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* Add capability bits to announce TLV Announces now carry an optional capabilities TLV (0x05): a little-endian bitfield with named bits for upcoming features (prekeys, wifiBulk, gateway, groups, board, vouch, meshDiagnostics). Old clients skip the unknown TLV; peers without it decode as nil so features can distinguish "legacy peer" from "advertises nothing". PeerCapabilities lives in BitFoundation with a minimal-length encoding that preserves unknown bits for forward compatibility. Peer capabilities are stored in the BLE peer registry on verified announce and exposed via BLEService.peerCapabilities(_:). The local advertisement set is empty until each feature ships its bit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Prekey bundles: forward-secret async first contact for courier mail Courier envelopes were sealed with one-way Noise X to the recipient's long-lived static key, so a later compromise of that key exposed every envelope captured in transit. This adds one-time prekey bundles: - PrekeyBundle (MessageType 0x24): 8 one-time Curve25519 public prekeys bound to the owner's Noise static key by an Ed25519 signature over "bitchat-prekey-bundle-v1" canonical bytes; gossiped mesh-wide on its own 60s sync round (SyncTypeFlags bit 9, 200-peer cap, 24h freshness) and verified against the announce-bound signing key before caching. - Sealed envelope v2: Noise X where the responder static is the one-time prekey, prologue "bitchat-prekey-v1" || prekeyID. Sender identity rides encrypted inside and is authenticated exactly like v1 (blocked-sender check included). CourierEnvelope gains an optional prekeyID TLV that v1 decoders skip as unknown. - Local prekeys live in the Keychain; consumed privates survive a 48h grace window for spray-and-wait redeliveries, then are deleted (the forward-secrecy clock starts at deletion). The batch tops back up and re-gossips when unconsumed count drops below 3, and everything is wiped in panic mode. - Routing: courier sealing picks a cached verified bundle when one exists (one prekey per message, reused across deposit retries), with the advertised .prekeys capability as a veto for on-mesh peers, and falls back to static sealing otherwise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Prekeys: authenticate bundle packets, fix consume-republish, deflake CI Fixes the prekey-bundle PR review + CI failure: - CI root cause: the receive queue (mesh.message) is concurrent, so a gossiped prekey bundle can be processed before the announce that binds its owner's signing key. The old handler dropped such bundles outright, so under CI parallel load the bundle was permanently lost and the cache/gossip tests flaked (verifiedBundleEntersGossipStore, prekeySealedMailTravelsViaCourierAndOpens). Bundles that arrive before their binding are now retained per-owner (bounded) and re-attempted when the verified announce lands, atomically to avoid a check-then-act race. - Authenticate the OUTER prekey-bundle packet (Codex P2 / review MEDIUM): require senderID == PeerID(bundle.noiseStaticPublicKey) and verify the packet's Ed25519 signature (covers senderID + timestamp) against the owner's bound signing key, in addition to the inner bundle signature. Stops replay under a fresh timestamp / fake senderID. - Key the gossip prekey-bundle store/dedup by the bundle's authenticated identity (noiseStaticPublicKey), not the unauthenticated packet senderID, so one valid bundle sprayed under many fabricated sender IDs can't multiply entries and exhaust the 200-owner cap. - Bump published-bundle generatedAt strictly on consume (Codex P1): consuming a prekey shrinks the published bundle, so it now republishes with a strictly newer generatedAt and re-gossips, so peers replace the cached copy and stop assigning the consumed ID before its 48h grace. - Guard the panic/clear detached Application Support tree-deletes behind TestEnvironment.isRunningTests: the SPM test process shares that tree, so the wipe could land mid-test and flake file-dependent tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update sync tests for prekeyBundle as bit 9 / default sync round Prekeys makes bit 9 (prekeyBundle) a known SyncTypeFlags bit and enables a prekey sync round by default. That broke tests authored by other PRs that assumed bit 9 was phantom or that only their own sync round fires: - SyncTypeFlags(Board)Tests: move the "unknown bits" probes to bits 10+ (0xFE -> 0xFC / 0xFD), since bit 9 is now assigned. - GossipSync(Board)Tests + GossipSyncManagerTests: disable the prekey sync round in configs that run maintenance (as they already do for message/ fragment/fileTransfer), so they isolate the behavior under test. Full app suite (1301 tests) green locally via SPM. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
195 lines
8.0 KiB
Swift
195 lines
8.0 KiB
Swift
//
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// CourierEnvelope.swift
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// BitFoundation
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//
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// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
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// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
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//
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import Foundation
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private import CryptoKit
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/// TLV payload for store-and-forward courier envelopes.
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///
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/// A courier envelope lets a mutual favorite physically carry an encrypted
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/// message to a peer who is currently offline. The envelope is opaque to the
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/// courier: the only routing information is a rotating recipient tag derived
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/// from the recipient's Noise static public key and the UTC day, so envelopes
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/// addressed to the same peer on different days do not correlate for
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/// observers who don't already know that peer's public key.
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public struct CourierEnvelope: Equatable {
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/// Rotating recipient hint: HMAC-SHA256(recipient static key, context || epoch day), truncated.
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public let recipientTag: Data
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/// Milliseconds since epoch after which the envelope must be discarded.
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public let expiry: UInt64
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/// Opaque one-way Noise X ciphertext (sender identity rides inside).
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public let ciphertext: Data
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/// Spray-and-wait copy budget: how many redundant copies of this envelope
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/// the holder may still hand to other couriers (binary split on each
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/// spray). 1 means carry-only — deliver to the recipient, never re-spray.
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public let copies: UInt8
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/// Seal-format discriminator: nil means v1 (ciphertext is one-way Noise X
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/// to the recipient's *static* key); a value means v2 (Noise X to the
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/// recipient's one-time prekey with this ID, forward secret). Encoded as
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/// an optional TLV so v1 decoders skip it as unknown: an old client still
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/// carries and hands over v2 envelopes opaquely, and when one is addressed
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/// to it the static-key open simply fails and is dropped quietly.
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public let prekeyID: UInt32?
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public static let tagLength = 16
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/// Couriered messages are text-sized; media transfers are out of scope.
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public static let maxCiphertextBytes = 16 * 1024
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/// Matches the outbox retention policy in MessageRouter.
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public static let maxLifetimeSeconds: TimeInterval = 24 * 60 * 60
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/// Cap on the copy budget a depositor can claim, so a malicious envelope
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/// cannot turn the courier network into an amplifier.
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public static let maxCopies: UInt8 = 8
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private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
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case recipientTag = 0x01
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case expiry = 0x02
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case ciphertext = 0x03
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case copies = 0x04
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case prekeyID = 0x05
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}
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public init(recipientTag: Data, expiry: UInt64, ciphertext: Data, copies: UInt8 = 1, prekeyID: UInt32? = nil) {
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self.recipientTag = recipientTag
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self.expiry = expiry
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self.ciphertext = ciphertext
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self.copies = min(max(copies, 1), Self.maxCopies)
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self.prekeyID = prekeyID
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}
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/// The same envelope with a different remaining copy budget.
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public func withCopies(_ copies: UInt8) -> CourierEnvelope {
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CourierEnvelope(recipientTag: recipientTag, expiry: expiry, ciphertext: ciphertext, copies: copies, prekeyID: prekeyID)
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}
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public var isExpired: Bool {
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isExpired(at: Date())
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}
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public func isExpired(at date: Date) -> Bool {
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UInt64(max(0, date.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)) >= expiry
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}
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public func encode() -> Data? {
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guard recipientTag.count == Self.tagLength else { return nil }
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guard !ciphertext.isEmpty, ciphertext.count <= Self.maxCiphertextBytes else { return nil }
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func appendBE<T: FixedWidthInteger>(_ value: T, into data: inout Data) {
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var big = value.bigEndian
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withUnsafeBytes(of: &big) { data.append(contentsOf: $0) }
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}
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var encoded = Data()
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encoded.reserveCapacity(3 * 3 + Self.tagLength + 8 + ciphertext.count)
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encoded.append(TLVType.recipientTag.rawValue)
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appendBE(UInt16(recipientTag.count), into: &encoded)
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encoded.append(recipientTag)
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encoded.append(TLVType.expiry.rawValue)
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appendBE(UInt16(8), into: &encoded)
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appendBE(expiry, into: &encoded)
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encoded.append(TLVType.ciphertext.rawValue)
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appendBE(UInt16(ciphertext.count), into: &encoded)
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encoded.append(ciphertext)
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// Omitted when 1 so carry-only envelopes stay byte-identical to the
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// pre-spray wire format (old clients skip the TLV as unknown anyway).
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if copies > 1 {
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encoded.append(TLVType.copies.rawValue)
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appendBE(UInt16(1), into: &encoded)
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encoded.append(copies)
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}
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// Omitted for v1 static-sealed envelopes so they stay byte-identical
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// to the pre-prekey wire format.
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if let prekeyID {
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encoded.append(TLVType.prekeyID.rawValue)
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appendBE(UInt16(4), into: &encoded)
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appendBE(prekeyID, into: &encoded)
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}
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return encoded
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}
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public static func decode(_ data: Data) -> CourierEnvelope? {
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var cursor = data.startIndex
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let end = data.endIndex
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var recipientTag: Data?
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var expiry: UInt64?
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var ciphertext: Data?
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var copies: UInt8 = 1
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var prekeyID: UInt32?
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while cursor < end {
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let typeRaw = data[cursor]
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cursor = data.index(after: cursor)
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guard data.distance(from: cursor, to: end) >= 2 else { return nil }
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let length = Int(data[cursor]) << 8 | Int(data[data.index(after: cursor)])
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cursor = data.index(cursor, offsetBy: 2)
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guard data.distance(from: cursor, to: end) >= length else { return nil }
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let value = data[cursor..<data.index(cursor, offsetBy: length)]
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cursor = data.index(cursor, offsetBy: length)
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switch TLVType(rawValue: typeRaw) {
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case .recipientTag:
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guard length == tagLength else { return nil }
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recipientTag = Data(value)
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case .expiry:
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guard length == 8 else { return nil }
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expiry = value.reduce(UInt64(0)) { ($0 << 8) | UInt64($1) }
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case .ciphertext:
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guard length > 0, length <= maxCiphertextBytes else { return nil }
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ciphertext = Data(value)
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case .copies:
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guard length == 1 else { return nil }
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copies = value.first ?? 1
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case .prekeyID:
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guard length == 4 else { return nil }
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prekeyID = value.reduce(UInt32(0)) { ($0 << 8) | UInt32($1) }
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case nil:
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// Unknown TLV: skip for forward compatibility.
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continue
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}
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}
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guard let recipientTag, let expiry, let ciphertext else { return nil }
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return CourierEnvelope(recipientTag: recipientTag, expiry: expiry, ciphertext: ciphertext, copies: copies, prekeyID: prekeyID)
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}
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// MARK: - Recipient Tags
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private static let tagContext = Data("bitchat-courier-tag-v1".utf8)
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/// UTC day number used to rotate recipient tags.
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public static func epochDay(for date: Date) -> UInt32 {
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UInt32(max(0, date.timeIntervalSince1970) / 86_400)
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}
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/// Rotating recipient hint for a given day. Computable only by parties
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/// who already know the recipient's Noise static public key.
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public static func recipientTag(noiseStaticKey: Data, epochDay: UInt32) -> Data {
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var message = tagContext
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withUnsafeBytes(of: epochDay.bigEndian) { message.append(contentsOf: $0) }
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let mac = HMAC<SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: message, using: SymmetricKey(data: noiseStaticKey))
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return Data(mac).prefix(tagLength)
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}
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/// Tags to test when checking whether an envelope is addressed to a peer.
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/// Covers the adjacent days so envelopes sealed near midnight (or across
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/// modest clock skew) still match while being carried.
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public static func candidateTags(noiseStaticKey: Data, around date: Date) -> [Data] {
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let day = epochDay(for: date)
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return [day == 0 ? 0 : day - 1, day, day + 1].map {
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recipientTag(noiseStaticKey: noiseStaticKey, epochDay: $0)
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}
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}
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}
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