Files
bitchat/bitchatTests/NoiseCourierTests.swift
T
jackandClaude Fable 5 5aaa209020 Friend-courier store-and-forward: mutual favorites carry sealed messages to offline peers
When a private message has no reachable transport, the router now seals it
to the recipient's Noise static key (new one-way Noise X pattern) and hands
the envelope to up to three connected mutual favorites. Couriers store the
opaque ciphertext under strict quotas (20 total, 5 per depositor, 16 KiB,
24 h) and hand it over when the recipient's announce matches a rotating
HMAC recipient tag; the recipient opens it and the message flows through
the normal private-message pipeline, so dedup and delivery acks just work.

- CourierEnvelope TLV + courierEnvelope (0x04) message type in BitFoundation
- Noise X one-way pattern reusing the existing handshake machinery,
  domain-separated by a courier prologue; sender identity authenticated
  via the ss DH (no forward secrecy - documented tradeoff)
- CourierStore with eviction, file persistence, and panic-wipe integration
- Rotating recipient tags (HMAC over epoch day) so carried envelopes don't
  correlate for observers who don't already know the recipient's key
- New "carried" delivery status with figure.walk glyph; header indicator
  while carrying mail for others
- Three-node end-to-end test ferrying packets through real BLEService
  instances, plus codec/crypto/store/router suites (986 tests green)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 11:13:16 +02:00

108 lines
4.5 KiB
Swift

//
// NoiseCourierTests.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import bitchat
/// One-way Noise X envelopes: encryption to a known static key without an
/// interactive handshake, used by the courier store-and-forward path.
struct NoiseCourierTests {
@Test func sealAndOpenRoundTrip() throws {
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let payload = Data("meet at the north gate".utf8)
let sealed = try alice.sealCourierPayload(payload, recipientStaticKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
let opened = try bob.openCourierPayload(sealed)
#expect(opened.payload == payload)
// The X pattern authenticates the sender: Bob learns Alice's real static key.
#expect(opened.senderStaticKey == alice.getStaticPublicKeyData())
}
@Test func wrongRecipientCannotOpen() throws {
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let carol = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let sealed = try alice.sealCourierPayload(Data("secret".utf8), recipientStaticKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
_ = try carol.openCourierPayload(sealed)
}
}
@Test func tamperedEnvelopeFailsToOpen() throws {
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
var sealed = try alice.sealCourierPayload(Data("secret".utf8), recipientStaticKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
sealed[sealed.count - 1] ^= 0x01
#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
_ = try bob.openCourierPayload(sealed)
}
}
@Test func senderIdentityCannotBeForged() throws {
// The encrypted static key inside the envelope is bound by the ss DH;
// splicing one envelope's ephemeral prefix onto another must fail.
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let mallory = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bobKey = bob.getStaticPublicKeyData()
let fromAlice = try alice.sealCourierPayload(Data("hi".utf8), recipientStaticKey: bobKey)
let fromMallory = try mallory.sealCourierPayload(Data("hi".utf8), recipientStaticKey: bobKey)
// e (32 bytes) from Mallory's envelope + rest from Alice's.
let spliced = fromMallory.prefix(32) + fromAlice.dropFirst(32)
#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
_ = try bob.openCourierPayload(Data(spliced))
}
}
@Test func sealRejectsInvalidRecipientKey() {
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
_ = try alice.sealCourierPayload(Data("x".utf8), recipientStaticKey: Data(repeating: 0, count: 32))
}
#expect(throws: (any Error).self) {
_ = try alice.sealCourierPayload(Data("x".utf8), recipientStaticKey: Data(repeating: 1, count: 8))
}
}
@Test func emptyAndLargePayloadsRoundTrip() throws {
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bobKey = bob.getStaticPublicKeyData()
let empty = try alice.sealCourierPayload(Data(), recipientStaticKey: bobKey)
#expect(try bob.openCourierPayload(empty).payload.isEmpty)
let large = Data((0..<8192).map { UInt8($0 % 251) })
let sealed = try alice.sealCourierPayload(large, recipientStaticKey: bobKey)
#expect(try bob.openCourierPayload(sealed).payload == large)
}
@Test func envelopesAreNotLinkableAcrossSends() throws {
// Fresh ephemeral per seal: same payload to the same recipient must
// produce entirely different ciphertexts.
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let payload = Data("same message".utf8)
let a = try alice.sealCourierPayload(payload, recipientStaticKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
let b = try alice.sealCourierPayload(payload, recipientStaticKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
#expect(a != b)
#expect(a.prefix(32) != b.prefix(32))
}
}