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* Fix the three follow-ups from the #1486 review Three defects shipped with the censorship-resilience merge, all confirmed against main: 1. Source-manifest verification silently accepted added files. shasum -c checks only the files the manifest lists, and the Xcode project compiles every source file present in the tree — so a hostile mirror could pass verification by adding a file rather than modifying one. The manifest header and VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md now require the completeness check (git status --porcelain, or a path diff for tarballs) alongside the hash check. 2. A relay removed while Tor was bootstrapping reconnected anyway. dropRelays never subtracted from pendingTorConnectionURLs, and a custom relay passes the allow-list filter, so draining the pending queue resurrected a relay someone had explicitly deleted. 3. Turning Tor off mid-bootstrap read as 'network may be blocking tor'. shutdownCompletely left the detached 75s poll loop running, which then stamped bootstrapDidStall over the clean shutdown state; and the stall handler guarded on torEnforced, which is compile-time true in release, instead of the runtime preference. The poll loop is now generation-fenced (shutdown, dormancy, and restart each invalidate it) and the handler consults persistedTorPreference(). Both app-side fixes carry regression tests proven to fail pre-fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Address Codex review: ignored files and manifest placement git status --porcelain omits ignored paths, and .gitignore covers build/ — a planted bitchat/build/Evil.swift would compile via the synchronized group while the documented check stayed silent. The checkout check now uses --ignored. The downloaded manifest also has to live outside the tree, or it trips the completeness checks itself; the doc now says so and references it at /tmp throughout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Test Harness Guide
This test suite uses an in-memory networking harness to make end-to-end and integration tests deterministic, fast, and race-free without touching production code.
In-Memory Bus
- File:
bitchatTests/Mocks/MockBLEService.swift - Registry/Adjacency: Global
registrymapspeerIDto aMockBLEServiceinstance;adjacencyrecords simulated links between peers. - Setup: Call
MockBLEService.resetTestBus()insetUp()to clear state between tests. - Topology: Use
simulateConnectedPeer(_:)andsimulateDisconnectedPeer(_:)to add/remove links.connectFullMesh()helpers in tests build larger topologies. - Handlers: Tests can observe data via
messageDeliveryHandler(decodedBitchatMessage) andpacketDeliveryHandler(rawBitchatPacket). - De‑duplication: A thread-safe
seenMessageIDsprevents duplicate deliveries during flooding/relays.
Broadcast Flooding
- Flag:
MockBLEService.autoFloodEnabled - Intent: When
true, public broadcasts propagate across the entire connected component (ignores TTL for reach) while still de‑duping to prevent loops. - Usage: Enabled in Integration tests (
setUp) to simulate large-network broadcast; disabled in E2E tests to keep routing explicit and verify TTL behavior (seePublicChatE2ETests.testZeroTTLNotRelayed).
Rehandshake Flow (Noise)
- Why: The legacy NACK recovery path was removed; recovery now relies on Noise session rehandshake after decrypt failure or desync.
- Manager:
NoiseSessionManagermanages per-peer sessions. - Pattern: On decrypt failure, proactively clear the local session and re-initiate a handshake. The peer accepts and replaces their session.
- Test:
IntegrationTests.testRehandshakeAfterDecryptionFailure- Corrupts ciphertext to induce a decrypt error.
- Calls
removeSession(for:)on the initiator’s manager beforeinitiateHandshake(with:)to avoidalreadyEstablished. - Verifies encrypt/decrypt succeeds post-rehandshake.
Tips
- Determinism: Add small async delays only where handler installation/topology changes could race the first send.
- Scoping: Keep
autoFloodEnabledtoggled only within Integration tests; always reset intearDown()to avoid cross-test contamination. - Direct vs Relay: Private messages target a specific peer when adjacent; otherwise they are surfaced to neighbors for relay and, if known, also delivered to the target.
Quick Start
- Create nodes and connect them:
let svc = MockBLEService(); svc.myPeerID = "PEER1"svc.simulateConnectedPeer("PEER2")
- Observe messages:
svc.messageDeliveryHandler = { msg in /* asserts */ }
- Enable broadcast flooding for Integration suites only:
MockBLEService.autoFloodEnabled = true