mirror of
https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
synced 2026-07-25 20:45:19 +00:00
1197 lines
50 KiB
Swift
1197 lines
50 KiB
Swift
//
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// NoiseSessionManager.swift
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// bitchat
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//
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// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
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// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
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//
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import BitLogger
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import CryptoKit
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import Foundation
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import BitFoundation
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struct NoiseHandshakeInitiation: Equatable, Sendable {
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let payload: Data
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let attemptID: UUID
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}
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struct NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest: Equatable, Sendable {
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let peerID: PeerID
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fileprivate let recoveryID: UUID
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}
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enum NoiseHandshakeRecoveryPreparation {
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case ordinary(NoiseHandshakeInitiation)
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case transferred
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}
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final class NoiseSessionManager {
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private var sessions: [PeerID: NoiseSession] = [:]
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/// Opaque identity for each exact entry in `sessions`. The generation is
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/// created and removed under the same barrier as the session itself, so a
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/// caller can never authenticate data with one session and lease another.
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private var sessionGenerations: [PeerID: UUID] = [:]
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/// One-time handoff tokens prevent a prepared XX message 1 from leaving
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/// after an inbound collision has already changed this peer's role.
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private var ordinaryInitiationIDs: [PeerID: UUID] = [:]
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private var ordinaryInitiatorTimeouts: [PeerID: DispatchWorkItem] = [:]
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private var ordinaryInitiatorRetryNotifications: [PeerID: Bool] = [:]
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private var ordinaryResponderTimeouts: [PeerID: DispatchWorkItem] = [:]
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private var ordinaryResponderDeadlines: [PeerID: DispatchTime] = [:]
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private var ordinaryResponderRetryNotifications: [PeerID: Bool] = [:]
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private var ordinaryRespondersCreatedByYield: Set<PeerID> = []
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private var recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions: [PeerID: Date] = [:]
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private struct QuarantinedTransport {
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let session: NoiseSession
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let generation: UUID
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/// Duplicate message 1 packets replace the incomplete responder but
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/// never extend the original rollback window indefinitely.
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let rollbackDeadline: DispatchTime
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}
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/// An unauthenticated inbound message 1 cannot keep old sending keys live,
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/// but it also must not permanently destroy a victim session. The old
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/// transport remains receive-only while the ordinary responder proves the
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/// claimed static identity, then is discarded on success or restored on
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/// bounded failure.
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private var quarantinedTransports: [PeerID: QuarantinedTransport] = [:]
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private var quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil: [PeerID: Date] = [:]
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private var suppressedInitiationRecoveryTimeouts: [PeerID: DispatchWorkItem] = [:]
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private var delayedHandshakeRecoveryWorkItems: [PeerID: DispatchWorkItem] = [:]
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private var handshakeRecoveryCallbackIDs: [PeerID: UUID] = [:]
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private var pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs: [PeerID: UUID] = [:]
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private let sessionFactory: (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
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private let localPeerID: PeerID
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private let ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval
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private let ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval
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private let recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: TimeInterval
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private let ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown: TimeInterval
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private let managerQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.manager", attributes: .concurrent)
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// Callbacks
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var onSessionEstablished: ((PeerID, Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey, UUID) -> Void)?
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var onSessionRestored: ((PeerID, UUID) -> Void)?
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var onSessionFailed: ((PeerID, Error) -> Void)?
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var onHandshakeRecoveryRequired: ((NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest) -> Void)?
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init(
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localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey,
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keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
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ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
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NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryHandshakeTimeout,
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ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
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NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout,
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recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: TimeInterval =
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NoiseSecurityConstants.recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod,
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ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown: TimeInterval =
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NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown
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) {
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self.localPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: localStaticKey.publicKey.rawRepresentation)
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self.ordinaryHandshakeTimeout = ordinaryHandshakeTimeout
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self.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout = ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
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self.recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod =
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recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod
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self.ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown =
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ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown
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self.sessionFactory = { peerID, role in
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SecureNoiseSession(
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peerID: peerID,
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role: role,
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keychain: keychain,
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localStaticKey: localStaticKey
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)
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}
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}
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#if DEBUG
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init(
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localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey,
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keychain _: KeychainManagerProtocol,
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ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
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NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryHandshakeTimeout,
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ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
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NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout,
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recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: TimeInterval =
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NoiseSecurityConstants.recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod,
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ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown: TimeInterval =
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NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown,
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sessionFactory: @escaping (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
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) {
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self.localPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: localStaticKey.publicKey.rawRepresentation)
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self.ordinaryHandshakeTimeout = ordinaryHandshakeTimeout
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self.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout = ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
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self.recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod =
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recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod
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self.ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown =
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ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown
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self.sessionFactory = sessionFactory
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}
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#endif
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// MARK: - Session Management
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func getSession(for peerID: PeerID) -> NoiseSession? {
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return managerQueue.sync {
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return sessions[peerID]
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}
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}
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/// Whether this peer has an inbound ordinary XX responder that still
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/// needs message 3 before its receive keys can become authoritative.
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func isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(for peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
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managerQueue.sync {
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guard let session = sessions[peerID] else { return false }
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return session.role == .responder
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&& session.getState() == .handshaking
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}
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}
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/// Transfers one bounded recovery generation to whatever ordinary XX
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/// handshake currently owns the peer, or starts the generation's single
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/// retry. The request token prevents stale transport callbacks from
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/// creating additional attempts.
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func prepareHandshakeRecovery(
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_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest,
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authorizeAttempt: () throws -> Void
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) throws -> NoiseHandshakeRecoveryPreparation? {
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try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
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let peerID = request.peerID
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guard pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs[peerID] == request.recoveryID else {
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return nil
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}
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if let current = sessions[peerID],
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current.getState() == .handshaking {
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if current.role == .initiator {
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scheduleOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(
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current,
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for: peerID,
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notifyOnTimeout: true
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)
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} else {
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// A recovery may transfer to a responder that raced ahead
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// of the callback. Preserve an existing quarantine deadline
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// so duplicate unauthenticated message 1 packets cannot
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// extend the outbound pause.
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scheduleOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(
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current,
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for: peerID,
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notifyOnTimeout: true,
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createdByYield: true,
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rearmDeadline: quarantinedTransports[peerID] == nil
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)
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}
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return .transferred
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}
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do {
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try authorizeAttempt()
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} catch {
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redispatchHandshakeRecoveryLocked(
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request,
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after: NoiseSecurityConstants.handshakeRateLimitRecoveryDelay
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)
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throw error
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}
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let next = sessionFactory(peerID, .initiator)
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let payload: Data
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do {
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payload = try next.startHandshake()
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} catch {
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next.reset()
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redispatchHandshakeRecoveryLocked(
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request,
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after: NoiseSecurityConstants.handshakeCollisionRecoveryDelay
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)
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throw error
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}
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// Start before retiring a working transport. If preparation fails,
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// the established session and its generation are untouched.
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if let current = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
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current.reset()
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}
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if let quarantined = quarantinedTransports.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
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quarantined.session.reset()
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}
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sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
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cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
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cancelSuppressedInitiationRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
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recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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let attemptID = UUID()
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sessions[peerID] = next
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sessionGenerations[peerID] = UUID()
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ordinaryInitiationIDs[peerID] = attemptID
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// This is the one retry owned by `request`; it may time out but
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// must not recursively mint another generation.
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scheduleOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(
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next,
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for: peerID,
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notifyOnTimeout: false
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)
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consumeHandshakeRecoveryLocked(request)
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return .ordinary(
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NoiseHandshakeInitiation(
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payload: payload,
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attemptID: attemptID
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)
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)
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}
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}
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func cancelHandshakeRecovery(_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest) {
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managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
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consumeHandshakeRecoveryLocked(request)
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}
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}
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func removeSession(for peerID: PeerID) {
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managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
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removeSessionLocked(for: peerID)
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}
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}
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private func removeSessionLocked(for peerID: PeerID) {
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if let session = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
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session.reset() // Clear sensitive data before removing
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}
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if let quarantined = quarantinedTransports.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
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quarantined.session.reset()
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}
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sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
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cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
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recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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cancelSuppressedInitiationRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
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cancelDelayedHandshakeRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
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}
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func removeAllSessions() {
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managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
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for (_, session) in sessions {
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session.reset()
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}
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for (_, quarantined) in quarantinedTransports {
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quarantined.session.reset()
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}
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for (_, timeout) in ordinaryInitiatorTimeouts {
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timeout.cancel()
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}
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for (_, timeout) in ordinaryResponderTimeouts {
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timeout.cancel()
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}
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for (_, timeout) in suppressedInitiationRecoveryTimeouts {
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timeout.cancel()
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}
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for (_, timeout) in delayedHandshakeRecoveryWorkItems {
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timeout.cancel()
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}
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sessions.removeAll()
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sessionGenerations.removeAll()
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ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeAll()
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ordinaryInitiatorTimeouts.removeAll()
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ordinaryInitiatorRetryNotifications.removeAll()
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ordinaryResponderTimeouts.removeAll()
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ordinaryResponderDeadlines.removeAll()
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ordinaryResponderRetryNotifications.removeAll()
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ordinaryRespondersCreatedByYield.removeAll()
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recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeAll()
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quarantinedTransports.removeAll()
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quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil.removeAll()
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suppressedInitiationRecoveryTimeouts.removeAll()
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delayedHandshakeRecoveryWorkItems.removeAll()
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handshakeRecoveryCallbackIDs.removeAll()
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pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs.removeAll()
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}
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}
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// MARK: - Handshake Helpers
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func initiateHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
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return try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
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// Check if we already have an established session
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if let existingSession = sessions[peerID], existingSession.isEstablished() {
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// Session already established, don't recreate
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throw NoiseSessionError.alreadyEstablished
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}
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// Remove any existing non-established session
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if let existingSession = sessions[peerID], !existingSession.isEstablished() {
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removeSessionLocked(for: peerID)
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}
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recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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// Create new initiator session
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let session = sessionFactory(peerID, .initiator)
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sessions[peerID] = session
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sessionGenerations[peerID] = UUID()
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do {
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let handshakeData = try session.startHandshake()
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scheduleOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(
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session,
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for: peerID,
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notifyOnTimeout: false
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)
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cancelDelayedHandshakeRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
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return handshakeData
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} catch {
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// Clean up failed session
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_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
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session.reset()
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SecureLogger.error(.handshakeFailed(peerID: peerID.id, error: error.localizedDescription))
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throw error
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}
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}
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}
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/// Atomically starts an ordinary initiator only when no other session
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/// already owns the peer. BLE discovery can report the same peer on
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/// multiple links; combining the absence check, authorization, creation,
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/// and handoff token prevents two different message 1 packets escaping.
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func initiateHandshakeIfAbsent(
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with peerID: PeerID,
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notifyOnTimeout: Bool,
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authorize: () throws -> Void
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) throws -> NoiseHandshakeInitiation? {
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try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
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guard sessions[peerID] == nil,
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quarantinedTransports[peerID] == nil else {
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return nil
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}
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try authorize()
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let session = sessionFactory(peerID, .initiator)
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do {
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let payload = try session.startHandshake()
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let attemptID = UUID()
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sessions[peerID] = session
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sessionGenerations[peerID] = UUID()
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ordinaryInitiationIDs[peerID] = attemptID
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recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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scheduleOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(
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session,
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for: peerID,
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notifyOnTimeout: notifyOnTimeout
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)
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cancelDelayedHandshakeRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
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return NoiseHandshakeInitiation(
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payload: payload,
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attemptID: attemptID
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)
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} catch {
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session.reset()
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SecureLogger.error(
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.handshakeFailed(
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peerID: peerID.id,
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error: error.localizedDescription
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)
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)
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throw error
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}
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}
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}
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/// Prepares an ordinary reconnect before atomically retiring the current
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/// transport. Authorization and handshake-start failure leave the working
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/// session untouched. Once this returns, encryption observes only the new
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/// handshaking session and must queue until it establishes.
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func initiateReconnectHandshake(
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with peerID: PeerID,
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notifyOnTimeout: Bool,
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authorize: () throws -> Void
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) throws -> NoiseHandshakeInitiation {
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try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
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guard let established = sessions[peerID],
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established.isEstablished() else {
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throw NoiseSessionError.notEstablished
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}
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try authorize()
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let next = sessionFactory(peerID, .initiator)
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let payload: Data
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do {
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payload = try next.startHandshake()
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} catch {
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next.reset()
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SecureLogger.error(
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.handshakeFailed(
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peerID: peerID.id,
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error: error.localizedDescription
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)
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)
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throw error
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}
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// Retire only after the replacement initiator has successfully
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// produced message 1. Do not use the broad removal helper here:
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// this transition owns the exact new session installed below.
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_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
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cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
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cancelSuppressedInitiationRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
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cancelDelayedHandshakeRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
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recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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established.reset()
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let attemptID = UUID()
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sessions[peerID] = next
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sessionGenerations[peerID] = UUID()
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ordinaryInitiationIDs[peerID] = attemptID
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scheduleOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(
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next,
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for: peerID,
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notifyOnTimeout: notifyOnTimeout
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)
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return NoiseHandshakeInitiation(
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payload: payload,
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attemptID: attemptID
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)
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}
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}
|
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|
|
/// Claims a prepared message 1 exactly once. A crossed inbound initiation
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|
/// that already made this peer a responder invalidates the token.
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|
func claimHandshakeInitiation(
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|
_ initiation: NoiseHandshakeInitiation,
|
|
for peerID: PeerID
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) -> Data? {
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|
managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
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guard ordinaryInitiationIDs[peerID] == initiation.attemptID,
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let session = sessions[peerID],
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session.role == .initiator,
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session.getState() == .handshaking else {
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return nil
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}
|
|
ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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|
let notifyOnTimeout =
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ordinaryInitiatorRetryNotifications[peerID] ?? false
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// Preparation and on-wire exchange have independent bounds. Once
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|
// BLE owns these exact bytes, give the peer the full response
|
|
// window without changing retry ownership.
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|
scheduleOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(
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session,
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for: peerID,
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notifyOnTimeout: notifyOnTimeout
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)
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return initiation.payload
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}
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}
|
|
|
|
func handleIncomingHandshake(from peerID: PeerID, message: Data) throws -> Data? {
|
|
let result: (
|
|
response: Data?,
|
|
establishedSession: (
|
|
remoteKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey,
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|
generation: UUID
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|
)?
|
|
) = try managerQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
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|
var yieldedInitiatorShouldRetry = false
|
|
var didYieldLocalInitiator = false
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|
var inheritedResponderShouldRetry = false
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|
var inheritedResponderWasCreatedByYield = false
|
|
|
|
if message.count == NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize {
|
|
if let cooldownUntil = quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil[peerID] {
|
|
if cooldownUntil > Date(),
|
|
sessions[peerID]?.isEstablished() == true {
|
|
SecureLogger.debug(
|
|
"Ignoring unauthenticated reconnect initiation during rollback cooldown for \(peerID)",
|
|
category: .session
|
|
)
|
|
return (nil, nil)
|
|
}
|
|
quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if suppressedInitiationRecoveryTimeouts[peerID] != nil,
|
|
localPeerID < peerID.toShort(),
|
|
sessions[peerID]?.isEstablished() == true {
|
|
SecureLogger.debug(
|
|
"Coalescing duplicate initiation while convergence recovery is pending for \(peerID)",
|
|
category: .session
|
|
)
|
|
return (nil, nil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let completedAt = recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions[peerID] {
|
|
let stillInGrace = Date().timeIntervalSince(completedAt)
|
|
< recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod
|
|
if stillInGrace,
|
|
localPeerID < peerID.toShort(),
|
|
let established = sessions[peerID],
|
|
established.isEstablished() {
|
|
recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
scheduleSuppressedInitiationRecoveryLocked(
|
|
established,
|
|
completedAt: completedAt,
|
|
for: peerID
|
|
)
|
|
SecureLogger.debug(
|
|
"Deferring delayed crossed initiation from \(peerID) after initiator completion",
|
|
category: .session
|
|
)
|
|
return (nil, nil)
|
|
}
|
|
recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let ordinaryInitiator = sessions[peerID],
|
|
ordinaryInitiator.role == .initiator,
|
|
ordinaryInitiator.getState() == .handshaking {
|
|
if localPeerID < peerID.toShort() {
|
|
SecureLogger.debug(
|
|
"Ignoring crossed ordinary initiation from \(peerID); keeping deterministic initiator role",
|
|
category: .session
|
|
)
|
|
return (nil, nil)
|
|
}
|
|
yieldedInitiatorShouldRetry =
|
|
ordinaryInitiatorRetryNotifications[peerID] ?? false
|
|
didYieldLocalInitiator = true
|
|
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
ordinaryInitiator.reset()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let session: NoiseSession
|
|
|
|
if let existing = sessions[peerID] {
|
|
if existing.isEstablished(),
|
|
message.count !=
|
|
NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize {
|
|
// An established ordinary XX transport has no remaining
|
|
// handshake messages to consume. Unauthenticated garbage
|
|
// must not tear down its working keys.
|
|
SecureLogger.debug(
|
|
"Ignoring non-initial handshake bytes for established peer \(peerID)",
|
|
category: .session
|
|
)
|
|
return (nil, nil)
|
|
}
|
|
if message.count == NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize {
|
|
if existing.isEstablished(),
|
|
let generation = sessionGenerations[peerID] {
|
|
// Message 1 is unauthenticated. Remove the old
|
|
// transport from every outbound/generation API now,
|
|
// retaining it only as receive-only rollback state.
|
|
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
if let prior = quarantinedTransports.updateValue(
|
|
QuarantinedTransport(
|
|
session: existing,
|
|
generation: generation,
|
|
rollbackDeadline: .now()
|
|
+ ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
|
|
),
|
|
forKey: peerID
|
|
) {
|
|
prior.session.reset()
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
inheritedResponderShouldRetry =
|
|
ordinaryResponderRetryNotifications[peerID] ?? false
|
|
inheritedResponderWasCreatedByYield =
|
|
ordinaryRespondersCreatedByYield.contains(peerID)
|
|
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
// Keep the first responder/quarantine deadline. A
|
|
// repeated message 1 may refresh message 2, but never
|
|
// refreshes the attacker's outbound-pause budget.
|
|
cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(
|
|
for: peerID,
|
|
preserveDeadline: true
|
|
)
|
|
existing.reset()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let replacement = sessionFactory(peerID, .responder)
|
|
sessions[peerID] = replacement
|
|
sessionGenerations[peerID] = UUID()
|
|
session = replacement
|
|
} else {
|
|
session = existing
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
let newSession = sessionFactory(peerID, .responder)
|
|
sessions[peerID] = newSession
|
|
sessionGenerations[peerID] = UUID()
|
|
session = newSession
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
if message.count == NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize,
|
|
session.role == .responder {
|
|
scheduleOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(
|
|
session,
|
|
for: peerID,
|
|
notifyOnTimeout:
|
|
yieldedInitiatorShouldRetry
|
|
|| inheritedResponderShouldRetry,
|
|
createdByYield:
|
|
didYieldLocalInitiator
|
|
|| inheritedResponderWasCreatedByYield
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let response = try session.processHandshakeMessage(message)
|
|
|
|
var establishedSession: (
|
|
remoteKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey,
|
|
generation: UUID
|
|
)?
|
|
if session.isEstablished() {
|
|
guard let remoteKey = session.getRemoteStaticPublicKey(),
|
|
authenticatedRemoteKey(remoteKey, matches: peerID) else {
|
|
throw NoiseSessionError.peerIdentityMismatch
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let quarantined = quarantinedTransports.removeValue(
|
|
forKey: peerID
|
|
) {
|
|
quarantined.session.reset()
|
|
}
|
|
ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
if session.role == .initiator {
|
|
recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions[peerID] = Date()
|
|
} else {
|
|
recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(
|
|
forKey: peerID
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
cancelSuppressedInitiationRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
cancelDelayedHandshakeRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
guard let generation = sessionGenerations[peerID] else {
|
|
throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
|
|
}
|
|
establishedSession = (remoteKey, generation)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (response, establishedSession)
|
|
} catch {
|
|
var shouldRequestRecovery = false
|
|
var shouldSuppressImmediateHandlerRestart = false
|
|
if session.role == .initiator {
|
|
shouldRequestRecovery =
|
|
ordinaryInitiatorRetryNotifications[peerID] ?? false
|
|
shouldSuppressImmediateHandlerRestart = true
|
|
} else {
|
|
shouldRequestRecovery =
|
|
ordinaryResponderRetryNotifications[peerID] ?? false
|
|
shouldSuppressImmediateHandlerRestart =
|
|
ordinaryRespondersCreatedByYield.contains(peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let storedSession = sessions[peerID],
|
|
storedSession === session {
|
|
_ = sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
session.reset()
|
|
|
|
let restoredGeneration: UUID?
|
|
if let quarantined = quarantinedTransports.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
|
|
sessions[peerID] = quarantined.session
|
|
sessionGenerations[peerID] = quarantined.generation
|
|
restoredGeneration = quarantined.generation
|
|
markRollbackCooldownLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
} else {
|
|
restoredGeneration = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Schedule callback outside the synchronized block to prevent deadlock
|
|
DispatchQueue.global().async { [weak self] in
|
|
if let restoredGeneration {
|
|
self?.onSessionRestored?(peerID, restoredGeneration)
|
|
}
|
|
self?.onSessionFailed?(peerID, error)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let isIdentityMismatch =
|
|
(error as? NoiseSessionError) == .peerIdentityMismatch
|
|
if pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs[peerID] != nil {
|
|
shouldSuppressImmediateHandlerRestart = true
|
|
}
|
|
if shouldRequestRecovery, !isIdentityMismatch {
|
|
requestHandshakeRecovery(
|
|
for: peerID,
|
|
after: NoiseSecurityConstants
|
|
.handshakeCollisionRecoveryDelay
|
|
)
|
|
} else if isIdentityMismatch,
|
|
let recoveryID = pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs[peerID] {
|
|
redispatchHandshakeRecoveryLocked(
|
|
NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest(
|
|
peerID: peerID,
|
|
recoveryID: recoveryID
|
|
),
|
|
after: NoiseSecurityConstants
|
|
.handshakeCollisionRecoveryDelay
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SecureLogger.error(.handshakeFailed(peerID: peerID.id, error: error.localizedDescription))
|
|
if shouldSuppressImmediateHandlerRestart, !isIdentityMismatch {
|
|
throw NoiseManagedHandshakeFailure(underlying: error)
|
|
}
|
|
throw error
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let established = result.establishedSession {
|
|
onSessionEstablished?(peerID, established.remoteKey, established.generation)
|
|
}
|
|
return result.response
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func scheduleOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(
|
|
_ session: NoiseSession,
|
|
for peerID: PeerID,
|
|
notifyOnTimeout: Bool
|
|
) {
|
|
cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
ordinaryInitiatorRetryNotifications[peerID] = notifyOnTimeout
|
|
let timeout = DispatchWorkItem(flags: .barrier) { [weak self, weak session] in
|
|
guard let self,
|
|
let session,
|
|
let current = self.sessions[peerID],
|
|
current === session,
|
|
current.role == .initiator,
|
|
current.getState() == .handshaking else {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_ = self.sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.ordinaryInitiatorTimeouts.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.ordinaryInitiatorRetryNotifications.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
session.reset()
|
|
SecureLogger.debug(
|
|
"Ordinary initiator handshake with \(peerID) timed out",
|
|
category: .session
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if notifyOnTimeout {
|
|
self.requestHandshakeRecovery(for: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ordinaryInitiatorTimeouts[peerID] = timeout
|
|
managerQueue.asyncAfter(
|
|
deadline: .now() + ordinaryHandshakeTimeout,
|
|
execute: timeout
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func cancelOrdinaryInitiatorTimeoutLocked(for peerID: PeerID) {
|
|
ordinaryInitiatorTimeouts.removeValue(forKey: peerID)?.cancel()
|
|
ordinaryInitiatorRetryNotifications.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func scheduleOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(
|
|
_ session: NoiseSession,
|
|
for peerID: PeerID,
|
|
notifyOnTimeout: Bool,
|
|
createdByYield: Bool,
|
|
rearmDeadline: Bool = false
|
|
) {
|
|
let previousDeadline = ordinaryResponderDeadlines[peerID]
|
|
cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(
|
|
for: peerID,
|
|
preserveDeadline: true
|
|
)
|
|
ordinaryResponderRetryNotifications[peerID] = notifyOnTimeout
|
|
if createdByYield {
|
|
ordinaryRespondersCreatedByYield.insert(peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let deadline: DispatchTime
|
|
if let rollbackDeadline =
|
|
quarantinedTransports[peerID]?.rollbackDeadline {
|
|
deadline = rollbackDeadline
|
|
} else if !rearmDeadline, let previousDeadline {
|
|
deadline = previousDeadline
|
|
} else {
|
|
deadline = .now() + ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
|
|
}
|
|
ordinaryResponderDeadlines[peerID] = deadline
|
|
|
|
let timeout = DispatchWorkItem(flags: .barrier) { [weak self, weak session] in
|
|
guard let self,
|
|
let session,
|
|
let current = self.sessions[peerID],
|
|
current === session,
|
|
current.role == .responder,
|
|
current.getState() == .handshaking else {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_ = self.sessions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.sessionGenerations.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.ordinaryInitiationIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.ordinaryResponderTimeouts.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.ordinaryResponderDeadlines.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.ordinaryResponderRetryNotifications.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.ordinaryRespondersCreatedByYield.remove(peerID)
|
|
self.recentOrdinaryInitiatorCompletions.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
session.reset()
|
|
|
|
let restored: QuarantinedTransport?
|
|
if let quarantined =
|
|
self.quarantinedTransports.removeValue(forKey: peerID) {
|
|
self.sessions[peerID] = quarantined.session
|
|
self.sessionGenerations[peerID] = quarantined.generation
|
|
self.markRollbackCooldownLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
restored = quarantined
|
|
} else {
|
|
restored = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SecureLogger.debug(
|
|
restored == nil
|
|
? "Ordinary responder handshake with \(peerID) timed out"
|
|
: "Ordinary responder handshake with \(peerID) timed out; restored quarantined transport",
|
|
category: .session
|
|
)
|
|
if let restored {
|
|
DispatchQueue.global().async { [weak self] in
|
|
self?.onSessionRestored?(peerID, restored.generation)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A rollback always owns one local convergence attempt. The retry
|
|
// retires the restored session atomically, so an attacker cannot
|
|
// pace unauthenticated message 1 packets to pause outbound forever.
|
|
if notifyOnTimeout || restored != nil {
|
|
self.requestHandshakeRecovery(for: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ordinaryResponderTimeouts[peerID] = timeout
|
|
managerQueue.asyncAfter(deadline: deadline, execute: timeout)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func cancelOrdinaryResponderTimeoutLocked(
|
|
for peerID: PeerID,
|
|
preserveDeadline: Bool = false
|
|
) {
|
|
ordinaryResponderTimeouts.removeValue(forKey: peerID)?.cancel()
|
|
if !preserveDeadline {
|
|
ordinaryResponderDeadlines.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
ordinaryResponderRetryNotifications.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
ordinaryRespondersCreatedByYield.remove(peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func markRollbackCooldownLocked(for peerID: PeerID) {
|
|
quarantineRollbackCooldownUntil[peerID] =
|
|
Date().addingTimeInterval(ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func scheduleSuppressedInitiationRecoveryLocked(
|
|
_ establishedSession: NoiseSession,
|
|
completedAt: Date,
|
|
for peerID: PeerID
|
|
) {
|
|
cancelSuppressedInitiationRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
let elapsed = max(0, Date().timeIntervalSince(completedAt))
|
|
let remainingGrace = max(
|
|
0,
|
|
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod - elapsed
|
|
)
|
|
let timeout = DispatchWorkItem(flags: .barrier) {
|
|
[weak self, weak establishedSession] in
|
|
guard let self,
|
|
let establishedSession,
|
|
let current = self.sessions[peerID],
|
|
current === establishedSession,
|
|
current.isEstablished() else {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
self.suppressedInitiationRecoveryTimeouts.removeValue(
|
|
forKey: peerID
|
|
)
|
|
self.requestHandshakeRecovery(for: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
suppressedInitiationRecoveryTimeouts[peerID] = timeout
|
|
managerQueue.asyncAfter(
|
|
deadline: .now() + remainingGrace,
|
|
execute: timeout
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func cancelSuppressedInitiationRecoveryLocked(for peerID: PeerID) {
|
|
suppressedInitiationRecoveryTimeouts.removeValue(forKey: peerID)?
|
|
.cancel()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func requestHandshakeRecovery(
|
|
for peerID: PeerID,
|
|
after delay: TimeInterval = 0
|
|
) {
|
|
cancelDelayedHandshakeRecoveryLocked(for: peerID)
|
|
let request = NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest(
|
|
peerID: peerID,
|
|
recoveryID: UUID()
|
|
)
|
|
pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs[peerID] = request.recoveryID
|
|
scheduleHandshakeRecoveryCallbackLocked(request, after: delay)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func redispatchHandshakeRecoveryLocked(
|
|
_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest,
|
|
after delay: TimeInterval
|
|
) {
|
|
guard pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs[request.peerID]
|
|
== request.recoveryID else {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
scheduleHandshakeRecoveryCallbackLocked(request, after: delay)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func scheduleHandshakeRecoveryCallbackLocked(
|
|
_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest,
|
|
after delay: TimeInterval
|
|
) {
|
|
let peerID = request.peerID
|
|
guard pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs[peerID] == request.recoveryID else {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
delayedHandshakeRecoveryWorkItems.removeValue(forKey: peerID)?.cancel()
|
|
let callbackID = UUID()
|
|
handshakeRecoveryCallbackIDs[peerID] = callbackID
|
|
let callback = DispatchWorkItem(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
|
|
guard let self,
|
|
self.pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs[peerID]
|
|
== request.recoveryID,
|
|
self.handshakeRecoveryCallbackIDs[peerID] == callbackID else {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
self.delayedHandshakeRecoveryWorkItems.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
self.handshakeRecoveryCallbackIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
let handler = self.onHandshakeRecoveryRequired
|
|
DispatchQueue.global().async {
|
|
handler?(request)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
delayedHandshakeRecoveryWorkItems[peerID] = callback
|
|
managerQueue.asyncAfter(
|
|
deadline: .now() + max(0, delay),
|
|
execute: callback
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func consumeHandshakeRecoveryLocked(
|
|
_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest
|
|
) {
|
|
let peerID = request.peerID
|
|
guard pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs[peerID] == request.recoveryID else {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
delayedHandshakeRecoveryWorkItems.removeValue(forKey: peerID)?.cancel()
|
|
handshakeRecoveryCallbackIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func cancelDelayedHandshakeRecoveryLocked(for peerID: PeerID) {
|
|
delayedHandshakeRecoveryWorkItems.removeValue(forKey: peerID)?.cancel()
|
|
handshakeRecoveryCallbackIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
pendingHandshakeRecoveryIDs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Mesh handshakes normally use a 16-hex wire ID. Full Noise-key IDs are
|
|
/// also accepted by internal callers when they exactly match the static
|
|
/// key. Non-wire identifiers remain available to protocol test harnesses;
|
|
/// BLE packet ingress always supplies a short hexadecimal ID.
|
|
private func authenticatedRemoteKey(
|
|
_ remoteKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey,
|
|
matches claimedPeerID: PeerID
|
|
) -> Bool {
|
|
let rawKey = remoteKey.rawRepresentation
|
|
if claimedPeerID.isShort {
|
|
return PeerID(publicKey: rawKey) == claimedPeerID
|
|
}
|
|
if let claimedNoiseKey = claimedPeerID.noiseKey {
|
|
return claimedNoiseKey == rawKey
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Encryption/Decryption
|
|
|
|
func encrypt(_ plaintext: Data, for peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
|
|
try managerQueue.sync {
|
|
guard let session = sessions[peerID] else {
|
|
throw NoiseSessionError.sessionNotFound
|
|
}
|
|
return try session.encrypt(plaintext)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Encrypts only if `expected` still names the current established entry.
|
|
/// A rekey between capability proof and media encryption therefore fails
|
|
/// closed instead of sending on an unproven reconnect session.
|
|
func encrypt(
|
|
_ plaintext: Data,
|
|
for peerID: PeerID,
|
|
expectedSessionGeneration expected: UUID
|
|
) throws -> Data {
|
|
try managerQueue.sync {
|
|
guard let session = sessions[peerID],
|
|
session.isEstablished(),
|
|
sessionGenerations[peerID] == expected else {
|
|
throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
|
|
}
|
|
return try session.encrypt(plaintext)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func decrypt(_ ciphertext: Data, from peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
|
|
try decryptWithSessionGeneration(ciphertext, from: peerID).plaintext
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func sessionGeneration(for peerID: PeerID) -> UUID? {
|
|
managerQueue.sync {
|
|
guard sessions[peerID]?.isEstablished() == true else { return nil }
|
|
return sessionGenerations[peerID]
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Decrypts while holding the manager's read lease. Session promotion and
|
|
/// removal require its barrier, so the returned generation always names
|
|
/// the exact session object that authenticated these bytes.
|
|
func decryptWithSessionGeneration(
|
|
_ ciphertext: Data,
|
|
from peerID: PeerID,
|
|
establishedGenerationIsReady: (UUID) -> Bool = { _ in true },
|
|
authorizeDecrypt: () throws -> Void = {}
|
|
) throws -> (plaintext: Data, sessionGeneration: UUID) {
|
|
try managerQueue.sync {
|
|
if let session = sessions[peerID],
|
|
session.isEstablished(),
|
|
let generation = sessionGenerations[peerID] {
|
|
// Keep the generation lease across the transport-readiness
|
|
// check and decrypt. Promotion/restoration needs this queue's
|
|
// barrier, so no new receive nonce can be consumed before BLE
|
|
// installs state for the exact generation.
|
|
guard establishedGenerationIsReady(generation) else {
|
|
throw NoiseEncryptionError.transportGenerationNotReady
|
|
}
|
|
try authorizeDecrypt()
|
|
return (try session.decrypt(ciphertext), generation)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Quarantine is receive-only: old keys cannot encrypt, advertise
|
|
// an established generation, or authorize outbound state, but
|
|
// legitimate in-flight ciphertext from the retained peer may
|
|
// still advance and later resume on rollback.
|
|
if let responder = sessions[peerID],
|
|
responder.role == .responder,
|
|
responder.getState() == .handshaking,
|
|
let quarantined = quarantinedTransports[peerID] {
|
|
try authorizeDecrypt()
|
|
return (
|
|
try quarantined.session.decrypt(ciphertext),
|
|
quarantined.generation
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sessions[peerID] == nil, quarantinedTransports[peerID] == nil {
|
|
throw NoiseSessionError.sessionNotFound
|
|
}
|
|
throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func hasReceiveSession(for peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
|
|
managerQueue.sync {
|
|
if sessions[peerID]?.isEstablished() == true {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
guard let responder = sessions[peerID],
|
|
responder.role == .responder,
|
|
responder.getState() == .handshaking else {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return quarantinedTransports[peerID]?.session.isEstablished() == true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Runs a state commit under a read lease for the exact established
|
|
/// session. Rekey, reconnect, and removal all need the same barrier.
|
|
func withCurrentSessionGeneration<Result>(
|
|
for peerID: PeerID,
|
|
expected: UUID,
|
|
_ body: () -> Result
|
|
) -> Result? {
|
|
managerQueue.sync {
|
|
guard sessions[peerID]?.isEstablished() == true,
|
|
sessionGenerations[peerID] == expected else { return nil }
|
|
return body()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Key Management
|
|
|
|
func getRemoteStaticKey(for peerID: PeerID) -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? {
|
|
return getSession(for: peerID)?.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Session Rekeying
|
|
|
|
func getSessionsNeedingRekey() -> [(peerID: PeerID, needsRekey: Bool)] {
|
|
return managerQueue.sync {
|
|
var needingRekey: [(peerID: PeerID, needsRekey: Bool)] = []
|
|
|
|
for (peerID, session) in sessions {
|
|
if let secureSession = session as? SecureNoiseSession,
|
|
secureSession.isEstablished(),
|
|
secureSession.needsRenegotiation() {
|
|
needingRekey.append((peerID: peerID, needsRekey: true))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return needingRekey
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func initiateRekey(for peerID: PeerID) throws -> NoiseHandshakeInitiation {
|
|
try initiateReconnectHandshake(
|
|
with: peerID,
|
|
notifyOnTimeout: true,
|
|
authorize: {}
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|