Pin announce signing keys to stop mesh identity spoofing

BLE announce trust verified the packet signature against the Ed25519
signing key carried inside the same announce, and the trust policy only
rejected on noise-key mismatch. Since peerIDs derive from the broadcast
(public) noise key, an on-mesh attacker could replay a victim's
peerID+noiseKey with their own signing key, nickname, and a valid
self-signature; BLEPeerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce then overwrote
the victim's entry unconditionally. That enabled mesh nickname spoofing
and, via the persisted identity, forged attribution of signed
public/broadcast messages.

Fix: TOFU-pin the signing key per peer (noise-key-derived peerID).

- BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy now rejects announces whose signing key
  differs from the one already recorded for the peer
  (.signingKeyMismatch) and logs a security event.
- BLEPeerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce refuses to replace a pinned
  signing key (returns nil), closing the race where the pre-barrier
  trust check reads the registry outside the collections barrier. It
  also never drops a pinned key when an announce omits one.
- BLEAnnounceHandler skips registry upsert, topology updates, and
  identity persistence for rejected announces.

No wire-format change: the packet signature already covers senderID,
timestamp, and the full announce payload (noise key, signing key,
nickname), so mixed-version meshes are unaffected. First contact for an
unknown peer behaves exactly as before (trust on first use); the pin is
scoped to the registry entry lifetime, so a legitimately re-keyed
identity recovers after normal peer eviction.

Tests: trust-policy signing-key mismatch/match cases, registry pinning
(attacker upsert refused, legitimate re-announce accepted, omitted key
keeps pin), handler-level pinned-key rejection, and an end-to-end test
with real Ed25519 keys showing a fully self-consistent attacker
announce cannot displace the victim's pinned identity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
jack
2026-07-01 23:31:09 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent f688e529f6
commit 385d32063f
7 changed files with 388 additions and 26 deletions
@@ -6,9 +6,10 @@ import Testing
struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
private final class Recorder {
var existingNoisePublicKey: Data?
var existingSigningPublicKey: Data?
var signatureValid = true
var linkState: (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool) = (false, false)
var upsertResult = BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(isNewPeer: false, wasDisconnected: false, previousNickname: nil)
var upsertResult: BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate? = BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(isNewPeer: false, wasDisconnected: false, previousNickname: nil)
var dedupSeenIDs: Set<String> = []
var shouldEmitReconnectLogResult = true
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
localPeerID: { localPeerID },
messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
now: { now },
existingNoisePublicKey: { _ in recorder.existingNoisePublicKey },
existingPeerKeys: { _ in (recorder.existingNoisePublicKey, recorder.existingSigningPublicKey) },
verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in
recorder.verifySignatureCalls.append((packet, signingPublicKey))
return recorder.signatureValid
@@ -368,6 +369,88 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
#expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.first?.neighbors == neighbors)
}
@Test
func matchingPinnedSigningKeyIsAccepted() throws {
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9A, count: 32)
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
peerID: peerID,
timestamp: timestamp(now),
signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
)
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = noiseKey
// Matches the signing key encoded by makeAnnouncePacket.
recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
}
@Test
func signingKeyMismatchWithPinnedKeySkipsUpsertAndIdentityPersistence() throws {
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9B, count: 32)
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
// Attacker announce: victim's noiseKey/peerID, attacker's signing key
// (0x99 from makeAnnouncePacket) with a "valid" self-signature.
let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
peerID: peerID,
timestamp: timestamp(now),
signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64)
)
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.existingNoisePublicKey = noiseKey
recorder.existingSigningPublicKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32) // victim's pinned key
recorder.signatureValid = true
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
}
@Test
func registryPinRejectionSkipsTopologyAndIdentityPersistence() throws {
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x9C, count: 32)
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)
let packet = try makeAnnouncePacket(
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
peerID: peerID,
timestamp: timestamp(now),
signature: Data(repeating: 0xEE, count: 64),
directNeighbors: [Data(repeating: 0xAB, count: 8)]
)
// Pre-barrier trust check sees no pinned key (e.g. concurrent race),
// but the registry itself refuses to replace its pinned signing key.
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.upsertResult = nil
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder, now: now)
handler.handle(packet, from: peerID)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.persistedIdentities.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.topologyUpdates.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
#expect(recorder.afterglowDelays.isEmpty)
}
@Test
func keyMismatchWithExistingPeerKeepsAnnounceUnverified() throws {
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
@@ -391,6 +474,106 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
#expect(recorder.uiEventDeliveries.first?.notifyPeerConnected == false)
}
@Test
func attackerReplayingVictimNoiseKeyWithOwnSigningKeyIsRejectedEndToEnd() throws {
// Real crypto: the attacker crafts a fully self-consistent announce
// (victim's noiseKey/peerID, attacker's signing key and nickname,
// valid packet signature made with the attacker's key). Without
// signing-key pinning this used to overwrite the victim's registry
// entry and persisted identity.
let victim = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let attacker = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let victimNoiseKey = victim.getStaticPublicKeyData()
let peerID = PeerID(publicKey: victimNoiseKey)
let now = Date()
final class RegistryBox {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
var persistedIdentities: [AnnouncementPacket] = []
}
let box = RegistryBox()
let environment = BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment(
localPeerID: { PeerID(str: "0102030405060708") },
messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
now: { now },
existingPeerKeys: { peerID in
let info = box.registry.info(for: peerID)
return (info?.noisePublicKey, info?.signingPublicKey)
},
verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in
victim.verifyPacketSignature(packet, publicKey: signingPublicKey)
},
linkState: { _ in (hasPeripheral: true, hasCentral: false) },
withRegistryBarrier: { body in body() },
upsertVerifiedAnnounce: { peerID, announcement, isConnected, now in
box.registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: announcement.nickname,
noisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey,
isConnected: isConnected,
now: now
)
},
shouldEmitReconnectLog: { _, _ in false },
updateTopology: { _, _ in },
persistIdentity: { announcement in
box.persistedIdentities.append(announcement)
},
dedupContains: { _ in true },
dedupMarkProcessed: { _ in },
deliverAnnounceUIEvents: { _, _, _ in },
trackPacketSeen: { _ in },
sendAnnounceBack: {},
scheduleAfterglow: { _ in }
)
let handler = BLEAnnounceHandler(environment: environment)
func makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: String, signer: NoiseEncryptionService) throws -> BitchatPacket {
let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
nickname: nickname,
noisePublicKey: victimNoiseKey,
signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
directNeighbors: nil
)
let payload = try #require(announcement.encode())
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: peerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(now.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
)
return try #require(signer.signPacket(packet))
}
// Legitimate announce from the victim is accepted and pinned.
let victimAnnounce = try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim", signer: victim)
handler.handle(victimAnnounce, from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim")
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
#expect(box.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
// Attacker announce with a valid self-signature must be rejected.
let attackerAnnounce = try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "attacker", signer: attacker)
handler.handle(attackerAnnounce, from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim")
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == victim.getSigningPublicKeyData())
#expect(box.persistedIdentities.count == 1)
// The victim's subsequent announces (same pinned key) still work.
let victimRename = try makeSignedAnnounce(nickname: "victim-renamed", signer: victim)
handler.handle(victimRename, from: peerID)
#expect(box.registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim-renamed")
#expect(box.persistedIdentities.count == 2)
}
private func expectNoSideEffects(_ recorder: Recorder) {
#expect(recorder.barrierCount == 0)
#expect(recorder.upsertCalls.isEmpty)
@@ -123,7 +123,9 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
hasSignature: false,
signatureValid: false,
existingNoisePublicKey: nil,
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32),
existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .reject(.missingSignature))
@@ -136,7 +138,9 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: false,
existingNoisePublicKey: nil,
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32),
existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .reject(.invalidSignature))
@@ -148,7 +152,9 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: true,
existingNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xAA, count: 32),
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xBB, count: 32)
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xBB, count: 32),
existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .reject(.keyMismatch))
@@ -162,13 +168,51 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: true,
existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey
announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
existingSigningPublicKey: nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .verified)
#expect(decision.isVerified)
}
@Test
func trustPolicyRejectsPinnedSigningKeyMismatchEvenWithValidSignature() {
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xCC, count: 32)
// Attacker replays the victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own signing
// key and a valid self-signature; the pinned key must win.
let decision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: true,
existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
existingSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32),
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x66, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .reject(.signingKeyMismatch))
#expect(!decision.isVerified)
}
@Test
func trustPolicyAcceptsMatchingPinnedSigningKey() {
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xCC, count: 32)
let signingKey = Data(repeating: 0x99, count: 32)
let decision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: true,
existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
existingSigningPublicKey: signingKey,
announcedSigningPublicKey: signingKey
)
#expect(decision == .verified)
}
@Test
func responsePolicyConnectsOnlyForDirectNewOrReconnectedPeers() {
let directNew = BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy.plan(
@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ import Testing
@Suite("BLE peer registry tests")
struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
@Test("upserted announces track new, reconnect, and rename transitions")
func upsertVerifiedAnnounceTracksTransitions() {
func upsertVerifiedAnnounceTracksTransitions() throws {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
let first = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
let firstResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "alice",
noisePublicKey: Data([1, 2, 3]),
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen
)
let first = try #require(firstResult)
#expect(first.isNewPeer)
#expect(!first.wasDisconnected)
@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
#expect(registry.nickname(for: peerID, connectedOnly: true) == "alice")
registry.markDisconnected(peerID)
let reconnect = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
let reconnectResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "alice-renamed",
noisePublicKey: Data([1, 2, 3]),
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
)
let reconnect = try #require(reconnectResult)
#expect(!reconnect.isNewPeer)
#expect(reconnect.wasDisconnected)
@@ -42,6 +44,85 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "alice-renamed")
}
@Test("pinned signing key cannot be silently replaced by a later announce")
func upsertVerifiedAnnounceRefusesToReplacePinnedSigningKey() throws {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
let victimSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
let attackerSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x66, count: 32)
let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
let pinResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "victim",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen
)
#expect(pinResult != nil)
// Attacker replays the victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own
// signing key and nickname; the upsert must be refused wholesale.
let attack = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "attacker",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: attackerSigningKey,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
)
#expect(attack == nil)
let info = try #require(registry.info(for: peerID))
#expect(info.nickname == "victim")
#expect(info.signingPublicKey == victimSigningKey)
// A legitimate re-announce with the pinned key is still accepted.
let legit = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "victim-renamed",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(2)
)
#expect(legit != nil)
#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim-renamed")
}
@Test("announce without a signing key keeps the pinned key")
func upsertVerifiedAnnounceKeepsPinnedSigningKeyWhenAnnounceOmitsIt() throws {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
let signingKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
let initialResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "alice",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: signingKey,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen
)
#expect(initialResult != nil)
let update = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "alice",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: nil,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
)
#expect(update != nil)
#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == signingKey)
}
@Test("reachability keeps recent verified offline peers only when mesh is attached")
func reachabilityRequiresMeshAttachmentForOfflinePeers() {
let offlinePeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")