mirror of
https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
synced 2026-07-24 23:25:19 +00:00
jackandClaude Fable 5
10ba71b1f8
Three confirmed defects from adversarial review of the per-relay inbound pipeline (PR #1352): - MEDIUM-2: a detached gift-wrap decrypt spawned just before a panic wipe strongly captures the pre-wipe Nostr private key and could deliver plaintext into ChatViewModel after the wipe. Add a per-pipeline monotonic wipe generation (NostrInboundPipeline.wipeGeneration), bumped from panicClearAllData via invalidateInFlightDecrypts(); spawn sites capture it and every main-actor hop drops the task's result on mismatch. The account-mailbox path (processNostrMessage) had the same pre-existing hazard and gets the identical guard, capturing the generation atomically with the identity fetch. - MEDIUM-1: the per-relay stream cap bounds FRAMES (256) but not BYTES; with the URLSession default of 1 MiB per WebSocket frame a hostile relay could pile up ~256 MiB. Set URLSessionWebSocketTask .maximumMessageSize to TransportConfig.nostrInboundMaxFrameBytes (512 KiB — an order of magnitude above any legitimate Nostr event or gift wrap we produce or expect), halving the worst case to 128 MiB, and correct the "cannot exhaust memory" comments to state the actual cap × maxFrameBytes bound. - LOW-5: three NostrRelayManagerTests gated on messagesReceived (first main hop) then immediately asserted delivery-side state that only lands after off-main verification plus a second main hop. Wait on the delivery-side state (receivedIDs / duplicate-drop counts) directly, keeping all assertions. Also: brief comment documenting pendingGiftWrapIDs growth (LOW-6) and a regression test that a panic wipe issued after spawn drops the decrypted result while leaving the pipeline usable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>