparation {
+                    case .ordinary(let initiation):
+                        self.noteNoiseSessionCleared(for: peerID)
+                        guard let handshakeData =
+                            service.claimHandshakeInitiation(
+                                initiation,
+                                for: peerID
+                            ) else {
+                            return
+                        }
+                        self.broadcastNoiseHandshake(
+                            handshakeData,
+                            to: peerID
+                        )
+                    case .transferred:
+                        return
+                    }
+                } catch {
+                    SecureLogger.error(
+                        "Failed to prepare handshake recovery with \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…: \(error)",
+                        category: .session
+                    )
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        service.onSessionRestoredWithGeneration = { [weak self, weak service] peerID, generation in
+            guard let self, let service else { return }
+            // The manager makes restored keys visible atomically. Reconcile
+            // transport state and queued sends as the next serialized phase.
+            self.messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self, weak service] in
+                guard let self,
+                      let service,
+                      self.noiseService === service,
+                      let fingerprint = service.getPeerFingerprint(peerID) else {
+                    return
+                }
+                SecureLogger.debug(
+                    "🔐 Restored quarantined Noise session with \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                // Re-enter the same generation-bound transition used after a
+                // successful handshake. This restores authenticated protocol
+                // state and drains both PM and typed-payload queues.
+                self.handleNoisePeerAuthenticated(
+                    peerID: peerID,
+                    fingerprint: fingerprint,
+                    sessionGeneration: generation
+                )
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     private func handleNoisePeerAuthenticated(
@@ -4660,7 +5019,16 @@ extension BLEService {
             }
         ) else { return }
 
-        guard let watchdog = transition.watchdog else { return }
+        guard let watchdog = transition.watchdog else {
+            // A quarantined transport restored the same cryptographic
+            // generation. Its capability proof and announce state never
+            // became stale; only work queued while outbound keys were paused
+            // needs one idempotent ready transition.
+            noisePacketHandler.handleSessionAuthenticated(normalizedPeerID)
+            sendPendingMessagesAfterHandshake(for: normalizedPeerID)
+            sendPendingNoisePayloadsAfterHandshake(for: normalizedPeerID)
+            return
+        }
 
         completePrivateMediaPolicyResolution(transition.rejected, with: .blockedDowngrade)
         schedulePrivateMediaProofTimeout(
@@ -4669,6 +5037,10 @@ extension BLEService {
             sessionGeneration: generation,
             nonce: watchdog.nonce
         )
+        // Cross-link delivery can put ciphertext sent immediately after
+        // message 3 ahead of message 3 itself. Retry the bounded queue only
+        // after this generation's transport state has been fully installed.
+        noisePacketHandler.handleSessionAuthenticated(normalizedPeerID)
 
         // `onPeerAuthenticated` can fire while the initiator is returning XX
         // message 3. This callback is queued behind the handshake handler, so
@@ -4866,8 +5238,9 @@ extension BLEService {
             }
             return
         }
-        guard noiseService.hasSession(with: peerID) else {
-            // No session yet - queue the payload SYNCHRONOUSLY before initiating handshake
+        guard noiseService.hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID) else {
+            // No established session yet - queue the payload synchronously
+            // before initiating a handshake
             // to prevent race where fast handshake completion drains empty queue
             collectionsQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
                 self.pendingNoiseSessionQueues.appendTypedPayload(typedPayload, for: peerID)
@@ -4883,7 +5256,11 @@ extension BLEService {
         }
     }
 
-    private func makeEncryptedNoisePacket(_ typedPayload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) throws -> BitchatPacket {
+    private func makeEncryptedNoisePacket(
+        _ typedPayload: Data,
+        to peerID: PeerID,
+        requiresAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts: Bool = false
+    ) throws -> BitchatPacket {
         let encrypted: Data
         let isPrivateFile = NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: typedPayload.first)
         if isPrivateFile {
@@ -4893,6 +5270,13 @@ extension BLEService {
                       let authenticated = authenticatedPeerStates[peerID],
                       authenticated.sessionGeneration == generation,
                       authenticated.capabilities.contains(.privateMedia) else { return nil }
+                if requiresAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts {
+                    guard authenticated.capabilities.contains(
+                        .privateMediaReceipts
+                    ) else {
+                        return nil
+                    }
+                }
                 return generation
             }
             guard let provenGeneration else {
@@ -5797,6 +6181,7 @@ extension BLEService {
                     self.pendingPeripheralWrites.discardAll(for: peripheralID)
                 }
                 self.noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(forKey: .peripheral(peripheralID))
+                self.noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(.peripheral(peripheralID))
                 _ = self.linkStateStore.removePeripheral(peripheralID)
                 cancelled += 1
             }
@@ -5862,12 +6247,27 @@ extension BLEService {
     }
     
     private func initiateNoiseHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) {
-        // Use NoiseEncryptionService for handshake
-        guard !noiseService.hasSession(with: peerID) else { return }
-        
+        let service = noiseService
         do {
-            let handshakeData = try noiseService.initiateHandshake(with: peerID)
-            broadcastNoiseHandshake(handshakeData, to: peerID)
+            guard let initiation = try service.initiateHandshakeIfNeeded(
+                with: peerID,
+                retryOnTimeout: true
+            ) else {
+                return
+            }
+            messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) {
+                [weak self, weak service] in
+                guard let self,
+                      let service,
+                      self.noiseService === service,
+                      let handshakeData = service.claimHandshakeInitiation(
+                        initiation,
+                        for: peerID
+                      ) else {
+                    return
+                }
+                self.broadcastNoiseHandshake(handshakeData, to: peerID)
+            }
         } catch {
             SecureLogger.error("Failed to initiate handshake: \(error)")
         }
@@ -5885,6 +6285,42 @@ extension BLEService {
         )
         broadcastPacket(packet)
     }
+
+    /// Starts a wire-compatible ordinary XX reconnect. The manager prepares
+    /// the initiator before atomically retiring the cached transport; the
+    /// one-shot claim prevents a crossed inbound message from making a stale
+    /// message 1 leave after this peer has already become responder.
+    private func initiateNoiseReconnectHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) {
+        let service = noiseService
+        do {
+            let initiation = try service.initiateReconnectHandshake(
+                with: peerID,
+                retryOnTimeout: true
+            )
+            messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self, weak service] in
+                guard let self,
+                      let service,
+                      self.noiseService === service else {
+                    return
+                }
+                self.noteNoiseSessionCleared(for: peerID)
+                guard let handshakeData = service.claimHandshakeInitiation(
+                          initiation,
+                          for: peerID
+                      ) else {
+                    return
+                }
+                self.broadcastNoiseHandshake(handshakeData, to: peerID)
+            }
+        } catch NoiseSessionError.notEstablished {
+            initiateNoiseHandshake(with: peerID)
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error(
+                "Failed to initiate ordinary reconnect: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+        }
+    }
     
     private func sendPendingMessagesAfterHandshake(for peerID: PeerID) {
         // Atomically take all pending messages to process (prevents concurrent modification)
@@ -6230,7 +6666,12 @@ extension BLEService {
     // MARK: Packet Reception
     
     private func handleReceivedPacket(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
-        // Call directly if already on messageQueue, otherwise dispatch
+        let isNoisePacket = packet.type == MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue
+            || packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue
+
+        // Capture the panic lifecycle at the first off-messageQueue handoff.
+        // Noise packets still enter through a barrier so handshake promotion,
+        // quarantine, and encrypted delivery share one ordered session.
         if DispatchQueue.getSpecific(key: messageQueueKey) == nil {
             guard let lifecycleGeneration =
                     capturePanicLifecycleGeneration() else {
@@ -6239,7 +6680,8 @@ extension BLEService {
             #if DEBUG
             _test_beforeReceivePacketHandoff?()
             #endif
-            messageQueue.async { [weak self] in
+            let flags: DispatchWorkItemFlags = isNoisePacket ? .barrier : []
+            messageQueue.async(flags: flags) { [weak self] in
                 guard let self,
                       self.isCurrentPanicLifecycleGeneration(
                           lifecycleGeneration
@@ -6249,11 +6691,34 @@ extension BLEService {
                 #if DEBUG
                 self._test_onReceivePacketHandoff?()
                 #endif
-                self.handleReceivedPacket(packet, from: peerID)
+                self.handleReceivedPacketOnQueue(packet, from: peerID)
             }
             return
         }
 
+        if isNoisePacket {
+            guard let lifecycleGeneration =
+                    capturePanicLifecycleGeneration() else {
+                return
+            }
+            messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
+                guard let self,
+                      self.isCurrentPanicLifecycleGeneration(
+                          lifecycleGeneration
+                      ) else {
+                    return
+                }
+                self.handleReceivedPacketOnQueue(packet, from: peerID)
+            }
+        } else {
+            handleReceivedPacketOnQueue(packet, from: peerID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func handleReceivedPacketOnQueue(
+        _ packet: BitchatPacket,
+        from peerID: PeerID
+    ) {
         let context = BLEReceivePipeline.context(for: packet, localPeerID: myPeerID)
         let senderID = context.senderID
         let messageID = context.messageID
@@ -6440,6 +6905,9 @@ extension BLEService {
         // consolidate duplicate same-role connections onto that link.
         if let result, result.isVerified, result.isDirectAnnounce {
             rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirectAnnounce(packet, to: result.peerID)
+            #if DEBUG
+            _test_afterVerifiedDirectRebindEnqueued?()
+            #endif
             retireRedundantPeripheralLinks(packet, to: result.peerID)
         }
 
@@ -6473,11 +6941,9 @@ extension BLEService {
             deliverCourierMailRemotely(to: result.peerID, noiseKey: noiseKey)
             if result.isDirectAnnounce,
                !hasCurrentNoiseAuthenticatedLink(to: result.peerID) {
-                if noiseService.hasEstablishedSession(with: result.peerID) {
-                    // A session with no surviving authenticated link is stale;
-                    // force the current link to prove possession again.
-                    clearNoiseSession(for: result.peerID)
-                }
+                // A cached session may predate this physical link.
+                // rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirectAnnounce performs its atomic
+                // ordinary reconnect after the binding is published.
                 if !noiseService.hasSession(with: result.peerID) {
                     initiateNoiseHandshake(with: result.peerID)
                 }
@@ -6506,7 +6972,14 @@ extension BLEService {
                 linkUUID = centralUUID
                 previousPeerID = self.linkStateStore.peerID(forCentralUUID: centralUUID)
             }
-            guard let previousPeerID, previousPeerID != peerID else { return }
+            guard let previousPeerID else { return }
+            guard previousPeerID != peerID else {
+                self.refreshNoiseSessionForVerifiedDirectLink(
+                    packet,
+                    peerID: peerID
+                )
+                return
+            }
 
             // The signature does not authenticate directness (TTL is excluded
             // from signing because relays mutate it), so a "verified direct"
@@ -6533,12 +7006,20 @@ extension BLEService {
             // it across an announce-driven rebind, whose direct TTL is
             // replayable; the new owner must complete a fresh handshake.
             self.noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(forKey: link)
+            self.noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(link)
             switch link {
             case .peripheral(let peripheralUUID):
                 self.linkStateStore.bindPeripheral(peripheralUUID, to: peerID)
             case .central(let centralUUID):
                 self.linkStateStore.bindCentral(centralUUID, to: peerID)
             }
+            // Keep the rebind and reconnect decision in one bleQueue critical
+            // section. No observer may see the new binding while a cached
+            // peer-level sender is still considered established.
+            self.refreshNoiseSessionForVerifiedDirectLink(
+                packet,
+                peerID: peerID
+            )
             SecureLogger.debug("🔄 Rebinding link after peer-ID rotation: \(previousPeerID.id.prefix(8))… → \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
             self.refreshLocalTopology()
             // The announce that triggered this rebind was upserted as
@@ -6630,6 +7111,7 @@ extension BLEService {
                 pendingPeripheralWrites.discardAll(for: uuid)
             }
             noiseAuthenticatedLinkOwners.removeValue(forKey: .peripheral(uuid))
+            noiseReconnectPolicy.endLinkEpoch(.peripheral(uuid))
             _ = linkStateStore.removePeripheral(uuid)
             SecureLogger.info(
                 "🔗 Retiring redundant link \(uuid.prefix(8))… bound to \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…\(keptUUID.map { " (keeping \($0.prefix(8))…)" } ?? "")",
@@ -7016,6 +7498,12 @@ extension BLEService {
             packet,
             from: peerID
         )
+        // An inbound message 1 quarantines the old transport receive-only.
+        // Keep its generation-bound BLE state intact: the manager's new
+        // handshaking generation already gates every outbound policy, while
+        // a rollback can become ready again without repeating capability
+        // proof or announce side effects. Only the exact handshake candidate's
+        // authenticated completion may promote the physical ingress link.
         if result.didEstablishAuthenticatedSession {
             markNoiseAuthenticatedIngressLink(for: packet, peerID: peerID)
         }
@@ -7053,6 +7541,11 @@ extension BLEService {
             hasNoiseSession: { [weak self] peerID in
                 self?.noiseService.hasSession(with: peerID) ?? false
             },
+            isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion: { [weak self] peerID in
+                self?.noiseService.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(
+                    with: peerID
+                ) ?? false
+            },
             initiateHandshake: { [weak self] peerID in
                 self?.initiateNoiseHandshake(with: peerID)
             },
@@ -7066,7 +7559,14 @@ extension BLEService {
                 guard let self = self else { throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished }
                 let result = try self.noiseService.decryptWithSessionGeneration(
                     payload,
-                    from: peerID
+                    from: peerID,
+                    establishedGenerationIsReady: { generation in
+                        self.collectionsQueue.sync {
+                            self.privateMediaSessionGenerations[
+                                peerID.toShort()
+                            ] == generation
+                        }
+                    }
                 )
                 return BLENoiseDecryptionResult(
                     plaintext: result.plaintext,

bitchat/Services/NoiseEncryptionService.swift

@@ -184,11 +184,17 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
     private var onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers: [((PeerID, String) -> Void)] = [] // Array of handlers for peer authentication
     private var onPeerAuthenticatedWithGenerationHandlers: [((PeerID, String, UUID) -> Void)] = []
     var onHandshakeRequired: ((PeerID) -> Void)? // peerID needs handshake
-    /// Automatic rekey removed the old session and produced XX message 1.
-    /// The transport must clear session-scoped state and put these exact bytes
-    /// on the wire; merely reporting "handshake required" strands the partial
-    /// initiator session because a second initiate call sees it already exists.
-    var onRekeyHandshakeReady: ((_ peerID: PeerID, _ message: Data) -> Void)?
+    /// Automatic rekey prepared XX message 1. The transport must claim the
+    /// exact attempt at its actual BLE handoff; a crossed inbound initiation
+    /// can invalidate the token before that point.
+    var onRekeyHandshakeReady:
+        ((_ peerID: PeerID, _ initiation: NoiseHandshakeInitiation) -> Void)?
+    var onHandshakeRecoveryRequired:
+        ((_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest) -> Void)?
+    /// An unauthenticated reconnect attempt failed or timed out and the
+    /// receive-only rollback session became the active transport again.
+    /// Transport queues must be drained for this exact restored generation.
+    var onSessionRestoredWithGeneration: ((_ peerID: PeerID, _ generation: UUID) -> Void)?
     
     // Add a handler for peer authentication
     func addOnPeerAuthenticatedHandler(_ handler: @escaping (PeerID, String) -> Void) {
@@ -219,7 +225,17 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
         }
     }
     
-    init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
+    init(
+        keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
+        ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
+            NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryHandshakeTimeout,
+        ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
+            NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout,
+        recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: TimeInterval =
+            NoiseSecurityConstants.recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod,
+        ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown: TimeInterval =
+            NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown
+    ) {
         self.keychain = keychain
         self.localPrekeys = LocalPrekeyStore(keychain: keychain)
 
@@ -309,7 +325,17 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
         self.signingPublicKey = signingKey.publicKey
 
         // Initialize session manager
-        self.sessionManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: staticIdentityKey, keychain: keychain)
+        self.sessionManager = NoiseSessionManager(
+            localStaticKey: staticIdentityKey,
+            keychain: keychain,
+            ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: ordinaryHandshakeTimeout,
+            ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout:
+                ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout,
+            recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod:
+                recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod,
+            ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown:
+                ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown
+        )
 
         // Set up session callbacks
         sessionManager.onSessionEstablished = { [weak self] peerID, remoteStaticKey, generation in
@@ -319,6 +345,12 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
                 sessionGeneration: generation
             )
         }
+        sessionManager.onSessionRestored = { [weak self] peerID, generation in
+            self?.onSessionRestoredWithGeneration?(peerID, generation)
+        }
+        sessionManager.onHandshakeRecoveryRequired = { [weak self] request in
+            self?.onHandshakeRecoveryRequired?(request)
+        }
 
         // Start session maintenance timer
         startRekeyTimer()
@@ -682,6 +714,90 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
         let handshakeData = try sessionManager.initiateHandshake(with: peerID)
         return handshakeData
     }
+
+    /// Atomically admits and prepares one initial ordinary handshake. Returns
+    /// nil when another discovery callback already created a session.
+    func initiateHandshakeIfNeeded(
+        with peerID: PeerID,
+        retryOnTimeout: Bool = false
+    ) throws -> NoiseHandshakeInitiation? {
+        guard peerID.isValid else {
+            SecureLogger.warning(.authenticationFailed(peerID: peerID.id))
+            throw NoiseSecurityError.invalidPeerID
+        }
+
+        guard let initiation = try sessionManager.initiateHandshakeIfAbsent(
+            with: peerID,
+            notifyOnTimeout: retryOnTimeout,
+            authorize: { [rateLimiter] in
+                guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: peerID) else {
+                    SecureLogger.warning(
+                        .authenticationFailed(peerID: "Rate limited: \(peerID)")
+                    )
+                    throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
+                }
+            }
+        ) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        SecureLogger.info(.handshakeStarted(peerID: peerID.id))
+        return initiation
+    }
+
+    /// Atomically prepares an ordinary reconnect for a peer whose cached
+    /// transport belongs to an earlier physical link. Failed authorization or
+    /// handshake setup preserves the established session.
+    func initiateReconnectHandshake(
+        with peerID: PeerID,
+        retryOnTimeout: Bool = false
+    ) throws -> NoiseHandshakeInitiation {
+        guard peerID.isValid else {
+            SecureLogger.warning(.authenticationFailed(peerID: peerID.id))
+            throw NoiseSecurityError.invalidPeerID
+        }
+
+        return try sessionManager.initiateReconnectHandshake(
+            with: peerID,
+            notifyOnTimeout: retryOnTimeout,
+            authorize: { [rateLimiter] in
+                guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: peerID) else {
+                    SecureLogger.warning(
+                        .authenticationFailed(peerID: "Rate limited: \(peerID)")
+                    )
+                    throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
+                }
+            }
+        )
+    }
+
+    func prepareHandshakeRecovery(
+        _ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest
+    ) throws -> NoiseHandshakeRecoveryPreparation? {
+        try sessionManager.prepareHandshakeRecovery(
+            request,
+            authorizeAttempt: { [rateLimiter] in
+                guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: request.peerID) else {
+                    SecureLogger.warning(
+                        .authenticationFailed(
+                            peerID: "Rate limited: \(request.peerID)"
+                        )
+                    )
+                    throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
+                }
+            }
+        )
+    }
+
+    func cancelHandshakeRecovery(_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest) {
+        sessionManager.cancelHandshakeRecovery(request)
+    }
+
+    func claimHandshakeInitiation(
+        _ initiation: NoiseHandshakeInitiation,
+        for peerID: PeerID
+    ) -> Data? {
+        sessionManager.claimHandshakeInitiation(initiation, for: peerID)
+    }
     
     /// Process an incoming handshake message
     func processHandshakeMessage(from peerID: PeerID, message: Data) throws -> Data? {
@@ -737,6 +853,13 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
     func hasSession(with peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
         return sessionManager.getSession(for: peerID) != nil
     }
+
+    /// True while an inbound ordinary XX responder is waiting for message 3.
+    /// A small amount of immediately-following ciphertext may arrive first
+    /// over BLE and must be retried only after responder promotion.
+    func isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(with peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
+        sessionManager.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(for: peerID)
+    }
     
     // MARK: - Encryption/Decryption
     
@@ -804,27 +927,37 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
 
     func decryptWithSessionGeneration(
         _ data: Data,
-        from peerID: PeerID
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        establishedGenerationIsReady: (UUID) -> Bool = { _ in true }
     ) throws -> (plaintext: Data, sessionGeneration: UUID) {
         // Standard transport ciphertext has 20 bytes of nonce/tag overhead.
-        // A larger candidate is admitted only up to the framed-file ceiling;
+        // A larger ciphertext is admitted only up to the framed-file ceiling;
         // after authenticated decryption it must prove it is `.privateFile`.
         let isStandardCiphertext = NoiseSecurityValidator.validateCiphertextSize(data)
-        guard isStandardCiphertext || NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(data) else {
-            throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
-        }
+        let isAdmittedCiphertext = isStandardCiphertext
+            || NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(data)
         
-        // Check rate limit
-        guard rateLimiter.allowMessage(from: peerID) else {
-            throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
-        }
-        
-        // Check if we have an established session
-        guard hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID) else {
+        // A quarantined transport is deliberately unavailable for outbound
+        // state, but remains receive-only until the responder proves identity
+        // or the bounded rollback restores it.
+        guard sessionManager.hasReceiveSession(for: peerID) else {
             throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
         }
         
-        let result = try sessionManager.decryptWithSessionGeneration(data, from: peerID)
+        let result = try sessionManager.decryptWithSessionGeneration(
+            data,
+            from: peerID,
+            establishedGenerationIsReady:
+                establishedGenerationIsReady,
+            authorizeDecrypt: { [rateLimiter] in
+                guard isAdmittedCiphertext else {
+                    throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
+                }
+                guard rateLimiter.allowMessage(from: peerID) else {
+                    throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
+                }
+            }
+        )
         if !isStandardCiphertext {
             guard NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: result.plaintext.first),
                   NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileMessageSize(result.plaintext) else {
@@ -943,9 +1076,9 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
     }
 
     private func initiateAutomaticRekey(for peerID: PeerID) throws {
-        let handshakeMessage = try sessionManager.initiateRekey(for: peerID)
+        let initiation = try sessionManager.initiateRekey(for: peerID)
         SecureLogger.debug("Key rotation initiated for peer: \(peerID)", category: .security)
-        onRekeyHandshakeReady?(peerID, handshakeMessage)
+        onRekeyHandshakeReady?(peerID, initiation)
         onHandshakeRequired?(peerID)
     }
 
@@ -1041,6 +1174,9 @@ struct NoiseMessage: Codable {
 enum NoiseEncryptionError: Error {
     case handshakeRequired
     case sessionNotEstablished
+    /// Manager keys are established or restored, but BLE has not installed
+    /// generation-bound transport state. No receive nonce was consumed.
+    case transportGenerationNotReady
     /// Envelope references a prekey ID we don't hold (never ours, already
     /// deleted after its grace window, or wiped in a panic).
     case unknownPrekey

bitchat/Services/Transport.swift

@@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ protocol TransportEventDelegate: AnyObject {
     @MainActor func didReceiveTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent)
 }
 
+/// Optional typed-event contract for sinks that can synchronously decide
+/// whether an inbound message was accepted.
+protocol SynchronousMessageTransportEventDelegate: TransportEventDelegate {
+    @MainActor
+    func didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool
+}
+
 protocol Transport: AnyObject {
     // Event sink
     var delegate: BitchatDelegate? { get set }
@@ -183,6 +190,14 @@ protocol Transport: AnyObject {
         transferId: String,
         allowLegacyFallback: Bool
     )
+    /// Automatic whole-file retry is admitted only while this exact Noise
+    /// generation authenticates bit 9. It must never queue across a session
+    /// replacement or enter the signed raw legacy path.
+    func sendFilePrivateReceiptRetry(
+        _ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
+        to peerID: PeerID,
+        transferId: String
+    )
     func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String)
 
     // Live voice / push-to-talk (mesh transports only): one encoded
@@ -229,6 +244,11 @@ protocol Transport: AnyObject {
     /// empty for peers that predate the capabilities TLV.
     func peerCapabilities(_ peerID: PeerID) -> PeerCapabilities
     func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy
+    /// The exact current Noise generation that authenticated both encrypted
+    /// private media (bit 8) and durable receipts/retry (bit 9).
+    func authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+        to peerID: PeerID
+    ) -> UUID?
     func resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(
         to peerID: PeerID,
         completion: @escaping @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
@@ -304,6 +324,11 @@ extension Transport {
     func broadcastGroupMessage(_ envelope: Data) {}
     func peerCapabilities(_ peerID: PeerID) -> PeerCapabilities { [] }
     func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy { .blockedDowngrade }
+    func authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+        to peerID: PeerID
+    ) -> UUID? {
+        nil
+    }
     func resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(
         to peerID: PeerID,
         completion: @escaping @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
@@ -338,6 +363,11 @@ extension Transport {
         guard !allowLegacyFallback else { return }
         sendFilePrivate(packet, to: peerID, transferId: transferId)
     }
+    func sendFilePrivateReceiptRetry(
+        _ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
+        to peerID: PeerID,
+        transferId: String
+    ) {}
     func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String) {}
 
     func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String], messageID: String, timestamp: Date) {

bitchat/Services/TransportConfig.swift

@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ enum TransportConfig {
     static let privateMediaCapabilityProofTimeoutSeconds: TimeInterval = 5
     static let privateMediaCapabilityProofPendingPeerCap: Int = 64
     static let privateMediaCapabilityProofWaitersPerPeerCap: Int = 16
+    /// Accepted private-media receipts and explicit-deletion tombstones each
+    /// receive this independent capacity.
+    static let privateMediaReceivedLedgerCapacity: Int = 4_096
+    /// A bounded retry horizon prevents stable receipt state from growing into
+    /// permanent application history.
+    static let privateMediaReceivedLedgerTTLSeconds: TimeInterval =
+        7 * 24 * 60 * 60
     static let bleFragmentRelayMinDelayMs: Int = 8          // Faster forwarding for media fragments
     static let bleFragmentRelayMaxDelayMs: Int = 25         // Upper jitter bound for fragment relays
     // Fragment relay TTL in sparse graphs; matches messageTTLDefault so media

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatDeliveryCoordinator.swift

@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ extension ChatViewModel: ChatDeliveryContext {
 
     func markMessageDelivered(_ messageID: String) {
         messageRouter.markDelivered(messageID)
+        mediaTransferCoordinator.confirmPrivateMediaDelivery(
+            messageID: messageID
+        )
     }
 }
 

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator.swift

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import Foundation
 @MainActor
 protocol ChatLiveVoiceContext: AnyObject {
     var nickname: String { get }
+    var myPeerID: PeerID { get }
     var selectedPrivateChatPeer: PeerID? { get }
     /// Whether the public mesh timeline is what's on screen (autoplay gate
     /// for public bursts).
@@ -30,6 +31,12 @@ protocol ChatLiveVoiceContext: AnyObject {
     func upsertPublicMeshMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage)
     @discardableResult
     func removePrivateMessage(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage?
+    /// Records and sends the finalized note's read receipt after a live
+    /// bubble adopts its wire-derivable message ID.
+    func hasSentReadReceipt(_ messageID: String) -> Bool
+    @discardableResult
+    func markReadReceiptSent(_ messageID: String) -> Bool
+    func sendMeshReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID)
     /// Removes a message from whichever conversation holds it.
     func removeMessage(withID messageID: String, cleanupFile: Bool)
     /// Publishes who is currently talking live in the public mesh channel
@@ -272,8 +279,16 @@ final class ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator {
         guard let entry = finishedBursts.first(where: { matches($0.key) }) else { return false }
         let finished = entry.value
 
+        // A DM live bubble starts before the finalized file exists and
+        // therefore has a receiver-local random ID. Adopt the finalized
+        // message's deterministic ID so delivery/read ACKs address the same
+        // row as the sender's media placeholder. Public notes retain their
+        // live-bubble ID because public transfers have no private receipts.
+        let replacementID = finished.scope == .directMessage
+            ? message.id
+            : finished.messageID
         let replacement = BitchatMessage(
-            id: finished.messageID,
+            id: replacementID,
             sender: message.sender,
             content: message.content,
             timestamp: finished.messageTimestamp,
@@ -287,7 +302,31 @@ final class ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator {
         )
         switch finished.scope {
         case .directMessage:
+            // Capture read state before rekeying. The user may have read the
+            // live bubble and navigated away before the finalized .m4a lands.
+            let shouldSendAdoptedReadReceipt =
+                context.hasSentReadReceipt(finished.messageID)
+                || context.selectedPrivateChatPeer == finished.peerID
+
+            // Insert first so replacing the only row in a DM never
+            // transiently deletes its conversation, unread state, or current
+            // selection. Then remove the receiver-local live-bubble alias.
             context.upsertPrivateMessage(replacement, in: finished.peerID)
+            if replacementID != finished.messageID {
+                context.removePrivateMessage(withID: finished.messageID)
+            }
+            // The live bubble may already have emitted a receiver-local READ
+            // before the sender created its finalized media row. Re-emit once
+            // for the adopted stable ID now that the file has arrived.
+            if shouldSendAdoptedReadReceipt,
+               context.markReadReceiptSent(replacementID) {
+                let receipt = ReadReceipt(
+                    originalMessageID: replacementID,
+                    readerID: context.myPeerID,
+                    readerNickname: context.nickname
+                )
+                context.sendMeshReadReceipt(receipt, to: finished.peerID)
+            }
         case .publicMesh:
             context.upsertPublicMeshMessage(replacement)
         }

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatPeerListCoordinator.swift

@@ -100,9 +100,14 @@ final class ChatPeerListCoordinator: @unchecked Sendable {
 
     func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {
         Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
-            self?.handlePeerListUpdate(peers)
+            self?.didUpdatePeerListSynchronously(peers)
         }
     }
+
+    @MainActor
+    func didUpdatePeerListSynchronously(_ peers: [PeerID]) {
+        handlePeerListUpdate(peers)
+    }
 }
 
 private extension ChatPeerListCoordinator {

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatTransportEventCoordinator.swift

@@ -163,21 +163,20 @@ final class ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
     }
 
     func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
-        runOnMain { context in
-            guard !context.isMessageBlocked(message) else { return }
-            guard !message.content.trimmed.isEmpty || message.isPrivate else { return }
-
-            if message.isPrivate {
-                context.handlePrivateMessage(message)
-            } else {
-                context.handlePublicMessage(message)
-            }
-
-            context.checkForMentions(message)
-            context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
+        runOnMain { [self] context in
+            handleReceivedMessage(message, in: context)
         }
     }
 
+    /// Typed transport events already arrive on the main actor. Handle them
+    /// synchronously so observers see the ConversationStore mutation before
+    /// the transport completes delivery.
+    @MainActor
+    @discardableResult
+    func didReceiveMessageSynchronously(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
+        handleReceivedMessage(message, in: context)
+    }
+
     func didReceivePublicMessage(
         from peerID: PeerID,
         nickname: String,
@@ -185,28 +184,36 @@ final class ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
         timestamp: Date,
         messageID: String?
     ) {
-        runOnMain { context in
-            let normalized = content.trimmed
-            let mentions = context.parseMentions(from: normalized)
-            let message = BitchatMessage(
-                id: messageID,
-                sender: nickname,
-                content: normalized,
+        runOnMain { [self] context in
+            handlePublicMessage(
+                from: peerID,
+                nickname: nickname,
+                content: content,
                 timestamp: timestamp,
-                isRelay: false,
-                originalSender: nil,
-                isPrivate: false,
-                recipientNickname: nil,
-                senderPeerID: peerID,
-                mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
+                messageID: messageID,
+                in: context
             )
-
-            context.handlePublicMessage(message)
-            context.checkForMentions(message)
-            context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
         }
     }
 
+    @MainActor
+    func didReceivePublicMessageSynchronously(
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        nickname: String,
+        content: String,
+        timestamp: Date,
+        messageID: String?
+    ) {
+        handlePublicMessage(
+            from: peerID,
+            nickname: nickname,
+            content: content,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            messageID: messageID,
+            in: context
+        )
+    }
+
     func didReceiveNoisePayload(
         from peerID: PeerID,
         type: NoisePayloadType,
@@ -224,59 +231,134 @@ final class ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
         }
     }
 
+    @MainActor
+    func didReceiveNoisePayloadSynchronously(
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        type: NoisePayloadType,
+        payload: Data,
+        timestamp: Date
+    ) {
+        handleNoisePayload(
+            from: peerID,
+            type: type,
+            payload: payload,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            in: context
+        )
+    }
+
     func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {
-        SecureLogger.debug("🤝 Peer connected: \(peerID)", category: .session)
-
-        runOnMain { context in
-            context.isConnected = true
-            context.registerEphemeralSession(peerID: peerID)
-            context.notifyUIChanged()
-
-            if let peer = context.unifiedPeer(for: peerID) {
-                let stablePeerID = PeerID(hexData: peer.noisePublicKey)
-                context.cacheStablePeerID(stablePeerID, for: peerID)
-            }
-
-            context.flushRouterOutbox(for: peerID)
-            context.retryCourierDeposits(via: peerID)
+        runOnMain { [weak self] _ in
+            self?.didConnectToPeerSynchronously(peerID)
         }
     }
 
+    @MainActor
+    func didConnectToPeerSynchronously(_ peerID: PeerID) {
+        SecureLogger.debug("🤝 Peer connected: \(peerID)", category: .session)
+
+        context.isConnected = true
+        context.registerEphemeralSession(peerID: peerID)
+        context.notifyUIChanged()
+
+        if let peer = context.unifiedPeer(for: peerID) {
+            let stablePeerID = PeerID(hexData: peer.noisePublicKey)
+            context.cacheStablePeerID(stablePeerID, for: peerID)
+        }
+
+        context.flushRouterOutbox(for: peerID)
+        context.retryCourierDeposits(via: peerID)
+    }
+
     func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {
+        runOnMain { [weak self] _ in
+            self?.didDisconnectFromPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    func didDisconnectFromPeerSynchronously(_ peerID: PeerID) {
         SecureLogger.debug("👋 Peer disconnected: \(peerID)", category: .session)
 
-        runOnMain { context in
-            context.removeEphemeralSession(peerID: peerID)
+        context.removeEphemeralSession(peerID: peerID)
 
-            var stablePeerID = context.cachedStablePeerID(for: peerID)
-            if stablePeerID == nil,
-               let key = context.noiseSessionPublicKeyData(for: peerID) {
-                let derivedPeerID = PeerID(hexData: key)
-                context.cacheStablePeerID(derivedPeerID, for: peerID)
-                stablePeerID = derivedPeerID
-            }
-
-            if let currentPeerID = context.selectedPrivateChatPeer,
-               currentPeerID == peerID,
-               let stablePeerID {
-                self.migrateSelectedConversationIfNeeded(
-                    from: peerID,
-                    to: stablePeerID,
-                    in: context
-                )
-            }
-
-            let receiptIDs = context.privateMessages(for: peerID)
-                .filter { $0.senderPeerID == peerID }
-                .map(\.id)
-            context.unmarkReadReceiptsSent(receiptIDs)
-
-            context.notifyUIChanged()
+        var stablePeerID = context.cachedStablePeerID(for: peerID)
+        if stablePeerID == nil,
+           let key = context.noiseSessionPublicKeyData(for: peerID) {
+            let derivedPeerID = PeerID(hexData: key)
+            context.cacheStablePeerID(derivedPeerID, for: peerID)
+            stablePeerID = derivedPeerID
         }
+
+        if let currentPeerID = context.selectedPrivateChatPeer,
+           currentPeerID == peerID,
+           let stablePeerID {
+            migrateSelectedConversationIfNeeded(
+                from: peerID,
+                to: stablePeerID,
+                in: context
+            )
+        }
+
+        let receiptIDs = context.privateMessages(for: peerID)
+            .filter { $0.senderPeerID == peerID }
+            .map(\.id)
+        context.unmarkReadReceiptsSent(receiptIDs)
+
+        context.notifyUIChanged()
     }
 }
 
 private extension ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
+    @MainActor
+    func handlePublicMessage(
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        nickname: String,
+        content: String,
+        timestamp: Date,
+        messageID: String?,
+        in context: any ChatTransportEventContext
+    ) {
+        let normalized = content.trimmed
+        let mentions = context.parseMentions(from: normalized)
+        let message = BitchatMessage(
+            id: messageID,
+            sender: nickname,
+            content: normalized,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            isRelay: false,
+            originalSender: nil,
+            isPrivate: false,
+            recipientNickname: nil,
+            senderPeerID: peerID,
+            mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
+        )
+
+        context.handlePublicMessage(message)
+        context.checkForMentions(message)
+        context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    @discardableResult
+    func handleReceivedMessage(
+        _ message: BitchatMessage,
+        in context: any ChatTransportEventContext
+    ) -> Bool {
+        guard !context.isMessageBlocked(message) else { return false }
+        guard !message.content.trimmed.isEmpty || message.isPrivate else { return false }
+
+        if message.isPrivate {
+            context.handlePrivateMessage(message)
+        } else {
+            context.handlePublicMessage(message)
+        }
+
+        context.checkForMentions(message)
+        context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
+        return true
+    }
+
     func runOnMain(_ action: @escaping @MainActor (any ChatTransportEventContext) -> Void) {
         Task { @MainActor [weak context = self.context] in
             guard let context else { return }

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatVerificationCoordinator.swift

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ protocol ChatVerificationContext: AnyObject {
     func noiseStaticPublicKeyData() -> Data
     func hasEstablishedNoiseSession(with peerID: PeerID) -> Bool
     func triggerHandshake(with peerID: PeerID)
+    func privateMediaPeerDidAuthenticate(_ peerID: PeerID)
     func sendVerifyChallenge(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)
     func sendVerifyResponse(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)
 
@@ -116,6 +117,10 @@ extension ChatViewModel: ChatVerificationContext {
         meshService.noiseStaticPublicKeyData()
     }
 
+    func privateMediaPeerDidAuthenticate(_ peerID: PeerID) {
+        mediaTransferCoordinator.peerDidAuthenticate(peerID.toShort())
+    }
+
     func sendVerifyChallenge(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data) {
         meshService.sendVerifyChallenge(to: peerID, noiseKeyHex: noiseKeyHex, nonceA: nonceA)
     }
@@ -129,6 +134,10 @@ extension ChatViewModel: ChatVerificationContext {
     }
 }
 
+extension ChatVerificationContext {
+    func privateMediaPeerDidAuthenticate(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
+}
+
 @MainActor
 final class ChatVerificationCoordinator {
     struct PendingVerification {
@@ -197,6 +206,7 @@ final class ChatVerificationCoordinator {
                     guard let self else { return }
 
                     SecureLogger.debug("🔐 Authenticated: \(peerID)", category: .security)
+                    self.context.privateMediaPeerDidAuthenticate(peerID)
 
                     if self.context.isVerifiedFingerprint(fingerprint) {
                         self.context.setEncryptionStatus(.noiseVerified, for: peerID)

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct PanicNetworkLifecycle {
 /// Manages the application state and business logic for BitChat.
 /// Acts as the primary coordinator between UI components and backend services,
 /// implementing the BitchatDelegate protocol to handle network events.
-final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDelegate, CommandContextProvider, GeohashParticipantContext, MessageFormattingContext {
+final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, SynchronousMessageTransportEventDelegate, CommandContextProvider, GeohashParticipantContext, MessageFormattingContext {
     // Use MessageFormattingEngine.Patterns for regex matching (shared, precompiled)
     typealias Patterns = MessageFormattingEngine.Patterns
 
@@ -495,6 +495,12 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
         }
     }
 
+    /// Whether a read receipt has already been recorded for `messageID`.
+    @MainActor
+    func hasSentReadReceipt(_ messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        sentReadReceipts.contains(messageID)
+    }
+
     /// Records that a read receipt is being sent for `messageID`.
     /// Returns `false` when one was already recorded — the caller must skip sending.
     @MainActor
@@ -1701,7 +1707,82 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
 
     @MainActor
     func didReceiveTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) {
-        receiveTransportEvent(event)
+        switch event {
+        case .messageReceived(let message):
+            _ = didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(message)
+
+        case let .publicMessageReceived(
+            peerID,
+            nickname,
+            content,
+            timestamp,
+            messageID
+        ):
+            transportEventCoordinator.didReceivePublicMessageSynchronously(
+                from: peerID,
+                nickname: nickname,
+                content: content,
+                timestamp: timestamp,
+                messageID: messageID
+            )
+
+        case let .noisePayloadReceived(peerID, type, payload, timestamp):
+            transportEventCoordinator.didReceiveNoisePayloadSynchronously(
+                from: peerID,
+                type: type,
+                payload: payload,
+                timestamp: timestamp
+            )
+
+        case let .groupMessageReceived(payload, timestamp):
+            groupCoordinator.handleGroupMessagePayload(
+                payload,
+                timestamp: timestamp
+            )
+
+        case let .publicVoiceFrameReceived(
+            peerID,
+            nickname,
+            payload,
+            timestamp
+        ):
+            liveVoiceCoordinator.handlePublicVoiceFramePayload(
+                from: peerID,
+                nickname: nickname,
+                payload: payload,
+                timestamp: timestamp
+            )
+
+        case .peerConnected(let peerID):
+            transportEventCoordinator.didConnectToPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+            mediaTransferCoordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+
+        case .peerDisconnected(let peerID):
+            transportEventCoordinator.didDisconnectFromPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+
+        case .peerListUpdated(let peers):
+            peerListCoordinator.didUpdatePeerListSynchronously(peers)
+            // A peer-list update follows every verified announce, which is
+            // where a peer's `.vouch` capability actually arrives.
+            vouchCoordinator.peersUpdated(peers)
+
+        case .peerSnapshotsUpdated:
+            break
+
+        case let .messageDeliveryStatusUpdated(messageID, status):
+            deliveryCoordinator.didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus(
+                messageID,
+                status: status
+            )
+
+        case .bluetoothStateUpdated(let state):
+            updateBluetoothState(state)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    func didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
+        transportEventCoordinator.didReceiveMessageSynchronously(message)
     }
 
     func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
@@ -1764,6 +1845,9 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
 
     func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {
         transportEventCoordinator.didConnectToPeer(peerID)
+        Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
+            self?.mediaTransferCoordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+        }
     }
 
     func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {

bitchatTests/BLEServiceCoreTests.swift

@@ -502,14 +502,26 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
         )
         let replay = try #require(victim.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign replayed announce")
         #expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: replay, linkID: attackerLink))
+        let rebindGate = VerifiedDirectRebindGate()
+        ble._test_afterVerifiedDirectRebindEnqueued = rebindGate.pause
+        defer {
+            rebindGate.release()
+            ble._test_afterVerifiedDirectRebindEnqueued = nil
+        }
         ble._test_handlePacket(replay, fromPeerID: victimPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
 
-        let rebound = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
-            { ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == victimPeerID },
+        let announcePaused = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { rebindGate.hasPaused },
             timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
         )
-        #expect(rebound)
-        #expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
+        try #require(announcePaused)
+
+        // Rebind and ordinary reconnect preparation are one bleQueue
+        // critical section. Once the binding is visible, stale sending keys
+        // must already be unavailable.
+        #expect(ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == victimPeerID)
+        #expect(!ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
+        rebindGate.release()
 
         let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
         ble._test_onOutboundPacket = { outbound.record($0) }
@@ -537,20 +549,26 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
 
         // Preserve a working victim session while an unauthenticated
         // replacement candidate arrives on a newly bound physical link.
-        let message1 = try ble._test_noiseInitiateHandshake(with: victimPeerID)
+        // Establish BLE as responder so the replacement candidate below is
+        // not coalesced by the initiator-completion grace path.
+        let message1 = try victim.initiateHandshake(with: ble.myPeerID)
         let message2 = try #require(
-            try victim.processHandshakeMessage(from: ble.myPeerID, message: message1)
-        )
-        let message3 = try #require(
             try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(
                 from: victimPeerID,
+                message: message1
+            )
+        )
+        let message3 = try #require(
+            try victim.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: ble.myPeerID,
                 message: message2
             )
         )
-        _ = try victim.processHandshakeMessage(
-            from: ble.myPeerID,
+        _ = try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(
+            from: victimPeerID,
             message: message3
         )
+        await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
         #expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
 
         let centralUUID = "central-replacement-xx-message-one"
@@ -614,7 +632,168 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
                 for: victimPeerID
             )
         )
-        #expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
+        // Ordinary reconnect hardening quarantines the cached transport while
+        // this candidate proves the claimed identity. It must be unavailable
+        // for sending as well as unable to authenticate this ingress link.
+        #expect(!ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func failedInboundReconnectRestoresAndDrainsWaitingWorkOnce() async throws {
+        let ble = makeService()
+        let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let mallory = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let alicePeerID = PeerID(publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData())
+
+        // Establish BLE as responder so the following inbound reconnect is
+        // not intentionally coalesced by the initiator-completion grace path.
+        let message1 = try alice.initiateHandshake(with: ble.myPeerID)
+        let message2 = try #require(
+            try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: message1
+            )
+        )
+        let message3 = try #require(
+            try alice.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: ble.myPeerID,
+                message: message2
+            )
+        )
+        _ = try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(
+            from: alicePeerID,
+            message: message3
+        )
+        await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
+        #expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: alicePeerID))
+
+        let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
+        ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
+        let forgedMessage1 = try mallory.initiateHandshake(with: ble.myPeerID)
+        let firstPacket = BitchatPacket(
+            type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
+            senderID: Data(hexString: alicePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id),
+            timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1_000),
+            payload: forgedMessage1,
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: 7
+        )
+        ble._test_handlePacket(firstPacket, fromPeerID: alicePeerID)
+
+        let responseReady = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            {
+                outbound.snapshot().contains {
+                    $0.type == MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue
+                        && PeerID(hexData: $0.senderID) == ble.myPeerID
+                        && $0.payload.count
+                            != NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize
+                }
+            },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        )
+        try #require(responseReady)
+        let forgedMessage2 = try #require(
+            outbound.snapshot().first {
+                $0.type == MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue
+                    && PeerID(hexData: $0.senderID) == ble.myPeerID
+                    && $0.payload.count
+                        != NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize
+            }?.payload
+        )
+        #expect(!ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: alicePeerID))
+
+        // Typed control traffic must queue behind the ordinary responder,
+        // rather than attempting encryption and disappearing.
+        let privateMessageID = "quarantine-pm-\(UUID().uuidString)"
+        ble.sendPrivateMessage(
+            "queued private message",
+            to: alicePeerID,
+            recipientNickname: "Alice",
+            messageID: privateMessageID
+        )
+        ble.sendGroupInvite(Data("queued-during-quarantine".utf8), to: alicePeerID)
+        await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
+        #expect(outbound.count(ofType: .noiseEncrypted) == 0)
+
+        let forgedMessage3 = try #require(
+            try mallory.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: ble.myPeerID,
+                message: forgedMessage2
+            )
+        )
+        let forgedEarlyPayload = try #require(
+            BLENoisePayloadFactory.privateMessage(
+                content: "forged early message",
+                messageID: "forged-early"
+            )
+        )
+        try #require(
+            mallory.hasEstablishedSession(with: ble.myPeerID),
+            "forged initiator did not establish after producing message three"
+        )
+        let forgedEarlyCiphertext = try mallory.encrypt(
+            forgedEarlyPayload,
+            for: ble.myPeerID
+        )
+        let earlyPacket = BitchatPacket(
+            type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
+            senderID: Data(hexString: alicePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id),
+            timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1_000) + 1,
+            payload: forgedEarlyCiphertext,
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: 7
+        )
+        ble._test_handlePacket(earlyPacket, fromPeerID: alicePeerID)
+        await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
+
+        let thirdPacket = BitchatPacket(
+            type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
+            senderID: Data(hexString: alicePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id),
+            timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1_000) + 2,
+            payload: forgedMessage3,
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: 7
+        )
+        ble._test_handlePacket(thirdPacket, fromPeerID: alicePeerID)
+
+        // Rollback restores the same generation. It retries the bounded early
+        // ciphertext and drains both outbound queues, but must not repeat a
+        // new-generation capability proof or forced announce.
+        let drained = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { outbound.count(ofType: .noiseEncrypted) >= 2 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        )
+        try #require(drained)
+        await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
+        let plaintexts = try outbound.snapshot()
+            .filter { $0.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue }
+            .map { try alice.decrypt($0.payload, from: ble.myPeerID) }
+        #expect(plaintexts.count == 2)
+        #expect(
+            plaintexts.filter {
+                $0.first == NoisePayloadType.authenticatedPeerState.rawValue
+            }.isEmpty
+        )
+        #expect(
+            plaintexts.filter {
+                $0.first == NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue
+            }.count == 1
+        )
+        #expect(
+            plaintexts.filter {
+                $0.first == NoisePayloadType.groupInvite.rawValue
+            }.count == 1
+        )
+        #expect(outbound.count(ofType: .announce) == 0)
+
+        // A duplicate ready callback cannot replay either buffer.
+        ble._test_reconcileCurrentNoiseSession(for: alicePeerID)
+        await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
+        #expect(outbound.count(ofType: .noiseEncrypted) == 2)
+        #expect(outbound.count(ofType: .announce) == 0)
     }
 
     /// A legitimate rotation announce necessarily arrives on a link still
@@ -943,6 +1122,40 @@ private final class OutboundPacketTap {
         lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
         return packets.filter { $0.type == type.rawValue }.count
     }
+
+    func snapshot() -> [BitchatPacket] {
+        lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
+        return packets
+    }
+}
+
+private final class VerifiedDirectRebindGate: @unchecked Sendable {
+    private let condition = NSCondition()
+    private var paused = false
+    private var released = false
+
+    var hasPaused: Bool {
+        condition.lock()
+        defer { condition.unlock() }
+        return paused
+    }
+
+    func pause() {
+        condition.lock()
+        paused = true
+        condition.broadcast()
+        while !released {
+            condition.wait()
+        }
+        condition.unlock()
+    }
+
+    func release() {
+        condition.lock()
+        released = true
+        condition.broadcast()
+        condition.unlock()
+    }
 }
 
 private final class ReceivePacketHandoffGate: @unchecked Sendable {
@@ -1076,6 +1289,7 @@ private final class PublicCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
         defer { lock.unlock() }
         return publicMessages
     }
+
 }
 
 @MainActor

bitchatTests/ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests.swift

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import BitFoundation
 @MainActor
 private final class MockChatLiveVoiceContext: ChatLiveVoiceContext {
     var nickname = "me"
+    var myPeerID = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
     var selectedPrivateChatPeer: PeerID?
     var isViewingPublicMeshTimeline = false
     var blockedPeers: Set<PeerID> = []
@@ -23,7 +24,10 @@ private final class MockChatLiveVoiceContext: ChatLiveVoiceContext {
     private(set) var upsertedMessages: [(message: BitchatMessage, peerID: PeerID)] = []
     private(set) var upsertedPublicMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
     private(set) var removedMessageIDs: [String] = []
+    private(set) var sentReadReceipts: [(receipt: ReadReceipt, peerID: PeerID)] = []
     private(set) var talkerUpdates: [String?] = []
+    private(set) var privateMutationLog: [String] = []
+    private var readReceiptMessageIDs: Set<String> = []
 
     func isPeerBlocked(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool { blockedPeers.contains(peerID) }
     func resolveNickname(for peerID: PeerID) -> String { "alice" }
@@ -31,6 +35,7 @@ private final class MockChatLiveVoiceContext: ChatLiveVoiceContext {
     func appendPublicMeshMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) { appendedPublicMessages.append(message) }
     func upsertPrivateMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage, in peerID: PeerID) {
         upsertedMessages.append((message, peerID))
+        privateMutationLog.append("upsert:\(message.id)")
     }
     func upsertPublicMeshMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
         upsertedPublicMessages.append(message)
@@ -38,8 +43,18 @@ private final class MockChatLiveVoiceContext: ChatLiveVoiceContext {
     @discardableResult
     func removePrivateMessage(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
         removedMessageIDs.append(messageID)
+        privateMutationLog.append("remove:\(messageID)")
         return nil
     }
+    func hasSentReadReceipt(_ messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        readReceiptMessageIDs.contains(messageID)
+    }
+    func markReadReceiptSent(_ messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        readReceiptMessageIDs.insert(messageID).inserted
+    }
+    func sendMeshReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID) {
+        sentReadReceipts.append((receipt, peerID))
+    }
     func removeMessage(withID messageID: String, cleanupFile: Bool) {
         removedMessageIDs.append(messageID)
     }
@@ -151,17 +166,29 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
 
     @Test func absorbsFinalizedNoteIntoLiveBubble() throws {
         let context = MockChatLiveVoiceContext()
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peer
         let coordinator = ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator(context: context, sweepsOnInit: false)
         let burstID = makeBurstID(0xB2)
         let hex = burstID.hexEncodedString()
+        let fileName = "voice_\(hex).m4a"
+        let stableMessageID = try #require(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: peer,
+            recipientPeerID: context.myPeerID,
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
 
         send(try #require(VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: 1, kind: .frames([Data(repeating: 7, count: 50)]))), to: coordinator, from: peer)
         send(try #require(VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: 2, kind: .end(totalDataPackets: 1, durationMs: 64))), to: coordinator, from: peer)
         let bubble = try #require(context.handledPrivateMessages.first)
+        // The user read the live bubble, then left before the finalized file
+        // arrived. Stable-ID adoption must preserve that read state.
+        #expect(context.markReadReceiptSent(bubble.id))
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = nil
 
         let note = BitchatMessage(
+            id: stableMessageID,
             sender: "alice",
-            content: "[voice] voice_\(hex).m4a",
+            content: "[voice] \(fileName)",
             timestamp: Date(),
             isRelay: false,
             isPrivate: true,
@@ -170,12 +197,21 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
         )
         #expect(coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(note))
 
-        // The note replaced the live bubble in place: same message ID, new
-        // content, partial capture deleted.
+        // The finalized note adopts the sender-correlatable ID, removes the
+        // receiver-local live ID, and emits a fresh READ now that the sender
+        // has created its finalized media row.
         let replacement = try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last)
-        #expect(replacement.message.id == bubble.id)
+        #expect(replacement.message.id == stableMessageID)
         #expect(replacement.message.content == note.content)
         #expect(replacement.peerID == peer)
+        #expect(context.removedMessageIDs.contains(bubble.id))
+        #expect(Array(context.privateMutationLog.suffix(2)) == [
+            "upsert:\(stableMessageID)",
+            "remove:\(bubble.id)"
+        ])
+        #expect(context.sentReadReceipts.count == 1)
+        #expect(context.sentReadReceipts.first?.receipt.originalMessageID == stableMessageID)
+        #expect(context.sentReadReceipts.first?.peerID == peer)
         // The promoted partial capture is deleted in favor of the note.
         let url = try #require(fallbackFileURL(burstID: burstID, peerID: peer))
         #expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: url.path))
@@ -449,7 +485,8 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
             isRelay: false, isPrivate: true, recipientNickname: "me", senderPeerID: peer
         )
         #expect(coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(dmNote))
-        #expect(try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last).message.id == dmBubble.id)
+        #expect(try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last).message.id == dmNote.id)
+        #expect(context.removedMessageIDs.contains(dmBubble.id))
     }
 
     @Test func finalizedNoteBindsToItsAuthenticatedSender() throws {
@@ -479,8 +516,9 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
         )
         #expect(coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(note))
         let replacement = try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last)
-        #expect(replacement.message.id == victimBubble.id)
+        #expect(replacement.message.id == note.id)
         #expect(replacement.peerID == peer)
+        #expect(context.removedMessageIDs.contains(victimBubble.id))
 
         // The attacker's note can only ever claim the attacker's own bubble.
         let attackerNote = BitchatMessage(
@@ -489,8 +527,9 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
         )
         #expect(coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(attackerNote))
         let attackerReplacement = try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last)
-        #expect(attackerReplacement.message.id == attackerBubble.id)
+        #expect(attackerReplacement.message.id == attackerNote.id)
         #expect(attackerReplacement.peerID == attacker)
+        #expect(context.removedMessageIDs.contains(attackerBubble.id))
 
         // Both registry entries are consumed — nothing left to hijack.
         #expect(!coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(note))

bitchatTests/ChatMediaTransferCoordinatorContextTests.swift

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 // `ChatPrivateConversationCoordinatorContextTests` exemplars.
 //
 // Real file/codec work remains covered by `ChatMediaPreparationTests`. These
-// tests inject a paused voice-note preparer to exercise cancellation ownership
+// tests inject paused media preparers to exercise cancellation ownership
 // across the detached-preparation/MainActor boundary deterministically.
 //
 
@@ -89,12 +89,26 @@ private final class MockChatMediaTransferContext: ChatMediaTransferContext {
     }
 
     // Mesh file transfer
-    private(set) var privateFileSends: [(peerID: PeerID, transferId: String)] = []
+    private(set) var privateFileSends: [(
+        packet: BitchatFilePacket,
+        peerID: PeerID,
+        transferId: String
+    )] = []
     private(set) var privateFileLegacyAllowances: [Bool] = []
+    private(set) var privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs: [String] = []
     private(set) var broadcastFileSends: [String] = []
     private(set) var cancelledTransfers: [String] = []
+    private(set) var privateMediaPolicyResolutionRequests: [PeerID] = []
     var privateMediaPolicy: PrivateMediaSendPolicy = .encrypted
     var resolvedPrivateMediaPolicy: PrivateMediaSendPolicy?
+    var resolvesPrivateMediaPolicyImmediately = true
+    var supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts = false
+    var authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptGeneration = UUID(
+        uuidString: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"
+    )!
+    private var pendingPrivateMediaPolicyResolutions: [
+        @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
+    ] = []
     private(set) var legacyConsentRequests: [(
         id: UUID,
         peerID: PeerID,
@@ -109,11 +123,40 @@ private final class MockChatMediaTransferContext: ChatMediaTransferContext {
         privateMediaPolicy
     }
 
+    func authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+        to peerID: PeerID
+    ) -> UUID? {
+        supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts
+            ? authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptGeneration
+            : nil
+    }
+
     func resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(
         to peerID: PeerID,
         completion: @escaping @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
     ) {
-        completion(resolvedPrivateMediaPolicy ?? privateMediaPolicy)
+        privateMediaPolicyResolutionRequests.append(peerID)
+        if resolvesPrivateMediaPolicyImmediately {
+            completion(resolvedPrivateMediaPolicy ?? privateMediaPolicy)
+        } else {
+            pendingPrivateMediaPolicyResolutions.append(completion)
+        }
+    }
+
+    var pendingPrivateMediaPolicyResolutionCount: Int {
+        pendingPrivateMediaPolicyResolutions.count
+    }
+
+    func resolveNextPrivateMediaPolicy(
+        _ policy: PrivateMediaSendPolicy? = nil
+    ) {
+        guard !pendingPrivateMediaPolicyResolutions.isEmpty else { return }
+        let completion = pendingPrivateMediaPolicyResolutions.removeFirst()
+        completion(
+            policy
+                ?? resolvedPrivateMediaPolicy
+                ?? privateMediaPolicy
+        )
     }
 
     func requestLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
@@ -154,10 +197,20 @@ private final class MockChatMediaTransferContext: ChatMediaTransferContext {
         transferId: String,
         allowLegacyFallback: Bool
     ) {
-        privateFileSends.append((peerID, transferId))
+        privateFileSends.append((packet, peerID, transferId))
         privateFileLegacyAllowances.append(allowLegacyFallback)
     }
 
+    func sendFilePrivateReceiptRetry(
+        _ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
+        to peerID: PeerID,
+        transferId: String
+    ) {
+        privateFileSends.append((packet, peerID, transferId))
+        privateFileLegacyAllowances.append(false)
+        privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs.append(transferId)
+    }
+
     func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) {
         broadcastFileSends.append(transferId)
     }
@@ -172,19 +225,8 @@ private final class PausedVoiceNotePreparer: @unchecked Sendable {
     private var started = false
     private var released = false
     private var finished = false
-    private let packet: BitchatFilePacket
 
-    init() {
-        let content = Data("voice".utf8)
-        packet = BitchatFilePacket(
-            fileName: "paused.m4a",
-            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
-            mimeType: "audio/mp4",
-            content: content
-        )
-    }
-
-    func prepare(_: URL) throws -> BitchatFilePacket {
+    func prepare(_ url: URL) throws -> BitchatFilePacket {
         condition.lock()
         started = true
         condition.broadcast()
@@ -194,7 +236,13 @@ private final class PausedVoiceNotePreparer: @unchecked Sendable {
         finished = true
         condition.broadcast()
         condition.unlock()
-        return packet
+        let content = Data("voice".utf8)
+        return BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: url.lastPathComponent,
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "audio/mp4",
+            content: content
+        )
     }
 
     var hasStarted: Bool {
@@ -217,6 +265,59 @@ private final class PausedVoiceNotePreparer: @unchecked Sendable {
     }
 }
 
+private final class StaticVoiceNotePreparer: @unchecked Sendable {
+    private let packet: BitchatFilePacket
+
+    init(fileName: String, content: Data = Data("voice".utf8)) {
+        packet = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: fileName,
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "audio/mp4",
+            content: content
+        )
+    }
+
+    func prepare(_ _: URL) throws -> BitchatFilePacket {
+        packet
+    }
+}
+
+private final class DeterministicMediaTransferIDFactory:
+    @unchecked Sendable {
+    private let lock = NSLock()
+    private var nextOrdinal = 0
+
+    func make(messageID: String) -> String {
+        lock.lock()
+        defer {
+            nextOrdinal += 1
+            lock.unlock()
+        }
+        return "\(messageID)-attempt-\(nextOrdinal)"
+    }
+}
+
+private final class MutableMediaRetryClock: @unchecked Sendable {
+    private let lock = NSLock()
+    private var value: Date
+
+    init(_ value: Date) {
+        self.value = value
+    }
+
+    func now() -> Date {
+        lock.lock()
+        defer { lock.unlock() }
+        return value
+    }
+
+    func advance(by interval: TimeInterval) {
+        lock.lock()
+        value = value.addingTimeInterval(interval)
+        lock.unlock()
+    }
+}
+
 // MARK: - Coordinator Tests Against Mock Context
 
 /// Exercises `ChatMediaTransferCoordinator` against
@@ -452,6 +553,109 @@ struct ChatMediaTransferCoordinatorContextTests {
         #expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs.isEmpty)
     }
 
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func privateVoiceNoteUsesWireDerivableMessageID() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent("voice_receipt_\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
+        try Data("voice".utf8).write(to: url)
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) }
+
+        coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let message = try #require(context.privateChats[peerID]?.first)
+        let sentPacket = try #require(context.privateFileSends.first?.packet)
+        #expect(message.id == PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            for: sentPacket,
+            senderPeerID: context.myPeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: peerID
+        ))
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func privateImageUsesWireDerivableMessageID() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "99aabbccddeeff00")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        let sourceURL = try makeCoordinatorTestImageURL()
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: sourceURL) }
+
+        coordinator.sendImage(from: sourceURL)
+
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let message = try #require(context.privateChats[peerID]?.first)
+        let sentPacket = try #require(context.privateFileSends.first?.packet)
+        #expect(message.id == PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            for: sentPacket,
+            senderPeerID: context.myPeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: peerID
+        ))
+        coordinator.cleanupLocalFile(forMessage: message)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func panicDuringImagePreparationDeletesStaleOutputWithoutSideEffects() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "99aabbccddeeff00")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        let sourceURL = try makeCoordinatorTestImageURL()
+        let outputURL = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent(
+                "panic-stale-image-\(UUID().uuidString).jpg"
+            )
+        let preparer = PausedImagePreparer(outputURL: outputURL)
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareImagePacket: { url in try preparer.prepare(url) }
+        )
+        defer {
+            preparer.release()
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: sourceURL)
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: outputURL)
+        }
+
+        coordinator.sendImage(from: sourceURL)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { preparer.hasStarted },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+
+        DispatchQueue.global(qos: .userInitiated).asyncAfter(
+            deadline: .now() + .milliseconds(100)
+        ) {
+            preparer.release()
+        }
+        coordinator.resetForPanic()
+
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { preparer.hasFinished },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { !FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: outputURL.path) },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        #expect(context.privateChats[peerID]?.isEmpty != false)
+        #expect(context.appendedPublicMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.broadcastFileSends.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.systemMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.deliveryStatusUpdates.isEmpty)
+        #expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs.isEmpty)
+        #expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId.isEmpty)
+    }
+
     @Test @MainActor
     func cancelVoiceNoteDuringDetachedPreparationCannotSendOrRestoreMapping() async throws {
         let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
@@ -696,6 +900,548 @@ struct ChatMediaTransferCoordinatorContextTests {
         #expect(context.legacyConsentRequests.isEmpty)
         #expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
     }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func receiptCapableEncryptedMediaRetriesExactPacketAfterReconnect() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        context.supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts = true
+        let fileName = "voice_0011223344556677.m4a"
+        let preparer = StaticVoiceNotePreparer(fileName: fileName)
+        let transferIDs = DeterministicMediaTransferIDFactory()
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in
+                try preparer.prepare(url)
+            },
+            transferIDFactory: transferIDs.make
+        )
+        let url = try makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(fileName: fileName)
+        defer {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(
+                at: url.deletingLastPathComponent()
+            )
+        }
+
+        coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let messageID = try #require(
+            context.privateChats[peerID]?.first?.id
+        )
+        let initial = try #require(
+            context.privateFileSends.first
+        )
+        #expect(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(messageID))
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 1)
+
+        coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.completed(
+            id: initial.transferId,
+            totalFragments: 1
+        ))
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 1)
+        #expect(context.deliveryStatusUpdates.last?.status == .sent)
+
+        coordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+        #expect(context.privateFileSends.count == 2)
+        let retry = try #require(context.privateFileSends.last)
+        #expect(retry.packet.encode() == initial.packet.encode())
+        #expect(retry.peerID == peerID)
+        #expect(retry.transferId != initial.transferId)
+        #expect(context.privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs == [
+            retry.transferId
+        ])
+        #expect(context.privateFileLegacyAllowances == [false, false])
+
+        coordinator.confirmPrivateMediaDelivery(messageID: messageID)
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 0)
+        #expect(context.cancelledTransfers == [retry.transferId])
+        #expect(context.removedMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(!context.deliveryStatusUpdates.contains {
+            if case .failed = $0.status { return true }
+            return false
+        })
+
+        // Receipt confirmation removes retry ownership before transport
+        // cancellation, so its late callback cannot delete the delivered row
+        // or re-arm another reconnect retry.
+        coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.cancelled(
+            id: retry.transferId,
+            sentFragments: 1,
+            totalFragments: 2
+        ))
+        coordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+        #expect(context.privateFileSends.count == 2)
+        #expect(context.removedMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId[messageID] == nil)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func bit8OnlyEncryptedMediaNeverRetainsOrAutomaticallyRetries() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        context.privateMediaPolicy = .encrypted
+        context.supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts = false
+        let fileName = "voice_1111222233334444.m4a"
+        let preparer = StaticVoiceNotePreparer(fileName: fileName)
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in
+                try preparer.prepare(url)
+            }
+        )
+        let url = try makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(fileName: fileName)
+        defer {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(
+                at: url.deletingLastPathComponent()
+            )
+        }
+
+        coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let initial = try #require(context.privateFileSends.first)
+        coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.completed(
+            id: initial.transferId,
+            totalFragments: 1
+        ))
+        coordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+        coordinator.peerDidAuthenticate(peerID)
+
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 0)
+        #expect(context.privateFileSends.count == 1)
+        #expect(context.privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.privateMediaPolicyResolutionRequests.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func consentedRawLegacyMediaNeverEntersAutomaticRetry() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        context.privateMediaPolicy = .legacyRequiresConsent
+        // Even a contradictory stale bit-9 observation must not retain an
+        // invocation that actually selected the explicit raw path.
+        context.supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts = true
+        let fileName = "voice_2222333344445555.m4a"
+        let preparer = StaticVoiceNotePreparer(fileName: fileName)
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in
+                try preparer.prepare(url)
+            }
+        )
+        let url = try makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(fileName: fileName)
+        defer {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(
+                at: url.deletingLastPathComponent()
+            )
+        }
+
+        coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.legacyConsentRequests.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        context.resolveNextLegacyConsent(true)
+        let initial = try #require(context.privateFileSends.first)
+        #expect(context.privateFileLegacyAllowances == [true])
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 0)
+
+        coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.completed(
+            id: initial.transferId,
+            totalFragments: 1
+        ))
+        context.privateMediaPolicy = .encrypted
+        coordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+        coordinator.peerDidAuthenticate(peerID)
+
+        #expect(context.privateFileSends.count == 1)
+        #expect(context.privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs.isEmpty)
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 0)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func authenticatedGenerationSupersedesStaleReconnectResolution() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        context.supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts = true
+        context.resolvesPrivateMediaPolicyImmediately = false
+        let oldGeneration = context
+            .authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptGeneration
+        let newGeneration = UUID(
+            uuidString: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002"
+        )!
+        let fileName = "voice_3333444455556666.m4a"
+        let preparer = StaticVoiceNotePreparer(fileName: fileName)
+        let transferIDs = DeterministicMediaTransferIDFactory()
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in
+                try preparer.prepare(url)
+            },
+            transferIDFactory: transferIDs.make
+        )
+        let url = try makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(fileName: fileName)
+        defer {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(
+                at: url.deletingLastPathComponent()
+            )
+        }
+
+        coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let initial = try #require(context.privateFileSends.first)
+        coordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+        #expect(context.pendingPrivateMediaPolicyResolutionCount == 1)
+
+        context.authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptGeneration = newGeneration
+        coordinator.peerDidAuthenticate(peerID)
+        #expect(context.pendingPrivateMediaPolicyResolutionCount == 2)
+
+        // The old-generation completion lost ownership and is inert.
+        context.resolveNextPrivateMediaPolicy(.encrypted)
+        #expect(context.privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.cancelledTransfers.isEmpty)
+
+        context.resolveNextPrivateMediaPolicy(.encrypted)
+        #expect(context.cancelledTransfers == [initial.transferId])
+        #expect(context.privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs.count == 1)
+        #expect(
+            context.authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptGeneration
+                == newGeneration
+        )
+        #expect(oldGeneration != newGeneration)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func panicClearsRetainedRetryPendingResolutionAndExpiry() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        context.supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts = true
+        context.resolvesPrivateMediaPolicyImmediately = false
+        let fileName = "voice_3333444455556666.m4a"
+        let preparer = StaticVoiceNotePreparer(fileName: fileName)
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in
+                try preparer.prepare(url)
+            },
+            reconnectRetryLimits: PrivateMediaReconnectRetryLimits(
+                maxRetainedPackets: 1,
+                maxRetainedBytes: 1_024,
+                maxRetriesPerMessage: 1,
+                retentionSeconds: 0.1,
+                maxRetriesPerReconnect: 1
+            )
+        )
+        let url = try makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(fileName: fileName)
+        defer {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(
+                at: url.deletingLastPathComponent()
+            )
+        }
+
+        coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let initial = try #require(context.privateFileSends.first)
+        coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.completed(
+            id: initial.transferId,
+            totalFragments: 1
+        ))
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 1)
+
+        coordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+        #expect(context.pendingPrivateMediaPolicyResolutionCount == 1)
+        let failedBeforePanic = context.deliveryStatusUpdates.filter {
+            if case .failed = $0.status { return true }
+            return false
+        }.count
+
+        coordinator.resetForPanic()
+        context.resolveNextPrivateMediaPolicy(.encrypted)
+        try await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 250_000_000)
+        coordinator._test_expireReconnectRetries()
+
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 0)
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryBytes == 0)
+        #expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs.isEmpty)
+        #expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.privateFileSends.count == 1)
+        #expect(context.privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.deliveryStatusUpdates.filter {
+            if case .failed = $0.status { return true }
+            return false
+        }.count == failedBeforePanic)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func retryCountAndRetentionTimeEndInVisibleFailure() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        context.supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts = true
+        let clock = MutableMediaRetryClock(
+            Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 4_000)
+        )
+        let limits = PrivateMediaReconnectRetryLimits(
+            maxRetainedPackets: 2,
+            maxRetainedBytes: 1_024,
+            maxRetriesPerMessage: 1,
+            retentionSeconds: 10,
+            maxRetriesPerReconnect: 1
+        )
+        let fileName = "voice_4444555566667777.m4a"
+        let preparer = StaticVoiceNotePreparer(fileName: fileName)
+        let transferIDs = DeterministicMediaTransferIDFactory()
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in
+                try preparer.prepare(url)
+            },
+            reconnectRetryLimits: limits,
+            now: clock.now,
+            transferIDFactory: transferIDs.make
+        )
+        let url = try makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(fileName: fileName)
+        defer {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(
+                at: url.deletingLastPathComponent()
+            )
+        }
+
+        coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let initial = try #require(context.privateFileSends.first)
+        coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.completed(
+            id: initial.transferId,
+            totalFragments: 1
+        ))
+        coordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+        let retryID = try #require(
+            context.privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs.first
+        )
+        coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.cancelled(
+            id: retryID,
+            sentFragments: 0,
+            totalFragments: 1
+        ))
+
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 0)
+        #expect(context.removedMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.deliveryStatusUpdates.contains {
+            $0.messageID.hasPrefix("media-")
+                && $0.status == .failed(reason: String(
+                    localized: "content.delivery.reason.not_delivered",
+                    defaultValue: "Not delivered",
+                    comment: "Failure reason shown when a private media transfer could not finish"
+                ))
+        })
+
+        // A separate retained row that locally completed but never received a
+        // remote receipt expires to a distinct visible failure.
+        let ttlFileName = "voice_5555666677778888.m4a"
+        let ttlPreparer = StaticVoiceNotePreparer(
+            fileName: ttlFileName
+        )
+        let ttlCoordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in
+                try ttlPreparer.prepare(url)
+            },
+            reconnectRetryLimits: limits,
+            now: clock.now,
+            transferIDFactory: transferIDs.make
+        )
+        let ttlURL = try makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(
+            fileName: ttlFileName
+        )
+        defer {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(
+                at: ttlURL.deletingLastPathComponent()
+            )
+        }
+        let sendsBeforeTTL = context.privateFileSends.count
+        ttlCoordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: ttlURL)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            {
+                context.privateFileSends.count
+                    == sendsBeforeTTL + 1
+            },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let ttlInitial = try #require(context.privateFileSends.last)
+        ttlCoordinator.handleTransferEvent(.completed(
+            id: ttlInitial.transferId,
+            totalFragments: 1
+        ))
+        clock.advance(by: 10)
+        ttlCoordinator._test_expireReconnectRetries()
+
+        #expect(ttlCoordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 0)
+        #expect(context.deliveryStatusUpdates.contains {
+            $0.status == .failed(
+                reason: String(
+                    localized:
+                        "content.delivery.reason.private_media_delivery_unconfirmed",
+                    defaultValue: "Delivery could not be confirmed"
+                )
+            )
+        })
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func retentionAndPerReconnectWorkAreBounded() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        context.supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts = true
+        let limits = PrivateMediaReconnectRetryLimits(
+            maxRetainedPackets: 2,
+            maxRetainedBytes: 10,
+            maxRetriesPerMessage: 2,
+            retentionSeconds: 120,
+            maxRetriesPerReconnect: 1
+        )
+        let transferIDs = DeterministicMediaTransferIDFactory()
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in
+                let content = Data("voice".utf8)
+                return BitchatFilePacket(
+                    fileName: url.lastPathComponent,
+                    fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+                    mimeType: "audio/mp4",
+                    content: content
+                )
+            },
+            reconnectRetryLimits: limits,
+            transferIDFactory: transferIDs.make
+        )
+        let fileNames = [
+            "voice_6666777788889999.m4a",
+            "voice_777788889999aaaa.m4a",
+            "voice_88889999aaaabbbb.m4a"
+        ]
+        var roots: [URL] = []
+        defer {
+            for root in roots {
+                try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root)
+            }
+        }
+
+        for fileName in fileNames {
+            let url = try makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(
+                fileName: fileName,
+                bytes: Data("voice".utf8)
+            )
+            roots.append(url.deletingLastPathComponent())
+            // The production preparer preserves this stable filename.
+            coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+        }
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 3 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 2)
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryBytes <= 10)
+
+        for send in context.privateFileSends {
+            coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.completed(
+                id: send.transferId,
+                totalFragments: 1
+            ))
+        }
+        coordinator.peerDidReconnect(peerID)
+        #expect(context.privateFileReceiptRetryTransferIDs.count == 1)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func userCancellationReleasesRetainedBytesAndIgnoresLateEvent() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        context.supportsAuthenticatedPrivateMediaReceipts = true
+        let fileName = "voice_9999aaaabbbbcccc.m4a"
+        let preparer = StaticVoiceNotePreparer(fileName: fileName)
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in
+                try preparer.prepare(url)
+            }
+        )
+        let url = try makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(fileName: fileName)
+        defer {
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(
+                at: url.deletingLastPathComponent()
+            )
+        }
+
+        coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let messageID = try #require(
+            context.privateChats[peerID]?.first?.id
+        )
+        let transferID = try #require(
+            context.privateFileSends.first?.transferId
+        )
+
+        coordinator.cancelMediaSend(messageID: messageID)
+        coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.cancelled(
+            id: transferID,
+            sentFragments: 0,
+            totalFragments: 1
+        ))
+
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryCount == 0)
+        #expect(coordinator.retainedReconnectRetryBytes == 0)
+        #expect(context.cancelledTransfers == [transferID])
+        #expect(context.removedMessages.map(\.messageID) == [
+            messageID
+        ])
+        #expect(!context.deliveryStatusUpdates.contains {
+            if case .failed = $0.status { return true }
+            return false
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+private func makeCoordinatorVoiceURL(
+    fileName: String,
+    bytes: Data = Data("voice".utf8)
+) throws -> URL {
+    let directory = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+        .appendingPathComponent(
+            "media-retry-\(UUID().uuidString)",
+            isDirectory: true
+        )
+    try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
+        at: directory,
+        withIntermediateDirectories: true
+    )
+    let url = directory.appendingPathComponent(fileName)
+    try bytes.write(to: url)
+    return url
 }
 
 private final class PausedImagePreparer: @unchecked Sendable {

bitchatTests/ChatPeerListCoordinatorContextTests.swift

@@ -104,6 +104,20 @@ private func makeMessage(id: String, senderPeerID: PeerID? = nil) -> BitchatMess
 /// no `ChatViewModel`.
 struct ChatPeerListCoordinatorContextTests {
 
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func synchronousPeerListUpdate_appliesBeforeReturning() {
+        let context = MockChatPeerListContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatPeerListCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
+
+        coordinator.didUpdatePeerListSynchronously([peerID])
+
+        #expect(context.isConnected)
+        #expect(context.registeredEphemeralSessions == [peerID])
+        #expect(context.updateEncryptionStatusForPeersCount == 1)
+        #expect(context.cleanupOldReadReceiptsCount == 1)
+    }
+
     @Test @MainActor
     func didUpdatePeerList_updatesConnectionSessionsAndEncryptionStatus() async {
         let context = MockChatPeerListContext()

bitchatTests/ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests.swift

@@ -220,26 +220,85 @@ struct ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests {
     func didReceiveMessage_routesPrivateAndPublic_skipsBlockedAndEmpty() async {
         let context = MockChatTransportEventContext()
         let coordinator = ChatTransportEventCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
 
         // Blocked messages are dropped before any handling.
-        context.blockedMessageIDs = ["blocked"]
+        context.blockedMessageIDs = ["blocked", "blocked-private"]
         coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "blocked"))
+        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(
+            id: "blocked-private",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        ))
         // Empty public content is dropped too.
         coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "empty", content: "   "))
         await drainMainActorTasks()
         #expect(context.handledPublicMessages.isEmpty)
         #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.isEmpty)
         #expect(context.mentionCheckedMessageIDs.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.meshDeliveryAcks.isEmpty)
 
         // Private goes to the private handler, public to the public handler;
-        // both get mention checks and haptics.
-        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "pm", isPrivate: true))
+        // both get mention checks and haptics. Stable-media ACK authorization
+        // belongs to BLEFileTransferHandler after its durable commit and this
+        // synchronous acceptance result, not to the generic UI coordinator.
+        let stableMediaID = "media-\(String(repeating: "a", count: 32))"
+        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(
+            id: stableMediaID,
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        ))
+        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(
+            id: "legacy-media",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        ))
+        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "pm-missing-sender", isPrivate: true))
         coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "pub"))
         await drainMainActorTasks()
-        #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.map(\.id) == ["pm"])
+        #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.map(\.id) == [
+            stableMediaID,
+            "legacy-media",
+            "pm-missing-sender"
+        ])
         #expect(context.handledPublicMessages.map(\.id) == ["pub"])
-        #expect(context.mentionCheckedMessageIDs == ["pm", "pub"])
-        #expect(context.hapticMessageIDs == ["pm", "pub"])
+        #expect(context.mentionCheckedMessageIDs == [
+            stableMediaID,
+            "legacy-media",
+            "pm-missing-sender",
+            "pub"
+        ])
+        #expect(context.hapticMessageIDs == [
+            stableMediaID,
+            "legacy-media",
+            "pm-missing-sender",
+            "pub"
+        ])
+        #expect(context.meshDeliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func synchronousMessageDeliveryReportsAcceptanceForAckGating() {
+        let context = MockChatTransportEventContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatTransportEventCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        let blocked = makeMessage(
+            id: "blocked-private-media",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        )
+        context.blockedMessageIDs = [blocked.id]
+
+        #expect(coordinator.didReceiveMessageSynchronously(blocked) == false)
+        #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.isEmpty)
+
+        let accepted = makeMessage(
+            id: "accepted-private-media",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        )
+        #expect(coordinator.didReceiveMessageSynchronously(accepted) == true)
+        #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.map(\.id) == [accepted.id])
     }
 
     @Test @MainActor
@@ -295,6 +354,32 @@ struct ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests {
         #expect(context.notifyUIChangedCount == 2)
     }
 
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func synchronousConnectAndDisconnect_applyBeforeReturning() {
+        let context = MockChatTransportEventContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatTransportEventCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "2233445566778899")
+        let incoming = makeMessage(
+            id: "incoming-receipt",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        )
+        context.privateChats[peerID] = [incoming]
+
+        coordinator.didConnectToPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+
+        #expect(context.isConnected)
+        #expect(context.registeredEphemeralSessions == [peerID])
+        #expect(context.flushedOutboxPeerIDs == [peerID])
+        #expect(context.courierRetryPeerIDs == [peerID])
+
+        coordinator.didDisconnectFromPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+
+        #expect(context.removedEphemeralSessions == [peerID])
+        #expect(context.unmarkedReadReceiptBatches == [[incoming.id]])
+        #expect(context.notifyUIChangedCount == 2)
+    }
+
     @Test @MainActor
     func didDisconnect_whileViewingChat_migratesConversationToStablePeerID() async {
         let context = MockChatTransportEventContext()

bitchatTests/ChatVerificationCoordinatorContextTests.swift

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ private final class MockChatVerificationContext: ChatVerificationContext {
     var noiseSessionKeysByPeerID: [PeerID: Data] = [:]
     private(set) var installedCallbacks: (onPeerAuthenticated: (PeerID, String) -> Void, onHandshakeRequired: (PeerID) -> Void)?
     private(set) var triggeredHandshakes: [PeerID] = []
+    private(set) var privateMediaAuthenticatedPeers: [PeerID] = []
     private(set) var sentChallenges: [(peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)] = []
     private(set) var sentResponses: [(peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)] = []
 
@@ -113,6 +114,9 @@ private final class MockChatVerificationContext: ChatVerificationContext {
         establishedNoiseSessions.contains(peerID)
     }
     func triggerHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) { triggeredHandshakes.append(peerID) }
+    func privateMediaPeerDidAuthenticate(_ peerID: PeerID) {
+        privateMediaAuthenticatedPeers.append(peerID)
+    }
 
     func sendVerifyChallenge(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data) {
         sentChallenges.append((peerID, noiseKeyHex, nonceA))
@@ -277,6 +281,7 @@ struct ChatVerificationCoordinatorContextTests {
         #expect(context.encryptionStatuses[peerID] == .noiseVerified)
         #expect(context.stablePeerIDCache[peerID] == PeerID(hexData: noiseKey))
         #expect(context.invalidatedEncryptionCachePeers.contains(peerID))
+        #expect(context.privateMediaAuthenticatedPeers == [peerID])
 
         // Handshake required -> handshaking status.
         callbacks?.onHandshakeRequired(peerID)

bitchatTests/ChatViewModelTests.swift

@@ -864,6 +864,80 @@ struct ChatViewModelPublicConversationTests {
 
 struct ChatViewModelPeerTests {
 
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func typedPeerLifecycleEvents_applyBeforeReturning() {
+        let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        let incoming = BitchatMessage(
+            id: "typed-peer-incoming",
+            sender: "Alice",
+            content: "Hello",
+            timestamp: Date(),
+            isRelay: false,
+            isPrivate: true,
+            recipientNickname: viewModel.nickname,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        )
+        viewModel.seedPrivateChat([incoming], for: peerID)
+        viewModel.sentReadReceipts.insert(incoming.id)
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.peerConnected(peerID))
+
+        #expect(viewModel.isConnected)
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.peerDisconnected(peerID))
+
+        #expect(!viewModel.sentReadReceipts.contains(incoming.id))
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func typedPeerListDeliveryAndBluetoothEvents_applyBeforeReturning() {
+        let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()
+        let stalePeer = PeerID(str: "00000000000000a2")
+        let deliveryPeer = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
+        let messageID = "typed-delivery-status"
+        let delivered = DeliveryStatus.delivered(
+            to: "Alice",
+            at: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        )
+        let outgoing = BitchatMessage(
+            id: messageID,
+            sender: viewModel.nickname,
+            content: "On the way",
+            timestamp: Date(),
+            isRelay: false,
+            isPrivate: true,
+            recipientNickname: "Alice",
+            senderPeerID: transport.myPeerID,
+            deliveryStatus: .sent
+        )
+        viewModel.markPrivateChatUnread(stalePeer)
+        viewModel.seedPrivateChat([outgoing], for: deliveryPeer)
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.peerListUpdated([]))
+        #expect(!viewModel.unreadPrivateMessages.contains(stalePeer))
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(
+            .messageDeliveryStatusUpdated(
+                messageID: messageID,
+                status: delivered
+            )
+        )
+        #expect(
+            viewModel.privateMessages(for: deliveryPeer).first?.deliveryStatus
+                == delivered
+        )
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.bluetoothStateUpdated(.poweredOff))
+        #expect(viewModel.bluetoothState == .poweredOff)
+        #expect(viewModel.showBluetoothAlert)
+
+        // Snapshot events belong to TransportPeerEventsDelegate and are
+        // intentionally ignored at this typed sink.
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.peerSnapshotsUpdated([]))
+        #expect(viewModel.bluetoothState == .poweredOff)
+    }
+
     @Test @MainActor
     func didConnectToPeer_notifiesDelegate() async {
         let (_, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()

bitchatTests/EndToEnd/PrivateMediaEndToEndTests.swift

@@ -364,6 +364,217 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
         #expect(alice.privateMediaSendPolicy(to: bob.myPeerID) == .legacyRequiresConsent)
     }
 
+    @Test
+    func privateMediaRetryRequiresExactAuthenticatedBit9Proof() async throws {
+        let root = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent(
+                "private-media-receipt-proof-\(UUID().uuidString)",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let alice = makeService(
+            baseDirectory: root.appendingPathComponent(
+                "alice",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+        )
+        let bob = makeService(
+            baseDirectory: root.appendingPathComponent(
+                "bob",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+        )
+        let bothCapabilities: PeerCapabilities = [
+            .privateMedia,
+            .privateMediaReceipts
+        ]
+
+        // A public bit-9 announce is discovery only.
+        alice._test_seedConnectedPeer(
+            bob.myPeerID,
+            nickname: "Bob",
+            capabilities: bothCapabilities,
+            noisePublicKey: bob.noiseStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        #expect(
+            alice.authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+                to: bob.myPeerID
+            ) == nil
+        )
+
+        let proofs = try await establishSessionCapturingPeerState(
+            alice: alice,
+            bob: bob
+        )
+        #expect(
+            alice.authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+                to: bob.myPeerID
+            ) == nil
+        )
+
+        // Bit 8 alone preserves encrypted transfer compatibility but cannot
+        // authorize automatic resend.
+        let privateMediaOnly = try authenticatedPeerStatePacket(
+            from: bob,
+            to: alice,
+            capabilities: .privateMedia
+        )
+        alice._test_handlePacket(
+            privateMediaOnly,
+            fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID
+        )
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            {
+                alice.privateMediaSendPolicy(to: bob.myPeerID)
+                    == .encrypted
+            },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        #expect(
+            alice.authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+                to: bob.myPeerID
+            ) == nil
+        )
+
+        let receiptCapable = try authenticatedPeerStatePacket(
+            from: bob,
+            to: alice,
+            capabilities: bothCapabilities
+        )
+        alice._test_handlePacket(
+            receiptCapable,
+            fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID
+        )
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            {
+                alice.authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+                    to: bob.myPeerID
+                ) != nil
+            },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+
+        bob._test_handlePacket(
+            proofs.alice,
+            fromPeerID: alice.myPeerID
+        )
+        alice._test_onOutboundPacket = nil
+        bob._test_onOutboundPacket = nil
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func receiptRetryRechecksBit9AtDeferredTransportBoundary() async throws {
+        let root = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent(
+                "private-media-retry-proof-race-\(UUID().uuidString)",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let alice = makeService(
+            baseDirectory: root.appendingPathComponent(
+                "alice",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+        )
+        let bob = makeService(
+            baseDirectory: root.appendingPathComponent(
+                "bob",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+        )
+        let receiptCapabilities: PeerCapabilities = [
+            .privateMedia,
+            .privateMediaReceipts
+        ]
+        alice._test_seedConnectedPeer(
+            bob.myPeerID,
+            nickname: "Bob",
+            capabilities: receiptCapabilities,
+            noisePublicKey: bob.noiseStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        bob._test_seedConnectedPeer(
+            alice.myPeerID,
+            nickname: "Alice",
+            capabilities: receiptCapabilities,
+            noisePublicKey: alice.noiseStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        try await establishSession(alice: alice, bob: bob)
+        #expect(
+            alice.authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+                to: bob.myPeerID
+            ) != nil
+        )
+
+        let privateMediaOnly = try authenticatedPeerStatePacket(
+            from: bob,
+            to: alice,
+            capabilities: .privateMedia
+        )
+        let transferID =
+            "receipt-proof-race-\(UUID().uuidString)"
+        let tap = PacketTap()
+        let boundaryProofs = ReceiptCapabilityRecorder()
+        let rejections = TransferCancellationRecorder()
+        let cancellable = TransferProgressManager.shared.publisher.sink {
+            rejections.record($0)
+        }
+        alice._test_onOutboundPacket = tap.record
+        alice._test_beforePrivateMediaDeferredSend = { id in
+            guard id == transferID else { return }
+            boundaryProofs.record(
+                alice
+                    .authenticatedPrivateMediaReceiptSessionGeneration(
+                        to: bob.myPeerID
+                    ) != nil
+            )
+        }
+        defer {
+            alice._test_beforePrivateMediaDeferredSend = nil
+            alice._test_onOutboundPacket = nil
+        }
+
+        // Rotate authenticated state before the deferred retry reaches its
+        // admission boundary.
+        alice._test_handlePacket(
+            privateMediaOnly,
+            fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID
+        )
+        let content = Data("%PDF-1.7\nreceipt-proof-race".utf8)
+        alice.sendFilePrivateReceiptRetry(
+            BitchatFilePacket(
+                fileName: "receipt-proof-race.pdf",
+                fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+                mimeType: "application/pdf",
+                content: content
+            ),
+            to: bob.myPeerID,
+            transferId: transferID
+        )
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { boundaryProofs.snapshot() == [false] },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        await alice._test_drainPrivateMediaSendPipeline()
+
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { rejections.contains(transferID) },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        #expect(tap.snapshot().allSatisfy {
+            $0.type != MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue
+                && !(
+                    $0.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue
+                        && $0.version == 2
+                )
+        })
+        let state = alice._test_privateMediaTransferState(
+            transferId: transferID
+        )
+        #expect(!state.admissionActive)
+        #expect(!state.pendingNoise)
+        _ = cancellable
+    }
+
     @Test
     func capabilityAnnounceCannotPoisonPinWithoutMatchingNoiseAuthentication() async throws {
         let root = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
@@ -682,13 +893,18 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
         #expect(!identity.hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(
             fingerprint: impostorKey.sha256Fingerprint()
         ))
+        #expect(identity.hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(
+            fingerprint: bob.noiseStaticPublicKeyData().sha256Fingerprint()
+        ))
         alice._test_seedConnectedPeer(
             bob.myPeerID,
             nickname: "Bob",
             capabilities: [],
             noisePublicKey: impostorKey
         )
-        #expect(alice.privateMediaSendPolicy(to: bob.myPeerID) == .legacyRequiresConsent)
+        // The exact live Noise identity remains authoritative over a later
+        // impostor registry rewrite.
+        #expect(alice.privateMediaSendPolicy(to: bob.myPeerID) == .encrypted)
     }
 
     @Test
@@ -741,7 +957,7 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
     }
 
     @Test
-    func consentedLegacySendRejectsAboveAndroidFragmentCapButEncryptedDoesNot() async throws {
+    func encryptedAndConsentedLegacySendsRejectAboveAndroidFragmentCap() async throws {
         let root = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
             .appendingPathComponent("private-media-fragment-cap-\(UUID().uuidString)", isDirectory: true)
         defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
@@ -790,24 +1006,14 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
             allowLegacyFallback: true
         )
 
-        // The directed raw-file migration fallback (Android-style peer without
-        // the .privateMedia capability) still honors the 256-fragment ceiling.
-        let legacyRejected = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
-            { rejections.contains(legacyID) },
+        let bothRejected = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { rejections.contains(encryptedID) && rejections.contains(legacyID) },
             timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
         )
-        #expect(legacyRejected)
+        #expect(bothRejected)
+        #expect(rejections.reason(for: encryptedID)?.contains("256") == true)
         #expect(rejections.reason(for: legacyID)?.contains("256") == true)
-
-        // Encrypted private media to a .privateMedia-capable peer is NOT forced
-        // down to Android's 256 cap: it uses the full receiver ceiling and
-        // proceeds to fragment/emit (a 130 KiB file exceeds 256 fragments).
-        let encryptedEmitted = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
-            { !tap.snapshot().isEmpty },
-            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
-        )
-        #expect(encryptedEmitted, "Encrypted send to a capable peer must not be blocked by the Android cap")
-        #expect(!rejections.contains(encryptedID))
+        #expect(tap.snapshot().isEmpty, "No outer packet or fragment may be exposed before size rejection")
         _ = cancellable
     }
 
@@ -876,7 +1082,7 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
             + marker
             + Data(repeating: 0x4A, count: 6 * 1024)
         try await assertPrivateMediaRoundTrip(
-            fileName: "private.jpg",
+            fileName: "img_20260725_120000_11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111.jpg",
             mimeType: "image/jpeg",
             content: content,
             marker: marker,
@@ -1147,6 +1353,17 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
         #expect(message.isPrivate)
         #expect(message.senderPeerID == alice.myPeerID)
         #expect(message.content.hasPrefix(expectedMessagePrefix))
+        if let stableMessageID = PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            for: file,
+            senderPeerID: alice.myPeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: bob.myPeerID
+        ) {
+            #expect(message.id == stableMessageID)
+        } else {
+            // Generic/legacy filenames retain random per-arrival IDs so two
+            // unrelated "photo.jpg" transfers are never deduplicated.
+            #expect(!message.id.hasPrefix("media-"))
+        }
 
         let stored = recursivelyStoredFiles(under: bobRoot)
         #expect(stored.count == 1)
@@ -1289,6 +1506,8 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
 
         return enumerator.compactMap { item in
             guard let url = item as? URL,
+                  !url.pathComponents.contains(".private-media-receipts"),
+                  url.lastPathComponent != ".private-media-receipts.json",
                   (try? url.resourceValues(forKeys: [.isRegularFileKey]).isRegularFile) == true else {
                 return nil
             }
@@ -1389,6 +1608,23 @@ private final class PrivateMediaPolicyRecorder: @unchecked Sendable {
     }
 }
 
+private final class ReceiptCapabilityRecorder: @unchecked Sendable {
+    private let lock = NSLock()
+    private var values: [Bool] = []
+
+    func record(_ value: Bool) {
+        lock.lock()
+        values.append(value)
+        lock.unlock()
+    }
+
+    func snapshot() -> [Bool] {
+        lock.lock()
+        defer { lock.unlock() }
+        return values
+    }
+}
+
 private final class MessageCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate, @unchecked Sendable {
     private let lock = NSLock()
     private var messages: [BitchatMessage] = []

bitchatTests/Integration/IntegrationTests.swift

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import Testing
 @testable import BitFoundation // to avoid unnecessary public's
 @testable import bitchat
 
+@Suite("Integration Tests", .serialized)
 struct IntegrationTests {
     
     private var helper = TestNetworkHelper()
@@ -272,8 +273,18 @@ struct IntegrationTests {
         // Re-establish Noise handshake explicitly via managers
         do {
             let m1 = try helper.noiseManagers["Bob"]!.initiateHandshake(with: helper.nodes["Alice"]!.peerID)
-            let m2 = try helper.noiseManagers["Alice"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(from: helper.nodes["Bob"]!.peerID, message: m1)!
-            let m3 = try helper.noiseManagers["Bob"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(from: helper.nodes["Alice"]!.peerID, message: m2)!
+            let m2 = try #require(
+                try helper.noiseManagers["Alice"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(
+                    from: helper.nodes["Bob"]!.peerID,
+                    message: m1
+                )
+            )
+            let m3 = try #require(
+                try helper.noiseManagers["Bob"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(
+                    from: helper.nodes["Alice"]!.peerID,
+                    message: m2
+                )
+            )
             _ = try helper.noiseManagers["Alice"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(from: helper.nodes["Bob"]!.peerID, message: m3)
         } catch {
             Issue.record("Failed to re-establish Noise session after restart: \(error)")

bitchatTests/Integration/TestNetworkHelper.swift

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 
 import Foundation
 import CryptoKit
+import Testing
 @testable import BitFoundation // to avoid unnecessary public's
 @testable import bitchat
 
@@ -27,9 +28,14 @@ final class TestNetworkHelper {
         node.mockNickname = name
         nodes[name] = node
         
-        // Create/replace Noise manager for this node
+        // This synchronous helper directly drives all three XX messages and
+        // has no transport callback loop for delayed collision recovery.
         let key = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
-        noiseManagers[name] = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: key, keychain: mockKeychain)
+        noiseManagers[name] = NoiseSessionManager(
+            localStaticKey: key,
+            keychain: mockKeychain,
+            recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
+        )
         return node
     }
     
@@ -108,8 +114,18 @@ final class TestNetworkHelper {
               let peer2ID = nodes[node2]?.peerID else { return }
         
         let msg1 = try manager1.initiateHandshake(with: peer2ID)
-        let msg2 = try manager2.handleIncomingHandshake(from: peer1ID, message: msg1)!
-        let msg3 = try manager1.handleIncomingHandshake(from: peer2ID, message: msg2)!
+        let msg2 = try #require(
+            try manager2.handleIncomingHandshake(
+                from: peer1ID,
+                message: msg1
+            )
+        )
+        let msg3 = try #require(
+            try manager1.handleIncomingHandshake(
+                from: peer2ID,
+                message: msg2
+            )
+        )
         _ = try manager2.handleIncomingHandshake(from: peer1ID, message: msg3)
     }
 }

bitchatTests/Noise/NoiseCoverageTests.swift

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import BitFoundation
 
 @testable import bitchat
 
-@Suite("Noise Coverage Tests")
+@Suite("Noise Coverage Tests", .serialized)
 struct NoiseCoverageTests {
     private let keychain = MockKeychain()
     private let aliceStaticKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
@@ -633,8 +633,16 @@ struct NoiseCoverageTests {
         )
         let replacementSession = try #require(manager.getSession(for: alicePeerID))
 
-        #expect(replacementResponse != nil)
-        #expect(replacementSession !== restartedSession)
+        let localPeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: aliceStaticKey.publicKey.rawRepresentation
+        )
+        if localPeerID < alicePeerID {
+            #expect(replacementResponse == nil)
+            #expect(replacementSession === restartedSession)
+        } else {
+            #expect(replacementResponse != nil)
+            #expect(replacementSession !== restartedSession)
+        }
 
         let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: aliceStaticKey, keychain: keychain)
         let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobStaticKey, keychain: keychain)
@@ -654,7 +662,13 @@ struct NoiseCoverageTests {
             try aliceManager.initiateHandshake(with: alicePeerID)
         }
 
-        let rekeyHandshake = try aliceManager.initiateRekey(for: alicePeerID)
+        let rekeyInitiation = try aliceManager.initiateRekey(for: alicePeerID)
+        let rekeyHandshake = try #require(
+            aliceManager.claimHandshakeInitiation(
+                rekeyInitiation,
+                for: alicePeerID
+            )
+        )
         #expect(!rekeyHandshake.isEmpty)
         let rekeyedSession = try #require(aliceManager.getSession(for: alicePeerID))
 
@@ -667,6 +681,7 @@ struct NoiseCoverageTests {
         let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(
             localStaticKey: aliceStaticKey,
             keychain: keychain,
+            recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0,
             sessionFactory: { peerID, role in
                 BlockingDecryptNoiseSession(
                     peerID: peerID,

bitchatTests/Noise/NoiseProtocolTests.swift

@@ -357,8 +357,18 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
     
     @Test func peerRestartDetection() throws {
         // Establish initial sessions
-        let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: aliceKey, keychain: mockKeychain)
-        let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobKey, keychain: mockKeychain)
+        // This test explicitly drives the three synchronous XX messages and
+        // does not exercise the transport's delayed collision recovery.
+        let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(
+            localStaticKey: aliceKey,
+            keychain: mockKeychain,
+            recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
+        )
+        let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(
+            localStaticKey: bobKey,
+            keychain: mockKeychain,
+            recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
+        )
         
         try establishManagerSessions(aliceManager: aliceManager, bobManager: bobManager)
         
@@ -377,15 +387,24 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
         let newHandshake1 = try bobManagerRestarted.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
         
         // Alice should accept the new handshake (clearing old session)
-        let newHandshake2 = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
-            from: alicePeerID, message: newHandshake1)
-        #expect(newHandshake2 != nil)
+        let newHandshake2 = try #require(
+            try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: newHandshake1
+            )
+        )
         
         // Complete the new handshake
-        let newHandshake3 = try bobManagerRestarted.handleIncomingHandshake(
-            from: bobPeerID, message: newHandshake2!)
-        #expect(newHandshake3 != nil)
-        _ = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(from: alicePeerID, message: newHandshake3!)
+        let newHandshake3 = try #require(
+            try bobManagerRestarted.handleIncomingHandshake(
+                from: bobPeerID,
+                message: newHandshake2
+            )
+        )
+        _ = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
+            from: alicePeerID,
+            message: newHandshake3
+        )
         
         // Should be able to exchange messages with new sessions
         let testMessage = Data("After restart".utf8)
@@ -543,8 +562,18 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
     
     @Test func nonceDesynchronizationCausesRehandshake() throws {
         // Test that nonce desynchronization leads to proper re-handshake
-        let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: aliceKey, keychain: mockKeychain)
-        let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobKey, keychain: mockKeychain)
+        // This test explicitly drives the three synchronous XX messages and
+        // does not exercise the transport's delayed collision recovery.
+        let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(
+            localStaticKey: aliceKey,
+            keychain: mockKeychain,
+            recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
+        )
+        let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(
+            localStaticKey: bobKey,
+            keychain: mockKeychain,
+            recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
+        )
         
         // Establish sessions
         try establishManagerSessions(aliceManager: aliceManager, bobManager: bobManager)
@@ -572,15 +601,25 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
         let rehandshake1 = try bobManager.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
         
         // Alice should accept despite having a "valid" (but desynced) session
-        let rehandshake2 = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
-            from: alicePeerID, message: rehandshake1)
-        #expect(rehandshake2 != nil, "Alice should accept handshake to fix desync")
+        let rehandshake2 = try #require(
+            try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: rehandshake1
+            ),
+            "Alice should accept handshake to fix desync"
+        )
         
         // Complete handshake
-        let rehandshake3 = try bobManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
-            from: bobPeerID, message: rehandshake2!)
-        #expect(rehandshake3 != nil)
-        _ = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(from: alicePeerID, message: rehandshake3!)
+        let rehandshake3 = try #require(
+            try bobManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
+                from: bobPeerID,
+                message: rehandshake2
+            )
+        )
+        _ = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
+            from: alicePeerID,
+            message: rehandshake3
+        )
         
         // Verify communication works again
         let testResynced = Data("Resynced".utf8)

bitchatTests/Protocols/BitchatFilePacketTests.swift

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import BitFoundation
 import XCTest
 @testable import bitchat
 
@@ -73,4 +74,85 @@ final class BitchatFilePacketTests: XCTestCase {
         XCTAssertEqual(decoded.fileSize, UInt64(content.count))
         XCTAssertEqual(decoded.content, content)
     }
+
+    func testPrivateMediaMessageIdentityConvergesAcrossPeerIDAliases() throws {
+        let senderKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
+        let recipientKey = Data(repeating: 0x22, count: 32)
+        let senderStable = PeerID(hexData: senderKey)
+        let recipientStable = PeerID(hexData: recipientKey)
+        let fileName = "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+
+        let senderID = try XCTUnwrap(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: senderStable.toShort(),
+            recipientPeerID: PeerID(str: "mesh:\(recipientStable.toShort().bare)"),
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+        let receiverID = try XCTUnwrap(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: senderStable,
+            recipientPeerID: recipientStable.toShort(),
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+
+        XCTAssertEqual(senderID, receiverID)
+        XCTAssertTrue(senderID.hasPrefix("media-"))
+        XCTAssertEqual(senderID.count, 38)
+        XCTAssertTrue(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(senderID))
+        XCTAssertFalse(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID("media-\(String(repeating: "A", count: 32))"))
+        XCTAssertFalse(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID("media-\(String(repeating: "a", count: 31))"))
+        XCTAssertFalse(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(UUID().uuidString))
+    }
+
+    func testPrivateMediaMessageIdentitySeparatesDirectionAndFilename() throws {
+        let alice = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
+        let bob = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
+        let firstName = "voice_20260725_105708_11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111.m4a"
+        let secondName = "voice_20260725_105709_22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222.m4a"
+        let first = try XCTUnwrap(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: firstName
+        ))
+
+        XCTAssertNotEqual(first, PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: bob,
+            recipientPeerID: alice,
+            fileName: firstName
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNotEqual(first, PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: secondName
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNil(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: nil
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNil(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: "photo.jpg"
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNil(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: "img_11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111.pdf"
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNotNil(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: "voice_0011223344556677.m4a"
+        ))
+    }
+
+    func testPrivateMediaMessageIdentityMatchesVersionOneGoldenVector() {
+        XCTAssertEqual(
+            PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+                senderPeerID: PeerID(str: "0011223344556677"),
+                recipientPeerID: PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff"),
+                fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+            ),
+            "media-910bd42c65060ab76bb6406f220c4516"
+        )
+    }
 }

bitchatTests/Services/BLEFileTransferHandlerTests.swift

@@ -13,11 +13,27 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
 
         var signatureVerifyCount = 0
         var signedNameQueries: [PeerID] = []
+        var blockedPeers: Set<PeerID> = []
         var trackedPackets: [BitchatPacket] = []
         var quotaReservations: [Int] = []
         var saveCalls: [(data: Data, preferredName: String?, subdirectory: String, fallbackExtension: String?, defaultPrefix: String)] = []
+        var receiptStates: [String: BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState] = [:]
+        var receiptCommits: [(messageID: String, storedURL: URL)] = []
+        var receiptCommitSucceeds = true
+        var removedIncomingFiles: [URL] = []
         var lastSeenUpdates: [PeerID] = []
+        var deliveryAcks: [(messageID: String, peerID: PeerID)] = []
         var deliveredMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
+        var saveOverride: ((
+            _ data: Data,
+            _ preferredName: String?,
+            _ subdirectory: String,
+            _ fallbackExtension: String?,
+            _ defaultPrefix: String
+        ) -> URL?)?
+        var receiptStateOverride: ((String) -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState)?
+        var receiptCommitOverride: ((String, URL) -> Bool)?
+        var removeIncomingFileOverride: ((URL) -> Void)?
     }
 
     private let localPeerID = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
@@ -46,13 +62,44 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
             },
             saveIncomingFile: { data, preferredName, subdirectory, fallbackExtension, defaultPrefix in
                 recorder.saveCalls.append((data, preferredName, subdirectory, fallbackExtension, defaultPrefix))
+                if let saveOverride = recorder.saveOverride {
+                    return saveOverride(data, preferredName, subdirectory, fallbackExtension, defaultPrefix)
+                }
                 return recorder.saveResult
             },
+            privateMediaReceiptState: { messageID in
+                if let receiptStateOverride = recorder.receiptStateOverride {
+                    return receiptStateOverride(messageID)
+                }
+                return recorder.receiptStates[messageID] ?? .absent
+            },
+            commitPrivateMediaFile: { messageID, storedURL in
+                recorder.receiptCommits.append((messageID, storedURL))
+                if let receiptCommitOverride = recorder.receiptCommitOverride {
+                    return receiptCommitOverride(messageID, storedURL)
+                }
+                guard recorder.receiptCommitSucceeds else { return false }
+                recorder.receiptStates[messageID] = .accepted(storedURL)
+                return true
+            },
+            removeIncomingFile: { storedURL in
+                recorder.removedIncomingFiles.append(storedURL)
+                recorder.removeIncomingFileOverride?(storedURL)
+            },
+            isPrivateMediaSenderBlocked: { peerID in
+                recorder.blockedPeers.contains(peerID)
+            },
             updatePeerLastSeen: { peerID in
                 recorder.lastSeenUpdates.append(peerID)
             },
-            deliverMessage: { message in
+            acknowledgePrivateMedia: { messageID, peerID in
+                recorder.deliveryAcks.append((messageID, peerID))
+            },
+            deliverMessage: { message, shouldDeliver, completion in
+                guard shouldDeliver() else { return }
                 recorder.deliveredMessages.append(message)
+                guard shouldDeliver() else { return }
+                completion()
             }
         )
         return BLEFileTransferHandler(environment: environment)
@@ -284,6 +331,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates == [remotePeerID])
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.isPrivate == true)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.id.hasPrefix("media-") == false)
         // Must be explicit: BitchatMessage defaults private messages to
         // .sending, which the media views render as an in-flight send
         // (empty reveal mask, disabled reveal tap).
@@ -291,13 +339,14 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
     }
 
     @Test
-    func decryptedPrivateFileUsesValidationQuotaAndPrivateDeliveryWithoutRawSignature() throws {
+    func bit8EncryptedPrivateFileKeepsStableIDAndAckWithoutBit9Proof() throws {
         let recorder = Recorder()
         recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
         let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
         let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let fileName = "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
         let file = BitchatFilePacket(
-            fileName: "secret.jpg",
+            fileName: fileName,
             fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
             mimeType: "image/jpeg",
             content: content
@@ -316,6 +365,357 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.isPrivate == true)
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.timestamp == timestamp)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.id == PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: remotePeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: localPeerID,
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.receiptCommits.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.first?.messageID == recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.id)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func rawLegacyPrivateFileWithRetryShapedNameNeverUsesReceiptLedger() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(
+            remotePeerID,
+            nickname: "Alice",
+            isVerified: true,
+            signingPublicKey: sampleSigningKey
+        )]
+        recorder.signatureVerifies = true
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9])
+        let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket(
+            sender: remotePeerID,
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content,
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+        )
+
+        #expect(handler.handle(packet, from: remotePeerID))
+        #expect(recorder.receiptCommits.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.id.hasPrefix("media-") == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func repeatedLegacyPrivateImageNamesKeepDistinctRandomMessageIDs() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "photo.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+        ))
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages[0].id != recorder.deliveredMessages[1].id)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.allSatisfy { !$0.id.hasPrefix("media-") })
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func lostCapabilityProofThenStableRetryReusesDurableIDWithoutSecondDiskWrite() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let fileName = "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: fileName,
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+        let expectedID = try #require(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: remotePeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: localPeerID,
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+
+        // First encrypted arrival may precede the sender's authenticated bit-9
+        // proof. It still uses the bit-8 stable ID/ACK contract.
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        // A later automatic retry after proof must resolve the same durable ID
+        // rather than create a legacy random-ID bubble.
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+        ))
+
+        #expect(recorder.quotaReservations == [content.count])
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 1)
+        // The handler re-offers a durable duplicate so a relaunched UI can
+        // restore its bubble; the synchronous conversation sink deduplicates.
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates == [remotePeerID, remotePeerID])
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.allSatisfy {
+            $0.messageID == expectedID && $0.peerID == remotePeerID
+        })
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func acceptedPrivateMediaAfterRelaunchRedeliversDurableURLBeforeAck() throws {
+        let root = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory.appendingPathComponent(
+            "private-media-handler-relaunch-\(UUID().uuidString)",
+            isDirectory: true
+        )
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let store = BLEIncomingFileStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9])
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+
+        func configure(_ recorder: Recorder) {
+            recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(
+                remotePeerID,
+                nickname: "Alice",
+                isVerified: true
+            )]
+            recorder.saveOverride = {
+                data,
+                preferredName,
+                subdirectory,
+                fallbackExtension,
+                defaultPrefix in
+                store.save(
+                    data: data,
+                    preferredName: preferredName,
+                    subdirectory: subdirectory,
+                    fallbackExtension: fallbackExtension,
+                    defaultPrefix: defaultPrefix
+                )
+            }
+            recorder.receiptStateOverride = {
+                store.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID: $0)
+            }
+            recorder.receiptCommitOverride = {
+                store.commitPrivateMediaFile(messageID: $0, storedURL: $1)
+            }
+            recorder.removeIncomingFileOverride = {
+                store.removeIncomingFile(at: $0)
+            }
+        }
+
+        let first = Recorder()
+        configure(first)
+        #expect(makeHandler(recorder: first).handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        let originalMessage = try #require(first.deliveredMessages.first)
+        #expect(first.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
+
+        // A fresh handler models process relaunch: its in-memory reservation
+        // cache is empty, so only the durable receipt can suppress disk work.
+        let relaunched = Recorder()
+        configure(relaunched)
+        #expect(makeHandler(recorder: relaunched).handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+        ))
+
+        #expect(relaunched.quotaReservations.isEmpty)
+        #expect(relaunched.saveCalls.isEmpty)
+        #expect(relaunched.receiptCommits.isEmpty)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveredMessages.first?.id == originalMessage.id)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveredMessages.first?.content == originalMessage.content)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveryAcks.first?.messageID == originalMessage.id)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func inFlightStableDuplicateIsNotAcknowledgedAndFailedSaveRemainsRetryable() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+        var handler: BLEFileTransferHandler!
+        var nestedResult: Bool?
+        var failFirstSave = true
+        recorder.saveOverride = { _, _, _, _, _ in
+            if failFirstSave {
+                failFirstSave = false
+                nestedResult = handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+                    payload,
+                    from: self.remotePeerID,
+                    timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+                )
+                return nil
+            }
+            return recorder.saveResult
+        }
+        handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+
+        // The nested arrival sees the first reservation as pending. It is
+        // coalesced without an ACK; then the first durable save fails.
+        #expect(!handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        #expect(nestedResult == true)
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
+
+        // Failure released the reservation, so the sender's later retry can
+        // persist and deliver normally.
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_236)
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func unavailableDurableReceiptStateWithholdsDiskDeliveryAndAck() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(
+            remotePeerID,
+            nickname: "Alice",
+            isVerified: true
+        )]
+        let fileName =
+            "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+        let messageID = try #require(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: remotePeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: localPeerID,
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+        recorder.receiptStates[messageID] = .unavailable
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9])
+        let payload = try #require(BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: fileName,
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        ).encode())
+
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.quotaReservations.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.receiptCommits.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func durableReceiptCommitFailureRollsBackAndWithholdsDeliveryAck() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(
+            remotePeerID,
+            nickname: "Alice",
+            isVerified: true
+        )]
+        recorder.receiptCommitSucceeds = false
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9])
+        let payload = try #require(BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        ).encode())
+
+        #expect(!handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.receiptCommits.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.removedIncomingFiles.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.removedIncomingFiles.first == recorder.saveResult)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func blockedPrivateMediaIsDroppedBeforeQuotaDiskAndDedupState() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.blockedPeers = [remotePeerID]
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+
+        #expect(recorder.quotaReservations.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
+
+        // Unblocking must allow a retry through; the blocked attempt cannot
+        // poison the stable-ID dedup reservation.
+        recorder.blockedPeers = []
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
     }
 
     @Test
@@ -337,6 +737,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.quotaReservations.isEmpty)
         #expect(recorder.saveCalls.isEmpty)
         #expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
     }
 
@@ -468,6 +869,33 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
         }
     }
 
+    @Test
+    func panicWipeClearsCachedPrivateMediaReceiptDecisions() throws {
+        let base = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent(
+                "panic-receipt-cache-\(UUID().uuidString)",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: base) }
+        let messageID = "media-00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
+
+        let seed = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: base)
+        #expect(seed.recordDeleted(messageID: messageID))
+
+        let store = BLEIncomingFileStore(baseDirectory: base)
+        #expect(
+            store.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID: messageID)
+                == .tombstoned
+        )
+
+        try store.panicWipe()
+
+        #expect(
+            store.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID: messageID)
+                == .absent
+        )
+    }
+
     @Test
     func panicWipeAttemptsDeletionWhenMarkerPersistenceFails() throws {
         enum MarkerFailure: Error { case unavailable }

bitchatTests/Services/BLENoisePacketHandlerTests.swift

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import BitFoundation
+import CryptoKit
 import Foundation
 import Testing
 @testable import bitchat
@@ -11,7 +12,11 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
         var handshakeAuthenticated = false
         var hasSession = false
         let sessionGeneration = UUID()
+        var awaitingResponderHandshake = false
         var decryptResult: Result<Data, Error> = .success(Data())
+        var currentDate = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
+        var transportGenerationReady = false
+        var forcedServiceDecryptError: Error?
 
         var processedHandshakes: [(peerID: PeerID, message: Data)] = []
         var hasSessionQueries: [PeerID] = []
@@ -34,11 +39,12 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
         recorder: Recorder,
         now: Date = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
     ) -> BLENoisePacketHandler {
+        recorder.currentDate = now
         let environment = BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment(
             localPeerID: { [localPeerID] in localPeerID },
             localPeerIDData: { [localPeerIDData] in localPeerIDData },
             messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
-            now: { now },
+            now: { recorder.currentDate },
             processHandshakeMessage: { peerID, message in
                 recorder.processedHandshakes.append((peerID, message))
                 return NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult(
@@ -51,6 +57,9 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
                 recorder.hasSessionQueries.append(peerID)
                 return recorder.hasSession
             },
+            isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion: { _ in
+                recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake
+            },
             initiateHandshake: { peerID in
                 recorder.initiatedHandshakes.append(peerID)
                 recorder.events.append("initiateHandshake")
@@ -82,6 +91,120 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
         return BLENoisePacketHandler(environment: environment)
     }
 
+    private func makeServiceBackedHandler(
+        service: NoiseEncryptionService,
+        localPeerID: PeerID,
+        recorder: Recorder,
+        transportGenerationIsReady:
+            @escaping (UUID) -> Bool
+    ) -> BLENoisePacketHandler {
+        BLENoisePacketHandler(
+            environment: BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment(
+                localPeerID: { localPeerID },
+                localPeerIDData: {
+                    Data(hexString: localPeerID.id) ?? Data()
+                },
+                messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
+                now: { recorder.currentDate },
+                processHandshakeMessage: { peerID, message in
+                    try service.processHandshakeMessageWithResult(
+                        from: peerID,
+                        message: message
+                    )
+                },
+                hasNoiseSession: { peerID in
+                    service.hasSession(with: peerID)
+                },
+                isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion: { peerID in
+                    service.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(
+                        with: peerID
+                    )
+                },
+                initiateHandshake: { peerID in
+                    recorder.initiatedHandshakes.append(peerID)
+                },
+                broadcastPacket: { packet in
+                    recorder.broadcastPackets.append(packet)
+                },
+                updatePeerLastSeen: { peerID in
+                    recorder.lastSeenUpdates.append(peerID)
+                },
+                decrypt: { payload, peerID in
+                    recorder.decryptCalls.append((payload, peerID))
+                    if let error = recorder.forcedServiceDecryptError {
+                        throw error
+                    }
+                    let result =
+                        try service.decryptWithSessionGeneration(
+                            payload,
+                            from: peerID,
+                            establishedGenerationIsReady:
+                                transportGenerationIsReady
+                        )
+                    return BLENoiseDecryptionResult(
+                        plaintext: result.plaintext,
+                        sessionGeneration: result.sessionGeneration
+                    )
+                },
+                clearSession: { peerID in
+                    recorder.clearedSessions.append(peerID)
+                    service.clearSession(for: peerID)
+                },
+                handleAuthenticatedPeerState: {
+                    peerID, payload, generation in
+                    recorder.authenticatedPeerStates.append(
+                        (peerID, payload, generation)
+                    )
+                },
+                deliverNoisePayload: {
+                    peerID, type, payload, timestamp in
+                    recorder.deliveries.append(
+                        (peerID, type, payload, timestamp)
+                    )
+                }
+            )
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func establishedServices() throws -> (
+        sender: NoiseEncryptionService,
+        receiver: NoiseEncryptionService,
+        senderPeerID: PeerID,
+        receiverPeerID: PeerID
+    ) {
+        let sender = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let receiver = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let senderPeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: sender.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let receiverPeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: receiver.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let message1 = try sender.initiateHandshake(with: receiverPeerID)
+        let message2 = try #require(
+            try receiver.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: senderPeerID,
+                message: message1
+            )
+        )
+        let message3 = try #require(
+            try sender.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: receiverPeerID,
+                message: message2
+            )
+        )
+        _ = try receiver.processHandshakeMessage(
+            from: senderPeerID,
+            message: message3
+        )
+        return (
+            sender,
+            receiver,
+            senderPeerID,
+            receiverPeerID
+        )
+    }
+
     // MARK: Handshake
 
     @Test
@@ -198,6 +321,24 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.broadcastPackets.isEmpty)
     }
 
+    @Test
+    func managedHandshakeFailureDoesNotStartASecondRecovery() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.handshakeResult = .failure(
+            NoiseManagedHandshakeFailure(underlying: TestError())
+        )
+        recorder.hasSession = false
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let packet = makeHandshakePacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        #expect(!handler.handleHandshake(packet, from: remotePeerID))
+        #expect(recorder.hasSessionQueries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.broadcastPackets.isEmpty)
+    }
+
     // MARK: Encrypted
 
     @Test
@@ -346,6 +487,799 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
     }
 
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextIsRetriedAfterResponderHandshakeCompletes() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0xCA, 0xFE])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .privateMessage)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0xCA, 0xFE]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func panicResetDiscardsDeferredCiphertextBeforeFutureAuthentication() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let prePanicCiphertext = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+            payload: Data(
+                count: NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
+                    + NoiseSecurityConstants.transportCiphertextOverhead
+            )
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(prePanicCiphertext, from: remotePeerID)
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+
+        handler.resetForPanic()
+
+        // Three maximum-sized packets fit only when reset also zeroed the
+        // global byte accounting. They model ciphertext received under the
+        // replacement identity before that responder handshake completes.
+        for index in 0..<3 {
+            handler.handleEncrypted(
+                makeEncryptedPacket(
+                    recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                    timestamp: UInt64(901_000 + index),
+                    payload: Data(
+                        count: NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
+                            + NoiseSecurityConstants.transportCiphertextOverhead
+                    )
+                ),
+                from: remotePeerID
+            )
+        }
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 4)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0xCA, 0xFE])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        // Only the three post-reset packets replay; the pre-panic packet does
+        // not survive into the replacement session.
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 7)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 3)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func ciphertextQueuedAheadOfEstablishmentCallbackDoesNotConsumeNonce()
+        throws {
+        let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let alicePeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let bobPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
+
+        let message1 = try alice.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
+        let message2 = try #require(
+            try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: message1
+            )
+        )
+        let message3 = try #require(
+            try alice.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: bobPeerID,
+                message: message2
+            )
+        )
+        let typedPayload = Data([
+            NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue,
+            0xCA, 0xFE
+        ])
+        let ciphertext = try alice.encrypt(
+            typedPayload,
+            for: bobPeerID
+        )
+
+        // Manager promotion has completed, but the serialized BLE callback is
+        // deliberately still behind this ciphertext.
+        _ = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+            from: alicePeerID,
+            message: message3
+        )
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = false
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: bob,
+            localPeerID: bobPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let packet = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: bobPeerID.id),
+            payload: ciphertext
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(packet, from: alicePeerID)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        // The exact ciphertext must still authenticate, proving the readiness
+        // rejection happened before the receive nonce was consumed.
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(alicePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .privateMessage)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0xCA, 0xFE]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func ciphertextQueuedAheadOfRestoreCallbackDoesNotConsumeNonce()
+        throws {
+        let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let mallory = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let alicePeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let bobPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
+
+        let initial1 = try alice.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
+        let initial2 = try #require(
+            try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: initial1
+            )
+        )
+        let initial3 = try #require(
+            try alice.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: bobPeerID,
+                message: initial2
+            )
+        )
+        _ = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+            from: alicePeerID,
+            message: initial3
+        )
+        let typedPayload = Data([
+            NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue,
+            0xBE, 0xEF
+        ])
+        let delayedCiphertext = try alice.encrypt(
+            typedPayload,
+            for: bobPeerID
+        )
+
+        let forged1 = try mallory.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
+        let forged2 = try #require(
+            try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: forged1
+            )
+        )
+        let forged3 = try #require(
+            try mallory.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: bobPeerID,
+                message: forged2
+            )
+        )
+        #expect(throws: NoiseSessionError.peerIdentityMismatch) {
+            try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: forged3
+            )
+        }
+        #expect(bob.hasEstablishedSession(with: alicePeerID))
+
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = false
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: bob,
+            localPeerID: bobPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let packet = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: bobPeerID.id),
+            payload: delayedCiphertext
+        )
+
+        // Manager rollback is visible, while the BLE restore callback is
+        // deliberately still queued behind this ciphertext.
+        handler.handleEncrypted(packet, from: alicePeerID)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(alicePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .privateMessage)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0xBE, 0xEF]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func oversizedCiphertextCannotEvictEstablishedTransport() throws {
+        let pair = try establishedServices()
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: pair.receiver,
+            localPeerID: pair.receiverPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data(
+                    count:
+                        NoiseSecurityConstants
+                            .maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize + 1
+                )
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+        #expect(
+            pair.receiver.hasEstablishedSession(with: pair.senderPeerID)
+        )
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        let valid = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x01]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: valid
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0x01]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func forgedAuthenticationFailureCannotEvictEstablishedTransport()
+        throws {
+        let pair = try establishedServices()
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: pair.receiver,
+            localPeerID: pair.receiverPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let valid = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x02]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+        var forged = valid
+        forged[forged.index(before: forged.endIndex)] ^= 0xFF
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: forged
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+        #expect(
+            pair.receiver.hasEstablishedSession(with: pair.senderPeerID)
+        )
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        // Authentication failure leaves nonce state untouched, so the exact
+        // original ciphertext remains valid.
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: valid
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0x02]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func replayCannotEvictEstablishedTransportOrBlockNextNonce() throws {
+        let pair = try establishedServices()
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: pair.receiver,
+            localPeerID: pair.receiverPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let first = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x03]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+        let firstPacket = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+            payload: first
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(firstPacket, from: pair.senderPeerID)
+        handler.handleEncrypted(firstPacket, from: pair.senderPeerID)
+        #expect(
+            pair.receiver.hasEstablishedSession(with: pair.senderPeerID)
+        )
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        let next = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x04]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: next
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.map { $0.payload } == [
+            Data([0x03]), Data([0x04])
+        ])
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func rateLimitFailureCannotEvictEstablishedTransportOrConsumeNonce()
+        throws {
+        let pair = try establishedServices()
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        recorder.forcedServiceDecryptError =
+            NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: pair.receiver,
+            localPeerID: pair.receiverPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let valid = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x05]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data(repeating: 0xA5, count: 20)
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+        #expect(
+            pair.receiver.hasEstablishedSession(with: pair.senderPeerID)
+        )
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        recorder.forcedServiceDecryptError = nil
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: valid
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0x05]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func maximumPrivateFileCiphertextIsEligibleForDeferredRetry() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+            payload: Data(
+                count: NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize
+            )
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateFile.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .privateFile)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func oversizedEarlyCiphertextIsNotDeferred() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+            payload: Data(
+                count:
+                    NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize + 1
+            )
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func missingSessionCiphertextIsRetriedAfterResponderHandshakeCompletes() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func lowNonceCiphertextIsRetriedAfterResponderHandshakeCompletes() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(NoiseError.replayDetected)
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.readReceipt.rawValue, 0x02])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .readReceipt)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func invalidDeferredCiphertextDoesNotClearAuthenticatedSession() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func nonCipherFailureDuringResponderHandshakeIsDroppedNotDeferred() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(TestError())
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+            ),
+            from: remotePeerID
+        )
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextBufferIsBoundedPerPeer() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+
+        for index in 0..<5 {
+            handler.handleEncrypted(
+                makeEncryptedPacket(
+                    recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                    timestamp: UInt64(900_000 + index)
+                ),
+                from: remotePeerID
+            )
+        }
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 5)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 9)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 4)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextBufferIsBoundedGlobally() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let peers = (1...33).map {
+            PeerID(str: String(format: "%016llx", UInt64($0)))
+        }
+        let packet = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        for peerID in peers {
+            handler.handleEncrypted(packet, from: peerID)
+        }
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 33)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        for peerID in peers {
+            handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(peerID)
+        }
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 65)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 32)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextBufferKeepsPrivateFileRoomAndByteBound() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let peers = [
+            PeerID(str: "0000000000000001"),
+            PeerID(str: "0000000000000002"),
+            PeerID(str: "0000000000000003")
+        ]
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data(
+                    count:
+                        NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize
+                )
+            ),
+            from: peers[0]
+        )
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data(count: 256 * 1024)
+            ),
+            from: peers[1]
+        )
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data([0x01])
+            ),
+            from: peers[2]
+        )
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        for peerID in peers {
+            handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(peerID)
+        }
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 5)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func expiredEarlyCiphertextIsNotRetried() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+            ),
+            from: remotePeerID
+        )
+
+        recorder.currentDate =
+            recorder.currentDate.addingTimeInterval(
+                NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
+                    + 0.001
+            )
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextSurvivesResponderHandshakeWindow() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+            ),
+            from: remotePeerID
+        )
+
+        recorder.currentDate =
+            recorder.currentDate.addingTimeInterval(
+                NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
+                    - 0.001
+            )
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
     private func makeHandshakePacket(recipientID: Data?) -> BitchatPacket {
         BitchatPacket(
             type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
@@ -360,14 +1294,15 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
 
     private func makeEncryptedPacket(
         recipientID: Data?,
-        timestamp: UInt64 = 900_000
+        timestamp: UInt64 = 900_000,
+        payload: Data = Data([0xC0, 0xFF, 0xEE])
     ) -> BitchatPacket {
         BitchatPacket(
             type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
             senderID: Data(hexString: remotePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
             recipientID: recipientID,
             timestamp: timestamp,
-            payload: Data([0xC0, 0xFF, 0xEE]),
+            payload: payload,
             signature: nil,
             ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
         )

bitchatTests/Services/BLENoiseReconnectPolicyTests.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+import BitFoundation
+import Foundation
+import Testing
+@testable import bitchat
+
+@Suite("BLE Noise reconnect policy")
+struct BLENoiseReconnectPolicyTests {
+    @Test("Revalidation requires a cached session and no authenticated link")
+    func revalidationPreconditions() {
+        var policy = BLENoiseReconnectPolicy()
+        let link = BLEIngressLinkID.peripheral("peripheral-a")
+        let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
+
+        let withoutSession = policy.shouldRevalidate(
+            on: link,
+            hasEstablishedSession: false,
+            isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
+            hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
+            now: now
+        )
+        #expect(!withoutSession)
+        let authenticated = policy.shouldRevalidate(
+            on: link,
+            hasEstablishedSession: true,
+            isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: true,
+            hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: true,
+            now: now
+        )
+        #expect(!authenticated)
+        let eligible = policy.shouldRevalidate(
+            on: link,
+            hasEstablishedSession: true,
+            isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
+            hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
+            now: now
+        )
+        #expect(eligible)
+    }
+
+    @Test("Revalidation is once per link epoch or after sixty seconds")
+    func revalidationIsBoundPerLinkEpoch() {
+        var policy = BLENoiseReconnectPolicy()
+        let link = BLEIngressLinkID.central("central-a")
+        let start = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 2_000)
+
+        let initial = policy.shouldRevalidate(
+            on: link,
+            hasEstablishedSession: true,
+            isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
+            hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
+            now: start
+        )
+        #expect(initial)
+        let duringCooldown = policy.shouldRevalidate(
+            on: link,
+            hasEstablishedSession: true,
+            isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
+            hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
+            now: start.addingTimeInterval(59.999)
+        )
+        #expect(!duringCooldown)
+        let afterCooldown = policy.shouldRevalidate(
+            on: link,
+            hasEstablishedSession: true,
+            isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
+            hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
+            now: start.addingTimeInterval(60)
+        )
+        #expect(afterCooldown)
+
+        policy.endLinkEpoch(link)
+        let nextEpoch = policy.shouldRevalidate(
+            on: link,
+            hasEstablishedSession: true,
+            isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
+            hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
+            now: start.addingTimeInterval(60.001)
+        )
+        #expect(nextEpoch)
+    }
+
+    @Test("An authenticated sibling suppresses redundant reconnect")
+    func authenticatedSiblingSuppressesReconnect() {
+        var policy = BLENoiseReconnectPolicy()
+        let link = BLEIngressLinkID.peripheral("unproven-sibling")
+        let start = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 3_000)
+
+        let suppressed = policy.shouldRevalidate(
+            on: link,
+            hasEstablishedSession: true,
+            isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
+            hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: true,
+            now: start
+        )
+        #expect(!suppressed)
+        let eligible = policy.shouldRevalidate(
+            on: link,
+            hasEstablishedSession: true,
+            isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
+            hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
+            now: start
+        )
+        #expect(eligible)
+    }
+
+    @Test("Reserved replacement bit is not advertised")
+    func reservedReplacementBitIsNotAdvertised() {
+        #expect(
+            !PeerCapabilities.localSupported.contains(
+                .nonDestructiveNoiseReplacement
+            )
+        )
+        #expect(PeerCapabilities.localSupported.contains(.privateMedia))
+        #expect(
+            PeerCapabilities.localSupported.contains(.privateMediaReceipts)
+        )
+    }
+}

bitchatTests/Services/BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStoreTests.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+import Foundation
+import Testing
+@testable import bitchat
+
+struct BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStoreTests {
+    private struct TestError: Error {}
+
+    private let messageID = "media-00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
+
+    @Test
+    func acceptedReceiptPersistsAcrossStoreInstances() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("persist")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+
+        let first = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(first.commitAccepted(messageID: messageID, storedURL: payload))
+        #expect(first.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+
+        let relaunched = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(relaunched.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func directoryEnumerationFailureIsUnavailableAndRetriesWithoutCachingEmpty() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("list-failure")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+        #expect(BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root).commitAccepted(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            storedURL: payload
+        ))
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+
+        var shouldFail = true
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(
+            baseDirectory: root,
+            directoryReader: { directory in
+                if shouldFail {
+                    shouldFail = false
+                    throw TestError()
+                }
+                return try FileManager.default.contentsOfDirectory(
+                    at: directory,
+                    includingPropertiesForKeys: nil
+                )
+            }
+        )
+
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .unavailable)
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func recordReadFailureIsUnavailableAndPreservesReceiptForRetry() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("read-failure")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+        #expect(BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root).commitAccepted(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            storedURL: payload
+        ))
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+
+        var shouldFail = true
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(
+            baseDirectory: root,
+            dataReader: { url in
+                if shouldFail {
+                    shouldFail = false
+                    throw TestError()
+                }
+                return try Data(contentsOf: url)
+            }
+        )
+
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .unavailable)
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func decodeFailureIsUnavailableAndDoesNotDeleteOrCachePastRepair() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("decode-failure")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+        #expect(BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root).commitAccepted(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            storedURL: payload
+        ))
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+        let durableBytes = try Data(contentsOf: record)
+        let corruptBytes = Data("{not-json".utf8)
+        try corruptBytes.write(to: record, options: .atomic)
+
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .unavailable)
+        #expect(!store.commitAccepted(messageID: messageID, storedURL: payload))
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+        #expect(try Data(contentsOf: record) == corruptBytes)
+
+        try durableBytes.write(to: record, options: .atomic)
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func unreadableTombstoneNeverBecomesAbsentOrGetsDeleted() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("tombstone-decode")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+        let seed = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(seed.commitAccepted(messageID: messageID, storedURL: payload))
+        #expect(seed.recordDeleted(messageID: messageID))
+        #expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: payload.path))
+
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+        let durableBytes = try Data(contentsOf: record)
+        try Data([0xFF, 0x00, 0x7B]).write(to: record, options: .atomic)
+
+        let relaunched = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(relaunched.state(for: messageID) == .unavailable)
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+
+        try durableBytes.write(to: record, options: .atomic)
+        #expect(relaunched.state(for: messageID) == .tombstoned)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func failedTombstonePersistenceDoesNotPoisonVolatileState() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("failed-tombstone-write")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .absent)
+
+        // Force the atomic record write itself to fail after the store has
+        // successfully loaded its empty index.
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
+            at: record,
+            withIntermediateDirectories: true
+        )
+        #expect(!store.recordDeleted(messageID: messageID))
+        try FileManager.default.removeItem(at: record)
+
+        // The UI must be able to report the deletion failure without a
+        // process-lifetime tombstone silently hiding a later retry.
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .absent)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func unreleasedAggregateLedgerIsIgnoredAndLeftUntouched() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("no-legacy-migration")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let files = root.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
+        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
+            at: files,
+            withIntermediateDirectories: true
+        )
+        let legacy = files.appendingPathComponent(
+            ".private-media-receipts.json",
+            isDirectory: false
+        )
+        let bytes = Data(
+            #"{"entries":{"media-00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":{"relativePath":"images/incoming/old.jpg","acceptedAt":0}}}"#
+                .utf8
+        )
+        try bytes.write(to: legacy, options: .atomic)
+
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .absent)
+        #expect(try Data(contentsOf: legacy) == bytes)
+    }
+
+    private func makeRoot(_ label: String) -> URL {
+        FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory.appendingPathComponent(
+            "private-media-receipt-\(label)-\(UUID().uuidString)",
+            isDirectory: true
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func makePayload(in root: URL) throws -> URL {
+        let directory = root.appendingPathComponent(
+            "files/images/incoming",
+            isDirectory: true
+        )
+        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
+            at: directory,
+            withIntermediateDirectories: true
+        )
+        let payload = directory.appendingPathComponent("image.jpg")
+        try Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9]).write(to: payload)
+        return payload
+    }
+
+    private func receiptRecord(in root: URL) -> URL {
+        root
+            .appendingPathComponent(
+                "files/.private-media-receipts",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+            .appendingPathComponent(messageID)
+            .appendingPathExtension("json")
+    }
+}

docs/PRIVATE-MEDIA-MIGRATION.md

@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ peer's Noise session before BLE fragmentation.
   `0x21`. A valid bit-8 proof selects Noise `0x20`; a valid no-bit proof or a
   no-proof timeout reaches the explicit legacy-consent path for an unpinned
   peer. No timeout automatically sends raw bytes.
+- `PeerCapabilities.privateMediaReceipts` is bit 9. Its exact-session
+  authenticated proof enables bounded sender-side automatic retry; a public
+  announce never does. It does not replace bit 8: encrypted `0x20` media from
+  bit-8-only prior iOS clients keeps the same deterministic stable ID and
+  delivery ACK. Receivers durably commit that ID before UI delivery or ACK, so
+  a lost proof followed by a later bit-9 retry cannot create a second,
+  random-ID bubble.
 - An unpinned peer with a stable Noise key but without that capability is
   eligible for one signed, directed
   `fileTransfer`, matching the pre-migration wire form used by older iOS and
@@ -100,16 +107,8 @@ temporary `0x09` alias. Ordinary Noise messages retain their 64 KiB limit.
 
 Current Android builds cap each reassembly at 256 fragments. Depending on the
 negotiated BLE packet size and routing overhead, that is roughly 110-120 KiB,
-well below iOS's absolute inbound ceiling. That cap only applies to those
-receivers, which take private media exclusively over the directed raw-file
-migration fallback (they do not implement the encrypted `0x20` path).
-Private-media v1 therefore runs the actual route-aware BLE fragment planner
-before a consented legacy send and rejects any plan above 256 fragments with a
-visible failure. Encrypted sends go only to peers that advertised the
-`privateMedia` capability — modern clients that reassemble up to the full
-receiver ceiling (10,000 fragments) — so they are not held to Android's cap and
-iOS→iOS photos in the ~120-512 KiB range keep working. This fragment-count
-contract, rather than a guessed byte threshold, stays correct as route overhead
-changes. A future Android client that adopts `0x20` but still caps its
-reassembler would need to negotiate an explicit per-peer fragment limit
-(tracked as a #1434 follow-up).
+well below iOS's absolute inbound ceiling. Private-media v1 therefore runs the
+actual route-aware BLE fragment planner before both encrypted and consented
+legacy sends and rejects any plan above 256 fragments with a visible failure.
+This fragment-count contract, rather than a guessed byte threshold, stays
+correct as route overhead changes.

localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/PeerCapabilities.swift

@@ -28,6 +28,18 @@ public struct PeerCapabilities: OptionSet, Equatable, Hashable, Sendable {
     /// before outer BLE fragmentation. Peers that omit this bit require the
     /// signed directed raw-file migration fallback.
     public static let privateMedia = PeerCapabilities(rawValue: 1 << 8)
+    /// Stable private-media IDs are durably deduplicated by the receiver and
+    /// correlated delivery/read receipts permit bounded automatic resend.
+    ///
+    /// Bit 8 remains the encrypted-media compatibility contract. Bit 9 only
+    /// enables sender-side automatic retry after exact-session proof.
+    public static let privateMediaReceipts =
+        PeerCapabilities(rawValue: 1 << 9)
+    /// Reserved for test builds that briefly advertised non-destructive Noise
+    /// replacement. Current clients intentionally do not advertise or act on
+    /// this bit; keep it decodable so the wire assignment is never reused.
+    public static let nonDestructiveNoiseReplacement =
+        PeerCapabilities(rawValue: 1 << 10)
 
     /// Minimal little-endian byte encoding; always at least one byte so an
     /// empty set is distinguishable from an absent TLV.

localPackages/BitFoundation/Tests/BitFoundationTests/PeerCapabilitiesTests.swift

@@ -18,10 +18,30 @@ struct PeerCapabilitiesTests {
         #expect(PeerCapabilities.meshDiagnostics.encoded() == Data([0x40]))
         #expect(PeerCapabilities.privateMedia.encoded() == Data([0x00, 0x01]))
 
-        let high = PeerCapabilities(rawValue: 1 << 9)
-        #expect(high.encoded() == Data([0x00, 0x02]))
+        #expect(
+            PeerCapabilities.privateMediaReceipts.encoded()
+                == Data([0x00, 0x02])
+        )
+        #expect(
+            PeerCapabilities.nonDestructiveNoiseReplacement.encoded()
+                == Data([0x00, 0x04])
+        )
 
-        let all: PeerCapabilities = [.prekeys, .wifiBulk, .gateway, .groups, .board, .vouch, .meshDiagnostics, .privateMedia]
+        let high = PeerCapabilities(rawValue: 1 << 11)
+        #expect(high.encoded() == Data([0x00, 0x08]))
+
+        let all: PeerCapabilities = [
+            .prekeys,
+            .wifiBulk,
+            .gateway,
+            .groups,
+            .board,
+            .vouch,
+            .meshDiagnostics,
+            .privateMedia,
+            .privateMediaReceipts,
+            .nonDestructiveNoiseReplacement
+        ]
         #expect(PeerCapabilities(encoded: all.encoded()) == all)
         #expect(PeerCapabilities(encoded: high.encoded()) == high)
         #expect(PeerCapabilities(encoded: PeerCapabilities([]).encoded()) == [])

relays/online_relays_gps.csv

@@ -1,442 +1,416 @@
 Relay URL,Latitude,Longitude
-bitchat.nostr1.com,40.7057,-74.0136
-relay.fundstr.me,42.3601,-71.0589
-nostr.2b9t.xyz,34.0549,-118.243
-armada.sharegap.net,43.6532,-79.3832
-nostr.chaima.info,51.5072,-0.127586
-nosflare-leefcore.leefcore.workers.dev,43.6532,-79.3832
-ribo.eu.nostria.app:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.lightning.pub,39.0438,-77.4874
-relay.nostu.be,40.4167,-3.70329
-nostr.whitenode45.ddns.net,40.55,-74.4758
-nostr.carroarmato0.be:443,50.914,3.21378
-cdn.satellite.earth,40.8302,-74.1299
-relay2.veganostr.com,60.1699,24.9384
-relay.layer.systems:443,49.0291,8.35695
-relay0.gfcom.info,13.7653,100.647
-relay.mmwaves.de:443,48.8575,2.35138
-offchain.pub,39.1585,-94.5728
-bcast.girino.org,43.6532,-79.3832
-staging.yabu.me,35.6092,139.73
-nostr.overpay.com,29.7449,-95.5343
-bridge.tagomago.me,42.3601,-71.0589
-nostr-01.yakihonne.com,1.32123,103.695
-strfry.bonsai.com,39.0438,-77.4874
-relay.sharegap.net,43.6532,-79.3832
-nostr.islandarea.net,35.4669,-97.6473
-dm-test-strfry-generic.samt.st,43.6532,-79.3832
-treuzkas.branruz.com,48.8575,2.35138
-relay-rpi.edufeed.org:443,49.4521,11.0767
-vault.iris.to:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-node.kommonzenze.de,49.4521,11.0767
-nostr.thalheim.io:443,60.1699,24.9384
-soloco.nl,43.6532,-79.3832
-strfry.shock.network,39.0438,-77.4874
-nostr-relay.zimage.com,34.0549,-118.243
-public.crostr.com:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-nostr.sathoarder.com:443,48.5734,7.75211
-relay.angor.io,48.1046,11.6002
-relay.wellorder.net,45.5201,-122.99
-relay.mwaters.net,50.9871,2.12554
-relay.staging.commonshub.brussels,49.4543,11.0746
-nostr-verified.wellorder.net,45.5201,-122.99
-nostr-pub.wellorder.net,45.5201,-122.99
+relay.lab.rytswd.com,49.4543,11.0746
+relay.paulstephenborile.com:443,49.4543,11.0746
+relay.binaryrobot.com,43.6532,-79.3832
 nostr-2.21crypto.ch,47.5356,8.73209
-relay.kaleidoswap.com,50.8476,4.35717
-relay.libernet.app:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.homeinhk.xyz,35.694,139.754
-relay.manneken.brussels,49.4543,11.0746
-nostr.spicyz.io:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.lanacoin-eternity.com:443,40.8302,-74.1299
-ribo.us.nostria.app:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.loveisbitcoin.com,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.angor.io:443,48.1046,11.6002
-relay02.lnfi.network,35.6764,139.65
-relay.cosmicbolt.net:443,37.3986,-121.964
+spookstr2.nostr1.com:443,40.7057,-74.0136
+fanfares.nostr1.com:443,40.7057,-74.0136
+x.kojira.io,43.6532,-79.3832
+freelay.sovbit.host,60.1699,24.9384
 nostr-rs-relay-qj1h.onrender.com,37.7775,-122.397
-nrs-01.darkcloudarcade.com,39.0997,-94.5786
-relay.endfiat.money:443,59.3327,18.0656
-relay.paulstephenborile.com,49.4543,11.0746
-rele.speyhard.fi,51.5072,-0.127586
-relay.froth.zone,60.1699,24.9384
-relay.nostr.blockhenge.com,39.0438,-77.4874
-nrl.ceskar.xyz,50.5145,16.0119
-rilo.nostria.app,43.6532,-79.3832
-nostr.overmind.lol:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-nostr.snowbla.de:443,50.4754,12.3683
-nostrrelay.taylorperron.com,45.5029,-73.5723
-chorus.pjv.me,45.5201,-122.99
-relay.nostr.place,43.6532,-79.3832
-bucket.coracle.social,37.7775,-122.397
-nostr.girino.org:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.aarpia.com,37.3986,-121.964
-nostr.thalheim.io,60.1699,24.9384
-ec2.f7z.io,60.1699,24.9384
-relay.trotters.cc,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.mccormick.cx:443,52.3563,4.95714
-relay.momostr.pink,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.nostr.net,43.6532,-79.3832
-conduitl2.fly.dev,37.7648,-122.432
-chat-relay.zap-work.com,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.ditto.pub,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.veganostr.com,60.1699,24.9384
-relay.minibolt.info:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-adre.su,59.9311,30.3609
-bitcoinostr.duckdns.org,41.1976,1.11167
-nostr.computingcache.com:443,34.0356,-118.442
-relay-fra.zombi.cloudrodion.com,48.8566,2.35222
-nostr.hekster.org:443,37.3986,-121.964
-nostr.88mph.life,52.1941,-2.21905
-wot.dergigi.com,64.1476,-21.9392
-nostr.planix.org,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay.satsmarkt.club,52.6907,4.8181
-nostrcity-club.fly.dev:443,37.7648,-122.432
-aeon.libretechsystems.xyz,55.486,9.86577
 testnet.samt.st,43.6532,-79.3832
-nostr.data.haus,50.4754,12.3683
-wot.sudocarlos.com,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay-fra.zombi.cloudrodion.com:443,48.8566,2.35222
-shu01.shugur.net,21.4902,39.2246
-relay.gulugulu.moe:443,43.6532,-79.3832
-relay2.angor.io:443,48.1046,11.6002
-relay.libernet.app,43.6532,-79.3832
-directories-safe-motherboard-recipients.trycloudflare.com,43.6532,-79.3832
-wot.nostr.party,36.1659,-86.7844
+relay.angor.io,48.1046,11.6002
+relay-arg.zombi.cloudrodion.com,1.35208,103.82
+nostr-01.yakihonne.com,1.32123,103.695
+nostr-relay.cbrx.io,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.guggero.org,46.5971,9.59652
+nostr.snowbla.de,60.1699,24.9384
 relay.zone667.com,60.1699,24.9384
-nostr.wild-vibes.ts.net,48.8566,2.35222
-relay.nostr.com,50.1109,8.68213
-nostr.iskarion.ddns.net,43.3076,-2.95421
-relay-dev.satlantis.io,39.0438,-77.4874
-relay.sovereignresonance.org,48.9006,2.25929
-relay.nostrian-conquest.com,41.223,-111.974
-relay.aidatanorge.no,43.6532,-79.3832
-strfry.apps3.slidestr.net,40.4167,-3.70329
-relay.klabo.world,47.2343,-119.853
-nostr.data.haus:443,50.4754,12.3683
-testr.nymble.world,40.8054,-74.0241
-relay.inforsupports.com,43.6532,-79.3832
+nexus.libernet.app:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.islandbitcoin.com,12.8498,77.6545
+relay-testnet.k8s.layer3.news,37.3387,-121.885
+nostr-relay.xbytez.io,50.6924,3.20113
+kasztanowa.bieda.it,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostrcity-club.fly.dev,37.7648,-122.432
+relay.typedcypher.com,51.5072,-0.127586
+nostr.na.social:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.laantungir.net,-19.4692,-42.5315
+relay-dev.satlantis.io:443,40.8302,-74.1299
+rilo.nostria.app,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.hekster.org:443,37.3986,-121.964
+nostr-relay.amethyst.name:443,39.0067,-77.4291
+chat-relay.zap-work.com:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.edufeed.org,49.4521,11.0767
+syb.lol:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.sigit.io,50.4754,12.3683
+nostr-relay.xbytez.io:443,50.6924,3.20113
+relay.wavefunc.live,41.8781,-87.6298
+nostr.sathoarder.com,48.5734,7.75211
+myvoiceourstory.org,37.3598,-121.981
+relay.underorion.se,50.1109,8.68213
+nostr.data.haus,50.4754,12.3683
+relay.erybody.com,41.4513,-81.7021
+espelho.girino.org,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.pbfs.io:443,50.4754,12.3683
+wot.dergigi.com,64.1476,-21.9392
+nostr.bitcoiner.social:443,47.6743,-117.112
+dm-test-nostr-rs-42-disabled.samt.st,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.gulugulu.moe,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.spicyz.io,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.cypherflow.ai,48.8575,2.35138
+treuzkas.branruz.com,48.8575,2.35138
+relay1.nostrchat.io,60.1699,24.9384
+kotukonostr.onrender.com,37.7775,-122.397
+nostr.plantroon.com,50.1013,8.62643
+nostr.davenov.com,50.1109,8.68213
+node.kommonzenze.de,49.4521,11.0767
+relay2.veganostr.com,60.1699,24.9384
+armada.sharegap.net,43.6532,-79.3832
+wot.makenomistakes.ca,43.7064,-79.3986
+nostr.2b9t.xyz:443,34.0549,-118.243
+relay.libernet.app:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.dreamith.to:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.lightning.pub:443,39.0438,-77.4874
+nostr.rtvslawenia.com,49.4543,11.0746
+nostr.21crypto.ch,47.5356,8.73209
+relay.ditto.pub:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.plebchain.club,43.6532,-79.3832
+memlay.v0l.io,53.3498,-6.26031
+nostr.chaima.info:443,50.1109,8.68213
+relay.wavlake.com:443,41.2619,-95.8608
+nostr.thalheim.io:443,60.1699,24.9384
+relay.lightning.pub,39.0438,-77.4874
+dev.relay.edufeed.org:443,49.4521,11.0767
+nostr.myshosholoza.co.za:443,52.3913,4.66545
+relay.binaryrobot.com:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+wot.nostr.place,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.sathoarder.com:443,48.5734,7.75211
+thecitadel.nostr1.com,40.7057,-74.0136
+relay.artx.market,43.6548,-79.3885
+nos.lol,50.4754,12.3683
+nostr.plantroon.com:443,50.1013,8.62643
+premium.primal.net,43.6532,-79.3832
+nas01xanthosnet.synology.me:7778,47.1285,8.74735
+nostrja-kari.heguro.com,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.mrmave.work,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostrelay.circum.space,52.6907,4.8181
+mostro-p2p.tech,50.1109,8.68213
+wot.shaving.kiwi,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.fundstr.me,42.3601,-71.0589
+nostrelay.circum.space:443,52.6907,4.8181
+relay.nostrdice.com,-33.8688,151.209
+relay.getvia.xyz,60.1699,24.9384
+strfry.shock.network:443,39.0438,-77.4874
 relay.nostrmap.net:443,60.1699,24.9384
-nostr.stakey.net:443,52.3676,4.90414
+relay.nearhood.co.uk,51.5072,-0.127586
+no.str.cr,10.6352,-85.4378
+relay.getsafebox.app:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay0.gfcom.info,13.6992,100.694
+nostr.ps1829.com,33.8851,130.883
+relay2.angor.io,48.1046,11.6002
+relay.stickeroo.is-cool.dev,37.3387,-121.885
+ricardo-oem.tailb5546.ts.net,40.7128,-74.006
+relay.typedcypher.com:443,51.5072,-0.127586
+relay.paulstephenborile.com,49.4543,11.0746
+nittom.nostr1.com,40.7057,-74.0136
+conduitl2.fly.dev,37.7648,-122.432
+nostr.rikmeijer.nl,51.7111,5.36809
+relay.thecryptosquid.com,50.4754,12.3683
+spookstr2.nostr1.com,40.7057,-74.0136
+offchain.bostr.online,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.planix.org,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.mccormick.cx,52.3563,4.95714
+0x-nostr-relay.fly.dev,37.7648,-122.432
+nostr.wecsats.io,43.6532,-79.3832
+schnorr.me,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.satmaxt.xyz,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.bornheimer.app,51.5072,-0.127586
+relay.nostrhub.fr,48.1045,11.6004
+blossom.gnostr.cloud:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr-02.yakihonne.com:443,1.32123,103.695
+dev.relay.stream,43.6532,-79.3832
+ithurtswhenip.ee,51.5072,-0.127586
+nostr.myshosholoza.co.za,52.3913,4.66545
+relayrs.notoshi.win:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay-rpi.edufeed.org:443,49.4521,11.0767
+relay.olas.app:443,60.1699,24.9384
+nostr.unkn0wn.world,46.8499,9.53287
+relay.mitchelltribe.com,39.0438,-77.4874
+yabu.me,35.6092,139.73
+nostr.nodesmap.com,59.3327,18.0656
+dm-test-strfry-generic.samt.st,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr2.girino.org:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+wot.brightbolt.net,47.6735,-116.781
+strfry.shock.network,39.0438,-77.4874
+relay.kilombino.com,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.nostr.blockhenge.com,39.0438,-77.4874
+shu04.shugur.net,25.2048,55.2708
+relay-rpi.edufeed.org,49.4521,11.0767
+relay.bullishbounty.com:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+vault.iris.to:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.mostro.network:443,40.8302,-74.1299
+offchain.pub:443,39.1585,-94.5728
+soloco.nl,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.nostu.be,40.4167,-3.70329
+nostr.pbfs.io,50.4754,12.3683
+relay.directsponsor.net,42.8864,-78.8784
+relay.decentralia.fr,49.4282,10.9796
+relayrs.notoshi.win,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr-relay.amethyst.name,39.0067,-77.4291
+relay.arx-ccn.com,50.4754,12.3683
+nostr.spaceshell.xyz,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay-fra.zombi.cloudrodion.com,48.8566,2.35222
+rilo.nostria.app:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.trotters.cc:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.overmind.lol:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.girino.org:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+bitsat.molonlabe.holdings,51.4012,-1.3147
+nostr.azzamo.net,52.2633,21.0283
+insta-relay.apps3.slidestr.net,40.4167,-3.70329
+bridge.tagomago.me,42.3601,-71.0589
+nostr.thalheim.io,60.1699,24.9384
+relay.artx.market:443,43.6548,-79.3885
+nostr.openhoofd.nl,51.5717,3.70417
+nostr.bond,50.1109,8.68213
+relay.earthly.city,34.1749,-118.54
+nexus.libernet.app,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.plebeian.market,50.1109,8.68213
+relay.nostr.net,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.overmind.lol,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.ohstr.com,43.6532,-79.3832
+testnet-relay.samt.st:443,40.8302,-74.1299
+relay01.lnfi.network,35.6764,139.65
+relay.mostr.pub:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+wot.nostr.party,36.1659,-86.7844
+relayone.soundhsa.com,39.1008,-94.5811
+relay.mostro.network,40.8302,-74.1299
+ribo.eu.nostria.app,43.6532,-79.3832
+chat-relay.zap-work.com,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.nostreon.com,60.1699,24.9384
+nostr-rs-relay.dev.fedibtc.com:443,39.0438,-77.4874
+nostr.quali.chat:443,60.1699,24.9384
+relay.internationalright-wing.org:443,-22.5022,-48.7114
+relay.mitchelltribe.com:443,39.0438,-77.4874
+relay.satlantis.io,40.8054,-74.0241
+nittom.nostr1.com:443,40.7057,-74.0136
+nostr.janx.com,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.carroarmato0.be:443,50.914,3.21378
+relay.mmwaves.de:443,48.8575,2.35138
+relay.chorus.community:443,48.5333,10.7
+wot.utxo.one,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.plebeian.market:443,50.1109,8.68213
+relay.cosmicbolt.net,37.3986,-121.964
+x.kojira.io:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+top.testrelay.top,43.6532,-79.3832
+nos.lol:443,50.4754,12.3683
+dev.relay.edufeed.org,49.4521,11.0767
+relayone.geektank.ai:443,39.1008,-94.5811
+relay.nostar.org,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr.oxtr.dev:443,50.4754,12.3683
+nostr.88mph.life,52.1941,-2.21905
+relay.staging.commonshub.brussels,49.4543,11.0746
+weboftrust.libretechsystems.xyz,55.4724,9.87335
+relay.openfarmtools.org,60.1699,24.9384
+cs-relay.nostrdev.com,50.4754,12.3683
+relay.inforsupports.com,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr-verified.wellorder.net,45.5201,-122.99
+nostr.hekster.org,37.3986,-121.964
+relay.gulugulu.moe:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.mwaters.net,50.9871,2.12554
+nostrcity-club.fly.dev:443,37.7648,-122.432
+relay.vrtmrz.net:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.nostr.place,43.6532,-79.3832
+relay.wavefunc.live:443,41.8781,-87.6298
+nostr.islandarea.net,35.4669,-97.6473
+purplerelay.com:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+nostr-relay.psfoundation.info:443,39.0438,-77.4874
+r.0kb.io,32.789,-96.7989
+relay-us.zombi.cloudrodion.com,40.7862,-74.0743
+relay.mulatta.io,37.5665,126.978
+strfry.bonsai.com:443,39.0438,-77.4874
+bendernostur.duckdns.org:8443,50.1109,8.68213
+vault.iris.to,43.6532,-79.3832
+ec2.f7z.io,60.1699,24.9384
+nostr.debate.report,50.1109,8.68213
+wot.codingarena.top,50.4754,12.3683
+relay.layer.systems:443,49.0291,8.35695
+relay.degmods.com,50.4754,12.3683
+nostr.mom,50.4754,12.3683
+ribo.us.nostria.app:443,43.6532,-79.3832
+adre.su,59.9311,30.3609
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