Files
bitchat/bitchat/Nostr/NostrRelaySettings.swift
T
c1ce9029d8 Keep working when the network is hostile, and make the app verifiable (#1486)
Tier 3 of a protest-hardening review. The BLE mesh is already properly
fenced off from network reachability and needs nothing here; every gap is
on the internet side, or in how someone gets a build they can trust.

Say when Tor is blocked. The bootstrap poll loop simply ended at its
75-second deadline, leaving isStarting true with no further state, so a
network that blocks Tor was indistinguishable from a slow one and the UI
said "starting tor…" indefinitely. TorManager now exposes
bootstrapDidStall and posts .TorBootstrapDidStall, and the app reports
that mesh messaging still works while internet delivery is paused. It is
cleared on each new start or restart, so a later attempt can report again.

Let relays be added by hand. The four built-in relays are well-known
clearnet hostnames, which is four names for a censor to block and no
recourse short of a new build. NostrRelaySettings persists up to eight
additional relays, normalized, .onion accepted, with a settings editor.
They join the same target set as the built-ins and are subject to the
same activation policy. Removal reconciles against the previous set:
the teardown path iterates the current targets, so without that a removed
relay's socket and queued sends would linger — covered by a test that
fails without it. The merged list is cached rather than recomputed,
because allowedRelayList consults it once per candidate URL and would
otherwise read UserDefaults inside that loop.

Stop stranding people who denied location. The activation gate required
location permission or a mutual favorite, but teleporting into a geohash
requires neither, so someone with no permission and no favorites could
sit in a channel that never connected while Tor and the relays stayed
suppressed and nothing said why. Being in a location channel is now a
third arm of the gate, in both the activation service and the relay
manager's copy of the policy, and leaving the channel closes it again.

Stop burning the Tor timeout when Tor is off. GeoRelayDirectory awaited
Tor readiness unconditionally, but with the preference off TorManager has
been shut down, so every refresh spent the full bootstrap deadline and the
directory froze on its cached copy. It now keys on the preference, not on
live readiness: Tor wanted but unavailable must still skip the fetch
rather than fall back to clearnet.

Say what turning Tor off costs. The toggle's copy described it as
hiding your IP "for location channels", understating both scope and
consequence. It now names private messages too, and while the toggle is
off the settings screen states that every relay can see the device IP.

Make builds verifiable. There was no release verification of any kind:
no signatures, no checksums, no documented procedure. Post-takedown that
is the acute gap, because mirrors appear and people install whatever they
can find during a shutdown. source-manifest.yml publishes a per-tag
SHA-256 manifest with a provenance attestation, self-checking before it
publishes, and docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md explains how to verify source and
states plainly that compiled builds from anywhere but the App Store cannot
be verified. It also records the gaps honestly: no published signing key,
no reproducible build, no non-GitHub mirror.

docs/TOR-INTEGRATION.md was substantially stale — it documented a
torrc, SOCKSPort and ControlPort that the in-process Arti client does not
use, and claimed there are no user-visible settings — so it is rewritten,
including the deferred gap below.

Deferred: no Tor bridges or pluggable transports. arti-client is built
without pt-client or bridge-client and bootstraps from stock config, so
in a country that blocks Tor outright there is still no circumvention
path — only a clear report that there isn't. Closing it needs the Rust
features, bridge config through the FFI, and an xcframework rebuild under
the pinned toolchain with a provenance update, which is its own change.

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 19:45:37 +02:00

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3.7 KiB
Swift

//
// NostrRelaySettings.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitLogger
import Foundation
/// Relays someone has added by hand, alongside the built-in set.
///
/// The built-in relays are four well-known clearnet hostnames, so a censor
/// blocking four names ends internet-delivered private messages for everyone.
/// Adding relays — including `.onion` addresses, or a relay run by whoever
/// needs it — is the escape hatch that does not require shipping a new build.
///
/// Stored normalized so comparisons against connection keys and the built-in
/// set are exact, and bounded so a long list cannot turn every send into a
/// fan-out across dozens of sockets.
enum NostrRelaySettings {
/// Enough to add a personal relay, an onion address, and a couple of
/// regional fallbacks without letting the connection fan-out grow unbounded.
static let maxCustomRelays = 8
private static let storageKey = "nostr.customRelays"
static let didChangeNotification = Notification.Name("bitchat.nostrRelaySettingsDidChange")
enum AddFailure: Error, Equatable {
case malformed
case alreadyPresent
case limitReached
}
/// Normalized relay URLs, in the order they were added.
static func customRelays(in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) -> [String] {
let stored = defaults.stringArray(forKey: storageKey) ?? []
// Re-normalize on read: a value written by an older build, or edited
// outside the app, must not reach the connection layer unchecked.
var seen = Set<String>()
return stored.compactMap { NostrRelayURL.normalized($0) }
.filter { seen.insert($0).inserted }
}
/// Adds a relay, returning the normalized URL or why it was rejected.
@discardableResult
static func add(
_ rawValue: String,
builtIn: Set<String>,
in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard
) -> Result<String, AddFailure> {
// Bare hostnames are the common way people quote a relay, and wss is
// the only sensible assumption for one.
guard let normalized = NostrRelayURL.normalized(rawValue, defaultScheme: "wss") else {
return .failure(.malformed)
}
var current = customRelays(in: defaults)
guard !current.contains(normalized), !builtIn.contains(normalized) else {
return .failure(.alreadyPresent)
}
guard current.count < maxCustomRelays else {
return .failure(.limitReached)
}
current.append(normalized)
write(current, in: defaults)
return .success(normalized)
}
static func remove(_ url: String, in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) {
// Same default scheme as `add`, so a relay entered as a bare hostname
// can be removed the way it was typed.
guard let normalized = NostrRelayURL.normalized(url, defaultScheme: "wss") else { return }
let remaining = customRelays(in: defaults).filter { $0 != normalized }
write(remaining, in: defaults)
}
/// Panic-wipe hook: an added relay names somewhere someone chose to route
/// through, which is exactly the kind of trace a wipe should not leave.
static func reset(in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) {
defaults.removeObject(forKey: storageKey)
NotificationCenter.default.post(name: didChangeNotification, object: nil)
}
private static func write(_ relays: [String], in defaults: UserDefaults) {
defaults.set(relays, forKey: storageKey)
NotificationCenter.default.post(name: didChangeNotification, object: nil)
}
}