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bitchat-android/docs/SOURCE_ROUTING.md

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# Source-Based Routing for BitChat Packets (v2)
This document specifies the Source-Based Routing extension (v2) for the BitChat protocol. This upgrade enables efficient unicast routing across the mesh by allowing senders to specify an explicit path of intermediate relays.
**Status:** Implemented in Android and iOS. Backward compatible (v1 clients ignore routing data).
---
## 1. Protocol Versioning & Layering
To support source routing and larger payloads, the packet format has been upgraded to **Version 2**.
* **Version 1 (Legacy):** 2-byte payload length limit. Ignores routing flags.
* **Version 2 (Current):** 4-byte payload length limit. Supports Source Routing.
**Key Rule:** The `HAS_ROUTE (0x08)` flag is **only valid** if the packet `version >= 2`. Relays receiving a v1 packet must ignore this flag even if set.
---
## 2. Packet Structure Comparison
The following diagram illustrates the structural differences between a standard v1 packet and a source-routed v2 packet.
### V1 Packet (Legacy)
```text
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Fixed Header (14) | Variable Sections |
+-------------------+----------+-------------+------------------+-------------+
| Ver: 1 (1B) | SenderID | RecipientID | Payload | Signature |
| Type, TTL, etc. | (8B) | (8B) | (Length in Head) | (64B) |
| Len: 2 Bytes | | (Optional) | | (Optional) |
+-------------------+----------+-------------+------------------+-------------+
```
### V2 Packet (Source Routed)
```text
+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Fixed Header (16) | Variable Sections |
+-------------------+----------+-------------+-----------------------+------------------+-------------+
| Ver: 2 (1B) | SenderID | RecipientID | SOURCE ROUTE | Payload | Signature |
| Type, TTL, etc. | (8B) | (8B) | (Variable) | (Length in Head) | (64B) |
| Len: 4 Bytes | | (Required*) | Only if HAS_ROUTE=1 | | (Optional) |
+-------------------+----------+-------------+-----------------------+------------------+-------------+
```
**(*) Note:** A `Route` can be attached to **any** packet type that has a `RecipientID` (flag `HAS_RECIPIENT` set).
### Fixed Header Differences
| Field | Size (v1) | Size (v2) | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Version** | 1 byte | 1 byte | `0x01` vs `0x02` |
| **Payload Length** | **2 bytes** | **4 bytes** | `UInt32` in v2 to support large files. **Excludes** route/IDs/sig. |
| **Total Size** | **14 bytes** | **16 bytes** | V2 header is 2 bytes larger. |
---
## 3. Source Route Specification
The `Source Route` field is a variable-length list of **intermediate hops** that the packet must traverse.
* **Location:** Immediately follows `RecipientID`.
* **Structure:**
* `Count` (1 byte): Number of intermediate hops (`N`).
* `Hops` (`N * 8` bytes): Sequence of Peer IDs.
### Intermediate Hops Only
The route list MUST contain **only** the intermediate relays between the sender and the recipient.
* **DO NOT** include the `SenderID` (it is already in the packet).
* **DO NOT** include the `RecipientID` (it is already in the packet).
**Example:**
Topology: `Alice (Sender) -> Bob -> Charlie -> Dave (Recipient)`
* Packet `SenderID`: Alice
* Packet `RecipientID`: Dave
* Packet `Route`: `[Bob, Charlie]` (Count = 2)
---
## 4. Topology Discovery (Gossip)
To calculate routes, nodes need a view of the network topology. This is achieved via a **Neighbor List** extension to the `IdentityAnnouncement` packet.
* **Mechanism:** `IdentityAnnouncement` packets contain a TLV (Type-Length-Value) payload.
* **New TLV Type:** `0x04` (Direct Neighbors).
* **Content:** A list of Peer IDs that the announcing node is directly connected to.
**TLV Structure (Type 0x04):**
```text
[Type: 0x04] [Length: 1B] [Count: 1B] [NeighborID1 (8B)] [NeighborID2 (8B)] ...
```
Nodes receiving this TLV update their local mesh graph, linking the sender to the listed neighbors.
---
## 5. Fragmentation & Source Routing
When a large source-routed packet (e.g., File Transfer) exceeds the MTU and requires fragmentation:
1. **Version Inheritance:** All fragments MUST be marked as **Version 2**.
2. **Route Inheritance:** All fragments MUST contain the **exact same Route field** as the parent packet.
**Why?** If fragments were sent as v1 packets or without routes, they would fall back to flooding, negating the bandwidth benefits of source routing for large data transfers.
### 5.1 Dynamic Fragment Sizing (Critical Implementation Detail)
To ensure reliable transmission over Bluetooth LE, all packets must strictly adhere to the 512-byte MTU limit. Because the Source Route field has a variable length, a fixed fragment size (e.g., the standard 469 bytes) is **unsafe** and will cause transmission failures when a long route is attached.
**Implementations MUST dynamically calculate the maximum fragment payload size for each packet using the following formula:**
```text
Overhead = HeaderV2(15) + SenderID(8) + RecipientID(8) + RouteSize + FragmentHeader(13) + PaddingBuffer(16)
MaxFragmentPayload = 512 - Overhead
```
**Definitions:**
* **HeaderV2:** 15 bytes (Fixed header size for Version 2).
* **RouteSize:** `1 + (Hops * 8)` bytes.
* **FragmentHeader:** 13 bytes (Standard fragment payload header).
* **PaddingBuffer:** 16 bytes (Reserved for PKCS#7 padding expansion and encryption tag overhead).
**Example:**
For a packet with a 3-hop route:
1. **RouteSize:** `1 + (3 * 8) = 25` bytes.
2. **Overhead:** `15 + 8 + 8 + 25 + 13 + 16 = 85` bytes.
3. **MaxFragmentPayload:** `512 - 85 = 427` bytes.
Implementations that fail to adjust the fragment size based on the route length will produce packets exceeding the MTU, resulting in dropped fragments and failed transfers.
---
## 6. Security & Signing
Source routing is fully secured by the existing Ed25519 signature scheme.
* **Scope:** The signature covers the **entire packet structure** (Header + Sender + Recipient + Route + Payload).
* **Verification:** The receiver verifies the signature against the `SenderID`'s public key.
* **Integrity:** Any tampering with the route list by malicious relays will invalidate the signature, causing the packet to be dropped by the destination.
**Signature Input Construction:**
Serialize the packet exactly as transmitted, but temporarily set `TTL = 0` and remove the `Signature` bytes.
---
## 7. Relay Logic
When a node receives a packet **not** addressed to itself:
1. **Check Route:**
* Is `Version >= 2`?
* Is `HAS_ROUTE` flag set?
* Is the route list non-empty?
2. **If YES (Source Routed):**
* Find local Peer ID in the route list at index `i`.
* **Next Hop:** The peer at `i + 1`.
* **Last Hop:** If `i` is the last index, the Next Hop is the `RecipientID`.
* **Action:** Attempt to unicast (`sendToPeer`) to the Next Hop.
* **Fallback:** If the Next Hop is unreachable, **fall back to broadcast/flood** to ensure delivery.
3. **If NO (Standard):**
* Flood the packet to all connected neighbors (subject to TTL and probability rules).