Files
bitchat/bitchat/ViewModels/NostrInboundPipeline.swift
T
jackandClaude Fable 5 cc76086615 Inject notification/favorites singletons through coordinator contexts
NotificationService.shared and FavoritesPersistenceService.shared
accesses across nine coordinators/components consolidate into
ChatViewModel witnesses behind intent-named context members
(notifyPrivateMessage, notifyMention, favoriteRelationship(forNoiseKey:),
allFavoriteRelationships, postLocalNotification, ...). Singleton reach
from coordinators is now zero; nine new tests cover previously
untestable notification/favorites flows.

Also root-causes the long-flaky gift-wrap dedup test: parallel tests
share LocationChannelManager.shared, so channel-switch tests trigger
clearProcessedNostrEvents() on every live ChatViewModel, wiping the
dedup record mid-test. The invariant (forged-signature copies never
poison dedup) now lives as a deterministic NostrInboundPipeline
mock-context test; two Schnorr concurrency probes added along the way
stay as regression guards for the P256K shared-context assumptions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 23:04:20 +02:00

501 lines
20 KiB
Swift

import BitFoundation
import BitLogger
import Foundation
/// The narrow surface `NostrInboundPipeline` needs from its owner.
///
/// Split out of `ChatNostrContext`: member names are shared with the sibling
/// component contexts so `ChatViewModel` provides a single witness for each.
@MainActor
protocol NostrInboundPipelineContext: AnyObject {
var currentGeohash: String? { get }
// MARK: Event dedup
func hasProcessedNostrEvent(_ eventID: String) -> Bool
func recordProcessedNostrEvent(_ eventID: String)
// MARK: Nostr identity & blocking
func deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash geohash: String) throws -> NostrIdentity
func currentNostrIdentity() -> NostrIdentity?
func isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool
func displayNameForNostrPubkey(_ pubkeyHex: String) -> String
// MARK: Favorites bridge
/// All favorite relationships, used to bridge a Nostr pubkey back to a
/// Noise key on the inbound DM path.
func allFavoriteRelationships() -> [FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship]
// MARK: Presence & key mapping
func setGeoNickname(_ nickname: String, forPubkey pubkeyHex: String)
/// Records the Nostr pubkey behind a (possibly virtual) peer ID.
func registerNostrKeyMapping(_ pubkey: String, for peerID: PeerID)
func recordGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: String)
// MARK: Inbound public messages
func handlePublicMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage)
func checkForMentions(_ message: BitchatMessage)
func sendHapticFeedback(for message: BitchatMessage)
func parseMentions(from content: String) -> [String]
// MARK: Inbound private (DM) payloads
func handlePrivateMessage(
_ payload: NoisePayload,
senderPubkey: String,
convKey: PeerID,
id: NostrIdentity,
messageTimestamp: Date
)
func handleDelivered(_ payload: NoisePayload, senderPubkey: String, convKey: PeerID)
func handleReadReceipt(_ payload: NoisePayload, senderPubkey: String, convKey: PeerID)
}
extension ChatViewModel: NostrInboundPipelineContext {
// `currentGeohash`, the identity/blocking members, key mapping, and the
// inbound message handlers already have witnesses on `ChatViewModel`.
// The members below flatten nested service accesses into intent-named calls.
func hasProcessedNostrEvent(_ eventID: String) -> Bool {
deduplicationService.hasProcessedNostrEvent(eventID)
}
func allFavoriteRelationships() -> [FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship] {
Array(FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.favorites.values)
}
func recordProcessedNostrEvent(_ eventID: String) {
deduplicationService.recordNostrEvent(eventID)
}
func setGeoNickname(_ nickname: String, forPubkey pubkeyHex: String) {
locationPresenceStore.setNickname(nickname, for: pubkeyHex)
}
func recordGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: String) {
participantTracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: pubkeyHex)
}
}
/// The inbound Nostr hot path: raw relay events in, chat messages / Noise
/// payloads out. Pure transformation plus dedup — no relay lifecycle.
///
/// Ordering is deliberate and performance-critical: cheap rejects (kind,
/// dedup lookup) run BEFORE Schnorr signature verification because duplicates
/// dominate real relay traffic; events are recorded only AFTER verification so
/// a forged-signature copy can never poison the dedup set; gift-wrap
/// verification for the account mailbox runs off-main with an atomic
/// main-actor check-and-record.
final class NostrInboundPipeline {
private weak var context: (any NostrInboundPipelineContext)?
private let presence: GeoPresenceTracker
private var geoEventLogCount = 0
init(context: any NostrInboundPipelineContext, presence: GeoPresenceTracker) {
self.context = context
self.presence = presence
}
@MainActor
func subscribeNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent) {
guard let context else { return }
// Cheap rejects (kind, dedup lookup) before Schnorr verification —
// duplicates dominate real traffic and must not pay for crypto.
// Only verified events are recorded, so a forged-signature copy can
// never poison the dedup set and suppress the genuine event.
guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue
|| event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue),
!context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(event.id)
else {
return
}
guard event.isValidSignature() else { return }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(event.id)
if let gh = context.currentGeohash,
let myGeoIdentity = try? context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: gh),
myGeoIdentity.publicKeyHex.lowercased() == event.pubkey.lowercased() {
let eventTime = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
if Date().timeIntervalSince(eventTime) < 15 {
return
}
}
if let nickTag = event.tags.first(where: { $0.first == "n" }), nickTag.count >= 2 {
let nick = nickTag[1].trimmed
context.setGeoNickname(nick, forPubkey: event.pubkey)
}
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(event.pubkey, for: PeerID(nostr_: event.pubkey))
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(event.pubkey, for: PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey))
context.recordGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
if event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue {
return
}
if GeoPresenceTracker.hasTeleportTag(event) {
let key = event.pubkey.lowercased()
let isSelf: Bool = {
if let gh = context.currentGeohash,
let myIdentity = try? context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: gh) {
return myIdentity.publicKeyHex.lowercased() == key
}
return false
}()
if !isSelf {
presence.scheduleMarkPeerTeleported(key, logged: false)
}
}
let senderName = context.displayNameForNostrPubkey(event.pubkey)
let content = event.content.trimmed
let rawTs = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
let timestamp = min(rawTs, Date())
let mentions = context.parseMentions(from: content)
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: event.id,
sender: senderName,
content: content,
timestamp: timestamp,
isRelay: false,
senderPeerID: PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey),
mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
)
Task { @MainActor [weak context] in
guard let context else { return }
let isBlocked = context.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey.lowercased())
context.handlePublicMessage(message)
if !isBlocked {
context.checkForMentions(message)
context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
}
}
}
@MainActor
func handleNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent) {
guard let context else { return }
// Cheap rejects (kind, dedup lookup) before Schnorr verification —
// duplicates dominate real traffic and must not pay for crypto.
guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue
|| event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue)
else {
return
}
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(event.id) { return }
guard event.isValidSignature() else { return }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(event.id)
// Sampled: fires for every geo event and floods dev logs in busy geohashes.
geoEventLogCount += 1
if geoEventLogCount == 1 || geoEventLogCount.isMultiple(of: TransportConfig.nostrInboundEventLogInterval) {
SecureLogger.debug("GeoTeleport: recv #\(geoEventLogCount) pub=\(event.pubkey.prefix(8))… tags=\(event.tags.map { "[" + $0.joined(separator: ",") + "]" }.joined(separator: ","))", category: .session)
}
if context.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey) {
return
}
let hasTeleportTag = GeoPresenceTracker.hasTeleportTag(event)
let isSelf: Bool = {
if let gh = context.currentGeohash,
let my = try? context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: gh) {
return my.publicKeyHex.lowercased() == event.pubkey.lowercased()
}
return false
}()
if hasTeleportTag, !isSelf {
presence.scheduleMarkPeerTeleported(event.pubkey.lowercased(), logged: true)
}
context.recordGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
if isSelf {
let eventTime = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
if Date().timeIntervalSince(eventTime) < 15 {
return
}
}
if let nickTag = event.tags.first(where: { $0.first == "n" }), nickTag.count >= 2 {
context.setGeoNickname(nickTag[1].trimmed, forPubkey: event.pubkey)
}
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(event.pubkey, for: PeerID(nostr_: event.pubkey))
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(event.pubkey, for: PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey))
if event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue {
return
}
let senderName = context.displayNameForNostrPubkey(event.pubkey)
let content = event.content
if let teleTag = event.tags.first(where: { $0.first == "t" }),
teleTag.count >= 2,
teleTag[1] == "teleport",
content.trimmed.isEmpty {
return
}
let rawTs = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
let mentions = context.parseMentions(from: content)
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: event.id,
sender: senderName,
content: content,
timestamp: min(rawTs, Date()),
isRelay: false,
senderPeerID: PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey),
mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
)
Task { @MainActor [weak context] in
guard let context else { return }
context.handlePublicMessage(message)
context.checkForMentions(message)
context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
}
}
@MainActor
func subscribeGiftWrap(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent, id: NostrIdentity) {
guard let context else { return }
// Dedup lookup before Schnorr verification; record only after it passes.
guard !context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) else { return }
guard giftWrap.isValidSignature() else { return }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
guard let (content, senderPubkey, rumorTs) = try? NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateMessage(
giftWrap: giftWrap,
recipientIdentity: id
),
let packet = Self.decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from: content),
packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
let noisePayload = NoisePayload.decode(packet.payload)
else {
return
}
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(rumorTs))
let convKey = PeerID(nostr_: senderPubkey)
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(senderPubkey, for: convKey)
switch noisePayload.type {
case .privateMessage:
context.handlePrivateMessage(
noisePayload,
senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
convKey: convKey,
id: id,
messageTimestamp: messageTimestamp
)
case .delivered:
context.handleDelivered(noisePayload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
case .readReceipt:
context.handleReadReceipt(noisePayload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse:
break
}
}
@MainActor
func handleGiftWrap(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent, id: NostrIdentity) {
guard let context else { return }
// Dedup lookup before Schnorr verification; record only after it passes.
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) {
return
}
guard giftWrap.isValidSignature() else { return }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
guard let (content, senderPubkey, rumorTs) = try? NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateMessage(
giftWrap: giftWrap,
recipientIdentity: id
) else {
SecureLogger.warning("GeoDM: failed decrypt giftWrap id=\(giftWrap.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
return
}
SecureLogger.debug(
"GeoDM: decrypted gift-wrap id=\(giftWrap.id.prefix(16))... from=\(senderPubkey.prefix(8))...",
category: .session
)
guard let packet = Self.decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from: content),
packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
let payload = NoisePayload.decode(packet.payload)
else {
return
}
let convKey = PeerID(nostr_: senderPubkey)
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(senderPubkey, for: convKey)
switch payload.type {
case .privateMessage:
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(rumorTs))
context.handlePrivateMessage(
payload,
senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
convKey: convKey,
id: id,
messageTimestamp: messageTimestamp
)
case .delivered:
context.handleDelivered(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
case .readReceipt:
context.handleReadReceipt(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: convKey)
case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse:
break
}
}
@MainActor
func handleNostrMessage(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent) {
guard let context else { return }
// Cheap dedup pre-check only; Schnorr verification runs off-main in
// processNostrMessage, which then does the authoritative
// check-and-record. Recording stays after verification so a
// forged-signature copy can never poison the dedup set and suppress
// the genuine event.
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) { return }
Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { [weak self] in
await self?.processNostrMessage(giftWrap)
}
}
func processNostrMessage(_ giftWrap: NostrEvent) async {
guard giftWrap.isValidSignature() else { return }
guard let context else { return }
// Authoritative check-and-record, atomic on the main actor so two
// concurrent detached tasks can't both process the same event.
let alreadyProcessed: Bool = await MainActor.run {
if context.hasProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id) { return true }
context.recordProcessedNostrEvent(giftWrap.id)
return false
}
if alreadyProcessed { return }
let currentIdentity: NostrIdentity? = await MainActor.run {
context.currentNostrIdentity()
}
guard let currentIdentity else { return }
do {
let (content, senderPubkey, rumorTimestamp) = try NostrProtocol.decryptPrivateMessage(
giftWrap: giftWrap,
recipientIdentity: currentIdentity
)
if content.hasPrefix("verify:") {
return
}
if content.hasPrefix("bitchat1:") {
let packet: BitchatPacket? = await MainActor.run {
Self.decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from: content)
}
guard let packet else {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to decode embedded BitChat packet from Nostr DM", category: .session)
return
}
let actualSenderNoiseKey: Data? = await MainActor.run {
self.findNoiseKey(for: senderPubkey)
}
let targetPeerID = PeerID(str: actualSenderNoiseKey?.hexEncodedString()) ?? PeerID(nostr_: senderPubkey)
if packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
let payload = NoisePayload.decode(packet.payload) {
let messageTimestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(rumorTimestamp))
await MainActor.run {
context.registerNostrKeyMapping(senderPubkey, for: targetPeerID)
switch payload.type {
case .privateMessage:
context.handlePrivateMessage(
payload,
senderPubkey: senderPubkey,
convKey: targetPeerID,
id: currentIdentity,
messageTimestamp: messageTimestamp
)
case .delivered:
context.handleDelivered(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: targetPeerID)
case .readReceipt:
context.handleReadReceipt(payload, senderPubkey: senderPubkey, convKey: targetPeerID)
case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse:
break
}
}
}
} else {
SecureLogger.debug("Ignoring non-embedded Nostr DM content", category: .session)
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to decrypt Nostr message: \(error)", category: .session)
}
}
/// Resolves the Noise static key behind a Nostr pubkey via the favorites
/// store. Lives here because the inbound DM path needs it per message;
/// the favorites glue in `ChatNostrCoordinator` delegates to it.
@MainActor
func findNoiseKey(for nostrPubkey: String) -> Data? {
guard let context else { return nil }
let favorites = context.allFavoriteRelationships()
var npubToMatch = nostrPubkey
if !nostrPubkey.hasPrefix("npub") {
if let pubkeyData = Data(hexString: nostrPubkey),
let encoded = try? Bech32.encode(hrp: "npub", data: pubkeyData) {
npubToMatch = encoded
} else {
SecureLogger.warning(
"⚠️ Invalid hex public key format or encoding failed: \(nostrPubkey.prefix(16))...",
category: .session
)
}
}
for relationship in favorites {
if let storedNostrKey = relationship.peerNostrPublicKey {
if storedNostrKey == npubToMatch {
return relationship.peerNoisePublicKey
}
if !storedNostrKey.hasPrefix("npub") && storedNostrKey == nostrPubkey {
SecureLogger.debug("✅ Found Noise key for Nostr sender (hex match)", category: .session)
return relationship.peerNoisePublicKey
}
}
}
SecureLogger.debug(
"⚠️ No matching Noise key found for Nostr pubkey: \(nostrPubkey.prefix(16))... (tried npub: \(npubToMatch.prefix(16))...)",
category: .session
)
return nil
}
}
private extension NostrInboundPipeline {
@MainActor
static func decodeEmbeddedBitChatPacket(from content: String) -> BitchatPacket? {
guard content.hasPrefix("bitchat1:") else { return nil }
let encoded = String(content.dropFirst("bitchat1:".count))
let maxBytes = FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes
let maxEncoded = ((maxBytes + 2) / 3) * 4
guard encoded.count <= maxEncoded else { return nil }
guard let packetData = Base64URLCoding.decode(encoded),
packetData.count <= maxBytes
else {
return nil
}
return BitchatPacket.from(packetData)
}
}