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When a Noise session establishes with a peer I verified and that peer advertises the .vouch capability, send signed attestations (up to 16, most recently verified first, at most once per peer per 24h) for the OTHER fingerprints I verified. Receivers accept vouches only from senders they verified themselves, verify the Ed25519 signature against the sender's announce-bound signing key, and surface the result as a new derived trust tier: vouched (unfilled seal) between casual and trusted. Protocol: - NoisePayloadType.vouch = 0x12 carries a batch of TLV attestations: voucheeFingerprint (32B), voucheeSigningKey (32B), timestamp (uint64 ms BE), Ed25519 signature over "bitchat-vouch-v1" | fingerprint | signingKey | timestamp. The voucher is implicit in the authenticated session. - PeerCapabilities.localSupported now advertises .vouch. Storage (SecureIdentityStateManager / IdentityCache): - vouches keyed by vouchee, capped at 8 vouchers each; validity is recomputed on read (voucher still verified-by-me, < 30 days old), so unverifying a voucher retires their vouches without cascade deletes. - New IdentityCache fields are Optional so pre-existing encrypted caches decode cleanly; TrustLevel.vouched is inserted mid-ladder but raw values are strings, so persisted values are unaffected (and vouched itself is never persisted). - Panic wipe clears vouch state with the rest of the identity cache. UI: unfilled checkmark.seal badge in the mesh peer list (filled seal stays exclusive to verified) and a "vouched for by N people you verified" section with voucher names in FingerprintView; VoiceOver labels and xcstrings entries included. Tests: attestation encode/decode + signature (forged/tampered/expired), accept-policy gates, batch cap, trust-level derivation incl. voucher invalidation, persistence compat, and coordinator exchange/accept policies. Full macOS suite: 1088 tests passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>