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https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
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BLE announce trust verified the packet signature against the Ed25519 signing key carried inside the same announce, and the trust policy only rejected on noise-key mismatch. Since peerIDs derive from the broadcast (public) noise key, an on-mesh attacker could replay a victim's peerID+noiseKey with their own signing key, nickname, and a valid self-signature; BLEPeerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce then overwrote the victim's entry unconditionally. That enabled mesh nickname spoofing and, via the persisted identity, forged attribution of signed public/broadcast messages. Fix: TOFU-pin the signing key per peer (noise-key-derived peerID). - BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy now rejects announces whose signing key differs from the one already recorded for the peer (.signingKeyMismatch) and logs a security event. - BLEPeerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce refuses to replace a pinned signing key (returns nil), closing the race where the pre-barrier trust check reads the registry outside the collections barrier. It also never drops a pinned key when an announce omits one. - BLEAnnounceHandler skips registry upsert, topology updates, and identity persistence for rejected announces. No wire-format change: the packet signature already covers senderID, timestamp, and the full announce payload (noise key, signing key, nickname), so mixed-version meshes are unaffected. First contact for an unknown peer behaves exactly as before (trust on first use); the pin is scoped to the registry entry lifetime, so a legitimately re-keyed identity recovers after normal peer eviction. Tests: trust-policy signing-key mismatch/match cases, registry pinning (attacker upsert refused, legitimate re-announce accepted, omitted key keeps pin), handler-level pinned-key rejection, and an end-to-end test with real Ed25519 keys showing a fully self-consistent attacker announce cannot displace the victim's pinned identity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
193 lines
7.0 KiB
Swift
193 lines
7.0 KiB
Swift
import BitFoundation
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import Foundation
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import Testing
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@testable import bitchat
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@Suite("BLE peer registry tests")
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struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
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@Test("upserted announces track new, reconnect, and rename transitions")
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func upsertVerifiedAnnounceTracksTransitions() throws {
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var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
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let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
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let firstResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
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peerID: peerID,
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nickname: "alice",
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noisePublicKey: Data([1, 2, 3]),
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signingPublicKey: Data([4, 5, 6]),
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isConnected: true,
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now: firstSeen
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)
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let first = try #require(firstResult)
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#expect(first.isNewPeer)
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#expect(!first.wasDisconnected)
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#expect(first.previousNickname == nil)
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#expect(registry.connectedPeerIDs == [peerID])
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#expect(registry.nickname(for: peerID, connectedOnly: true) == "alice")
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registry.markDisconnected(peerID)
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let reconnectResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
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peerID: peerID,
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nickname: "alice-renamed",
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noisePublicKey: Data([1, 2, 3]),
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signingPublicKey: Data([4, 5, 6]),
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isConnected: true,
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now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
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)
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let reconnect = try #require(reconnectResult)
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#expect(!reconnect.isNewPeer)
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#expect(reconnect.wasDisconnected)
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#expect(reconnect.previousNickname == "alice")
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#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "alice-renamed")
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}
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@Test("pinned signing key cannot be silently replaced by a later announce")
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func upsertVerifiedAnnounceRefusesToReplacePinnedSigningKey() throws {
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var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
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let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
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let victimSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
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let attackerSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x66, count: 32)
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let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
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let pinResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
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peerID: peerID,
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nickname: "victim",
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noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
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signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
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isConnected: true,
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now: firstSeen
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)
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#expect(pinResult != nil)
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// Attacker replays the victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own
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// signing key and nickname; the upsert must be refused wholesale.
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let attack = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
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peerID: peerID,
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nickname: "attacker",
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noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
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signingPublicKey: attackerSigningKey,
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isConnected: true,
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now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
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)
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#expect(attack == nil)
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let info = try #require(registry.info(for: peerID))
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#expect(info.nickname == "victim")
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#expect(info.signingPublicKey == victimSigningKey)
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// A legitimate re-announce with the pinned key is still accepted.
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let legit = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
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peerID: peerID,
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nickname: "victim-renamed",
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noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
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signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
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isConnected: true,
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now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(2)
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)
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#expect(legit != nil)
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#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim-renamed")
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}
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@Test("announce without a signing key keeps the pinned key")
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func upsertVerifiedAnnounceKeepsPinnedSigningKeyWhenAnnounceOmitsIt() throws {
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var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
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let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
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let signingKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
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let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
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let initialResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
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peerID: peerID,
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nickname: "alice",
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noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
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signingPublicKey: signingKey,
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isConnected: true,
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now: firstSeen
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)
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#expect(initialResult != nil)
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let update = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
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peerID: peerID,
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nickname: "alice",
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noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
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signingPublicKey: nil,
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isConnected: true,
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now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
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)
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#expect(update != nil)
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#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == signingKey)
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}
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@Test("reachability keeps recent verified offline peers only when mesh is attached")
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func reachabilityRequiresMeshAttachmentForOfflinePeers() {
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let offlinePeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let connectedPeer = PeerID(str: "8877665544332211")
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let now = Date()
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var isolatedRegistry = BLEPeerRegistry()
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isolatedRegistry.upsert(BLEPeerInfo(
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peerID: offlinePeer,
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nickname: "offline",
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isConnected: false,
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noisePublicKey: nil,
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signingPublicKey: nil,
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isVerifiedNickname: true,
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lastSeen: now
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))
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#expect(!isolatedRegistry.isReachable(offlinePeer, now: now))
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var attachedRegistry = isolatedRegistry
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attachedRegistry.upsert(BLEPeerInfo(
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peerID: connectedPeer,
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nickname: "connected",
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isConnected: true,
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noisePublicKey: nil,
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signingPublicKey: nil,
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isVerifiedNickname: true,
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lastSeen: now
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))
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#expect(attachedRegistry.isReachable(offlinePeer, now: now))
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}
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@Test("connectivity reconciliation disconnects inactive peers and prunes expired offline peers")
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func reconcileConnectivityUpdatesAndPrunesPeerState() {
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var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
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let inactiveConnectedPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
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let expiredOfflinePeer = PeerID(str: "8877665544332211")
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let now = Date()
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registry.upsert(BLEPeerInfo(
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peerID: inactiveConnectedPeer,
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nickname: "inactive",
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isConnected: true,
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noisePublicKey: nil,
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signingPublicKey: nil,
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isVerifiedNickname: true,
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lastSeen: now.addingTimeInterval(-TransportConfig.blePeerInactivityTimeoutSeconds - 1)
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))
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registry.upsert(BLEPeerInfo(
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peerID: expiredOfflinePeer,
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nickname: "expired",
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isConnected: false,
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noisePublicKey: nil,
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signingPublicKey: nil,
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isVerifiedNickname: true,
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lastSeen: .distantPast
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))
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let changes = registry.reconcileConnectivity(now: now, linkStates: [:])
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#expect(changes.disconnectedPeerIDs == [inactiveConnectedPeer])
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#expect(changes.removedPeers.map(\.peerID) == [expiredOfflinePeer])
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#expect(registry.info(for: inactiveConnectedPeer)?.isConnected == false)
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#expect(registry.info(for: expiredOfflinePeer) == nil)
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}
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}
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