mirror of
https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
synced 2026-07-24 23:45:18 +00:00
jackandClaude Fable 5
2cbcb290f7
The app test job hung at process exit (all tests pass, then SIGKILL at the CI timeout). Root cause: fix #5 replaced the dead Timer.scheduledTimer with a real DispatchSourceTimer, created per manager instance, resumed and never cancelled. Those live timer sources kept the dispatch machinery alive so the swift-testing process never exited. The earlier `isRunningTests` guard was fragile (it does not reliably detect the swift-testing-only runner on CI). Drop the debounce timer entirely. Mutations now persist via the same serialized `queue` barrier their callers already run on (saveIdentityCache -> performSave directly); forceSave is a direct, non-blocking call (no queue.sync, which is unsafe on the cooperative pool). No timer is left scheduled, so nothing keeps the process alive. The original bug is still fixed — saves now actually happen, unlike the never-firing Timer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
591 lines
23 KiB
Swift
591 lines
23 KiB
Swift
//
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// SecureIdentityStateManager.swift
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// bitchat
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//
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// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
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// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
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//
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///
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/// # SecureIdentityStateManager
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///
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/// Manages the persistent storage and retrieval of identity mappings with
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/// encryption at rest. This singleton service maintains the relationship between
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/// ephemeral peer IDs, cryptographic fingerprints, and social identities.
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///
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/// ## Overview
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/// The SecureIdentityStateManager provides a secure, privacy-preserving way to
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/// maintain identity relationships across app launches. It implements:
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/// - Encrypted storage of identity mappings
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/// - In-memory caching for performance
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/// - Thread-safe access patterns
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/// - Automatic debounced persistence
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///
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/// ## Architecture
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/// The manager operates at three levels:
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/// 1. **In-Memory State**: Fast access to active identities
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/// 2. **Encrypted Cache**: Persistent storage in Keychain
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/// 3. **Privacy Controls**: User-configurable persistence settings
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///
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/// ## Security Features
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///
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/// ### Encryption at Rest
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/// - Identity cache encrypted with AES-GCM
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/// - Unique 256-bit encryption key per device
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/// - Key stored separately in Keychain
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/// - No plaintext identity data on disk
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///
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/// ### Privacy by Design
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/// - Persistence is optional (user-controlled)
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/// - Minimal data retention
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/// - No cloud sync or backup
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/// - Automatic cleanup of stale entries
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///
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/// ### Thread Safety
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/// - Concurrent read access via GCD barriers
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/// - Write operations serialized
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/// - Atomic state updates
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/// - No data races or corruption
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///
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/// ## Data Model
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/// Manages three types of identity data:
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/// 1. **Ephemeral Sessions**: Current peer connections
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/// 2. **Cryptographic Identities**: Public keys and fingerprints
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/// 3. **Social Identities**: User-assigned names and trust
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///
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/// ## Persistence Strategy
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/// - Changes batched and debounced (2-second window)
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/// - Automatic save on app termination
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/// - Crash-resistant with atomic writes
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/// - Migration support for schema changes
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///
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/// ## Usage Patterns
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/// ```swift
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/// // Register a new peer identity
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/// manager.registerPeerIdentity(peerID, publicKey, fingerprint)
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///
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/// // Update social identity
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/// manager.updateSocialIdentity(fingerprint, nickname, trustLevel)
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///
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/// // Query identity
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/// let identity = manager.resolvePeerIdentity(peerID)
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/// ```
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///
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/// ## Performance Optimizations
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/// - In-memory cache eliminates Keychain roundtrips
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/// - Debounced saves reduce I/O operations
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/// - Efficient data structures for lookups
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/// - Background queue for expensive operations
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///
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/// ## Privacy Considerations
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/// - Users can disable all persistence
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/// - Identity cache can be wiped instantly
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/// - No analytics or telemetry
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/// - Ephemeral mode for high-risk users
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///
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/// ## Future Enhancements
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/// - Selective identity export
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/// - Cross-device identity sync (optional)
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/// - Identity attestation support
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/// - Advanced conflict resolution
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///
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import BitLogger
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import BitFoundation
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import Foundation
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import CryptoKit
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protocol SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
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// MARK: Secure Loading/Saving
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func forceSave()
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// MARK: Social Identity Management
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func getSocialIdentity(for fingerprint: String) -> SocialIdentity?
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// MARK: Cryptographic Identities
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func upsertCryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: String, noisePublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data?, claimedNickname: String?)
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func getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(_ peerID: PeerID) -> [CryptographicIdentity]
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func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity)
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// MARK: Favorites Management
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func getFavorites() -> Set<String>
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func setFavorite(_ fingerprint: String, isFavorite: Bool)
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func isFavorite(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
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// MARK: Blocked Users Management
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func isBlocked(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
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func setBlocked(_ fingerprint: String, isBlocked: Bool)
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// MARK: Geohash (Nostr) Blocking
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func isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool
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func setNostrBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String, isBlocked: Bool)
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func getBlockedNostrPubkeys() -> Set<String>
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// MARK: Ephemeral Session Management
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func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState)
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func updateHandshakeState(peerID: PeerID, state: HandshakeState)
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// MARK: Cleanup
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func clearAllIdentityData()
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func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID)
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// MARK: Verification
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func setVerified(fingerprint: String, verified: Bool)
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func isVerified(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
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func getVerifiedFingerprints() -> Set<String>
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}
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/// Singleton manager for secure identity state persistence and retrieval.
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/// Provides thread-safe access to identity mappings with encryption at rest.
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/// All identity data is stored encrypted in the device Keychain for security.
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final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
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private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
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private let cacheKey = "bitchat.identityCache.v2"
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private let encryptionKeyName = "identityCacheEncryptionKey"
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// In-memory state
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private var ephemeralSessions: [PeerID: EphemeralIdentity] = [:]
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private var cryptographicIdentities: [String: CryptographicIdentity] = [:]
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private var cache: IdentityCache = IdentityCache()
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// Thread safety
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private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "bitchat.identity.state", attributes: .concurrent)
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// Pending-save coalescing flag. Reads/writes are serialized on `queue`.
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// Persistence is done with a fire-and-forget `queue.async(.barrier)` rather
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// than a retained DispatchSourceTimer: a lingering, never-cancelled timer
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// keeps the dispatch machinery alive and prevents the unit-test process from
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// exiting. (The original code used Timer.scheduledTimer on a GCD queue with
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// no run loop, so saves never actually fired.)
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private var pendingSave = false
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// Encryption key
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private let encryptionKey: SymmetricKey
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/// True when `encryptionKey` is a throwaway generated this session because the
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/// persisted key could not be read (device locked / access denied). In that
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/// state we must NOT persist (it would overwrite the real cache with data the
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/// next launch can't decrypt) and must NOT delete the existing cache.
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private let encryptionKeyIsEphemeral: Bool
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init(_ keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
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self.keychain = keychain
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// Retrieve (or, only on genuine first run, generate) the cache
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// encryption key. We MUST distinguish "key doesn't exist yet" from a
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// transient failure (device locked / access denied): the legacy
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// getIdentityKey(forKey:) collapses both to nil, and generating+saving a
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// new key deletes the existing one first — permanently orphaning the
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// encrypted cache on a launch that merely couldn't read the key.
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let loadedKey: SymmetricKey
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let keyIsEphemeral: Bool
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switch keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: encryptionKeyName) {
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case .success(let keyData):
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loadedKey = SymmetricKey(data: keyData)
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keyIsEphemeral = false
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SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "identity cache encryption key", success: true)
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case .itemNotFound:
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// Genuine first run: generate and persist a new key.
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let newKey = SymmetricKey(size: .bits256)
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let keyData = newKey.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
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let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: encryptionKeyName)
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loadedKey = newKey
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// If even the save failed, treat the key as ephemeral so we don't
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// later try to persist a cache the next launch can't read.
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keyIsEphemeral = !saved
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SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.generate, keyType: "identity cache encryption key", success: saved)
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case .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed, .accessDenied, .otherError:
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// Transient/critical read failure. Do NOT overwrite the persisted
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// key. Use a session-only ephemeral key; the real key and cache are
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// left intact for a healthy launch.
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SecureLogger.warning("Identity cache key unavailable; using ephemeral key for this session (not persisting)", category: .security)
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loadedKey = SymmetricKey(size: .bits256)
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keyIsEphemeral = true
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}
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self.encryptionKey = loadedKey
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self.encryptionKeyIsEphemeral = keyIsEphemeral
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// Only read the persisted cache when we hold the real key; with an
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// ephemeral key the decrypt would fail and discard the real cache.
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if !keyIsEphemeral {
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loadIdentityCache()
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}
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}
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deinit {
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forceSave()
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}
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// MARK: - Secure Loading/Saving
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private func loadIdentityCache() {
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guard let encryptedData = keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: cacheKey) else {
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// No existing cache, start fresh
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return
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}
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do {
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let sealedBox = try AES.GCM.SealedBox(combined: encryptedData)
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let decryptedData = try AES.GCM.open(sealedBox, using: encryptionKey)
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cache = try JSONDecoder().decode(IdentityCache.self, from: decryptedData)
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} catch {
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cache = IdentityCache()
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let deleted = keychain.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: cacheKey)
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SecureLogger.warning(
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"Discarded unreadable identity cache; starting fresh (deleted=\(deleted), error=\(error.localizedDescription))",
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category: .security
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)
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}
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}
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/// Persists the cache. Always invoked on `queue` under a barrier (its callers
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/// run inside `queue.async(.barrier)`), so it simply marks the cache dirty
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/// and persists it on the same serialized context — no timer, nothing left
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/// scheduled to keep the process alive.
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private func saveIdentityCache() {
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pendingSave = true
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performSave()
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}
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/// Writes the cache to the keychain. Must run on `queue` with exclusive
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/// (barrier) access.
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private func performSave() {
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guard pendingSave else { return }
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pendingSave = false
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// Never persist under an ephemeral key — it would overwrite the real
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// cache with data the next launch cannot decrypt.
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guard !encryptionKeyIsEphemeral else {
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SecureLogger.debug("Skipping identity cache save (ephemeral key this session)", category: .security)
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return
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}
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do {
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let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(cache)
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let sealedBox = try AES.GCM.seal(data, using: encryptionKey)
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let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(sealedBox.combined!, forKey: cacheKey)
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if saved {
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SecureLogger.debug("Identity cache saved to keychain", category: .security)
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}
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} catch {
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SecureLogger.error(error, context: "Failed to save identity cache", category: .security)
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}
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}
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// Force immediate save (for app termination / lifecycle events). Mutations
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// already persist synchronously via saveIdentityCache, so this is normally a
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// no-op (performSave early-returns when nothing is pending). Runs directly on
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// the caller's thread — deliberately NOT a `queue.sync(barrier)`, which is
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// reachable from `deinit` and from async tests on the swift-concurrency
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// cooperative pool where a blocking barrier-sync can starve/deadlock it.
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func forceSave() {
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performSave()
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}
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// MARK: - Social Identity Management
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func getSocialIdentity(for fingerprint: String) -> SocialIdentity? {
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queue.sync {
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return cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint]
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}
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}
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// MARK: - Cryptographic Identities
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/// Insert or update a cryptographic identity and optionally persist its signing key and claimed nickname.
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/// - Parameters:
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/// - fingerprint: SHA-256 hex of the Noise static public key
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/// - noisePublicKey: Noise static public key data
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/// - signingPublicKey: Optional Ed25519 signing public key for authenticating public messages
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/// - claimedNickname: Optional latest claimed nickname to persist into social identity
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func upsertCryptographicIdentity(fingerprint: String, noisePublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data?, claimedNickname: String? = nil) {
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queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
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let now = Date()
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if var existing = self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] {
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// Update keys if changed
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if existing.publicKey != noisePublicKey {
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existing = CryptographicIdentity(
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fingerprint: fingerprint,
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publicKey: noisePublicKey,
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signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey,
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firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
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lastHandshake: now
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)
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self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing
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} else {
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// Update signing key and lastHandshake
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existing.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey
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let updated = CryptographicIdentity(
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fingerprint: existing.fingerprint,
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publicKey: existing.publicKey,
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signingPublicKey: existing.signingPublicKey,
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firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
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lastHandshake: now
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)
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self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = updated
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}
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// Persist updated state (already assigned in branches above)
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} else {
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// New entry
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let entry = CryptographicIdentity(
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fingerprint: fingerprint,
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publicKey: noisePublicKey,
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signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
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firstSeen: now,
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lastHandshake: now
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)
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self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = entry
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}
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// Optionally persist claimed nickname into social identity
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if let claimed = claimedNickname {
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var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] ?? SocialIdentity(
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fingerprint: fingerprint,
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localPetname: nil,
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claimedNickname: claimed,
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trustLevel: .unknown,
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isFavorite: false,
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isBlocked: false,
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notes: nil
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)
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// Update claimed nickname if changed
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if identity.claimedNickname != claimed {
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identity.claimedNickname = claimed
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self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
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} else if self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] == nil {
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self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
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}
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}
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self.saveIdentityCache()
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}
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}
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/// Find cryptographic identities whose fingerprint prefix matches a peerID (16-hex) short ID
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func getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix(_ peerID: PeerID) -> [CryptographicIdentity] {
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queue.sync {
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// Defensive: ensure hex and correct length
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guard peerID.isShort else { return [] }
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return cryptographicIdentities.values.filter { $0.fingerprint.hasPrefix(peerID.id) }
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}
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}
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func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) {
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queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
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let previousClaimedNickname = self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint]?.claimedNickname
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self.cache.socialIdentities[identity.fingerprint] = identity
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// Update nickname index
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if let previousClaimedNickname,
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previousClaimedNickname != identity.claimedNickname {
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self.cache.nicknameIndex[previousClaimedNickname]?.remove(identity.fingerprint)
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if self.cache.nicknameIndex[previousClaimedNickname]?.isEmpty == true {
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self.cache.nicknameIndex.removeValue(forKey: previousClaimedNickname)
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}
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}
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// Add new nickname to index
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if self.cache.nicknameIndex[identity.claimedNickname] == nil {
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self.cache.nicknameIndex[identity.claimedNickname] = Set<String>()
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}
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self.cache.nicknameIndex[identity.claimedNickname]?.insert(identity.fingerprint)
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// Save to keychain
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self.saveIdentityCache()
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}
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}
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// MARK: - Favorites Management
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func getFavorites() -> Set<String> {
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queue.sync {
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let favorites = cache.socialIdentities.values
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.filter { $0.isFavorite }
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.map { $0.fingerprint }
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return Set(favorites)
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}
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}
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func setFavorite(_ fingerprint: String, isFavorite: Bool) {
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queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
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if var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] {
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identity.isFavorite = isFavorite
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self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
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} else {
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// Create new social identity for this fingerprint
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let newIdentity = SocialIdentity(
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fingerprint: fingerprint,
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localPetname: nil,
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claimedNickname: "Unknown",
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trustLevel: .unknown,
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isFavorite: isFavorite,
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isBlocked: false,
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notes: nil
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)
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self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = newIdentity
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}
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self.saveIdentityCache()
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}
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}
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func isFavorite(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
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queue.sync {
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return cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint]?.isFavorite ?? false
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}
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}
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// MARK: - Blocked Users Management
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func isBlocked(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
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queue.sync {
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return cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint]?.isBlocked ?? false
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}
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}
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func setBlocked(_ fingerprint: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
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SecureLogger.info("User \(isBlocked ? "blocked" : "unblocked"): \(fingerprint)", category: .security)
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queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
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if var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] {
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identity.isBlocked = isBlocked
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if isBlocked {
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identity.isFavorite = false // Can't be both favorite and blocked
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}
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self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
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} else {
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// Create new social identity for this fingerprint
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let newIdentity = SocialIdentity(
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fingerprint: fingerprint,
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localPetname: nil,
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claimedNickname: "Unknown",
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trustLevel: .unknown,
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isFavorite: false,
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isBlocked: isBlocked,
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notes: nil
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)
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self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = newIdentity
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}
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self.saveIdentityCache()
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}
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}
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// MARK: - Geohash (Nostr) Blocking
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func isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool {
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queue.sync {
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return cache.blockedNostrPubkeys.contains(pubkeyHexLowercased.lowercased())
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}
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}
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func setNostrBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
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let key = pubkeyHexLowercased.lowercased()
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queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
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if isBlocked {
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self.cache.blockedNostrPubkeys.insert(key)
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} else {
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self.cache.blockedNostrPubkeys.remove(key)
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}
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self.saveIdentityCache()
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}
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}
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func getBlockedNostrPubkeys() -> Set<String> {
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queue.sync { cache.blockedNostrPubkeys }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Ephemeral Session Management
|
|
|
|
func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState = .none) {
|
|
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
|
|
self.ephemeralSessions[peerID] = EphemeralIdentity(
|
|
peerID: peerID,
|
|
sessionStart: Date(),
|
|
handshakeState: handshakeState
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func updateHandshakeState(peerID: PeerID, state: HandshakeState) {
|
|
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
|
|
self.ephemeralSessions[peerID]?.handshakeState = state
|
|
|
|
// If handshake completed, update last interaction
|
|
if case .completed(let fingerprint) = state {
|
|
self.cache.lastInteractions[fingerprint] = Date()
|
|
self.saveIdentityCache()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Cleanup
|
|
|
|
func clearAllIdentityData() {
|
|
SecureLogger.warning("Clearing all identity data", category: .security)
|
|
|
|
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
|
|
self.cache = IdentityCache()
|
|
self.ephemeralSessions.removeAll()
|
|
self.cryptographicIdentities.removeAll()
|
|
|
|
// Delete from keychain
|
|
let deleted = self.keychain.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: self.cacheKey)
|
|
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.delete, keyType: "identity cache", success: deleted)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID) {
|
|
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
|
|
self.ephemeralSessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Verification
|
|
|
|
func setVerified(fingerprint: String, verified: Bool) {
|
|
SecureLogger.info("Fingerprint \(verified ? "verified" : "unverified"): \(fingerprint)", category: .security)
|
|
|
|
queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
|
|
if verified {
|
|
self.cache.verifiedFingerprints.insert(fingerprint)
|
|
} else {
|
|
self.cache.verifiedFingerprints.remove(fingerprint)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Update trust level if social identity exists
|
|
if var identity = self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] {
|
|
identity.trustLevel = verified ? .verified : .casual
|
|
self.cache.socialIdentities[fingerprint] = identity
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
self.saveIdentityCache()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func isVerified(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
|
|
queue.sync {
|
|
return cache.verifiedFingerprints.contains(fingerprint)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func getVerifiedFingerprints() -> Set<String> {
|
|
queue.sync {
|
|
return cache.verifiedFingerprints
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var debugNicknameIndex: [String: Set<String>] {
|
|
queue.sync { cache.nicknameIndex }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func debugEphemeralSession(for peerID: PeerID) -> EphemeralIdentity? {
|
|
queue.sync { ephemeralSessions[peerID] }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func debugLastInteraction(for fingerprint: String) -> Date? {
|
|
queue.sync { cache.lastInteractions[fingerprint] }
|
|
}
|
|
}
|