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https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
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* Originate v2 source routes and wire fragmentIdFilter targeted resync Part A — source-route origination policy: - Gate route application (BLESourceRouteOriginationPolicy): only packets we author, directed at a single peer, with TTL headroom, whose recipient is not directly connected. Relays no longer attach routes to (and re-sign) packets they merely forward. - Version-gate paths: MeshTopologyTracker records the highest protocol version observed per peer; BFS routes require every intermediate hop and the recipient to be v2-observed, capped at 4 intermediate hops. - Degrade on failure: BLESourceRouteFailureCache marks a routed send that sees no inbound traffic from the recipient within 10s as failed and floods for 60s before retrying routes. Part B — REQUEST_SYNC fragmentIdFilter (TLV 0x06): - Requester: BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer reports stalled broadcast reassemblies (no new fragment for 5s, retried at most every 10s); the maintenance pass sends a types=fragment REQUEST_SYNC naming the stalled 8-byte fragment stream IDs to each connected peer. - Responder: GossipSyncManager restricts the fragment diff to exactly the named streams, bypassing the since-cursor while the GCS filter still excludes pieces the requester holds; RSR/TTL-0/rate-limit semantics unchanged and REQUEST_SYNC stays link-local. - Bounds: at most 60 IDs per request (60*17-1 = 1019 bytes <= the 1024-byte decoder cap); oversized 0x06 values are ignored, not fatal. Docs: SOURCE_ROUTING.md gains the iOS origination policy (§8); REQUEST_SYNC_MANAGER.md documents 0x05/0x06 as implemented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix stall-clock refresh on duplicates and overflow suppression in fragment resync Two fixes to stalledBroadcastFragmentIDs bookkeeping in BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer: - Duplicate fragments no longer reset the stall clock. Fragment packets bypass the packet deduplicator, so relayed duplicates of an already-held index arriving every few seconds kept lastFragmentAt fresh and suppressed the targeted REQUEST_SYNC indefinitely. Now lastFragmentAt only updates when the index is new (actual progress). - Only the streams that will actually be encoded on the wire are rate-limited. Previously every stalled candidate got lastResyncRequestAt set, but encodeFragmentIdFilter serializes at most RequestSyncPacket.maxFragmentIdFilterCount (60) IDs, so overflow streams were suppressed for retryAfter without ever being requested. Selection now caps at that shared constant, oldest stall first, so overflow stays eligible and rotates fairly on the next pass. Tests: duplicates arriving periodically still trigger the stall report; 70 stalled streams yield the 60 oldest on the first pass and the remaining 10 on the next. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
139 lines
5.3 KiB
Swift
139 lines
5.3 KiB
Swift
import BitFoundation
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import Foundation
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// REQUEST_SYNC payload TLV (type, length16, value)
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// - 0x01: P (uint8) — Golomb-Rice parameter
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// - 0x02: M (uint32, big-endian) — hash range (N * 2^P)
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// - 0x03: data (opaque) — GR bitstream bytes (MSB-first)
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// - 0x04: types (SyncTypeFlags) — packet types the filter covers
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// - 0x05: sinceTimestamp (uint64, big-endian) — filter coverage cursor
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// - 0x06: fragmentIdFilter (UTF-8) — comma-separated 16-hex-char (8-byte)
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// fragment stream IDs; restricts the fragment diff to exactly those
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// streams (targeted resync for stalled reassemblies)
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struct RequestSyncPacket {
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/// Maximum fragment IDs one 0x06 filter may carry. Each ID encodes as
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/// 16 hex chars plus a comma separator, so the largest encoded value is
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/// 60 * 17 - 1 = 1019 bytes, which fits the 1024-byte decoder cap.
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static let maxFragmentIdFilterCount = 60
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let p: Int
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let m: UInt32
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let data: Data
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let types: SyncTypeFlags?
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let sinceTimestamp: UInt64?
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let fragmentIdFilter: String?
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/// Encodes 8-byte fragment stream IDs as the 0x06 filter string,
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/// dropping malformed IDs and capping at `maxFragmentIdFilterCount`.
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static func encodeFragmentIdFilter(_ fragmentIDs: [Data]) -> String? {
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let tokens = fragmentIDs
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.filter { $0.count == 8 }
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.prefix(maxFragmentIdFilterCount)
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.map { $0.hexEncodedString() }
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guard !tokens.isEmpty else { return nil }
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return tokens.joined(separator: ",")
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}
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/// Decodes a 0x06 filter string back into 8-byte fragment stream IDs,
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/// ignoring malformed tokens and capping at `maxFragmentIdFilterCount`.
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static func decodeFragmentIdFilter(_ filter: String?) -> Set<Data>? {
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guard let filter else { return nil }
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var ids: Set<Data> = []
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for token in filter.split(separator: ",").prefix(maxFragmentIdFilterCount) {
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guard token.count == 16, let id = Data(hexString: String(token)) else { continue }
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ids.insert(id)
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}
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return ids.isEmpty ? nil : ids
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}
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init(p: Int, m: UInt32, data: Data, types: SyncTypeFlags? = nil, sinceTimestamp: UInt64? = nil, fragmentIdFilter: String? = nil) {
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self.p = p
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self.m = m
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self.data = data
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self.types = types
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self.sinceTimestamp = sinceTimestamp
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self.fragmentIdFilter = fragmentIdFilter
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}
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func encode() -> Data {
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var out = Data()
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func putTLV(_ t: UInt8, _ v: Data) {
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out.append(t)
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let len = UInt16(v.count)
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out.append(UInt8((len >> 8) & 0xFF))
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out.append(UInt8(len & 0xFF))
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out.append(v)
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}
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// P
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putTLV(0x01, Data([UInt8(p & 0xFF)]))
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// M (uint32)
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var mBE = m.bigEndian
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putTLV(0x02, withUnsafeBytes(of: &mBE) { Data($0) })
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// data
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putTLV(0x03, data)
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if let typesData = types?.toData() {
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putTLV(0x04, typesData)
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}
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if let ts = sinceTimestamp {
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var tsBE = ts.bigEndian
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putTLV(0x05, withUnsafeBytes(of: &tsBE) { Data($0) })
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}
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if let fid = fragmentIdFilter, let fidData = fid.data(using: .utf8) {
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putTLV(0x06, fidData)
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}
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return out
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}
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static func decode(from data: Data, maxAcceptBytes: Int = 1024) -> RequestSyncPacket? {
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var off = 0
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var p: Int? = nil
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var m: UInt32? = nil
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var payload: Data? = nil
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var types: SyncTypeFlags? = nil
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var sinceTimestamp: UInt64? = nil
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var fragmentIdFilter: String? = nil
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while off + 3 <= data.count {
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let t = Int(data[off]); off += 1
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guard off + 2 <= data.count else { return nil }
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let len = (Int(data[off]) << 8) | Int(data[off+1]); off += 2
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guard off + len <= data.count else { return nil }
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let v = data.subdata(in: off..<(off+len)); off += len
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switch t {
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case 0x01:
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if v.count == 1 { p = Int(v[0]) }
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case 0x02:
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if v.count == 4 {
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var mm: UInt32 = 0
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for b in v { mm = (mm << 8) | UInt32(b) }
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m = mm
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}
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case 0x03:
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if v.count > maxAcceptBytes { return nil }
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payload = v
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case 0x04:
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if let decoded = SyncTypeFlags.decode(v) {
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types = decoded
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}
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case 0x05:
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if v.count == 8 {
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var ts: UInt64 = 0
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for b in v { ts = (ts << 8) | UInt64(b) }
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sinceTimestamp = ts
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}
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case 0x06:
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// Same acceptance cap as the GCS payload; an oversized filter
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// is ignored rather than failing the whole request.
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if v.count <= maxAcceptBytes, let fid = String(data: v, encoding: .utf8) {
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fragmentIdFilter = fid
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}
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default:
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break // forward compatible; ignore unknown TLVs
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}
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}
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guard let pp = p, let mm = m, let dd = payload, pp >= 1, pp <= GCSFilter.maxP, mm > 0 else { return nil }
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return RequestSyncPacket(p: pp, m: mm, data: dd, types: types, sinceTimestamp: sinceTimestamp, fragmentIdFilter: fragmentIdFilter)
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}
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}
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