mirror of
https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
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* Friend-courier store-and-forward: mutual favorites carry sealed messages to offline peers When a private message has no reachable transport, the router now seals it to the recipient's Noise static key (new one-way Noise X pattern) and hands the envelope to up to three connected mutual favorites. Couriers store the opaque ciphertext under strict quotas (20 total, 5 per depositor, 16 KiB, 24 h) and hand it over when the recipient's announce matches a rotating HMAC recipient tag; the recipient opens it and the message flows through the normal private-message pipeline, so dedup and delivery acks just work. - CourierEnvelope TLV + courierEnvelope (0x04) message type in BitFoundation - Noise X one-way pattern reusing the existing handshake machinery, domain-separated by a courier prologue; sender identity authenticated via the ss DH (no forward secrecy - documented tradeoff) - CourierStore with eviction, file persistence, and panic-wipe integration - Rotating recipient tags (HMAC over epoch day) so carried envelopes don't correlate for observers who don't already know the recipient's key - New "carried" delivery status with figure.walk glyph; header indicator while carrying mail for others - Three-node end-to-end test ferrying packets through real BLEService instances, plus codec/crypto/store/router suites (986 tests green) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix courier handoff verification and directed sends * Authenticate courier deposits by ingress peer * Gate courier handover on direct announces and isolate store test Envelopes are removed from the courier store optimistically, so releasing them on a relayed (multi-hop) announce risks losing carried mail to a speculative flood that never reaches the recipient. Handover now also requires the announce to have arrived directly (full TTL), i.e. an actual encounter with a live link; regression test builds a relayed copy of a genuinely signed announce (TTL is excluded from announce signatures). Also make CourierStore's on-disk location injectable so the persistence test round-trips through a temp directory instead of wiping the real Application Support store, and reattach BLEAnnounceHandler's doc comment to the class it describes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Use Xcode-bundled Swift in CI instead of a standalone toolchain The unpinned setup-swift action installs Swift 6.1, which refuses the SDK on runner images that have rolled to Xcode 26.5 ("this SDK is not supported by the compiler"). Jobs passed or failed depending on which image they landed on. The Xcode-bundled toolchain always matches the image's SDK, and matches local development. Cache keys now include the toolchain version so artifacts from one compiler are never restored into builds with another. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Drop couriered mail from blocked senders at envelope open The UI-layer block check (isPeerBlocked in the transport event coordinator) resolves a fingerprint from the live session or peer list, but a couriered message arrives precisely when its sender is absent — no session, no registry entry — so the check failed open and a blocked identity's mail was delivered anyway. Gate in openCourierEnvelope, where the sealed sender's full static key is in hand. End-to-end test ferries a full deposit→carry→handover round and verifies the envelope from a blocked sender never reaches the delegate (confirmed failing without the gate). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix favorites end-to-end: peer-list dedup, Nostr sync, /fav key corruption - UnifiedPeerService: dedup offline favorites against mesh peers by noise key. Phase 2 compared a 64-hex noise-key PeerID against 16-hex mesh IDs (never equal), leaving only a nickname+isConnected heuristic — a mutual favorite that was reachable-but-not-connected or renamed rendered twice, and a same-nick stranger could suppress a favorite entirely. - Nostr inbound: intercept [FAVORITED]/[UNFAVORITED] markers in the live PM handler so they update theyFavoritedUs instead of rendering as chat text; mutual favorites can now form over Nostr. Delete the dead favorite-aware PM variant and ChatNostrCoordinator.handleFavoriteNotification (unwired, parsed a stale FAVORITE:TRUE|… format no sender emits). - NostrTransport.isPeerReachable: match short form regardless of incoming ID width — toggling an offline favorite (addressed by 64-hex noise key) was silently dropped with no reachable transport. - BLEService.sendPrivateMessage: normalize recipient to the short ID like sendFilePrivate, so a 64-hex target hits the existing Noise session instead of initiating a handshake with a 32-byte wire recipient ID. - /fav, /unfav: stop writing Data(hexString: peerID.id) — the 8-byte routing ID for mesh peers — into the favorites store as a "noise key", and stop double-sending the favorite notification; delegate to toggleFavorite with a proper state check. - FavoritesPersistenceService.updatePeerFavoritedUs: keep the stored nickname when the caller passes the "Unknown" placeholder. - Bump marketing version to 1.5.4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Route DMs to mutual favorites via Nostr when a mesh-keyed peer goes offline Field-tested on device: with a DM window opened while the peer was on mesh (conversation keyed by the short 16-hex ID), walking out of range and sending failed instantly with "peer not reachable" even though the header showed the peer as Nostr-reachable (mutual favorite, npub known). sendPrivateMessage derived the favorites key as Data(hexString: peerID.id) — for a short mesh ID that is the 8-byte routing ID, never the noise key — so the mutual-favorite/Nostr-key checks always came up empty and the send failed before reaching MessageRouter. Conversations keyed by the full 64-hex noise-key ID (opened from the offline favorite row) were unaffected, which is why later tests appeared to work. Resolve the noise key properly (peerID.noiseKey, then the unified peer row, then the favorites store by derived short ID) and add a regression test for the mesh-keyed-peer-goes-offline case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Label Nostr DMs from favorites with their stored nickname Field-tested: a DM delivered over the Nostr fallback rendered as "anon#678e" instead of the sender's name. The inbound handler named the sender via displayNameForNostrPubkey, which only knows geohash-scoped names — even though the pipeline had already resolved the sender's noise key (the conversation is keyed by it). When the conversation key carries a noise key, prefer the favorite's stored nickname; geohash DMs (nostr_ keys) keep the anon geo name. This also stops an inbound Nostr [FAVORITED] from overwriting the stored nickname with the anon fallback, since the same name feeds updatePeerFavoritedUs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix courier path for offline favorites addressed by noise-key IDs Two Codex review findings, both the same ID-width confusion this PR targets, in the courier flow: - CourierDirectory.favoritesBacked resolved recipients only via getFavoriteStatus(forPeerID:), which requires a short 16-hex ID — offline favorites are addressed by the full 64-hex noise-key ID, so attemptCourierDeposit silently bailed for exactly the peers couriers exist to serve. The 64-hex ID now yields its own key directly. - openCourierEnvelope emitted the derived short mesh ID even when the sender has no live mesh identity, landing couriered mail in an unresolvable short-ID thread labeled "Unknown". Absent senders now emit the full noise-key ID so the message joins the stable favorite conversation; present senders keep the live short-ID thread. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
232 lines
10 KiB
Swift
232 lines
10 KiB
Swift
import BitFoundation
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import BitLogger
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import Foundation
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/// Narrow environment for `BLEAnnounceHandler`.
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///
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/// All queue hops (collections barrier, BLE-queue link-state reads, main-actor
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/// UI notification, delayed re-announce) live inside the closures supplied by
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/// `BLEService`, keeping the handler queue-agnostic and synchronously testable.
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struct BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
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/// Local peer identity at the time the announce is handled.
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let localPeerID: () -> PeerID
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/// TTL value used for direct (non-relayed) packets.
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let messageTTL: UInt8
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/// Current time source.
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let now: () -> Date
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/// Noise public key already recorded for the peer, if any (registry read).
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let existingNoisePublicKey: (PeerID) -> Data?
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/// Verifies the packet signature against the announced signing key.
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let verifySignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool
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/// Direct link state for the peer (BLE-queue read).
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let linkState: (PeerID) -> (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool)
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/// Runs the registry mutation phase under the collections barrier.
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let withRegistryBarrier: (() -> Void) -> Void
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/// Upserts the verified announce into the peer registry.
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/// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
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let upsertVerifiedAnnounce: (
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_ peerID: PeerID,
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_ announcement: AnnouncementPacket,
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_ isConnected: Bool,
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_ now: Date
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) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate
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/// Debounced reconnect-log decision.
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/// Must only be called from inside `withRegistryBarrier`.
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let shouldEmitReconnectLog: (_ peerID: PeerID, _ now: Date) -> Bool
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/// Records verified direct-neighbor claims in the mesh topology.
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let updateTopology: (_ peerID: PeerID, _ neighbors: [Data]) -> Void
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/// Persists the announced cryptographic identity for offline verification.
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let persistIdentity: (AnnouncementPacket) -> Void
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/// Announce-back dedup check.
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let dedupContains: (String) -> Bool
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/// Announce-back dedup marking.
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let dedupMarkProcessed: (String) -> Void
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/// Delivers the announce UI events as one ordered main-actor hop:
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/// `.peerConnected` (if flagged) → initial gossip sync scheduling (if
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/// flagged) → peer-ID snapshot + data publish + `.peerListUpdated`.
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/// A single closure keeps the original in-order delivery guarantee that
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/// separate unstructured tasks would not provide.
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let deliverAnnounceUIEvents: (
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_ peerID: PeerID,
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_ notifyPeerConnected: Bool,
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_ scheduleInitialSync: Bool
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) -> Void
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/// Tracks the announce packet for gossip sync.
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let trackPacketSeen: (BitchatPacket) -> Void
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/// Reciprocates the announce for bidirectional discovery.
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let sendAnnounceBack: () -> Void
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/// Schedules a delayed re-announce (afterglow) after the given delay.
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let scheduleAfterglow: (TimeInterval) -> Void
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}
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/// Outcome of an accepted announce, surfaced so the service can run
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/// follow-up work (e.g. courier handover) that keys off the announce.
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struct BLEAnnounceHandlingResult {
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let peerID: PeerID
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let announcement: AnnouncementPacket
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let isDirectAnnounce: Bool
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let isVerified: Bool
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}
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/// Orchestrates inbound announce packets: preflight validation, signature
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/// trust, registry/topology updates, identity persistence, UI notification,
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/// gossip tracking, and the reciprocal announce response.
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final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
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private let environment: BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment
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init(environment: BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment) {
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self.environment = environment
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}
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@discardableResult
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func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) -> BLEAnnounceHandlingResult? {
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let env = environment
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let now = env.now()
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let preflight = BLEAnnouncePreflightPolicy.evaluate(
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packet: packet,
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from: peerID,
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localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
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now: now
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)
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let announcement: AnnouncementPacket
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switch preflight {
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case .accept(let acceptance):
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announcement = acceptance.announcement
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case .reject(.malformed):
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SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decode announce packet from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .session)
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return nil
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case .reject(.senderMismatch(let derivedFromKey)):
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SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce sender mismatch: derived \(derivedFromKey.id.prefix(8))… vs packet \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .security)
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return nil
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case .reject(.selfAnnounce):
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return nil
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case .reject(.stale(let ageSeconds)):
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SecureLogger.debug("⏰ Ignoring stale announce from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… (age: \(ageSeconds)s)", category: .session)
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return nil
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}
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// Suppress announce logs to reduce noise
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// Precompute signature verification outside barrier to reduce contention
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let existingNoisePublicKey = env.existingNoisePublicKey(peerID)
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let hasSignature = packet.signature != nil
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let signatureValid: Bool
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if hasSignature {
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signatureValid = env.verifySignature(packet, announcement.signingPublicKey)
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if !signatureValid {
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SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Signature verification for announce failed \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security)
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}
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} else {
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signatureValid = false
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}
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let trustDecision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
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hasSignature: hasSignature,
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signatureValid: signatureValid,
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existingNoisePublicKey: existingNoisePublicKey,
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announcedNoisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey
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)
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if case .reject(.keyMismatch) = trustDecision {
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SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce key mismatch for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — keeping unverified", category: .security)
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}
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let verifiedAnnounce = trustDecision.isVerified
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var isNewPeer = false
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var isReconnectedPeer = false
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let directLinkState = env.linkState(peerID)
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let isDirectAnnounce = packet.ttl == env.messageTTL
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env.withRegistryBarrier {
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let hasPeripheralConnection = directLinkState.hasPeripheral
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let hasCentralSubscription = directLinkState.hasCentral
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// Require verified announce; ignore otherwise (no backward compatibility)
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if !verifiedAnnounce {
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SecureLogger.warning("❌ Ignoring unverified announce from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .security)
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// Reset flags to prevent post-barrier code from acting on unverified announces
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isNewPeer = false
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isReconnectedPeer = false
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return
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}
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let update = env.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
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peerID,
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announcement,
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isDirectAnnounce || hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription,
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now
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)
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isNewPeer = update.isNewPeer
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isReconnectedPeer = update.wasDisconnected
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// Log connection status only for direct connectivity changes; debounce to reduce spam
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if isDirectAnnounce || hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription {
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let now = env.now()
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if update.isNewPeer {
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SecureLogger.debug("🆕 New peer: \(announcement.nickname)", category: .session)
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} else if update.wasDisconnected {
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if env.shouldEmitReconnectLog(peerID, now) {
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SecureLogger.debug("🔄 Peer \(announcement.nickname) reconnected", category: .session)
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}
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} else if let previousNickname = update.previousNickname, previousNickname != announcement.nickname {
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SecureLogger.debug("🔄 Peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… changed nickname: \(previousNickname) -> \(announcement.nickname)", category: .session)
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}
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}
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}
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// Update topology with verified neighbor claims (only for authenticated announces)
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if verifiedAnnounce, let neighbors = announcement.directNeighbors {
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env.updateTopology(peerID, neighbors)
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}
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// Persist cryptographic identity and signing key for robust offline
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// verification — only for verified announces. Persisting unverified
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// announces would let an attacker who replays a victim's noisePublicKey
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// overwrite the victim's stored signing key/nickname (identity poisoning).
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if verifiedAnnounce {
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env.persistIdentity(announcement)
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}
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let announceBackID = "announce-back-\(peerID)"
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let shouldSendBack = !env.dedupContains(announceBackID)
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if shouldSendBack {
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env.dedupMarkProcessed(announceBackID)
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}
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let responsePlan = BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy.plan(
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isDirectAnnounce: isDirectAnnounce,
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isNewPeer: isNewPeer,
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isReconnectedPeer: isReconnectedPeer,
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shouldSendAnnounceBack: shouldSendBack
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)
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// Only notify of connection for new or reconnected peers when it is a
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// direct announce; the list update always follows in the same hop.
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env.deliverAnnounceUIEvents(
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peerID,
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responsePlan.shouldNotifyPeerConnected,
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responsePlan.shouldNotifyPeerConnected && responsePlan.shouldScheduleInitialSync
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)
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// Track for sync (include our own and others' announces)
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env.trackPacketSeen(packet)
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if responsePlan.shouldSendAnnounceBack {
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// Reciprocate announce for bidirectional discovery
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// Force send to ensure the peer receives our announce
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env.sendAnnounceBack()
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}
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// Afterglow: on first-seen peers, schedule a short re-announce to push presence one more hop
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if responsePlan.shouldScheduleAfterglow {
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let delay = Double.random(in: 0.3...0.6)
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env.scheduleAfterglow(delay)
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}
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return BLEAnnounceHandlingResult(
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peerID: peerID,
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announcement: announcement,
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isDirectAnnounce: isDirectAnnounce,
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isVerified: verifiedAnnounce
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)
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}
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}
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