Files
bitchat/bitchat/Noise/NoiseSessionManager.swift
T
jackandGitHub 16324c819f Bind Noise sessions to claimed peer identities; require signed leaves (#1432)
Adds remote-static-key->peerID binding at Noise handshake completion (closes a mesh impersonation/MITM hole where a peer could complete a handshake under another peer's ID). Also hardens LEAVE handling to require a verified signature and suppresses relay of unverifiable leaves.
2026-07-26 10:30:55 +02:00

310 lines
12 KiB
Swift

//
// NoiseSessionManager.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitLogger
import CryptoKit
import Foundation
import BitFoundation
struct NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult {
let response: Data?
let didEstablishAuthenticatedSession: Bool
}
final class NoiseSessionManager {
private var sessions: [PeerID: NoiseSession] = [:]
/// A responder rehandshake must not evict a working transport session
/// before the candidate proves that its authenticated static key belongs
/// to the claimed wire ID. Candidates therefore live outside `sessions`
/// until the XX handshake completes and the binding is validated.
private var responderCandidates: [PeerID: NoiseSession] = [:]
private let sessionFactory: (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
private let managerQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.manager", attributes: .concurrent)
// Callbacks
var onSessionEstablished: ((PeerID, Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey) -> Void)?
var onSessionFailed: ((PeerID, Error) -> Void)?
init(localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey, keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
self.sessionFactory = { peerID, role in
SecureNoiseSession(
peerID: peerID,
role: role,
keychain: keychain,
localStaticKey: localStaticKey
)
}
}
#if DEBUG
init(
localStaticKey _: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey,
keychain _: KeychainManagerProtocol,
sessionFactory: @escaping (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
) {
self.sessionFactory = sessionFactory
}
#endif
// MARK: - Session Management
func getSession(for peerID: PeerID) -> NoiseSession? {
return managerQueue.sync {
return sessions[peerID]
}
}
func removeSession(for peerID: PeerID) {
managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
if let session = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
session.reset() // Clear sensitive data before removing
}
if let candidate = responderCandidates.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
candidate.reset()
}
}
}
func removeAllSessions() {
managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
for (_, session) in sessions {
session.reset()
}
for (_, candidate) in responderCandidates {
candidate.reset()
}
sessions.removeAll()
responderCandidates.removeAll()
}
}
// MARK: - Handshake Helpers
func initiateHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
return try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
// Check if we already have an established session
if let existingSession = sessions[peerID], existingSession.isEstablished() {
// Session already established, don't recreate
throw NoiseSessionError.alreadyEstablished
}
// Remove any existing non-established session
if let existingSession = sessions[peerID], !existingSession.isEstablished() {
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
existingSession.reset()
}
// Create new initiator session
let session = sessionFactory(peerID, .initiator)
sessions[peerID] = session
do {
let handshakeData = try session.startHandshake()
return handshakeData
} catch {
// Clean up failed session
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
session.reset()
SecureLogger.error(.handshakeFailed(peerID: peerID.id, error: error.localizedDescription))
throw error
}
}
}
func handleIncomingHandshake(from peerID: PeerID, message: Data) throws -> Data? {
try handleIncomingHandshakeWithResult(
from: peerID,
message: message
).response
}
/// Processes one exact handshake candidate and reports whether that
/// candidate completed authenticated establishment. The peer's retained
/// session may already be established while a replacement is only on
/// message one, so callers must not infer candidate completion from the
/// peer-level session table.
func handleIncomingHandshakeWithResult(
from peerID: PeerID,
message: Data
) throws -> NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult {
// Process everything within the synchronized block to prevent race conditions
return try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
let session: NoiseSession
let isReplacementCandidate: Bool
if let candidate = responderCandidates[peerID] {
// A fresh XX message 1 supersedes an incomplete candidate,
// but never the established session it is trying to replace.
if message.count == NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize {
candidate.reset()
let replacement = sessionFactory(peerID, .responder)
responderCandidates[peerID] = replacement
session = replacement
} else {
session = candidate
}
isReplacementCandidate = true
} else if let existing = sessions[peerID] {
if existing.isEstablished() {
SecureLogger.info(
"Validating replacement handshake from \(peerID) while preserving the established session",
category: .session
)
let candidate = sessionFactory(peerID, .responder)
responderCandidates[peerID] = candidate
session = candidate
isReplacementCandidate = true
} else if existing.getState() == .handshaking,
message.count == NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize {
// No established transport state exists to preserve. A
// fresh initiation replaces the incomplete handshake.
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
existing.reset()
let replacement = sessionFactory(peerID, .responder)
sessions[peerID] = replacement
session = replacement
isReplacementCandidate = false
} else {
session = existing
isReplacementCandidate = false
}
} else {
let newSession = sessionFactory(peerID, .responder)
sessions[peerID] = newSession
session = newSession
isReplacementCandidate = false
}
// Process the handshake message within the synchronized block
do {
let response = try session.processHandshakeMessage(message)
// Check the exact session that processed this message. A
// preserved peer-level session can remain established while a
// replacement candidate is still unauthenticated.
let didEstablishAuthenticatedSession = session.isEstablished()
if didEstablishAuthenticatedSession {
guard let remoteKey = session.getRemoteStaticPublicKey(),
authenticatedRemoteKey(remoteKey, matches: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSessionError.peerIdentityMismatch
}
if isReplacementCandidate {
_ = responderCandidates.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
let previous = sessions.updateValue(session, forKey: peerID)
if let previous, previous !== session {
previous.reset()
}
}
// Schedule callback outside the synchronized block to prevent deadlock
DispatchQueue.global().async { [weak self] in
self?.onSessionEstablished?(peerID, remoteKey)
}
}
return NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult(
response: response,
didEstablishAuthenticatedSession:
didEstablishAuthenticatedSession
)
} catch {
// A failed candidate is discarded without touching the
// established session. Ordinary failed handshakes retain the
// historical cleanup behavior.
if isReplacementCandidate {
if let storedCandidate = responderCandidates[peerID],
storedCandidate === session {
_ = responderCandidates.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
} else if let storedSession = sessions[peerID],
storedSession === session {
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
session.reset()
// Schedule callback outside the synchronized block to prevent deadlock
DispatchQueue.global().async { [weak self] in
self?.onSessionFailed?(peerID, error)
}
SecureLogger.error(.handshakeFailed(peerID: peerID.id, error: error.localizedDescription))
throw error
}
}
}
/// Mesh handshakes normally use a 16-hex wire ID. Full Noise-key IDs are
/// also accepted by internal callers when they exactly match the static
/// key. Non-wire identifiers remain available to protocol test harnesses;
/// BLE packet ingress always supplies a short hexadecimal ID.
private func authenticatedRemoteKey(
_ remoteKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey,
matches claimedPeerID: PeerID
) -> Bool {
let rawKey = remoteKey.rawRepresentation
if claimedPeerID.isShort {
return PeerID(publicKey: rawKey) == claimedPeerID
}
if let claimedNoiseKey = claimedPeerID.noiseKey {
return claimedNoiseKey == rawKey
}
return true
}
// MARK: - Encryption/Decryption
func encrypt(_ plaintext: Data, for peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
guard let session = getSession(for: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSessionError.sessionNotFound
}
return try session.encrypt(plaintext)
}
func decrypt(_ ciphertext: Data, from peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
guard let session = getSession(for: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSessionError.sessionNotFound
}
return try session.decrypt(ciphertext)
}
// MARK: - Key Management
func getRemoteStaticKey(for peerID: PeerID) -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? {
return getSession(for: peerID)?.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
}
// MARK: - Session Rekeying
func getSessionsNeedingRekey() -> [(peerID: PeerID, needsRekey: Bool)] {
return managerQueue.sync {
var needingRekey: [(peerID: PeerID, needsRekey: Bool)] = []
for (peerID, session) in sessions {
if let secureSession = session as? SecureNoiseSession,
secureSession.isEstablished(),
secureSession.needsRenegotiation() {
needingRekey.append((peerID: peerID, needsRekey: true))
}
}
return needingRekey
}
}
func initiateRekey(for peerID: PeerID) throws {
// Remove old session
removeSession(for: peerID)
// Initiate new handshake
_ = try initiateHandshake(with: peerID)
}
}