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Improve mesh relaying, presence, and DM robustness; signed public msgs; reachability UI; quicker announces; store-and-forward (#527)
* Sign public broadcasts; verify relayed messages via persisted signing keys; keep scheduled relays in sparse graphs and speed their jitter; persist announce signing key for offline auth; add short backoff after disconnect errors to reduce reconnect thrash * Add connected vs reachable model: retain peers after link drop, expire after reachability window; expose all peers in snapshots; compute isReachable in UI; add meshReachable state and sorting; avoid removing peers on link events; notify UI on stale removals * ContentView: handle new .meshReachable connection state in header icon switch (exhaustive switch fix) * Logs: tag relayed announces as 'Reachable via mesh' and annotate public message logs with (direct|mesh) path for easier field analysis * Fix syntax error: remove stray else/log inserted into writeOrEnqueue; keep logs clean * UI: use 'point.3.connected.trianglepath.dotted' for mesh-reachable; change people count to include connected+reachable (exclude Nostr-only) * UI: switch to 'point.3.filled.connected.trianglepath.dotted' for mesh-reachable icons in list and header * Reachability: reduce retention to 21s for all peers (verified and unverified) to minimize stale presence * mesh DMs/acks: route to reachable peers; queue READ/DELIVERED until handshake; add Transport.isPeerReachable; UI: hide offline non-mutuals; DM header: better name fallback + show transport + encryption icons; fix NostrTransport conformance * Verification sheet: compute encryption status and fingerprint using short mesh ID mapping (fix 'not encrypted/handshake' for DMs with stable key) * Announce cadence: faster discovery (4s), sparse 15±4s, dense 30±8s; initial 0.6s; post-subscribe 50ms; min-force 150ms; maintenance 5s; proactive announces on handshake + recent-traffic nudge * Relay: increase broadcast TTL cap in sparse graphs to 6; tighten jitter for handshake (10–35ms) and directed (20–60ms) relays * Range/robustness: store-and-forward for directed packets (15s) with flush on new links + periodic; announces: no subset + afterglow re-announce on first-seen; adaptive scanning: force ON when <=2 neighbors or recent traffic * Fix warnings: remove unused msgID and unused mutable var in directed spool flush * Announces: TTL 7 (sparse only) via RelayController; no fanout subset for announces; neighbor-change rebroadcast of last 2–3 announces. Fragments: faster pacing (5ms global, 4ms directed). * Peer list: real-time icon updates by publishing snapshots on connectivity checks; add unread message indicator (envelope) next to peers with unread DMs * UI: unread envelope uses orange; hasUnreadMessages checks Nostr conv key for peers with known Nostr pubkeys (geohash DM consistency) * Logs/robustness: debounce disconnect notifications (1.5s), debounce 'reconnected' logs (2s), add weak-link cooldown after timeouts on very weak RSSI (<= -90) * Peer icons: faster, accurate reachability\n\n- Run connectivity checks every maintenance tick (5s)\n- Publish peer snapshots on central unsubscribe for instant UI refresh\n- Lower inactivity timeout to 8s and disconnect debounce to 0.9s\n- Gate reachability on mesh-attached (>=1 direct link); no links => no reachable peers\n- Keep 21s retention for verified/unverified, but only when attached to mesh\n\nImproves list responsiveness when walking out of range and prevents stale 'reachable' states when isolated. --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ enum HandshakeState {
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struct CryptographicIdentity: Codable {
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let fingerprint: String // SHA256 of public key
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let publicKey: Data // Noise static public key
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// Optional Ed25519 signing public key (used to authenticate public messages)
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var signingPublicKey: Data? = nil
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let firstSeen: Date
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let lastHandshake: Date?
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}
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@@ -229,6 +229,91 @@ class SecureIdentityStateManager {
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return cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint]
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}
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}
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// MARK: - Cryptographic Identities
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/// Insert or update a cryptographic identity and optionally persist its signing key and claimed nickname.
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/// - Parameters:
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/// - fingerprint: SHA-256 hex of the Noise static public key
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/// - noisePublicKey: Noise static public key data
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/// - signingPublicKey: Optional Ed25519 signing public key for authenticating public messages
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/// - claimedNickname: Optional latest claimed nickname to persist into social identity
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func upsertCryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: String, noisePublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data?, claimedNickname: String? = nil) {
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queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
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let now = Date()
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if var existing = self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] {
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// Update keys if changed
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if existing.publicKey != noisePublicKey {
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existing = CryptographicIdentity(
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fingerprint: fingerprint,
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publicKey: noisePublicKey,
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signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey,
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firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
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lastHandshake: now
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)
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self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing
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} else {
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// Update signing key and lastHandshake
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existing.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey
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let updated = CryptographicIdentity(
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fingerprint: existing.fingerprint,
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publicKey: existing.publicKey,
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signingPublicKey: existing.signingPublicKey,
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firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
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lastHandshake: now
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)
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self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = updated
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}
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// Persist updated state (already assigned in branches above)
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} else {
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// New entry
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let entry = CryptographicIdentity(
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fingerprint: fingerprint,
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publicKey: noisePublicKey,
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signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
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firstSeen: now,
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lastHandshake: now
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)
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self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = entry
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}
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// Optionally persist claimed nickname into social identity
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if let claimed = claimedNickname {
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var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] ?? SocialIdentity(
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fingerprint: fingerprint,
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localPetname: nil,
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claimedNickname: claimed,
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trustLevel: .unknown,
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isFavorite: false,
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isBlocked: false,
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notes: nil
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)
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// Update claimed nickname if changed
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if identity.claimedNickname != claimed {
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identity.claimedNickname = claimed
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self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
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} else if self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] == nil {
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self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
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}
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}
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self.saveIdentityCache()
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}
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}
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/// Retrieve cryptographic identity by fingerprint
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func getCryptographicIdentity(for fingerprint: String) -> CryptographicIdentity? {
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queue.sync { cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] }
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}
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/// Find cryptographic identities whose fingerprint prefix matches a peerID (16-hex) short ID
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func getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(_ peerID: String) -> [CryptographicIdentity] {
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queue.sync {
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// Defensive: ensure hex and correct length
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guard peerID.count == 16, peerID.allSatisfy({ $0.isHexDigit }) else { return [] }
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return cryptographicIdentities.values.filter { $0.fingerprint.hasPrefix(peerID) }
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}
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}
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func getAllSocialIdentities() -> [SocialIdentity] {
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queue.sync {
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