Files
bitchat/bitchat/ViewModels/ChatPublicConversationCoordinator.swift
T
87910541ef Prekey bundles: forward-secret async first contact for courier mail (#1381)
* Add capability bits to announce TLV

Announces now carry an optional capabilities TLV (0x05): a little-endian
bitfield with named bits for upcoming features (prekeys, wifiBulk,
gateway, groups, board, vouch, meshDiagnostics). Old clients skip the
unknown TLV; peers without it decode as nil so features can distinguish
"legacy peer" from "advertises nothing".

PeerCapabilities lives in BitFoundation with a minimal-length encoding
that preserves unknown bits for forward compatibility. Peer capabilities
are stored in the BLE peer registry on verified announce and exposed via
BLEService.peerCapabilities(_:). The local advertisement set is empty
until each feature ships its bit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Prekey bundles: forward-secret async first contact for courier mail

Courier envelopes were sealed with one-way Noise X to the recipient's
long-lived static key, so a later compromise of that key exposed every
envelope captured in transit. This adds one-time prekey bundles:

- PrekeyBundle (MessageType 0x24): 8 one-time Curve25519 public prekeys
  bound to the owner's Noise static key by an Ed25519 signature over
  "bitchat-prekey-bundle-v1" canonical bytes; gossiped mesh-wide on its
  own 60s sync round (SyncTypeFlags bit 9, 200-peer cap, 24h freshness)
  and verified against the announce-bound signing key before caching.
- Sealed envelope v2: Noise X where the responder static is the one-time
  prekey, prologue "bitchat-prekey-v1" || prekeyID. Sender identity rides
  encrypted inside and is authenticated exactly like v1 (blocked-sender
  check included). CourierEnvelope gains an optional prekeyID TLV that
  v1 decoders skip as unknown.
- Local prekeys live in the Keychain; consumed privates survive a 48h
  grace window for spray-and-wait redeliveries, then are deleted (the
  forward-secrecy clock starts at deletion). The batch tops back up and
  re-gossips when unconsumed count drops below 3, and everything is
  wiped in panic mode.
- Routing: courier sealing picks a cached verified bundle when one
  exists (one prekey per message, reused across deposit retries), with
  the advertised .prekeys capability as a veto for on-mesh peers, and
  falls back to static sealing otherwise.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Prekeys: authenticate bundle packets, fix consume-republish, deflake CI

Fixes the prekey-bundle PR review + CI failure:

- CI root cause: the receive queue (mesh.message) is concurrent, so a
  gossiped prekey bundle can be processed before the announce that binds
  its owner's signing key. The old handler dropped such bundles outright,
  so under CI parallel load the bundle was permanently lost and the
  cache/gossip tests flaked (verifiedBundleEntersGossipStore,
  prekeySealedMailTravelsViaCourierAndOpens). Bundles that arrive before
  their binding are now retained per-owner (bounded) and re-attempted when
  the verified announce lands, atomically to avoid a check-then-act race.

- Authenticate the OUTER prekey-bundle packet (Codex P2 / review MEDIUM):
  require senderID == PeerID(bundle.noiseStaticPublicKey) and verify the
  packet's Ed25519 signature (covers senderID + timestamp) against the
  owner's bound signing key, in addition to the inner bundle signature.
  Stops replay under a fresh timestamp / fake senderID.

- Key the gossip prekey-bundle store/dedup by the bundle's authenticated
  identity (noiseStaticPublicKey), not the unauthenticated packet
  senderID, so one valid bundle sprayed under many fabricated sender IDs
  can't multiply entries and exhaust the 200-owner cap.

- Bump published-bundle generatedAt strictly on consume (Codex P1):
  consuming a prekey shrinks the published bundle, so it now republishes
  with a strictly newer generatedAt and re-gossips, so peers replace the
  cached copy and stop assigning the consumed ID before its 48h grace.

- Guard the panic/clear detached Application Support tree-deletes behind
  TestEnvironment.isRunningTests: the SPM test process shares that tree,
  so the wipe could land mid-test and flake file-dependent tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update sync tests for prekeyBundle as bit 9 / default sync round

Prekeys makes bit 9 (prekeyBundle) a known SyncTypeFlags bit and enables
a prekey sync round by default. That broke tests authored by other PRs
that assumed bit 9 was phantom or that only their own sync round fires:

- SyncTypeFlags(Board)Tests: move the "unknown bits" probes to bits 10+
  (0xFE -> 0xFC / 0xFD), since bit 9 is now assigned.
- GossipSync(Board)Tests + GossipSyncManagerTests: disable the prekey sync
  round in configs that run maintenance (as they already do for message/
  fragment/fileTransfer), so they isolate the behavior under test.

Full app suite (1301 tests) green locally via SPM.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 15:38:33 +02:00

564 lines
24 KiB
Swift

import BitFoundation
import BitLogger
import CoreBluetooth
import Foundation
import SwiftUI
#if os(iOS)
import UIKit
#endif
/// The narrow surface `ChatPublicConversationCoordinator` needs from its owner.
///
/// Follows the `ChatDeliveryContext` exemplar: the coordinator depends on the
/// minimal context it actually uses instead of holding an `unowned` back-ref
/// to the whole `ChatViewModel`. This keeps the coordinator independently
/// testable (see `ChatPublicConversationCoordinatorContextTests`) and makes
/// its true dependencies explicit. The surface is intentionally large — it
/// documents the coordinator's real coupling to the public timeline, the
/// conversation stores, geohash participants, and the inbound public message
/// pipeline.
@MainActor
protocol ChatPublicConversationContext: AnyObject {
// MARK: Channel state
var activeChannel: ChannelID { get }
var currentGeohash: String? { get }
var nickname: String { get }
var myPeerID: PeerID { get }
/// Publishes the public-timeline batching state (UI animation suppression).
/// (Single mutation path for the owner's `isBatchingPublic`; this
/// coordinator never reads it.)
func setPublicBatching(_ isBatching: Bool)
/// Signals that message state changed so observers refresh (e.g. `objectWillChange.send()`).
func notifyUIChanged()
// MARK: Public conversation store (single-writer intents)
/// Appends a public message in timestamp order. Returns `false` when a
/// message with the same ID is already in that conversation.
@discardableResult
func appendPublicMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage, to conversationID: ConversationID) -> Bool
/// Appends a geohash message if absent. Returns `true` when stored.
@discardableResult
func appendGeohashMessageIfAbsent(_ message: BitchatMessage, toGeohash geohash: String) -> Bool
func publicConversationContainsMessage(withID messageID: String, in conversationID: ConversationID) -> Bool
/// Removes a message by ID from whichever public conversation contains it.
@discardableResult
func removePublicMessage(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage?
/// Removes every matching message from a geohash conversation (block purge).
func removePublicMessages(fromGeohash geohash: String, where predicate: (BitchatMessage) -> Bool)
/// Empties a public conversation's timeline (`/clear`).
func clearPublicConversation(_ conversationID: ConversationID)
/// Queues a system message for the next geohash channel visit.
func queueGeohashSystemMessage(_ content: String)
// MARK: Private chats (block cleanup & message removal)
/// Removes the peer's chat entirely, including unread state
/// (single-writer store intent; no-op for unknown peers).
func removePrivateChat(_ peerID: PeerID)
/// Removes a message by ID from every private chat containing it,
/// dropping chats that become empty. Returns the removed message.
@discardableResult
func removePrivateMessage(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage?
func cleanupLocalFile(forMessage message: BitchatMessage)
// MARK: Geohash participants & presence
var geoNicknames: [String: String] { get }
var isTeleported: Bool { get }
var nostrKeyMapping: [PeerID: String] { get }
/// Drops every key mapping that resolves to the given (lowercased) Nostr pubkey.
func removeNostrKeyMappings(matchingPubkeyHexLowercased hex: String)
func visibleGeoPeople() -> [GeoPerson]
func geoParticipantCount(for geohash: String) -> Int
func removeGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: String)
// MARK: Nostr identity & blocking (shared with the other contexts)
func deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash geohash: String) throws -> NostrIdentity
func isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool
func setNostrBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String, isBlocked: Bool)
// MARK: Mesh transport
func meshPeerNicknames() -> [PeerID: String]
func sendMeshMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String], messageID: String, timestamp: Date)
// MARK: Inbound public message processing
func processActionMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> BitchatMessage
func isMessageBlocked(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool
/// `powBits` is the validated NIP-13 difficulty of the source Nostr event
/// (0 for mesh messages); sufficient PoW relaxes the per-sender bucket.
func allowPublicMessage(senderKey: String, contentKey: String, powBits: Int) -> Bool
/// Buffers a visible-channel message for the batched (~80 ms) pipeline
/// flush, which commits it to `conversationID` in the store.
func enqueuePublicMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage, to conversationID: ConversationID)
func cachedStablePeerID(for shortPeerID: PeerID) -> PeerID?
// MARK: Content dedup & formatting
func normalizedContentKey(_ content: String) -> String
func contentTimestamp(forKey key: String) -> Date?
func recordContentKey(_ key: String, timestamp: Date)
/// Pre-renders the message so the formatting cache is warm before display.
func prewarmMessageFormatting(_ message: BitchatMessage)
// MARK: Notifications
/// Posts the you-were-mentioned local notification.
func notifyMention(from sender: String, message: String)
}
extension ChatViewModel: ChatPublicConversationContext {
// `unreadPrivateMessages`, `nostrKeyMapping`,
// `nickname`, `activeChannel`, `currentGeohash`, `geoNicknames`,
// `myPeerID`, `isTeleported`, `notifyUIChanged()`,
// `geoParticipantCount(for:)`, `isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased:)`,
// `deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash:)`, the public conversation store
// intents (`appendPublicMessage(_:to:)`,
// `appendGeohashMessageIfAbsent(_:toGeohash:)`,
// `publicConversationContainsMessage(withID:in:)`,
// `removePublicMessage(withID:)`,
// `removePublicMessages(fromGeohash:where:)`,
// `clearPublicConversation(_:)`, and `queueGeohashSystemMessage(_:)`)
// are shared requirements with `ChatDeliveryContext` /
// `ChatPrivateConversationContext` / `ChatNostrContext` or satisfied by
// existing `ChatViewModel` members. The members below flatten nested
// service accesses into intent-named calls.
func visibleGeoPeople() -> [GeoPerson] {
participantTracker.getVisiblePeople()
}
func removeGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: String) {
participantTracker.removeParticipant(pubkeyHex: pubkeyHex)
}
func setNostrBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String, isBlocked: Bool) {
identityManager.setNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased, isBlocked: isBlocked)
}
func meshPeerNicknames() -> [PeerID: String] {
meshService.getPeerNicknames()
}
func sendMeshMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String], messageID: String, timestamp: Date) {
meshService.sendMessage(content, mentions: mentions, messageID: messageID, timestamp: timestamp)
}
func allowPublicMessage(senderKey: String, contentKey: String, powBits: Int) -> Bool {
publicRateLimiter.allow(senderKey: senderKey, contentKey: contentKey, powBits: powBits)
}
func enqueuePublicMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage, to conversationID: ConversationID) {
publicMessagePipeline.enqueue(message, to: conversationID)
}
func normalizedContentKey(_ content: String) -> String {
deduplicationService.normalizedContentKey(content)
}
func contentTimestamp(forKey key: String) -> Date? {
deduplicationService.contentTimestamp(forKey: key)
}
func recordContentKey(_ key: String, timestamp: Date) {
deduplicationService.recordContentKey(key, timestamp: timestamp)
}
func prewarmMessageFormatting(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
_ = formatMessageAsText(message, colorScheme: currentColorScheme)
}
func notifyMention(from sender: String, message: String) {
NotificationService.shared.sendMentionNotification(from: sender, message: message)
}
}
@MainActor
final class ChatPublicConversationCoordinator: PublicMessagePipelineDelegate {
private unowned let context: any ChatPublicConversationContext
init(context: any ChatPublicConversationContext) {
self.context = context
}
func visibleGeohashPeople() -> [GeoPerson] {
context.visibleGeoPeople()
}
func getVisibleGeoParticipants() -> [CommandGeoParticipant] {
visibleGeohashPeople().map { CommandGeoParticipant(id: $0.id, displayName: $0.displayName) }
}
func geohashParticipantCount(for geohash: String) -> Int {
context.geoParticipantCount(for: geohash)
}
func displayNameForPubkey(_ pubkeyHex: String) -> String {
displayNameForNostrPubkey(pubkeyHex)
}
func isBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool {
context.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: pubkeyHexLowercased)
}
func isGeohashUserBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool {
context.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: pubkeyHexLowercased)
}
func blockGeohashUser(pubkeyHexLowercased: String, displayName: String) {
let hex = pubkeyHexLowercased.lowercased()
context.setNostrBlocked(hex, isBlocked: true)
context.removeGeoParticipant(pubkeyHex: hex)
if let gh = context.currentGeohash {
let predicate: (BitchatMessage) -> Bool = { [unowned context] message in
guard let senderPeerID = message.senderPeerID,
senderPeerID.isGeoDM || senderPeerID.isGeoChat else {
return false
}
if let full = context.nostrKeyMapping[senderPeerID]?.lowercased() {
return full == hex
}
return false
}
context.removePublicMessages(fromGeohash: gh, where: predicate)
}
// The store intent no-ops when no such chat exists.
context.removePrivateChat(PeerID(nostr_: hex))
context.removeNostrKeyMappings(matchingPubkeyHexLowercased: hex)
addSystemMessage(
String(
format: String(
localized: "system.geohash.blocked",
comment: "System message shown when a user is blocked in geohash chats"
),
locale: .current,
displayName
)
)
}
func unblockGeohashUser(pubkeyHexLowercased: String, displayName: String) {
context.setNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased, isBlocked: false)
addSystemMessage(
String(
format: String(
localized: "system.geohash.unblocked",
comment: "System message shown when a user is unblocked in geohash chats"
),
locale: .current,
displayName
)
)
}
func displayNameForNostrPubkey(_ pubkeyHex: String) -> String {
let suffix = String(pubkeyHex.suffix(4))
if let geohash = context.currentGeohash,
let myGeoIdentity = try? context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: geohash),
myGeoIdentity.publicKeyHex.lowercased() == pubkeyHex.lowercased() {
return context.nickname + "#" + suffix
}
if let nick = context.geoNicknames[pubkeyHex.lowercased()], !nick.isEmpty {
return nick + "#" + suffix
}
return "anon#\(suffix)"
}
func currentPublicSender() -> (name: String, peerID: PeerID) {
var displaySender = context.nickname
var senderPeerID = context.myPeerID
if case .location(let channel) = context.activeChannel,
let identity = try? context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: channel.geohash) {
let suffix = String(identity.publicKeyHex.suffix(4))
displaySender = context.nickname + "#" + suffix
senderPeerID = PeerID(nostr: identity.publicKeyHex)
}
return (displaySender, senderPeerID)
}
func removeMessage(withID messageID: String, cleanupFile: Bool = false) {
var removedMessage = context.removePublicMessage(withID: messageID)
if let removedPrivateMessage = context.removePrivateMessage(withID: messageID) {
removedMessage = removedMessage ?? removedPrivateMessage
}
if cleanupFile, let removedMessage {
context.cleanupLocalFile(forMessage: removedMessage)
}
context.notifyUIChanged()
}
func clearCurrentPublicTimeline() {
context.clearPublicConversation(ConversationID(channelID: context.activeChannel))
// The SPM test process shares the real Application Support tree, so this
// detached deletion can land mid-test under parallel scheduling and flake
// a file-dependent test. Tests never need the on-disk media cleared.
guard !TestEnvironment.isRunningTests else { return }
Task.detached(priority: .utility) {
// Skipped under tests: the test process shares the user's real
// ~/Library/Application Support/files tree, and this detached
// wipe fires at a nondeterministic time — racing tests that
// write media there (see the same guard in panicClearAllData).
guard !TestEnvironment.isRunningTests else { return }
do {
let base = try FileManager.default.url(
for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
in: .userDomainMask,
appropriateFor: nil,
create: true
)
let filesDir = base.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
let outgoingDirs = [
filesDir.appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true),
filesDir.appendingPathComponent("images/outgoing", isDirectory: true),
filesDir.appendingPathComponent("files/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
]
for dir in outgoingDirs {
if FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: dir.path) {
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: dir)
try? FileManager.default.createDirectory(
at: dir,
withIntermediateDirectories: true,
attributes: nil
)
}
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to clear media files: \(error)", category: .session)
}
}
}
func addSystemMessage(_ content: String, timestamp: Date = Date()) {
let systemMessage = BitchatMessage(
sender: "system",
content: content,
timestamp: timestamp,
isRelay: false
)
context.appendPublicMessage(systemMessage, to: ConversationID(channelID: context.activeChannel))
}
func addMeshOnlySystemMessage(_ content: String) {
let systemMessage = BitchatMessage(
sender: "system",
content: content,
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false
)
context.appendPublicMessage(systemMessage, to: .mesh)
}
func addPublicSystemMessage(_ content: String) {
let systemMessage = BitchatMessage(
sender: "system",
content: content,
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false
)
context.appendPublicMessage(systemMessage, to: ConversationID(channelID: context.activeChannel))
let contentKey = context.normalizedContentKey(systemMessage.content)
context.recordContentKey(contentKey, timestamp: systemMessage.timestamp)
}
func addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(_ content: String) {
if case .location = context.activeChannel {
addPublicSystemMessage(content)
} else {
context.queueGeohashSystemMessage(content)
}
}
func sendPublicRaw(_ content: String) {
if case .location(let channel) = context.activeChannel {
Task { @MainActor [weak context] in
guard let context else { return }
do {
let identity = try context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: channel.geohash)
let event = try await NostrProtocol.createMinedEphemeralGeohashEvent(
content: content,
geohash: channel.geohash,
senderIdentity: identity,
nickname: context.nickname,
teleported: context.isTeleported
)
let targetRelays = GeoRelayDirectory.shared.closestRelays(toGeohash: channel.geohash, count: 5)
if targetRelays.isEmpty {
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event)
} else {
NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event, to: targetRelays)
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to send geohash raw message: \(error)", category: .session)
}
}
return
}
context.sendMeshMessage(
content,
mentions: [],
messageID: UUID().uuidString,
timestamp: Date()
)
}
/// - Parameter powBits: validated NIP-13 difficulty of the source Nostr
/// event (0 for mesh messages). Sufficient PoW relaxes the per-sender
/// rate limit; low/no-PoW events keep the strict limits so old clients
/// still get through at normal rates.
func handlePublicMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage, powBits: Int = 0) {
let finalMessage = context.processActionMessage(message)
if context.isMessageBlocked(finalMessage) { return }
let isGeo = finalMessage.senderPeerID?.isGeoChat == true
let isSystem = finalMessage.sender == "system"
let shouldRateLimit = !isSystem || finalMessage.senderPeerID != nil
if shouldRateLimit {
let senderKey = normalizedSenderKey(for: finalMessage)
let contentKey = context.normalizedContentKey(finalMessage.content)
if !context.allowPublicMessage(senderKey: senderKey, contentKey: contentKey, powBits: powBits) {
return
}
}
if !isSystem && finalMessage.content.count > 16000 { return }
// Empty content never rendered before (the old visible-array enqueue
// filtered it); with the store as the sole timeline it is dropped
// outright instead of lingering invisibly in a backing buffer.
guard !finalMessage.content.trimmed.isEmpty else { return }
// Resolve the destination conversation. System messages surface on
// the active channel (matching their old visible-only routing); geo
// messages require a current geohash, mesh messages always land in
// the mesh conversation.
let destination: ConversationID?
if isSystem {
destination = ConversationID(channelID: context.activeChannel)
} else if isGeo {
destination = context.currentGeohash.map { .geohash($0.lowercased()) }
} else {
destination = .mesh
}
guard let destination else { return }
let channelMatches: Bool = {
switch context.activeChannel {
case .mesh: return !isGeo || isSystem
case .location: return isGeo || isSystem
}
}()
if channelMatches {
// Visible-channel arrivals are batched: the pipeline's ~80 ms
// flush commits them to the store (which dedups by ID), keeping
// the deliberate UI flush cadence.
guard !context.publicConversationContainsMessage(withID: finalMessage.id, in: destination) else { return }
context.enqueuePublicMessage(finalMessage, to: destination)
} else {
// Background-channel arrivals have no rendering observers to
// batch for; they land in the store immediately.
context.appendPublicMessage(finalMessage, to: destination)
}
}
func checkForMentions(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
var myTokens: Set<String> = [context.nickname]
let meshPeers = context.meshPeerNicknames()
let collisions = meshPeers.values.filter { $0.hasPrefix(context.nickname + "#") }
if !collisions.isEmpty {
let suffix = "#" + String(context.myPeerID.id.prefix(4))
myTokens = [context.nickname + suffix]
}
let isMentioned = message.mentions?.contains(where: myTokens.contains) ?? false
if isMentioned && message.sender != context.nickname {
SecureLogger.info("🔔 Mention from \(message.sender)", category: .session)
context.notifyMention(from: message.sender, message: message.content)
}
}
func sendHapticFeedback(for message: BitchatMessage) {
#if os(iOS)
guard UIApplication.shared.applicationState == .active else { return }
var tokens: [String] = [context.nickname]
switch context.activeChannel {
case .location(let channel):
if let identity = try? context.deriveNostrIdentity(forGeohash: channel.geohash) {
tokens.append(context.nickname + "#" + String(identity.publicKeyHex.suffix(4)))
}
case .mesh:
break
}
let hugsMe = tokens.contains { message.content.contains("hugs \($0)") } || message.content.contains("hugs you")
let slapsMe = tokens.contains { message.content.contains("slaps \($0) around") } || message.content.contains("slaps you around")
let isHugForMe = message.content.contains("🫂") && hugsMe
let isSlapForMe = message.content.contains("🐟") && slapsMe
if isHugForMe && message.sender != context.nickname {
let impactFeedback = UIImpactFeedbackGenerator(style: .medium)
impactFeedback.prepare()
for i in 0..<8 {
DispatchQueue.main.asyncAfter(
deadline: .now() + Double(i) * TransportConfig.uiBatchDispatchStaggerSeconds
) {
impactFeedback.impactOccurred()
}
}
} else if isSlapForMe && message.sender != context.nickname {
let impactFeedback = UIImpactFeedbackGenerator(style: .heavy)
impactFeedback.prepare()
impactFeedback.impactOccurred()
}
#endif
}
func pipeline(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, normalizeContent content: String) -> String {
context.normalizedContentKey(content)
}
func pipeline(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, contentTimestampForKey key: String) -> Date? {
context.contentTimestamp(forKey: key)
}
func pipeline(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, recordContentKey key: String, timestamp: Date) {
context.recordContentKey(key, timestamp: timestamp)
}
func pipeline(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, commit message: BitchatMessage, to conversationID: ConversationID) -> Bool {
context.appendPublicMessage(message, to: conversationID)
}
func pipelinePrewarmMessage(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, message: BitchatMessage) {
context.prewarmMessageFormatting(message)
}
func pipelineSetBatchingState(_ pipeline: PublicMessagePipeline, isBatching: Bool) {
context.setPublicBatching(isBatching)
}
}
private extension ChatPublicConversationCoordinator {
func normalizedSenderKey(for message: BitchatMessage) -> String {
if let senderPeerID = message.senderPeerID {
if senderPeerID.isGeoChat || senderPeerID.isGeoDM {
let full = (context.nostrKeyMapping[senderPeerID] ?? senderPeerID.bare).lowercased()
return "nostr:" + full
} else if senderPeerID.id.count == 16,
let full = context.cachedStablePeerID(for: senderPeerID)?.id.lowercased() {
return "noise:" + full
} else {
return "mesh:" + senderPeerID.id.lowercased()
}
}
return "name:" + message.sender.lowercased()
}
}