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Tier 3 of a protest-hardening review. The BLE mesh is already properly fenced off from network reachability and needs nothing here; every gap is on the internet side, or in how someone gets a build they can trust. Say when Tor is blocked. The bootstrap poll loop simply ended at its 75-second deadline, leaving isStarting true with no further state, so a network that blocks Tor was indistinguishable from a slow one and the UI said "starting tor…" indefinitely. TorManager now exposes bootstrapDidStall and posts .TorBootstrapDidStall, and the app reports that mesh messaging still works while internet delivery is paused. It is cleared on each new start or restart, so a later attempt can report again. Let relays be added by hand. The four built-in relays are well-known clearnet hostnames, which is four names for a censor to block and no recourse short of a new build. NostrRelaySettings persists up to eight additional relays, normalized, .onion accepted, with a settings editor. They join the same target set as the built-ins and are subject to the same activation policy. Removal reconciles against the previous set: the teardown path iterates the current targets, so without that a removed relay's socket and queued sends would linger — covered by a test that fails without it. The merged list is cached rather than recomputed, because allowedRelayList consults it once per candidate URL and would otherwise read UserDefaults inside that loop. Stop stranding people who denied location. The activation gate required location permission or a mutual favorite, but teleporting into a geohash requires neither, so someone with no permission and no favorites could sit in a channel that never connected while Tor and the relays stayed suppressed and nothing said why. Being in a location channel is now a third arm of the gate, in both the activation service and the relay manager's copy of the policy, and leaving the channel closes it again. Stop burning the Tor timeout when Tor is off. GeoRelayDirectory awaited Tor readiness unconditionally, but with the preference off TorManager has been shut down, so every refresh spent the full bootstrap deadline and the directory froze on its cached copy. It now keys on the preference, not on live readiness: Tor wanted but unavailable must still skip the fetch rather than fall back to clearnet. Say what turning Tor off costs. The toggle's copy described it as hiding your IP "for location channels", understating both scope and consequence. It now names private messages too, and while the toggle is off the settings screen states that every relay can see the device IP. Make builds verifiable. There was no release verification of any kind: no signatures, no checksums, no documented procedure. Post-takedown that is the acute gap, because mirrors appear and people install whatever they can find during a shutdown. source-manifest.yml publishes a per-tag SHA-256 manifest with a provenance attestation, self-checking before it publishes, and docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md explains how to verify source and states plainly that compiled builds from anywhere but the App Store cannot be verified. It also records the gaps honestly: no published signing key, no reproducible build, no non-GitHub mirror. docs/TOR-INTEGRATION.md was substantially stale — it documented a torrc, SOCKSPort and ControlPort that the in-process Arti client does not use, and claimed there are no user-visible settings — so it is rewritten, including the deferred gap below. Deferred: no Tor bridges or pluggable transports. arti-client is built without pt-client or bridge-client and bootstraps from stock config, so in a country that blocks Tor outright there is still no circumvention path — only a clear report that there isn't. Closing it needs the Rust features, bridge config through the FFI, and an xcframework rebuild under the pinned toolchain with a provenance update, which is its own change. Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
93 lines
3.7 KiB
Swift
93 lines
3.7 KiB
Swift
//
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// NostrRelaySettings.swift
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// bitchat
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//
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// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
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// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
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//
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import BitLogger
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import Foundation
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/// Relays someone has added by hand, alongside the built-in set.
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///
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/// The built-in relays are four well-known clearnet hostnames, so a censor
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/// blocking four names ends internet-delivered private messages for everyone.
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/// Adding relays — including `.onion` addresses, or a relay run by whoever
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/// needs it — is the escape hatch that does not require shipping a new build.
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///
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/// Stored normalized so comparisons against connection keys and the built-in
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/// set are exact, and bounded so a long list cannot turn every send into a
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/// fan-out across dozens of sockets.
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enum NostrRelaySettings {
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/// Enough to add a personal relay, an onion address, and a couple of
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/// regional fallbacks without letting the connection fan-out grow unbounded.
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static let maxCustomRelays = 8
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private static let storageKey = "nostr.customRelays"
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static let didChangeNotification = Notification.Name("bitchat.nostrRelaySettingsDidChange")
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enum AddFailure: Error, Equatable {
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case malformed
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case alreadyPresent
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case limitReached
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}
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/// Normalized relay URLs, in the order they were added.
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static func customRelays(in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) -> [String] {
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let stored = defaults.stringArray(forKey: storageKey) ?? []
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// Re-normalize on read: a value written by an older build, or edited
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// outside the app, must not reach the connection layer unchecked.
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var seen = Set<String>()
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return stored.compactMap { NostrRelayURL.normalized($0) }
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.filter { seen.insert($0).inserted }
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}
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/// Adds a relay, returning the normalized URL or why it was rejected.
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@discardableResult
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static func add(
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_ rawValue: String,
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builtIn: Set<String>,
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in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard
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) -> Result<String, AddFailure> {
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// Bare hostnames are the common way people quote a relay, and wss is
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// the only sensible assumption for one.
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guard let normalized = NostrRelayURL.normalized(rawValue, defaultScheme: "wss") else {
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return .failure(.malformed)
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}
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var current = customRelays(in: defaults)
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guard !current.contains(normalized), !builtIn.contains(normalized) else {
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return .failure(.alreadyPresent)
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}
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guard current.count < maxCustomRelays else {
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return .failure(.limitReached)
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}
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current.append(normalized)
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write(current, in: defaults)
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return .success(normalized)
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}
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static func remove(_ url: String, in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) {
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// Same default scheme as `add`, so a relay entered as a bare hostname
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// can be removed the way it was typed.
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guard let normalized = NostrRelayURL.normalized(url, defaultScheme: "wss") else { return }
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let remaining = customRelays(in: defaults).filter { $0 != normalized }
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write(remaining, in: defaults)
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}
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/// Panic-wipe hook: an added relay names somewhere someone chose to route
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/// through, which is exactly the kind of trace a wipe should not leave.
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static func reset(in defaults: UserDefaults = .standard) {
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defaults.removeObject(forKey: storageKey)
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NotificationCenter.default.post(name: didChangeNotification, object: nil)
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}
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private static func write(_ relays: [String], in defaults: UserDefaults) {
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defaults.set(relays, forKey: storageKey)
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NotificationCenter.default.post(name: didChangeNotification, object: nil)
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}
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}
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