Files
bitchat/bitchat/Services/Prekeys/PrekeyBundleStore.swift
T
b7c6f42b3a Close forged-directness link-rebind DoS on DM routing (#1421)
* Gate connected-link trust on a secure session; deny forged direct announces the connected shortcut

Residual gap after the rotation-heal containment (#1401): "verified
direct" announces prove the signature but not directness — TTL is
unsigned — so a malicious connected peer can replay a victim's fresh
announce with its TTL restored. When the victim has no live link, the
replayer's link rebinds to the victim's ID and reads as "connected",
and MessageRouter's connected fast-path then trusts it outright: every
DM stalls on a Noise handshake the replayer can never complete and is
silently lost while showing "sent".

Router-level trust gate (no wire change):
- Transport gains canDeliverSecurely(to:) — BLE answers with an
  established Noise session; Nostr keeps its prompt-delivery predicate;
  the protocol default forwards to canDeliverPromptly for transports
  without a forgeable link layer.
- MessageRouter.sendPrivate only trusts a connected link outright when
  it can deliver securely; otherwise it still sends (kicking the
  handshake on a genuine link) but retains a copy and hands a sealed
  copy to couriers, like the reachable path. flushOutbox gets the same
  gate so a flush over an insecure link resends instead of dropping the
  retained copy.

Presence hardening (defense in depth): a "direct" announce arriving on
a link already bound to a different peer no longer shortcuts the
claimed peer into "connected" — only real link state does. Genuine
first-contact and direct announces are unaffected; only the ambiguous
heal path loses the forgeable shortcut.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Harden the insecure-link outbox bound; document the second-replay presence gap and the courier metadata tradeoff

Review follow-ups on the canDeliverSecurely gate:

- flushOutbox no longer counts connected-but-insecure flushes toward the
  maxSendAttempts drop: the message was actually transmitted over a live
  link, so a peer whose Noise handshake stalls across reconnect flapping
  must not burn through the cap and lose the store-and-forward copy the
  gate exists to preserve. Retention stays bounded by the 24h outbox TTL
  and the per-peer FIFO cap; acks still clear it. Attempt-counting stays
  for reachable-only (heuristic) sends. Regression test: >8 connected-
  insecure flushes keep the retained copy, drop callback never fires.

- Document the known second-replay presence gap: linkBoundToOtherPeer
  reads the binding before rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirectAnnounce steals
  the link, so once a first replay has rebound a link to an absent
  victim's ID, a second replay marks the victim connected. Presence
  display only — DMs stay on the retain+courier path via the router
  gate. Not closed at the announce layer because the post-rebind state
  is indistinguishable from a legitimate rotation/reconnect heal (a
  supported, field-verified flow). Covered by a two-announce test.

- Note the accepted courier-spray metadata tradeoff at the connected-
  insecure send: nearby verified peers receive a sealed copy (they learn
  a DM exists, never its content), cleared on ack.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Promote a healed rotation to connected; normalize the secure-delivery probe; retain Codable properties in Periphery

Codex review follow-ups on 5017c232:

- P1: a legitimate rotation announce necessarily arrives on a link still
  bound to the OLD peer ID, so the linkBoundToOtherPeer denial stored the
  new identity as disconnected — and the rebind only fixed link state,
  never the registry. A healed rotation then read as disconnected until
  the peer happened to announce again. rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirect-
  Announce now promotes the rebound identity to connected after the
  containment checks pass (registry markConnected + topology/snapshot/
  peer-list refresh; the .peerConnected UI event already fired from the
  announce path). This consciously moves the forged-presence residue
  from second-replay to first-successful-rebind — bounded by the rebind
  containment (never steals a live identity, one rebind per link per
  cooldown) and still display-only: DMs stay gated on canDeliverSecurely.
  Comments and the pinned tests updated; new regression test covers
  rotate-on-open-link -> rebind -> isPeerConnected(new) == true.

- P2: BLEService.canDeliverSecurely probed the Noise session with the
  peer ID as given, but sessions are keyed by the short wire ID — a send
  keyed by the full 64-hex Noise key (favorites resolution) misread an
  established session as insecure and needlessly retained + couriered
  every DM until ack. Normalize with toShort() like isPeerConnected.
  Test drives a real XX handshake and asserts both ID forms pass.

- Periphery: the PrekeyBundleStore.StoredBundle.noiseKey "assign-only"
  flake fired again and slipped past its baselined USR (read exists in
  loadFromDisk; the indexer intermittently misses it). Replace the
  baseline entry with retain_codable_properties: true — deterministic,
  and a truly-dead Codable field is a persisted-format change anyway.
  Local periphery scan --strict: no unused code detected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 16:46:33 +02:00

217 lines
8.4 KiB
Swift

//
// PrekeyBundleStore.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitFoundation
import BitLogger
import Foundation
/// Signature-verified one-time prekey bundles received from other peers.
///
/// One bundle per Noise static key: a newer `generatedAt` replaces the cached
/// copy, keeping the IDs we already sealed with marked used so a prekey is
/// never reused across messages. Assignments are remembered per message ID so
/// deposit retries of the same message re-use its prekey (and its budget)
/// instead of burning a fresh one per courier.
///
/// Only public key material lives here; it persists to disk so a sender can
/// prekey-seal for recipients met long ago. Included in the panic wipe.
final class PrekeyBundleStore {
struct StoredBundle: Codable {
// noiseKey is read in loadFromDisk (dictionary keying), but the
// Periphery indexer intermittently misses that read and flaked CI
// with "assign-only" — even past its baselined USR. Covered
// deterministically by retain_codable_properties in .periphery.yml
// (an in-source ignore can't work: strict mode flags it as
// superfluous on the runs where the indexer gets it right).
let noiseKey: Data
var generatedAt: UInt64
var prekeyIDs: [UInt32]
var prekeyPublicKeys: [Data]
/// IDs this device already sealed with (never reused).
var usedIDs: Set<UInt32>
/// messageID → prekey ID, so re-deposits of one message share one prekey.
var assignments: [String: UInt32]
var updatedAt: Date
}
enum Limits {
static let maxPeers = 200
/// Don't seal to bundles older than this: the owner may have rotated
/// the unconsumed keys out (see `LocalPrekeyStore.Policy`).
static let maxBundleAgeForSealingSeconds: TimeInterval = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
}
static let shared = PrekeyBundleStore()
private var bundles: [Data: StoredBundle] = [:]
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.prekeys.bundles")
private let fileURL: URL?
private let maxPeers: Int
private let now: () -> Date
/// - Parameter fileURL: Overrides the on-disk location (tests). Ignored
/// when `persistsToDisk` is false.
init(
persistsToDisk: Bool = true,
fileURL: URL? = nil,
maxPeers: Int = Limits.maxPeers,
now: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init
) {
self.now = now
self.maxPeers = maxPeers
self.fileURL = persistsToDisk ? (fileURL ?? Self.defaultFileURL()) : nil
loadFromDisk()
}
// MARK: - Ingest
/// Stores a bundle whose signature the caller has already verified
/// against the owner's announce-bound signing key. Returns false when an
/// equal-or-newer bundle is already cached (nothing changed).
@discardableResult
func ingest(_ bundle: PrekeyBundle) -> Bool {
guard bundle.noiseStaticPublicKey.count == PrekeyBundle.keyLength,
!bundle.prekeys.isEmpty else { return false }
return queue.sync {
if let existing = bundles[bundle.noiseStaticPublicKey],
existing.generatedAt >= bundle.generatedAt {
return false
}
let previous = bundles[bundle.noiseStaticPublicKey]
let newIDs = Set(bundle.prekeys.map(\.id))
// Keep consumption state for IDs the fresh bundle still offers
// (a top-up keeps the owner's unconsumed keys); drop the rest.
let carriedUsed = (previous?.usedIDs ?? []).intersection(newIDs)
let carriedAssignments = (previous?.assignments ?? [:]).filter { newIDs.contains($0.value) }
bundles[bundle.noiseStaticPublicKey] = StoredBundle(
noiseKey: bundle.noiseStaticPublicKey,
generatedAt: bundle.generatedAt,
prekeyIDs: bundle.prekeys.map(\.id),
prekeyPublicKeys: bundle.prekeys.map(\.publicKey),
usedIDs: carriedUsed,
assignments: carriedAssignments,
updatedAt: now()
)
enforceCapLocked()
persistLocked()
return true
}
}
// MARK: - Sealing support
/// Whether an unexpired bundle with sealable prekeys is cached for a peer.
func hasUsableBundle(for noiseKey: Data) -> Bool {
queue.sync {
guard let bundle = bundles[noiseKey], isFreshLocked(bundle) else { return false }
return bundle.usedIDs.count < bundle.prekeyIDs.count
}
}
/// The prekey to seal a message with: the message's existing assignment if
/// any (re-deposits reuse it), else the lowest unused ID, which is then
/// marked used. Nil when no fresh bundle is cached or all its prekeys are
/// spent — callers fall back to static sealing.
func assignPrekey(messageID: String, recipientNoiseKey: Data) -> PrekeyBundle.Prekey? {
queue.sync {
guard var bundle = bundles[recipientNoiseKey], isFreshLocked(bundle) else { return nil }
if let assigned = bundle.assignments[messageID],
let index = bundle.prekeyIDs.firstIndex(of: assigned) {
return PrekeyBundle.Prekey(id: assigned, publicKey: bundle.prekeyPublicKeys[index])
}
guard let index = bundle.prekeyIDs.indices
.filter({ !bundle.usedIDs.contains(bundle.prekeyIDs[$0]) })
.min(by: { bundle.prekeyIDs[$0] < bundle.prekeyIDs[$1] }) else {
return nil
}
let id = bundle.prekeyIDs[index]
bundle.usedIDs.insert(id)
bundle.assignments[messageID] = id
bundle.updatedAt = now()
bundles[recipientNoiseKey] = bundle
persistLocked()
return PrekeyBundle.Prekey(id: id, publicKey: bundle.prekeyPublicKeys[index])
}
}
// MARK: - Maintenance
/// Panic wipe: drop all cached bundles from memory and disk.
func wipe() {
queue.sync {
bundles.removeAll()
if let fileURL {
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: fileURL)
}
}
}
// MARK: - Internals (call only on `queue`)
private func isFreshLocked(_ bundle: StoredBundle) -> Bool {
let ageSeconds = now().timeIntervalSince1970 - Double(bundle.generatedAt) / 1000
return ageSeconds <= Limits.maxBundleAgeForSealingSeconds
}
private func enforceCapLocked() {
while bundles.count > maxPeers {
guard let victim = bundles.min(by: { $0.value.updatedAt < $1.value.updatedAt }) else { return }
bundles.removeValue(forKey: victim.key)
}
}
private func persistLocked() {
guard let fileURL else { return }
do {
if bundles.isEmpty {
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: fileURL)
return
}
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
at: fileURL.deletingLastPathComponent(),
withIntermediateDirectories: true
)
let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(Array(bundles.values))
var options: Data.WritingOptions = [.atomic]
#if os(iOS)
options.insert(.completeFileProtection)
#endif
try data.write(to: fileURL, options: options)
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to persist prekey bundle store: \(error)", category: .security)
}
}
private func loadFromDisk() {
guard let fileURL else { return }
queue.sync {
guard let data = try? Data(contentsOf: fileURL),
let stored = try? JSONDecoder().decode([StoredBundle].self, from: data) else {
return
}
for bundle in stored where bundle.prekeyIDs.count == bundle.prekeyPublicKeys.count {
bundles[bundle.noiseKey] = bundle
}
}
}
private static func defaultFileURL() -> URL? {
guard let base = try? FileManager.default.url(
for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
in: .userDomainMask,
appropriateFor: nil,
create: true
) else { return nil }
return base
.appendingPathComponent("prekeys", isDirectory: true)
.appendingPathComponent("bundles.json")
}
}