Files
bitchat/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEIngressLinkRegistry.swift
T
3e9230229d Heal peer-ID rotation: rebind link on verified announce, retire ghost peer (#1401)
* Heal peer-ID rotation: rebind link on verified announce, retire ghost

When a peer relaunches it rotates its ephemeral peer ID, but a
still-open BLE connection kept its stale peripheral/central→peerID
binding for the reachability retention window (~45-60s). Until it aged
out, the other side showed a duplicate ghost peer and dropped the
rotated peer's direct announces as spoofing attempts.

Root cause: the ingress guard rejected a direct announce whose claimed
sender differed from the link binding before signature verification
could ever see it, so the binding could never heal.

- Ingress guard: let a mismatched direct announce through, attributed
  to the claimed sender; REQUEST_SYNC keeps the strict binding check.
- Bind sites: raw (pre-verification) announces may only bind unbound
  links, never rebind bound ones — rebinding now requires the announce
  handler's signature verification to pass.
- On a verified direct announce whose ingress link is bound to a
  different peer, rebind the link to the announced ID and retire the
  rotated-away ID immediately (registry + gossip + UI), mirroring
  handleLeave.
- BLELinkStateStore.bindPeripheral: drop the previous peer's reverse
  mapping on rebind so the retired ID no longer claims the link.

Fixes #1387

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Contain forged-directness rebinds: no identity steal, per-link cooldown

The announce signature does not authenticate directness (TTL is
excluded from signing because relays mutate it), so a bound peer could
replay another peer's fresh signed announce with its TTL restored and
reach the rotation rebind path. Contain what such a replay can do:

- Refuse a rebind when the claimed identity already owns another live
  link — a replayed announce can no longer steal a connected peer's
  binding or route its directed traffic to the replaying link.
- Allow at most one rebind per link per cooldown window (60s) so two
  identities cannot fight over a link in a replay flip-flop, with each
  flip retiring the other peer.

A replay against an identity with no live link remains possible, but
that capability already exists today on unbound links, where any raw
direct announce binds pre-verification.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 10:08:23 +02:00

127 lines
4.4 KiB
Swift

import BitFoundation
import Foundation
enum BLEIngressLinkID: Hashable, Equatable {
case peripheral(String)
case central(String)
}
struct BLEIngressPacketContext: Equatable {
let receivedFromPeerID: PeerID
let validationPeerID: PeerID
}
struct BLEIngressLinkRecord: Equatable {
let link: BLEIngressLinkID
let peerID: PeerID
let timestamp: Date
}
enum BLEIngressRejection: Error, Equatable {
case selfLoopback(packetType: UInt8)
case directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: PeerID, claimedSenderID: PeerID)
}
struct BLEIngressLinkRegistry {
private var ingressByMessageID: [String: BLEIngressLinkRecord] = [:]
var isEmpty: Bool {
ingressByMessageID.isEmpty
}
mutating func removeAll() {
ingressByMessageID.removeAll()
}
func record(for packet: BitchatPacket) -> BLEIngressLinkRecord? {
ingressByMessageID[Self.messageID(for: packet)]
}
func link(for packet: BitchatPacket) -> BLEIngressLinkID? {
record(for: packet)?.link
}
func peerID(for packet: BitchatPacket) -> PeerID? {
record(for: packet)?.peerID
}
mutating func recordIfNew(
_ packet: BitchatPacket,
link: BLEIngressLinkID,
peerID: PeerID,
now: Date = Date(),
lifetime: TimeInterval
) -> Bool {
let messageID = Self.messageID(for: packet)
if let existing = ingressByMessageID[messageID],
now.timeIntervalSince(existing.timestamp) <= lifetime {
return false
}
ingressByMessageID[messageID] = BLEIngressLinkRecord(link: link, peerID: peerID, timestamp: now)
return true
}
mutating func prune(before cutoff: Date) {
ingressByMessageID = ingressByMessageID.filter { $0.value.timestamp >= cutoff }
}
static func packetContext(
for packet: BitchatPacket,
claimedSenderID: PeerID,
boundPeerID: PeerID?,
localPeerID: PeerID,
directAnnounceTTL: UInt8
) -> Result<BLEIngressPacketContext, BLEIngressRejection> {
if claimedSenderID == localPeerID,
!isSelfAuthoredSyncResponse(packet) {
return .failure(.selfLoopback(packetType: packet.type))
}
if let boundPeerID, boundPeerID != claimedSenderID {
if requiresDirectSenderBinding(packet) {
return .failure(.directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: boundPeerID, claimedSenderID: claimedSenderID))
}
// A direct announce claiming a new sender on a bound link is either
// a spoof or a legitimate peer-ID rotation on a connection that
// outlived the old ID. Attribute it to the claimed sender and let
// it through: announces are self-authenticating, and only a
// signature-verified announce may rebind the link (BLEService).
if isDirectAnnounce(packet, directAnnounceTTL: directAnnounceTTL) {
return .success(BLEIngressPacketContext(
receivedFromPeerID: claimedSenderID,
validationPeerID: claimedSenderID
))
}
}
let receivedFromPeerID = boundPeerID ?? claimedSenderID
let validationPeerID = packet.isRSR ? receivedFromPeerID : claimedSenderID
return .success(BLEIngressPacketContext(
receivedFromPeerID: receivedFromPeerID,
validationPeerID: validationPeerID
))
}
static func messageID(for packet: BitchatPacket) -> String {
let senderID = packet.senderID.hexEncodedString()
let digestPrefix = packet.payload.sha256Hash().prefix(4).hexEncodedString()
return "\(senderID)-\(packet.timestamp)-\(packet.type)-\(digestPrefix)"
}
private static func requiresDirectSenderBinding(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> Bool {
// REQUEST_SYNC is never relayed, so on a bound link the claimed sender
// must be the link peer — it elicits a full store replay, and the
// response is addressed to whoever the sender claims to be.
packet.type == MessageType.requestSync.rawValue
}
static func isDirectAnnounce(_ packet: BitchatPacket, directAnnounceTTL: UInt8) -> Bool {
packet.type == MessageType.announce.rawValue && packet.ttl == directAnnounceTTL
}
private static func isSelfAuthoredSyncResponse(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> Bool {
packet.isRSR && packet.ttl == 0
}
}