mirror of
https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
synced 2026-07-24 23:25:19 +00:00
* Gate connected-link trust on a secure session; deny forged direct announces the connected shortcut
Residual gap after the rotation-heal containment (#1401): "verified
direct" announces prove the signature but not directness — TTL is
unsigned — so a malicious connected peer can replay a victim's fresh
announce with its TTL restored. When the victim has no live link, the
replayer's link rebinds to the victim's ID and reads as "connected",
and MessageRouter's connected fast-path then trusts it outright: every
DM stalls on a Noise handshake the replayer can never complete and is
silently lost while showing "sent".
Router-level trust gate (no wire change):
- Transport gains canDeliverSecurely(to:) — BLE answers with an
established Noise session; Nostr keeps its prompt-delivery predicate;
the protocol default forwards to canDeliverPromptly for transports
without a forgeable link layer.
- MessageRouter.sendPrivate only trusts a connected link outright when
it can deliver securely; otherwise it still sends (kicking the
handshake on a genuine link) but retains a copy and hands a sealed
copy to couriers, like the reachable path. flushOutbox gets the same
gate so a flush over an insecure link resends instead of dropping the
retained copy.
Presence hardening (defense in depth): a "direct" announce arriving on
a link already bound to a different peer no longer shortcuts the
claimed peer into "connected" — only real link state does. Genuine
first-contact and direct announces are unaffected; only the ambiguous
heal path loses the forgeable shortcut.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Harden the insecure-link outbox bound; document the second-replay presence gap and the courier metadata tradeoff
Review follow-ups on the canDeliverSecurely gate:
- flushOutbox no longer counts connected-but-insecure flushes toward the
maxSendAttempts drop: the message was actually transmitted over a live
link, so a peer whose Noise handshake stalls across reconnect flapping
must not burn through the cap and lose the store-and-forward copy the
gate exists to preserve. Retention stays bounded by the 24h outbox TTL
and the per-peer FIFO cap; acks still clear it. Attempt-counting stays
for reachable-only (heuristic) sends. Regression test: >8 connected-
insecure flushes keep the retained copy, drop callback never fires.
- Document the known second-replay presence gap: linkBoundToOtherPeer
reads the binding before rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirectAnnounce steals
the link, so once a first replay has rebound a link to an absent
victim's ID, a second replay marks the victim connected. Presence
display only — DMs stay on the retain+courier path via the router
gate. Not closed at the announce layer because the post-rebind state
is indistinguishable from a legitimate rotation/reconnect heal (a
supported, field-verified flow). Covered by a two-announce test.
- Note the accepted courier-spray metadata tradeoff at the connected-
insecure send: nearby verified peers receive a sealed copy (they learn
a DM exists, never its content), cleared on ack.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Promote a healed rotation to connected; normalize the secure-delivery probe; retain Codable properties in Periphery
Codex review follow-ups on 5017c232:
- P1: a legitimate rotation announce necessarily arrives on a link still
bound to the OLD peer ID, so the linkBoundToOtherPeer denial stored the
new identity as disconnected — and the rebind only fixed link state,
never the registry. A healed rotation then read as disconnected until
the peer happened to announce again. rebindLinkAfterVerifiedDirect-
Announce now promotes the rebound identity to connected after the
containment checks pass (registry markConnected + topology/snapshot/
peer-list refresh; the .peerConnected UI event already fired from the
announce path). This consciously moves the forged-presence residue
from second-replay to first-successful-rebind — bounded by the rebind
containment (never steals a live identity, one rebind per link per
cooldown) and still display-only: DMs stay gated on canDeliverSecurely.
Comments and the pinned tests updated; new regression test covers
rotate-on-open-link -> rebind -> isPeerConnected(new) == true.
- P2: BLEService.canDeliverSecurely probed the Noise session with the
peer ID as given, but sessions are keyed by the short wire ID — a send
keyed by the full 64-hex Noise key (favorites resolution) misread an
established session as insecure and needlessly retained + couriered
every DM until ack. Normalize with toShort() like isPeerConnected.
Test drives a real XX handshake and asserts both ID forms pass.
- Periphery: the PrekeyBundleStore.StoredBundle.noiseKey "assign-only"
flake fired again and slipped past its baselined USR (read exists in
loadFromDisk; the indexer intermittently misses it). Replace the
baseline entry with retain_codable_properties: true — deterministic,
and a truly-dead Codable field is a persisted-format change anyway.
Local periphery scan --strict: no unused code detected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
121 lines
5.7 KiB
Swift
121 lines
5.7 KiB
Swift
import Testing
|
|
import Foundation
|
|
import Combine
|
|
import CoreBluetooth
|
|
import BitFoundation
|
|
@testable import bitchat
|
|
|
|
private final class DefaultDelegateProbe: BitchatDelegate {
|
|
func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {}
|
|
func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
|
|
func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
|
|
func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {}
|
|
func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState) {}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private final class DefaultTransportProbe: Transport {
|
|
weak var delegate: BitchatDelegate?
|
|
weak var eventDelegate: TransportEventDelegate?
|
|
weak var peerEventsDelegate: TransportPeerEventsDelegate?
|
|
|
|
let subject = CurrentValueSubject<[TransportPeerSnapshot], Never>([])
|
|
let myPeerID = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
|
|
var myNickname = "Tester"
|
|
private(set) var sentMessages: [(content: String, mentions: [String])] = []
|
|
|
|
func currentPeerSnapshots() -> [TransportPeerSnapshot] { subject.value }
|
|
func setNickname(_ nickname: String) { myNickname = nickname }
|
|
func startServices() {}
|
|
func stopServices() {}
|
|
func emergencyDisconnectAll() {}
|
|
func isPeerConnected(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool { false }
|
|
func isPeerReachable(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool { false }
|
|
func peerNickname(peerID: PeerID) -> String? { nil }
|
|
func getPeerNicknames() -> [PeerID: String] { [:] }
|
|
func getFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? { nil }
|
|
func getNoiseSessionState(for peerID: PeerID) -> LazyHandshakeState { .none }
|
|
func triggerHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) {}
|
|
func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String]) { sentMessages.append((content, mentions)) }
|
|
func sendPrivateMessage(_ content: String, to peerID: PeerID, recipientNickname: String, messageID: String) {}
|
|
func sendReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID) {}
|
|
func sendFavoriteNotification(to peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool) {}
|
|
func sendBroadcastAnnounce() {}
|
|
func sendDeliveryAck(for messageID: String, to peerID: PeerID) {}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct ProtocolContractTests {
|
|
@Test
|
|
func commandInfo_exposesAliasesPlaceholdersAndGeoVariants() {
|
|
// Aliases must match what CommandProcessor actually accepts —
|
|
// the suggestion panel is the only command-discovery surface.
|
|
#expect(CommandInfo.message.id == "msg")
|
|
#expect(CommandInfo.message.alias == "/msg")
|
|
#expect(CommandInfo.message.placeholder != nil)
|
|
#expect(CommandInfo.clear.placeholder == nil)
|
|
#expect(CommandInfo.favorite.description.isEmpty == false)
|
|
#expect(CommandInfo.all(isGeoPublic: false, isGeoDM: false).contains(.help))
|
|
// Favorites are rejected by the processor in geohash contexts, so
|
|
// they are suggested only in mesh.
|
|
#expect(CommandInfo.all(isGeoPublic: false, isGeoDM: false).contains(.favorite))
|
|
#expect(CommandInfo.all(isGeoPublic: true, isGeoDM: false).contains(.favorite) == false)
|
|
#expect(CommandInfo.all(isGeoPublic: false, isGeoDM: true).contains(.unfavorite) == false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func protocolEnums_andDelegateDefaults_haveStableContracts() {
|
|
let delegate = DefaultDelegateProbe()
|
|
let peerID = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
|
|
|
|
#expect(MessageType.requestSync.description == "requestSync")
|
|
#expect(NoisePayloadType.verifyResponse.description == "verifyResponse")
|
|
#expect(DeliveryStatus.sending.displayText == "Sending...")
|
|
#expect(DeliveryStatus.sent.displayText == "Sent")
|
|
#expect(DeliveryStatus.delivered(to: "Alice", at: Date()).displayText == "Delivered to Alice")
|
|
#expect(DeliveryStatus.read(by: "Bob", at: Date()).displayText == "Read by Bob")
|
|
#expect(DeliveryStatus.failed(reason: "oops").displayText == "Failed: oops")
|
|
#expect(DeliveryStatus.partiallyDelivered(reached: 1, total: 3).displayText == "Delivered to 1/3")
|
|
#expect(delegate.isFavorite(fingerprint: "fp") == false)
|
|
|
|
delegate.didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus("msg-1", status: .sent)
|
|
delegate.didReceiveNoisePayload(from: peerID, type: .privateMessage, payload: Data(), timestamp: Date())
|
|
delegate.didReceivePublicMessage(from: peerID, nickname: "Alice", content: "hi", timestamp: Date(), messageID: "msg-1")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func transportDefaults_forwardOrNoOp() {
|
|
let probe = DefaultTransportProbe()
|
|
let peerID = PeerID(str: "0123456789abcdef")
|
|
let filePacket = BitchatFilePacket(
|
|
fileName: "voice.m4a",
|
|
fileSize: 4,
|
|
mimeType: "audio/mp4",
|
|
content: Data([1, 2, 3, 4])
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
probe.sendMessage("hello", mentions: ["@alice"], messageID: "msg-1", timestamp: Date())
|
|
probe.sendVerifyChallenge(to: peerID, noiseKeyHex: "abcd", nonceA: Data([0x01]))
|
|
probe.sendVerifyResponse(to: peerID, noiseKeyHex: "abcd", nonceA: Data([0x02]))
|
|
probe.sendFileBroadcast(filePacket, transferId: "tx-1")
|
|
probe.sendFilePrivate(filePacket, to: peerID, transferId: "tx-2")
|
|
probe.cancelTransfer("tx-3")
|
|
probe.declinePendingFile(id: "pending")
|
|
|
|
#expect(probe.sentMessages.count == 1)
|
|
#expect(probe.sentMessages.first?.content == "hello")
|
|
#expect(probe.acceptPendingFile(id: "pending") == nil)
|
|
// Secure delivery defaults to prompt delivery (itself defaulting to
|
|
// reachability) for transports without a forgeable link layer.
|
|
#expect(probe.canDeliverSecurely(to: peerID) == false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Test
|
|
func previewMessage_exposesStableSampleShape() {
|
|
let preview = BitchatMessage.preview
|
|
|
|
#expect(preview.sender == "John Doe")
|
|
#expect(preview.content == "Hello")
|
|
#expect(preview.deliveryStatus == .sent)
|
|
#expect(preview.isPrivate == false)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|