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https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
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Tier 3 of a protest-hardening review. The BLE mesh is already properly fenced off from network reachability and needs nothing here; every gap is on the internet side, or in how someone gets a build they can trust. Say when Tor is blocked. The bootstrap poll loop simply ended at its 75-second deadline, leaving isStarting true with no further state, so a network that blocks Tor was indistinguishable from a slow one and the UI said "starting tor…" indefinitely. TorManager now exposes bootstrapDidStall and posts .TorBootstrapDidStall, and the app reports that mesh messaging still works while internet delivery is paused. It is cleared on each new start or restart, so a later attempt can report again. Let relays be added by hand. The four built-in relays are well-known clearnet hostnames, which is four names for a censor to block and no recourse short of a new build. NostrRelaySettings persists up to eight additional relays, normalized, .onion accepted, with a settings editor. They join the same target set as the built-ins and are subject to the same activation policy. Removal reconciles against the previous set: the teardown path iterates the current targets, so without that a removed relay's socket and queued sends would linger — covered by a test that fails without it. The merged list is cached rather than recomputed, because allowedRelayList consults it once per candidate URL and would otherwise read UserDefaults inside that loop. Stop stranding people who denied location. The activation gate required location permission or a mutual favorite, but teleporting into a geohash requires neither, so someone with no permission and no favorites could sit in a channel that never connected while Tor and the relays stayed suppressed and nothing said why. Being in a location channel is now a third arm of the gate, in both the activation service and the relay manager's copy of the policy, and leaving the channel closes it again. Stop burning the Tor timeout when Tor is off. GeoRelayDirectory awaited Tor readiness unconditionally, but with the preference off TorManager has been shut down, so every refresh spent the full bootstrap deadline and the directory froze on its cached copy. It now keys on the preference, not on live readiness: Tor wanted but unavailable must still skip the fetch rather than fall back to clearnet. Say what turning Tor off costs. The toggle's copy described it as hiding your IP "for location channels", understating both scope and consequence. It now names private messages too, and while the toggle is off the settings screen states that every relay can see the device IP. Make builds verifiable. There was no release verification of any kind: no signatures, no checksums, no documented procedure. Post-takedown that is the acute gap, because mirrors appear and people install whatever they can find during a shutdown. source-manifest.yml publishes a per-tag SHA-256 manifest with a provenance attestation, self-checking before it publishes, and docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md explains how to verify source and states plainly that compiled builds from anywhere but the App Store cannot be verified. It also records the gaps honestly: no published signing key, no reproducible build, no non-GitHub mirror. docs/TOR-INTEGRATION.md was substantially stale — it documented a torrc, SOCKSPort and ControlPort that the in-process Arti client does not use, and claimed there are no user-visible settings — so it is rewritten, including the deferred gap below. Deferred: no Tor bridges or pluggable transports. arti-client is built without pt-client or bridge-client and bootstraps from stock config, so in a country that blocks Tor outright there is still no circumvention path — only a clear report that there isn't. Closing it needs the Rust features, bridge config through the FFI, and an xcframework rebuild under the pinned toolchain with a provenance update, which is its own change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
277 lines
12 KiB
Swift
277 lines
12 KiB
Swift
import Foundation
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import BitLogger
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import Combine
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import Tor
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@MainActor
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protocol NetworkActivationTorControlling: AnyObject {
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func setAutoStartAllowed(_ allowed: Bool)
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func startIfNeeded()
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func shutdownCompletely()
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}
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@MainActor
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protocol NetworkActivationRelayControlling: AnyObject {
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func connect()
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func disconnect()
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}
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protocol NetworkActivationProxyControlling: AnyObject {
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func setProxyMode(useTor: Bool)
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}
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extension TorManager: NetworkActivationTorControlling {}
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extension NostrRelayManager: NetworkActivationRelayControlling {}
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extension TorURLSession: NetworkActivationProxyControlling {}
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/// Coordinates when the app is allowed to start Tor and connect to Nostr relays.
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/// Policy: permit start when (location permissions are authorized OR there
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/// exists at least one mutual favorite) AND the device has a usable network
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/// path. When there is provably no network at all we do not bootstrap Tor or
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/// spin relay reconnects — that only wastes battery on a mesh-only/offline
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/// device. BLE mesh is entirely independent of this gate.
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@MainActor
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final class NetworkActivationService: ObservableObject {
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static let shared = NetworkActivationService()
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@Published private(set) var activationAllowed: Bool = false
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@Published private(set) var userTorEnabled: Bool = true
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/// Coarse, debounced network reachability. `false` only when the OS reports
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/// no usable interface at all. Surfaced for UI ("offline" vs "connecting").
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@Published private(set) var isNetworkReachable: Bool = true
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private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
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private var started = false
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/// Storage key for the Tor preference. Exposed as a `nonisolated` constant
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/// so off-main callers can read the preference without hopping to the main
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/// actor; see `persistedTorPreference(in:)`.
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nonisolated static let torPreferenceKey = "networkActivationService.userTorEnabled"
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private var torAutoStartDesired: Bool = false
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private let storage: UserDefaults
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private let locationPermissionPublisher: AnyPublisher<LocationChannelManager.PermissionState, Never>
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private let mutualFavoritesPublisher: AnyPublisher<Set<Data>, Never>
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private let selectedChannelPublisher: AnyPublisher<ChannelID, Never>
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private let permissionProvider: () -> LocationChannelManager.PermissionState
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private let mutualFavoritesProvider: () -> Set<Data>
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private let locationChannelSelectedProvider: () -> Bool
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private let reachabilityMonitor: NetworkReachabilityMonitoring
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private let torController: NetworkActivationTorControlling
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// Resolved lazily: NostrRelayManager.init() reads NetworkActivationService.shared
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// (via its live dependencies), so capturing NostrRelayManager.shared here would
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// re-enter whichever singleton's dispatch_once started first and trap at launch.
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private lazy var relayController: NetworkActivationRelayControlling = relayControllerProvider()
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private let relayControllerProvider: () -> NetworkActivationRelayControlling
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private let proxyController: NetworkActivationProxyControlling
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private let notificationCenter: NotificationCenter
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private init() {
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storage = .standard
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locationPermissionPublisher = LocationChannelManager.shared.$permissionState.eraseToAnyPublisher()
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mutualFavoritesPublisher = FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.$mutualFavorites.eraseToAnyPublisher()
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selectedChannelPublisher = LocationChannelManager.shared.$selectedChannel.eraseToAnyPublisher()
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permissionProvider = { LocationChannelManager.shared.permissionState }
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mutualFavoritesProvider = { FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.mutualFavorites }
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locationChannelSelectedProvider = {
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if case .location = LocationChannelManager.shared.selectedChannel { return true }
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return false
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}
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reachabilityMonitor = NWPathReachabilityMonitor()
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torController = TorManager.shared
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relayControllerProvider = { NostrRelayManager.shared }
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proxyController = TorURLSession.shared
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notificationCenter = .default
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}
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internal init(
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storage: UserDefaults,
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locationPermissionPublisher: AnyPublisher<LocationChannelManager.PermissionState, Never>,
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mutualFavoritesPublisher: AnyPublisher<Set<Data>, Never>,
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permissionProvider: @escaping () -> LocationChannelManager.PermissionState,
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mutualFavoritesProvider: @escaping () -> Set<Data>,
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selectedChannelPublisher: AnyPublisher<ChannelID, Never> = Empty().eraseToAnyPublisher(),
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locationChannelSelectedProvider: @escaping () -> Bool = { false },
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reachabilityMonitor: NetworkReachabilityMonitoring,
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torController: NetworkActivationTorControlling,
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relayController: NetworkActivationRelayControlling,
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proxyController: NetworkActivationProxyControlling,
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notificationCenter: NotificationCenter = .default
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) {
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self.storage = storage
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self.locationPermissionPublisher = locationPermissionPublisher
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self.mutualFavoritesPublisher = mutualFavoritesPublisher
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self.permissionProvider = permissionProvider
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self.mutualFavoritesProvider = mutualFavoritesProvider
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self.selectedChannelPublisher = selectedChannelPublisher
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self.locationChannelSelectedProvider = locationChannelSelectedProvider
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self.reachabilityMonitor = reachabilityMonitor
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self.torController = torController
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self.relayControllerProvider = { relayController }
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self.proxyController = proxyController
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self.notificationCenter = notificationCenter
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}
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/// Whether Tor routing is switched on, read without main-actor isolation.
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///
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/// This is the *preference*, not live Tor readiness. Background work that
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/// must decide whether waiting for Tor is even meaningful needs the
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/// preference: when someone has deliberately turned Tor off, requests are
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/// intended to go direct, so waiting on a client that has been shut down
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/// would only burn the bootstrap timeout. When the preference is on, callers
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/// must still wait for readiness rather than falling back to clearnet.
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nonisolated static func persistedTorPreference(
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in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard
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) -> Bool {
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defaults.object(forKey: torPreferenceKey) as? Bool ?? true
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}
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func start() {
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guard !started else { return }
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started = true
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if let stored = storage.object(forKey: Self.torPreferenceKey) as? Bool {
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userTorEnabled = stored
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} else {
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userTorEnabled = true
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}
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// Begin (idempotent) reachability monitoring and seed initial state.
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reachabilityMonitor.start()
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isNetworkReachable = reachabilityMonitor.isReachable
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// Initial compute
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let allowed = effectiveAllowed()
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activationAllowed = allowed
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torAutoStartDesired = allowed && userTorEnabled
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torController.setAutoStartAllowed(torAutoStartDesired)
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applyTorState(torDesired: torAutoStartDesired)
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if allowed {
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relayController.connect()
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} else {
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relayController.disconnect()
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}
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// React to location permission changes
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locationPermissionPublisher
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.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
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.sink { [weak self] _ in
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self?.reevaluate()
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}
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.store(in: &cancellables)
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// React to mutual favorites changes
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mutualFavoritesPublisher
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.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
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.sink { [weak self] _ in
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self?.reevaluate()
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}
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.store(in: &cancellables)
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// React to entering or leaving a location channel, which can flip the
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// gate on its own for someone with no location permission and no
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// mutual favorites.
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selectedChannelPublisher
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.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
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.sink { [weak self] _ in
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self?.reevaluate()
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}
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.store(in: &cancellables)
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// React to network reachability changes (debounced, unsatisfied-only).
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reachabilityMonitor.reachabilityPublisher
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.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
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.sink { [weak self] reachable in
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guard let self else { return }
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guard reachable != self.isNetworkReachable else { return }
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self.isNetworkReachable = reachable
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SecureLogger.info(
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"NetworkActivationService: isNetworkReachable -> \(reachable)",
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category: .session
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)
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self.reevaluate()
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}
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.store(in: &cancellables)
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}
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/// Stops all internet-facing work at the synchronous panic boundary.
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/// `start()` may be called again only after the full wipe commits.
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func stopForPanic() {
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cancellables.removeAll()
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started = false
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reachabilityMonitor.stop()
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activationAllowed = false
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torAutoStartDesired = false
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relayController.disconnect()
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torController.setAutoStartAllowed(false)
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applyTorState(torDesired: false)
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}
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func setUserTorEnabled(_ enabled: Bool) {
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guard enabled != userTorEnabled else { return }
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userTorEnabled = enabled
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storage.set(enabled, forKey: Self.torPreferenceKey)
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notificationCenter.post(
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name: .TorUserPreferenceChanged,
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object: nil,
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userInfo: ["enabled": enabled]
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)
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reevaluate()
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}
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private func reevaluate() {
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guard started else { return }
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let allowed = effectiveAllowed()
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let torDesired = allowed && userTorEnabled
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let statusChanged = allowed != activationAllowed
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let torChanged = torDesired != torAutoStartDesired
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if statusChanged {
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SecureLogger.info("NetworkActivationService: activationAllowed -> \(allowed)", category: .session)
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activationAllowed = allowed
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}
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if statusChanged || torChanged {
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torAutoStartDesired = torDesired
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torController.setAutoStartAllowed(torDesired)
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applyTorState(torDesired: torDesired)
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}
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if allowed {
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if torChanged {
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// Reset relay sockets when switching transport path (Tor ↔︎ direct)
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relayController.disconnect()
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}
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relayController.connect()
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} else if statusChanged {
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relayController.disconnect()
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}
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}
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/// Base policy: who is allowed to use the network at all (permission or a
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/// mutual favorite), ignoring current link state.
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private func basePolicyAllowed() -> Bool {
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let permOK = permissionProvider() == .authorized
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let hasMutual = !mutualFavoritesProvider().isEmpty
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// Being in a location channel counts too. Teleporting into a geohash
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// needs no location permission, so someone who denied location and has
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// no mutual favorites could sit in a channel that never connects: the
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// gate suppressed Tor and the relays, and nothing said why. The channel
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// is itself an internet feature in active use, which is exactly what
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// this gate is meant to detect.
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let inLocationChannel = locationChannelSelectedProvider()
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return permOK || hasMutual || inLocationChannel
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}
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/// Effective gate: base policy AND a usable network path. When there is
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/// provably no network, Tor bootstrap and relay reconnects are suppressed.
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private func effectiveAllowed() -> Bool {
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basePolicyAllowed() && reachabilityMonitor.isReachable
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}
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private func applyTorState(torDesired: Bool) {
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proxyController.setProxyMode(useTor: torDesired)
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if torDesired {
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torController.startIfNeeded()
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} else {
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torController.shutdownCompletely()
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}
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}
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}
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