Files
bitchat/bitchatTests/Services/BLEPeerRegistryTests.swift
T
jackandClaude Opus 4.8 0558c2bc82 Pin announce signing keys to stop mesh identity spoofing
BLE announce trust verified the packet signature against the Ed25519
signing key carried inside the same announce, and the trust policy only
rejected on noise-key mismatch. Since peerIDs derive from the broadcast
(public) noise key, an on-mesh attacker could replay a victim's
peerID+noiseKey with their own signing key, nickname, and a valid
self-signature; the registry/persisted identity was then overwritten
unconditionally, enabling mesh nickname spoofing and forged attribution
of signed public/broadcast messages.

Fix: TOFU-pin the Ed25519 signing key per peer (noise-key-derived
peerID) on the announce path.

- BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy rejects announces whose signing key differs
  from the one already recorded for the peer (.signingKeyMismatch).
- BLEPeerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce refuses to replace a pinned
  signing key (returns nil) and never drops a pinned key.
- BLEAnnounceHandler falls back to the persisted cryptographic identity
  (persistedSigningPublicKey) when the registry has no signing key, so
  the pin survives registry eviction and app restart.
- SecureIdentityStateManager.upsertCryptographicIdentity refuses to
  replace a persisted signing key with a different one, and the
  cryptographic identities (incl. the pin) now live in the encrypted,
  persisted IdentityCache with synchronous, teardown-safe saves.

Rebased onto main and integrated with #1432 (Noise session identity
binding + signed leaves): both are complementary. #1432's signed-leave
verification reads the same registry/persisted signing key that this
change protects from announce-path poisoning. main's evolution is kept:
BLEPeerRegistry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce still takes capabilities/
bridgeGeohash (nil return propagates as a refusal), the handler's
linkBoundToOtherPeer env is preserved, CryptographicIdentity keeps
main's field set, and EphemeralIdentity uses main's initializer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 11:06:37 +02:00

193 lines
7.0 KiB
Swift

import BitFoundation
import Foundation
import Testing
@testable import bitchat
@Suite("BLE peer registry tests")
struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
@Test("upserted announces track new, reconnect, and rename transitions")
func upsertVerifiedAnnounceTracksTransitions() throws {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
let firstResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "alice",
noisePublicKey: Data([1, 2, 3]),
signingPublicKey: Data([4, 5, 6]),
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen
)
let first = try #require(firstResult)
#expect(first.isNewPeer)
#expect(!first.wasDisconnected)
#expect(first.previousNickname == nil)
#expect(registry.connectedPeerIDs == [peerID])
#expect(registry.nickname(for: peerID, connectedOnly: true) == "alice")
registry.markDisconnected(peerID)
let reconnectResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "alice-renamed",
noisePublicKey: Data([1, 2, 3]),
signingPublicKey: Data([4, 5, 6]),
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
)
let reconnect = try #require(reconnectResult)
#expect(!reconnect.isNewPeer)
#expect(reconnect.wasDisconnected)
#expect(reconnect.previousNickname == "alice")
#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "alice-renamed")
}
@Test("pinned signing key cannot be silently replaced by a later announce")
func upsertVerifiedAnnounceRefusesToReplacePinnedSigningKey() throws {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
let victimSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
let attackerSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x66, count: 32)
let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
let pinResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "victim",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen
)
#expect(pinResult != nil)
// Attacker replays the victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own
// signing key and nickname; the upsert must be refused wholesale.
let attack = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "attacker",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: attackerSigningKey,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
)
#expect(attack == nil)
let info = try #require(registry.info(for: peerID))
#expect(info.nickname == "victim")
#expect(info.signingPublicKey == victimSigningKey)
// A legitimate re-announce with the pinned key is still accepted.
let legit = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "victim-renamed",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: victimSigningKey,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(2)
)
#expect(legit != nil)
#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "victim-renamed")
}
@Test("announce without a signing key keeps the pinned key")
func upsertVerifiedAnnounceKeepsPinnedSigningKeyWhenAnnounceOmitsIt() throws {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
let signingKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
let firstSeen = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 100)
let initialResult = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "alice",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: signingKey,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen
)
#expect(initialResult != nil)
let update = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: peerID,
nickname: "alice",
noisePublicKey: noiseKey,
signingPublicKey: nil,
isConnected: true,
now: firstSeen.addingTimeInterval(1)
)
#expect(update != nil)
#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.signingPublicKey == signingKey)
}
@Test("reachability keeps recent verified offline peers only when mesh is attached")
func reachabilityRequiresMeshAttachmentForOfflinePeers() {
let offlinePeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let connectedPeer = PeerID(str: "8877665544332211")
let now = Date()
var isolatedRegistry = BLEPeerRegistry()
isolatedRegistry.upsert(BLEPeerInfo(
peerID: offlinePeer,
nickname: "offline",
isConnected: false,
noisePublicKey: nil,
signingPublicKey: nil,
isVerifiedNickname: true,
lastSeen: now
))
#expect(!isolatedRegistry.isReachable(offlinePeer, now: now))
var attachedRegistry = isolatedRegistry
attachedRegistry.upsert(BLEPeerInfo(
peerID: connectedPeer,
nickname: "connected",
isConnected: true,
noisePublicKey: nil,
signingPublicKey: nil,
isVerifiedNickname: true,
lastSeen: now
))
#expect(attachedRegistry.isReachable(offlinePeer, now: now))
}
@Test("connectivity reconciliation disconnects inactive peers and prunes expired offline peers")
func reconcileConnectivityUpdatesAndPrunesPeerState() {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
let inactiveConnectedPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let expiredOfflinePeer = PeerID(str: "8877665544332211")
let now = Date()
registry.upsert(BLEPeerInfo(
peerID: inactiveConnectedPeer,
nickname: "inactive",
isConnected: true,
noisePublicKey: nil,
signingPublicKey: nil,
isVerifiedNickname: true,
lastSeen: now.addingTimeInterval(-TransportConfig.blePeerInactivityTimeoutSeconds - 1)
))
registry.upsert(BLEPeerInfo(
peerID: expiredOfflinePeer,
nickname: "expired",
isConnected: false,
noisePublicKey: nil,
signingPublicKey: nil,
isVerifiedNickname: true,
lastSeen: .distantPast
))
let changes = registry.reconcileConnectivity(now: now, linkStates: [:])
#expect(changes.disconnectedPeerIDs == [inactiveConnectedPeer])
#expect(changes.removedPeers.map(\.peerID) == [expiredOfflinePeer])
#expect(registry.info(for: inactiveConnectedPeer)?.isConnected == false)
#expect(registry.info(for: expiredOfflinePeer) == nil)
}
}