Files
bitchat/bitchatTests/BLEServiceCoreTests.swift
T
3e9230229d Heal peer-ID rotation: rebind link on verified announce, retire ghost peer (#1401)
* Heal peer-ID rotation: rebind link on verified announce, retire ghost

When a peer relaunches it rotates its ephemeral peer ID, but a
still-open BLE connection kept its stale peripheral/central→peerID
binding for the reachability retention window (~45-60s). Until it aged
out, the other side showed a duplicate ghost peer and dropped the
rotated peer's direct announces as spoofing attempts.

Root cause: the ingress guard rejected a direct announce whose claimed
sender differed from the link binding before signature verification
could ever see it, so the binding could never heal.

- Ingress guard: let a mismatched direct announce through, attributed
  to the claimed sender; REQUEST_SYNC keeps the strict binding check.
- Bind sites: raw (pre-verification) announces may only bind unbound
  links, never rebind bound ones — rebinding now requires the announce
  handler's signature verification to pass.
- On a verified direct announce whose ingress link is bound to a
  different peer, rebind the link to the announced ID and retire the
  rotated-away ID immediately (registry + gossip + UI), mirroring
  handleLeave.
- BLELinkStateStore.bindPeripheral: drop the previous peer's reverse
  mapping on rebind so the retired ID no longer claims the link.

Fixes #1387

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Contain forged-directness rebinds: no identity steal, per-link cooldown

The announce signature does not authenticate directness (TTL is
excluded from signing because relays mutate it), so a bound peer could
replay another peer's fresh signed announce with its TTL restored and
reach the rotation rebind path. Contain what such a replay can do:

- Refuse a rebind when the claimed identity already owns another live
  link — a replayed announce can no longer steal a connected peer's
  binding or route its directed traffic to the replaying link.
- Allow at most one rebind per link per cooldown window (60s) so two
  identities cannot fight over a link in a replay flip-flop, with each
  flip retiring the other peer.

A replay against an identity with no live link remains possible, but
that capability already exists today on unbound links, where any raw
direct announce binds pre-verification.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 10:08:23 +02:00

464 lines
18 KiB
Swift

//
// BLEServiceCoreTests.swift
// bitchatTests
//
// Focused BLEService tests for packet handling behavior.
//
import Testing
import Foundation
import CoreBluetooth
import BitFoundation
@testable import bitchat
struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
@Test
func duplicatePacket_isDeduped() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let delegate = PublicCaptureDelegate()
ble.delegate = delegate
// Public messages must carry a valid signature from the claimed sender;
// sign the packet and preseed the sender's signing key so the receiver
// can verify it (production `sendMessage` signs public broadcasts too).
let signer = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let sender = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let timestamp = UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
let unsigned = makePublicPacket(content: "Hello", sender: sender, timestamp: timestamp)
let packet = try #require(signer.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign public message")
let signingKey = signer.getSigningPublicKeyData()
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender, signingPublicKey: signingKey)
let receivedFirst = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().count == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.defaultTimeout
)
#expect(receivedFirst)
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender, signingPublicKey: signingKey)
let receivedDuplicate = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().count > 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout
)
#expect(!receivedDuplicate)
let messages = delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot()
#expect(messages.count == 1)
#expect(messages.first?.content == "Hello")
}
@Test
func staleBroadcast_isIgnored() async {
let ble = makeService()
let delegate = PublicCaptureDelegate()
ble.delegate = delegate
let sender = PeerID(str: "A1B2C3D4E5F60708")
let oldTimestamp = UInt64(Date().addingTimeInterval(-901).timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
let packet = makePublicPacket(content: "Old", sender: sender, timestamp: oldTimestamp)
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: sender)
let didReceive = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ !delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().isEmpty }, timeout: 0.3)
#expect(!didReceive)
#expect(delegate.publicMessagesSnapshot().isEmpty)
}
@Test
func announceSenderMismatch_isRejected() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let signer = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
nickname: "Spoof",
noisePublicKey: signer.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
directNeighbors: nil
)
let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
let derivedPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
let wrongFirst = derivedPeerID.bare.first == "0" ? "1" : "0"
let wrongBare = String(wrongFirst) + String(derivedPeerID.bare.dropFirst())
let wrongPeerID = PeerID(str: wrongBare)
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: wrongPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
let signed = try #require(signer.signPacket(packet), "Failed to sign announce packet")
ble._test_handlePacket(signed, fromPeerID: wrongPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
_ = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ !ble.currentPeerSnapshots().isEmpty }, timeout: 0.3)
#expect(ble.currentPeerSnapshots().isEmpty)
}
@Test
func ingressAllowsRelayedSenderOnBoundLink() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let boundPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let relayedSender = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
let packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "Relayed",
sender: relayedSender,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
#expect(ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: boundPeer))
}
@Test
func ingressAllowsDirectAnnounceThatConflictsWithBoundLink() async throws {
// Peer-ID rotation heal: the announce must reach signature
// verification, which decides whether the link rebinds.
let ble = makeService()
let boundPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let claimedPeer = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: claimedPeer.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: Data(),
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
#expect(ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: boundPeer))
}
@Test
func ingressRejectsRequestSyncThatConflictsWithBoundLink() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let boundPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let claimedPeer = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.requestSync.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: claimedPeer.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: Data(),
signature: nil,
ttl: 0
)
#expect(!ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: boundPeer))
}
@Test
func verifiedDirectAnnounceRebindsRotatedLinkAndRetiresOldPeer() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let oldPeerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let centralUUID = "central-rotation"
// A connected peer whose link binding predates its relaunch.
ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(oldPeerID, nickname: "alice")
ble._test_bindCentral(centralUUID, to: oldPeerID)
// The relaunched device re-announces its rotated identity over the
// still-open link.
let signer = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
nickname: "alice",
noisePublicKey: signer.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
signingPublicKey: signer.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
directNeighbors: nil
)
let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
let newPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
let unsigned = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: newPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
let packet = try #require(signer.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign announce packet")
#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: centralUUID))
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: newPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let rebound = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ ble._test_centralBinding(centralUUID) == newPeerID },
timeout: TestConstants.defaultTimeout
)
#expect(rebound)
let retired = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{
let peerIDs = ble.currentPeerSnapshots().map(\.peerID)
return peerIDs.contains(newPeerID) && !peerIDs.contains(oldPeerID)
},
timeout: TestConstants.defaultTimeout
)
#expect(retired)
}
@Test
func replayedDirectAnnounceCannotStealBoundIdentity() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let attackerPeerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let victimLink = "central-victim"
let attackerLink = "central-attacker"
// The victim's identity, genuinely bound on its own link.
let victimSigner = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
nickname: "victim",
noisePublicKey: victimSigner.getStaticPublicKeyData(),
signingPublicKey: victimSigner.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
directNeighbors: nil
)
let payload = try #require(announcement.encode(), "Failed to encode announcement")
let victimPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(victimPeerID, nickname: "victim")
ble._test_bindCentral(victimLink, to: victimPeerID)
ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(attackerPeerID, nickname: "attacker")
ble._test_bindCentral(attackerLink, to: attackerPeerID)
// The victim's fresh signed announce replayed on the attacker's bound
// link with its direct TTL restored (TTL is excluded from signing, so
// the signature still verifies).
let unsigned = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: victimPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
let packet = try #require(victimSigner.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign announce packet")
#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: attackerLink))
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: victimPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
// The rebind must be refused: the identity already owns a live link.
let stolen = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == victimPeerID },
timeout: 0.3
)
#expect(!stolen)
#expect(ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == attackerPeerID)
#expect(ble._test_centralBinding(victimLink) == victimPeerID)
// And the replay must not retire the link's real bound peer.
#expect(ble.currentPeerSnapshots().map(\.peerID).contains(attackerPeerID))
}
@Test
func ingressRejectsSelfLoopbackBeforeSpoofChecks() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "Loopback",
sender: ble.myPeerID,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
#expect(!ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")))
}
@Test
func ingressAllowsSelfAuthoredRSRWithTTLZeroFromBoundPeer() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
var packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "Recovered by sync",
sender: ble.myPeerID,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
packet.isRSR = true
packet.ttl = 0
#expect(ble._test_acceptsIngress(packet: packet, boundPeerID: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")))
}
@Test
func ingressRecordSuppressesSecondLinkDuplicate() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "Duplicate link copy",
sender: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788"),
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: "central-a"))
#expect(!ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: packet, linkID: "central-b"))
}
@Test
func panicReset_rotatesPeerIDDerivedFromNewNoiseFingerprint() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let originalPeerID = ble.myPeerID
let originalFingerprint = ble.noiseIdentityFingerprint()
#expect(originalPeerID == PeerID(str: originalFingerprint.prefix(16)))
ble.resetIdentityForPanic(currentNickname: "anon")
// The Noise identity is regenerated and the peer ID swaps with it
// (atomically, behind a messageQueue barrier).
let newFingerprint = ble.noiseIdentityFingerprint()
#expect(newFingerprint != originalFingerprint)
#expect(ble.myPeerID != originalPeerID)
#expect(ble.myPeerID == PeerID(str: newFingerprint.prefix(16)))
}
@Test
func modifiedServices_rediscoverWhenBitChatServiceIsInvalidated() async throws {
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
#expect(BLEService._test_shouldRediscoverBitChatService(
invalidatedServiceUUIDs: [BLEService.serviceUUID],
cachedServiceUUIDs: [otherService]
))
}
@Test
func modifiedServices_rediscoverWhenCachedServicesNoLongerIncludeBitChat() async throws {
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
#expect(BLEService._test_shouldRediscoverBitChatService(
invalidatedServiceUUIDs: [otherService],
cachedServiceUUIDs: [otherService]
))
}
@Test
func modifiedServices_ignoreUnrelatedInvalidationWhenBitChatIsStillCached() async throws {
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
#expect(!BLEService._test_shouldRediscoverBitChatService(
invalidatedServiceUUIDs: [otherService],
cachedServiceUUIDs: [BLEService.serviceUUID, otherService]
))
}
/// Pings are unsigned, so their claimed sender is attacker-controlled.
/// The pong budget must be keyed on the ingress link (the directly
/// connected peer that delivered the packet): rotating forged sender IDs
/// over one link exhausts one budget instead of resetting it, so a single
/// malicious link cannot turn /ping into an amplification primitive.
@Test
func meshPingResponseBudget_isPerIngressLinkNotClaimedSender() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
let link = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let budget = TransportConfig.meshPingInboundMaxPerLink
let myRecipientData = try #require(Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id))
for i in 0..<(budget * 2) {
// A fresh forged sender for every ping, all arriving on one link.
let forgedSender = PeerID(str: String(format: "%016x", 0xA0_0000 + i))
var nonce = Data(repeating: 0, count: MeshPingPayload.nonceLength)
nonce[0] = UInt8(i)
let payload = try #require(MeshPingPayload(nonce: nonce, originTTL: 7))
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.ping.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: forgedSender.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: myRecipientData,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload.encode(),
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
ble._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: link, preseedPeer: false)
}
let reachedBudget = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .pong) >= budget },
timeout: TestConstants.defaultTimeout
)
#expect(reachedBudget)
// Give any over-budget pong a chance to surface, then confirm the
// rotated sender IDs never bought a sixth response.
let exceededBudget = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .pong) > budget },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout
)
#expect(!exceededBudget)
#expect(outbound.count(ofType: .pong) == budget)
}
}
/// Thread-safe capture of packets leaving the service under test.
private final class OutboundPacketTap {
private let lock = NSLock()
private var packets: [BitchatPacket] = []
func record(_ packet: BitchatPacket) {
lock.lock(); packets.append(packet); lock.unlock()
}
func count(ofType type: MessageType) -> Int {
lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
return packets.filter { $0.type == type.rawValue }.count
}
}
private func makeService() -> BLEService {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let identityManager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: MockKeychainHelper())
return BLEService(
keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: identityManager,
initializeBluetoothManagers: false
)
}
private func makePublicPacket(content: String, sender: PeerID, timestamp: UInt64) -> BitchatPacket {
BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.message.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: sender.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: timestamp,
payload: Data(content.utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 3
)
}
private final class PublicCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
private let lock = NSLock()
private(set) var publicMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: messageID,
sender: nickname,
content: content,
timestamp: timestamp,
isRelay: false,
originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: false,
recipientNickname: nil,
senderPeerID: peerID,
mentions: nil
)
lock.lock()
publicMessages.append(message)
lock.unlock()
}
func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {}
func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {}
func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState) {}
func publicMessagesSnapshot() -> [BitchatMessage] {
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
return publicMessages
}
}