mirror of
https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
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* Friend-courier store-and-forward: mutual favorites carry sealed messages to offline peers When a private message has no reachable transport, the router now seals it to the recipient's Noise static key (new one-way Noise X pattern) and hands the envelope to up to three connected mutual favorites. Couriers store the opaque ciphertext under strict quotas (20 total, 5 per depositor, 16 KiB, 24 h) and hand it over when the recipient's announce matches a rotating HMAC recipient tag; the recipient opens it and the message flows through the normal private-message pipeline, so dedup and delivery acks just work. - CourierEnvelope TLV + courierEnvelope (0x04) message type in BitFoundation - Noise X one-way pattern reusing the existing handshake machinery, domain-separated by a courier prologue; sender identity authenticated via the ss DH (no forward secrecy - documented tradeoff) - CourierStore with eviction, file persistence, and panic-wipe integration - Rotating recipient tags (HMAC over epoch day) so carried envelopes don't correlate for observers who don't already know the recipient's key - New "carried" delivery status with figure.walk glyph; header indicator while carrying mail for others - Three-node end-to-end test ferrying packets through real BLEService instances, plus codec/crypto/store/router suites (986 tests green) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix courier handoff verification and directed sends * Authenticate courier deposits by ingress peer * Gate courier handover on direct announces and isolate store test Envelopes are removed from the courier store optimistically, so releasing them on a relayed (multi-hop) announce risks losing carried mail to a speculative flood that never reaches the recipient. Handover now also requires the announce to have arrived directly (full TTL), i.e. an actual encounter with a live link; regression test builds a relayed copy of a genuinely signed announce (TTL is excluded from announce signatures). Also make CourierStore's on-disk location injectable so the persistence test round-trips through a temp directory instead of wiping the real Application Support store, and reattach BLEAnnounceHandler's doc comment to the class it describes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Use Xcode-bundled Swift in CI instead of a standalone toolchain The unpinned setup-swift action installs Swift 6.1, which refuses the SDK on runner images that have rolled to Xcode 26.5 ("this SDK is not supported by the compiler"). Jobs passed or failed depending on which image they landed on. The Xcode-bundled toolchain always matches the image's SDK, and matches local development. Cache keys now include the toolchain version so artifacts from one compiler are never restored into builds with another. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Drop couriered mail from blocked senders at envelope open The UI-layer block check (isPeerBlocked in the transport event coordinator) resolves a fingerprint from the live session or peer list, but a couriered message arrives precisely when its sender is absent — no session, no registry entry — so the check failed open and a blocked identity's mail was delivered anyway. Gate in openCourierEnvelope, where the sealed sender's full static key is in hand. End-to-end test ferries a full deposit→carry→handover round and verifies the envelope from a blocked sender never reaches the delegate (confirmed failing without the gate). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix favorites end-to-end: peer-list dedup, Nostr sync, /fav key corruption - UnifiedPeerService: dedup offline favorites against mesh peers by noise key. Phase 2 compared a 64-hex noise-key PeerID against 16-hex mesh IDs (never equal), leaving only a nickname+isConnected heuristic — a mutual favorite that was reachable-but-not-connected or renamed rendered twice, and a same-nick stranger could suppress a favorite entirely. - Nostr inbound: intercept [FAVORITED]/[UNFAVORITED] markers in the live PM handler so they update theyFavoritedUs instead of rendering as chat text; mutual favorites can now form over Nostr. Delete the dead favorite-aware PM variant and ChatNostrCoordinator.handleFavoriteNotification (unwired, parsed a stale FAVORITE:TRUE|… format no sender emits). - NostrTransport.isPeerReachable: match short form regardless of incoming ID width — toggling an offline favorite (addressed by 64-hex noise key) was silently dropped with no reachable transport. - BLEService.sendPrivateMessage: normalize recipient to the short ID like sendFilePrivate, so a 64-hex target hits the existing Noise session instead of initiating a handshake with a 32-byte wire recipient ID. - /fav, /unfav: stop writing Data(hexString: peerID.id) — the 8-byte routing ID for mesh peers — into the favorites store as a "noise key", and stop double-sending the favorite notification; delegate to toggleFavorite with a proper state check. - FavoritesPersistenceService.updatePeerFavoritedUs: keep the stored nickname when the caller passes the "Unknown" placeholder. - Bump marketing version to 1.5.4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Route DMs to mutual favorites via Nostr when a mesh-keyed peer goes offline Field-tested on device: with a DM window opened while the peer was on mesh (conversation keyed by the short 16-hex ID), walking out of range and sending failed instantly with "peer not reachable" even though the header showed the peer as Nostr-reachable (mutual favorite, npub known). sendPrivateMessage derived the favorites key as Data(hexString: peerID.id) — for a short mesh ID that is the 8-byte routing ID, never the noise key — so the mutual-favorite/Nostr-key checks always came up empty and the send failed before reaching MessageRouter. Conversations keyed by the full 64-hex noise-key ID (opened from the offline favorite row) were unaffected, which is why later tests appeared to work. Resolve the noise key properly (peerID.noiseKey, then the unified peer row, then the favorites store by derived short ID) and add a regression test for the mesh-keyed-peer-goes-offline case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Label Nostr DMs from favorites with their stored nickname Field-tested: a DM delivered over the Nostr fallback rendered as "anon#678e" instead of the sender's name. The inbound handler named the sender via displayNameForNostrPubkey, which only knows geohash-scoped names — even though the pipeline had already resolved the sender's noise key (the conversation is keyed by it). When the conversation key carries a noise key, prefer the favorite's stored nickname; geohash DMs (nostr_ keys) keep the anon geo name. This also stops an inbound Nostr [FAVORITED] from overwriting the stored nickname with the anon fallback, since the same name feeds updatePeerFavoritedUs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix courier path for offline favorites addressed by noise-key IDs Two Codex review findings, both the same ID-width confusion this PR targets, in the courier flow: - CourierDirectory.favoritesBacked resolved recipients only via getFavoriteStatus(forPeerID:), which requires a short 16-hex ID — offline favorites are addressed by the full 64-hex noise-key ID, so attemptCourierDeposit silently bailed for exactly the peers couriers exist to serve. The 64-hex ID now yields its own key directly. - openCourierEnvelope emitted the derived short mesh ID even when the sender has no live mesh identity, landing couriered mail in an unresolvable short-ID thread labeled "Unknown". Absent senders now emit the full noise-key ID so the message joins the stable favorite conversation; present senders keep the live short-ID thread. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
500 lines
20 KiB
Swift
500 lines
20 KiB
Swift
import BitFoundation
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import BitLogger
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import Foundation
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/// The narrow surface `NostrInboundPipeline` needs from its owner.
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///
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/// Split out of `ChatNostrContext`: member names are shared with the sibling
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/// component contexts so `ChatViewModel` provides a single witness for each.
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@MainActor
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protocol NostrInboundPipelineContext: AnyObject {
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var currentGeohash: String? { get }
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// MARK: Event dedup
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func hasProcessedNostrEvent(_ eventID: String) -> Bool
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func recordProcessedNostrEvent(_ eventID: String)
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// MARK: Nostr identity & blocking
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func deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash geohash: String) throws -> NostrIdentity
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func currentNostrIdentity() -> NostrIdentity?
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func isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool
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func displayNameForNostrPubkey(_ pubkeyHex: String) -> String
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// MARK: Favorites bridge
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/// All favorite relationships, used to bridge a Nostr pubkey back to a
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/// Noise key on the inbound DM path.
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func allFavoriteRelationships() -> [FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship]
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// MARK: Presence & key mapping
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func setGeoNickname(_ nickname: String, forPubkey pubkeyHex: String)
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/// Records the Nostr pubkey behind a (possibly virtual) peer ID.
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func registerNostrKeyMapping(_ pubkey: String, for peerID: PeerID)
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func recordGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: String)
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// MARK: Inbound public messages
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func handlePublicMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage)
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func checkForMentions(_ message: BitchatMessage)
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func sendHapticFeedback(for message: BitchatMessage)
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func parseMentions(from content: String) -> [String]
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// MARK: Inbound private (DM) payloads
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func handlePrivateMessage(
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_ payload: NoisePayload,
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senderPubkey: String,
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convKey: PeerID,
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id: NostrIdentity,
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messageTimestamp: Date
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)
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func handleDelivered(_ payload: NoisePayload, senderPubkey: String, convKey: PeerID)
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func handleReadReceipt(_ payload: NoisePayload, senderPubkey: String, convKey: PeerID)
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}
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extension ChatViewModel: NostrInboundPipelineContext {
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// `currentGeohash`, the identity/blocking members, key mapping, and the
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// inbound message handlers already have witnesses on `ChatViewModel`.
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// The members below flatten nested service accesses into intent-named calls.
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func hasProcessedNostrEvent(_ eventID: String) -> Bool {
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deduplicationService.hasProcessedNostrEvent(eventID)
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}
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func allFavoriteRelationships() -> [FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship] {
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Array(FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.favorites.values)
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}
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func recordProcessedNostrEvent(_ eventID: String) {
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deduplicationService.recordNostrEvent(eventID)
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}
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func setGeoNickname(_ nickname: String, forPubkey pubkeyHex: String) {
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locationPresenceStore.setNickname(nickname, for: pubkeyHex)
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}
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func recordGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: String) {
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participantTracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: pubkeyHex)
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}
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}
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/// The inbound Nostr hot path: raw relay events in, chat messages / Noise
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/// payloads out. Pure transformation plus dedup — no relay lifecycle.
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///
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/// Ordering is deliberate and performance-critical: cheap rejects (kind,
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/// dedup lookup) run BEFORE Schnorr signature verification because duplicates
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/// dominate real relay traffic; events are recorded only AFTER verification so
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/// a forged-signature copy can never poison the dedup set; gift-wrap
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/// verification for the account mailbox runs off-main with an atomic
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/// main-actor check-and-record.
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final class NostrInboundPipeline {
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private weak var context: (any NostrInboundPipelineContext)?
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private let presence: GeoPresenceTracker
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private var geoEventLogCount = 0
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init(context: any NostrInboundPipelineContext, presence: GeoPresenceTracker) {
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self.context = context
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self.presence = presence
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}
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@MainActor
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func subscribeNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent) {
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guard let context else { return }
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// Cheap rejects (kind, dedup lookup) before Schnorr verification —
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// duplicates dominate real traffic and must not pay for crypto.
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// Only verified events are recorded, so a forged-signature copy can
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// never poison the dedup set and suppress the genuine event.
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guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue
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|| event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue),
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!context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(event.id)
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else {
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return
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}
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guard event.isValidSignature() else { return }
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context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(event.id)
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if let gh = context.currentGeohash,
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let myGeoIdentity = try? context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: gh),
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myGeoIdentity.publicKeyHex.lowercased() == event.pubkey.lowercased() {
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let eventTime = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
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if Date().timeIntervalSince(eventTime) < 15 {
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return
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}
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}
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if let nickTag = event.tags.first(where: { $0.first == "n" }), nickTag.count >= 2 {
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let nick = nickTag[1].trimmed
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context.setGeoNickname(nick, forPubkey: event.pubkey)
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}
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context.registerNostrKeyMapping(event.pubkey, for: PeerID(nostr_: event.pubkey))
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context.registerNostrKeyMapping(event.pubkey, for: PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey))
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context.recordGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
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if event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue {
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return
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}
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if GeoPresenceTracker.hasTeleportTag(event) {
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let key = event.pubkey.lowercased()
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let isSelf: Bool = {
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if let gh = context.currentGeohash,
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let myIdentity = try? context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: gh) {
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return myIdentity.publicKeyHex.lowercased() == key
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}
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return false
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}()
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if !isSelf {
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presence.scheduleMarkPeerTeleported(key, logged: false)
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}
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}
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let senderName = context.displayNameForNostrPubkey(event.pubkey)
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let content = event.content.trimmed
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let rawTs = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
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let timestamp = min(rawTs, Date())
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let mentions = context.parseMentions(from: content)
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let message = BitchatMessage(
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id: event.id,
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sender: senderName,
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content: content,
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timestamp: timestamp,
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isRelay: false,
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senderPeerID: PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey),
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mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
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)
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Task { @MainActor [weak context] in
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guard let context else { return }
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let isBlocked = context.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey.lowercased())
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context.handlePublicMessage(message)
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if !isBlocked {
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context.checkForMentions(message)
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context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
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}
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}
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}
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@MainActor
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func handleNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent) {
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guard let context else { return }
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// Cheap rejects (kind, dedup lookup) before Schnorr verification —
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// duplicates dominate real traffic and must not pay for crypto.
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guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue
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|| event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue)
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else {
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return
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}
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if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(event.id) { return }
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guard event.isValidSignature() else { return }
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context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(event.id)
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// Sampled: fires for every geo event and floods dev logs in busy geohashes.
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geoEventLogCount += 1
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if geoEventLogCount == 1 || geoEventLogCount.isMultiple(of: TransportConfig.nostrInboundEventLogInterval) {
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SecureLogger.debug("GeoTeleport: recv #\(geoEventLogCount) pub=\(event.pubkey.prefix(8))… tags=\(event.tags.map { "[" + $0.joined(separator: ",") + "]" }.joined(separator: ","))", category: .session)
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}
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if context.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey) {
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return
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}
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let hasTeleportTag = GeoPresenceTracker.hasTeleportTag(event)
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let isSelf: Bool = {
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if let gh = context.currentGeohash,
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let my = try? context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: gh) {
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return my.publicKeyHex.lowercased() == event.pubkey.lowercased()
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}
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return false
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}()
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if hasTeleportTag, !isSelf {
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presence.scheduleMarkPeerTeleported(event.pubkey.lowercased(), logged: true)
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}
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context.recordGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
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if isSelf {
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let eventTime = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
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if Date().timeIntervalSince(eventTime) < 15 {
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return
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}
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}
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if let nickTag = event.tags.first(where: { $0.first == "n" }), nickTag.count >= 2 {
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context.setGeoNickname(nickTag[1].trimmed, forPubkey: event.pubkey)
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}
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context.registerNostrKeyMapping(event.pubkey, for: PeerID(nostr_: event.pubkey))
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context.registerNostrKeyMapping(event.pubkey, for: PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey))
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if event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue {
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return
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}
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let senderName = context.displayNameForNostrPubkey(event.pubkey)
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let content = event.content
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if let teleTag = event.tags.first(where: { $0.first == "t" }),
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teleTag.count >= 2,
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teleTag[1] == "teleport",
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content.trimmed.isEmpty {
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return
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}
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let rawTs = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
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let mentions = context.parseMentions(from: content)
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let message = BitchatMessage(
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id: event.id,
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sender: senderName,
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content: content,
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timestamp: min(rawTs, Date()),
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isRelay: false,
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senderPeerID: PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey),
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mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
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)
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Task { @MainActor [weak context] in
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guard let context else { return }
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context.handlePublicMessage(message)
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context.checkForMentions(message)
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context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
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}
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}
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@MainActor
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func subscribeGiftWrap(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent, id: NostrIdentity) {
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guard let context else { return }
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// Dedup lookup before Schnorr verification; record only after it passes.
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guard !context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) else { return }
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guard giftWrap.isValidSignature() else { return }
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context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
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guard let (content, senderPubkey, rumorTs) = try? NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateMessage(
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giftWrap: giftWrap,
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recipientIdentity: id
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),
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let packet = Self.decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from: content),
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packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
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let noisePayload = NoisePayload.decode(packet.payload)
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else {
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return
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}
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let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(rumorTs))
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let convKey = PeerID(nostr_: senderPubkey)
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context.registerNostrKeyMapping(senderPubkey, for: convKey)
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switch noisePayload.type {
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case .privateMessage:
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context.handlePrivateMessage(
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noisePayload,
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senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
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convKey: convKey,
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id: id,
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messageTimestamp: messageTimestamp
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)
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case .delivered:
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context.handleDelivered(noisePayload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
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case .readReceipt:
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context.handleReadReceipt(noisePayload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
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case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse:
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break
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}
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}
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@MainActor
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func handleGiftWrap(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent, id: NostrIdentity) {
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guard let context else { return }
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// Dedup lookup before Schnorr verification; record only after it passes.
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if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) {
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return
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}
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guard giftWrap.isValidSignature() else { return }
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context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
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guard let (content, senderPubkey, rumorTs) = try? NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateMessage(
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giftWrap: giftWrap,
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recipientIdentity: id
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) else {
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SecureLogger.warning("GeoDM: failed decrypt giftWrap id=\(giftWrap.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
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return
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}
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SecureLogger.debug(
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"GeoDM: decrypted gift-wrap id=\(giftWrap.id.prefix(16))... from=\(senderPubkey.prefix(8))...",
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category: .session
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)
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guard let packet = Self.decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from: content),
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packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
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let payload = NoisePayload.decode(packet.payload)
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else {
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return
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}
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let convKey = PeerID(nostr_: senderPubkey)
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context.registerNostrKeyMapping(senderPubkey, for: convKey)
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switch payload.type {
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case .privateMessage:
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let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(rumorTs))
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context.handlePrivateMessage(
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payload,
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senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
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convKey: convKey,
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id: id,
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messageTimestamp: messageTimestamp
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)
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case .delivered:
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context.handleDelivered(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
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case .readReceipt:
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context.handleReadReceipt(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
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case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse:
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break
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}
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}
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@MainActor
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func handleNostrMessage(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent) {
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guard let context else { return }
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// Cheap dedup pre-check only; Schnorr verification runs off-main in
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// processNostrMessage, which then does the authoritative
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// check-and-record. Recording stays after verification so a
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// forged-signature copy can never poison the dedup set and suppress
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// the genuine event.
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if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) { return }
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|
|
|
Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { [weak self] in
|
|
await self?.processNostrMessage(giftWrap)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func processNostrMessage(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent) async {
|
|
guard giftWrap.isValidSignature() else { return }
|
|
guard let context else { return }
|
|
// Authoritative check-and-record, atomic on the main actor so two
|
|
// concurrent detached tasks can't both process the same event.
|
|
let alreadyProcessed: Bool = await MainActor.run {
|
|
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) { return true }
|
|
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if alreadyProcessed { return }
|
|
let currentIdentity: NostrIdentity? = await MainActor.run {
|
|
context.currentNostrIdentity()
|
|
}
|
|
guard let currentIdentity else { return }
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
let (content, senderPubkey, rumorTimestamp) = try NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateMessage(
|
|
giftWrap: giftWrap,
|
|
recipientIdentity: currentIdentity
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if content.hasPrefix("verify:") {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if content.hasPrefix("bitchat1:") {
|
|
let packet: BitchatPacket? = await MainActor.run {
|
|
Self.decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from: content)
|
|
}
|
|
guard let packet else {
|
|
SecureLogger.error("Failed to decode embedded BitChat packet from Nostr DM", category: .session)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let actualSenderNoiseKey: Data? = await MainActor.run {
|
|
self.findNoiseKey(for: senderPubkey)
|
|
}
|
|
let targetPeerID = PeerID(str: actualSenderNoiseKey?.hexEncodedString()) ?? PeerID(nostr_: senderPubkey)
|
|
|
|
if packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
|
|
let payload = NoisePayload.decode(packet.payload) {
|
|
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(rumorTimestamp))
|
|
await MainActor.run {
|
|
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(senderPubkey, for: targetPeerID)
|
|
|
|
switch payload.type {
|
|
case .privateMessage:
|
|
context.handlePrivateMessage(
|
|
payload,
|
|
senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
|
|
convKey: targetPeerID,
|
|
id: currentIdentity,
|
|
messageTimestamp: messageTimestamp
|
|
)
|
|
case .delivered:
|
|
context.handleDelivered(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: targetPeerID)
|
|
case .readReceipt:
|
|
context.handleReadReceipt(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: targetPeerID)
|
|
case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse:
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
SecureLogger.debug("Ignoring non-embedded Nostr DM content", category: .session)
|
|
}
|
|
} catch {
|
|
SecureLogger.error("Failed to decrypt Nostr message: \(error)", category: .session)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Resolves the Noise static key behind a Nostr pubkey via the favorites
|
|
/// store. Lives here because the inbound DM path needs it per message.
|
|
@MainActor
|
|
func findNoiseKey(for nostrPubkey: String) -> Data? {
|
|
guard let context else { return nil }
|
|
let favorites = context.allFavoriteRelationships()
|
|
var npubToMatch = nostrPubkey
|
|
|
|
if !nostrPubkey.hasPrefix("npub") {
|
|
if let pubkeyData = Data(hexString: nostrPubkey),
|
|
let encoded = try? Bech32.encode(hrp: "npub", data: pubkeyData) {
|
|
npubToMatch = encoded
|
|
} else {
|
|
SecureLogger.warning(
|
|
"⚠️ Invalid hex public key format or encoding failed: \(nostrPubkey.prefix(16))...",
|
|
category: .session
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for relationship in favorites {
|
|
if let storedNostrKey = relationship.peerNostrPublicKey {
|
|
if storedNostrKey == npubToMatch {
|
|
return relationship.peerNoisePublicKey
|
|
}
|
|
if !storedNostrKey.hasPrefix("npub") && storedNostrKey == nostrPubkey {
|
|
SecureLogger.debug("✅ Found Noise key for Nostr sender (hex match)", category: .session)
|
|
return relationship.peerNoisePublicKey
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SecureLogger.debug(
|
|
"⚠️ No matching Noise key found for Nostr pubkey: \(nostrPubkey.prefix(16))... (tried npub: \(npubToMatch.prefix(16))...)",
|
|
category: .session
|
|
)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private extension NostrInboundPipeline {
|
|
@MainActor
|
|
static func decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from content: String) -> BitchatPacket? {
|
|
guard content.hasPrefix("bitchat1:") else { return nil }
|
|
let encoded = String(content.dropFirst("bitchat1:".count))
|
|
let maxBytes = FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes
|
|
let maxEncoded = ((maxBytes + 2) / 3) * 4
|
|
guard encoded.count <= maxEncoded else { return nil }
|
|
guard let packetData = Base64URLCoding.decode(encoded),
|
|
packetData.count <= maxBytes
|
|
else {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return BitchatPacket.from(packetData)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|