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bitchat-android/docs/SOURCE_ROUTING.md
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# Source-Based Routing for BitChat Packets
This document specifies an optional source-based routing extension to the BitChat packet format. A sender may attach a hop-by-hop route (list of peer IDs) to instruct relays on the intended path. Relays that support this feature will try to forward to the next hop directly; otherwise, they fall back to regular broadcast relaying.
Status: optional and backward-compatible.
## Layering Overview
- Outer packet: BitChat binary packet with unchanged fixed header (version/type/ttl/timestamp/flags/payloadLength).
- Flags: adds a new bit `HAS_ROUTE (0x08)`.
- Variable sections (when present, in order):
1) `SenderID` (8 bytes)
2) `RecipientID` (8 bytes) if `HAS_RECIPIENT`
3) `Route` (if `HAS_ROUTE`): `count` (1 byte) + `count * 8` bytes hop IDs
4) `Payload` (with optional compression preamble)
5) `Signature` (64 bytes) if `HAS_SIGNATURE`
Unknown flags are ignored by older implementations (they will simply not see a route and continue broadcasting as before).
## Route Field Encoding
- Presence: Signaled by the `HAS_ROUTE (0x08)` bit in `flags`.
- Layout (immediately after optional `RecipientID`):
- `count`: 1 byte (0..255)
- `hops`: concatenation of `count` peer IDs, each encoded as exactly 8 bytes
- Peer ID encoding (8 bytes): same as used elsewhere in BitChat (16 hex chars → 8 bytes; left-to-right conversion; pad with `0x00` if shorter). This matches the onwire `senderID`/`recipientID` encoding.
- Size impact: `1 + 8*N` bytes, where `N = count`.
- Empty route: `HAS_ROUTE` with `count = 0` is treated as no route (relays ignore it).
## Sender Behavior
- Applicability: Intended for addressed packets (i.e., where `recipientID` is set and is not the broadcast ID). For broadcast packets, omit the route.
- Path computation: Use Dijkstras shortest path (unit weights) on your internal mesh topology to find a route from the sender (your peerID) to the recipient (the destination peerID). The `BitchatPacket` already contains dedicated `senderID` and `recipientID` fields. The `Route` field's `hops` list **SHOULD** contain the sequence of intermediate peer IDs that the packet should traverse. It **SHOULD NOT** duplicate the `senderID` or `recipientID` if they are already present in the `BitchatPacket`'s dedicated fields. Instead, the `hops` list represents the explicit path *between* the sender and recipient, starting from the first relay and ending with the last relay before the recipient.
- Encoding: Set `HAS_ROUTE`, write `count = path.length`, then the 8byte hop IDs in order. Keep `count <= 255`.
- Signing: The route is covered by the Ed25519 signature (recommended):
- Signature input is the canonical encoding with `signature` omitted and `ttl = 0` (TTL excluded to allow relay decrement) — same rule as base protocol.
## Relay Behavior
When receiving a packet that is not addressed to you:
1) If `HAS_ROUTE` is not set, or the route is empty, relay using your normal broadcast logic (subject to TTL/probability policies).
2) If `HAS_ROUTE` is set:
- **Route Sanity Check**: Before processing, the relay **MUST** validate the route. If the route contains duplicate hops (i.e., the same peer ID appears more than once), the packet **MUST** be dropped to prevent loops.
- If your peer ID appears at index `i` in the hop list:
- If there is a next hop at `i+1`, attempt a targeted unicast to that next hop if you have a direct connection to it.
- If successful, do NOT broadcast this packet further.
- If not directly connected (or the send fails), fall back to broadcast relaying.
- If you are the last hop (no `i+1`), the packet has reached the end of its explicit route. The relay should then attempt to deliver it to the final `recipientID` if directly connected, but SHOULD NOT relay it further as a broadcast.
TTL handling remains unchanged: relays decrement TTL by 1 before forwarding (whether targeted or broadcast). If TTL reaches 0, do not relay.
## Receiver Behavior (Destination)
- This extension does not change how addressed packets are handled by the final recipient. If the packet is addressed to you (`recipientID == myPeerID`), process it normally (e.g., decrypt Noise payload, verify signatures, etc.).
- Signature verification MUST include the route field when present; route tampering will invalidate the signature.
## Compatibility
- Omission: If `HAS_ROUTE` is omitted, legacy behavior applies. Relays that dont implement this feature will ignore the route entirely, because they wont set or check `HAS_ROUTE`.
- Partial support: If any relay on the path cannot directly reach the next hop, it will fall back to broadcast relaying; delivery is still probabilistic like the base protocol.
## Minimal Example (conceptual)
- Header (fixed 13 bytes): unchanged.
- Variable sections (ordered):
- `SenderID(8)`
- `RecipientID(8)` (if present)
- `HAS_ROUTE` set → `count=1`, `hops = [H1]` where `H1` is 8 bytes
- Payload (optionally compressed)
- Signature (64)
In this example, `SENDER_ID` is the sender, `RECIPIENT_ID` is the final recipient, and `H1` is the single intermediate relay. The `hops` list explicitly defines the path *between* the sender and recipient. The receiver verifies the signature over the packet encoding (with `ttl = 0` and `signature` omitted), which includes the `hops` when `HAS_ROUTE` is set.
## Operational Notes
- Routing optimality depends on the freshness and completeness of the topology your implementation has learned (e.g., via gossip of direct neighbors). Recompute routes as needed.
- Route length should be kept small to reduce overhead and the probability of missing a direct link at some hop.
- Implementations may introduce policy controls (e.g., disable source routing, cap max route length).