Files
bitchat/bitchat/Services/NostrTransport.swift
T
b7c6f42b3a Close forged-directness link-rebind DoS on DM routing (#1421)
* Gate connected-link trust on a secure session; deny forged direct announces the connected shortcut

Residual gap after the rotation-heal containment (#1401): "verified
direct" announces prove the signature but not directness — TTL is
unsigned — so a malicious connected peer can replay a victim's fresh
announce with its TTL restored. When the victim has no live link, the
replayer's link rebinds to the victim's ID and reads as "connected",
and MessageRouter's connected fast-path then trusts it outright: every
DM stalls on a Noise handshake the replayer can never complete and is
silently lost while showing "sent".

Router-level trust gate (no wire change):
- Transport gains canDeliverSecurely(to:) — BLE answers with an
  established Noise session; Nostr keeps its prompt-delivery predicate;
  the protocol default forwards to canDeliverPromptly for transports
  without a forgeable link layer.
- MessageRouter.sendPrivate only trusts a connected link outright when
  it can deliver securely; otherwise it still sends (kicking the
  handshake on a genuine link) but retains a copy and hands a sealed
  copy to couriers, like the reachable path. flushOutbox gets the same
  gate so a flush over an insecure link resends instead of dropping the
  retained copy.

Presence hardening (defense in depth): a "direct" announce arriving on
a link already bound to a different peer no longer shortcuts the
claimed peer into "connected" — only real link state does. Genuine
first-contact and direct announces are unaffected; only the ambiguous
heal path loses the forgeable shortcut.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Harden the insecure-link outbox bound; document the second-replay presence gap and the courier metadata tradeoff

Review follow-ups on the canDeliverSecurely gate:

- flushOutbox no longer counts connected-but-insecure flushes toward the
  maxSendAttempts drop: the message was actually transmitted over a live
  link, so a peer whose Noise handshake stalls across reconnect flapping
  must not burn through the cap and lose the store-and-forward copy the
  gate exists to preserve. Retention stays bounded by the 24h outbox TTL
  and the per-peer FIFO cap; acks still clear it. Attempt-counting stays
  for reachable-only (heuristic) sends. Regression test: >8 connected-
  insecure flushes keep the retained copy, drop callback never fires.

- Document the known second-replay presence gap: linkBoundToOtherPeer
  reads the binding before rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirectAnnounce steals
  the link, so once a first replay has rebound a link to an absent
  victim's ID, a second replay marks the victim connected. Presence
  display only — DMs stay on the retain+courier path via the router
  gate. Not closed at the announce layer because the post-rebind state
  is indistinguishable from a legitimate rotation/reconnect heal (a
  supported, field-verified flow). Covered by a two-announce test.

- Note the accepted courier-spray metadata tradeoff at the connected-
  insecure send: nearby verified peers receive a sealed copy (they learn
  a DM exists, never its content), cleared on ack.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Promote a healed rotation to connected; normalize the secure-delivery probe; retain Codable properties in Periphery

Codex review follow-ups on 5017c232:

- P1: a legitimate rotation announce necessarily arrives on a link still
  bound to the OLD peer ID, so the linkBoundToOtherPeer denial stored the
  new identity as disconnected — and the rebind only fixed link state,
  never the registry. A healed rotation then read as disconnected until
  the peer happened to announce again. rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirect-
  Announce now promotes the rebound identity to connected after the
  containment checks pass (registry markConnected + topology/snapshot/
  peer-list refresh; the .peerConnected UI event already fired from the
  announce path). This consciously moves the forged-presence residue
  from second-replay to first-successful-rebind — bounded by the rebind
  containment (never steals a live identity, one rebind per link per
  cooldown) and still display-only: DMs stay gated on canDeliverSecurely.
  Comments and the pinned tests updated; new regression test covers
  rotate-on-open-link -> rebind -> isPeerConnected(new) == true.

- P2: BLEService.canDeliverSecurely probed the Noise session with the
  peer ID as given, but sessions are keyed by the short wire ID — a send
  keyed by the full 64-hex Noise key (favorites resolution) misread an
  established session as insecure and needlessly retained + couriered
  every DM until ack. Normalize with toShort() like isPeerConnected.
  Test drives a real XX handshake and asserts both ID forms pass.

- Periphery: the PrekeyBundleStore.StoredBundle.noiseKey "assign-only"
  flake fired again and slipped past its baselined USR (read exists in
  loadFromDisk; the indexer intermittently misses it). Replace the
  baseline entry with retain_codable_properties: true — deterministic,
  and a truly-dead Codable field is a persisted-format change anyway.
  Local periphery scan --strict: no unused code detected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 16:46:33 +02:00

411 lines
20 KiB
Swift

import BitLogger
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
import Combine
// Minimal Nostr transport conforming to Transport for offline sending
final class NostrTransport: Transport, @unchecked Sendable {
struct Dependencies {
let notificationCenter: NotificationCenter
let loadFavorites: @MainActor () -> [Data: FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship]
let favoriteStatusForNoiseKey: @MainActor (Data) -> FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship?
let favoriteStatusForPeerID: @MainActor (PeerID) -> FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship?
let currentIdentity: @MainActor () throws -> NostrIdentity?
let registerPendingGiftWrap: @MainActor (String) -> Void
let sendEvent: @MainActor (NostrEvent) -> Void
/// Emits whether a relay that carries private messages is up
/// (fail-closed behind Tor). A connected geohash/custom relay alone
/// doesn't count: DM sends target the default relay set and would
/// still queue.
let relayConnectivity: @MainActor () -> AnyPublisher<Bool, Never>
/// Paces outbound acks. Defaults to an isolated pacer so tests don't
/// serialize behind each other; `live` passes the process-wide one.
let ackPacer: AckPacer
init(
notificationCenter: NotificationCenter,
loadFavorites: @escaping @MainActor () -> [Data: FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship],
favoriteStatusForNoiseKey: @escaping @MainActor (Data) -> FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship?,
favoriteStatusForPeerID: @escaping @MainActor (PeerID) -> FavoritesPersistenceService.FavoriteRelationship?,
currentIdentity: @escaping @MainActor () throws -> NostrIdentity?,
registerPendingGiftWrap: @escaping @MainActor (String) -> Void,
sendEvent: @escaping @MainActor (NostrEvent) -> Void,
scheduleAfter: @escaping @Sendable (TimeInterval, @escaping @Sendable () -> Void) -> Void,
relayConnectivity: @escaping @MainActor () -> AnyPublisher<Bool, Never>,
ackPacer: AckPacer? = nil
) {
self.notificationCenter = notificationCenter
self.loadFavorites = loadFavorites
self.favoriteStatusForNoiseKey = favoriteStatusForNoiseKey
self.favoriteStatusForPeerID = favoriteStatusForPeerID
self.currentIdentity = currentIdentity
self.registerPendingGiftWrap = registerPendingGiftWrap
self.sendEvent = sendEvent
self.relayConnectivity = relayConnectivity
// Default pacer drives its throttle through the same injected
// scheduler, so tests that step scheduleAfter manually keep
// control of the ack cadence.
self.ackPacer = ackPacer ?? AckPacer(scheduleAfter: scheduleAfter)
}
@MainActor
static func live(idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge) -> Dependencies {
Dependencies(
notificationCenter: .default,
loadFavorites: { FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.favorites },
favoriteStatusForNoiseKey: { FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.getFavoriteStatus(for: $0) },
favoriteStatusForPeerID: { FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.getFavoriteStatus(forPeerID: $0) },
currentIdentity: { try idBridge.getCurrentNostrIdentity() },
registerPendingGiftWrap: { NostrRelayManager.registerPendingGiftWrap(id: $0) },
sendEvent: { NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent($0) },
scheduleAfter: { delay, action in
DispatchQueue.main.asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + delay, execute: action)
},
relayConnectivity: { NostrRelayManager.shared.$isDMRelayConnected.eraseToAnyPublisher() },
ackPacer: NostrTransport.sharedAckPacer
)
}
}
// Provide BLE short peer ID for BitChat embedding
var senderPeerID = PeerID(str: "")
// Throttle outbound acks — READ receipts and DELIVERED acks, direct and
// geohash — to avoid relay rate limits. Reconnect redelivery produces a
// burst of acks at once: 8 DELIVERED in under a second tripped damus's
// "noting too much" during July 2026 device testing.
private enum QueuedAck {
case readDirect(ReadReceipt, PeerID)
case deliveredDirect(messageID: String, peerID: PeerID)
case deliveredGeohash(messageID: String, recipientHex: String, identity: NostrIdentity)
case readGeohash(messageID: String, recipientHex: String, identity: NostrIdentity)
}
/// Ack pacing shared across transport instances. Geohash acks are sent
/// through short-lived transports created per ack
/// (`makeGeohashNostrTransport()`), so a per-instance queue would only
/// ever hold one item and never pace a burst (flagged by Codex on
/// #1398). Production wires `sharedAckPacer` via `Dependencies.live`;
/// tests get an isolated instance per `Dependencies` by default.
/// @unchecked Sendable: all mutable state (`pending`, `isSending`) is
/// confined to the serial `queue`; the class is only touched via
/// `enqueue` and the scheduler callback, both of which hop onto it.
final class AckPacer: @unchecked Sendable {
typealias Scheduler = @Sendable (TimeInterval, @escaping @Sendable () -> Void) -> Void
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.nostr-ack-pacer")
private var pending: [() -> Void] = []
private var isSending = false
private let interval: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.nostrReadAckInterval
private let scheduleAfter: Scheduler
init(scheduleAfter: @escaping Scheduler = { delay, action in
DispatchQueue.global(qos: .utility).asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + delay, execute: action)
}) {
self.scheduleAfter = scheduleAfter
}
func enqueue(_ send: @escaping () -> Void) {
queue.async {
self.pending.append(send)
self.processNext()
}
}
/// Must be called on `queue`.
private func processNext() {
guard !isSending, !pending.isEmpty else { return }
isSending = true
let send = pending.removeFirst()
send()
scheduleAfter(interval) { [weak self] in
guard let self else { return }
self.queue.async {
self.isSending = false
self.processNext()
}
}
}
}
static let sharedAckPacer = AckPacer()
private let dependencies: Dependencies
private var favoriteStatusObserver: NSObjectProtocol?
// Reachability Cache (thread-safe)
private var reachablePeers: Set<PeerID> = []
// Mirror of the relay manager's connection state, cached here because
// canDeliverPromptly is called synchronously off the main actor.
private var relaysConnected = false
private var relayConnectivityCancellable: AnyCancellable?
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "nostr.transport.state", attributes: .concurrent)
@MainActor
init(
keychain _: KeychainManagerProtocol,
idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge,
dependencies: Dependencies? = nil
) {
self.dependencies = dependencies ?? .live(idBridge: idBridge)
setupObservers()
// Synchronously warm the cache to avoid startup race
let favorites = self.dependencies.loadFavorites()
let reachable = favorites.values
.filter { $0.peerNostrPublicKey != nil }
.map { PeerID(publicKey: $0.peerNoisePublicKey) }
queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
self.reachablePeers = Set(reachable)
}
relayConnectivityCancellable = self.dependencies.relayConnectivity()
.sink { [weak self] connected in
guard let self else { return }
self.queue.async(flags: .barrier) { self.relaysConnected = connected }
}
}
deinit {
if let favoriteStatusObserver {
dependencies.notificationCenter.removeObserver(favoriteStatusObserver)
}
}
private func setupObservers() {
favoriteStatusObserver = dependencies.notificationCenter.addObserver(
forName: .favoriteStatusChanged,
object: nil,
queue: nil
) { [weak self] _ in
self?.refreshReachablePeers()
}
}
private func refreshReachablePeers() {
Task { @MainActor in
let favorites = dependencies.loadFavorites()
let reachable = favorites.values
.filter { $0.peerNostrPublicKey != nil }
.map { PeerID(publicKey: $0.peerNoisePublicKey) }
self.queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
self?.reachablePeers = Set(reachable)
}
}
}
// MARK: - Transport Protocol Conformance
weak var delegate: BitchatDelegate?
weak var eventDelegate: TransportEventDelegate?
weak var peerEventsDelegate: TransportPeerEventsDelegate?
func currentPeerSnapshots() -> [TransportPeerSnapshot] { [] }
var myPeerID: PeerID { senderPeerID }
var myNickname: String { "" }
func setNickname(_ nickname: String) { /* not used for Nostr */ }
func startServices() { /* no-op */ }
func stopServices() { /* no-op */ }
func emergencyDisconnectAll() { /* no-op */ }
func isPeerConnected(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool { false }
func isPeerReachable(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
// Callers address peers by either the short 16-hex ID or the full
// 64-hex noise key (offline favorites), so compare in short form.
let short = peerID.toShort()
return queue.sync {
if reachablePeers.contains(peerID) { return true }
return reachablePeers.contains(where: { $0.toShort() == short })
}
}
func canDeliverPromptly(to peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
// A known npub makes a peer "reachable", but with no relay
// connection a send only joins the local queue. Answering honestly
// here lets the router hand a sealed copy to a courier in parallel
// instead of waiting for internet that may never come.
isPeerReachable(peerID) && queue.sync { relaysConnected }
}
func canDeliverSecurely(to peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
// Nostr has no link bindings to forge; a known recipient key plus a
// connected relay is the strongest delivery signal it has. The router
// already retains + couriers for Nostr sends, so keep that behavior.
canDeliverPromptly(to: peerID)
}
func peerNickname(peerID: PeerID) -> String? { nil }
func getPeerNicknames() -> [PeerID: String] { [:] }
func getFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? { nil }
func getNoiseSessionState(for peerID: PeerID) -> LazyHandshakeState { .none }
func triggerHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) { /* no-op */ }
// Nostr does not use Noise sessions here; the inert Transport defaults
// for the noise* identity hooks apply.
// Public broadcast not supported over Nostr here
func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String]) { /* no-op */ }
func sendPrivateMessage(_ content: String, to peerID: PeerID, recipientNickname: String, messageID: String) {
Task { @MainActor in
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID),
let recipientHex = npubToHex(recipientNpub),
let senderIdentity = try? dependencies.currentIdentity() else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing PM to \(recipientNpub.prefix(16))… id=\(messageID.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodePMForNostr(content: content, messageID: messageID, recipientPeerID: peerID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed PM packet", category: .session)
return
}
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity)
}
}
func sendReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID) {
enqueueAck(.readDirect(receipt, peerID))
}
/// Enqueue an ack for paced sending. Captures self strongly on purpose:
/// geohash acks ride throwaway transport instances that must stay alive
/// until their ack leaves the queue.
private func enqueueAck(_ ack: QueuedAck) {
dependencies.ackPacer.enqueue { self.sendAckItem(ack) }
}
func sendFavoriteNotification(to peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool) {
Task { @MainActor in
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID),
let recipientHex = npubToHex(recipientNpub),
let senderIdentity = try? dependencies.currentIdentity() else { return }
let content = isFavorite ? "[FAVORITED]:\(senderIdentity.npub)" : "[UNFAVORITED]:\(senderIdentity.npub)"
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing FAVORITE(\(isFavorite)) to \(recipientNpub.prefix(16))…", category: .session)
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodePMForNostr(content: content, messageID: UUID().uuidString, recipientPeerID: peerID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed favorite notification", category: .session)
return
}
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity)
}
}
func sendBroadcastAnnounce() { /* no-op for Nostr */ }
func sendDeliveryAck(for messageID: String, to peerID: PeerID) {
enqueueAck(.deliveredDirect(messageID: messageID, peerID: peerID))
}
}
// MARK: - Geohash Helpers
extension NostrTransport {
// MARK: Geohash ACK helpers
func sendDeliveryAckGeohash(for messageID: String, toRecipientHex recipientHex: String, from identity: NostrIdentity) {
enqueueAck(.deliveredGeohash(messageID: messageID, recipientHex: recipientHex, identity: identity))
}
func sendReadReceiptGeohash(_ messageID: String, toRecipientHex recipientHex: String, from identity: NostrIdentity) {
enqueueAck(.readGeohash(messageID: messageID, recipientHex: recipientHex, identity: identity))
}
// MARK: Geohash DMs (per-geohash identity)
func sendPrivateMessageGeohash(content: String, toRecipientHex recipientHex: String, from identity: NostrIdentity, messageID: String) {
Task { @MainActor in
guard !recipientHex.isEmpty else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("GeoDM: send PM mid=\(messageID.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodePMForNostrNoRecipient(content: content, messageID: messageID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed geohash PM packet", category: .session)
return
}
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: identity, registerPending: true)
}
}
}
// MARK: - Private Helpers
extension NostrTransport {
/// Converts npub bech32 string to hex pubkey
@MainActor
private func npubToHex(_ npub: String) -> String? {
do {
let (hrp, data) = try Bech32.decode(npub)
guard hrp == "npub" else { return nil }
return data.hexEncodedString()
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to decode npub -> hex: \(error)", category: .session)
return nil
}
}
/// Creates and sends a gift-wrapped private message event
@MainActor
private func sendWrappedMessage(content: String, recipientHex: String, senderIdentity: NostrIdentity, registerPending: Bool = false) {
guard let event = try? NostrProtocol.createPrivateMessage(content: content, recipientPubkey: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to build Nostr event", category: .session)
return
}
if registerPending {
dependencies.registerPendingGiftWrap(event.id)
}
dependencies.sendEvent(event)
}
/// Sends a single ack item (invoked by the pacer, one per interval)
private func sendAckItem(_ item: QueuedAck) {
Task { @MainActor in
switch item {
case .readDirect(let receipt, let peerID):
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID),
let recipientHex = npubToHex(recipientNpub),
let senderIdentity = try? dependencies.currentIdentity() else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing READ ack id=\(receipt.originalMessageID.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
guard let ack = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodeAckForNostr(type: .readReceipt, messageID: receipt.originalMessageID, recipientPeerID: peerID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed READ ack", category: .session)
return
}
sendWrappedMessage(content: ack, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity)
case .deliveredDirect(let messageID, let peerID):
guard let recipientNpub = resolveRecipientNpub(for: peerID),
let recipientHex = npubToHex(recipientNpub),
let senderIdentity = try? dependencies.currentIdentity() else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("NostrTransport: preparing DELIVERED ack id=\(messageID.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
guard let ack = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodeAckForNostr(type: .delivered, messageID: messageID, recipientPeerID: peerID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else {
SecureLogger.error("NostrTransport: failed to embed DELIVERED ack", category: .session)
return
}
sendWrappedMessage(content: ack, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: senderIdentity)
case .deliveredGeohash(let messageID, let recipientHex, let identity):
SecureLogger.debug("GeoDM: send DELIVERED mid=\(messageID.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodeAckForNostrNoRecipient(type: .delivered, messageID: messageID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else { return }
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: identity, registerPending: true)
case .readGeohash(let messageID, let recipientHex, let identity):
SecureLogger.debug("GeoDM: send READ mid=\(messageID.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
guard let embedded = NostrEmbeddedBitChat.encodeAckForNostrNoRecipient(type: .readReceipt, messageID: messageID, senderPeerID: senderPeerID) else { return }
sendWrappedMessage(content: embedded, recipientHex: recipientHex, senderIdentity: identity, registerPending: true)
}
}
}
@MainActor
private func resolveRecipientNpub(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? {
if let noiseKey = Data(hexString: peerID.id),
let fav = dependencies.favoriteStatusForNoiseKey(noiseKey),
let npub = fav.peerNostrPublicKey {
return npub
}
if peerID.id.count == 16,
let fav = dependencies.favoriteStatusForPeerID(peerID),
let npub = fav.peerNostrPublicKey {
return npub
}
return nil
}
}