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Tier 3 of a protest-hardening review. The BLE mesh is already properly fenced off from network reachability and needs nothing here; every gap is on the internet side, or in how someone gets a build they can trust. Say when Tor is blocked. The bootstrap poll loop simply ended at its 75-second deadline, leaving isStarting true with no further state, so a network that blocks Tor was indistinguishable from a slow one and the UI said "starting tor…" indefinitely. TorManager now exposes bootstrapDidStall and posts .TorBootstrapDidStall, and the app reports that mesh messaging still works while internet delivery is paused. It is cleared on each new start or restart, so a later attempt can report again. Let relays be added by hand. The four built-in relays are well-known clearnet hostnames, which is four names for a censor to block and no recourse short of a new build. NostrRelaySettings persists up to eight additional relays, normalized, .onion accepted, with a settings editor. They join the same target set as the built-ins and are subject to the same activation policy. Removal reconciles against the previous set: the teardown path iterates the current targets, so without that a removed relay's socket and queued sends would linger — covered by a test that fails without it. The merged list is cached rather than recomputed, because allowedRelayList consults it once per candidate URL and would otherwise read UserDefaults inside that loop. Stop stranding people who denied location. The activation gate required location permission or a mutual favorite, but teleporting into a geohash requires neither, so someone with no permission and no favorites could sit in a channel that never connected while Tor and the relays stayed suppressed and nothing said why. Being in a location channel is now a third arm of the gate, in both the activation service and the relay manager's copy of the policy, and leaving the channel closes it again. Stop burning the Tor timeout when Tor is off. GeoRelayDirectory awaited Tor readiness unconditionally, but with the preference off TorManager has been shut down, so every refresh spent the full bootstrap deadline and the directory froze on its cached copy. It now keys on the preference, not on live readiness: Tor wanted but unavailable must still skip the fetch rather than fall back to clearnet. Say what turning Tor off costs. The toggle's copy described it as hiding your IP "for location channels", understating both scope and consequence. It now names private messages too, and while the toggle is off the settings screen states that every relay can see the device IP. Make builds verifiable. There was no release verification of any kind: no signatures, no checksums, no documented procedure. Post-takedown that is the acute gap, because mirrors appear and people install whatever they can find during a shutdown. source-manifest.yml publishes a per-tag SHA-256 manifest with a provenance attestation, self-checking before it publishes, and docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md explains how to verify source and states plainly that compiled builds from anywhere but the App Store cannot be verified. It also records the gaps honestly: no published signing key, no reproducible build, no non-GitHub mirror. docs/TOR-INTEGRATION.md was substantially stale — it documented a torrc, SOCKSPort and ControlPort that the in-process Arti client does not use, and claimed there are no user-visible settings — so it is rewritten, including the deferred gap below. Deferred: no Tor bridges or pluggable transports. arti-client is built without pt-client or bridge-client and bootstraps from stock config, so in a country that blocks Tor outright there is still no circumvention path — only a clear report that there isn't. Closing it needs the Rust features, bridge config through the FFI, and an xcframework rebuild under the pinned toolchain with a provenance update, which is its own change. Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
107 lines
3.7 KiB
YAML
107 lines
3.7 KiB
YAML
name: Source manifest
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# Publishes a hash manifest for every tagged release so a copy of the source
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# obtained from somewhere other than this repository can be checked against it.
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#
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# This exists because the repository has been the target of takedown demands.
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# When that succeeds, mirrors appear, and without a manifest there is no way to
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# tell a faithful mirror from a modified one. The manifest is attested to this
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# workflow run, so its own provenance is verifiable with `gh attestation verify`.
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#
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# Scope, stated plainly: this verifies SOURCE. It does not verify any compiled
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# app. See docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md.
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on:
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push:
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tags:
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- 'v*'
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workflow_dispatch:
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inputs:
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ref:
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description: 'Tag or commit to produce a manifest for'
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required: true
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permissions:
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contents: read
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jobs:
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manifest:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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permissions:
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contents: write # attach the manifest to the release
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id-token: write # provenance attestation
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attestations: write
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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with:
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ref: ${{ github.event.inputs.ref || github.ref }}
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# Full history so the commit the tag names can be recorded exactly.
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fetch-depth: 0
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- name: Build manifest
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id: build
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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ref_name="${{ github.event.inputs.ref || github.ref_name }}"
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commit="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
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tree="$(git rev-parse HEAD^{tree})"
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# Hash every tracked file, in a stable order, with NUL separation so
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# paths containing spaces or newlines cannot shift the columns.
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git ls-files -z \
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| sort -z \
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| xargs -0 sha256sum \
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> files.sha256
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{
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echo "# bitchat source manifest"
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echo "#"
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echo "# ref: ${ref_name}"
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echo "# commit: ${commit}"
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echo "# tree: ${tree}"
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echo "# files: $(wc -l < files.sha256 | tr -d ' ')"
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echo "#"
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echo "# Verify a checkout of this ref with:"
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echo "# shasum -a 256 -c files.sha256"
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echo "# The git tree hash above is the single value that covers all of it:"
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echo "# git rev-parse HEAD^{tree}"
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echo "#"
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} > SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt
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cat files.sha256 >> SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt
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echo "commit=${commit}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
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echo "tree=${tree}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
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- name: Self-check the manifest
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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# A manifest that does not validate against the tree it was made from
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# is worse than none, so fail loudly rather than publishing it.
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grep -v '^#' SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt > check.sha256
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sha256sum -c check.sha256 > /dev/null
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echo "manifest validates against this checkout"
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- name: Attest the manifest
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uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v1
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with:
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subject-path: SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt
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- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
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with:
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name: source-manifest
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path: SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt
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- name: Attach to release
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if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
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env:
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GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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# A tag may be pushed before its release exists; only attach when
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# there is a release to attach to, and never fail the run over it.
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if gh release view "${{ github.ref_name }}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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gh release upload "${{ github.ref_name }}" SOURCE-MANIFEST.txt --clobber
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else
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echo "no release for ${{ github.ref_name }} yet; manifest is available as a workflow artifact"
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fi
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