Files
bitchat/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicy.swift
T
jackandGitHub 2d96fd99a1 Encrypt private media before BLE fragmentation (#1434)
Closes the last cleartext private-content path over BLE: private DM images/voice were sent as plaintext signed fileTransfer packets, TTL-relayed across the mesh, so every relay saw the full bytes. Now the complete BitchatFilePacket is encrypted as a single Noise AEAD message (inner type 0x20, matching Android) and the opaque ciphertext is fragmented. Adds an authenticated in-session capability proof (0x21 TLV: capabilities + Ed25519 key), TOFU-style downgrade pinning, a per-send consent dialog for the signed-cleartext fallback to legacy peers, and a cancellation/admission registry so cancel/delete cannot race a deferred cleartext send.

Android wire constants (0x20 / 0x21 / capability bit 8) confirmed shipping. The 256-fragment preflight cap applies only to the directed fileTransfer migration fallback; encrypted media to capable peers uses the full receiver ceiling.

Rebased over #1428/#1349: identity reads go through BLELocalIdentityStateStore; the session-bound authenticated signing-key check and the announce-path TOFU pin are kept as complementary checks. Full local suite green (1744+197 tests).
2026-07-26 12:17:22 +02:00

141 lines
4.4 KiB
Swift

import BitFoundation
import Foundation
struct BLEAnnouncePreflightAcceptance {
let announcement: AnnouncementPacket
let derivedPeerID: PeerID
}
enum BLEAnnouncePreflightRejection: Equatable {
case malformed
case senderMismatch(derivedPeerID: PeerID)
case selfAnnounce
case stale(ageSeconds: Double)
}
enum BLEAnnouncePreflightDecision {
case accept(BLEAnnouncePreflightAcceptance)
case reject(BLEAnnouncePreflightRejection)
}
enum BLEAnnouncePreflightPolicy {
static func evaluate(
packet: BitchatPacket,
from peerID: PeerID,
localPeerID: PeerID,
now: Date
) -> BLEAnnouncePreflightDecision {
guard let announcement = AnnouncementPacket.decode(from: packet.payload) else {
return .reject(.malformed)
}
let derivedPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey)
guard derivedPeerID == peerID else {
return .reject(.senderMismatch(derivedPeerID: derivedPeerID))
}
guard peerID != localPeerID else {
return .reject(.selfAnnounce)
}
guard !BLEPacketFreshnessPolicy.isStale(timestampMilliseconds: packet.timestamp, now: now) else {
return .reject(.stale(ageSeconds: BLEPacketFreshnessPolicy.ageSeconds(
timestampMilliseconds: packet.timestamp,
now: now
)))
}
return .accept(BLEAnnouncePreflightAcceptance(
announcement: announcement,
derivedPeerID: derivedPeerID
))
}
}
enum BLEAnnounceTrustRejection: Equatable {
case missingSignature
case invalidSignature
case keyMismatch
case signingKeyMismatch
case authenticatedSigningKeyMismatch
}
enum BLEAnnounceTrustDecision: Equatable {
case verified
case reject(BLEAnnounceTrustRejection)
var isVerified: Bool {
self == .verified
}
}
enum BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy {
static func evaluate(
hasSignature: Bool,
signatureValid: Bool,
existingNoisePublicKey: Data?,
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data,
existingSigningPublicKey: Data? = nil,
authenticatedSigningPublicKey: Data? = nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data
) -> BLEAnnounceTrustDecision {
if let existingNoisePublicKey, existingNoisePublicKey != announcedNoisePublicKey {
return .reject(.keyMismatch)
}
// Strongest binding first: an Ed25519 key bound to this Noise identity
// inside an authenticated Noise session can never be replaced by a
// merely self-signed announce.
if let authenticatedSigningPublicKey,
announcedSigningPublicKey != authenticatedSigningPublicKey {
return .reject(.authenticatedSigningKeyMismatch)
}
// TOFU signing-key pinning. The packet signature only proves the
// announce is self-consistent — it is verified against the Ed25519 key
// carried *inside the same announce*. Since peerIDs derive from the
// broadcast (public) noise key, an attacker can replay a victim's
// peerID+noiseKey with their own signing key and a valid
// self-signature. Once we have bound a signing key to this peer,
// refuse to silently replace it.
if let existingSigningPublicKey, existingSigningPublicKey != announcedSigningPublicKey {
return .reject(.signingKeyMismatch)
}
guard hasSignature else {
return .reject(.missingSignature)
}
guard signatureValid else {
return .reject(.invalidSignature)
}
return .verified
}
}
struct BLEAnnounceResponsePlan: Equatable {
let shouldNotifyPeerConnected: Bool
let shouldScheduleInitialSync: Bool
let shouldSendAnnounceBack: Bool
let shouldScheduleAfterglow: Bool
}
enum BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy {
static func plan(
isDirectAnnounce: Bool,
isNewPeer: Bool,
isReconnectedPeer: Bool,
shouldSendAnnounceBack: Bool
) -> BLEAnnounceResponsePlan {
let shouldNotifyPeerConnected = isDirectAnnounce && (isNewPeer || isReconnectedPeer)
return BLEAnnounceResponsePlan(
shouldNotifyPeerConnected: shouldNotifyPeerConnected,
shouldScheduleInitialSync: shouldNotifyPeerConnected,
shouldSendAnnounceBack: shouldSendAnnounceBack,
shouldScheduleAfterglow: isNewPeer
)
}
}