Files
bitchat/bitchat/Services/NoiseEncryptionService.swift
T
islam 5d6aecfc83 Replace .log w/ explicit .debug/.error functions
This would make the intention more explicit so we can overload different logging types as well like keychain, security events, etc…

Search/Replace Strategies:

1.
Search regex: `SecureLogger\.log\(\s*(.*?),\s*category:\s*(.*?),\s*level:\s*\.(\w+)\s*\)`
Replace regex: `SecureLogger.$3($1, category: $2)`

Sample input:
```
SecureLogger.log(
    "🔄 Found favorite for '\(peerInfo.nickname)' by nickname, updating noise key",
    category: .session,
    level: .debug
)
```

Sample output:
`SecureLogger.debug("🔄 Found favorite for '\(peerInfo.nickname)' by nickname, updating noise key", category: .session)`

---

2.
Search regex: `SecureLogger\.log\((.*?)\)`
Replace regex: `SecureLogger.debug($1)` (as it’s the default level)

Sample input:
`SecureLogger.log("some text")`

Sample output:
`SecureLogger.debug("some text")`

---

3
Manual changes:
ChatViewModel line 5393 (commented code)
NostrRelayManager line 196 (commented code)
NostrRelayManager lines 346-350 (if/else logic)
NostrRelayManager line 371 (commented code)
2025-09-11 19:03:08 +01:00

673 lines
25 KiB
Swift

//
// NoiseEncryptionService.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
///
/// # NoiseEncryptionService
///
/// High-level encryption service that manages Noise Protocol sessions for secure
/// peer-to-peer communication in BitChat. Acts as the bridge between the transport
/// layer (BLEService) and the cryptographic layer (NoiseProtocol).
///
/// ## Overview
/// This service provides a simplified API for establishing and managing encrypted
/// channels between peers. It handles:
/// - Static identity key management
/// - Session lifecycle (creation, maintenance, teardown)
/// - Message encryption/decryption
/// - Peer authentication and fingerprint tracking
/// - Automatic rekeying for forward secrecy
///
/// ## Architecture
/// The service operates at multiple levels:
/// 1. **Identity Management**: Persistent Curve25519 keys stored in Keychain
/// 2. **Session Management**: Per-peer Noise sessions with state tracking
/// 3. **Message Processing**: Encryption/decryption with proper framing
/// 4. **Security Features**: Rate limiting, fingerprint verification
///
/// ## Key Features
///
/// ### Identity Keys
/// - Static Curve25519 key pair for Noise XX pattern
/// - Ed25519 signing key pair for additional authentication
/// - Keys persisted securely in iOS/macOS Keychain
/// - Fingerprints derived from SHA256 of public keys
///
/// ### Session Management
/// - Lazy session creation (on-demand when sending messages)
/// - Automatic session recovery after disconnections
/// - Configurable rekey intervals for forward secrecy
/// - Graceful handling of simultaneous handshakes
///
/// ### Security Properties
/// - Forward secrecy via ephemeral keys in handshakes
/// - Mutual authentication via static key exchange
/// - Protection against replay attacks
/// - Rate limiting to prevent DoS attacks
///
/// ## Encryption Flow
/// ```
/// 1. Message arrives for encryption
/// 2. Check if session exists for peer
/// 3. If not, initiate Noise handshake
/// 4. Once established, encrypt message
/// 5. Add message type header for protocol handling
/// 6. Return encrypted payload for transmission
/// ```
///
/// ## Integration Points
/// - **BLEService**: Calls this service for all private messages
/// - **ChatViewModel**: Monitors encryption status for UI indicators
/// - **NoiseHandshakeCoordinator**: Prevents handshake race conditions
/// - **KeychainManager**: Secure storage for identity keys
///
/// ## Thread Safety
/// - Concurrent read access via reader-writer queue
/// - Session operations protected by per-peer queues
/// - Atomic updates for critical state changes
///
/// ## Error Handling
/// - Graceful fallback for encryption failures
/// - Clear error messages for debugging
/// - Automatic retry with exponential backoff
/// - User notification for critical failures
///
/// ## Performance Considerations
/// - Sessions cached in memory for fast access
/// - Minimal allocations in hot paths
/// - Efficient binary message format
/// - Background queue for CPU-intensive operations
///
import Foundation
import CryptoKit
import os.log
// MARK: - Encryption Status
/// Represents the current encryption status of a peer connection.
/// Used for UI indicators and decision-making about message handling.
enum EncryptionStatus: Equatable {
case none // Failed or incompatible
case noHandshake // No handshake attempted yet
case noiseHandshaking // Currently establishing
case noiseSecured // Established but not verified
case noiseVerified // Established and verified
var icon: String? { // Made optional to hide icon when no handshake
switch self {
case .none:
return "lock.slash" // Failed handshake
case .noHandshake:
return nil // No icon when no handshake attempted
case .noiseHandshaking:
return "lock.rotation"
case .noiseSecured:
return "lock.fill" // Changed from "lock" to "lock.fill" for filled lock
case .noiseVerified:
return "checkmark.seal.fill" // Verified badge
}
}
var description: String {
switch self {
case .none:
return "Encryption failed"
case .noHandshake:
return "Not encrypted"
case .noiseHandshaking:
return "Establishing encryption..."
case .noiseSecured:
return "Encrypted"
case .noiseVerified:
return "Encrypted & Verified"
}
}
}
// MARK: - Noise Encryption Service
/// Manages end-to-end encryption for BitChat using the Noise Protocol Framework.
/// Provides a high-level API for establishing secure channels between peers,
/// handling all cryptographic operations transparently.
/// - Important: This service maintains the device's cryptographic identity
final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// Static identity key (persistent across sessions)
private let staticIdentityKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey
public let staticIdentityPublicKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey
// Ed25519 signing key (persistent across sessions)
private let signingKey: Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey
public let signingPublicKey: Curve25519.Signing.PublicKey
// Session manager
private let sessionManager: NoiseSessionManager
// Peer fingerprints (SHA256 hash of static public key)
private var peerFingerprints: [String: String] = [:] // peerID -> fingerprint
private var fingerprintToPeerID: [String: String] = [:] // fingerprint -> peerID
// Thread safety
private let serviceQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.service", attributes: .concurrent)
// Security components
private let rateLimiter = NoiseRateLimiter()
// Session maintenance
private var rekeyTimer: Timer?
private let rekeyCheckInterval: TimeInterval = 60.0 // Check every minute
// Callbacks
private var onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers: [((String, String) -> Void)] = [] // Array of handlers for peer authentication
var onHandshakeRequired: ((String) -> Void)? // peerID needs handshake
// Add a handler for peer authentication
func addOnPeerAuthenticatedHandler(_ handler: @escaping (String, String) -> Void) {
serviceQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
self?.onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers.append(handler)
}
}
// Legacy support - setting this will add to the handlers array
var onPeerAuthenticated: ((String, String) -> Void)? {
get { nil } // Always return nil for backward compatibility
set {
if let handler = newValue {
addOnPeerAuthenticatedHandler(handler)
}
}
}
init() {
// Load or create static identity key (ONLY from keychain)
let loadedKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey
// Try to load from keychain
if let identityData = KeychainManager.shared.getIdentityKey(forKey: "noiseStaticKey"),
let key = try? Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: identityData) {
loadedKey = key
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation("load", keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: true)
}
// If no identity exists, create new one
else {
loadedKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
let keyData = loadedKey.rawRepresentation
// Save to keychain
let saved = KeychainManager.shared.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation("create", keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: saved)
}
// Now assign the final value
self.staticIdentityKey = loadedKey
self.staticIdentityPublicKey = staticIdentityKey.publicKey
// Load or create signing key pair
let loadedSigningKey: Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey
// Try to load from keychain
if let signingData = KeychainManager.shared.getIdentityKey(forKey: "ed25519SigningKey"),
let key = try? Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: signingData) {
loadedSigningKey = key
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation("load", keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: true)
}
// If no signing key exists, create new one
else {
loadedSigningKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
let keyData = loadedSigningKey.rawRepresentation
// Save to keychain
let saved = KeychainManager.shared.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: "ed25519SigningKey")
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation("create", keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: saved)
}
// Now assign the signing keys
self.signingKey = loadedSigningKey
self.signingPublicKey = signingKey.publicKey
// Initialize session manager
self.sessionManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: staticIdentityKey)
// Set up session callbacks
sessionManager.onSessionEstablished = { [weak self] peerID, remoteStaticKey in
self?.handleSessionEstablished(peerID: peerID, remoteStaticKey: remoteStaticKey)
}
// Start session maintenance timer
startRekeyTimer()
}
// MARK: - Public Interface
/// Get our static public key for sharing
func getStaticPublicKeyData() -> Data {
return staticIdentityPublicKey.rawRepresentation
}
/// Get our signing public key for sharing
func getSigningPublicKeyData() -> Data {
return signingPublicKey.rawRepresentation
}
/// Get our identity fingerprint
func getIdentityFingerprint() -> String {
let hash = SHA256.hash(data: staticIdentityPublicKey.rawRepresentation)
return hash.map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
}
/// Get peer's public key data
func getPeerPublicKeyData(_ peerID: String) -> Data? {
return sessionManager.getRemoteStaticKey(for: peerID)?.rawRepresentation
}
/// Clear persistent identity (for panic mode)
func clearPersistentIdentity() {
// Clear from keychain
let deletedStatic = KeychainManager.shared.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
let deletedSigning = KeychainManager.shared.deleteIdentityKey(forKey: "ed25519SigningKey")
SecureLogger.logKeyOperation("delete", keyType: "identity keys", success: deletedStatic && deletedSigning)
SecureLogger.warning("Panic mode activated - identity cleared", category: .security)
// Stop rekey timer
stopRekeyTimer()
}
/// Sign data with our Ed25519 signing key
func signData(_ data: Data) -> Data? {
do {
let signature = try signingKey.signature(for: data)
return signature
} catch {
SecureLogger.logError(error, context: "Failed to sign data", category: .noise)
return nil
}
}
/// Verify signature with a peer's Ed25519 public key
func verifySignature(_ signature: Data, for data: Data, publicKey: Data) -> Bool {
do {
let signingPublicKey = try Curve25519.Signing.PublicKey(rawRepresentation: publicKey)
return signingPublicKey.isValidSignature(signature, for: data)
} catch {
SecureLogger.logError(error, context: "Failed to verify signature", category: .noise)
return false
}
}
// MARK: - Announce Signature Helpers
/// Build the canonical announce binding message bytes and sign with our Ed25519 key
/// - Parameters:
/// - peerID: 8-byte routing ID (as in packet header)
/// - noiseKey: 32-byte Curve25519.KeyAgreement public key
/// - ed25519Key: 32-byte Ed25519 public key (self)
/// - nickname: UTF-8 nickname (<=255 bytes)
/// - timestampMs: UInt64 milliseconds since epoch
/// - Returns: Ed25519 signature over the canonical bytes, or nil on failure
func buildAnnounceSignature(peerID: Data, noiseKey: Data, ed25519Key: Data, nickname: String, timestampMs: UInt64) -> Data? {
let message = canonicalAnnounceBytes(peerID: peerID, noiseKey: noiseKey, ed25519Key: ed25519Key, nickname: nickname, timestampMs: timestampMs)
return signData(message)
}
/// Verify an announce signature
func verifyAnnounceSignature(signature: Data, peerID: Data, noiseKey: Data, ed25519Key: Data, nickname: String, timestampMs: UInt64, publicKey: Data) -> Bool {
let message = canonicalAnnounceBytes(peerID: peerID, noiseKey: noiseKey, ed25519Key: ed25519Key, nickname: nickname, timestampMs: timestampMs)
return verifySignature(signature, for: message, publicKey: publicKey)
}
/// Build canonical bytes for announce signing.
private func canonicalAnnounceBytes(peerID: Data, noiseKey: Data, ed25519Key: Data, nickname: String, timestampMs: UInt64) -> Data {
var out = Data()
// context
let context = "bitchat-announce-v1".data(using: .utf8) ?? Data()
out.append(UInt8(min(context.count, 255)))
out.append(context.prefix(255))
// peerID (expect 8 bytes; pad/truncate to 8 for canonicalization)
let peerID8 = peerID.prefix(8)
out.append(peerID8)
if peerID8.count < 8 { out.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: 8 - peerID8.count)) }
// noise static key (expect 32)
let noise32 = noiseKey.prefix(32)
out.append(noise32)
if noise32.count < 32 { out.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: 32 - noise32.count)) }
// ed25519 public key (expect 32)
let ed32 = ed25519Key.prefix(32)
out.append(ed32)
if ed32.count < 32 { out.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: 32 - ed32.count)) }
// nickname length + bytes
let nickData = nickname.data(using: .utf8) ?? Data()
out.append(UInt8(min(nickData.count, 255)))
out.append(nickData.prefix(255))
// timestamp
var ts = timestampMs.bigEndian
withUnsafeBytes(of: &ts) { raw in out.append(contentsOf: raw) }
return out
}
// MARK: - Packet Signing/Verification
/// Sign a BitchatPacket using the noise private key
func signPacket(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> BitchatPacket? {
// Create canonical packet bytes for signing
guard let packetData = packet.toBinaryDataForSigning() else {
return nil
}
// Sign with the noise private key (converted to Ed25519 for signing)
guard let signature = signData(packetData) else {
return nil
}
// Return new packet with signature
var signedPacket = packet
signedPacket.signature = signature
return signedPacket
}
/// Verify a BitchatPacket signature using the provided public key
func verifyPacketSignature(_ packet: BitchatPacket, publicKey: Data) -> Bool {
guard let signature = packet.signature else {
return false
}
// Create canonical packet bytes for verification (without signature)
guard let packetData = packet.toBinaryDataForSigning() else {
return false
}
// For noise public keys, we need to derive the Ed25519 key for verification
// This assumes the noise key can be used for Ed25519 signing
return verifySignature(signature, for: packetData, publicKey: publicKey)
}
// MARK: - Handshake Management
/// Initiate a Noise handshake with a peer
func initiateHandshake(with peerID: String) throws -> Data {
// Validate peer ID
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePeerID(peerID) else {
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.authenticationFailed(peerID: peerID), level: .warning)
throw NoiseSecurityError.invalidPeerID
}
// Check rate limit
guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: peerID) else {
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.authenticationFailed(peerID: "Rate limited: \(peerID)"), level: .warning)
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.handshakeStarted(peerID: peerID))
// Return raw handshake data without wrapper
// The Noise protocol handles its own message format
let handshakeData = try sessionManager.initiateHandshake(with: peerID)
return handshakeData
}
/// Process an incoming handshake message
func processHandshakeMessage(from peerID: String, message: Data) throws -> Data? {
// Validate peer ID
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePeerID(peerID) else {
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.authenticationFailed(peerID: peerID), level: .warning)
throw NoiseSecurityError.invalidPeerID
}
// Validate message size
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateHandshakeMessageSize(message) else {
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.handshakeFailed(peerID: peerID, error: "Message too large"), level: .warning)
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
// Check rate limit
guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: peerID) else {
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.authenticationFailed(peerID: "Rate limited: \(peerID)"), level: .warning)
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
// For handshakes, we process the raw data directly without NoiseMessage wrapper
// The Noise protocol handles its own message format
let responsePayload = try sessionManager.handleIncomingHandshake(from: peerID, message: message)
// Return raw response without wrapper
return responsePayload
}
/// Check if we have an established session with a peer
func hasEstablishedSession(with peerID: String) -> Bool {
return sessionManager.getSession(for: peerID)?.isEstablished() ?? false
}
/// Check if we have a session (established or handshaking) with a peer
func hasSession(with peerID: String) -> Bool {
return sessionManager.getSession(for: peerID) != nil
}
// MARK: - Encryption/Decryption
/// Encrypt data for a specific peer
func encrypt(_ data: Data, for peerID: String) throws -> Data {
// Validate message size
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(data) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
// Check rate limit
guard rateLimiter.allowMessage(from: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
// Check if we have an established session
guard hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID) else {
// Signal that handshake is needed
onHandshakeRequired?(peerID)
throw NoiseEncryptionError.handshakeRequired
}
return try sessionManager.encrypt(data, for: peerID)
}
/// Decrypt data from a specific peer
func decrypt(_ data: Data, from peerID: String) throws -> Data {
// Validate message size
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(data) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
// Check rate limit
guard rateLimiter.allowMessage(from: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
// Check if we have an established session
guard hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID) else {
throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
}
return try sessionManager.decrypt(data, from: peerID)
}
// MARK: - Peer Management
/// Get fingerprint for a peer
func getPeerFingerprint(_ peerID: String) -> String? {
return serviceQueue.sync {
return peerFingerprints[peerID]
}
}
/// Get peer ID for a fingerprint
func getPeerID(for fingerprint: String) -> String? {
return serviceQueue.sync {
return fingerprintToPeerID[fingerprint]
}
}
/// Remove a peer session
func removePeer(_ peerID: String) {
sessionManager.removeSession(for: peerID)
serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
if let fingerprint = peerFingerprints[peerID] {
fingerprintToPeerID.removeValue(forKey: fingerprint)
}
peerFingerprints.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.sessionExpired(peerID: peerID))
}
// MARK: - Private Helpers
private func handleSessionEstablished(peerID: String, remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey) {
// Calculate fingerprint
let fingerprint = calculateFingerprint(for: remoteStaticKey)
// Store fingerprint mapping
serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
peerFingerprints[peerID] = fingerprint
fingerprintToPeerID[fingerprint] = peerID
}
// Log security event
SecureLogger.logSecurityEvent(.handshakeCompleted(peerID: peerID))
// Notify all handlers about authentication
serviceQueue.async { [weak self] in
self?.onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers.forEach { handler in
handler(peerID, fingerprint)
}
}
}
private func calculateFingerprint(for publicKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey) -> String {
let hash = SHA256.hash(data: publicKey.rawRepresentation)
return hash.map { String(format: "%02x", $0) }.joined()
}
// MARK: - Session Maintenance
private func startRekeyTimer() {
rekeyTimer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: rekeyCheckInterval, repeats: true) { [weak self] _ in
self?.checkSessionsForRekey()
}
}
private func stopRekeyTimer() {
rekeyTimer?.invalidate()
rekeyTimer = nil
}
private func checkSessionsForRekey() {
let sessionsNeedingRekey = sessionManager.getSessionsNeedingRekey()
for (peerID, needsRekey) in sessionsNeedingRekey where needsRekey {
// Attempt to rekey the session
do {
try sessionManager.initiateRekey(for: peerID)
SecureLogger.debug("Key rotation initiated for peer: \(peerID)", category: .security)
// Signal that handshake is needed
onHandshakeRequired?(peerID)
} catch {
SecureLogger.logError(error, context: "Failed to initiate rekey for peer: \(peerID)", category: .session)
}
}
}
deinit {
stopRekeyTimer()
}
}
// MARK: - Protocol Message Types for Noise
/// Message types for the Noise encryption protocol layer.
/// These types wrap the underlying BitChat protocol messages with encryption metadata.
enum NoiseMessageType: UInt8 {
case handshakeInitiation = 0x10
case handshakeResponse = 0x11
case handshakeFinal = 0x12
case encryptedMessage = 0x13
case sessionRenegotiation = 0x14
}
// MARK: - Noise Message Wrapper
/// Container for encrypted messages in the Noise protocol.
/// Provides versioning and type information for proper message handling.
/// The actual message content is encrypted in the payload field.
struct NoiseMessage: Codable {
let type: UInt8
let sessionID: String // Random ID for this handshake session
let payload: Data
init(type: NoiseMessageType, sessionID: String, payload: Data) {
self.type = type.rawValue
self.sessionID = sessionID
self.payload = payload
}
func encode() -> Data? {
do {
let encoded = try JSONEncoder().encode(self)
return encoded
} catch {
return nil
}
}
static func decode(from data: Data) -> NoiseMessage? {
return try? JSONDecoder().decode(NoiseMessage.self, from: data)
}
static func decodeWithError(from data: Data) -> NoiseMessage? {
do {
let decoded = try JSONDecoder().decode(NoiseMessage.self, from: data)
return decoded
} catch {
return nil
}
}
// MARK: - Binary Encoding
func toBinaryData() -> Data {
var data = Data()
data.appendUInt8(type)
data.appendUUID(sessionID)
data.appendData(payload)
return data
}
static func fromBinaryData(_ data: Data) -> NoiseMessage? {
// Create defensive copy
let dataCopy = Data(data)
var offset = 0
guard let type = dataCopy.readUInt8(at: &offset),
let sessionID = dataCopy.readUUID(at: &offset),
let payload = dataCopy.readData(at: &offset) else { return nil }
guard let messageType = NoiseMessageType(rawValue: type) else { return nil }
return NoiseMessage(type: messageType, sessionID: sessionID, payload: payload)
}
}
// MARK: - Errors
enum NoiseEncryptionError: Error {
case handshakeRequired
case sessionNotEstablished
}