Files
bitchat/bitchat/Nostr/NostrIdentityBridge.swift
T
jackandClaude Fable 5 ca63893197 Fix security audit findings: 3 critical, 7 high
A broad audit surfaced ten critical/high issues across the crypto,
transport, identity, and panic-wipe layers. This fixes all ten.

Critical:
- Nostr DMs were unauthenticated. The NIP-17 seal was signed with a
  throwaway ephemeral key and the receiver never verified it, so anyone
  who knows a recipient's npub could forge messages (and delivery/read
  receipts) into an existing trusted conversation. The seal is now
  signed with the sender's real identity key, and the receiver verifies
  the seal signature and that seal.pubkey == rumor.pubkey.
  NOTE: this is a breaking wire-protocol change (see PR).
- Public BLE messages trusted registry membership instead of the packet
  signature. Since senderID is attacker-controlled, any verified peer
  could be impersonated in public chat. A valid signature from the
  claimed sender is now required before any registry identity is used.
- Unverified announces still persisted the announced identity, letting a
  replayed noisePublicKey overwrite a victim's stored signing key and
  nickname. persistIdentity is now gated on verification.

High:
- Noise decrypt trapped on a 16-19 byte ciphertext (negative prefix
  length after nonce extraction) — a remote crash. Now validated.
- Identity-cache debounce save used Timer.scheduledTimer on a GCD queue
  with no run loop, so it never fired; block/verify/favorite changes
  only persisted on explicit forceSave. Replaced with a
  DispatchSourceTimer on the queue; forceSave is now serialized.
- Identity-cache key load couldn't tell "missing" from a transient
  keychain failure and would regenerate (deleting) the key, orphaning
  the cache. Now uses getIdentityKeyWithResult and falls back to a
  session-only ephemeral key without clobbering the persisted key/cache.
- BLE receive-dedup key lacked a payload digest, so post-handshake
  flushes (queued msgs + delivery/read acks in the same ms) were dropped
  as duplicates. Digest added, matching the ingress registry.
- Maintenance timer was created only in init and never recreated after a
  panic stop/start, silently degrading the mesh until app restart. Now
  recreated in startServices.
- Panic wipe left persisted location state (selected channel, teleport
  set, bookmarks) and cached per-geohash Nostr private keys behind. Both
  are now cleared.
- Panic spawned an orphan NostrRelayManager instead of reusing .shared,
  splitting relay state from every other component. Now reuses .shared.

Tests updated to assert the fixed behavior (announce no longer persists
unverified identities; public messages require a signature; receive
dedup ID includes the payload digest).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 14:07:28 +02:00

166 lines
6.8 KiB
Swift

import BitFoundation
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
/// Bridge between Noise and Nostr identities
final class NostrIdentityBridge {
private let keychainService = "chat.bitchat.nostr"
private let currentIdentityKey = "nostr-current-identity"
private let deviceSeedKey = "nostr-device-seed"
// In-memory cache to avoid transient keychain access issues
private var deviceSeedCache: Data?
// Cache derived identities to avoid repeated crypto during view rendering
private var derivedIdentityCache: [String: NostrIdentity] = [:]
private let cacheLock = NSLock()
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager()) {
self.keychain = keychain
}
/// Get or create the current Nostr identity
func getCurrentNostrIdentity() throws -> NostrIdentity? {
// Check if we already have a Nostr identity
if let existingData = keychain.load(key: currentIdentityKey, service: keychainService),
let identity = try? JSONDecoder().decode(NostrIdentity.self, from: existingData) {
return identity
}
// Generate new Nostr identity
let nostrIdentity = try NostrIdentity.generate()
// Store it
let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(nostrIdentity)
keychain.save(key: currentIdentityKey, data: data, service: keychainService, accessible: nil)
return nostrIdentity
}
/// Associate a Nostr identity with a Noise public key (for favorites)
func associateNostrIdentity(_ nostrPubkey: String, with noisePublicKey: Data) {
let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
if let data = nostrPubkey.data(using: .utf8) {
keychain.save(key: key, data: data, service: keychainService, accessible: nil)
}
}
/// Get Nostr public key associated with a Noise public key
func getNostrPublicKey(for noisePublicKey: Data) -> String? {
let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
guard let data = keychain.load(key: key, service: keychainService),
let pubkey = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) else {
return nil
}
return pubkey
}
/// Clear all Nostr identity associations and current identity
func clearAllAssociations() {
let query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: keychainService,
kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitAll,
kSecReturnAttributes as String: true
]
var result: AnyObject?
let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
if status == errSecSuccess, let items = result as? [[String: Any]] {
for item in items {
var deleteQuery: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: keychainService
]
if let account = item[kSecAttrAccount as String] as? String {
deleteQuery[kSecAttrAccount as String] = account
}
SecItemDelete(deleteQuery as CFDictionary)
}
} else if status == errSecItemNotFound {
// nothing persisted; no action needed
}
deviceSeedCache = nil
// Also drop the in-memory derived per-geohash identities. These hold the
// actual secp256k1 private keys; if left cached, post-panic geohash
// messages would still be signed with pre-panic keys (linkable across the
// wipe) until the app is force-quit.
cacheLock.lock()
derivedIdentityCache.removeAll()
cacheLock.unlock()
}
// MARK: - Per-Geohash Identities (Location Channels)
/// Returns a stable device seed used to derive unlinkable per-geohash identities.
/// Stored only on device keychain.
private func getOrCreateDeviceSeed() -> Data {
if let cached = deviceSeedCache { return cached }
if let existing = keychain.load(key: deviceSeedKey, service: keychainService) {
// Migrate to AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly for stability during lock
keychain.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: existing, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
deviceSeedCache = existing
return existing
}
var seed = Data(count: 32)
_ = seed.withUnsafeMutableBytes { ptr in
SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, 32, ptr.baseAddress!)
}
// Ensure availability after first unlock to prevent unintended rotation when locked
keychain.save(key: deviceSeedKey, data: seed, service: keychainService, accessible: kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly)
deviceSeedCache = seed
return seed
}
/// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a given geohash.
/// Uses HMAC-SHA256(deviceSeed, geohash) as private key material, with fallback rehashing
/// if the candidate is not a valid secp256k1 private key.
func deriveIdentity(forGeohash geohash: String) throws -> NostrIdentity {
// Check cache first to avoid repeated crypto + keychain I/O during view rendering
cacheLock.lock()
if let cached = derivedIdentityCache[geohash] {
cacheLock.unlock()
return cached
}
cacheLock.unlock()
let seed = getOrCreateDeviceSeed()
guard let msg = geohash.data(using: .utf8) else {
throw NSError(domain: "NostrIdentity", code: -1, userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "Invalid geohash string"])
}
func candidateKey(iteration: UInt32) -> Data {
var input = Data(msg)
var iterBE = iteration.bigEndian
withUnsafeBytes(of: &iterBE) { bytes in
input.append(contentsOf: bytes)
}
let code = HMAC<SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: input, using: SymmetricKey(data: seed))
return Data(code)
}
// Try a few iterations to ensure a valid key can be formed
for i in 0..<10 {
let keyData = candidateKey(iteration: UInt32(i))
if let identity = try? NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: keyData) {
// Cache the result
cacheLock.lock()
derivedIdentityCache[geohash] = identity
cacheLock.unlock()
return identity
}
}
// As a final fallback, hash the seed+msg and try again
let fallback = (seed + msg).sha256Hash()
let identity = try NostrIdentity(privateKeyData: fallback)
// Cache the result
cacheLock.lock()
derivedIdentityCache[geohash] = identity
cacheLock.unlock()
return identity
}
}