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Add mesh diagnostics: /ping, /trace, and topology map (#1377)
* Add mesh diagnostics: /ping, /trace, and topology map - New protocol types ping=0x26 / pong=0x27 (9-byte payload: 8-byte nonce + origin TTL) with per-peer inbound rate limiting (5 per 10s) - /ping @name reports RTT and hop count, 10s timeout - /trace @name prints the estimated path from gossiped directNeighbors - Topology map sheet (circular Canvas layout) reachable from App Info - Ping/pong ride the deterministic directed-relay path like DMs - Tests: payload round-trip, hop-count math, command output, edge normalization, layout Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix CI media-wipe race, per-link ping rate limiting, and /ping output routing Three fixes for PR #1377 review: 1. CI flake (sendImage_privateChatProcessesAndTransfersImage): the panicClearAllData / clearCurrentPublicTimeline detached utility-priority tasks delete the real ~/Library/Application Support/files tree, which the test process shares. The wipe fires at a nondeterministic time and raced the sendImage test's JPEG in files/images/outgoing (write then re-read), so prepareImagePacket threw and the test timed out. Both wipes are now skipped under tests (existing TestEnvironment.isRunningTests pattern); this also stops test runs from deleting the developer's real media. 2. Codex P1: ping packets are unsigned, so keying the pong rate limiter on packet.senderID let one connected peer rotate forged sender IDs to bypass the 5-per-10s budget. The limiter now keys on the ingress link (the directly connected peer that delivered the packet); the pong still goes to the claimed sender. Regression test proves rotating senders over one link exhaust one budget (fails 10 vs 5 pongs on the old code). 3. Codex P2: /ping output arrived up to 10s later and was routed from selectedPrivateChatPeer at callback time, misrouting the result after a chat switch. The origin conversation is now captured when the command is issued (CommandOutputDestination) and deferred output is routed there: a DM result lands in the origin chat's history even if deselected, and a mesh-timeline result pins to #mesh instead of the active channel. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * App Info: move NETWORK section under HOW TO USE and uppercase NETWORK/SYMBOLS headers Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Conform DiagnosticsMockContext to sendPublicMessage CommandContextProvider gained sendPublicMessage (Cashu /pay, #1376) after this branch forked, so the diagnostics test mock no longer conformed once main was merged in. Add the no-op stub. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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jack
Claude Fable 5
parent
d4f0c49787
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@@ -216,6 +216,69 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
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cachedServiceUUIDs: [BLEService.serviceUUID, otherService]
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))
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}
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/// Pings are unsigned, so their claimed sender is attacker-controlled.
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/// The pong budget must be keyed on the ingress link (the directly
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/// connected peer that delivered the packet): rotating forged sender IDs
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/// over one link exhausts one budget instead of resetting it, so a single
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/// malicious link cannot turn /ping into an amplification primitive.
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@Test
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func meshPingResponseBudget_isPerIngressLinkNotClaimedSender() async throws {
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let ble = makeService()
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let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
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ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
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let link = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let budget = TransportConfig.meshPingInboundMaxPerLink
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let myRecipientData = try #require(Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id))
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for i in 0..<(budget * 2) {
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// A fresh forged sender for every ping, all arriving on one link.
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let forgedSender = PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", 0xA0_0000 + i))
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var nonce = Data(repeating: 0, count: MeshPingPayload.nonceLength)
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nonce[0] = UInt8(i)
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let payload = try #require(MeshPingPayload(nonce: nonce, originTTL: 7))
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let packet = BitchatPacket(
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type: MessageType.ping.rawValue,
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senderID: Data(hexString: forgedSender.id) ?? Data(),
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recipientID: myRecipientData,
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timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
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payload: payload.encode(),
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signature: nil,
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ttl: 7
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)
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ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: link, preseedPeer: false)
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}
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let reachedBudget = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{ outbound.count(ofType: .pong) >= budget },
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timeout: TestConstants.defaultTimeout
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)
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#expect(reachedBudget)
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// Give any over-budget pong a chance to surface, then confirm the
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// rotated sender IDs never bought a sixth response.
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let exceededBudget = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
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{ outbound.count(ofType: .pong) > budget },
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timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout
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)
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#expect(!exceededBudget)
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#expect(outbound.count(ofType: .pong) == budget)
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}
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}
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/// Thread-safe capture of packets leaving the service under test.
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private final class OutboundPacketTap {
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private let lock = NSLock()
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private var packets: [BitchatPacket] = []
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func record(_ packet: BitchatPacket) {
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lock.lock(); packets.append(packet); lock.unlock()
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}
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func count(ofType type: MessageType) -> Int {
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lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
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return packets.filter { $0.type == type.rawValue }.count
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}
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}
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private func makeService() -> BLEService {
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