Files
bitchat/bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEIncomingFileStore.swift
T
c079d2ab5d Harden what a locked or seized device gives away (#1484)
* Harden what a locked or seized device gives away

The realistic compromise for many of the people this app is built for is
not interception but a phone taken, and often unlocked under coercion.
Content encryption is in good shape; these are the gaps around it.

Hide notification previews, by default. Notification content is rendered
by the system on the lock screen, so it was readable without unlocking:
DM alerts carried the sender's nickname and the full message body, and
geohash alerts put the geohash in the title. Alerts now state that a DM,
mention, or location-channel activity arrived and withhold the rest until
the app is opened. userInfo still carries the routing peer ID and deep
link, neither of which the system displays, so taps land where they did.
A settings toggle restores full previews for anyone who wants them.
Default-on is the deliberate part: a phone face-up on a table should not
narrate conversations, and someone who wants previews can say so.

Cover the window on willResignActive, so the snapshot iOS stores for the
app switcher shows a placeholder rather than an open conversation. Opaque
rather than blurred, because blurred large text stays partly legible and
the snapshot goes to disk. Added synchronously from a UIKit notification
with queue: nil, since the capture follows shortly after and an
OperationQueue hop or a SwiftUI state change can lose that race. Panic
wipe already deleted snapshots already on disk; this stops new ones from
being worth deleting.

Bound media by age as well as size. The 100 MB quota only ever considered
incoming files, so outgoing media had no lifetime at all and a received
photo could outlive its conversation indefinitely. A launch-time sweep now
deletes managed media older than seven days, incoming and outgoing, with
the same exemptions quota eviction honors: in-flight live captures and
files reserved by a delivery or deletion in progress.

Make /clear tell the truth on the mesh timeline. It recorded an echo
watermark and left the gossip archive on disk for up to 6 hours, so
someone who cleared before a police stop had deleted nothing. Clearing now
erases the archive too. The watermark still matters: it suppresses
pre-clear messages this device hears again from peers. The cost is that
the device stops serving recent public backlog until it hears fresh
traffic, which is a fair reading of what clearing a timeline means.

Documented in PRIVACY_POLICY.md and the privacy assessment, including a
new section on what is deliberately NOT addressed: there is still no
duress mechanism of any kind (no decoy passphrase, no wipe-on-failed-auth,
no app lock), macOS gets no file-protection classes, and media is not
sealed at the app layer. The duress question is a product decision as much
as an engineering one, since in some jurisdictions destroying data on
demand is itself an offence and hiding may protect someone better than
destroying, so it is called out rather than guessed at.

Three findings from the audit that prompted this work turned out to be
already fixed on main and are not included: keychain accessibility is
AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly with a retrying migration, the panic media
wipe uses a two-location durable marker transaction, and panic already
discards staged share-extension content.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Inject the previews preference instead of reading shared defaults

CI caught a real problem this introduced. `NotificationServiceTests`
already asserted the full-preview title and body, and both it and the new
redaction tests read `NotificationPrivacySettings` from
`UserDefaults.standard` in the same process. Whichever ran second
depended on the other's cleanup, so it passed locally and failed in CI:

  XCTAssertEqual failed: ("🔒 new dm") is not equal to ("🔒 DM from Alice")

Fixed at the source rather than by ordering or serialization.
`NotificationService` now takes a `hidePreviewsProvider`, defaulting to
the real preference, so each test states which behavior it asserts. The
pre-existing test asks for previews shown and gains a redacted
counterpart; the redaction tests no longer touch the shared store.

`NotificationPrivacySettings` also gained store-injecting accessors so
the default-value and round-trip assertions can use an isolated suite
rather than mutating preferences other tests read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 19:26:29 +02:00

778 lines
30 KiB
Swift

import BitLogger
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
struct PanicRecoveryIntent {
let fileMarkerEstablished: Bool
let externalMarkerEstablished: Bool
var hasDurableMarker: Bool {
fileMarkerEstablished || externalMarkerEstablished
}
}
/// Small, dependency-injectable transaction surface used by ChatViewModel.
/// Production persists the same intent in two independent locations before
/// any application state is erased. Tests can inject an ephemeral operation
/// set without touching the developer's Application Support directory.
struct PanicRecoveryOperations {
let isPending: () throws -> Bool
let begin: () -> PanicRecoveryIntent
let wipeMedia: (PanicRecoveryIntent) throws -> Void
let complete: () throws -> Void
static func ephemeral(
wipeMedia: @escaping () throws -> Void = {}
) -> PanicRecoveryOperations {
PanicRecoveryOperations(
isPending: { false },
begin: {
PanicRecoveryIntent(
fileMarkerEstablished: false,
externalMarkerEstablished: false
)
},
wipeMedia: { _ in try wipeMedia() },
complete: {}
)
}
static func live(
fileStore: BLEIncomingFileStore = BLEIncomingFileStore(),
defaults: UserDefaults = .standard
) -> PanicRecoveryOperations {
let defaultsKey = "bitchat.panicResetPending"
return PanicRecoveryOperations(
isPending: {
if defaults.bool(forKey: defaultsKey) {
return true
}
return try fileStore.isPanicRecoveryPending()
},
begin: {
defaults.set(true, forKey: defaultsKey)
let externalMarkerEstablished =
defaults.synchronize()
&& defaults.bool(forKey: defaultsKey)
let fileMarkerEstablished: Bool
do {
try fileStore.markPanicRecoveryPending()
fileMarkerEstablished = true
} catch {
fileMarkerEstablished = false
SecureLogger.error(
"Failed to persist file panic-recovery marker: \(error)",
category: .security
)
}
return PanicRecoveryIntent(
fileMarkerEstablished: fileMarkerEstablished,
externalMarkerEstablished: externalMarkerEstablished
)
},
wipeMedia: { intent in
try fileStore.panicWipe(
hasDurablePendingMarker: intent.hasDurableMarker
)
},
complete: {
// Keep the independent defaults latch until the file marker
// has definitely cleared. Any failure therefore remains
// visible to the next launch.
try fileStore.completePanicRecovery()
defaults.removeObject(forKey: defaultsKey)
guard defaults.synchronize(),
!defaults.bool(forKey: defaultsKey) else {
throw BLEIncomingFileStore.PanicRecoveryError
.externalMarkerCommitFailed
}
}
)
}
}
struct BLEIncomingFileStore: @unchecked Sendable {
enum PanicRecoveryError: Error {
case externalMarkerCommitFailed
case markerWriteFailed(Error)
case markerWriteAndMediaWipeFailed(
markerError: Error,
mediaError: Error
)
}
struct PrivateMediaDeletionReservation: Sendable {
fileprivate let id: UUID
}
private final class PayloadCoordination: @unchecked Sendable {
let lock = NSLock()
var pendingDeliveryPaths: Set<String> = []
var deletionReservations: [UUID: Set<String>] = [:]
}
private static let defaultQuotaBytes: Int64 = 100 * 1024 * 1024
/// How long managed media may stay on disk. Bounds by age what the quota
/// only bounds by size; see `expireAgedMedia(retention:)`.
static let defaultMediaRetention: TimeInterval = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
/// Kept outside `files/` so deleting the media tree cannot erase the
/// fail-closed startup decision before the full panic has committed.
private static let panicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName =
".panic-recovery-pending"
/// Compatibility with a short-lived development build that used the
/// media-specific name for the same full-transaction latch.
private static let legacyPanicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName =
".panic-media-wipe-pending"
private static let mediaSubdirectories = [
"voicenotes/incoming",
"voicenotes/outgoing",
"images/incoming",
"images/outgoing",
"files/incoming",
"files/outgoing"
]
/// Name prefix of in-flight live voice captures (progressively written by
/// `ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator`). Quota eviction skips them by pattern —
/// deleting one mid-stream unlinks the inode under an open `FileHandle`
/// and kills playback — and the coordinator's startup sweep deletes any
/// orphans a previous session left behind.
static let liveCapturePrefix = "voice_live_"
/// Exposed so callers that write progressively into the store's
/// directories (live voice captures) share the same file manager.
let fileManager: FileManager
private let baseDirectory: URL?
private let dateProvider: () -> Date
private let panicMarkerWriter: (Data, URL) throws -> Void
private let quotaBytes: Int64
private let privateMediaReceipts: BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore
private let payloadCoordination: PayloadCoordination
init(
fileManager: FileManager = .default,
baseDirectory: URL? = nil,
dateProvider: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init,
panicMarkerWriter: @escaping (Data, URL) throws -> Void = {
try $0.write(to: $1, options: .atomic)
},
quotaBytes: Int64 = Self.defaultQuotaBytes
) {
self.fileManager = fileManager
self.baseDirectory = baseDirectory
self.dateProvider = dateProvider
self.panicMarkerWriter = panicMarkerWriter
self.quotaBytes = max(0, quotaBytes)
self.privateMediaReceipts = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(
fileManager: fileManager,
baseDirectory: baseDirectory,
now: dateProvider
)
self.payloadCoordination = PayloadCoordination()
}
/// Panic-wipe every managed incoming and outgoing media artifact before
/// returning. Recreating the directory tree keeps later capture/receive
/// paths usable without allowing a detached cleanup task to race them.
///
/// Marker persistence and deletion are deliberately separate error
/// domains: even when both durable marker channels fail, deletion is
/// still attempted before this method reports the marker failure.
func panicWipe(
hasDurablePendingMarker: Bool = false
) throws {
// The receipt index caches tombstones as well as accepted payloads,
// while payload coordination retains save/delete reservations. Always
// invalidate both on return, including partial-failure paths, so no
// pre-panic receiver decision survives after identity reset.
defer {
privateMediaReceipts.resetForPanic()
payloadCoordination.lock.lock()
payloadCoordination.pendingDeliveryPaths.removeAll(
keepingCapacity: false
)
payloadCoordination.deletionReservations.removeAll(
keepingCapacity: false
)
payloadCoordination.lock.unlock()
}
let markerError: Error?
do {
try markPanicRecoveryPending()
markerError = nil
} catch {
markerError = error
SecureLogger.error(
"Could not persist file panic-recovery marker; attempting media deletion anyway: \(error)",
category: .security
)
}
do {
let filesDirectory = try rootDirectory()
.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
if fileManager.fileExists(atPath: filesDirectory.path) {
try fileManager.removeItem(at: filesDirectory)
}
for subdirectory in Self.mediaSubdirectories {
try fileManager.createDirectory(
at: filesDirectory.appendingPathComponent(
subdirectory,
isDirectory: true
),
withIntermediateDirectories: true,
attributes: nil
)
}
} catch {
if let markerError {
throw PanicRecoveryError.markerWriteAndMediaWipeFailed(
markerError: markerError,
mediaError: error
)
}
throw error
}
if let markerError, !hasDurablePendingMarker {
throw PanicRecoveryError.markerWriteFailed(markerError)
}
}
func markPanicRecoveryPending() throws {
let markerURL = try panicRecoveryPendingMarkerURL()
try fileManager.createDirectory(
at: markerURL.deletingLastPathComponent(),
withIntermediateDirectories: true,
attributes: nil
)
try panicMarkerWriter(Data([1]), markerURL)
}
func isPanicRecoveryPending() throws -> Bool {
try panicRecoveryMarkerURLs().contains {
fileManager.fileExists(atPath: $0.path)
}
}
func completePanicRecovery() throws {
for markerURL in try panicRecoveryMarkerURLs()
where fileManager.fileExists(atPath: markerURL.path) {
try fileManager.removeItem(at: markerURL)
}
}
/// Resolves (and creates) an incoming-media directory for callers that
/// write progressively instead of via `save` (live voice captures).
func incomingDirectory(subdirectory: String) throws -> URL {
let directory = try filesDirectory().appendingPathComponent(subdirectory, isDirectory: true)
try fileManager.createDirectory(at: directory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
return directory
}
func save(
data: Data,
preferredName: String?,
subdirectory: String,
fallbackExtension: String?,
defaultPrefix: String
) -> URL? {
payloadCoordination.lock.lock()
defer { payloadCoordination.lock.unlock() }
do {
let base = try filesDirectory().appendingPathComponent(subdirectory, isDirectory: true)
try fileManager.createDirectory(at: base, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
let sanitized = sanitizedFileName(
preferredName,
defaultName: "\(defaultPrefix)_\(Self.timestampString(from: dateProvider()))",
fallbackExtension: fallbackExtension
)
let reservedPaths = privateMediaReceipts.reservedPayloadPaths()
let deletionPaths = payloadCoordination
.deletionReservations.values.reduce(into: Set<String>()) {
$0.formUnion($1)
}
let allocationReservations = deletionPaths.union(
payloadCoordination.pendingDeliveryPaths
)
let destination = uniqueFileURL(
in: base,
fileName: sanitized,
reservedPaths: (reservedPaths ?? []).union(
allocationReservations
),
forceRandomizedName: reservedPaths == nil
)
try data.write(to: destination, options: .atomic)
payloadCoordination.pendingDeliveryPaths.insert(
destination.standardizedFileURL.path
)
return destination
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to persist incoming media: \(error)", category: .session)
return nil
}
}
/// Drops THIS instance's in-memory receipt index after a panic wipe.
///
/// `panicWipe` already resets the receipt store it runs on, but the
/// production wipe runs on the `PanicRecoveryOperations.live()` file
/// store while receipt lookups are served by `BLEService`'s own
/// `incomingFileStore`. The service's panic path must invalidate its own
/// cache explicitly or pre-panic decisions survive in memory.
func resetPrivateMediaReceiptsForPanic() {
privateMediaReceipts.resetForPanic()
}
func privateMediaReceiptState(
messageID: String
) -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState {
privateMediaReceipts.state(for: messageID)
}
func commitPrivateMediaFile(
messageID: String,
storedURL: URL
) -> Bool {
privateMediaReceipts.commitAccepted(
messageID: messageID,
storedURL: storedURL
)
}
/// Reserves every receipt/UI path before the asynchronous deletion
/// barrier. Allocation and reservation share one lock, so either an
/// in-flight raw arrival is observed and deletion fails closed, or the
/// arrival is forced onto a different filename.
func reservePrivateMediaDeletion(
messageIDs: [String],
payloadRelativePaths: [String: String]
) -> PrivateMediaDeletionReservation? {
payloadCoordination.lock.lock()
defer { payloadCoordination.lock.unlock() }
guard let paths = privateMediaReceipts
.prospectiveDeletionPayloadPaths(
messageIDs: messageIDs,
payloadRelativePaths: payloadRelativePaths
),
paths.isDisjoint(
with: payloadCoordination.pendingDeliveryPaths
) else {
return nil
}
let reservation = PrivateMediaDeletionReservation(id: UUID())
payloadCoordination.deletionReservations[reservation.id] = paths
return reservation
}
func commitPrivateMediaDeletion(
reservation: PrivateMediaDeletionReservation,
messageIDs: [String],
payloadRelativePaths: [String: String],
protectedPayloadRelativePaths: Set<String>
) -> Bool {
payloadCoordination.lock.lock()
defer {
payloadCoordination.deletionReservations.removeValue(
forKey: reservation.id
)
payloadCoordination.lock.unlock()
}
guard payloadCoordination.deletionReservations[reservation.id] != nil
else {
return false
}
return privateMediaReceipts.recordDeleted(
messageIDs: messageIDs,
payloadRelativePaths: payloadRelativePaths,
protectedPayloadRelativePaths: protectedPayloadRelativePaths
)
}
/// Explicit deletion of a LEGACY (non-stable-ID) incoming payload.
///
/// Legacy media has no durable receipt, so the only safe unlink is one
/// that can prove no other owner may hold the basename: the path must
/// not be pending delivery, must not belong to an in-flight deletion
/// reservation, and must not be owned by a stable receipt or journal
/// entry. When any of those hold — or receipt state cannot be read —
/// the file stays for bounded quota cleanup (the fail-safe fallback).
/// Returns true only when the payload was verifiably unlinked.
@discardableResult
func removeLegacyIncomingFile(relativePath: String) -> Bool {
payloadCoordination.lock.lock()
defer { payloadCoordination.lock.unlock() }
guard let payload = incomingPayloadURL(
relativePath: relativePath
) else {
return false
}
let standardizedPath = payload.standardizedFileURL.path
let reservedByDeletion = payloadCoordination.deletionReservations
.values.contains { $0.contains(standardizedPath) }
guard !reservedByDeletion,
!payloadCoordination.pendingDeliveryPaths.contains(
standardizedPath
),
let receiptOwnedPaths =
privateMediaReceipts.reservedPayloadPaths(),
!receiptOwnedPaths.contains(standardizedPath) else {
return false
}
guard fileManager.fileExists(atPath: payload.path),
(try? payload.resourceValues(
forKeys: [.isRegularFileKey]
).isRegularFile) == true else {
return false
}
do {
try fileManager.removeItem(at: payload)
return !fileManager.fileExists(atPath: payload.path)
} catch {
SecureLogger.warning(
"⚠️ Failed to remove explicitly deleted legacy media: \(error)",
category: .session
)
return false
}
}
/// Resolves a `files/`-relative path iff it lands directly inside one of
/// the incoming media directories. Anything else is not a deletable
/// incoming payload.
private func incomingPayloadURL(relativePath: String) -> URL? {
guard !relativePath.isEmpty,
let base = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
return nil
}
let candidate = base
.appendingPathComponent(relativePath, isDirectory: false)
.standardizedFileURL
let parentPath = candidate.deletingLastPathComponent().path
let incomingDirectories = [
"voicenotes/incoming",
"images/incoming",
"files/incoming"
]
guard incomingDirectories.contains(where: { relativeDirectory in
base.appendingPathComponent(
relativeDirectory,
isDirectory: true
).standardizedFileURL.path == parentPath
}) else {
return nil
}
return candidate
}
/// Releases the short window between disk save and synchronous
/// conversation insertion. Before this callback, a deletion transaction
/// may not infer ownership from a stale bubble that names the same path.
func finishIncomingFileDelivery(at storedURL: URL) {
payloadCoordination.lock.lock()
defer { payloadCoordination.lock.unlock() }
payloadCoordination.pendingDeliveryPaths.remove(
storedURL.standardizedFileURL.path
)
}
/// Best-effort rollback for a payload whose durable receipt commit failed.
func removeIncomingFile(at storedURL: URL) {
payloadCoordination.lock.lock()
defer { payloadCoordination.lock.unlock() }
payloadCoordination.pendingDeliveryPaths.remove(
storedURL.standardizedFileURL.path
)
guard isURLInsideFilesDirectory(storedURL) else { return }
do {
try fileManager.removeItem(at: storedURL)
} catch {
SecureLogger.warning(
"⚠️ Failed to roll back uncommitted incoming media: \(error)",
category: .session
)
}
}
/// Frees least-recently-modified incoming files until `reservingBytes`
/// fits under the quota. Files named `voice_live_*` (in-flight live
/// captures) are never evicted regardless of who triggers enforcement —
/// a finalized transfer can arrive at quota while a burst is still
/// streaming — but they still count toward usage.
func enforceQuota(reservingBytes: Int) {
payloadCoordination.lock.lock()
defer { payloadCoordination.lock.unlock() }
do {
let base = try filesDirectory()
let incomingDirs = [
base.appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/incoming", isDirectory: true),
base.appendingPathComponent("images/incoming", isDirectory: true),
base.appendingPathComponent("files/incoming", isDirectory: true)
]
var allFiles: [(url: URL, size: Int64, modified: Date)] = []
for dir in incomingDirs where fileManager.fileExists(atPath: dir.path) {
guard let contents = try? fileManager.contentsOfDirectory(
at: dir,
includingPropertiesForKeys: [.fileSizeKey, .contentModificationDateKey],
options: [.skipsHiddenFiles]
) else { continue }
for fileURL in contents {
guard let attrs = try? fileURL.resourceValues(forKeys: [.fileSizeKey, .contentModificationDateKey]),
let size = attrs.fileSize,
let modified = attrs.contentModificationDate else { continue }
allFiles.append((url: fileURL, size: Int64(size), modified: modified))
}
}
let currentUsage = allFiles.reduce(0) { $0 + $1.size }
let targetUsage = quotaBytes - Int64(reservingBytes)
guard currentUsage > targetUsage else { return }
let needToFree = currentUsage - targetUsage
let activeDeletionPaths = payloadCoordination
.deletionReservations.values.reduce(into: Set<String>()) {
$0.formUnion($1)
}
let protectedPaths = activeDeletionPaths.union(
payloadCoordination.pendingDeliveryPaths
)
var freedSpace: Int64 = 0
for file in allFiles.sorted(by: { $0.modified < $1.modified }) {
guard freedSpace < needToFree else { break }
guard !file.url.lastPathComponent.hasPrefix(Self.liveCapturePrefix) else { continue }
guard !protectedPaths.contains(
file.url.standardizedFileURL.path
) else {
continue
}
do {
try fileManager.removeItem(at: file.url)
freedSpace += file.size
SecureLogger.debug("🗑️ BCH-01-002: Deleted old incoming file to free space: \(file.url.lastPathComponent)", category: .security)
} catch {
SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Failed to delete old file for quota: \(error)", category: .security)
}
}
if freedSpace > 0 {
SecureLogger.info("📊 BCH-01-002: Freed \(ByteCountFormatter.string(fromByteCount: freedSpace, countStyle: .file)) to stay within incoming files quota", category: .security)
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Could not enforce storage quota: \(error)", category: .security)
}
}
/// Deletes managed media older than `retention`, across both incoming and
/// outgoing directories, and reports how many files went away.
///
/// The quota sweep above only bounds *size*, and only for incoming files,
/// so a received photo or a sent voice note could sit on disk unbounded in
/// time — long outliving the conversation it belonged to, which is what a
/// seized device gives up. This bounds media by age instead, on the same
/// principle as the courier envelope and gossip archive lifetimes.
///
/// Honors the same exclusions as quota eviction: in-flight live captures
/// and files reserved by an in-progress delivery or deletion are left
/// alone regardless of age.
@discardableResult
func expireAgedMedia(retention: TimeInterval = Self.defaultMediaRetention) -> Int {
guard retention > 0 else { return 0 }
payloadCoordination.lock.lock()
defer { payloadCoordination.lock.unlock() }
let cutoff = dateProvider().addingTimeInterval(-retention)
let activeDeletionPaths = payloadCoordination
.deletionReservations.values.reduce(into: Set<String>()) {
$0.formUnion($1)
}
let protectedPaths = activeDeletionPaths.union(
payloadCoordination.pendingDeliveryPaths
)
var removed = 0
do {
let base = try filesDirectory()
for subdirectory in Self.mediaSubdirectories {
let dir = base.appendingPathComponent(subdirectory, isDirectory: true)
guard fileManager.fileExists(atPath: dir.path) else { continue }
guard let contents = try? fileManager.contentsOfDirectory(
at: dir,
includingPropertiesForKeys: [.contentModificationDateKey],
options: [.skipsHiddenFiles]
) else { continue }
for fileURL in contents {
guard let modified = try? fileURL.resourceValues(
forKeys: [.contentModificationDateKey]
).contentModificationDate else { continue }
guard modified < cutoff else { continue }
guard !fileURL.lastPathComponent.hasPrefix(Self.liveCapturePrefix) else { continue }
guard !protectedPaths.contains(
fileURL.standardizedFileURL.path
) else { continue }
do {
try fileManager.removeItem(at: fileURL)
removed += 1
} catch {
SecureLogger.warning(
"⚠️ Failed to expire aged media file: \(error)",
category: .security
)
}
}
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.warning(
"⚠️ Could not expire aged media: \(error)",
category: .security
)
return removed
}
if removed > 0 {
SecureLogger.info(
"🗑️ Expired \(removed) media file(s) older than the retention window",
category: .security
)
}
return removed
}
private func filesDirectory() throws -> URL {
let filesDir = try rootDirectory().appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
try fileManager.createDirectory(at: filesDir, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
return filesDir
}
private func rootDirectory() throws -> URL {
try baseDirectory ?? fileManager.url(
for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
in: .userDomainMask,
appropriateFor: nil,
create: true
)
}
private func panicRecoveryPendingMarkerURL() throws -> URL {
try rootDirectory().appendingPathComponent(
Self.panicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName,
isDirectory: false
)
}
private func panicRecoveryMarkerURLs() throws -> [URL] {
let root = try rootDirectory()
return [
root.appendingPathComponent(
Self.panicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName,
isDirectory: false
),
root.appendingPathComponent(
Self.legacyPanicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName,
isDirectory: false
)
]
}
private func isURLInsideFilesDirectory(_ url: URL) -> Bool {
guard let filesDirectory = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
return false
}
return url.standardizedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(filesDirectory.path + "/")
}
private func sanitizedFileName(_ name: String?, defaultName: String, fallbackExtension: String?) -> String {
var candidate = (name ?? "")
.replacingOccurrences(of: "\0", with: "")
.precomposedStringWithCanonicalMapping
.replacingOccurrences(of: "/", with: "_")
.replacingOccurrences(of: "\\", with: "_")
let invalid = CharacterSet(charactersIn: "<>:\"|?*\0").union(.controlCharacters)
candidate = candidate.components(separatedBy: invalid).joined(separator: "_").trimmed
if candidate.isEmpty { candidate = defaultName }
if candidate.hasPrefix(".") { candidate = "_" + candidate }
if candidate.count > 120 {
let ext = (candidate as NSString).pathExtension
let base = (candidate as NSString).deletingPathExtension
candidate = ext.isEmpty
? String(candidate.prefix(120))
: String(base.prefix(max(10, 120 - ext.count - 1))) + "." + ext
}
if let fallbackExtension, (candidate as NSString).pathExtension.isEmpty {
candidate += ".\(fallbackExtension)"
}
return candidate.isEmpty ? defaultName : candidate
}
private func uniqueFileURL(
in directory: URL,
fileName: String,
reservedPaths: Set<String>,
forceRandomizedName: Bool
) -> URL {
let directoryPath = directory.standardizedFileURL.path
func isInsideDirectory(_ url: URL) -> Bool {
url.standardizedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(directoryPath + "/")
}
func isAvailable(_ url: URL) -> Bool {
!reservedPaths.contains(url.standardizedFileURL.path)
&& !fileManager.fileExists(atPath: url.path)
}
var candidate = directory.appendingPathComponent(fileName)
guard isInsideDirectory(candidate) else {
SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Path traversal blocked: \(fileName)", category: .security)
return directory.appendingPathComponent("blocked_\(UUID().uuidString)")
}
let baseName = (fileName as NSString).deletingPathExtension
let ext = (fileName as NSString).pathExtension
if forceRandomizedName {
let suffix = UUID().uuidString
let randomizedName = ext.isEmpty
? "\(baseName)_\(suffix)"
: "\(baseName)_\(suffix).\(ext)"
return directory.appendingPathComponent(randomizedName)
}
if isAvailable(candidate) {
return candidate
}
for counter in 1..<100 {
let newName = ext.isEmpty ? "\(baseName) (\(counter))" : "\(baseName) (\(counter)).\(ext)"
candidate = directory.appendingPathComponent(newName)
guard isInsideDirectory(candidate) else {
return directory.appendingPathComponent("blocked_\(UUID().uuidString)")
}
if isAvailable(candidate) {
return candidate
}
}
return directory.appendingPathComponent("\(baseName)_\(UUID().uuidString).\(ext.isEmpty ? "dat" : ext)")
}
private static func timestampString(from date: Date) -> String {
let formatter = DateFormatter()
formatter.dateFormat = "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
return formatter.string(from: date)
}
}