Merge pull request #959 from permissionlesstech/fix/tor-foreground-restart-delay

Remove dormant wake attempt on Tor foreground restart

.github/workflows/fetch_georelays.yml

@@ -25,47 +25,18 @@ jobs:
           wget -q https://raw.githubusercontent.com/permissionlesstech/georelays/refs/heads/main/nostr_relays.csv
           mv nostr_relays.csv ./relays/online_relays_gps.csv
 
-      - name: Configure git
+      - name: Check for changes
+        id: git-check
         run: |
-          git config user.email "action@github.com"
-          git config user.name "GitHub Action"
+          git diff --exit-code || echo "changes=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
     
-      - name: Create update branch if changes
-        id: create_branch
+      - name: Commit and push changes
+        if: steps.git-check.outputs.changes == 'true'
         run: |
-          # exit early if no changes
-          if git diff --quiet --relays/online_relays_gps.csv; then
-            echo "changed=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-            exit 0
-          fi
-
-          # branch name with timestamp
-          BRANCH="update-georelays-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
-          git checkout -b "$BRANCH"
-
+          git config --local user.email "action@github.com"
+          git config --local user.name "GitHub Action"
           git add relays/online_relays_gps.csv
-          git commit -m "Automated update of relay data - $(date -u --rfc-3339=seconds)"
-          echo "changed=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          echo "branch=$BRANCH" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-
-      - name: Push branch
-        if: steps.create_branch.outputs.changed == 'true'
-        run: |
-          git push --set-upstream origin "${{ steps.create_branch.outputs.branch }}"
-
-      - name: Create pull request
-        if: steps.create_branch.outputs.changed == 'true'
-        uses: peter-evans/create-pull-request@v5
-        with:
-          token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          commit-message: Automated update of relay data
-          branch: ${{ steps.create_branch.outputs.branch }}
-          base: main
-          title: Automated update of relay data
-          body: |
-            This PR was created automatically by the scheduled workflow. It updates relays/online_relays_gps.csv from the GeoRelays source.
-          labels: automated, georelays
-
-      - name: No changes
-        if: steps.create_branch.outputs.changed != 'true'
-        run: echo "No changes to relays/online_relays_gps.csv"
+          git commit -m "Automated update of relay data - $(date -u)"
+          git push
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

Package.swift

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ let package = Package(
         ),
     ],
     dependencies:[
-        .package(path: "localPackages/Tor"),
+        .package(path: "localPackages/Arti"),
         .package(path: "localPackages/BitLogger"),
         .package(url: "https://github.com/21-DOT-DEV/swift-secp256k1", exact: "0.21.1")
     ],
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ let package = Package(
             dependencies: [
                 .product(name: "P256K", package: "swift-secp256k1"),
                 .product(name: "BitLogger", package: "BitLogger"),
-                .product(name: "Tor", package: "Tor")
+                .product(name: "Tor", package: "Arti")
             ],
             path: "bitchat",
             exclude: [

bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 		A6E3E5722E7703760032EA8A /* BitLogger in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3E5712E7703760032EA8A /* BitLogger */; };
 		A6E3EA7F2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3EA7E2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor */; };
 		A6E3EA812E7706A80032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; productRef = A6E3EA802E7706A80032EA8A /* Tor */; };
-		A6F183FD2E948783006A9046 /* tor-nolzma.xcframework in Frameworks */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = A6F183FC2E948783006A9046 /* tor-nolzma.xcframework */; };
 		E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678D /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678A /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv */; };
 		E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678E /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */ = {isa = PBXBuildFile; fileRef = E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678A /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv */; };
 /* End PBXBuildFile section */
@@ -162,7 +161,6 @@
 		B5A5CC493FFB3D8966548140 /* Frameworks */ = {
 			isa = PBXFrameworksBuildPhase;
 			files = (
-				A6F183FD2E948783006A9046 /* tor-nolzma.xcframework in Frameworks */,
 				A6E3E5702E77036A0032EA8A /* BitLogger in Frameworks */,
 				885BBED78092484A5B069461 /* P256K in Frameworks */,
 				A6E3EA7F2E7706720032EA8A /* Tor in Frameworks */,
@@ -345,7 +343,7 @@
 			packageReferences = (
 				B8C407587481BBB190741C93 /* XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference "swift-secp256k1" */,
 				A6E3E56E2E77036A0032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/BitLogger" */,
-				A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Tor" */,
+				A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Arti" */,
 			);
 			preferredProjectObjectVersion = 90;
 			projectDirPath = "";
@@ -913,9 +911,9 @@
 			isa = XCLocalSwiftPackageReference;
 			relativePath = localPackages/BitLogger;
 		};
-		A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Tor" */ = {
+		A6E3EA7D2E7706720032EA8A /* XCLocalSwiftPackageReference "localPackages/Arti" */ = {
 			isa = XCLocalSwiftPackageReference;
-			relativePath = localPackages/Tor;
+			relativePath = localPackages/Arti;
 		};
 /* End XCLocalSwiftPackageReference section */
 
@@ -924,8 +922,8 @@
 			isa = XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference;
 			repositoryURL = "https://github.com/21-DOT-DEV/swift-secp256k1";
 			requirement = {
-				kind = upToNextMajorVersion;
-				minimumVersion = 0.21.1;
+				kind = exactVersion;
+				version = 0.21.1;
 			};
 		};
 /* End XCRemoteSwiftPackageReference section */

bitchat/BitchatApp.swift

@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ struct BitchatApp: App {
 
                     // Initialize network activation policy; will start Tor/Nostr only when allowed
                     NetworkActivationService.shared.start()
+                    
+                    // Start presence service (will wait for Tor readiness)
+                    GeohashPresenceService.shared.start()
+
                     // Check for shared content
                     checkForSharedContent()
                 }

bitchat/Noise/NoiseProtocol.swift

@@ -165,8 +165,12 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
     // MARK: - Sliding Window Replay Protection
     
     /// Check if nonce is valid for replay protection
+    /// BCH-01-010: Use safe arithmetic to prevent integer overflow
     private func isValidNonce(_ receivedNonce: UInt64) -> Bool {
-        if receivedNonce + UInt64(Self.REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE) <= highestReceivedNonce {
+        // Safe overflow check: instead of (receivedNonce + WINDOW_SIZE <= highest)
+        // use (highest >= WINDOW_SIZE && receivedNonce <= highest - WINDOW_SIZE)
+        let windowSize = UInt64(Self.REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE)
+        if highestReceivedNonce >= windowSize && receivedNonce <= highestReceivedNonce - windowSize {
             return false  // Too old, outside window
         }
 
@@ -348,15 +352,19 @@ final class NoiseCipherState {
         do {
             let plaintext = try ChaChaPoly.open(sealedBox, using: key, authenticating: associatedData)
 
+            // BCH-01-010: Atomic nonce state update
+            // Both replay window marking and nonce increment must complete together
+            // to prevent state desynchronization. We perform both after successful
+            // decryption only, ensuring state consistency on any failure path.
             if useExtractedNonce {
-                // Mark nonce as seen after successful decryption
                 markNonceAsSeen(decryptionNonce)
             }
             nonce += 1
+
             return plaintext
         } catch {
+            // Decryption failed - nonce state remains unchanged (atomic rollback)
             SecureLogger.debug("Decrypt failed: \(error) for nonce \(decryptionNonce)")
-            // Log authentication failures with nonce info
             SecureLogger.error("Decryption failed at nonce \(decryptionNonce)", category: .encryption)
             throw error
         }
@@ -459,9 +467,32 @@ final class NoiseSymmetricState {
         let c1 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey1, useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
         let c2 = NoiseCipherState(key: tempKey2, useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
 
+        // BCH-01-010: Clear symmetric state after split per Noise spec
+        // The chaining key and hash should not be retained after handshake completes
+        clearSensitiveData()
+
         return (c1, c2)
     }
 
+    /// BCH-01-010: Securely clear sensitive cryptographic state
+    /// Called after split() to clear chaining key and hash per Noise spec
+    func clearSensitiveData() {
+        // Clear chaining key by overwriting with zeros
+        let chainingKeyCount = chainingKey.count
+        chainingKey = Data(repeating: 0, count: chainingKeyCount)
+
+        // Clear hash by overwriting with zeros
+        let hashCount = hash.count
+        hash = Data(repeating: 0, count: hashCount)
+
+        // Clear the internal cipher state
+        cipherState.clearSensitiveData()
+    }
+
+    deinit {
+        clearSensitiveData()
+    }
+
     // HKDF implementation
     private func hkdf(chainingKey: Data, inputKeyMaterial: Data, numOutputs: Int) -> [Data] {
         let tempKey = HMAC<SHA256>.authenticationCode(for: inputKeyMaterial, using: SymmetricKey(data: chainingKey))
@@ -807,16 +838,20 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
         return currentPattern >= messagePatterns.count
     }
     
-    func getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: Bool) throws -> (send: NoiseCipherState, receive: NoiseCipherState) {
+    func getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: Bool) throws -> (send: NoiseCipherState, receive: NoiseCipherState, handshakeHash: Data) {
         guard isHandshakeComplete() else {
             throw NoiseError.handshakeNotComplete
         }
 
+        // BCH-01-010: Capture handshake hash BEFORE split() clears symmetric state
+        let finalHandshakeHash = symmetricState.getHandshakeHash()
+
         let (c1, c2) = symmetricState.split(useExtractedNonce: useExtractedNonce)
 
         // Initiator uses c1 for sending, c2 for receiving
         // Responder uses c2 for sending, c1 for receiving
-        return role == .initiator ? (c1, c2) : (c2, c1)
+        let ciphers = role == .initiator ? (c1, c2) : (c2, c1)
+        return (send: ciphers.0, receive: ciphers.1, handshakeHash: finalHandshakeHash)
     }
     
     func getRemoteStaticPublicKey() -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey? {
@@ -877,19 +912,44 @@ enum NoiseError: Error {
     case nonceExceeded
 }
 
+// MARK: - Constant-Time Operations
+
+/// BCH-01-010: Constant-time comparison to prevent timing side-channel attacks
+/// This function compares two Data objects in constant time, preventing
+/// information leakage via timing analysis.
+private func constantTimeCompare(_ a: Data, _ b: Data) -> Bool {
+    guard a.count == b.count else { return false }
+
+    var result: UInt8 = 0
+    for i in 0..<a.count {
+        result |= a[a.startIndex.advanced(by: i)] ^ b[b.startIndex.advanced(by: i)]
+    }
+    return result == 0
+}
+
+/// BCH-01-010: Constant-time check if all bytes are zero
+private func constantTimeIsZero(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
+    var result: UInt8 = 0
+    for byte in data {
+        result |= byte
+    }
+    return result == 0
+}
+
 // MARK: - Key Validation
 
 extension NoiseHandshakeState {
     /// Validate a Curve25519 public key
     /// Checks for weak/invalid keys that could compromise security
+    /// BCH-01-010: Uses constant-time operations to prevent timing side-channels
     static func validatePublicKey(_ keyData: Data) throws -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey {
         // Check key length
         guard keyData.count == 32 else {
             throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
         }
 
-        // Check for all-zero key (point at infinity)
-        if keyData.allSatisfy({ $0 == 0 }) {
+        // BCH-01-010: Constant-time check for all-zero key (point at infinity)
+        if constantTimeIsZero(keyData) {
             throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
         }
 
@@ -914,8 +974,16 @@ extension NoiseHandshakeState {
                   0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff])  // Another bad point
         ]
 
-        // Check against known bad points
-        if lowOrderPoints.contains(keyData) {
+        // BCH-01-010: Constant-time check against known bad points
+        // We check all points and accumulate matches to avoid early exit timing leaks
+        var foundBadPoint = false
+        for badPoint in lowOrderPoints {
+            if constantTimeCompare(keyData, badPoint) {
+                foundBadPoint = true
+            }
+        }
+
+        if foundBadPoint {
             SecureLogger.warning("Low-order point detected", category: .security)
             throw NoiseError.invalidPublicKey
         }

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSession.swift

@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ class NoiseSession {
             
             // Check if handshake is complete
             if handshake.isHandshakeComplete() {
-                // Get transport ciphers
-                let (send, receive) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
+                // Get transport ciphers and handshake hash (hash captured before split clears state)
+                let (send, receive, hash) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
                 sendCipher = send
                 receiveCipher = receive
 
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ class NoiseSession {
                 remoteStaticPublicKey = handshake.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
 
                 // Store handshake hash for channel binding
-                handshakeHash = handshake.getHandshakeHash()
+                handshakeHash = hash
 
                 state = .established
                 handshakeState = nil // Clear handshake state
@@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ class NoiseSession {
                 
                 // Check if handshake is complete after writing
                 if handshake.isHandshakeComplete() {
-                    // Get transport ciphers
-                    let (send, receive) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
+                    // Get transport ciphers and handshake hash (hash captured before split clears state)
+                    let (send, receive, hash) = try handshake.getTransportCiphers(useExtractedNonce: true)
                     sendCipher = send
                     receiveCipher = receive
 
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ class NoiseSession {
                     remoteStaticPublicKey = handshake.getRemoteStaticPublicKey()
 
                     // Store handshake hash for channel binding
-                    handshakeHash = handshake.getHandshakeHash()
+                    handshakeHash = hash
 
                     state = .established
                     handshakeState = nil // Clear handshake state

bitchat/Nostr/NostrProtocol.swift

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
         case seal = 13 // NIP-17 sealed event
         case giftWrap = 1059 // NIP-59 gift wrap
         case ephemeralEvent = 20000
+        case geohashPresence = 20001
     }
     
     /// Create a NIP-17 private message
@@ -125,6 +126,24 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
         return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
     }
 
+    /// Create a geohash presence heartbeat (kind 20001)
+    /// Must contain empty content and NO nickname tag
+    static func createGeohashPresenceEvent(
+        geohash: String,
+        senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
+    ) throws -> NostrEvent {
+        let tags = [["g", geohash]]
+        let event = NostrEvent(
+            pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
+            createdAt: Date(),
+            kind: .geohashPresence,
+            tags: tags,
+            content: ""
+        )
+        let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
+        return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
+    }
+
     /// Create a persistent location note (kind 1: text note) tagged to a street-level geohash.
     static func createGeohashTextNote(
         content: String,

bitchat/Nostr/NostrRelayManager.swift

@@ -887,10 +887,10 @@ struct NostrFilter: Encodable {
         return filter
     }
 
-    // For location channels: geohash-scoped ephemeral events (kind 20000)
-    static func geohashEphemeral(_ geohash: String, since: Date? = nil, limit: Int = 200) -> NostrFilter {
+    // For location channels: geohash-scoped ephemeral events (kind 20000) and presence (kind 20001)
+    static func geohashEphemeral(_ geohash: String, since: Date? = nil, limit: Int = 1000) -> NostrFilter {
         var filter = NostrFilter()
-        filter.kinds = [20000]
+        filter.kinds = [20000, 20001]
         filter.since = since?.timeIntervalSince1970.toInt()
         filter.tagFilters = ["g": [geohash]]
         filter.limit = limit

bitchat/Protocols/BinaryProtocol.swift

@@ -161,7 +161,9 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
         }
 
         let lengthFieldBytes = lengthFieldSize(for: version)
-        let originalRoute = packet.route ?? []
+        
+        // Route is only supported for v2+ packets (per SOURCE_ROUTING.md spec)
+        let originalRoute = (version >= 2) ? (packet.route ?? []) : []
         if originalRoute.contains(where: { $0.isEmpty }) { return nil }
         let sanitizedRoute: [Data] = originalRoute.map { hop in
             if hop.count == senderIDSize { return hop }
@@ -175,13 +177,14 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
         let hasRoute = !sanitizedRoute.isEmpty
         let routeLength = hasRoute ? 1 + sanitizedRoute.count * senderIDSize : 0
         let originalSizeFieldBytes = isCompressed ? lengthFieldBytes : 0
-        let payloadDataSize = routeLength + payload.count + originalSizeFieldBytes
+        // payloadLength in header is payload-only (does NOT include route bytes)
+        let payloadDataSize = payload.count + originalSizeFieldBytes
 
         if version == 1 && payloadDataSize > Int(UInt16.max) { return nil }
         if version == 2 && payloadDataSize > Int(UInt32.max) { return nil }
 
         guard let headerSize = headerSize(for: version) else { return nil }
-        let estimatedHeader = headerSize + senderIDSize + (packet.recipientID == nil ? 0 : recipientIDSize)
+        let estimatedHeader = headerSize + senderIDSize + (packet.recipientID == nil ? 0 : recipientIDSize) + routeLength
         let estimatedPayload = payloadDataSize
         let estimatedSignature = (packet.signature == nil ? 0 : signatureSize)
         var data = Data()
@@ -199,7 +202,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
         if packet.recipientID != nil { flags |= Flags.hasRecipient }
         if packet.signature != nil { flags |= Flags.hasSignature }
         if isCompressed { flags |= Flags.isCompressed }
-        if hasRoute { flags |= Flags.hasRoute }
+        // HAS_ROUTE is only valid for v2+ packets
+        if hasRoute && version >= 2 { flags |= Flags.hasRoute }
         data.append(flags)
 
         if version == 2 {
@@ -323,6 +327,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
             let hasRecipient = (flags & Flags.hasRecipient) != 0
             let hasSignature = (flags & Flags.hasSignature) != 0
             let isCompressed = (flags & Flags.isCompressed) != 0
+            // HAS_ROUTE is only valid for v2+ packets; ignore the flag for v1
+            let hasRoute = (version >= 2) && (flags & Flags.hasRoute) != 0
 
             let payloadLength: Int
             if version == 2 {
@@ -343,27 +349,24 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
                 if recipientID == nil { return nil }
             }
 
+            // Route (optional, v2+ only): route bytes are NOT included in payloadLength
             var route: [Data]? = nil
-            var remainingPayloadBytes = payloadLength
-
-            if (flags & Flags.hasRoute) != 0 {
-                guard remainingPayloadBytes >= 1, let routeCount = read8() else { return nil }
-                remainingPayloadBytes -= 1
+            if hasRoute {
+                guard let routeCount = read8() else { return nil }
                 if routeCount > 0 {
                     var hops: [Data] = []
                     for _ in 0..<Int(routeCount) {
-                        guard remainingPayloadBytes >= senderIDSize,
-                              let hop = readData(senderIDSize) else { return nil }
-                        remainingPayloadBytes -= senderIDSize
+                        guard let hop = readData(senderIDSize) else { return nil }
                         hops.append(hop)
                     }
                     route = hops
                 }
             }
 
+            // Payload: payloadLength is exactly the payload size (+ compression preamble if compressed)
             let payload: Data
             if isCompressed {
-                guard remainingPayloadBytes >= lengthFieldBytes else { return nil }
+                guard payloadLength >= lengthFieldBytes else { return nil }
                 let originalSize: Int
                 if version == 2 {
                     guard let rawSize = read32() else { return nil }
@@ -372,11 +375,9 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
                     guard let rawSize = read16() else { return nil }
                     originalSize = Int(rawSize)
                 }
-                remainingPayloadBytes -= lengthFieldBytes
                 guard originalSize >= 0 && originalSize <= FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes else { return nil }
-                let compressedSize = remainingPayloadBytes
+                let compressedSize = payloadLength - lengthFieldBytes
                 guard compressedSize > 0, let compressed = readData(compressedSize) else { return nil }
-                remainingPayloadBytes = 0
 
                 let compressionRatio = Double(originalSize) / Double(compressedSize)
                 guard compressionRatio <= 50_000.0 else {
@@ -388,9 +389,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocol {
                       decompressed.count == originalSize else { return nil }
                 payload = decompressed
             } else {
-                guard remainingPayloadBytes >= 0,
-                      let rawPayload = readData(remainingPayloadBytes) else { return nil }
-                remainingPayloadBytes = 0
+                guard let rawPayload = readData(payloadLength) else { return nil }
                 payload = rawPayload
             }
 

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
     
     // Default per-fragment chunk size when link limits are unknown
     private let defaultFragmentSize = TransportConfig.bleDefaultFragmentSize
+    private let bleMaxMTU = 512
     private let maxMessageLength = InputValidator.Limits.maxMessageLength
     private let messageTTL: UInt8 = TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
     // Flood/battery controls
@@ -52,6 +53,15 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
     private var subscribedCentrals: [CBCentral] = []
     private var centralToPeerID: [String: PeerID] = [:]  // Central UUID -> Peer ID mapping
 
+    // BCH-01-004: Rate-limiting for subscription-triggered announces
+    // Tracks subscription attempts per central to prevent enumeration attacks
+    private struct SubscriptionRateLimitState {
+        var lastAnnounceTime: Date
+        var attemptCount: Int
+        var currentBackoffSeconds: TimeInterval
+    }
+    private var centralSubscriptionRateLimits: [String: SubscriptionRateLimitState] = [:]  // Central UUID -> rate limit state
+    
     // 3. Peer Information (single source of truth)
     private struct PeerInfo {
         let peerID: PeerID
@@ -574,6 +584,9 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         subscribedCentrals.removeAll()
         centralToPeerID.removeAll()
         meshTopology.reset()
+
+        // BCH-01-004: Clear rate-limit state
+        centralSubscriptionRateLimits.removeAll()
     }
     
     // MARK: Connectivity and peers
@@ -715,7 +728,10 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                 SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to encode file packet for private send", category: .session)
                 return
             }
-            guard let recipientData = Data(hexString: peerID.id) else {
+            // Normalize to short form (SHA256-derived 16-hex) for wire protocol compatibility
+            // This ensures 64-hex Noise keys are converted to the canonical routing format
+            let targetID = peerID.toShort()
+            guard let recipientData = Data(hexString: targetID.id) else {
                 SecureLogger.error("❌ Invalid recipient peer ID for file transfer: \(peerID)", category: .session)
                 return
             }
@@ -731,8 +747,6 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                 version: 2
             )
 
-            self.applyRouteIfAvailable(&packet, to: peerID)
-
             if let signed = self.noiseService.signPacket(packet) {
                 packet = signed
             }
@@ -752,7 +766,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
             SecureLogger.debug("📤 Sending READ receipt for message \(receipt.originalMessageID) to \(peerID)", category: .session)
             do {
                 let encrypted = try noiseService.encrypt(payload, for: peerID)
-                var packet = BitchatPacket(
+                let packet = BitchatPacket(
                     type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
                     senderID: myPeerIDData,
                     recipientID: Data(hexString: peerID.id),
@@ -761,7 +775,6 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                     signature: nil,
                     ttl: messageTTL
                 )
-                applyRouteIfAvailable(&packet, to: peerID)
                 broadcastPacket(packet)
             } catch {
                 SecureLogger.error("Failed to send read receipt: \(error)")
@@ -780,21 +793,29 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
     // MARK: - Packet Broadcasting
     
     private func broadcastPacket(_ packet: BitchatPacket, transferId: String? = nil) {
+        // Apply route if recipient exists (centralized route application)
+        let packetToSend: BitchatPacket
+        if let recipientPeerID = PeerID(hexData: packet.recipientID) {
+            packetToSend = applyRouteIfAvailable(packet, to: recipientPeerID)
+        } else {
+            packetToSend = packet
+        }
+        
         // Encode once using a small per-type padding policy, then delegate by type
-        let padForBLE = padPolicy(for: packet.type)
-        if packet.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue {
-            sendFragmentedPacket(packet, pad: padForBLE, maxChunk: nil, directedOnlyPeer: nil, transferId: transferId)
+        let padForBLE = padPolicy(for: packetToSend.type)
+        if packetToSend.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue {
+            sendFragmentedPacket(packetToSend, pad: padForBLE, maxChunk: nil, directedOnlyPeer: nil, transferId: transferId)
             return
         }
-        guard let data = packet.toBinaryData(padding: padForBLE) else {
+        guard let data = packetToSend.toBinaryData(padding: padForBLE) else {
             SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to convert packet to binary data", category: .session)
             return
         }
-        if packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue {
-            sendEncrypted(packet, data: data, pad: padForBLE)
+        if packetToSend.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue {
+            sendEncrypted(packetToSend, data: data, pad: padForBLE)
             return
         }
-        sendGenericBroadcast(packet, data: data, pad: padForBLE)
+        sendGenericBroadcast(packetToSend, data: data, pad: padForBLE)
     }
 
     // MARK: - Broadcast helpers (single responsibility)
@@ -1149,6 +1170,9 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
             return
         }
 
+        // BCH-01-002: Enforce storage quota before saving
+        enforceIncomingFilesQuota(reservingBytes: filePacket.content.count)
+
         let fallbackExt = mime.defaultExtension
         let subdirectory: String
         switch mime.category {
@@ -1234,7 +1258,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         if noiseService.hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID) {
             do {
                 let encrypted = try noiseService.encrypt(payload, for: peerID)
-                var packet = BitchatPacket(
+                let packet = BitchatPacket(
                     type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
                     senderID: myPeerIDData,
                     recipientID: Data(hexString: peerID.id),
@@ -1243,7 +1267,6 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                     signature: nil,
                     ttl: messageTTL
                 )
-                applyRouteIfAvailable(&packet, to: peerID)
                 broadcastPacket(packet)
             } catch {
                 SecureLogger.error("Failed to send delivery ACK: \(error)")
@@ -1385,6 +1408,72 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         }
     }
 
+    // MARK: - Storage Quota Management (BCH-01-002)
+
+    /// Maximum total storage for incoming files (100 MB)
+    private static let incomingFilesQuota: Int64 = 100 * 1024 * 1024
+
+    /// Enforces storage quota for incoming files by deleting oldest files when quota is exceeded.
+    /// Call before saving a new incoming file.
+    private func enforceIncomingFilesQuota(reservingBytes: Int) {
+        do {
+            let base = try applicationFilesDirectory()
+            let incomingDirs = [
+                base.appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/incoming", isDirectory: true),
+                base.appendingPathComponent("images/incoming", isDirectory: true),
+                base.appendingPathComponent("files/incoming", isDirectory: true)
+            ]
+
+            // Gather all incoming files with their sizes and modification dates
+            var allFiles: [(url: URL, size: Int64, modified: Date)] = []
+            let fileManager = FileManager.default
+
+            for dir in incomingDirs {
+                guard fileManager.fileExists(atPath: dir.path) else { continue }
+                guard let contents = try? fileManager.contentsOfDirectory(
+                    at: dir,
+                    includingPropertiesForKeys: [.fileSizeKey, .contentModificationDateKey],
+                    options: [.skipsHiddenFiles]
+                ) else { continue }
+
+                for fileURL in contents {
+                    guard let attrs = try? fileURL.resourceValues(forKeys: [.fileSizeKey, .contentModificationDateKey]),
+                          let size = attrs.fileSize,
+                          let modified = attrs.contentModificationDate else { continue }
+                    allFiles.append((url: fileURL, size: Int64(size), modified: modified))
+                }
+            }
+
+            // Calculate current usage
+            let currentUsage = allFiles.reduce(0) { $0 + $1.size }
+            let targetUsage = Self.incomingFilesQuota - Int64(reservingBytes)
+
+            guard currentUsage > targetUsage else { return }
+
+            // Sort by modification date (oldest first) and delete until under quota
+            let sortedFiles = allFiles.sorted { $0.modified < $1.modified }
+            var freedSpace: Int64 = 0
+            let needToFree = currentUsage - targetUsage
+
+            for file in sortedFiles {
+                guard freedSpace < needToFree else { break }
+                do {
+                    try fileManager.removeItem(at: file.url)
+                    freedSpace += file.size
+                    SecureLogger.debug("🗑️ BCH-01-002: Deleted old incoming file to free space: \(file.url.lastPathComponent)", category: .security)
+                } catch {
+                    SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Failed to delete old file for quota: \(error)", category: .security)
+                }
+            }
+
+            if freedSpace > 0 {
+                SecureLogger.info("📊 BCH-01-002: Freed \(ByteCountFormatter.string(fromByteCount: freedSpace, countStyle: .file)) to stay within incoming files quota", category: .security)
+            }
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Could not enforce storage quota: \(error)", category: .security)
+        }
+    }
+
     private func sendLeave() {
         SecureLogger.debug("👋 Sending leave announcement", category: .session)
         let packet = BitchatPacket(
@@ -1753,9 +1842,10 @@ func centralManager(_ central: CBCentralManager, didConnect peripheral: CBPeriph
                     peers[peerID] = info
                 }
             }
-            clearDirectLink(with: peerID)
+            refreshLocalTopology()
         }
 
+        
         // Restart scanning with allow duplicates for faster rediscovery
         if centralManager?.state == .poweredOn {
             // Stop and restart scanning to ensure we get fresh discovery events
@@ -2041,7 +2131,7 @@ extension BLEService: CBPeripheralDelegate {
                     peripherals[peripheralUUID] = state
                 }
                 peerToPeripheralUUID[senderID] = peripheralUUID
-                registerDirectLink(with: senderID)
+                refreshLocalTopology()
             }
 
             let msgID = makeMessageID(for: packet)
@@ -2173,9 +2263,70 @@ extension BLEService: CBPeripheralManagerDelegate {
     }
     
     func peripheralManager(_ peripheral: CBPeripheralManager, central: CBCentral, didSubscribeTo characteristic: CBCharacteristic) {
-        SecureLogger.debug("📥 Central subscribed: \(central.identifier.uuidString)", category: .session)
+        let centralUUID = central.identifier.uuidString
+        SecureLogger.debug("📥 Central subscribed: \(centralUUID)", category: .session)
         subscribedCentrals.append(central)
-        // Send announce to the newly subscribed central after a small delay to avoid overwhelming
+
+        // BCH-01-004: Rate-limit subscription-triggered announces to prevent enumeration attacks
+        let now = Date()
+        var state = centralSubscriptionRateLimits[centralUUID]
+
+        // Clean up stale entries periodically
+        cleanupStaleSubscriptionRateLimits()
+
+        // Check if this central is rate-limited
+        if let existingState = state {
+            let timeSinceLastAnnounce = now.timeIntervalSince(existingState.lastAnnounceTime)
+
+            // If within backoff period, skip the announce
+            if timeSinceLastAnnounce < existingState.currentBackoffSeconds {
+                SecureLogger.warning("🛡️ BCH-01-004: Rate-limited announce for central \(centralUUID.prefix(8))... (backoff: \(Int(existingState.currentBackoffSeconds))s, attempts: \(existingState.attemptCount))", category: .security)
+
+                // Increment attempt count and increase backoff
+                // Update lastAnnounceTime to 'now' so each blocked attempt extends the suppression window
+                // This prevents attackers from waiting out the backoff while spamming attempts
+                let newAttemptCount = existingState.attemptCount + 1
+                let newBackoff = min(
+                    existingState.currentBackoffSeconds * TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitBackoffFactor,
+                    TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds
+                )
+                centralSubscriptionRateLimits[centralUUID] = SubscriptionRateLimitState(
+                    lastAnnounceTime: now,  // Reset timer on each blocked attempt
+                    attemptCount: newAttemptCount,
+                    currentBackoffSeconds: newBackoff
+                )
+
+                // If too many rapid attempts, this is likely an enumeration attack - don't respond
+                if newAttemptCount >= TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxAttempts {
+                    SecureLogger.warning("🚨 BCH-01-004: Possible enumeration attack from central \(centralUUID.prefix(8))... - suppressing announce", category: .security)
+                    return
+                }
+
+                // Still flush directed packets and rebroadcast for legitimate mesh operation
+                messageQueue.asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + TransportConfig.blePostAnnounceDelaySeconds) { [weak self] in
+                    self?.flushDirectedSpool()
+                    self?.rebroadcastRecentAnnounces()
+                }
+                return
+            }
+
+            // Outside backoff period - allow announce but track it
+            state = SubscriptionRateLimitState(
+                lastAnnounceTime: now,
+                attemptCount: 1,
+                currentBackoffSeconds: TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds
+            )
+        } else {
+            // First subscription from this central - track it
+            state = SubscriptionRateLimitState(
+                lastAnnounceTime: now,
+                attemptCount: 1,
+                currentBackoffSeconds: TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds
+            )
+        }
+        centralSubscriptionRateLimits[centralUUID] = state
+
+        // Send announce to the newly subscribed central after a small delay
         messageQueue.asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + TransportConfig.blePostAnnounceDelaySeconds) { [weak self] in
             self?.sendAnnounce(forceSend: true)
             // Flush any spooled directed packets now that we have a central subscribed
@@ -2185,6 +2336,15 @@ extension BLEService: CBPeripheralManagerDelegate {
         }
     }
 
+    /// BCH-01-004: Clean up stale rate-limit entries to prevent memory growth
+    private func cleanupStaleSubscriptionRateLimits() {
+        let now = Date()
+        let windowSeconds = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitWindowSeconds
+        centralSubscriptionRateLimits = centralSubscriptionRateLimits.filter { _, state in
+            now.timeIntervalSince(state.lastAnnounceTime) < windowSeconds
+        }
+    }
+    
     func peripheralManager(_ peripheral: CBPeripheralManager, central: CBCentral, didUnsubscribeFrom characteristic: CBCharacteristic) {
         SecureLogger.debug("📤 Central unsubscribed: \(central.identifier.uuidString)", category: .session)
         subscribedCentrals.removeAll { $0.identifier == central.identifier }
@@ -2208,7 +2368,7 @@ extension BLEService: CBPeripheralManagerDelegate {
             
             // Clean up mappings
             centralToPeerID.removeValue(forKey: centralUUID)
-            clearDirectLink(with: peerID)
+            refreshLocalTopology()
             
             // Update UI immediately
             notifyUI { [weak self] in
@@ -2327,7 +2487,7 @@ extension BLEService: CBPeripheralManagerDelegate {
                 if packet.type == MessageType.announce.rawValue {
                     if packet.ttl == messageTTL {
                         centralToPeerID[centralUUID] = senderID
-                        registerDirectLink(with: senderID)
+                        refreshLocalTopology()
                     }
                     // Record ingress link for last-hop suppression then process
                     let msgID = makeMessageID(for: packet)
@@ -2442,27 +2602,39 @@ extension BLEService {
         peerID.toShort().routingData
     }
 
-    private func registerDirectLink(with peerID: PeerID) {
-        meshTopology.recordDirectLink(between: myPeerIDData, and: routingData(for: peerID))
-    }
-
-    private func clearDirectLink(with peerID: PeerID) {
-        meshTopology.removeDirectLink(between: myPeerIDData, and: routingData(for: peerID))
-    }
-
-    private func registerRoute(_ route: [Data]?) {
-        guard let hops = route, !hops.isEmpty else { return }
-        meshTopology.recordRoute(hops)
+    private func refreshLocalTopology() {
+        let neighbors: [Data] = collectionsQueue.sync {
+            peers.values.filter { $0.isConnected }.compactMap { $0.peerID.routingData }
+        }
+        meshTopology.updateNeighbors(for: myPeerIDData, neighbors: neighbors)
     }
 
     private func computeRoute(to peerID: PeerID) -> [Data]? {
         meshTopology.computeRoute(from: myPeerIDData, to: routingData(for: peerID))
     }
 
-    private func applyRouteIfAvailable(_ packet: inout BitchatPacket, to recipient: PeerID) {
-        guard let route = computeRoute(to: recipient), route.count >= 2 else { return }
-        packet.route = route
-        meshTopology.recordRoute(route)
+    private func applyRouteIfAvailable(_ packet: BitchatPacket, to recipient: PeerID) -> BitchatPacket {
+        guard let route = computeRoute(to: recipient), route.count >= 1 else {
+            return packet
+        }
+        // Create new packet with route applied and version upgraded to 2
+        let routedPacket = BitchatPacket(
+            type: packet.type,
+            senderID: packet.senderID,
+            recipientID: packet.recipientID,
+            timestamp: packet.timestamp,
+            payload: packet.payload,
+            signature: nil, // Will be re-signed below
+            ttl: packet.ttl,
+            version: 2,
+            route: route
+        )
+        // Re-sign the packet since route and version changed
+        guard let signedPacket = noiseService.signPacket(routedPacket) else {
+            SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to re-sign packet with route", category: .security)
+            return packet // Return original packet if signing fails
+        }
+        return signedPacket
     }
 
     private func routingPeer(from data: Data) -> PeerID? {
@@ -2472,23 +2644,46 @@ extension BLEService {
     private func forwardAlongRouteIfNeeded(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> Bool {
         guard let route = packet.route, !route.isEmpty else { return false }
         let myRoutingData = routingData(for: myPeerID) ?? (myPeerIDData.isEmpty ? nil : myPeerIDData)
-        guard let selfData = myRoutingData,
-              let index = route.firstIndex(of: selfData) else { return false }
+        guard let selfData = myRoutingData else { return false }
         
-        // No further hops: respect explicit route termination
-        if index == route.count - 1 {
+        // Route contains only intermediate hops (start and end excluded)
+        // If we're not in the route, we're the sender - forward to first hop
+        guard let index = route.firstIndex(of: selfData) else {
+            // We're the sender, forward to first intermediate hop
+            guard packet.ttl > 1 else { return true }
+            let firstHopData = route[0]
+            guard let nextPeer = routingPeer(from: firstHopData),
+                  isPeerConnected(nextPeer) else {
+                return false
+            }
+            var relayPacket = packet
+            relayPacket.ttl = packet.ttl - 1
+            sendPacketDirected(relayPacket, to: nextPeer)
             return true
         }
 
-        guard packet.ttl > 1 else { return true }
+        // We're an intermediate node in the route
+        // If we're the last intermediate hop, forward to destination
+        if index == route.count - 1 {
+            guard packet.ttl > 1 else { return true }
+            guard let destinationPeer = PeerID(hexData: packet.recipientID),
+                  isPeerConnected(destinationPeer) else {
+                return false
+            }
+            var relayPacket = packet
+            relayPacket.ttl = packet.ttl - 1
+            sendPacketDirected(relayPacket, to: destinationPeer)
+            return true
+        }
 
+        // Forward to next intermediate hop
+        guard packet.ttl > 1 else { return true }
         let nextHopData = route[index + 1]
         guard let nextPeer = routingPeer(from: nextHopData),
               isPeerConnected(nextPeer) else {
             return false
         }
 
-        registerDirectLink(with: nextPeer)
         var relayPacket = packet
         relayPacket.ttl = packet.ttl - 1
         sendPacketDirected(relayPacket, to: nextPeer)
@@ -2547,7 +2742,7 @@ extension BLEService {
         }
         do {
             let encrypted = try noiseService.encrypt(typedPayload, for: peerID)
-            var packet = BitchatPacket(
+            let packet = BitchatPacket(
                 type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
                 senderID: myPeerIDData,
                 recipientID: Data(hexString: peerID.id),
@@ -2556,7 +2751,6 @@ extension BLEService {
                 signature: nil,
                 ttl: messageTTL
             )
-            applyRouteIfAvailable(&packet, to: peerID)
             broadcastPacket(packet)
         } catch {
             SecureLogger.error("Failed to send verification payload: \(error)")
@@ -2775,7 +2969,7 @@ extension BLEService {
                     }
                 }
 
-                var packet = BitchatPacket(
+                let packet = BitchatPacket(
                     type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
                     senderID: myPeerIDData,
                     recipientID: recipientData,
@@ -2784,7 +2978,6 @@ extension BLEService {
                     signature: nil,
                     ttl: messageTTL
                 )
-                applyRouteIfAvailable(&packet, to: recipientID)
                 
                 broadcastPacket(packet)
                 
@@ -2824,7 +3017,7 @@ extension BLEService {
             let handshakeData = try noiseService.initiateHandshake(with: peerID)
             
             // Send handshake init
-            var packet = BitchatPacket(
+            let packet = BitchatPacket(
                 type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
                 senderID: myPeerIDData,
                 recipientID: Data(hexString: peerID.id),
@@ -2833,7 +3026,6 @@ extension BLEService {
                 signature: nil,
                 ttl: messageTTL
             )
-            applyRouteIfAvailable(&packet, to: peerID)
             broadcastPacket(packet)
         } catch {
             SecureLogger.error("Failed to initiate handshake: \(error)")
@@ -2867,7 +3059,7 @@ extension BLEService {
 
                 let encrypted = try noiseService.encrypt(messagePayload, for: peerID)
 
-                var packet = BitchatPacket(
+                let packet = BitchatPacket(
                     type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
                     senderID: myPeerIDData,
                     recipientID: Data(hexString: peerID.id),
@@ -2876,7 +3068,6 @@ extension BLEService {
                     signature: nil,
                     ttl: messageTTL
                 )
-                applyRouteIfAvailable(&packet, to: peerID)
 
                 // We're already on messageQueue from the callback
                 broadcastPacket(packet)
@@ -2970,7 +3161,21 @@ extension BLEService {
         }
         // Fragment the unpadded frame; each fragment will be encoded independently
         let fragmentID = Data((0..<8).map { _ in UInt8.random(in: 0...255) })
-        let chunk = context.maxChunk ?? defaultFragmentSize
+        // Dynamic Fragment Sizing (Source Routing v2)
+        // See docs/SOURCE_ROUTING.md Section 5.1
+        var fragmentVersion: UInt8 = 1
+        var calculatedChunk = defaultFragmentSize
+
+        if let route = packet.route, !route.isEmpty {
+            fragmentVersion = 2
+            // RouteSize = 1 + (Hops * 8)
+            let routeSize = 1 + (route.count * 8)
+            // Overhead = HeaderV2(16) + SenderID(8) + RecipientID(8) + RouteSize + FragmentHeader(13) + PaddingBuffer(16)
+            let overhead = 16 + 8 + 8 + routeSize + 13 + 16
+            calculatedChunk = max(64, bleMaxMTU - overhead)
+        }
+
+        let chunk = context.maxChunk ?? calculatedChunk
         let safeChunk = max(64, chunk)
         let fragments = stride(from: 0, to: fullData.count, by: safeChunk).map { offset in
             Data(fullData[offset..<min(offset + safeChunk, fullData.count)])
@@ -3029,6 +3234,7 @@ extension BLEService {
                 payload: payload,
                 signature: nil,
                 ttl: packet.ttl,
+                version: fragmentVersion,
                 route: packet.route
             )
 
@@ -3245,10 +3451,6 @@ extension BLEService {
             return
         }
 
-        registerRoute(packet.route)
-        if peerID != myPeerID && packet.ttl == messageTTL {
-            registerDirectLink(with: peerID)
-        }
         
         // Deduplication (thread-safe)
         let senderID = PeerID(hexData: packet.senderID)
@@ -3450,6 +3652,9 @@ extension BLEService {
             // Require verified announce; ignore otherwise (no backward compatibility)
             if !verified {
                 SecureLogger.warning("❌ Ignoring unverified announce from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…", category: .security)
+                // Reset flags to prevent post-barrier code from acting on unverified announces
+                isNewPeer = false
+                isReconnectedPeer = false
                 return
             }
 
@@ -3497,6 +3702,11 @@ extension BLEService {
             }
         }
 
+        // Update topology with verified neighbor claims (only for authenticated announces)
+        if verifiedAnnounce, let neighbors = announcement.directNeighbors {
+            meshTopology.updateNeighbors(for: peerID.routingData, neighbors: neighbors)
+        }
+
         // Persist cryptographic identity and signing key for robust offline verification
         identityManager.upsertCryptographicIdentity(
             fingerprint: announcement.noisePublicKey.sha256Fingerprint(),
@@ -3683,7 +3893,7 @@ extension BLEService {
             do {
                 if let response = try noiseService.processHandshakeMessage(from: peerID, message: packet.payload) {
                     // Send response
-                    var responsePacket = BitchatPacket(
+                    let responsePacket = BitchatPacket(
                         type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
                         senderID: myPeerIDData,
                         recipientID: Data(hexString: peerID.id),
@@ -3692,7 +3902,6 @@ extension BLEService {
                         signature: nil,
                         ttl: messageTTL
                     )
-                    applyRouteIfAvailable(&responsePacket, to: peerID)
                     // We're on messageQueue from delegate callback
                     broadcastPacket(responsePacket)
                 }
@@ -3977,6 +4186,11 @@ extension BLEService {
                 self.delegate?.didUpdatePeerList(currentPeerIDs)
             }
         }
+        
+        // Refresh local topology to keep our own entry fresh and sync any changes
+        refreshLocalTopology()
+        // Prune stale topology nodes (using safe retention window)
+        meshTopology.prune(olderThan: 60.0)
     }
     
     private func performCleanup() {

bitchat/Services/GeohashParticipantTracker.swift

@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ public final class GeohashParticipantTracker: ObservableObject {
         map[key] = Date()
         participants[geohash] = map
         
+        // Always notify observers that state has changed so counts in UI update
+        objectWillChange.send()
+
         // Only refresh visible list if this geohash is currently active
         if activeGeohash == geohash {
             refresh()

bitchat/Services/GeohashPresenceService.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+//
+// GeohashPresenceService.swift
+// bitchat
+//
+// Manages the broadcasting of ephemeral presence heartbeats (Kind 20001)
+// to geohash location channels.
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+//
+
+import Foundation
+import Combine
+import BitLogger
+import Tor
+
+/// Service that coordinates the broadcasting of presence heartbeats.
+///
+/// Behavior:
+/// - Monitors location changes via LocationStateManager
+/// - Broadcasts Kind 20001 events to low-precision geohash channels
+/// - Uses randomized timing (40-80s loop) and decorrelated bursts
+/// - Respects privacy by NOT broadcasting to Neighborhood/Block/Building levels
+@MainActor
+final class GeohashPresenceService: ObservableObject {
+    static let shared = GeohashPresenceService()
+
+    private var subscriptions = Set<AnyCancellable>()
+    private var heartbeatTimer: Timer?
+    private let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge()
+    
+    // MARK: - Constants
+
+    // Loop interval range in seconds
+    private let loopMinInterval: TimeInterval = 40.0
+    private let loopMaxInterval: TimeInterval = 80.0
+    
+    // Per-broadcast decorrelation delay range in seconds
+    private let burstMinDelay: TimeInterval = 2.0
+    private let burstMaxDelay: TimeInterval = 5.0
+
+    // Privacy: Only broadcast to these levels
+    private let allowedPrecisions: Set<Int> = [
+        GeohashChannelLevel.region.precision,    // 2
+        GeohashChannelLevel.province.precision,  // 4
+        GeohashChannelLevel.city.precision       // 5
+    ]
+
+    private init() {
+        setupObservers()
+    }
+    
+    /// Start the service (safe to call multiple times)
+    func start() {
+        SecureLogger.info("Presence: service starting...", category: .session)
+        scheduleNextHeartbeat()
+    }
+
+    private func setupObservers() {
+        // Monitor location channel changes
+        LocationStateManager.shared.$availableChannels
+            .dropFirst()
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.handleLocationChange()
+            }
+            .store(in: &subscriptions)
+
+        // Monitor Tor readiness to kick off heartbeat if it was stalled
+        NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorDidBecomeReady)
+            .sink { [weak self] _ in
+                self?.handleConnectivityChange()
+            }
+            .store(in: &subscriptions)
+    }
+
+    private func handleLocationChange() {
+        // When location changes, we trigger an immediate (but slightly delayed) heartbeat
+        // to announce presence in the new zone, then reset the loop.
+        SecureLogger.debug("Presence: location changed, scheduling update", category: .session)
+        heartbeatTimer?.invalidate()
+        
+        // Small delay to allow location state to settle
+        heartbeatTimer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: 5.0, repeats: false) { [weak self] _ in
+            Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
+                self?.performHeartbeat()
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    
+    private func handleConnectivityChange() {
+        SecureLogger.debug("Presence: connectivity restored, triggering heartbeat", category: .session)
+        // If we were waiting for network, do it now
+        if heartbeatTimer == nil || !heartbeatTimer!.isValid {
+            scheduleNextHeartbeat()
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func scheduleNextHeartbeat() {
+        heartbeatTimer?.invalidate()
+        let interval = TimeInterval.random(in: loopMinInterval...loopMaxInterval)
+        heartbeatTimer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: interval, repeats: false) { [weak self] _ in
+            Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
+                self?.performHeartbeat()
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func performHeartbeat() {
+        // Always schedule next loop first ensures continuity even if this one fails/skips
+        defer { scheduleNextHeartbeat() }
+
+        // 1. Check preconditions
+        guard TorManager.shared.isReady else {
+            SecureLogger.debug("Presence: skipping heartbeat (Tor not ready)", category: .session)
+            return
+        }
+        
+        // App must be active (or at least we shouldn't broadcast if in background, usually)
+        if !TorManager.shared.isForeground() {
+            return
+        }
+
+        // 2. Get channels
+        let channels = LocationStateManager.shared.availableChannels
+        guard !channels.isEmpty else { return }
+
+        // 3. Filter and broadcast
+        // We use Task + sleep for decorrelation to allow the main runloop to proceed
+        for channel in channels {
+            // Check privacy restriction
+            if !self.allowedPrecisions.contains(channel.geohash.count) {
+                continue
+            }
+            
+            // Launch independent task for each channel's delay
+            Task { @MainActor in
+                // Random delay for decorrelation
+                let delay = TimeInterval.random(in: self.burstMinDelay...self.burstMaxDelay)
+                let nanoseconds = UInt64(delay * 1_000_000_000)
+                try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: nanoseconds)
+                
+                self.broadcastPresence(for: channel.geohash)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func broadcastPresence(for geohash: String) {
+        do {
+            guard let identity = try? idBridge.deriveIdentity(forGeohash: geohash) else {
+                return
+            }
+            
+            let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
+                geohash: geohash,
+                senderIdentity: identity
+            )
+            
+            // Send via RelayManager
+            let targetRelays = GeoRelayDirectory.shared.closestRelays(
+                toGeohash: geohash,
+                count: TransportConfig.nostrGeoRelayCount
+            )
+            
+            if !targetRelays.isEmpty {
+                NostrRelayManager.shared.sendEvent(event, to: targetRelays)
+                SecureLogger.debug("Presence: sent heartbeat for \(geohash) (pub=\(identity.publicKeyHex.prefix(6))...)", category: .session)
+            }
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error("Presence: failed to create event for \(geohash): \(error)", category: .session)
+        }
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/KeychainManager.swift

@@ -10,6 +10,47 @@ import BitLogger
 import Foundation
 import Security
 
+// MARK: - Keychain Error Types
+// BCH-01-009: Proper error classification to distinguish expected states from critical failures
+
+/// Result of a keychain read operation with proper error classification
+enum KeychainReadResult {
+    case success(Data)
+    case itemNotFound        // Expected: key doesn't exist yet
+    case accessDenied        // Critical: app lacks keychain access
+    case deviceLocked        // Recoverable: device is locked
+    case authenticationFailed // Recoverable: biometric/passcode failed
+    case otherError(OSStatus) // Unexpected error
+
+    var isRecoverableError: Bool {
+        switch self {
+        case .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed:
+            return true
+        default:
+            return false
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Result of a keychain save operation with proper error classification
+enum KeychainSaveResult {
+    case success
+    case duplicateItem       // Can retry with update
+    case accessDenied        // Critical: app lacks keychain access
+    case deviceLocked        // Recoverable: device is locked
+    case storageFull         // Critical: no space available
+    case otherError(OSStatus)
+
+    var isRecoverableError: Bool {
+        switch self {
+        case .duplicateItem, .deviceLocked:
+            return true
+        default:
+            return false
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 protocol KeychainManagerProtocol {
     func saveIdentityKey(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> Bool
     func getIdentityKey(forKey key: String) -> Data?
@@ -21,6 +62,12 @@ protocol KeychainManagerProtocol {
 
     func verifyIdentityKeyExists() -> Bool
 
+    // BCH-01-009: Methods with proper error classification
+    /// Get identity key with detailed result for error handling
+    func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult
+    /// Save identity key with detailed result for error handling
+    func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult
+
     // MARK: - Generic Data Storage (consolidated from KeychainHelper)
     /// Save data with a custom service name
     func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString?)
@@ -55,6 +102,180 @@ final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
         return result
     }
 
+    // MARK: - BCH-01-009: Methods with Proper Error Classification
+
+    /// Get identity key with detailed result for proper error handling
+    /// Distinguishes between missing keys (expected) and critical failures
+    func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
+        let fullKey = "identity_\(key)"
+        return retrieveDataWithResult(forKey: fullKey)
+    }
+
+    /// Save identity key with detailed result and retry logic for transient errors
+    func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult {
+        let fullKey = "identity_\(key)"
+        return saveDataWithResult(keyData, forKey: fullKey)
+    }
+
+    /// Internal method to save data with detailed result and retry for transient errors
+    private func saveDataWithResult(_ data: Data, forKey key: String, retryCount: Int = 2) -> KeychainSaveResult {
+        // Delete any existing item first to ensure clean state
+        _ = delete(forKey: key)
+
+        // Build base query
+        var base: [String: Any] = [
+            kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
+            kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
+            kSecValueData as String: data,
+            kSecAttrService as String: service,
+            kSecAttrAccessible as String: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked,
+            kSecAttrLabel as String: "bitchat-\(key)"
+        ]
+        #if os(macOS)
+        base[kSecAttrSynchronizable as String] = false
+        #endif
+
+        func attempt(addAccessGroup: Bool) -> OSStatus {
+            var query = base
+            if addAccessGroup { query[kSecAttrAccessGroup as String] = appGroup }
+            return SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
+        }
+
+        #if os(iOS)
+        var status = attempt(addAccessGroup: true)
+        if status == -34018 { // Missing entitlement, retry without access group
+            status = attempt(addAccessGroup: false)
+        }
+        #else
+        let status = attempt(addAccessGroup: false)
+        #endif
+
+        // Classify the result
+        let result = classifySaveStatus(status)
+
+        // Log all outcomes consistently
+        switch result {
+        case .success:
+            SecureLogger.debug("Keychain save succeeded for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        case .duplicateItem:
+            SecureLogger.warning("Keychain save found duplicate for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        case .accessDenied:
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
+                               context: "Keychain access denied for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        case .deviceLocked:
+            SecureLogger.warning("Device locked during keychain save for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        case .storageFull:
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
+                               context: "Keychain storage full for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        case .otherError(let code):
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(code)),
+                               context: "Keychain save failed for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        }
+
+        // Retry transient errors with exponential backoff
+        if result.isRecoverableError && retryCount > 0 {
+            let delayMs = UInt32((3 - retryCount) * 100) // 100ms, 200ms backoff
+            usleep(delayMs * 1000)
+            SecureLogger.debug("Retrying keychain save for key: \(key), attempts remaining: \(retryCount)", category: .keychain)
+            return saveDataWithResult(data, forKey: key, retryCount: retryCount - 1)
+        }
+
+        return result
+    }
+
+    /// Internal method to retrieve data with detailed result
+    private func retrieveDataWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
+        let base: [String: Any] = [
+            kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
+            kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
+            kSecAttrService as String: service,
+            kSecReturnData as String: true,
+            kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitOne
+        ]
+
+        var result: AnyObject?
+        func attempt(withAccessGroup: Bool) -> OSStatus {
+            var q = base
+            if withAccessGroup { q[kSecAttrAccessGroup as String] = appGroup }
+            return SecItemCopyMatching(q as CFDictionary, &result)
+        }
+
+        #if os(iOS)
+        var status = attempt(withAccessGroup: true)
+        if status == -34018 { status = attempt(withAccessGroup: false) }
+        #else
+        let status = attempt(withAccessGroup: false)
+        #endif
+
+        // Classify the result
+        let readResult = classifyReadStatus(status, data: result as? Data)
+
+        // Log all outcomes consistently
+        switch readResult {
+        case .success:
+            SecureLogger.debug("Keychain read succeeded for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        case .itemNotFound:
+            // Expected case - no logging needed for missing keys
+            break
+        case .accessDenied:
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
+                               context: "Keychain access denied for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        case .deviceLocked:
+            SecureLogger.warning("Device locked during keychain read for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        case .authenticationFailed:
+            SecureLogger.warning("Authentication failed for keychain read of key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        case .otherError(let code):
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(code)),
+                               context: "Keychain read failed for key: \(key)", category: .keychain)
+        }
+
+        return readResult
+    }
+
+    /// Classify keychain read status into meaningful categories
+    private func classifyReadStatus(_ status: OSStatus, data: Data?) -> KeychainReadResult {
+        switch status {
+        case errSecSuccess:
+            if let data = data {
+                return .success(data)
+            }
+            return .otherError(status)
+        case errSecItemNotFound:
+            return .itemNotFound
+        case errSecInteractionNotAllowed:
+            // Device is locked or in a state that doesn't allow keychain access
+            return .deviceLocked
+        case errSecAuthFailed:
+            return .authenticationFailed
+        case -34018: // errSecMissingEntitlement
+            return .accessDenied
+        case errSecNotAvailable:
+            return .accessDenied
+        default:
+            return .otherError(status)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Classify keychain save status into meaningful categories
+    private func classifySaveStatus(_ status: OSStatus) -> KeychainSaveResult {
+        switch status {
+        case errSecSuccess:
+            return .success
+        case errSecDuplicateItem:
+            return .duplicateItem
+        case errSecInteractionNotAllowed:
+            return .deviceLocked
+        case -34018: // errSecMissingEntitlement
+            return .accessDenied
+        case errSecNotAvailable:
+            return .accessDenied
+        case errSecDiskFull:
+            return .storageFull
+        default:
+            return .otherError(status)
+        }
+    }
+
     // MARK: - Generic Operations
     
     private func save(_ value: String, forKey key: String) -> Bool {

bitchat/Services/MeshTopologyTracker.swift

@@ -6,104 +6,97 @@ final class MeshTopologyTracker {
 
     private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "mesh.topology", attributes: .concurrent)
     private let hopSize = 8
-    private var adjacency: [RoutingID: Set<RoutingID>] = [:]
+    // Directed claims: Key claims to see Value (neighbors)
+    private var claims: [RoutingID: Set<RoutingID>] = [:]
+    // Last time we received an update from a node
+    private var lastSeen: [RoutingID: Date] = [:]
 
     func reset() {
         queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
-            self.adjacency.removeAll()
+            self.claims.removeAll()
+            self.lastSeen.removeAll()
         }
     }
 
-    func recordDirectLink(between a: Data?, and b: Data?) {
-        guard let left = sanitize(a), let right = sanitize(b), left != right else { return }
-        queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
-            var setA = self.adjacency[left] ?? []
-            setA.insert(right)
-            self.adjacency[left] = setA
+    /// Update the topology with a node's self-reported neighbor list
+    func updateNeighbors(for sourceData: Data?, neighbors: [Data]) {
+        guard let source = sanitize(sourceData) else { return }
+        // Sanitize neighbors and exclude self-loops
+        let validNeighbors = Set(neighbors.compactMap { sanitize($0) }).subtracting([source])
         
-            var setB = self.adjacency[right] ?? []
-            setB.insert(left)
-            self.adjacency[right] = setB
-        }
-    }
-
-    func removeDirectLink(between a: Data?, and b: Data?) {
-        guard let left = sanitize(a), let right = sanitize(b), left != right else { return }
         queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
-            if var setA = self.adjacency[left] {
-                setA.remove(right)
-                self.adjacency[left] = setA.isEmpty ? nil : setA
-            }
-            if var setB = self.adjacency[right] {
-                setB.remove(left)
-                self.adjacency[right] = setB.isEmpty ? nil : setB
-            }
+            self.claims[source] = validNeighbors
+            self.lastSeen[source] = Date()
         }
     }
 
     func removePeer(_ data: Data?) {
         guard let peer = sanitize(data) else { return }
         queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
-            guard let neighbors = self.adjacency.removeValue(forKey: peer) else { return }
-            for neighbor in neighbors {
-                if var set = self.adjacency[neighbor] {
-                    set.remove(peer)
-                    self.adjacency[neighbor] = set.isEmpty ? nil : set
-                }
-            }
+            self.claims.removeValue(forKey: peer)
+            self.lastSeen.removeValue(forKey: peer)
         }
     }
     
-    func recordRoute(_ hops: [Data]) {
-        let sanitized = hops.compactMap { sanitize($0) }
-        guard sanitized.count >= 2 else { return }
+    /// Prune nodes that haven't updated their topology in `age` seconds
+    func prune(olderThan age: TimeInterval) {
+        let deadline = Date().addingTimeInterval(-age)
         queue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
-            for idx in 0..<(sanitized.count - 1) {
-                let left = sanitized[idx]
-                let right = sanitized[idx + 1]
-                guard left != right else { continue }
-
-                var setA = self.adjacency[left] ?? []
-                setA.insert(right)
-                self.adjacency[left] = setA
-
-                var setB = self.adjacency[right] ?? []
-                setB.insert(left)
-                self.adjacency[right] = setB
+            let stale = self.lastSeen.filter { $0.value < deadline }
+            for (peer, _) in stale {
+                self.claims.removeValue(forKey: peer)
+                self.lastSeen.removeValue(forKey: peer)
             }
         }
     }
 
-    func computeRoute(from start: Data?, to goal: Data?, maxHops: Int = 255) -> [Data]? {
+    func computeRoute(from start: Data?, to goal: Data?, maxHops: Int = 10) -> [Data]? {
         guard let source = sanitize(start), let target = sanitize(goal) else { return nil }
-        if source == target { return [source] }
+        if source == target { return [] } // Direct connection, no intermediate hops
 
-        let graph = queue.sync { adjacency }
-        guard graph[source] != nil, graph[target] != nil else { return nil }
+        return queue.sync {
+            // BFS
+            var visited: Set<RoutingID> = [source]
+            // Queue stores paths: [Start, Hop1, Hop2, ..., Current]
+            var queuePaths: [[RoutingID]] = [[source]]
             
-        var visited: Set<RoutingID> = [source]
-        var queuePaths: [[RoutingID]] = [[source]]
-        var index = 0
+            while !queuePaths.isEmpty {
+                let path = queuePaths.removeFirst()
+                // Limit path length (path contains source + maxHops + target) -> maxHops intermediate
+                // If maxHops = 10, max edges = 11, max nodes = 12.
+                if path.count > maxHops + 1 { continue }
                 
-        while index < queuePaths.count {
-            let path = queuePaths[index]
-            index += 1
-            guard path.count <= maxHops else { continue }
-            guard let last = path.last, let neighbors = graph[last] else { continue }
+                guard let last = path.last else { continue }
                 
-            for neighbor in neighbors {
-                if visited.contains(neighbor) { continue }
-                var nextPath = path
-                nextPath.append(neighbor)
-                if neighbor == target { return nextPath }
-                if nextPath.count <= maxHops {
+                // Get neighbors that 'last' claims to see
+                guard let neighbors = claims[last] else { continue }
+
+                for neighbor in neighbors {
+                    if visited.contains(neighbor) { continue }
+                    
+                    // CONFIRMED EDGE CHECK:
+                    // 'last' claims 'neighbor' (checked above)
+                    // Does 'neighbor' claim 'last'?
+                    guard let neighborClaims = claims[neighbor],
+                          neighborClaims.contains(last) else {
+                        continue
+                    }
+                    
+                    var nextPath = path
+                    nextPath.append(neighbor)
+                    
+                    if neighbor == target {
+                        // Return only intermediate hops
+                        // Path: [Source, I1, I2, Target] -> [I1, I2]
+                        return Array(nextPath.dropFirst().dropLast())
+                    }
+                    
+                    visited.insert(neighbor)
                     queuePaths.append(nextPath)
                 }
-                visited.insert(neighbor)
             }
+            return nil
         }
-
-        return nil
     }
 
     // MARK: - Helpers

bitchat/Services/NoiseEncryptionService.swift

@@ -200,46 +200,85 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
     init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
         self.keychain = keychain
 
-        // Load or create static identity key (ONLY from keychain)
+        // BCH-01-009: Load or create static identity key with proper error handling
         let loadedKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey
 
-        // Try to load from keychain
-        if let identityData = keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: "noiseStaticKey"),
-           let key = try? Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: identityData) {
-            loadedKey = key
-            SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: true)
-        }
-        // If no identity exists, create new one
-        else {
-            loadedKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
-            let keyData = loadedKey.rawRepresentation
+        // Try to load from keychain with proper error classification
+        let noiseKeyResult = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
 
-            // Save to keychain
-            let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
-            SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.create, keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: saved)
+        switch noiseKeyResult {
+        case .success(let identityData):
+            if let key = try? Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: identityData) {
+                loadedKey = key
+                SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: true)
+            } else {
+                // Data corrupted, regenerate
+                SecureLogger.warning("Noise static key data corrupted, regenerating", category: .keychain)
+                loadedKey = Self.generateAndSaveNoiseKey(keychain: keychain)
+            }
+
+        case .itemNotFound:
+            // Expected case: no key exists yet, create new one
+            loadedKey = Self.generateAndSaveNoiseKey(keychain: keychain)
+
+        case .accessDenied:
+            // Critical error - log but proceed with ephemeral key (will be lost on restart)
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: -1),
+                               context: "Keychain access denied - using ephemeral identity", category: .keychain)
+            loadedKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
+
+        case .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed:
+            // Recoverable error - use ephemeral key and warn
+            SecureLogger.warning("Device locked or auth failed - using ephemeral identity until unlocked", category: .keychain)
+            loadedKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
+
+        case .otherError(let status):
+            // Unexpected error - log and use ephemeral key
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
+                               context: "Unexpected keychain error - using ephemeral identity", category: .keychain)
+            loadedKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
         }
 
         // Now assign the final value
         self.staticIdentityKey = loadedKey
         self.staticIdentityPublicKey = staticIdentityKey.publicKey
 
-        // Load or create signing key pair
+        // BCH-01-009: Load or create signing key pair with proper error handling
         let loadedSigningKey: Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey
 
-        // Try to load from keychain
-        if let signingData = keychain.getIdentityKey(forKey: "ed25519SigningKey"),
-           let key = try? Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: signingData) {
-            loadedSigningKey = key
-            SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: true)
-        }
-        // If no signing key exists, create new one
-        else {
-            loadedSigningKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
-            let keyData = loadedSigningKey.rawRepresentation
+        let signingKeyResult = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "ed25519SigningKey")
 
-            // Save to keychain
-            let saved = keychain.saveIdentityKey(keyData, forKey: "ed25519SigningKey")
-            SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.create, keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: saved)
+        switch signingKeyResult {
+        case .success(let signingData):
+            if let key = try? Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: signingData) {
+                loadedSigningKey = key
+                SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.load, keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: true)
+            } else {
+                // Data corrupted, regenerate
+                SecureLogger.warning("Ed25519 signing key data corrupted, regenerating", category: .keychain)
+                loadedSigningKey = Self.generateAndSaveSigningKey(keychain: keychain)
+            }
+
+        case .itemNotFound:
+            // Expected case: no key exists yet, create new one
+            loadedSigningKey = Self.generateAndSaveSigningKey(keychain: keychain)
+
+        case .accessDenied:
+            // Critical error - log but proceed with ephemeral key
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: -1),
+                               context: "Keychain access denied - using ephemeral signing key", category: .keychain)
+            loadedSigningKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
+
+        case .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed:
+            // Recoverable error - use ephemeral key and warn
+            SecureLogger.warning("Device locked or auth failed - using ephemeral signing key until unlocked", category: .keychain)
+            loadedSigningKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
+
+        case .otherError(let status):
+            // Unexpected error - log and use ephemeral key
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(status)),
+                               context: "Unexpected keychain error - using ephemeral signing key", category: .keychain)
+            loadedSigningKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
         }
 
         // Now assign the signing keys
@@ -258,6 +297,56 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
         startRekeyTimer()
     }
 
+    // MARK: - BCH-01-009: Key Generation Helpers with Save Verification
+
+    /// Generate and save a new Noise static key, verifying the save succeeds
+    private static func generateAndSaveNoiseKey(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) -> Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey {
+        let newKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
+        let keyData = newKey.rawRepresentation
+
+        // Save to keychain and verify success
+        let saveResult = keychain.saveIdentityKeyWithResult(keyData, forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
+
+        switch saveResult {
+        case .success:
+            SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.create, keyType: "noiseStaticKey", success: true)
+        case .duplicateItem:
+            // This shouldn't happen since we just tried to load, but handle it
+            SecureLogger.warning("Noise key already exists (race condition?)", category: .keychain)
+        default:
+            // Save failed - log but continue with the key (it will be ephemeral)
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: -1),
+                               context: "Failed to persist noise static key - identity will be lost on restart",
+                               category: .keychain)
+        }
+
+        return newKey
+    }
+
+    /// Generate and save a new Ed25519 signing key, verifying the save succeeds
+    private static func generateAndSaveSigningKey(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) -> Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey {
+        let newKey = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey()
+        let keyData = newKey.rawRepresentation
+
+        // Save to keychain and verify success
+        let saveResult = keychain.saveIdentityKeyWithResult(keyData, forKey: "ed25519SigningKey")
+
+        switch saveResult {
+        case .success:
+            SecureLogger.logKeyOperation(.create, keyType: "ed25519SigningKey", success: true)
+        case .duplicateItem:
+            // This shouldn't happen since we just tried to load, but handle it
+            SecureLogger.warning("Signing key already exists (race condition?)", category: .keychain)
+        default:
+            // Save failed - log but continue with the key (it will be ephemeral)
+            SecureLogger.error(NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: -1),
+                               context: "Failed to persist signing key - identity will be lost on restart",
+                               category: .keychain)
+        }
+
+        return newKey
+    }
+    
     // MARK: - Public Interface
     
     /// Get our static public key for sharing

bitchat/Services/NotificationStreamAssembler.swift

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct NotificationStreamAssembler {
             let hasRecipient = (flags & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRecipient) != 0
             let hasSignature = (flags & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasSignature) != 0
             let isCompressed = (flags & BinaryProtocol.Flags.isCompressed) != 0
+            let hasRoute = (version >= 2) && (flags & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) != 0
 
             let lengthOffset = 12
             let payloadLength: Int
@@ -80,6 +81,15 @@ struct NotificationStreamAssembler {
             var frameLength = framePrefix + payloadLength
             if hasRecipient { frameLength += BinaryProtocol.recipientIDSize }
             if hasSignature { frameLength += BinaryProtocol.signatureSize }
+            
+            if hasRoute {
+                let routeCountOffset = framePrefix + (hasRecipient ? BinaryProtocol.recipientIDSize : 0)
+                let routeCountIndex = buffer.startIndex + routeCountOffset
+                guard buffer.count > routeCountOffset else { break }
+                let routeCount = Int(buffer[routeCountIndex])
+                frameLength += 1 + (routeCount * BinaryProtocol.senderIDSize)
+            }
+            
             if isCompressed {
                 let rawLengthFieldBytes = (version == 2) ? 4 : 2
                 if payloadLength < rawLengthFieldBytes {

bitchat/Services/Transport.swift

@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ protocol Transport: AnyObject {
     // QR verification (optional for transports)
     func sendVerifyChallenge(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)
     func sendVerifyResponse(to peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)
+
+    // Pending file management (BCH-01-002: files held in memory until user accepts)
+    func acceptPendingFile(id: String) -> URL?
+    func declinePendingFile(id: String)
 }
 
 extension Transport {
@@ -70,6 +74,9 @@ extension Transport {
     func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String], messageID: String, timestamp: Date) {
         sendMessage(content, mentions: mentions)
     }
+
+    func acceptPendingFile(id: String) -> URL? { nil }
+    func declinePendingFile(id: String) {}
 }
 
 protocol TransportPeerEventsDelegate: AnyObject {

bitchat/Services/TransportConfig.swift

@@ -162,6 +162,14 @@ enum TransportConfig {
     static let blePostAnnounceDelaySeconds: TimeInterval = 0.4
     static let bleForceAnnounceMinIntervalSeconds: TimeInterval = 0.15
 
+    // BCH-01-004: Rate-limiting for subscription-triggered announces
+    // Prevents rapid enumeration attacks by rate-limiting announce responses
+    static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds: TimeInterval = 2.0       // Minimum interval between announces per central
+    static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitBackoffFactor: Double = 2.0          // Exponential backoff multiplier
+    static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds: TimeInterval = 30.0  // Maximum backoff period
+    static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitWindowSeconds: TimeInterval = 60.0   // Window for tracking subscription attempts
+    static let bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxAttempts: Int = 5                 // Max attempts before extended cooldown
+
     // Store-and-forward for directed packets at relays
     static let bleDirectedSpoolWindowSeconds: TimeInterval = 15.0
 

bitchat/Utils/InputValidator.swift

@@ -52,11 +52,13 @@ struct InputValidator {
     // MessageType/NoisePayloadType enums; keeping validator free of stale lists.
 
     /// Validates timestamp is reasonable (not too far in past or future)
+    /// BCH-01-011: Reduced from ±1 hour to ±5 minutes to limit replay attack window
     static func validateTimestamp(_ timestamp: Date) -> Bool {
         let now = Date()
-        let oneHourAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-3600)
-        let oneHourFromNow = now.addingTimeInterval(3600)
-        return timestamp >= oneHourAgo && timestamp <= oneHourFromNow
+        // 5 minutes = 300 seconds (industry standard for replay protection)
+        let fiveMinutesAgo = now.addingTimeInterval(-300)
+        let fiveMinutesFromNow = now.addingTimeInterval(300)
+        return timestamp >= fiveMinutesAgo && timestamp <= fiveMinutesFromNow
     }
 
 }

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift

@@ -2055,6 +2055,12 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
             } catch {
                 SecureLogger.error("Failed to clear media files during panic: \(error)", category: .session)
             }
+
+            // BCH-01-013: Clear iOS app switcher snapshots
+            // These are stored in Library/Caches/Snapshots/<bundle_id>/
+            #if os(iOS)
+            Self.clearAppSwitcherSnapshots()
+            #endif
         }
 
         // Force immediate UI update for panic mode
@@ -2062,6 +2068,29 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
 
     }
 
+    /// BCH-01-013: Clear iOS app switcher snapshots during panic mode
+    /// iOS stores preview screenshots in Library/Caches/Snapshots/<bundle_id>/
+    /// These could reveal sensitive information visible in the app at the time
+    #if os(iOS)
+    private nonisolated static func clearAppSwitcherSnapshots() {
+        do {
+            let cacheDir = try FileManager.default.url(for: .cachesDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: false)
+            let snapshotsDir = cacheDir.appendingPathComponent("Snapshots", isDirectory: true)
+
+            // Clear all snapshots (iOS stores them in subdirectories by bundle ID and scene)
+            if FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: snapshotsDir.path) {
+                let contents = try FileManager.default.contentsOfDirectory(at: snapshotsDir, includingPropertiesForKeys: nil)
+                for item in contents {
+                    try FileManager.default.removeItem(at: item)
+                }
+                SecureLogger.info("🗑️ Cleared app switcher snapshots during panic clear", category: .session)
+            }
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error("Failed to clear app switcher snapshots: \(error)", category: .session)
+        }
+    }
+    #endif
+
     // MARK: - Autocomplete
     
     func updateAutocomplete(for text: String, cursorPosition: Int) {
@@ -3046,46 +3075,91 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, CommandContextProv
         }
     }
 
+    /// Find message index trying both short (16-hex) and long (64-hex) peer ID formats.
+    /// Returns the peer ID where the message was found and its index, or nil if not found.
+    private func findMessageIndex(messageID: String, peerID: PeerID) -> (peerID: PeerID, index: Int)? {
+        // Try direct lookup first
+        if let messages = privateChats[peerID],
+           let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
+            return (peerID, idx)
+        }
+
+        // Try with full noise key if peerID is short (16 hex chars)
+        if peerID.bare.count == 16,
+           let peer = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID),
+           !peer.noisePublicKey.isEmpty {
+            let longID = PeerID(hexData: peer.noisePublicKey)
+            if let messages = privateChats[longID],
+               let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
+                return (longID, idx)
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Try with short form if peerID is long (64 hex = noise key)
+        if peerID.bare.count == 64 {
+            let shortID = peerID.toShort()
+            if let messages = privateChats[shortID],
+               let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
+                return (shortID, idx)
+            }
+        }
+
+        return nil
+    }
+
     // Low-level BLE events
     func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
         Task { @MainActor in
             switch type {
             case .privateMessage:
                 guard let pm = PrivateMessagePacket.decode(from: payload) else { return }
+
+                // BCH-01-012: Check blocking before processing private message to prevent notification bypass
+                if isPeerBlocked(peerID) {
+                    SecureLogger.debug("🚫 Ignoring Noise payload from blocked peer: \(peerID)", category: .security)
+                    return
+                }
+
                 let senderName = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname ?? "Unknown"
-            let pmMentions = parseMentions(from: pm.content)
-            let msg = BitchatMessage(
-                id: pm.messageID,
-                sender: senderName,
-                content: pm.content,
-                timestamp: timestamp,
-                isRelay: false,
-                originalSender: nil,
-                isPrivate: true,
-                recipientNickname: nickname,
-                senderPeerID: peerID,
-                mentions: pmMentions.isEmpty ? nil : pmMentions
-            )
+                let pmMentions = parseMentions(from: pm.content)
+                let msg = BitchatMessage(
+                    id: pm.messageID,
+                    sender: senderName,
+                    content: pm.content,
+                    timestamp: timestamp,
+                    isRelay: false,
+                    originalSender: nil,
+                    isPrivate: true,
+                    recipientNickname: nickname,
+                    senderPeerID: peerID,
+                    mentions: pmMentions.isEmpty ? nil : pmMentions
+                )
                 handlePrivateMessage(msg)
                 // Send delivery ACK back over BLE
                 meshService.sendDeliveryAck(for: pm.messageID, to: peerID)
 
             case .delivered:
                 guard let messageID = String(data: payload, encoding: .utf8) else { return }
-                if let name = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname {
-                    if let messages = privateChats[peerID], let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
-                        privateChats[peerID]?[idx].deliveryStatus = .delivered(to: name, at: Date())
-                        objectWillChange.send()
-                    }
-                }
+                guard let name = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname,
+                      let (foundPeerID, idx) = findMessageIndex(messageID: messageID, peerID: peerID) else { return }
+
+                // Don't downgrade from .read to .delivered
+                if case .read = privateChats[foundPeerID]?[idx].deliveryStatus { return }
+
+                privateChats[foundPeerID]?[idx].deliveryStatus = .delivered(to: name, at: Date())
+                objectWillChange.send()
 
             case .readReceipt:
                 guard let messageID = String(data: payload, encoding: .utf8) else { return }
-                if let name = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname {
-                    if let messages = privateChats[peerID], let idx = messages.firstIndex(where: { $0.id == messageID }) {
-                        privateChats[peerID]?[idx].deliveryStatus = .read(by: name, at: Date())
-                        objectWillChange.send()
-                    }
+                guard let name = unifiedPeerService.getPeer(by: peerID)?.nickname,
+                      let (foundPeerID, idx) = findMessageIndex(messageID: messageID, peerID: peerID) else { return }
+
+                // Explicitly unwrap and re-assign to ensure the @Published setter is called
+                if let messages = privateChats[foundPeerID], idx < messages.count {
+                    messages[idx].deliveryStatus = .read(by: name, at: Date())
+                    privateChats[foundPeerID] = messages
+                    privateChatManager.objectWillChange.send()
+                    objectWillChange.send()
                 }
             case .verifyChallenge:
                 // Parse and respond

bitchat/ViewModels/Extensions/ChatViewModel+Nostr.swift

@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
     }
     
     func subscribeNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent) {
-        guard event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue,
+        guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue || 
+               event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue),
               !deduplicationService.hasProcessedNostrEvent(event.id)
         else {
             return
@@ -86,6 +87,11 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
         // Update participants last-seen for this pubkey
         participantTracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
         
+        // If presence heartbeat (Kind 20001), stop here - no content to display
+        if event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue {
+            return
+        }
+        
         // Track teleported tag (only our format ["t","teleport"]) for icon state
         let hasTeleportTag = event.tags.contains(where: { tag in
             tag.count >= 2 && tag[0].lowercased() == "t" && tag[1].lowercased() == "teleport"
@@ -124,9 +130,18 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
             mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
         )
         Task { @MainActor in
+            // BCH-01-012: Check blocking before any notifications
+            // handlePublicMessage has its own blocking check but returns silently,
+            // so we must also guard checkForMentions to prevent notification bypass
+            let isBlocked = identityManager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey.lowercased())
+
             handlePublicMessage(msg)
-            checkForMentions(msg)
-            sendHapticFeedback(for: msg)
+
+            // Only check mentions and send haptic if sender is not blocked
+            if !isBlocked {
+                checkForMentions(msg)
+                sendHapticFeedback(for: msg)
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -239,8 +254,9 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
     }
     
     func handleNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent) {
-        // Only handle ephemeral kind 20000 with matching tag
-        guard event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue else { return }
+        // Only handle ephemeral kind 20000 or presence kind 20001 with matching tag
+        guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue ||
+               event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue) else { return }
         
         // Deduplicate
         if deduplicationService.hasProcessedNostrEvent(event.id) { return }
@@ -250,6 +266,11 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
         let tagSummary = event.tags.map { "[" + $0.joined(separator: ",") + "]" }.joined(separator: ",")
         SecureLogger.debug("GeoTeleport: recv pub=\(event.pubkey.prefix(8))… tags=\(tagSummary)", category: .session)
         
+        // If this pubkey is blocked, skip mapping, participants, and timeline
+        if identityManager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey) {
+            return
+        }
+        
         // Track teleport tag for participants – only our format ["t", "teleport"]
         let hasTeleportTag: Bool = event.tags.contains { tag in
             tag.count >= 2 && tag[0].lowercased() == "t" && tag[1].lowercased() == "teleport"
@@ -273,6 +294,9 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
             }
         }
         
+        // Update participants last-seen for this pubkey
+        participantTracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
+
         // Skip only very recent self-echo from relay; include older self events for hydration
         if isSelf {
             let eventTime = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: TimeInterval(event.created_at))
@@ -287,17 +311,14 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
             geoNicknames[event.pubkey.lowercased()] = nick
         }
         
-        // If this pubkey is blocked, skip mapping, participants, and timeline
-        if identityManager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey) {
-            return
-        }
-        
         // Store mapping for geohash DM initiation
         nostrKeyMapping[PeerID(nostr_: event.pubkey)] = event.pubkey
         nostrKeyMapping[PeerID(nostr: event.pubkey)] = event.pubkey
         
-        // Update participants last-seen for this pubkey
-        participantTracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: event.pubkey)
+        // If presence heartbeat (Kind 20001), stop here - no content to display
+        if event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue {
+            return
+        }
         
         let senderName = displayNameForNostrPubkey(event.pubkey)
         let content = event.content
@@ -464,7 +485,8 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
     }
     
     func subscribeNostrEvent(_ event: NostrEvent, gh: String) {
-        guard event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue else { return }
+        guard (event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue ||
+               event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue) else { return }
 
         // Compute current participant count (5-minute window) BEFORE updating with this event
         let existingCount = participantTracker.participantCount(for: gh)

bitchat/ViewModels/Extensions/ChatViewModel+PrivateChat.swift

@@ -740,15 +740,11 @@ extension ChatViewModel {
         
         if isViewing {
             // Mark read immediately if viewing
-            // Use router to send read receipt
+            // Use the incoming peerID directly - it has the established Noise session.
+            // Don't use PeerID(hexData: noiseKey) as that creates a 64-hex ID without a session.
+            // Use meshService directly (not messageRouter) so it queues if peer disconnects.
             let receipt = ReadReceipt(originalMessageID: message.id, readerID: meshService.myPeerID, readerNickname: nickname)
-            if let key = noiseKey {
-                 // Send via router to stable key if available (preferred for persistence/Nostr fallback)
-                 messageRouter.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: PeerID(hexData: key))
-            } else {
-                 // Fallback to mesh direct
-                 meshService.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: peerID)
-            }
+            meshService.sendReadReceipt(receipt, to: peerID)
             sentReadReceipts.insert(message.id)
         } else {
             // Notify

bitchat/Views/AppInfoView.swift

@@ -86,10 +86,6 @@ struct AppInfoView: View {
             ]
         }
 
-        enum Warning {
-            static let title: LocalizedStringKey = "app_info.warning.title"
-            static let message: LocalizedStringKey = "app_info.warning.message"
-        }
     }
     
     var body: some View {
@@ -192,24 +188,6 @@ struct AppInfoView: View {
 
                 FeatureRow(info: Strings.Privacy.panic)
             }
-
-            // Warning
-            VStack(alignment: .leading, spacing: 6) {
-                SectionHeader(Strings.Warning.title)
-                    .foregroundColor(Color.red)
-                
-                Text(Strings.Warning.message)
-                    .font(.bitchatSystem(size: 14, design: .monospaced))
-                    .foregroundColor(Color.red)
-                    .fixedSize(horizontal: false, vertical: true)
-            }
-            .padding(.top, 6)
-            .padding(.bottom, 16)
-            .padding(.horizontal)
-            .background(Color.red.opacity(0.1))
-            .cornerRadius(8)
-            
-            .padding(.top)
         }
         .padding()
     }

bitchat/Views/LocationChannelsSheet.swift

@@ -40,10 +40,31 @@ struct LocationChannelsSheet: View {
         }
 
         static func levelTitle(for level: GeohashChannelLevel, count: Int) -> String {
+            // High-precision uncertainty: if count is 0 for high-precision levels,
+            // show "?" because presence broadcasting is disabled for privacy.
+            let isHighPrecision = (level == .neighborhood || level == .block || level == .building)
+            if isHighPrecision && count == 0 {
+                return String(
+                    format: String(localized: "location_channels.row_title_unknown", defaultValue: "%@ [? people]"),
+                    locale: .current,
+                    level.displayName
+                )
+            }
             return rowTitle(label: level.displayName, count: count)
         }
 
         static func bookmarkTitle(geohash: String, count: Int) -> String {
+            // Check precision for bookmarks too
+            let len = geohash.count
+            // Neighborhood=6, Block=7, Building=8+
+            let isHighPrecision = (len >= 6)
+            if isHighPrecision && count == 0 {
+                return String(
+                    format: String(localized: "location_channels.row_title_unknown", defaultValue: "%@ [? people]"),
+                    locale: .current,
+                    "#\(geohash)"
+                )
+            }
             return rowTitle(label: "#\(geohash)", count: count)
         }
 

bitchat/_PreviewHelpers/PreviewKeychainManager.swift

@@ -41,6 +41,19 @@ final class PreviewKeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
         storage["identity_noiseStaticKey"] != nil
     }
 
+    // BCH-01-009: New methods with proper error classification
+    func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
+        if let data = storage[key] {
+            return .success(data)
+        }
+        return .itemNotFound
+    }
+
+    func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult {
+        storage[key] = keyData
+        return .success
+    }
+
     // MARK: - Generic Data Storage (consolidated from KeychainHelper)
 
     func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString?) {

bitchatTests/Fragmentation/FragmentationTests.swift

@@ -43,17 +43,16 @@ struct FragmentationTests {
         // Shuffle fragments to simulate out-of-order arrival
         let shuffled = fragments.shuffled()
 
-        // Inject fragments spaced out to avoid concurrent mutation inside BLEService
+        // Send fragments sequentially with small delays (no fire-and-forget Tasks)
         for (i, fragment) in shuffled.enumerated() {
-            let delay = 5 * Double(i) * 0.001
-            Task {
-                try await sleep(delay)
-                ble._test_handlePacket(fragment, fromPeerID: remoteShortID)
+            if i > 0 {
+                try await Task.sleep(for: .milliseconds(5))
             }
+            ble._test_handlePacket(fragment, fromPeerID: remoteShortID)
         }
 
-        // Allow async processing
-        try await sleep(0.5)
+        // Wait for delegate callback with proper timeout
+        try await capture.waitForPublicMessages(count: 1, timeout: .seconds(2))
 
         #expect(capture.publicMessages.count == 1)
         #expect(capture.publicMessages.first?.content.count == 3_000)
@@ -78,16 +77,16 @@ struct FragmentationTests {
             frags.insert(dup, at: 1)
         }
 
+        // Send fragments sequentially with small delays (no fire-and-forget Tasks)
         for (i, fragment) in frags.enumerated() {
-            let delay = 5 * Double(i) * 0.001
-            Task {
-                try await sleep(delay)
-                ble._test_handlePacket(fragment, fromPeerID: remoteShortID)
+            if i > 0 {
+                try await Task.sleep(for: .milliseconds(5))
             }
+            ble._test_handlePacket(fragment, fromPeerID: remoteShortID)
         }
 
-        // Allow async processing
-        try await sleep(0.5)
+        // Wait for delegate callback with proper timeout
+        try await capture.waitForPublicMessages(count: 1, timeout: .seconds(2))
 
         #expect(capture.publicMessages.count == 1)
         #expect(capture.publicMessages.first?.content.count == 2048)
@@ -196,12 +195,128 @@ struct FragmentationTests {
 }
 
 extension FragmentationTests {
-    private final class CaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
-        var publicMessages: [(peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String)] = []
-        var receivedMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
-        func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
-            receivedMessages.append(message)
+    /// Thread-safe delegate that supports awaiting message delivery
+    private final class CaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate, @unchecked Sendable {
+        private let lock = NSLock()
+        private var _publicMessages: [(peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String)] = []
+        private var _receivedMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
+        private var publicMessageContinuation: CheckedContinuation<Void, Never>?
+        private var receivedMessageContinuation: CheckedContinuation<Void, Never>?
+        private var expectedPublicMessageCount: Int = 0
+        private var expectedReceivedMessageCount: Int = 0
+
+        var publicMessages: [(peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String)] {
+            lock.lock()
+            defer { lock.unlock() }
+            return _publicMessages
         }
+
+        var receivedMessages: [BitchatMessage] {
+            lock.lock()
+            defer { lock.unlock() }
+            return _receivedMessages
+        }
+
+        func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
+            lock.lock()
+            _receivedMessages.append(message)
+            let count = _receivedMessages.count
+            let expected = expectedReceivedMessageCount
+            let continuation = receivedMessageContinuation
+            lock.unlock()
+
+            if count >= expected, let cont = continuation {
+                lock.lock()
+                receivedMessageContinuation = nil
+                lock.unlock()
+                cont.resume()
+            }
+        }
+
+        func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
+            lock.lock()
+            _publicMessages.append((peerID, nickname, content))
+            let count = _publicMessages.count
+            let expected = expectedPublicMessageCount
+            let continuation = publicMessageContinuation
+            lock.unlock()
+
+            if count >= expected, let cont = continuation {
+                lock.lock()
+                publicMessageContinuation = nil
+                lock.unlock()
+                cont.resume()
+            }
+        }
+
+        /// Waits for the specified number of public messages to be received
+        func waitForPublicMessages(count: Int, timeout: Duration = .seconds(2)) async throws {
+            lock.lock()
+            if _publicMessages.count >= count {
+                lock.unlock()
+                return
+            }
+            expectedPublicMessageCount = count
+            lock.unlock()
+
+            try await withThrowingTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
+                group.addTask {
+                    await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
+                        self.lock.lock()
+                        // Recheck count after acquiring lock to avoid race condition
+                        // where message arrives between initial check and continuation install
+                        if self._publicMessages.count >= count {
+                            self.lock.unlock()
+                            continuation.resume()
+                            return
+                        }
+                        self.publicMessageContinuation = continuation
+                        self.lock.unlock()
+                    }
+                }
+                group.addTask {
+                    try await Task.sleep(for: timeout)
+                    throw CancellationError()
+                }
+                try await group.next()
+                group.cancelAll()
+            }
+        }
+
+        /// Waits for the specified number of received messages
+        func waitForReceivedMessages(count: Int, timeout: Duration = .seconds(2)) async throws {
+            lock.lock()
+            if _receivedMessages.count >= count {
+                lock.unlock()
+                return
+            }
+            expectedReceivedMessageCount = count
+            lock.unlock()
+
+            try await withThrowingTaskGroup(of: Void.self) { group in
+                group.addTask {
+                    await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
+                        self.lock.lock()
+                        // Recheck count after acquiring lock to avoid race condition
+                        // where message arrives between initial check and continuation install
+                        if self._receivedMessages.count >= count {
+                            self.lock.unlock()
+                            continuation.resume()
+                            return
+                        }
+                        self.receivedMessageContinuation = continuation
+                        self.lock.unlock()
+                    }
+                }
+                group.addTask {
+                    try await Task.sleep(for: timeout)
+                    throw CancellationError()
+                }
+                try await group.next()
+                group.cancelAll()
+            }
+        }
+
         func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
         func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
         func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {}
@@ -209,9 +324,6 @@ extension FragmentationTests {
         func didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus(_ messageID: String, status: DeliveryStatus) {}
         func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {}
         func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState) {}
-        func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
-            publicMessages.append((peerID, nickname, content))
-        }
         func didReceiveRegionalPublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date) {}
     }
 

bitchatTests/GeohashPresenceTests.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,567 @@
+//
+// GeohashPresenceTests.swift
+// bitchatTests
+//
+// Tests for the Geohash Presence (Kind 20001) feature.
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+//
+
+import Testing
+import Foundation
+import Combine
+@testable import bitchat
+
+// MARK: - NostrProtocol Presence Event Tests
+
+struct NostrProtocolPresenceTests {
+
+    @Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_hasCorrectKind() throws {
+        let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
+        let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
+            geohash: "u4pruydq",
+            senderIdentity: identity
+        )
+
+        #expect(event.kind == NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue)
+        #expect(event.kind == 20001)
+    }
+
+    @Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_hasEmptyContent() throws {
+        let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
+        let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
+            geohash: "u4pruydq",
+            senderIdentity: identity
+        )
+
+        #expect(event.content == "")
+    }
+
+    @Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_hasOnlyGeohashTag() throws {
+        let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
+        let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
+            geohash: "u4pruydq",
+            senderIdentity: identity
+        )
+
+        // Should have exactly one tag: ["g", geohash]
+        #expect(event.tags.count == 1)
+        #expect(event.tags[0] == ["g", "u4pruydq"])
+    }
+
+    @Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_noNicknameTag() throws {
+        let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
+        let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
+            geohash: "u4pruydq",
+            senderIdentity: identity
+        )
+
+        // Should NOT contain nickname tag
+        let hasNicknameTag = event.tags.contains { $0.first == "n" }
+        #expect(!hasNicknameTag)
+    }
+
+    @Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_usesSenderPubkey() throws {
+        let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
+        let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
+            geohash: "u4pruydq",
+            senderIdentity: identity
+        )
+
+        #expect(event.pubkey == identity.publicKeyHex)
+    }
+
+    @Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_isSigned() throws {
+        let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
+        let event = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(
+            geohash: "u4pruydq",
+            senderIdentity: identity
+        )
+
+        #expect(event.sig != nil && !event.sig!.isEmpty)
+        #expect(!event.id.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test func createGeohashPresenceEvent_differentGeohashes() throws {
+        let identity = try makeTestIdentity()
+
+        let event1 = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(geohash: "87", senderIdentity: identity)
+        let event2 = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(geohash: "87yw", senderIdentity: identity)
+        let event3 = try NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent(geohash: "87yw7", senderIdentity: identity)
+
+        #expect(event1.tags[0][1] == "87")
+        #expect(event2.tags[0][1] == "87yw")
+        #expect(event3.tags[0][1] == "87yw7")
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Helper
+
+    private func makeTestIdentity() throws -> NostrIdentity {
+        // Generate a fresh test identity
+        return try NostrIdentity.generate()
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - NostrFilter Presence Tests
+
+struct NostrFilterPresenceTests {
+
+    @Test func geohashEphemeral_includesBothKinds() {
+        let filter = NostrFilter.geohashEphemeral("u4pruydq")
+
+        #expect(filter.kinds?.contains(20000) == true)
+        #expect(filter.kinds?.contains(20001) == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test func geohashEphemeral_hasLimit1000() {
+        let filter = NostrFilter.geohashEphemeral("u4pruydq")
+
+        #expect(filter.limit == 1000)
+    }
+
+    @Test func geohashEphemeral_respectsSinceParameter() {
+        let since = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1700000000)
+        let filter = NostrFilter.geohashEphemeral("u4pruydq", since: since)
+
+        #expect(filter.since == 1700000000)
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - ChatViewModel Presence Handling Tests
+
+@MainActor
+struct ChatViewModelPresenceHandlingTests {
+
+    @Test func handleNostrEvent_presenceUpdatesParticipantTracker() async {
+        let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
+        let geohash = "u4pruydq"
+
+        // Set up the channel
+        viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
+
+        // Create a presence event (kind 20001)
+        var event = NostrEvent(
+            pubkey: "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
+            createdAt: Date(),
+            kind: .geohashPresence,
+            tags: [["g", geohash]],
+            content: ""
+        )
+        event.id = "presence_evt_1"
+        event.sig = "sig"
+
+        // Handle the event
+        viewModel.handleNostrEvent(event)
+
+        // Allow async processing
+        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
+
+        // Participant should be recorded
+        let count = viewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: geohash)
+        #expect(count >= 1)
+    }
+
+    @Test func handleNostrEvent_presenceDoesNotAddToTimeline() async {
+        let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
+        let geohash = "u4pruydq"
+
+        viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
+
+        let initialMessageCount = viewModel.messages.count
+
+        // Create a presence event (kind 20001)
+        var event = NostrEvent(
+            pubkey: "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
+            createdAt: Date(),
+            kind: .geohashPresence,
+            tags: [["g", geohash]],
+            content: ""
+        )
+        event.id = "presence_evt_2"
+        event.sig = "sig"
+
+        viewModel.handleNostrEvent(event)
+
+        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
+
+        // Message count should NOT increase
+        #expect(viewModel.messages.count == initialMessageCount)
+    }
+
+    @Test func handleNostrEvent_chatMessageUpdatesParticipant() async {
+        let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
+        let geohash = "u4pruydq"
+
+        viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
+
+        // Create a chat event (kind 20000) - NOT presence
+        var event = NostrEvent(
+            pubkey: "abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234abcd1234",
+            createdAt: Date(),
+            kind: .ephemeralEvent,
+            tags: [["g", geohash]],
+            content: "Hello world"
+        )
+        event.id = "chat_evt_1"
+        event.sig = "sig"
+
+        viewModel.handleNostrEvent(event)
+
+        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
+
+        // Chat messages should also update participant count (not just presence)
+        let count = viewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: geohash)
+        #expect(count >= 1)
+    }
+
+    @Test func presenceEvent_hasDifferentKindThanChat() {
+        // Verify the two event kinds are distinct
+        let presenceKind = NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue
+        let chatKind = NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue
+
+        #expect(presenceKind != chatKind)
+        #expect(presenceKind == 20001)
+        #expect(chatKind == 20000)
+    }
+
+    @Test func subscribeNostrEvent_acceptsPresenceKind() async {
+        let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
+        let geohash = "u4pruydq"
+
+        viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: geohash)))
+
+        // Create presence event
+        var event = NostrEvent(
+            pubkey: "test1234test1234test1234test1234test1234test1234test1234test1234",
+            createdAt: Date(),
+            kind: .geohashPresence,
+            tags: [["g", geohash]],
+            content: ""
+        )
+        event.id = "subscribe_presence_evt"
+        event.sig = "sig"
+
+        // subscribeNostrEvent should accept kind 20001
+        viewModel.subscribeNostrEvent(event)
+
+        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
+
+        // Should record participant
+        let count = viewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: geohash)
+        #expect(count >= 1)
+    }
+
+    @Test func subscribeNostrEvent_presenceForNonActiveGeohash() async {
+        let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
+        let activeGeohash = "u4pruydq"
+        let otherGeohash = "87yw7"
+
+        viewModel.switchLocationChannel(to: .location(GeohashChannel(level: .city, geohash: activeGeohash)))
+
+        // Create presence event for a DIFFERENT geohash
+        var event = NostrEvent(
+            pubkey: "other1234other1234other1234other1234other1234other1234other1234",
+            createdAt: Date(),
+            kind: .geohashPresence,
+            tags: [["g", otherGeohash]],
+            content: ""
+        )
+        event.id = "other_geohash_presence"
+        event.sig = "sig"
+
+        // Use subscribeNostrEvent with geohash parameter
+        viewModel.subscribeNostrEvent(event, gh: otherGeohash)
+
+        try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 50_000_000)
+
+        // Should record for the other geohash
+        let count = viewModel.geohashParticipantCount(for: otherGeohash)
+        #expect(count >= 1)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Test Helper
+
+    private func makeTestableViewModel() -> (viewModel: ChatViewModel, transport: MockTransport) {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let keychainHelper = MockKeychainHelper()
+        let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychainHelper)
+        let identityManager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
+        let transport = MockTransport()
+
+        let viewModel = ChatViewModel(
+            keychain: keychain,
+            idBridge: idBridge,
+            identityManager: identityManager,
+            transport: transport
+        )
+
+        return (viewModel, transport)
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Presence Privacy Tests
+
+struct GeohashPresencePrivacyTests {
+
+    @Test func allowedPrecisions_onlyLowPrecision() {
+        // The allowed precisions for presence broadcasting should be:
+        // Region (2), Province (4), City (5)
+        // NOT Neighborhood (6), Block (7), Building (8+)
+
+        let regionPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.region.precision
+        let provincePrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.province.precision
+        let cityPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.city.precision
+        let neighborhoodPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.neighborhood.precision
+        let blockPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.block.precision
+        let buildingPrecision = GeohashChannelLevel.building.precision
+
+        #expect(regionPrecision == 2)
+        #expect(provincePrecision == 4)
+        #expect(cityPrecision == 5)
+        #expect(neighborhoodPrecision == 6)
+        #expect(blockPrecision == 7)
+        #expect(buildingPrecision == 8)
+
+        // High precision channels should NOT receive presence broadcasts
+        #expect(neighborhoodPrecision > 5)
+        #expect(blockPrecision > 5)
+        #expect(buildingPrecision > 5)
+    }
+
+    @Test func geohashLengthDeterminesPrecision() {
+        // Verify geohash length maps to expected precision
+        #expect("87".count == GeohashChannelLevel.region.precision)
+        #expect("87yw".count == GeohashChannelLevel.province.precision)
+        #expect("87yw7".count == GeohashChannelLevel.city.precision)
+        #expect("87yw7t".count == GeohashChannelLevel.neighborhood.precision)
+        #expect("87yw7tc".count == GeohashChannelLevel.block.precision)
+        #expect("87yw7tcx".count == GeohashChannelLevel.building.precision)
+    }
+
+    @Test func highPrecisionGeohash_isPrivacySensitive() {
+        // Helper to check if a geohash is "high precision" (privacy sensitive)
+        func isHighPrecision(_ geohash: String) -> Bool {
+            geohash.count >= 6
+        }
+
+        // Low precision - OK to broadcast presence
+        #expect(!isHighPrecision("87"))      // region
+        #expect(!isHighPrecision("87yw"))    // province
+        #expect(!isHighPrecision("87yw7"))   // city
+
+        // High precision - should NOT broadcast presence
+        #expect(isHighPrecision("87yw7t"))   // neighborhood
+        #expect(isHighPrecision("87yw7tc"))  // block
+        #expect(isHighPrecision("87yw7tcx")) // building
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Display Logic Tests
+
+struct LocationChannelsDisplayLogicTests {
+
+    @Test func displayLogic_highPrecisionZeroCount_showsUnknown() {
+        // Test the logic that determines "?" vs actual count
+        // High precision + count 0 = "?"
+
+        let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(
+            level: .neighborhood,
+            count: 0
+        )
+        #expect(shouldShowUnknown)
+    }
+
+    @Test func displayLogic_highPrecisionNonZeroCount_showsActual() {
+        // High precision + count > 0 = show actual
+        let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(
+            level: .neighborhood,
+            count: 5
+        )
+        #expect(!shouldShowUnknown)
+    }
+
+    @Test func displayLogic_lowPrecisionZeroCount_showsActual() {
+        // Low precision + count 0 = show "0" (not "?")
+        let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(
+            level: .city,
+            count: 0
+        )
+        #expect(!shouldShowUnknown)
+    }
+
+    @Test func displayLogic_lowPrecisionNonZeroCount_showsActual() {
+        // Low precision + count > 0 = show actual
+        let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(
+            level: .region,
+            count: 10
+        )
+        #expect(!shouldShowUnknown)
+    }
+
+    @Test func displayLogic_allHighPrecisionLevels() {
+        // All high precision levels with 0 should show "?"
+        let highPrecisionLevels: [GeohashChannelLevel] = [.neighborhood, .block, .building]
+
+        for level in highPrecisionLevels {
+            let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(level: level, count: 0)
+            #expect(shouldShowUnknown, "Level \(level) with count 0 should show unknown")
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func displayLogic_allLowPrecisionLevels() {
+        // All low precision levels with 0 should show actual count
+        let lowPrecisionLevels: [GeohashChannelLevel] = [.region, .province, .city]
+
+        for level in lowPrecisionLevels {
+            let shouldShowUnknown = shouldShowUnknownCount(level: level, count: 0)
+            #expect(!shouldShowUnknown, "Level \(level) with count 0 should show actual count")
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func displayLogic_bookmarkHighPrecision() {
+        // Bookmarks use geohash length to determine precision
+        #expect(shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw7t", count: 0))   // len 6
+        #expect(shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw7tc", count: 0))  // len 7
+        #expect(shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw7tcx", count: 0)) // len 8
+    }
+
+    @Test func displayLogic_bookmarkLowPrecision() {
+        #expect(!shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87", count: 0))     // len 2
+        #expect(!shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw", count: 0))   // len 4
+        #expect(!shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: "87yw7", count: 0))  // len 5
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Helpers (mirror the logic from LocationChannelsSheet)
+
+    private func shouldShowUnknownCount(level: GeohashChannelLevel, count: Int) -> Bool {
+        let isHighPrecision = (level == .neighborhood || level == .block || level == .building)
+        return isHighPrecision && count == 0
+    }
+
+    private func shouldShowUnknownForBookmark(geohash: String, count: Int) -> Bool {
+        let isHighPrecision = (geohash.count >= 6)
+        return isHighPrecision && count == 0
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Event Kind Tests
+
+struct NostrEventKindTests {
+
+    @Test func eventKind_geohashPresence_is20001() {
+        #expect(NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue == 20001)
+    }
+
+    @Test func eventKind_ephemeralEvent_is20000() {
+        #expect(NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue == 20000)
+    }
+
+    @Test func eventKind_presenceIsEphemeral() {
+        // Both 20000 and 20001 are in the ephemeral range (20000-29999)
+        let presenceKind = NostrProtocol.EventKind.geohashPresence.rawValue
+        let chatKind = NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue
+
+        #expect(presenceKind >= 20000 && presenceKind < 30000)
+        #expect(chatKind >= 20000 && chatKind < 30000)
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Participant Tracker Presence Integration Tests
+
+@MainActor
+struct ParticipantTrackerPresenceTests {
+
+    @Test func recordParticipant_fromPresenceEvent_countsParticipant() async {
+        let tracker = GeohashParticipantTracker()
+        let context = PresenceTestParticipantContext()
+        tracker.configure(context: context)
+
+        let geohash = "87yw7"
+        tracker.setActiveGeohash(geohash)
+
+        // Simulate recording from a presence event
+        tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "presence_user_1")
+
+        #expect(tracker.participantCount(for: geohash) == 1)
+    }
+
+    @Test func recordParticipant_multiplePresenceEvents_countsUnique() async {
+        let tracker = GeohashParticipantTracker()
+        let context = PresenceTestParticipantContext()
+        tracker.configure(context: context)
+
+        let geohash = "87yw7"
+        tracker.setActiveGeohash(geohash)
+
+        // Multiple presence events from same user = 1 participant
+        tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user_a")
+        tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user_a")
+        tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user_a")
+
+        #expect(tracker.participantCount(for: geohash) == 1)
+
+        // Different user = 2 participants
+        tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user_b")
+
+        #expect(tracker.participantCount(for: geohash) == 2)
+    }
+
+    @Test func recordParticipant_nonActiveGeohash_stillCounts() async {
+        let tracker = GeohashParticipantTracker()
+        let context = PresenceTestParticipantContext()
+        tracker.configure(context: context)
+
+        // Active geohash is different from where we're recording
+        tracker.setActiveGeohash("active_gh")
+
+        // Record to a non-active geohash (like when sampling nearby channels)
+        tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "nearby_user", geohash: "other_gh")
+
+        #expect(tracker.participantCount(for: "other_gh") == 1)
+        #expect(tracker.participantCount(for: "active_gh") == 0)
+    }
+
+    @Test func objectWillChange_firesOnNonActiveGeohashUpdate() async {
+        let tracker = GeohashParticipantTracker()
+        let context = PresenceTestParticipantContext()
+        tracker.configure(context: context)
+
+        tracker.setActiveGeohash("active_gh")
+
+        var changeCount = 0
+        let cancellable = tracker.objectWillChange.sink { _ in
+            changeCount += 1
+        }
+
+        // Record to non-active geohash
+        tracker.recordParticipant(pubkeyHex: "user1", geohash: "other_gh")
+
+        // Should fire objectWillChange even for non-active geohash
+        #expect(changeCount >= 1)
+
+        _ = cancellable // Keep alive
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Mock for Participant Context (Presence Tests)
+
+@MainActor
+private final class PresenceTestParticipantContext: GeohashParticipantContext {
+    var blockedPubkeys: Set<String> = []
+    var nicknameMap: [String: String] = [:]
+    var selfPubkey: String?
+
+    func displayNameForPubkey(_ pubkeyHex: String) -> String {
+        let suffix = String(pubkeyHex.suffix(4))
+        if let s = selfPubkey, pubkeyHex.lowercased() == s.lowercased() {
+            return "me#\(suffix)"
+        }
+        if let nick = nicknameMap[pubkeyHex.lowercased()] {
+            return "\(nick)#\(suffix)"
+        }
+        return "anon#\(suffix)"
+    }
+
+    func isBlocked(_ pubkeyHexLowercased: String) -> Bool {
+        blockedPubkeys.contains(pubkeyHexLowercased.lowercased())
+    }
+}

bitchatTests/InputValidatorTests.swift

@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ struct InputValidatorTests {
     }
 
     // MARK: - Timestamp Validation Tests
+    // BCH-01-011: Window reduced from ±1 hour to ±5 minutes
 
     @Test func currentTimestampIsValid() throws {
         let now = Date()
@@ -138,31 +139,48 @@ struct InputValidatorTests {
         #expect(result == true)
     }
 
-    @Test func timestampWithinOneHourIsValid() throws {
+    @Test func timestampWithinFiveMinutesIsValid() throws {
+        // 2 minutes ago should be valid (within 5-minute window)
+        let twoMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-2 * 60)
+        let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(twoMinutesAgo)
+        #expect(result == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test func timestampThirtyMinutesAgoIsInvalid() throws {
+        // BCH-01-011: 30 minutes is now outside the 5-minute window
         let thirtyMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-30 * 60)
         let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(thirtyMinutesAgo)
-        #expect(result == true)
-    }
-
-    @Test func timestampTwoHoursAgoIsInvalid() throws {
-        let twoHoursAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-2 * 3600)
-        let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(twoHoursAgo)
         #expect(result == false)
     }
 
-    @Test func timestampTwoHoursInFutureIsInvalid() throws {
-        let twoHoursFromNow = Date().addingTimeInterval(2 * 3600)
-        let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(twoHoursFromNow)
+    @Test func timestampTenMinutesAgoIsInvalid() throws {
+        // 10 minutes is outside the 5-minute window
+        let tenMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-10 * 60)
+        let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(tenMinutesAgo)
         #expect(result == false)
     }
 
-    @Test func timestampAtOneHourBoundaryIsValid() throws {
-        // Just slightly within the one-hour window
-        let almostOneHourAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-3599)
-        let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(almostOneHourAgo)
+    @Test func timestampTenMinutesInFutureIsInvalid() throws {
+        // 10 minutes in future is outside the 5-minute window
+        let tenMinutesFromNow = Date().addingTimeInterval(10 * 60)
+        let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(tenMinutesFromNow)
+        #expect(result == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test func timestampAtFiveMinuteBoundaryIsValid() throws {
+        // Just slightly within the five-minute window (299 seconds)
+        let almostFiveMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-299)
+        let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(almostFiveMinutesAgo)
         #expect(result == true)
     }
 
+    @Test func timestampJustOutsideFiveMinuteWindowIsInvalid() throws {
+        // Just outside the five-minute window (301 seconds)
+        let justOverFiveMinutesAgo = Date().addingTimeInterval(-301)
+        let result = InputValidator.validateTimestamp(justOverFiveMinutesAgo)
+        #expect(result == false)
+    }
+
     // MARK: - Edge Cases
 
     @Test func singleCharacterStringIsAccepted() throws {

bitchatTests/KeychainErrorHandlingTests.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+//
+// KeychainErrorHandlingTests.swift
+// bitchatTests
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+// BCH-01-009: Tests for proper keychain error classification and handling
+
+import Testing
+import Foundation
+@testable import bitchat
+
+struct KeychainErrorHandlingTests {
+
+    // MARK: - Error Classification Tests
+
+    @Test func keychainReadResult_successIsNotRecoverable() throws {
+        let result = KeychainReadResult.success(Data([1, 2, 3]))
+        #expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test func keychainReadResult_itemNotFoundIsNotRecoverable() throws {
+        let result = KeychainReadResult.itemNotFound
+        #expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test func keychainReadResult_deviceLockedIsRecoverable() throws {
+        let result = KeychainReadResult.deviceLocked
+        #expect(result.isRecoverableError == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test func keychainReadResult_authenticationFailedIsRecoverable() throws {
+        let result = KeychainReadResult.authenticationFailed
+        #expect(result.isRecoverableError == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test func keychainReadResult_accessDeniedIsNotRecoverable() throws {
+        let result = KeychainReadResult.accessDenied
+        #expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test func keychainSaveResult_successIsNotRecoverable() throws {
+        let result = KeychainSaveResult.success
+        #expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test func keychainSaveResult_duplicateItemIsRecoverable() throws {
+        let result = KeychainSaveResult.duplicateItem
+        #expect(result.isRecoverableError == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test func keychainSaveResult_deviceLockedIsRecoverable() throws {
+        let result = KeychainSaveResult.deviceLocked
+        #expect(result.isRecoverableError == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test func keychainSaveResult_storageFullIsNotRecoverable() throws {
+        let result = KeychainSaveResult.storageFull
+        #expect(result.isRecoverableError == false)
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Mock Keychain Error Simulation Tests
+
+    @Test func mockKeychain_canSimulateReadErrors() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+
+        // Simulate access denied error
+        keychain.simulatedReadError = .accessDenied
+        let result = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "testKey")
+
+        switch result {
+        case .accessDenied:
+            // Expected
+            break
+        default:
+            throw KeychainTestError("Expected accessDenied, got \(result)")
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func mockKeychain_canSimulateSaveErrors() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+
+        // Simulate storage full error
+        keychain.simulatedSaveError = .storageFull
+        let result = keychain.saveIdentityKeyWithResult(Data([1, 2, 3]), forKey: "testKey")
+
+        switch result {
+        case .storageFull:
+            // Expected
+            break
+        default:
+            throw KeychainTestError("Expected storageFull, got \(result)")
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func mockKeychain_returnsItemNotFoundForMissingKey() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let result = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "nonExistentKey")
+
+        switch result {
+        case .itemNotFound:
+            // Expected
+            break
+        default:
+            throw KeychainTestError("Expected itemNotFound, got \(result)")
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func mockKeychain_returnsSuccessForExistingKey() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let testData = Data([1, 2, 3, 4, 5])
+
+        // First save the key
+        _ = keychain.saveIdentityKey(testData, forKey: "existingKey")
+
+        // Now read it back
+        let result = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "existingKey")
+
+        switch result {
+        case .success(let data):
+            #expect(data == testData)
+        default:
+            throw KeychainTestError("Expected success, got \(result)")
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func mockKeychain_saveWithResultStoresData() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let testData = Data([10, 20, 30])
+
+        let saveResult = keychain.saveIdentityKeyWithResult(testData, forKey: "newKey")
+
+        switch saveResult {
+        case .success:
+            // Verify data was stored
+            let readResult = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "newKey")
+            switch readResult {
+            case .success(let data):
+                #expect(data == testData)
+            default:
+                throw KeychainTestError("Expected to read back saved data")
+            }
+        default:
+            throw KeychainTestError("Expected save success, got \(saveResult)")
+        }
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - NoiseEncryptionService Integration Tests
+
+    @Test func noiseEncryptionService_generatesNewIdentityWhenMissing() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+
+        // Create service with empty keychain - should generate new identity
+        let service = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
+
+        // Should have generated and saved keys
+        #expect(service.getStaticPublicKeyData().count == 32)
+        #expect(service.getSigningPublicKeyData().count == 32)
+
+        // Keys should be persisted
+        let noiseKeyResult = keychain.getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey: "noiseStaticKey")
+        switch noiseKeyResult {
+        case .success:
+            // Expected - key was saved
+            break
+        default:
+            throw KeychainTestError("Expected noise key to be saved")
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test func noiseEncryptionService_loadsExistingIdentity() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+
+        // Create first service to generate identity
+        let service1 = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
+        let originalPublicKey = service1.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        let originalSigningKey = service1.getSigningPublicKeyData()
+
+        // Create second service - should load same identity
+        let service2 = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
+
+        #expect(service2.getStaticPublicKeyData() == originalPublicKey)
+        #expect(service2.getSigningPublicKeyData() == originalSigningKey)
+    }
+
+    @Test func noiseEncryptionService_handlesAccessDeniedGracefully() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        keychain.simulatedReadError = .accessDenied
+
+        // Service should still initialize with ephemeral key
+        let service = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
+
+        // Should have an identity (ephemeral)
+        #expect(service.getStaticPublicKeyData().count == 32)
+        #expect(service.getSigningPublicKeyData().count == 32)
+    }
+
+    @Test func noiseEncryptionService_handlesDeviceLockedGracefully() throws {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        keychain.simulatedReadError = .deviceLocked
+
+        // Service should still initialize with ephemeral key
+        let service = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: keychain)
+
+        // Should have an identity (ephemeral)
+        #expect(service.getStaticPublicKeyData().count == 32)
+    }
+}
+
+// Helper error type for tests
+private struct KeychainTestError: Error, CustomStringConvertible {
+    let message: String
+    init(_ message: String) { self.message = message }
+    var description: String { message }
+}

bitchatTests/Mocks/MockKeychain.swift

@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ final class MockKeychain: KeychainManagerProtocol {
     private var storage: [String: Data] = [:]
     private var serviceStorage: [String: [String: Data]] = [:]
 
+    // BCH-01-009: Configurable error simulation for testing
+    var simulatedReadError: KeychainReadResult?
+    var simulatedSaveError: KeychainSaveResult?
+
     func saveIdentityKey(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> Bool {
         storage[key] = keyData
         return true
@@ -45,6 +49,25 @@ final class MockKeychain: KeychainManagerProtocol {
         storage["identity_noiseStaticKey"] != nil
     }
 
+    // BCH-01-009: New methods with proper error classification
+    func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
+        if let simulated = simulatedReadError {
+            return simulated
+        }
+        if let data = storage[key] {
+            return .success(data)
+        }
+        return .itemNotFound
+    }
+
+    func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult {
+        if let simulated = simulatedSaveError {
+            return simulated
+        }
+        storage[key] = keyData
+        return .success
+    }
+
     // MARK: - Generic Data Storage (consolidated from KeychainHelper)
 
     func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString?) {
@@ -76,6 +99,10 @@ final class TrackingMockKeychain: KeychainManagerProtocol {
     private var _secureClearDataCallCount = 0
     private var _secureClearStringCallCount = 0
 
+    // BCH-01-009: Configurable error simulation for testing
+    var simulatedReadError: KeychainReadResult?
+    var simulatedSaveError: KeychainSaveResult?
+
     var secureClearDataCallCount: Int {
         lock.lock()
         defer { lock.unlock() }
@@ -137,6 +164,25 @@ final class TrackingMockKeychain: KeychainManagerProtocol {
         storage["identity_noiseStaticKey"] != nil
     }
 
+    // BCH-01-009: New methods with proper error classification
+    func getIdentityKeyWithResult(forKey key: String) -> KeychainReadResult {
+        if let simulated = simulatedReadError {
+            return simulated
+        }
+        if let data = storage[key] {
+            return .success(data)
+        }
+        return .itemNotFound
+    }
+
+    func saveIdentityKeyWithResult(_ keyData: Data, forKey key: String) -> KeychainSaveResult {
+        if let simulated = simulatedSaveError {
+            return simulated
+        }
+        storage[key] = keyData
+        return .success
+    }
+
     func save(key: String, data: Data, service: String, accessible: CFString?) {
         if serviceStorage[service] == nil {
             serviceStorage[service] = [:]

bitchatTests/NotificationBlockingTests.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+//
+// NotificationBlockingTests.swift
+// bitchatTests
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+// BCH-01-012: Tests for notification blocking feature
+
+import Testing
+import Foundation
+@testable import bitchat
+
+struct NotificationBlockingTests {
+
+    // MARK: - Nostr Blocking Tests
+
+    @Test("isNostrBlocked returns true for blocked pubkeys")
+    func isNostrBlocked_returnsTrueForBlockedPubkey() {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
+
+        let testPubkey = "abc123def456".lowercased()
+
+        // Initially not blocked
+        #expect(manager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: testPubkey) == false)
+
+        // Block the pubkey
+        manager.setNostrBlocked(testPubkey, isBlocked: true)
+
+        // Now should be blocked
+        #expect(manager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: testPubkey) == true)
+
+        // Unblock
+        manager.setNostrBlocked(testPubkey, isBlocked: false)
+        #expect(manager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: testPubkey) == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test("isBlocked returns true for blocked fingerprints")
+    func isBlocked_returnsTrueForBlockedFingerprint() {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
+
+        let testFingerprint = "fingerprint123"
+
+        // Initially not blocked
+        #expect(manager.isBlocked(fingerprint: testFingerprint) == false)
+
+        // Block the fingerprint
+        manager.setBlocked(testFingerprint, isBlocked: true)
+
+        // Now should be blocked
+        #expect(manager.isBlocked(fingerprint: testFingerprint) == true)
+
+        // Unblock
+        manager.setBlocked(testFingerprint, isBlocked: false)
+        #expect(manager.isBlocked(fingerprint: testFingerprint) == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test("getBlockedNostrPubkeys returns all blocked pubkeys")
+    func getBlockedNostrPubkeys_returnsAllBlocked() {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
+
+        let pubkey1 = "pubkey1".lowercased()
+        let pubkey2 = "pubkey2".lowercased()
+        let pubkey3 = "pubkey3".lowercased()
+
+        manager.setNostrBlocked(pubkey1, isBlocked: true)
+        manager.setNostrBlocked(pubkey2, isBlocked: true)
+        manager.setNostrBlocked(pubkey3, isBlocked: true)
+
+        let blocked = manager.getBlockedNostrPubkeys()
+
+        #expect(blocked.count == 3)
+        #expect(blocked.contains(pubkey1))
+        #expect(blocked.contains(pubkey2))
+        #expect(blocked.contains(pubkey3))
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Message Blocking Tests
+
+    @Test("BitchatMessage with blocked sender is identified")
+    func bitchatMessage_blockedSenderIdentified() {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
+
+        let blockedFingerprint = "blocked_fingerprint_123"
+        manager.setBlocked(blockedFingerprint, isBlocked: true)
+
+        #expect(manager.isBlocked(fingerprint: blockedFingerprint) == true)
+    }
+
+    @Test("Case insensitive blocking for Nostr pubkeys")
+    func nostrBlocking_caseInsensitive() {
+        let keychain = MockKeychain()
+        let manager = MockIdentityManager(keychain)
+
+        let pubkeyLower = "abc123def456"
+
+        // Block lowercase
+        manager.setNostrBlocked(pubkeyLower, isBlocked: true)
+
+        // Check lowercase is blocked
+        #expect(manager.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: pubkeyLower) == true)
+
+        // Note: The API expects lowercased input, so callers must normalize
+        // This test verifies the contract that pubkeys should be lowercased before checking
+        // The fix in ChatViewModel+Nostr.swift normalizes via event.pubkey.lowercased()
+    }
+}

bitchatTests/Protocol/BinaryProtocolTests.swift

@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
         #expect(decodedPacket.signature == TestConstants.testSignature)
     }
 
+    // MARK: - Source-Based Routing Tests (v2 only)
+    
     @Test func packetWithRouteRoundTrip() throws {
         let route: [Data] = [
             try #require(Data(hexString: "0102030405060708")),
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
             try #require(Data(hexString: "2122232425262728"))
         ]
 
+        // Route is only supported for v2+ packets
         var packet = BitchatPacket(
             type: 0x01,
             senderID: route[0],
@@ -69,7 +72,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
             timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
             payload: Data("route-test".utf8),
             signature: nil,
-            ttl: 6
+            ttl: 6,
+            version: 2
         )
         packet.route = route
 
@@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
         #expect((flagsByte & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) != 0)
 
         let decoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.decode(encoded), "Failed to decode packet with route")
+        #expect(decoded.version == 2)
         let decodedRoute = try #require(decoded.route)
         #expect(decodedRoute.count == route.count)
         for (expected, actual) in zip(route, decodedRoute) {
@@ -90,6 +95,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
         let destination = try #require(Data(hexString: "8899aabbccddeeff"))
         let shortHop = Data([0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC])
 
+        // Route is only supported for v2+ packets
         var packet = BitchatPacket(
             type: 0x02,
             senderID: sender,
@@ -97,7 +103,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
             timestamp: 1_730_000_000_000,
             payload: Data("pad-test".utf8),
             signature: nil,
-            ttl: 5
+            ttl: 5,
+            version: 2
         )
         packet.route = [shortHop, destination]
 
@@ -117,6 +124,7 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
             try #require(Data(hexString: "0202020202020202"))
         ]
         let repeatedString = String(repeating: "compress-me", count: 150)
+        // Route is only supported for v2+ packets
         var packet = BitchatPacket(
             type: 0x03,
             senderID: route[0],
@@ -124,7 +132,8 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
             timestamp: 1_740_000_000_000,
             payload: Data(repeatedString.utf8),
             signature: nil,
-            ttl: 7
+            ttl: 7,
+            version: 2
         )
         packet.route = route
 
@@ -135,6 +144,146 @@ struct BinaryProtocolTests {
         #expect(decodedRoute == route)
     }
     
+    @Test func v1PacketIgnoresRouteOnEncode() throws {
+        // v1 packets should NOT include route even if route is set on the packet object
+        let route: [Data] = [
+            try #require(Data(hexString: "0102030405060708")),
+            try #require(Data(hexString: "1112131415161718"))
+        ]
+        
+        var packet = BitchatPacket(
+            type: 0x01,
+            senderID: route[0],
+            recipientID: route.last,
+            timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
+            payload: Data("v1-no-route".utf8),
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: 6
+            // version defaults to 1 (v1 packet)
+        )
+        packet.route = route  // route is set but should be ignored for v1
+        
+        let encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(packet), "Failed to encode v1 packet")
+        
+        // HAS_ROUTE flag should NOT be set for v1 packets
+        let flagsByte = encoded[BinaryProtocol.Offsets.flags]
+        #expect((flagsByte & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) == 0, "v1 packet should not have HAS_ROUTE flag set")
+        
+        // Decoded packet should have no route
+        let decoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.decode(encoded), "Failed to decode v1 packet")
+        #expect(decoded.version == 1)
+        #expect(decoded.route == nil, "v1 packet should decode with nil route")
+        #expect(decoded.payload == Data("v1-no-route".utf8))
+    }
+    
+    @Test func v2PacketIncludesRouteOnEncode() throws {
+        // v2 packets SHOULD include route when route is set
+        let route: [Data] = [
+            try #require(Data(hexString: "0102030405060708")),
+            try #require(Data(hexString: "1112131415161718"))
+        ]
+        
+        var packet = BitchatPacket(
+            type: 0x01,
+            senderID: route[0],
+            recipientID: route.last,
+            timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
+            payload: Data("v2-with-route".utf8),
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: 6,
+            version: 2
+        )
+        packet.route = route
+        
+        let encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(packet), "Failed to encode v2 packet")
+        
+        // HAS_ROUTE flag SHOULD be set for v2 packets with route
+        let flagsByte = encoded[BinaryProtocol.Offsets.flags]
+        #expect((flagsByte & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) != 0, "v2 packet should have HAS_ROUTE flag set")
+        
+        // Decoded packet should have route
+        let decoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.decode(encoded), "Failed to decode v2 packet")
+        #expect(decoded.version == 2)
+        let decodedRoute = try #require(decoded.route, "v2 packet should decode with route")
+        #expect(decodedRoute.count == route.count)
+        #expect(decoded.payload == Data("v2-with-route".utf8))
+    }
+    
+    @Test func v2PacketWithoutRouteDecodesCorrectly() throws {
+        // v2 packet without route should still work
+        let sender = try #require(Data(hexString: "0011223344556677"))
+        let recipient = try #require(Data(hexString: "8899aabbccddeeff"))
+        
+        let packet = BitchatPacket(
+            type: 0x02,
+            senderID: sender,
+            recipientID: recipient,
+            timestamp: 1_750_000_000_000,
+            payload: Data("v2-no-route".utf8),
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: 5,
+            version: 2
+        )
+        // route is nil by default
+        
+        let encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(packet), "Failed to encode v2 packet without route")
+        
+        // HAS_ROUTE flag should NOT be set when no route
+        let flagsByte = encoded[BinaryProtocol.Offsets.flags]
+        #expect((flagsByte & BinaryProtocol.Flags.hasRoute) == 0, "v2 packet without route should not have HAS_ROUTE flag")
+        
+        let decoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.decode(encoded), "Failed to decode v2 packet without route")
+        #expect(decoded.version == 2)
+        #expect(decoded.route == nil)
+        #expect(decoded.payload == Data("v2-no-route".utf8))
+    }
+    
+    @Test func v1AndV2PayloadLengthDifference() throws {
+        // Verify that payloadLength does NOT include route bytes
+        // by comparing encoded sizes
+        let route: [Data] = [
+            try #require(Data(hexString: "0102030405060708"))
+        ]
+        let payloadData = Data("test-payload".utf8)
+        
+        // v1 packet (route ignored)
+        var v1Packet = BitchatPacket(
+            type: 0x01,
+            senderID: route[0],
+            recipientID: nil,
+            timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
+            payload: payloadData,
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: 6
+            // version defaults to 1
+        )
+        v1Packet.route = route  // will be ignored for v1
+        
+        // v2 packet with same payload but route included
+        var v2Packet = BitchatPacket(
+            type: 0x01,
+            senderID: route[0],
+            recipientID: nil,
+            timestamp: 1_720_000_000_000,
+            payload: payloadData,
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: 6,
+            version: 2
+        )
+        v2Packet.route = route
+        
+        let v1Encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(v1Packet, padding: false))
+        let v2Encoded = try #require(BinaryProtocol.encode(v2Packet, padding: false))
+        
+        // v2 should be larger by: 2 bytes (header length field difference) + 1 byte (route count) + 8 bytes (one hop)
+        // Header: v1=14, v2=16 -> +2 bytes
+        // Route: 1 + 8 = 9 bytes
+        // Total expected difference: 11 bytes
+        let expectedDiff = 2 + 1 + 8  // header diff + route count + one hop
+        #expect(v2Encoded.count - v1Encoded.count == expectedDiff, 
+                "v2 packet should be \(expectedDiff) bytes larger than v1 (actual diff: \(v2Encoded.count - v1Encoded.count))")
+    }
+    
     // MARK: - Compression Tests
     
     @Test("Create a large, compressible payload above current threshold (2048B)")

bitchatTests/Services/MeshTopologyTrackerTests.swift

@@ -20,9 +20,13 @@ struct MeshTopologyTrackerTests {
         let a = try hex("0102030405060708")
         let b = try hex("1112131415161718")
 
-        tracker.recordDirectLink(between: a, and: b)
+        // Bidirectional announcement
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a])
+        
         let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: b))
-        #expect(route == [a, b])
+        // Direct connection returns empty route (no intermediate hops)
+        #expect(route == [])
     }
 
     @Test func multiHopRouteComputation() throws {
@@ -32,41 +36,38 @@ struct MeshTopologyTrackerTests {
         let c = try hex("2021222324252627")
         let d = try hex("3031323334353637")
 
-        tracker.recordDirectLink(between: a, and: b)
-        tracker.recordDirectLink(between: b, and: c)
-        tracker.recordDirectLink(between: c, and: d)
+        // Bidirectional announcements for A-B, B-C, C-D
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a, c])
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: c, neighbors: [b, d])
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: d, neighbors: [c])
 
         let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: d))
-        #expect(route == [a, b, c, d])
+        // Route should only contain intermediate hops (b, c), excluding start (a) and end (d)
+        #expect(route == [b, c])
     }
 
-    @Test func recordRouteAddsEdges() throws {
-        let tracker = MeshTopologyTracker()
-        var a = Data([0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC])
-        let b = try hex("4445464748494A4B")
-        let c = try hex("5455565758595A5B")
-
-        tracker.recordRoute([a, b, c])
-
-        a.append(Data(repeating: 0, count: BinaryProtocol.senderIDSize - a.count))
-        let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c))
-        #expect(route.first == a)
-        #expect(route.last == c)
-    }
-
-    @Test func removingDirectLinkBreaksRoute() throws {
+    @Test func unconfirmedEdgeDoesNotRoute() throws {
         let tracker = MeshTopologyTracker()
         let a = try hex("0101010101010101")
         let b = try hex("0202020202020202")
         let c = try hex("0303030303030303")
 
-        tracker.recordDirectLink(between: a, and: b)
-        tracker.recordDirectLink(between: b, and: c)
-        let initialRoute = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c))
-        #expect(initialRoute == [a, b, c])
+        // A announces B (confirmed)
+        // B announces A, C (confirmed A-B, unconfirmed B-C)
+        // C does NOT announce B
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a, c])
+        // C is silent or announces empty
 
-        tracker.removeDirectLink(between: b, and: c)
+        // Should NOT find route A->C because B->C is unconfirmed (C didn't announce B)
         #expect(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c) == nil)
+        
+        // Now C announces B
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: c, neighbors: [b])
+        // Should find route
+        let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c))
+        #expect(route == [b])
     }
 
     @Test func removingPeerClearsEdges() throws {
@@ -75,12 +76,28 @@ struct MeshTopologyTrackerTests {
         let b = try hex("0A0B0C0D0E0F0001")
         let c = try hex("0011223344556677")
 
-        tracker.recordRoute([a, b, c])
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a, c])
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: c, neighbors: [b])
+
         let initialRoute = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c))
-        #expect(initialRoute == [a, b, c])
+        #expect(initialRoute == [b])
 
         tracker.removePeer(b)
         #expect(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: c) == nil)
     }
 
+    @Test func sameStartAndEndReturnsEmptyRoute() throws {
+        let tracker = MeshTopologyTracker()
+        let a = try hex("0102030405060708")
+        let b = try hex("1112131415161718")
+
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: a, neighbors: [b])
+        tracker.updateNeighbors(for: b, neighbors: [a])
+        
+        // When start == end, route should be empty (no intermediate hops needed)
+        let route = try #require(tracker.computeRoute(from: a, to: a))
+        #expect(route == [])
+    }
+
 }

bitchatTests/SubscriptionRateLimitTests.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+//
+// SubscriptionRateLimitTests.swift
+// bitchatTests
+//
+// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
+// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
+//
+
+import Testing
+import Foundation
+@testable import bitchat
+
+/// Tests for BCH-01-004 fix: Rate-limiting subscription-triggered announces
+/// to prevent device enumeration attacks
+struct SubscriptionRateLimitTests {
+
+    @Test("Rate limit configuration values are sensible")
+    func rateLimitConfigurationValues() {
+        // Minimum interval should be at least 1 second to slow enumeration
+        #expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds >= 1.0)
+
+        // Backoff factor should be > 1 for exponential backoff
+        #expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitBackoffFactor > 1.0)
+
+        // Max backoff should be reasonable (not hours)
+        #expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds <= 60.0)
+        #expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds >= TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds)
+
+        // Window should be long enough to track repeated attempts
+        #expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitWindowSeconds >= 30.0)
+
+        // Max attempts before suppression should be > 1 to allow legitimate reconnects
+        #expect(TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxAttempts >= 2)
+    }
+
+    @Test("Exponential backoff calculation is correct")
+    func exponentialBackoffCalculation() {
+        let minInterval = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds
+        let factor = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitBackoffFactor
+        let maxBackoff = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxBackoffSeconds
+
+        // Simulate backoff progression
+        var currentBackoff = minInterval
+        var iterations = 0
+        let maxIterations = 10
+
+        while currentBackoff < maxBackoff && iterations < maxIterations {
+            let nextBackoff = min(currentBackoff * factor, maxBackoff)
+            #expect(nextBackoff >= currentBackoff, "Backoff should increase or stay at max")
+            currentBackoff = nextBackoff
+            iterations += 1
+        }
+
+        // Should reach max within reasonable iterations
+        #expect(iterations <= maxIterations, "Backoff should reach max within \(maxIterations) iterations")
+        #expect(currentBackoff == maxBackoff, "Final backoff should equal max")
+    }
+
+    @Test("Rate limiting would significantly slow enumeration attacks")
+    func rateLimitingSlowsEnumeration() {
+        // Without rate limiting: ~120 devices/minute (0.5 seconds per device)
+        // With rate limiting: minimum interval enforced
+
+        let minInterval = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds
+        let devicesPerMinuteWithRateLimit = 60.0 / minInterval
+
+        // Should be significantly slower than 120 devices/minute
+        #expect(devicesPerMinuteWithRateLimit < 60, "Rate limiting should significantly slow enumeration")
+
+        // With 2-second minimum interval, max ~30 devices/minute per connection
+        // And with backoff, repeated attempts are even slower
+        #expect(devicesPerMinuteWithRateLimit <= 30, "With 2s minimum, should be <=30/min")
+    }
+
+    @Test("Max attempts threshold prevents complete enumeration")
+    func maxAttemptsThresholdPreventsEnumeration() {
+        let maxAttempts = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMaxAttempts
+        let minInterval = TransportConfig.bleSubscriptionRateLimitMinSeconds
+
+        // After max attempts within window, announces are suppressed entirely
+        // This means an attacker gets at most maxAttempts announces per window
+        #expect(maxAttempts >= 2, "Should allow at least 2 attempts for legitimate reconnects")
+        #expect(maxAttempts <= 10, "Should cap attempts to prevent enumeration")
+
+        // With 5 attempts max and 2s minimum interval, attacker gets limited info
+        let maxAnnounces = maxAttempts
+        #expect(maxAnnounces <= 10, "Max announces per window should be limited")
+    }
+}

bitchatTests/Utils/PeerIDTests.swift

@@ -426,4 +426,70 @@ struct PeerIDTests {
         #expect(!PeerID(str: "nostr:\(hex65)").isValid)
         #expect(!PeerID(str: "nostr_\(hex65)").isValid)
     }
+
+    // MARK: - File Transfer PeerID Normalization
+    // These tests verify the fix for asymmetric voice/media delivery (BCH-01-XXX)
+    // The bug occurred when selectedPrivateChatPeer was migrated to 64-hex stable key
+    // but the receiver expected SHA256-derived 16-hex format
+
+    @Test func fileTransfer_toShortNormalizesNoiseKeyToFingerprint() {
+        // Given: A 64-hex Noise public key (what selectedPrivateChatPeer becomes after session)
+        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xAB, count: 32)
+        let stableKeyPeerID = PeerID(hexData: noiseKey)  // 64-hex
+
+        // When: Convert to short form (what sendFilePrivate should do)
+        let shortID = stableKeyPeerID.toShort()
+
+        // Then: Should be 16-hex SHA256 fingerprint (matching myPeerID format)
+        let expected = noiseKey.sha256Fingerprint().prefix(16)
+        #expect(shortID.id == String(expected))
+        #expect(shortID.id.count == 16)
+    }
+
+    @Test func fileTransfer_shortIDMatchesMyPeerIDFormat() {
+        // Given: A receiver's myPeerID is SHA256-derived (from refreshPeerIdentity)
+        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xCD, count: 32)
+        let myPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)  // SHA256-derived 16-hex
+
+        // When: Sender uses toShort() on 64-hex stable key
+        let senderStableKey = PeerID(hexData: noiseKey)  // 64-hex
+        let recipientData = Data(hexString: senderStableKey.toShort().id)!
+        let receivedRecipientID = PeerID(hexData: recipientData)
+
+        // Then: Should match receiver's myPeerID (file transfer accepted)
+        #expect(receivedRecipientID == myPeerID)
+    }
+
+    @Test func fileTransfer_truncatedRawKeyDoesNotMatchMyPeerID() {
+        // This test demonstrates the bug we fixed
+        // When 64-hex was truncated to first 8 bytes instead of using SHA256 fingerprint
+
+        // Given: Receiver's myPeerID is SHA256-derived
+        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xEF, count: 32)
+        let myPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: noiseKey)  // SHA256-derived 16-hex
+
+        // When: Truncate raw key (the OLD buggy behavior)
+        let truncatedRaw = noiseKey.prefix(8)  // First 8 bytes of raw key
+        let wrongRecipientID = PeerID(hexData: truncatedRaw)
+
+        // Then: Should NOT match (demonstrates why fix was needed)
+        #expect(wrongRecipientID != myPeerID)
+    }
+
+    @Test func fileTransfer_shortIDProducesCorrect8ByteRoutingData() {
+        // Verify the wire format is correct (8 bytes for BinaryProtocol)
+        let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0x12, count: 32)
+        let stableKeyPeerID = PeerID(hexData: noiseKey)
+        let shortID = stableKeyPeerID.toShort()
+
+        // routingData should be 8 bytes (16 hex chars -> 8 bytes)
+        let routingData = shortID.routingData
+        #expect(routingData != nil)
+        #expect(routingData?.count == 8)
+
+        // And it should match SHA256 fingerprint first 8 bytes
+        let expectedFingerprint = noiseKey.sha256Fingerprint()
+        let expectedFirst8 = Data(hexString: String(expectedFingerprint.prefix(16)))
+        #expect(routingData == expectedFirst8)
+    }
 }

docs/GeohashPresenceSpec.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Geohash Presence Specification
+
+## Overview
+
+The Geohash Presence feature provides a mechanism to track online participants in geohash-based location channels. It uses a dedicated ephemeral Nostr event kind to broadcast "heartbeats," ensuring accurate and privacy-preserving online counts.
+
+## Nostr Protocol
+
+### Event Kind
+A new ephemeral event kind is defined for presence heartbeats:
+- **Kind:** `20001` (`GEOHASH_PRESENCE`)
+- **Type:** Ephemeral (not stored by relays long-term)
+
+### Event Structure
+The presence event mimics the structure of a geohash chat message (Kind 20000) but without content or nickname metadata, to minimize overhead and focus purely on "liveness".
+
+```json
+{
+  "kind": 20001,
+  "created_at": <timestamp>,
+  "tags": [
+    ["g", "<geohash>"]
+  ],
+  "content": "",
+  "pubkey": "<geohash_derived_pubkey>",
+  "id": "<event_id>",
+  "sig": "<signature>"
+}
+```
+
+*   **`content`**: Must be empty string.
+*   **`tags`**: Must include `["g", "<geohash>"]`. Should NOT include `["n", "<nickname>"]`.
+*   **`pubkey`**: The ephemeral identity derived specifically for this geohash (same as used for chat messages).
+
+## Client Behavior
+
+### 1. Broadcasting Presence
+
+Clients MUST broadcast a Kind 20001 presence event globally when the app is open, regardless of which screen the user is viewing.
+
+*   **Global Heartbeat:**
+    *   **Trigger:** Application start / initialization, or whenever location (available geohashes) changes.
+    *   **Frequency:** Randomized loop interval between **40s and 80s** (average 60s).
+    *   **Scope:** Sent to *all* geohash channels corresponding to the device's *current physical location*.
+    *   **Privacy Restriction:** Presence MUST ONLY be broadcast to low-precision geohash levels to protect user privacy. Specifically:
+        *   **Allowed:** `REGION` (precision 2), `PROVINCE` (precision 4), `CITY` (precision 5).
+        *   **Denied:** `NEIGHBORHOOD` (precision 6), `BLOCK` (precision 7), `BUILDING` (precision 8+).
+    *   **Decorrelation:** Individual broadcasts within a heartbeat loop must be separated by random delays (e.g., 2-5 seconds) to prevent temporal correlation of public keys across different geohash levels. The main loop delay is adjusted to maintain the target average cadence.
+
+### 2. Subscribing to Presence
+
+Clients must update their Nostr filters to listen for both chat and presence events on geohash channels.
+
+*   **Filter:**
+    *   `kinds`: `[20000, 20001]`
+    *   `#g`: `["<geohash>"]`
+
+### 3. Participant Counting
+
+The "online participants" count shown in the UI aggregates unique public keys from both presence heartbeats and active chat messages.
+
+*   **Logic:**
+    *   Maintain a map of `pubkey -> last_seen_timestamp` for each geohash.
+    *   Update `last_seen_timestamp` upon receiving a valid **Kind 20001 (Presence)** OR **Kind 20000 (Chat)** event.
+    *   A participant is considered "online" if their `last_seen_timestamp` is within the last **5 minutes**.
+
+### 4. UI Presentation
+
+The presentation of the participant count depends on the geohash precision level and data availability.
+
+*   **Standard Display:** For channels where presence is broadcast (Region, Province, City) OR any channel where at least one participant has been detected, show the exact count: `[N people]`.
+*   **High-Precision Uncertainty:** For high-precision channels (Neighborhood, Block, Building) where:
+    *   Presence broadcasting is disabled (privacy restriction).
+    *   **AND** the detected participant count is `0`.
+    *   **Display:** `[? people]`
+    *   **Reasoning:** Since clients don't announce themselves in these channels, a count of "0" is misleading (people could be lurking).
+
+### 5. Implementation Details (Android Reference)
+
+*   **`NostrKind.GEOHASH_PRESENCE`**: Added constant `20001`.
+*   **`NostrProtocol.createGeohashPresenceEvent`**: Helper to generate the event.
+*   **`GeohashViewModel`**:
+    *   `startGlobalPresenceHeartbeat()`: Coroutine that `collectLatest` on `LocationChannelManager.availableChannels`.
+    *   Implements randomized loop logic (40-80s) and per-broadcast random delays (2-5s).
+    *   Filters channels by `precision <= 5` before broadcasting.
+*   **`GeohashMessageHandler`**:
+    *   Refactored `onEvent` to update participant counts for both Kind 20000 and 20001.
+*   **`LocationChannelsSheet`**:
+    *   Implements the `[? people]` display logic for high-precision, zero-count channels.
+
+## Benefits
+
+*   **Accuracy:** Counts reflect both active listeners (via heartbeats) and active speakers (via messages).
+*   **Privacy:** High-precision location presence is NOT broadcast. Temporal correlation between different levels is obfuscated via random delays.
+*   **Consistency:** "Online" status is maintained globally while the app is open.
+*   **Transparency:** The UI correctly reflects uncertainty (`?`) when privacy rules prevent accurate passive counting.

docs/SOURCE_ROUTING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# Source-Based Routing for BitChat Packets (v2)
+
+This document specifies the Source-Based Routing extension (v2) for the BitChat protocol. This upgrade enables efficient unicast routing across the mesh by allowing senders to specify an explicit path of intermediate relays.
+
+**Status:** Implemented in Android and iOS. Backward compatible (v1 clients ignore routing data).
+
+---
+
+## 1. Protocol Versioning & Layering
+
+To support source routing and larger payloads, the packet format has been upgraded to **Version 2**.
+
+*   **Version 1 (Legacy):** 2-byte payload length limit. Ignores routing flags.
+*   **Version 2 (Current):** 4-byte payload length limit. Supports Source Routing.
+
+**Key Rule:** The `HAS_ROUTE (0x08)` flag is **only valid** if the packet `version >= 2`. Relays receiving a v1 packet must ignore this flag even if set.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Packet Structure Comparison
+
+The following diagram illustrates the structural differences between a standard v1 packet and a source-routed v2 packet.
+
+### V1 Packet (Legacy)
+```text
++-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------+
+| Fixed Header (14) | Variable Sections                                       |
++-------------------+----------+-------------+------------------+-------------+
+| Ver: 1 (1B)       | SenderID | RecipientID | Payload          | Signature   |
+| Type, TTL, etc.   | (8B)     | (8B)        | (Length in Head) | (64B)       |
+| Len: 2 Bytes      |          | (Optional)  |                  | (Optional)  |
++-------------------+----------+-------------+------------------+-------------+
+```
+
+### V2 Packet (Source Routed)
+```text
++-------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Fixed Header (16) | Variable Sections                                                           |
++-------------------+----------+-------------+-----------------------+------------------+-------------+
+| Ver: 2 (1B)       | SenderID | RecipientID | SOURCE ROUTE          | Payload          | Signature   |
+| Type, TTL, etc.   | (8B)     | (8B)        | (Variable)            | (Length in Head) | (64B)       |
+| Len: 4 Bytes      |          | (Required*) | Only if HAS_ROUTE=1   |                  | (Optional)  |
++-------------------+----------+-------------+-----------------------+------------------+-------------+
+```
+
+**(*) Note:** A `Route` can be attached to **any** packet type that has a `RecipientID` (flag `HAS_RECIPIENT` set).
+
+### Fixed Header Differences
+
+| Field | Size (v1) | Size (v2) | Description |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **Version** | 1 byte | 1 byte | `0x01` vs `0x02` |
+| **Payload Length** | **2 bytes** | **4 bytes** | `UInt32` in v2 to support large files. **Excludes** route/IDs/sig. |
+| **Total Size** | **14 bytes** | **16 bytes** | V2 header is 2 bytes larger. |
+
+---
+
+## 3. Source Route Specification
+
+The `Source Route` field is a variable-length list of **intermediate hops** that the packet must traverse.
+
+*   **Location:** Immediately follows `RecipientID`.
+*   **Structure:**
+    *   `Count` (1 byte): Number of intermediate hops (`N`).
+    *   `Hops` (`N * 8` bytes): Sequence of Peer IDs.
+
+### Intermediate Hops Only
+The route list MUST contain **only** the intermediate relays between the sender and the recipient.
+*   **DO NOT** include the `SenderID` (it is already in the packet).
+*   **DO NOT** include the `RecipientID` (it is already in the packet).
+
+**Example:**
+Topology: `Alice (Sender) -> Bob -> Charlie -> Dave (Recipient)`
+*   Packet `SenderID`: Alice
+*   Packet `RecipientID`: Dave
+*   Packet `Route`: `[Bob, Charlie]` (Count = 2)
+
+---
+
+## 4. Topology Discovery (Gossip)
+
+To calculate routes, nodes need a view of the network topology. This is achieved via a **Neighbor List** extension to the `IdentityAnnouncement` packet.
+
+The `ANNOUNCE` packet payload now consists of a sequence of TLVs. The standard identity information is followed by an optional Gossip TLV.
+
+*   **Mechanism:** Appended to the `IdentityAnnouncement` payload.
+*   **New TLV Type:** `0x04` (Direct Neighbors).
+*   **Content:** A list of Peer IDs that the announcing node is directly connected to.
+
+**TLV Structure (Type 0x04):**
+```text
+[Type: 0x04] [Length: 1B] [NeighborID1 (8B)] [NeighborID2 (8B)] ...
+```
+The `Length` field indicates the total size of the neighbor IDs in bytes (N * 8). There is no explicit count field.
+
+Nodes receiving this TLV update their local mesh graph, linking the sender to the listed neighbors.
+
+### Edge Verification (Two-Way Handshake)
+
+To prevent spoofing and routing through stale connections, the Mesh Graph service implements a strict two-way handshake verification:
+
+*   **Unconfirmed Edge:** If Peer A announces Peer B, but Peer B does *not* announce Peer A, the connection is treated as **unconfirmed**. Unconfirmed edges are visualized as dotted lines in debug tools but are **excluded** from route calculations.
+*   **Confirmed Edge:** An edge is only valid for routing when **both** peers explicitly announce each other in their neighbor lists. This ensures that the connection is bidirectional and currently active from both perspectives.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Fragmentation & Source Routing
+
+When a large source-routed packet (e.g., File Transfer) exceeds the MTU and requires fragmentation:
+
+1.  **Version Inheritance:** All fragments MUST be marked as **Version 2**.
+2.  **Route Inheritance:** All fragments MUST contain the **exact same Route field** as the parent packet.
+
+**Why?** If fragments were sent as v1 packets or without routes, they would fall back to flooding, negating the bandwidth benefits of source routing for large data transfers.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Security & Signing
+
+Source routing is fully secured by the existing Ed25519 signature scheme.
+
+*   **Scope:** The signature covers the **entire packet structure** (Header + Sender + Recipient + Route + Payload).
+*   **Verification:** The receiver verifies the signature against the `SenderID`'s public key.
+*   **Integrity:** Any tampering with the route list by malicious relays will invalidate the signature, causing the packet to be dropped by the destination.
+
+**Signature Input Construction:**
+Serialize the packet exactly as transmitted, but temporarily set `TTL = 0` and remove the `Signature` bytes.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Relay Logic
+
+When a node receives a packet **not** addressed to itself:
+
+1.  **Check Route:**
+    *   Is `Version >= 2`?
+    *   Is `HAS_ROUTE` flag set?
+    *   Is the route list non-empty?
+2.  **If YES (Source Routed):**
+    *   Find local Peer ID in the route list at index `i`.
+    *   **Next Hop:** The peer at `i + 1`.
+    *   **Last Hop:** If `i` is the last index, the Next Hop is the `RecipientID`.
+    *   **Action:** Attempt to unicast (`sendToPeer`) to the Next Hop.
+    *   **Fallback:** If the Next Hop is unreachable, **fall back to broadcast/flood** to ensure delivery.
+3.  **If NO (Standard):**
+    *   Flood the packet to all connected neighbors (subject to TTL and probability rules).

localPackages/Arti/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+/target/
+/.build/
+/.swiftpm/

localPackages/Arti/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[workspace]
+resolver = "2"
+members = ["arti-bitchat"]
+
+[profile.release]
+opt-level = "z"
+lto = "fat"
+codegen-units = 1
+panic = "abort"
+strip = "symbols"

localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti.xcframework/Info.plist

@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@
 	<array>
 		<dict>
 			<key>BinaryPath</key>
-			<string>tor-nolzma.framework/tor-nolzma</string>
+			<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
+			<key>HeadersPath</key>
+			<string>Headers</string>
 			<key>LibraryIdentifier</key>
 			<string>macos-arm64</string>
 			<key>LibraryPath</key>
-			<string>tor-nolzma.framework</string>
+			<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
 			<key>SupportedArchitectures</key>
 			<array>
 				<string>arm64</string>
@@ -20,11 +22,29 @@
 		</dict>
 		<dict>
 			<key>BinaryPath</key>
-			<string>tor-nolzma.framework/tor-nolzma</string>
+			<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
+			<key>HeadersPath</key>
+			<string>Headers</string>
+			<key>LibraryIdentifier</key>
+			<string>ios-arm64</string>
+			<key>LibraryPath</key>
+			<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
+			<key>SupportedArchitectures</key>
+			<array>
+				<string>arm64</string>
+			</array>
+			<key>SupportedPlatform</key>
+			<string>ios</string>
+		</dict>
+		<dict>
+			<key>BinaryPath</key>
+			<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
+			<key>HeadersPath</key>
+			<string>Headers</string>
 			<key>LibraryIdentifier</key>
 			<string>ios-arm64-simulator</string>
 			<key>LibraryPath</key>
-			<string>tor-nolzma.framework</string>
+			<string>libarti_bitchat.a</string>
 			<key>SupportedArchitectures</key>
 			<array>
 				<string>arm64</string>
@@ -34,20 +54,6 @@
 			<key>SupportedPlatformVariant</key>
 			<string>simulator</string>
 		</dict>
-		<dict>
-			<key>BinaryPath</key>
-			<string>tor-nolzma.framework/tor-nolzma</string>
-			<key>LibraryIdentifier</key>
-			<string>ios-arm64</string>
-			<key>LibraryPath</key>
-			<string>tor-nolzma.framework</string>
-			<key>SupportedArchitectures</key>
-			<array>
-				<string>arm64</string>
-			</array>
-			<key>SupportedPlatform</key>
-			<string>ios</string>
-		</dict>
 	</array>
 	<key>CFBundlePackageType</key>
 	<string>XFWK</string>

localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/Headers/arti.h

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef ARTI_H
+#define ARTI_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+/**
+ * Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
+ *
+ * # Arguments
+ * * `data_dir` - Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
+ * * `socks_port` - Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if already running
+ * * -2 if data_dir is invalid
+ * * -3 if runtime initialization failed
+ * * -4 if bootstrap failed
+ */
+int arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
+
+/**
+ * Stop Arti gracefully.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_stop(void);
+
+/**
+ * Check if Arti is currently running.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 1 if running
+ * * 0 if not running
+ */
+int arti_is_running(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
+ */
+int arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap summary string.
+ *
+ * # Arguments
+ * * `buf` - Buffer to write the summary into
+ * * `len` - Length of the buffer
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * Number of bytes written (not including null terminator)
+ * * -1 if buffer is null or too small
+ */
+int arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int len);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
+ * This is a hint; Arti may not fully support dormant mode yet.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_go_dormant(void);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_wake(void);
+
+#endif  /* ARTI_H */

localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti.xcframework/ios-arm64/Headers/arti.h

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef ARTI_H
+#define ARTI_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+/**
+ * Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
+ *
+ * # Arguments
+ * * `data_dir` - Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
+ * * `socks_port` - Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if already running
+ * * -2 if data_dir is invalid
+ * * -3 if runtime initialization failed
+ * * -4 if bootstrap failed
+ */
+int arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
+
+/**
+ * Stop Arti gracefully.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_stop(void);
+
+/**
+ * Check if Arti is currently running.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 1 if running
+ * * 0 if not running
+ */
+int arti_is_running(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
+ */
+int arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap summary string.
+ *
+ * # Arguments
+ * * `buf` - Buffer to write the summary into
+ * * `len` - Length of the buffer
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * Number of bytes written (not including null terminator)
+ * * -1 if buffer is null or too small
+ */
+int arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int len);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
+ * This is a hint; Arti may not fully support dormant mode yet.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_go_dormant(void);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_wake(void);
+
+#endif  /* ARTI_H */

localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/arti.xcframework/macos-arm64/Headers/arti.h

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef ARTI_H
+#define ARTI_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+/**
+ * Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
+ *
+ * # Arguments
+ * * `data_dir` - Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
+ * * `socks_port` - Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if already running
+ * * -2 if data_dir is invalid
+ * * -3 if runtime initialization failed
+ * * -4 if bootstrap failed
+ */
+int arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
+
+/**
+ * Stop Arti gracefully.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_stop(void);
+
+/**
+ * Check if Arti is currently running.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 1 if running
+ * * 0 if not running
+ */
+int arti_is_running(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
+ */
+int arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap summary string.
+ *
+ * # Arguments
+ * * `buf` - Buffer to write the summary into
+ * * `len` - Length of the buffer
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * Number of bytes written (not including null terminator)
+ * * -1 if buffer is null or too small
+ */
+int arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int len);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
+ * This is a hint; Arti may not fully support dormant mode yet.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_go_dormant(void);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_wake(void);
+
+#endif  /* ARTI_H */

localPackages/Arti/Frameworks/include/arti.h

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef ARTI_H
+#define ARTI_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+/**
+ * Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
+ *
+ * # Arguments
+ * * `data_dir` - Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
+ * * `socks_port` - Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if already running
+ * * -2 if data_dir is invalid
+ * * -3 if runtime initialization failed
+ * * -4 if bootstrap failed
+ */
+int arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
+
+/**
+ * Stop Arti gracefully.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_stop(void);
+
+/**
+ * Check if Arti is currently running.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 1 if running
+ * * 0 if not running
+ */
+int arti_is_running(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
+ */
+int arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap summary string.
+ *
+ * # Arguments
+ * * `buf` - Buffer to write the summary into
+ * * `len` - Length of the buffer
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * Number of bytes written (not including null terminator)
+ * * -1 if buffer is null or too small
+ */
+int arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int len);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
+ * This is a hint; Arti may not fully support dormant mode yet.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_go_dormant(void);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
+ *
+ * # Returns
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -1 if not running
+ */
+int arti_wake(void);
+
+#endif  /* ARTI_H */

localPackages/Arti/Package.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// swift-tools-version:5.9
+import PackageDescription
+
+let package = Package(
+    name: "Tor",  // Keep name "Tor" for drop-in compatibility
+    platforms: [
+        .iOS(.v16),
+        .macOS(.v13),
+    ],
+    products: [
+        .library(
+            name: "Tor",
+            targets: ["Tor"]
+        ),
+    ],
+    dependencies: [
+        .package(path: "../BitLogger"),
+    ],
+    targets: [
+        // Main Swift target
+        .target(
+            name: "Tor",
+            dependencies: [
+                "arti",
+                .product(name: "BitLogger", package: "BitLogger"),
+            ],
+            path: "Sources",
+            exclude: ["C"],
+            sources: [
+                "TorManager.swift",
+                "TorURLSession.swift",
+                "TorNotifications.swift",
+            ],
+            linkerSettings: [
+                .linkedLibrary("resolv"),
+                .linkedLibrary("z"),
+                .linkedLibrary("sqlite3"),
+            ]
+        ),
+        // Binary framework containing the Rust static library
+        .binaryTarget(
+            name: "arti",
+            path: "Frameworks/arti.xcframework"
+        ),
+    ]
+)

localPackages/Arti/Sources/C/arti_shim.c

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+// Empty shim file to satisfy SPM target requirements.
+// The actual implementation is in the Rust static library (arti.xcframework).
+// This file exists only to make SPM happy with a C target.

localPackages/Arti/Sources/C/include/arti.h

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#ifndef ARTI_H
+#define ARTI_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
+ *
+ * @param data_dir Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
+ * @param socks_port Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
+ * @return 0 on success, negative on error:
+ *         -1: already running
+ *         -2: invalid data_dir
+ *         -3: runtime initialization failed
+ *         -4: bootstrap failed
+ */
+int32_t arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
+
+/**
+ * Stop Arti gracefully.
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success, -1 if not running
+ */
+int32_t arti_stop(void);
+
+/**
+ * Check if Arti is currently running.
+ *
+ * @return 1 if running, 0 if not running
+ */
+int32_t arti_is_running(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
+ *
+ * @return Progress percentage
+ */
+int32_t arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap summary string.
+ *
+ * @param buf Buffer to write the summary into
+ * @param len Length of the buffer
+ * @return Number of bytes written, -1 on error
+ */
+int32_t arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int32_t len);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success, -1 if not running
+ */
+int32_t arti_go_dormant(void);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success, -1 if not running
+ */
+int32_t arti_wake(void);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ARTI_H */

localPackages/Arti/Sources/C/include/module.modulemap

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+module ArtiC {
+    header "arti.h"
+    export *
+}

localPackages/Arti/Sources/TorManager.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+import BitLogger
+import Foundation
+#if canImport(Network)
+import Network
+#endif
+
+#if !canImport(Network)
+private final class NWPathMonitor {
+    var pathUpdateHandler: ((Any) -> Void)?
+
+    func start(queue: DispatchQueue) {
+        // Path monitoring is unavailable on this platform; nothing to do.
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+// FFI declarations for Arti (Rust)
+@_silgen_name("arti_start")
+private func arti_start(_ dataDir: UnsafePointer<CChar>, _ socksPort: UInt16) -> Int32
+
+@_silgen_name("arti_stop")
+private func arti_stop() -> Int32
+
+@_silgen_name("arti_is_running")
+private func arti_is_running() -> Int32
+
+@_silgen_name("arti_bootstrap_progress")
+private func arti_bootstrap_progress() -> Int32
+
+@_silgen_name("arti_bootstrap_summary")
+private func arti_bootstrap_summary(_ buf: UnsafeMutablePointer<CChar>, _ len: Int32) -> Int32
+
+@_silgen_name("arti_go_dormant")
+private func arti_go_dormant() -> Int32
+
+@_silgen_name("arti_wake")
+private func arti_wake() -> Int32
+
+/// Arti-based Tor integration for BitChat.
+/// - Boots a local Arti client and exposes a SOCKS5 proxy
+///   on 127.0.0.1:socksPort. All app networking should await readiness and
+///   route via this proxy. Fails closed by default when Tor is unavailable.
+@MainActor
+public final class TorManager: ObservableObject {
+    public static let shared = TorManager()
+
+    // SOCKS endpoint where Arti listens
+    let socksHost: String = "127.0.0.1"
+    let socksPort: Int = 39050
+
+    // State
+    @Published private(set) public var isReady: Bool = false
+    @Published private(set) var isStarting: Bool = false
+    @Published private(set) var lastError: Error?
+    @Published private(set) var bootstrapProgress: Int = 0
+    @Published private(set) var bootstrapSummary: String = ""
+
+    // Internal readiness trackers
+    private var socksReady: Bool = false { didSet { recomputeReady() } }
+    private var restarting: Bool = false
+
+    // Whether the app must enforce Tor for all connections (fail-closed).
+    public var torEnforced: Bool {
+        #if BITCHAT_DEV_ALLOW_CLEARNET
+        return false
+        #else
+        return true
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    // Returns true only when Tor is actually up (or dev fallback is compiled).
+    var networkPermitted: Bool {
+        if torEnforced { return isReady }
+        return true
+    }
+
+    private var didStart = false
+    private var bootstrapMonitorStarted = false
+    private var pathMonitor: NWPathMonitor?
+    private var isAppForeground: Bool = true
+    private var isDormant: Bool = false
+    private var lastRestartAt: Date? = nil
+    private var startedAt: Date? = nil  // Tracks initial startup time for grace period
+    private(set) var allowAutoStart: Bool = false
+
+    private init() {}
+
+    // MARK: - Public API
+
+    public func startIfNeeded() {
+        guard allowAutoStart else { return }
+        guard isAppForeground else { return }
+        guard !didStart else { return }
+        didStart = true
+        isDormant = false
+        isStarting = true
+        startedAt = Date()  // Track startup time for grace period
+        SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: startIfNeeded() - startedAt set", category: .session)
+        lastError = nil
+        NotificationCenter.default.post(name: .TorWillStart, object: nil)
+        ensureFilesystemLayout()
+        startArti()
+        startPathMonitorIfNeeded()
+    }
+
+    public func setAppForeground(_ foreground: Bool) {
+        isAppForeground = foreground
+    }
+
+    public func isForeground() -> Bool { isAppForeground }
+
+    nonisolated
+    public func awaitReady(timeout: TimeInterval = 25.0) async -> Bool {
+        await MainActor.run {
+            if self.isAppForeground { self.startIfNeeded() }
+        }
+        let deadline = Date().addingTimeInterval(timeout)
+        if await MainActor.run(body: { self.networkPermitted }) { return true }
+        while Date() < deadline {
+            try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 200_000_000)
+            if await MainActor.run(body: { self.networkPermitted }) { return true }
+        }
+        return await MainActor.run(body: { self.networkPermitted })
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Filesystem
+
+    func dataDirectoryURL() -> URL? {
+        do {
+            let base = try FileManager.default.url(
+                for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
+                in: .userDomainMask,
+                appropriateFor: nil,
+                create: true
+            )
+            let dir = base.appendingPathComponent("bitchat/arti", isDirectory: true)
+            return dir
+        } catch {
+            return nil
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func ensureFilesystemLayout() {
+        guard let dir = dataDirectoryURL() else { return }
+        do {
+            try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: dir, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
+        } catch {
+            // Non-fatal; Arti will surface errors during start if paths are missing
+        }
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Arti Integration
+
+    private func startArti() {
+        guard let dir = dataDirectoryURL()?.path else {
+            isStarting = false
+            lastError = NSError(domain: "TorManager", code: -1, userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "No data directory"])
+            return
+        }
+
+        // Check if already running
+        if arti_is_running() != 0 {
+            SecureLogger.info("TorManager: Arti already running", category: .session)
+            startBootstrapMonitor()
+            return
+        }
+
+        let result = dir.withCString { dptr in
+            arti_start(dptr, UInt16(socksPort))
+        }
+
+        if result != 0 {
+            SecureLogger.error("TorManager: arti_start failed rc=\(result)", category: .session)
+            isStarting = false
+            lastError = NSError(domain: "TorManager", code: Int(result), userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "Arti start failed"])
+            return
+        }
+
+        SecureLogger.info("TorManager: arti_start OK (SOCKS \(socksHost):\(socksPort))", category: .session)
+        startBootstrapMonitor()
+
+        // Start SOCKS readiness probe
+        Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { [weak self] in
+            guard let self else { return }
+            let ready = await self.waitForSocksReady(timeout: 60.0)
+            await MainActor.run {
+                self.socksReady = ready
+                if ready {
+                    SecureLogger.info("TorManager: SOCKS ready at \(self.socksHost):\(self.socksPort)", category: .session)
+                } else {
+                    self.lastError = NSError(domain: "TorManager", code: -14, userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "SOCKS not reachable"])
+                    SecureLogger.error("TorManager: SOCKS not reachable (timeout)", category: .session)
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func waitForSocksReady(timeout: TimeInterval) async -> Bool {
+        let deadline = Date().addingTimeInterval(timeout)
+        while Date() < deadline {
+            if await probeSocksOnce() { return true }
+            try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 250_000_000)
+        }
+        return false
+    }
+
+    private func probeSocksOnce() async -> Bool {
+        #if canImport(Network)
+        await withCheckedContinuation { cont in
+            let params = NWParameters.tcp
+            let host = NWEndpoint.Host.ipv4(.loopback)
+            guard let port = NWEndpoint.Port(rawValue: UInt16(socksPort)) else {
+                cont.resume(returning: false)
+                return
+            }
+            let endpoint = NWEndpoint.hostPort(host: host, port: port)
+            let conn = NWConnection(to: endpoint, using: params)
+
+            var resumed = false
+            let resumeOnce: (Bool) -> Void = { value in
+                if !resumed {
+                    resumed = true
+                    cont.resume(returning: value)
+                }
+            }
+
+            conn.stateUpdateHandler = { state in
+                switch state {
+                case .ready:
+                    resumeOnce(true)
+                    conn.cancel()
+                case .failed, .cancelled:
+                    resumeOnce(false)
+                    conn.cancel()
+                default:
+                    break
+                }
+            }
+
+            DispatchQueue.global(qos: .utility).asyncAfter(deadline: .now() + 1.0) {
+                resumeOnce(false)
+                conn.cancel()
+            }
+
+            conn.start(queue: DispatchQueue.global(qos: .utility))
+        }
+        #else
+        return false
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Bootstrap Monitoring
+
+    private func startBootstrapMonitor() {
+        guard !bootstrapMonitorStarted else { return }
+        bootstrapMonitorStarted = true
+        Task.detached(priority: .utility) { [weak self] in
+            await self?.bootstrapPollLoop()
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func bootstrapPollLoop() async {
+        let deadline = Date().addingTimeInterval(75)
+        while Date() < deadline {
+            let progress = Int(arti_bootstrap_progress())
+            let summary = getBootstrapSummary()
+
+            await MainActor.run {
+                self.bootstrapProgress = progress
+                self.bootstrapSummary = summary
+                if progress >= 100 { self.isStarting = false }
+                self.recomputeReady()
+            }
+
+            if progress >= 100 { break }
+            try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_000_000_000)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func getBootstrapSummary() -> String {
+        var buf = [CChar](repeating: 0, count: 256)
+        let len = arti_bootstrap_summary(&buf, Int32(buf.count))
+        if len > 0 {
+            return String(cString: buf)
+        }
+        return ""
+    }
+
+    // MARK: - Foreground/Background
+
+    public func ensureRunningOnForeground() {
+        if !allowAutoStart { return }
+        SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: ensureRunningOnForeground() started", category: .session)
+        Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { [weak self] in
+            guard let self = self else { return }
+            let claimed: Bool = await MainActor.run {
+                if self.isStarting || self.restarting { return false }
+                self.restarting = true
+                return true
+            }
+            if !claimed { return }
+
+            // Check if already ready
+            let alreadyReady = await MainActor.run { self.isReady }
+            if alreadyReady {
+                await MainActor.run { self.restarting = false }
+                return
+            }
+
+            // Arti doesn't support dormant/wake (it's a no-op stub), so always do full restart
+            await self.restartArti()
+            await MainActor.run { self.restarting = false }
+        }
+    }
+
+    public func goDormantOnBackground() {
+        // Arti doesn't support real dormant mode, so just mark as not ready.
+        // iOS will suspend the runtime anyway. On foreground we do a full restart.
+        // Clear isStarting so foreground recovery can proceed if bootstrap was interrupted.
+        SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: goDormantOnBackground() called", category: .session)
+        Task { @MainActor in
+            self.isReady = false
+            self.socksReady = false
+            self.isStarting = false
+        }
+    }
+
+    public func shutdownCompletely() {
+        SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: shutdownCompletely() called", category: .session)
+        Task.detached { [weak self] in
+            guard let self = self else { return }
+            _ = arti_stop()
+
+            // Wait for shutdown
+            var waited = 0
+            while arti_is_running() != 0 && waited < 50 {
+                try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
+                waited += 1
+            }
+
+            await MainActor.run {
+                self.isDormant = false
+                self.isReady = false
+                self.socksReady = false
+                self.bootstrapProgress = 0
+                self.bootstrapSummary = ""
+                self.isStarting = false
+                self.didStart = false
+                self.restarting = false
+                self.bootstrapMonitorStarted = false
+                // Note: Don't clear startedAt here - it will be set fresh on next startIfNeeded()
+                // Clearing it here races with startup and defeats the grace period
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func restartArti() async {
+        SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: restartArti() starting", category: .session)
+        await MainActor.run {
+            NotificationCenter.default.post(name: .TorWillRestart, object: nil)
+            self.isReady = false
+            self.socksReady = false
+            self.bootstrapProgress = 0
+            self.bootstrapSummary = ""
+            self.isStarting = true
+            self.isDormant = false
+            self.lastRestartAt = Date()
+        }
+
+        _ = arti_stop()
+
+        // Wait for stop
+        var waited = 0
+        while arti_is_running() != 0 && waited < 40 {
+            try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 100_000_000)
+            waited += 1
+        }
+
+        await MainActor.run {
+            self.bootstrapMonitorStarted = false
+            self.didStart = false
+        }
+
+        await MainActor.run { self.startIfNeeded() }
+    }
+
+    private func recomputeReady() {
+        let ready = socksReady && bootstrapProgress >= 100
+        if ready != isReady {
+            if !ready {
+                SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: isReady -> false (socksReady=\(socksReady), bootstrap=\(bootstrapProgress))", category: .session)
+            }
+            isReady = ready
+            if ready {
+                NotificationCenter.default.post(name: .TorDidBecomeReady, object: nil)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func startPathMonitorIfNeeded() {
+        #if canImport(Network)
+        guard pathMonitor == nil else { return }
+        let monitor = NWPathMonitor()
+        pathMonitor = monitor
+        let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "TorPathMonitor")
+        monitor.pathUpdateHandler = { [weak self] _ in
+            Task { @MainActor in
+                guard let self = self else { return }
+                if self.isAppForeground {
+                    self.pokeTorOnPathChange()
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        monitor.start(queue: queue)
+        #endif
+    }
+
+    private func pokeTorOnPathChange() {
+        // Skip if we recently restarted
+        if let last = lastRestartAt, Date().timeIntervalSince(last) < 3.0 {
+            SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: pokeTorOnPathChange() skipped - recent restart", category: .session)
+            return
+        }
+        // Skip during initial startup grace period (15s) to avoid race conditions
+        if let started = startedAt, Date().timeIntervalSince(started) < 15.0 {
+            SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: pokeTorOnPathChange() skipped - startup grace period (\(Int(Date().timeIntervalSince(started)))s)", category: .session)
+            return
+        }
+        if isStarting || restarting {
+            SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: pokeTorOnPathChange() skipped - isStarting=\(isStarting) restarting=\(restarting)", category: .session)
+            return
+        }
+        if isReady { return }
+        SecureLogger.debug("TorManager: pokeTorOnPathChange() - Arti not ready, initiating recovery", category: .session)
+        ensureRunningOnForeground()
+    }
+}
+
+// MARK: - Start policy configuration
+extension TorManager {
+    @MainActor
+    public func setAutoStartAllowed(_ allow: Bool) {
+        allowAutoStart = allow
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    public func isAutoStartAllowed() -> Bool { allowAutoStart }
+}

localPackages/Arti/arti-bitchat/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+[package]
+name = "arti-bitchat"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2021"
+rust-version = "1.86"
+
+[lib]
+crate-type = ["staticlib"]
+
+[dependencies]
+# Arti core - minimal features for client-only SOCKS proxy
+arti-client = { version = "0.38", default-features = false, features = [
+    "tokio",
+    "rustls",
+] }
+
+# Async runtime
+tokio = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
+    "rt-multi-thread",
+    "net",
+    "sync",
+    "time",
+    "macros",
+] }
+
+# Tor runtime compatibility
+tor-rtcompat = { version = "0.38", default-features = false, features = ["tokio"] }
+
+# FFI utilities
+libc = "0.2"
+once_cell = "1"
+
+# Logging (minimal)
+tracing = "0.1"
+tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", default-features = false, features = ["fmt"] }
+
+[features]
+default = []

localPackages/Arti/arti-bitchat/cbindgen.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+language = "C"
+include_guard = "ARTI_H"
+no_includes = true
+sys_includes = ["stdint.h", "stdbool.h"]
+
+[export]
+include = ["arti_start", "arti_stop", "arti_is_running", "arti_bootstrap_progress", "arti_bootstrap_summary", "arti_go_dormant", "arti_wake"]
+
+[fn]
+args = "Auto"
+
+[parse]
+parse_deps = false

localPackages/Arti/arti-bitchat/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+//! arti-bitchat: Minimal FFI wrapper around arti-client for BitChat
+//!
+//! Provides a C-compatible interface for embedding Arti (Rust Tor) in iOS/macOS apps.
+//! Exposes a SOCKS5 proxy on localhost that Swift code can route traffic through.
+
+use std::ffi::{c_char, c_int, CStr};
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicI32, Ordering};
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+
+use arti_client::TorClient;
+use once_cell::sync::OnceCell;
+use tokio::net::TcpListener;
+use tokio::runtime::Runtime;
+use tokio::sync::oneshot;
+use tor_rtcompat::PreferredRuntime;
+
+mod socks;
+
+/// Global state for the Arti instance
+struct ArtiState {
+    /// Tokio runtime (owned, single instance)
+    runtime: Runtime,
+    /// Shutdown signal sender
+    shutdown_tx: Option<oneshot::Sender<()>>,
+    /// TorClient handle for status queries
+    client: Option<Arc<TorClient<PreferredRuntime>>>,
+}
+
+static ARTI_STATE: OnceCell<Mutex<ArtiState>> = OnceCell::new();
+static BOOTSTRAP_PROGRESS: AtomicI32 = AtomicI32::new(0);
+static IS_RUNNING: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
+static BOOTSTRAP_SUMMARY: Mutex<String> = Mutex::new(String::new());
+
+/// Initialize the global state with a new runtime
+fn init_state() -> Result<(), &'static str> {
+    ARTI_STATE.get_or_try_init(|| -> Result<Mutex<ArtiState>, &'static str> {
+        let runtime = Runtime::new().map_err(|_| "Failed to create tokio runtime")?;
+        Ok(Mutex::new(ArtiState {
+            runtime,
+            shutdown_tx: None,
+            client: None,
+        }))
+    })?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
+///
+/// # Arguments
+/// * `data_dir` - Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
+/// * `socks_port` - Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// * 0 on success
+/// * -1 if already running
+/// * -2 if data_dir is invalid
+/// * -3 if runtime initialization failed
+/// * -4 if bootstrap failed
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn arti_start(data_dir: *const c_char, socks_port: u16) -> c_int {
+    // Check if already running
+    if IS_RUNNING.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    // Parse data directory
+    let data_path = match unsafe { CStr::from_ptr(data_dir) }.to_str() {
+        Ok(s) => PathBuf::from(s),
+        Err(_) => return -2,
+    };
+
+    // Initialize runtime if needed
+    if let Err(_) = init_state() {
+        return -3;
+    }
+
+    let state = match ARTI_STATE.get() {
+        Some(s) => s,
+        None => return -3,
+    };
+
+    let mut guard = match state.lock() {
+        Ok(g) => g,
+        Err(_) => return -3,
+    };
+
+    // Create shutdown channel
+    let (shutdown_tx, shutdown_rx) = oneshot::channel();
+    guard.shutdown_tx = Some(shutdown_tx);
+
+    let socks_addr: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{}", socks_port)
+        .parse()
+        .expect("valid addr");
+
+    // Spawn the main Arti task
+    let data_path_clone = data_path.clone();
+    guard.runtime.spawn(async move {
+        match run_arti(data_path_clone, socks_addr, shutdown_rx).await {
+            Ok(_) => {
+                tracing::info!("Arti shutdown cleanly");
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::error!("Arti error: {}", e);
+                update_summary(&format!("Error: {}", e));
+            }
+        }
+        IS_RUNNING.store(false, Ordering::SeqCst);
+        BOOTSTRAP_PROGRESS.store(0, Ordering::SeqCst);
+    });
+
+    IS_RUNNING.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
+    BOOTSTRAP_PROGRESS.store(0, Ordering::SeqCst);
+    update_summary("Starting...");
+
+    0
+}
+
+/// Stop Arti gracefully.
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// * 0 on success
+/// * -1 if not running
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn arti_stop() -> c_int {
+    if !IS_RUNNING.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    let state = match ARTI_STATE.get() {
+        Some(s) => s,
+        None => return -1,
+    };
+
+    let mut guard = match state.lock() {
+        Ok(g) => g,
+        Err(_) => return -1,
+    };
+
+    // Send shutdown signal
+    if let Some(tx) = guard.shutdown_tx.take() {
+        let _ = tx.send(());
+    }
+
+    // Clear client reference
+    guard.client = None;
+
+    // Give async tasks time to complete
+    std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(200));
+
+    IS_RUNNING.store(false, Ordering::SeqCst);
+    BOOTSTRAP_PROGRESS.store(0, Ordering::SeqCst);
+    update_summary("");
+
+    0
+}
+
+/// Check if Arti is currently running.
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// * 1 if running
+/// * 0 if not running
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn arti_is_running() -> c_int {
+    if IS_RUNNING.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
+        1
+    } else {
+        0
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn arti_bootstrap_progress() -> c_int {
+    BOOTSTRAP_PROGRESS.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
+}
+
+/// Get the current bootstrap summary string.
+///
+/// # Arguments
+/// * `buf` - Buffer to write the summary into
+/// * `len` - Length of the buffer
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// * Number of bytes written (not including null terminator)
+/// * -1 if buffer is null or too small
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn arti_bootstrap_summary(buf: *mut c_char, len: c_int) -> c_int {
+    if buf.is_null() || len <= 0 {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    let summary = match BOOTSTRAP_SUMMARY.lock() {
+        Ok(s) => s.clone(),
+        Err(_) => return -1,
+    };
+
+    let bytes = summary.as_bytes();
+    let copy_len = std::cmp::min(bytes.len(), (len - 1) as usize);
+
+    unsafe {
+        std::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(bytes.as_ptr(), buf as *mut u8, copy_len);
+        *buf.add(copy_len) = 0; // null terminator
+    }
+
+    copy_len as c_int
+}
+
+/// Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
+/// This is a hint; Arti may not fully support dormant mode yet.
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// * 0 on success
+/// * -1 if not running
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn arti_go_dormant() -> c_int {
+    if !IS_RUNNING.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+    // Arti doesn't have explicit dormant mode yet, but we can note the intent
+    update_summary("Dormant");
+    0
+}
+
+/// Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// * 0 on success
+/// * -1 if not running
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn arti_wake() -> c_int {
+    if !IS_RUNNING.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+    update_summary("Active");
+    0
+}
+
+fn update_summary(s: &str) {
+    if let Ok(mut guard) = BOOTSTRAP_SUMMARY.lock() {
+        guard.clear();
+        guard.push_str(s);
+    }
+}
+
+/// Main async entry point for Arti
+async fn run_arti(
+    data_dir: PathBuf,
+    socks_addr: SocketAddr,
+    mut shutdown_rx: oneshot::Receiver<()>,
+) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
+    // Ensure data directory exists
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(&data_dir)?;
+
+    update_summary("Configuring...");
+
+    // Build Arti configuration with custom directories
+    let cache_dir = data_dir.join("cache");
+    let state_dir = data_dir.join("state");
+
+    // Use from_directories which sets up storage correctly
+    use arti_client::config::TorClientConfigBuilder;
+    let config = TorClientConfigBuilder::from_directories(state_dir, cache_dir)
+        .build()?;
+
+    update_summary("Bootstrapping...");
+
+    // Create and bootstrap the Tor client
+    let client = TorClient::create_bootstrapped(config).await?;
+    let client = Arc::new(client);
+
+    // Store client reference for status queries
+    if let Some(state) = ARTI_STATE.get() {
+        if let Ok(mut guard) = state.lock() {
+            guard.client = Some(client.clone());
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Mark bootstrap complete
+    BOOTSTRAP_PROGRESS.store(100, Ordering::SeqCst);
+    update_summary("Ready");
+
+    // Bind SOCKS listener
+    let listener = TcpListener::bind(socks_addr).await?;
+    tracing::info!("SOCKS5 proxy listening on {}", socks_addr);
+
+    // Accept connections until shutdown
+    loop {
+        tokio::select! {
+            accept_result = listener.accept() => {
+                match accept_result {
+                    Ok((stream, peer_addr)) => {
+                        let client = client.clone();
+                        tokio::spawn(async move {
+                            if let Err(e) = socks::handle_socks_connection(stream, peer_addr, client).await {
+                                tracing::debug!("SOCKS connection error from {}: {}", peer_addr, e);
+                            }
+                        });
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        tracing::warn!("Accept error: {}", e);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            _ = &mut shutdown_rx => {
+                tracing::info!("Shutdown signal received");
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    update_summary("Shutting down...");
+    Ok(())
+}

localPackages/Arti/arti-bitchat/src/socks.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+//! SOCKS5 protocol handler for Arti
+//!
+//! Implements a minimal SOCKS5 server that forwards connections through Tor.
+
+use std::io;
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use arti_client::{TorClient, IntoTorAddr};
+use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+use tokio::net::TcpStream;
+use tor_rtcompat::PreferredRuntime;
+
+// SOCKS5 constants
+const SOCKS5_VERSION: u8 = 0x05;
+const SOCKS5_AUTH_NONE: u8 = 0x00;
+const SOCKS5_CMD_CONNECT: u8 = 0x01;
+const SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4: u8 = 0x01;
+const SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN: u8 = 0x03;
+const SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV6: u8 = 0x04;
+const SOCKS5_REP_SUCCESS: u8 = 0x00;
+const SOCKS5_REP_FAILURE: u8 = 0x01;
+const SOCKS5_REP_CONN_REFUSED: u8 = 0x05;
+
+/// Handle a single SOCKS5 connection
+pub async fn handle_socks_connection(
+    mut stream: TcpStream,
+    peer_addr: SocketAddr,
+    client: Arc<TorClient<PreferredRuntime>>,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    // --- Greeting ---
+    // Client sends: VER | NMETHODS | METHODS
+    let mut greeting = [0u8; 2];
+    stream.read_exact(&mut greeting).await?;
+
+    if greeting[0] != SOCKS5_VERSION {
+        return Err(io::Error::new(
+            io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+            "Not SOCKS5",
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let nmethods = greeting[1] as usize;
+    let mut methods = vec![0u8; nmethods];
+    stream.read_exact(&mut methods).await?;
+
+    // We only support no-auth
+    if !methods.contains(&SOCKS5_AUTH_NONE) {
+        // Send failure: no acceptable methods
+        stream.write_all(&[SOCKS5_VERSION, 0xFF]).await?;
+        return Err(io::Error::new(
+            io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
+            "No acceptable auth methods",
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Accept no-auth
+    stream.write_all(&[SOCKS5_VERSION, SOCKS5_AUTH_NONE]).await?;
+
+    // --- Request ---
+    // Client sends: VER | CMD | RSV | ATYP | DST.ADDR | DST.PORT
+    let mut request_header = [0u8; 4];
+    stream.read_exact(&mut request_header).await?;
+
+    if request_header[0] != SOCKS5_VERSION {
+        return Err(io::Error::new(
+            io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+            "Invalid SOCKS5 request version",
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let cmd = request_header[1];
+    let atyp = request_header[3];
+
+    if cmd != SOCKS5_CMD_CONNECT {
+        // We only support CONNECT
+        send_reply(&mut stream, SOCKS5_REP_FAILURE).await?;
+        return Err(io::Error::new(
+            io::ErrorKind::Unsupported,
+            "Only CONNECT supported",
+        ));
+    }
+
+    // Parse destination address
+    let (dest_host, dest_port) = match atyp {
+        SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 => {
+            let mut addr = [0u8; 4];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut addr).await?;
+            let mut port_buf = [0u8; 2];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut port_buf).await?;
+            let port = u16::from_be_bytes(port_buf);
+            let host = format!("{}.{}.{}.{}", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]);
+            (host, port)
+        }
+        SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN => {
+            let mut len_buf = [0u8; 1];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut len_buf).await?;
+            let len = len_buf[0] as usize;
+            let mut domain = vec![0u8; len];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut domain).await?;
+            let mut port_buf = [0u8; 2];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut port_buf).await?;
+            let port = u16::from_be_bytes(port_buf);
+            let host = String::from_utf8_lossy(&domain).to_string();
+            (host, port)
+        }
+        SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV6 => {
+            let mut addr = [0u8; 16];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut addr).await?;
+            let mut port_buf = [0u8; 2];
+            stream.read_exact(&mut port_buf).await?;
+            let port = u16::from_be_bytes(port_buf);
+            // Format IPv6 address
+            let segments: Vec<String> = addr
+                .chunks(2)
+                .map(|c| format!("{:02x}{:02x}", c[0], c[1]))
+                .collect();
+            let host = format!("[{}]", segments.join(":"));
+            (host, port)
+        }
+        _ => {
+            send_reply(&mut stream, SOCKS5_REP_FAILURE).await?;
+            return Err(io::Error::new(
+                io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+                "Unsupported address type",
+            ));
+        }
+    };
+
+    tracing::debug!("SOCKS5 CONNECT from {} to {}:{}", peer_addr, dest_host, dest_port);
+
+    // Connect through Tor
+    let tor_addr = format!("{}:{}", dest_host, dest_port);
+    let tor_addr = match tor_addr.as_str().into_tor_addr() {
+        Ok(a) => a,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::debug!("Invalid Tor address: {}", e);
+            send_reply(&mut stream, SOCKS5_REP_FAILURE).await?;
+            return Err(io::Error::new(
+                io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
+                format!("Invalid Tor address: {}", e),
+            ));
+        }
+    };
+
+    let tor_stream = match client.connect(tor_addr).await {
+        Ok(s) => s,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::debug!("Tor connect failed: {}", e);
+            send_reply(&mut stream, SOCKS5_REP_CONN_REFUSED).await?;
+            return Err(io::Error::new(
+                io::ErrorKind::ConnectionRefused,
+                e.to_string(),
+            ));
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Send success reply
+    // Reply: VER | REP | RSV | ATYP | BND.ADDR | BND.PORT
+    // We use 0.0.0.0:0 as the bound address since we're proxying
+    let reply = [
+        SOCKS5_VERSION,
+        SOCKS5_REP_SUCCESS,
+        0x00, // RSV
+        SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4,
+        0, 0, 0, 0, // BND.ADDR
+        0, 0, // BND.PORT
+    ];
+    stream.write_all(&reply).await?;
+
+    // Bidirectional copy
+    let (mut client_read, mut client_write) = stream.into_split();
+    let (mut tor_read, mut tor_write) = tor_stream.split();
+
+    let client_to_tor = async {
+        tokio::io::copy(&mut client_read, &mut tor_write).await
+    };
+    let tor_to_client = async {
+        tokio::io::copy(&mut tor_read, &mut client_write).await
+    };
+
+    tokio::select! {
+        result = client_to_tor => {
+            if let Err(e) = result {
+                tracing::debug!("Client to Tor copy error: {}", e);
+            }
+        }
+        result = tor_to_client => {
+            if let Err(e) = result {
+                tracing::debug!("Tor to client copy error: {}", e);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn send_reply(stream: &mut TcpStream, rep: u8) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let reply = [
+        SOCKS5_VERSION,
+        rep,
+        0x00, // RSV
+        SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4,
+        0, 0, 0, 0, // BND.ADDR
+        0, 0, // BND.PORT
+    ];
+    stream.write_all(&reply).await
+}

localPackages/Arti/build-ios.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# Build arti-bitchat for iOS/macOS with aggressive size optimization
+#
+# Output: Frameworks/arti.xcframework containing static libraries for:
+#   - aarch64-apple-ios (iOS device)
+#   - aarch64-apple-ios-sim (iOS simulator, Apple Silicon)
+#   - x86_64-apple-ios (iOS simulator, Intel - optional)
+#   - aarch64-apple-darwin (macOS)
+#
+set -e
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+cd "$SCRIPT_DIR"
+
+# Configuration
+CRATE_NAME="arti-bitchat"
+LIB_NAME="libarti_bitchat.a"
+FRAMEWORK_NAME="arti"
+OUTPUT_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/Frameworks"
+
+# Targets to build
+TARGETS=(
+    "aarch64-apple-ios"           # iOS device
+    "aarch64-apple-ios-sim"       # iOS simulator (Apple Silicon)
+    "aarch64-apple-darwin"        # macOS
+)
+
+# Colors for output
+RED='\033[0;31m'
+GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
+NC='\033[0m' # No Color
+
+log_info() { echo -e "${GREEN}[INFO]${NC} $1"; }
+log_warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $1"; }
+log_error() { echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $1"; }
+
+# Check prerequisites
+check_prerequisites() {
+    log_info "Checking prerequisites..."
+
+    if ! command -v rustc &> /dev/null; then
+        log_error "Rust is not installed. Please install via rustup."
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    if ! command -v cargo &> /dev/null; then
+        log_error "Cargo is not installed. Please install via rustup."
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    # Check/install targets
+    for target in "${TARGETS[@]}"; do
+        if ! rustup target list --installed | grep -q "$target"; then
+            log_info "Installing target: $target"
+            rustup target add "$target"
+        fi
+    done
+
+    # Install cbindgen if needed
+    if ! command -v cbindgen &> /dev/null; then
+        log_info "Installing cbindgen..."
+        cargo install cbindgen
+    fi
+
+    log_info "Prerequisites OK"
+}
+
+# Set up aggressive size optimization flags and deployment targets
+setup_rustflags() {
+    local target="$1"
+
+    # Base flags for size optimization
+    export RUSTFLAGS="-C opt-level=z -C lto=fat -C codegen-units=1 -C panic=abort -C strip=symbols"
+
+    # Set deployment targets to suppress linker warnings about version mismatches
+    case "$target" in
+        *-apple-ios-sim*)
+            export IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET="16.0"
+            # Simulator uses iPhone SDK but needs the sim target
+            ;;
+        *-apple-ios*)
+            export IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET="16.0"
+            ;;
+        *-apple-darwin*)
+            export MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET="13.0"
+            ;;
+    esac
+
+    log_info "RUSTFLAGS: $RUSTFLAGS"
+    log_info "Deployment target: MACOSX=$MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET IPHONEOS=$IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET"
+}
+
+# Build for a single target
+build_target() {
+    local target="$1"
+    log_info "Building for target: $target"
+
+    setup_rustflags "$target"
+
+    # Build release
+    cargo build --release --target "$target" -p "$CRATE_NAME"
+
+    # Check output
+    local lib_path="target/$target/release/$LIB_NAME"
+    if [[ -f "$lib_path" ]]; then
+        local size=$(du -h "$lib_path" | cut -f1)
+        log_info "Built $lib_path ($size)"
+    else
+        log_error "Build failed: $lib_path not found"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+# Create xcframework from built libraries
+create_xcframework() {
+    log_info "Creating xcframework..."
+
+    local xcframework_path="$OUTPUT_DIR/$FRAMEWORK_NAME.xcframework"
+
+    # Remove existing xcframework
+    rm -rf "$xcframework_path"
+    mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR"
+
+    # Build the xcodebuild command
+    local cmd="xcodebuild -create-xcframework"
+
+    for target in "${TARGETS[@]}"; do
+        local lib_path="$SCRIPT_DIR/target/$target/release/$LIB_NAME"
+        if [[ -f "$lib_path" ]]; then
+            # Strip the library for additional size reduction
+            log_info "Stripping $target library..."
+            strip -x "$lib_path" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+            cmd="$cmd -library $lib_path"
+
+            # Add headers if they exist
+            local header_dir="$OUTPUT_DIR/include"
+            if [[ -d "$header_dir" ]]; then
+                cmd="$cmd -headers $header_dir"
+            fi
+        else
+            log_warn "Skipping missing library: $lib_path"
+        fi
+    done
+
+    cmd="$cmd -output $xcframework_path"
+
+    log_info "Running: $cmd"
+    eval "$cmd"
+
+    if [[ -d "$xcframework_path" ]]; then
+        local size=$(du -sh "$xcframework_path" | cut -f1)
+        log_info "Created $xcframework_path ($size)"
+    else
+        log_error "Failed to create xcframework"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+# Generate C header using cbindgen
+generate_header() {
+    log_info "Generating C header..."
+
+    local header_dir="$OUTPUT_DIR/include"
+    local header_path="$header_dir/arti.h"
+
+    mkdir -p "$header_dir"
+
+    # Create cbindgen.toml if it doesn't exist
+    if [[ ! -f "$CRATE_NAME/cbindgen.toml" ]]; then
+        cat > "$CRATE_NAME/cbindgen.toml" << 'EOF'
+language = "C"
+include_guard = "ARTI_H"
+no_includes = true
+sys_includes = ["stdint.h", "stdbool.h"]
+
+[export]
+include = ["arti_start", "arti_stop", "arti_is_running", "arti_bootstrap_progress", "arti_bootstrap_summary", "arti_go_dormant", "arti_wake"]
+
+[fn]
+args = "Auto"
+
+[parse]
+parse_deps = false
+EOF
+    fi
+
+    cbindgen --config "$CRATE_NAME/cbindgen.toml" \
+             --crate "$CRATE_NAME" \
+             --output "$header_path"
+
+    if [[ -f "$header_path" ]]; then
+        log_info "Generated $header_path"
+        cat "$header_path"
+    else
+        log_warn "cbindgen did not generate header, creating manually..."
+        # Fallback: create header manually
+        cat > "$header_path" << 'EOF'
+#ifndef ARTI_H
+#define ARTI_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Start Arti with a SOCKS5 proxy.
+ *
+ * @param data_dir Path to data directory for Tor state (C string)
+ * @param socks_port Port for SOCKS5 proxy (e.g., 39050)
+ * @return 0 on success, negative on error
+ */
+int32_t arti_start(const char *data_dir, uint16_t socks_port);
+
+/**
+ * Stop Arti gracefully.
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success, -1 if not running
+ */
+int32_t arti_stop(void);
+
+/**
+ * Check if Arti is currently running.
+ *
+ * @return 1 if running, 0 if not running
+ */
+int32_t arti_is_running(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap progress (0-100).
+ *
+ * @return Progress percentage
+ */
+int32_t arti_bootstrap_progress(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the current bootstrap summary string.
+ *
+ * @param buf Buffer to write the summary into
+ * @param len Length of the buffer
+ * @return Number of bytes written, -1 on error
+ */
+int32_t arti_bootstrap_summary(char *buf, int32_t len);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to go dormant (reduce resource usage).
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success, -1 if not running
+ */
+int32_t arti_go_dormant(void);
+
+/**
+ * Signal Arti to wake from dormant mode.
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success, -1 if not running
+ */
+int32_t arti_wake(void);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ARTI_H */
+EOF
+        log_info "Created manual header at $header_path"
+    fi
+}
+
+# Print size report
+print_size_report() {
+    log_info "=== Size Report ==="
+    for target in "${TARGETS[@]}"; do
+        local lib_path="$SCRIPT_DIR/target/$target/release/$LIB_NAME"
+        if [[ -f "$lib_path" ]]; then
+            local size=$(du -h "$lib_path" | cut -f1)
+            echo "  $target: $size"
+        fi
+    done
+
+    local xcframework_path="$OUTPUT_DIR/$FRAMEWORK_NAME.xcframework"
+    if [[ -d "$xcframework_path" ]]; then
+        local total_size=$(du -sh "$xcframework_path" | cut -f1)
+        echo "  xcframework total: $total_size"
+    fi
+}
+
+# Main
+main() {
+    log_info "Building arti-bitchat for iOS/macOS"
+    log_info "=================================="
+
+    check_prerequisites
+    generate_header
+
+    for target in "${TARGETS[@]}"; do
+        build_target "$target"
+    done
+
+    create_xcframework
+    print_size_report
+
+    log_info "Build complete!"
+    log_info "xcframework: $OUTPUT_DIR/$FRAMEWORK_NAME.xcframework"
+}
+
+# Run
+main "$@"

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/BITCHAT_TOR.md

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-**BitChat Tor Build Notes**
-
-- Date: See repo history for the commit you pulled
-- Output: `tor-nolzma.xcframework` (static, C-only)
-- Platforms: iOS device (arm64), iOS simulator (arm64), macOS (arm64)
-- Goal: Minimize binary size while retaining client functionality
-
-**Overview**
-- We built a minimal Tor static xcframework with LZMA disabled to reduce size and complexity.
-- The artifact contains only the C libraries (Tor + libevent + OpenSSL) and their headers. Objective‑C wrappers (`TORThread`, `TORController`, etc.) are not compiled into this minimal artifact to keep size down.
-- This xcframework is suitable for iOS and macOS targets that link the Objective‑C wrappers as source (or use CocoaPods to bring them in).
-
-**Component Versions**
-- Tor: 0.4.8.17
-- libevent: 2.1.12
-- OpenSSL: 3.5.1
-- liblzma: not linked (intentionally disabled)
-
-**Build Environment**
-- Xcode with iOS and macOS SDKs
-- Homebrew tools: `autoconf`, `automake`, `libtool`, `gettext`
-- Install prerequisites from repo root: `brew bundle`
-
-**Command Used**
-- Minimal build (nolzma), with persistent logs: `./build-xcframework.sh -md`
-  - `-m` = minimal mode
-  - `-d` = keep build dir and logs under `build/`
-
-**What Minimal Mode Does**
-- Targets: `iphoneos/arm64`, `iphonesimulator/arm64`, `macosx/arm64`.
-- Disables LZMA in Tor (`--enable-lzma=no`) and removes zstd.
-- Trims OpenSSL features: `no-zlib no-comp no-ssl3 no-tls1 no-tls1_1 no-dtls no-srp no-psk no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-engine no-ocsp`.
-- Compiles with size-first flags: `-Os -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections`; bitcode is not embedded.
-- Statically links Tor, libevent, and OpenSSL into a single library per slice inside the framework.
-- Copies public headers from Tor/libevent/OpenSSL into the framework `Headers` directory.
-
-**Resulting Slices (approx sizes)**
-- Folder size: ~73 MB (`tor-nolzma.xcframework`)
-- Binaries (non-fat, measured on this build):
-  - iOS arm64 (device): ~16.49 MB
-  - iOS arm64 (simulator): ~15.32 MB
-  - macOS arm64: ~15.60 MB
-
-Note: Sizes vary slightly by Xcode/SDK versions and environment.
-
-**Integrating in BitChat**
-- Add `tor-nolzma.xcframework` to your app target(s). Xcode will select the correct slice for device/simulator/macOS.
-- Link `libz.tbd` (Tor depends on zlib).
-- Keep app link-time stripping enabled for best results:
-  - Other Linker Flags: add `-dead_strip`
-  - Avoid `-ObjC` if possible (prevents dead stripping)
-  - Consider enabling ThinLTO/LTO in the app for further size gains
-- Objective‑C API (wrappers):
-  - Not included in this minimal xcframework. Use one of:
-    - CocoaPods: `Tor/CTor-NoLZMA` subspec (brings `TORThread`, `TORController` sources + links the xcframework), or
-    - Vendor the ObjC sources from `Tor/Classes/CTor` and `Tor/Classes/Core` directly into your project.
-
-**Rebuilding**
-- Ensure prerequisites: `brew bundle`
-- Minimal nolzma, iOS+sim+macOS: `./build-xcframework.sh -m`
-- Logs (if `-d`): `build/*.log` and per-component logs like `build/libtor-nolzma-<sdk>-<arch>.log`
-
-**LZMA Trade‑off (for reference)**
-- We measured that enabling LZMA adds roughly ~0.25 MB per slice to the binary on this setup. For a 3‑slice xcframework, expect ~0.7–0.8 MB more overall.
-- If you want the LZMA variant with the same minimal trimming: `./build-xcframework.sh -Md` (outputs `tor.xcframework`).
-
-**Key Flags (for auditing)**
-- OpenSSL `./Configure` adds: `no-shared` and, in minimal modes, `no-zlib no-comp no-ssl3 no-tls1 no-tls1_1 no-dtls no-srp no-psk no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-engine no-ocsp`
-- libevent `./configure`: `--disable-openssl --disable-samples --disable-regress --enable-static --disable-shared`
-- Tor `./configure` (highlights):
-  - `--enable-pic --disable-module-relay --disable-module-dirauth --disable-unittests`
-  - `--enable-static-openssl --enable-static-libevent`
-  - `--disable-asciidoc --disable-manpage --disable-html-manual --disable-zstd`
-  - `--enable-lzma=no` (in this build)
-- Compiler flags: `-Os -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections`; no bitcode
-- Minimum OS: iOS 12.0, macOS 10.13
-
-**Verification Tips**
-- Check slices: `lipo -info tor-nolzma.xcframework/*/tor-nolzma.framework/tor-nolzma`
-- Ensure headers present: `ls tor-nolzma.xcframework/*/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers`
-- Link test: build a small app and add `-dead_strip`; confirm successful run and circuit establishment via control port.
-
-**Notes**
-- This minimal build avoids bundling large GeoIP resources. If you need GeoIP, embed the GeoIP bundle (or use the `Tor/GeoIP-NoLZMA` subspec) and set `TORConfiguration.geoipFile`/`geoip6File`.
-- Static linking maximizes the app’s ability to dead‑strip unused code across the boundary.
-

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/config/config.h

@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file config.h
- * \brief Header file for config.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CONFIG_H
-#define TOR_CONFIG_H
-
-#include "app/config/or_options_st.h"
-#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
-#include "app/config/quiet_level.h"
-
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__) || defined(DARWIN)
-#define KERNEL_MAY_SUPPORT_IPFW
-#endif
-
-/** Lowest allowable value for HeartbeatPeriod; if this is too low, we might
- * expose more information than we're comfortable with. */
-#define MIN_HEARTBEAT_PERIOD (30*60)
-
-/** Maximum default value for MaxMemInQueues, in bytes. */
-#if SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8
-#define MAX_DEFAULT_MEMORY_QUEUE_SIZE (UINT64_C(8) << 30)
-#else
-#define MAX_DEFAULT_MEMORY_QUEUE_SIZE (UINT64_C(2) << 30)
-#endif
-
-MOCK_DECL(const or_options_t *, get_options, (void));
-MOCK_DECL(or_options_t *, get_options_mutable, (void));
-int set_options(or_options_t *new_val, char **msg);
-void config_free_all(void);
-const char *safe_str_client(const char *address);
-const char *safe_str(const char *address);
-const char *escaped_safe_str_client(const char *address);
-const char *escaped_safe_str(const char *address);
-void init_protocol_warning_severity_level(void);
-int get_protocol_warning_severity_level(void);
-
-#define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_protocol_warning_severity_level())
-
-/** Pattern for backing up configuration files */
-#define CONFIG_BACKUP_PATTERN "%s.orig.1"
-
-/** An error from options_trial_assign() or options_init_from_string(). */
-typedef enum setopt_err_t {
-  SETOPT_OK = 0,
-  SETOPT_ERR_MISC = -1,
-  SETOPT_ERR_PARSE = -2,
-  SETOPT_ERR_TRANSITION = -3,
-  SETOPT_ERR_SETTING = -4,
-} setopt_err_t;
-setopt_err_t options_trial_assign(struct config_line_t *list, unsigned flags,
-                                  char **msg);
-
-void options_init(or_options_t *options);
-
-#define OPTIONS_DUMP_MINIMAL 1
-#define OPTIONS_DUMP_ALL 2
-char *options_dump(const or_options_t *options, int how_to_dump);
-int options_init_from_torrc(int argc, char **argv);
-setopt_err_t options_init_from_string(const char *cf_defaults, const char *cf,
-                            int command, const char *command_arg, char **msg);
-int option_is_recognized(const char *key);
-const char *option_get_canonical_name(const char *key);
-struct config_line_t *option_get_assignment(const or_options_t *options,
-                                     const char *key);
-int options_save_current(void);
-const char *get_torrc_fname(int defaults_fname);
-typedef enum {
-  DIRROOT_DATADIR,
-  DIRROOT_CACHEDIR,
-  DIRROOT_KEYDIR
-} directory_root_t;
-
-MOCK_DECL(char *,
-          options_get_dir_fname2_suffix,
-          (const or_options_t *options,
-           directory_root_t roottype,
-           const char *sub1, const char *sub2,
-           const char *suffix));
-
-/* These macros wrap options_get_dir_fname2_suffix to provide a more
- * convenient API for finding filenames that Tor uses inside its storage
- * They are named according to a pattern:
- *    (options_)?get_(cache|key|data)dir_fname(2)?(_suffix)?
- *
- * Macros that begin with options_ take an options argument; the others
- * work with respect to the global options.
- *
- * Each macro works relative to the data directory, the key directory,
- * or the cache directory, as determined by which one is mentioned.
- *
- * Macro variants with "2" in their name take two path components; others
- * take one.
- *
- * Macro variants with "_suffix" at the end take an additional suffix
- * that gets appended to the end of the file
- */
-#define options_get_datadir_fname2_suffix(options, sub1, sub2, suffix) \
-  options_get_dir_fname2_suffix((options), DIRROOT_DATADIR, \
-                                (sub1), (sub2), (suffix))
-#define options_get_cachedir_fname2_suffix(options, sub1, sub2, suffix) \
-  options_get_dir_fname2_suffix((options), DIRROOT_CACHEDIR, \
-                                (sub1), (sub2), (suffix))
-#define options_get_keydir_fname2_suffix(options, sub1, sub2, suffix) \
-  options_get_dir_fname2_suffix((options), DIRROOT_KEYDIR, \
-                                (sub1), (sub2), (suffix))
-
-#define options_get_datadir_fname(opts,sub1)                    \
-  options_get_datadir_fname2_suffix((opts),(sub1), NULL, NULL)
-#define options_get_datadir_fname2(opts,sub1,sub2)                      \
-  options_get_datadir_fname2_suffix((opts),(sub1), (sub2), NULL)
-
-#define get_datadir_fname2_suffix(sub1, sub2, suffix) \
-  options_get_datadir_fname2_suffix(get_options(), (sub1), (sub2), (suffix))
-#define get_datadir_fname(sub1)                 \
-  get_datadir_fname2_suffix((sub1), NULL, NULL)
-#define get_datadir_fname2(sub1,sub2) \
-  get_datadir_fname2_suffix((sub1), (sub2), NULL)
-#define get_datadir_fname_suffix(sub1, suffix) \
-  get_datadir_fname2_suffix((sub1), NULL, (suffix))
-
-/** DOCDOC */
-#define options_get_keydir_fname(options, sub1)  \
-  options_get_keydir_fname2_suffix((options), (sub1), NULL, NULL)
-#define get_keydir_fname_suffix(sub1, suffix)   \
-  options_get_keydir_fname2_suffix(get_options(), (sub1), NULL, suffix)
-#define get_keydir_fname(sub1)                  \
-  options_get_keydir_fname2_suffix(get_options(), (sub1), NULL, NULL)
-
-#define get_cachedir_fname(sub1) \
-  options_get_cachedir_fname2_suffix(get_options(), (sub1), NULL, NULL)
-#define get_cachedir_fname_suffix(sub1, suffix) \
-  options_get_cachedir_fname2_suffix(get_options(), (sub1), NULL, (suffix))
-
-#define safe_str_client(address) \
-  safe_str_client_opts(NULL, address)
-#define safe_str(address) \
-  safe_str_opts(NULL, address)
-
-const char * safe_str_client_opts(const or_options_t *options,
-                                  const char *address);
-const char * safe_str_opts(const or_options_t *options,
-                           const char *address);
-
-int using_default_dir_authorities(const or_options_t *options);
-
-int create_keys_directory(const or_options_t *options);
-
-int check_or_create_data_subdir(const char *subdir);
-int write_to_data_subdir(const char* subdir, const char* fname,
-                         const char* str, const char* descr);
-
-int get_num_cpus(const or_options_t *options);
-
-MOCK_DECL(const smartlist_t *,get_configured_ports,(void));
-int port_binds_ipv4(const port_cfg_t *port);
-int port_binds_ipv6(const port_cfg_t *port);
-int portconf_get_first_advertised_port(int listener_type,
-                                       int address_family);
-#define portconf_get_primary_dir_port() \
-  (portconf_get_first_advertised_port(CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER, AF_INET))
-const tor_addr_t *portconf_get_first_advertised_addr(int listener_type,
-                                                       int address_family);
-int port_exists_by_type_addr_port(int listener_type, const tor_addr_t *addr,
-                                  int port, int check_wildcard);
-int port_exists_by_type_addr32h_port(int listener_type, uint32_t addr_ipv4h,
-                                     int port, int check_wildcard);
-
-char *get_first_listener_addrport_string(int listener_type);
-
-int options_need_geoip_info(const or_options_t *options,
-                            const char **reason_out);
-
-int getinfo_helper_config(control_connection_t *conn,
-                          const char *question, char **answer,
-                          const char **errmsg);
-
-int init_cookie_authentication(const char *fname, const char *header,
-                               int cookie_len, int group_readable,
-                               uint8_t **cookie_out, int *cookie_is_set_out);
-
-or_options_t *options_new(void);
-
-/** Options settings parsed from the command-line. */
-typedef struct {
-  /** List of options that can only be set from the command-line */
-  struct config_line_t *cmdline_opts;
-  /** List of other options, to be handled by the general Tor configuration
-      system. */
-  struct config_line_t *other_opts;
-  /** Subcommand that Tor has been told to run */
-  tor_cmdline_mode_t command;
-  /** Argument for the command mode, if any. */
-  const char *command_arg;
-  /** How quiet have we been told to be? */
-  quiet_level_t quiet_level;
-} parsed_cmdline_t;
-
-parsed_cmdline_t *config_parse_commandline(int argc, char **argv,
-                                           int ignore_errors);
-void parsed_cmdline_free_(parsed_cmdline_t *cmdline);
-#define parsed_cmdline_free(c) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(parsed_cmdline_t, parsed_cmdline_free_, (c))
-
-void config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options);
-/* XXXX move to connection_edge.h */
-int addressmap_register_auto(const char *from, const char *to,
-                             time_t expires,
-                             addressmap_entry_source_t addrmap_source,
-                             const char **msg);
-
-int port_cfg_line_extract_addrport(const char *line,
-                                   char **addrport_out,
-                                   int *is_unix_out,
-                                   const char **rest_out);
-
-/** Represents the information stored in a torrc Bridge line. */
-typedef struct bridge_line_t {
-  tor_addr_t addr; /* The IP address of the bridge. */
-  uint16_t port; /* The TCP port of the bridge. */
-  char *transport_name; /* The name of the pluggable transport that
-                           should be used to connect to the bridge. */
-  char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /* The bridge's identity key digest. */
-  smartlist_t *socks_args; /* SOCKS arguments for the pluggable
-                               transport proxy. */
-} bridge_line_t;
-
-void bridge_line_free_(bridge_line_t *bridge_line);
-#define bridge_line_free(line) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(bridge_line_t, bridge_line_free_, (line))
-bridge_line_t *parse_bridge_line(const char *line);
-
-/* Port helper functions. */
-int options_any_client_port_set(const or_options_t *options);
-int port_parse_config(smartlist_t *out,
-                      const struct config_line_t *ports,
-                      const char *portname,
-                      int listener_type,
-                      const char *defaultaddr,
-                      int defaultport,
-                      const unsigned flags);
-
-#define CL_PORT_NO_STREAM_OPTIONS (1u<<0)
-#define CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL (1u<<1)
-/* Was CL_PORT_ALLOW_EXTRA_LISTENADDR (1u<<2) */
-#define CL_PORT_SERVER_OPTIONS (1u<<3)
-#define CL_PORT_FORBID_NONLOCAL (1u<<4)
-#define CL_PORT_TAKES_HOSTNAMES (1u<<5)
-#define CL_PORT_IS_UNIXSOCKET (1u<<6)
-#define CL_PORT_DFLT_GROUP_WRITABLE (1u<<7)
-
-port_cfg_t *port_cfg_new(size_t namelen);
-#define port_cfg_free(port) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(port_cfg_t, port_cfg_free_, (port))
-void port_cfg_free_(port_cfg_t *port);
-
-int port_count_real_listeners(const smartlist_t *ports,
-                         int listenertype,
-                         int count_sockets);
-int pt_parse_transport_line(const or_options_t *options,
-                         const char *line, int validate_only,
-                         int server);
-int config_ensure_bandwidth_cap(uint64_t *value, const char *desc, char **msg);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_PRIVATE
-
-MOCK_DECL(STATIC int, options_act,(const or_options_t *old_options));
-MOCK_DECL(STATIC int, options_act_reversible,(const or_options_t *old_options,
-                                             char **msg));
-struct config_mgr_t;
-STATIC const struct config_mgr_t *get_options_mgr(void);
-
-#define or_options_free(opt) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(or_options_t, or_options_free_, (opt))
-STATIC void or_options_free_(or_options_t *options);
-STATIC int options_validate_single_onion(or_options_t *options,
-                                         char **msg);
-STATIC int parse_tcp_proxy_line(const char *line, or_options_t *options,
-                                char **msg);
-STATIC int consider_adding_dir_servers(const or_options_t *options,
-                                       const or_options_t *old_options);
-STATIC void add_default_trusted_dir_authorities(dirinfo_type_t type);
-MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, add_default_fallback_dir_servers, (void));
-STATIC int parse_dir_authority_line(const char *line,
-                                    dirinfo_type_t required_type,
-                                    int validate_only);
-STATIC int parse_dir_fallback_line(const char *line, int validate_only);
-
-STATIC uint64_t compute_real_max_mem_in_queues(const uint64_t val,
-                                               bool is_server);
-STATIC int open_and_add_file_log(const log_severity_list_t *severity,
-                                 const char *fname,
-                                 int truncate_log);
-STATIC int options_init_logs(const or_options_t *old_options,
-                             const or_options_t *options, int validate_only);
-
-STATIC int options_create_directories(char **msg_out);
-struct log_transaction_t;
-STATIC struct log_transaction_t *options_start_log_transaction(
-                              const or_options_t *old_options,
-                              char **msg_out);
-STATIC void options_commit_log_transaction(struct log_transaction_t *xn);
-STATIC void options_rollback_log_transaction(struct log_transaction_t *xn);
-
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-int options_validate(const or_options_t *old_options,
-                     or_options_t *options,
-                     char **msg);
-#endif
-
-STATIC int parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
-                       char **msg, int *n_ports_out,
-                       int *world_writable_control_socket);
-
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CONFIG_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/config/or_state_st.h

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file or_state_st.h
- *
- * \brief The or_state_t structure, which represents Tor's state file.
- */
-
-#ifndef TOR_OR_STATE_ST_H
-#define TOR_OR_STATE_ST_H
-
-#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
-struct smartlist_t;
-struct config_suite_t;
-
-/** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */
-struct or_state_t {
-  uint32_t magic_;
-  /** The time at which we next plan to write the state to the disk.  Equal to
-   * TIME_MAX if there are no saveable changes, 0 if there are changes that
-   * should be saved right away. */
-  time_t next_write;
-
-  /** When was the state last written to disk? */
-  time_t LastWritten;
-
-  /** Fields for accounting bandwidth use. */
-  time_t AccountingIntervalStart;
-  uint64_t AccountingBytesReadInInterval;
-  uint64_t AccountingBytesWrittenInInterval;
-  int AccountingSecondsActive;
-  int AccountingSecondsToReachSoftLimit;
-  time_t AccountingSoftLimitHitAt;
-  uint64_t AccountingBytesAtSoftLimit;
-  uint64_t AccountingExpectedUsage;
-
-  /** A list of guard-related configuration lines. */
-  struct config_line_t *Guard;
-
-  struct config_line_t *TransportProxies;
-
-  /** These fields hold information on the history of bandwidth usage for
-   * servers.  The "Ends" fields hold the time when we last updated the
-   * bandwidth usage. The "Interval" fields hold the granularity, in seconds,
-   * of the entries of Values.  The "Values" lists hold decimal string
-   * representations of the number of bytes read or written in each
-   * interval. The "Maxima" list holds decimal strings describing the highest
-   * rate achieved during the interval.
-   */
-  time_t      BWHistoryReadEnds;
-  int         BWHistoryReadInterval;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryReadValues;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryReadMaxima;
-  time_t      BWHistoryWriteEnds;
-  int         BWHistoryWriteInterval;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryWriteValues;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryWriteMaxima;
-  time_t      BWHistoryIPv6ReadEnds;
-  int         BWHistoryIPv6ReadInterval;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryIPv6ReadValues;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryIPv6ReadMaxima;
-  time_t      BWHistoryIPv6WriteEnds;
-  int         BWHistoryIPv6WriteInterval;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryIPv6WriteValues;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryIPv6WriteMaxima;
-  time_t      BWHistoryDirReadEnds;
-  int         BWHistoryDirReadInterval;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirReadValues;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirReadMaxima;
-  time_t      BWHistoryDirWriteEnds;
-  int         BWHistoryDirWriteInterval;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirWriteValues;
-  struct smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirWriteMaxima;
-
-  /** Build time histogram */
-  struct config_line_t * BuildtimeHistogram;
-  int TotalBuildTimes;
-  int CircuitBuildAbandonedCount;
-
-  /** What version of Tor wrote this state file? */
-  char *TorVersion;
-
-  /** Holds any unrecognized values we found in the state file, in the order
-   * in which we found them. */
-  struct config_line_t *ExtraLines;
-
-  /** When did we last rotate our onion key?  "0" for 'no idea'. */
-  time_t LastRotatedOnionKey;
-
-  /**
-   * State objects for individual modules.
-   *
-   * Never access this field or its members directly: instead, use the module
-   * in question to get its relevant state object if you must.
-   */
-  struct config_suite_t *substates_;
-};
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_OR_STATE_ST_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/config/quiet_level.h

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file quiet_level.h
- * \brief Declare the quiet_level enumeration and global.
- **/
-
-#ifndef QUIET_LEVEL_H
-#define QUIET_LEVEL_H
-
-/** Enumeration to define how quietly Tor should log at startup. */
-typedef enum {
-   /** Default quiet level: we log everything of level NOTICE or higher. */
-   QUIET_NONE = 0,
-   /** "--hush" quiet level: we log everything of level WARNING or higher. */
-   QUIET_HUSH = 1 ,
-   /** "--quiet" quiet level: we log nothing at all. */
-   QUIET_SILENT = 2
-} quiet_level_t;
-
-/** How quietly should Tor log at startup? */
-extern quiet_level_t quiet_level;
-
-void add_default_log_for_quiet_level(quiet_level_t quiet);
-
-#endif /* !defined(QUIET_LEVEL_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/config/resolve_addr.h

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2020-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file resolve_addr.h
- * \brief Header file for resolve_addr.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CONFIG_RESOLVE_ADDR_H
-#define TOR_CONFIG_RESOLVE_ADDR_H
-
-#include "app/config/config.h"
-#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
-
-#include "app/config/or_options_st.h"
-
-/** Method used to resolved an address. In other words, how was the address
- * discovered by tor. */
-typedef enum {
-  /* Default value. Indicate that no method found the address. */
-  RESOLVED_ADDR_NONE              = 0,
-  /* Found from the "Address" configuration option. */
-  RESOLVED_ADDR_CONFIGURED        = 1,
-  /* Found from the "ORPort" configuration option. */
-  RESOLVED_ADDR_CONFIGURED_ORPORT = 2,
-  /* Found by resolving the local hostname. */
-  RESOLVED_ADDR_GETHOSTNAME       = 3,
-  /* Found by querying the local interface(s). */
-  RESOLVED_ADDR_INTERFACE         = 4,
-  /* Found by resolving the hostname from the Address configuration option. */
-  RESOLVED_ADDR_RESOLVED          = 5,
-} resolved_addr_method_t;
-
-const char *resolved_addr_method_to_str(const resolved_addr_method_t method);
-
-#define get_orport_addr(family) \
-  (portconf_get_first_advertised_addr(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER, family))
-
-bool find_my_address(const or_options_t *options, int family,
-                     int warn_severity, tor_addr_t *addr_out,
-                     resolved_addr_method_t *method_out, char **hostname_out);
-
-void resolved_addr_get_last(int family, tor_addr_t *addr_out);
-void resolved_addr_reset_last(int family);
-void resolved_addr_set_last(const tor_addr_t *addr,
-                            const resolved_addr_method_t method_used,
-                            const char *hostname_used);
-
-void resolved_addr_get_suggested(int family, tor_addr_t *addr_out);
-void resolved_addr_set_suggested(const tor_addr_t *addr);
-
-bool resolved_addr_is_configured(int family);
-
-MOCK_DECL(bool, is_local_to_resolve_addr, (const tor_addr_t *addr));
-
-#ifdef RESOLVE_ADDR_PRIVATE
-
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-
-void resolve_addr_reset_suggested(int family);
-
-#endif /* TOR_UNIT_TESTS */
-
-#endif /* defined(RESOLVE_ADDR_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CONFIG_RESOLVE_ADDR_H) */
-

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/config/statefile.h

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file statefile.h
- *
- * \brief Header for statefile.c
- */
-
-#ifndef TOR_STATEFILE_H
-#define TOR_STATEFILE_H
-
-MOCK_DECL(or_state_t *,get_or_state,(void));
-int did_last_state_file_write_fail(void);
-int or_state_save(time_t now);
-
-void save_transport_to_state(const char *transport_name,
-                             const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port);
-char *get_stored_bindaddr_for_server_transport(const char *transport);
-int or_state_load(void);
-int or_state_loaded(void);
-void or_state_free_all(void);
-void or_state_mark_dirty(or_state_t *state, time_t when);
-
-#ifdef STATEFILE_PRIVATE
-STATIC struct config_line_t *get_transport_in_state_by_name(
-                                                 const char *transport);
-STATIC void or_state_free_(or_state_t *state);
-#define or_state_free(st) FREE_AND_NULL(or_state_t, or_state_free_, (st))
-STATIC or_state_t *or_state_new(void);
-struct config_mgr_t;
-STATIC const struct config_mgr_t *get_state_mgr(void);
-STATIC void or_state_remove_obsolete_lines(struct config_line_t **extra_lines);
-#endif /* defined(STATEFILE_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_STATEFILE_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/config/tor_cmdline_mode.h

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file tor_cmdline_mode.h
- * \brief Declare the tor_cmdline_mode_t enumeration
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CMDLINE_MODE_H
-#define TOR_CMDLINE_MODE_H
-
-/**
- * Enumeration to describe which command Tor is running.  These commands
- * are controlled by command-line options.
- **/
-typedef enum {
-  CMD_RUN_TOR=0, /**< The default: run Tor as a daemon. */
-  CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT, /**< Running --list-fingerprint. */
-  CMD_HASH_PASSWORD, /**< Running --hash-password. */
-  CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG, /**< Running --verify-config. */
-  CMD_DUMP_CONFIG, /**< Running --dump-config. */
-  CMD_KEYGEN, /**< Running --keygen */
-  CMD_KEY_EXPIRATION, /**< Running --key-expiration */
-  CMD_IMMEDIATE, /**< Special value: indicates a command that is handled
-                  * immediately during configuration processing. */
-  CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS, /**< Special value: indicates that we have entered
-                      * the Tor code from the unit tests, not from the
-                      * regular Tor binary at all. */
-} tor_cmdline_mode_t;
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CMDLINE_MODE_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/main/main.h

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file main.h
- * \brief Header file for main.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_MAIN_H
-#define TOR_MAIN_H
-
-void handle_signals(void);
-void activate_signal(int signal_num);
-
-int try_locking(const or_options_t *options, int err_if_locked);
-int have_lockfile(void);
-void release_lockfile(void);
-
-void tor_remove_file(const char *filename);
-
-int tor_init(int argc, char **argv);
-
-int run_tor_main_loop(void);
-
-void pubsub_install(void);
-void pubsub_connect(void);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_MAIN_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/main/ntmain.h

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file ntmain.h
- * \brief Header file for ntmain.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_NTMAIN_H
-#define TOR_NTMAIN_H
-
-#ifdef _WIN32
-#define NT_SERVICE
-#endif
-
-#ifdef NT_SERVICE
-int nt_service_parse_options(int argc, char **argv, int *should_exit);
-int nt_service_is_stopping(void);
-void nt_service_set_state(DWORD state);
-#else
-#define nt_service_is_stopping() 0
-#define nt_service_parse_options(a, b, c) (0)
-#define nt_service_set_state(s) STMT_NIL
-#endif /* defined(NT_SERVICE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_NTMAIN_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/main/risky_options.h

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file risky_options.h
- * \brief Header for risky_options.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_RISKY_OPTIONS_H
-#define TOR_RISKY_OPTIONS_H
-
-extern const char risky_option_list[];
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_RISKY_OPTIONS_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/main/shutdown.h

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file shutdown.h
- * \brief Header file for shutdown.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_SHUTDOWN_H
-#define TOR_SHUTDOWN_H
-
-void tor_cleanup(void);
-void tor_free_all(int postfork);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_SHUTDOWN_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/app/main/subsysmgr.h

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2003-2004, Roger Dingledine
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file subsysmgr.h
- * @brief Header for subsysmgr.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_SUBSYSMGR_T
-#define TOR_SUBSYSMGR_T
-
-#include "lib/subsys/subsys.h"
-
-extern const struct subsys_fns_t *tor_subsystems[];
-extern const unsigned n_tor_subsystems;
-
-int subsystems_init(void);
-int subsystems_init_upto(int level);
-
-struct pubsub_builder_t;
-int subsystems_add_pubsub_upto(struct pubsub_builder_t *builder,
-                               int target_level);
-int subsystems_add_pubsub(struct pubsub_builder_t *builder);
-
-void subsystems_shutdown(void);
-void subsystems_shutdown_downto(int level);
-
-void subsystems_prefork(void);
-void subsystems_postfork(void);
-void subsystems_thread_cleanup(void);
-
-void subsystems_dump_list(void);
-
-struct config_mgr_t;
-int subsystems_register_options_formats(struct config_mgr_t *mgr);
-int subsystems_register_state_formats(struct config_mgr_t *mgr);
-struct or_options_t;
-struct or_state_t;
-int subsystems_set_options(const struct config_mgr_t *mgr,
-                           struct or_options_t *options);
-int subsystems_set_state(const struct config_mgr_t *mgr,
-                         struct or_state_t *state);
-int subsystems_flush_state(const struct config_mgr_t *mgr,
-                           struct or_state_t *state);
-
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-int subsystems_get_options_idx(const subsys_fns_t *sys);
-int subsystems_get_state_idx(const subsys_fns_t *sys);
-#endif
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_SUBSYSMGR_T) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/crypto/hs_ntor.h

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2017-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file hs_ntor.h
- * @brief Header for hs_ntor.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_HS_NTOR_H
-#define TOR_HS_NTOR_H
-
-#include "core/or/or.h"
-struct ed25519_public_key_t;
-struct curve25519_public_key_t;
-struct curve25519_keypair_t;
-
-/* Output length of KDF for key expansion */
-#define HS_NTOR_KEY_EXPANSION_KDF_OUT_LEN \
-  (DIGEST256_LEN*2 + CIPHER256_KEY_LEN*2)
-
-/* Key material needed to encode/decode INTRODUCE1 cells */
-typedef struct hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t {
-  /* Key used for encryption of encrypted INTRODUCE1 blob */
-  uint8_t enc_key[CIPHER256_KEY_LEN];
-  /* MAC key used to protect encrypted INTRODUCE1 blob */
-  uint8_t mac_key[DIGEST256_LEN];
-} hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t;
-
-/* Key material needed to encode/decode RENDEZVOUS1 cells */
-typedef struct hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t {
-  /* This is the MAC of the HANDSHAKE_INFO field */
-  uint8_t rend_cell_auth_mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
-  /* This is the key seed used to derive further rendezvous crypto keys as
-   * detailed in section 4.2.1 of rend-spec-ng.txt. */
-  uint8_t ntor_key_seed[DIGEST256_LEN];
-} hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t;
-
-#define SUBCRED_LEN DIGEST256_LEN
-
-/**
- * A 'subcredential' used to prove knowledge of a hidden service.
- **/
-typedef struct hs_subcredential_t {
-  uint8_t subcred[SUBCRED_LEN];
-} hs_subcredential_t;
-
-int hs_ntor_client_get_introduce1_keys(
-              const struct ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey,
-              const struct curve25519_public_key_t *intro_enc_pubkey,
-              const struct curve25519_keypair_t *client_ephemeral_enc_keypair,
-              const hs_subcredential_t *subcredential,
-              hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out);
-
-int hs_ntor_client_get_rendezvous1_keys(
-          const struct ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey,
-          const struct curve25519_keypair_t *client_ephemeral_enc_keypair,
-          const struct curve25519_public_key_t *intro_enc_pubkey,
-          const struct curve25519_public_key_t *service_ephemeral_rend_pubkey,
-          hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_out);
-
-int hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys_multi(
-            const struct ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey,
-            const struct curve25519_keypair_t *intro_enc_keypair,
-            const struct curve25519_public_key_t *client_ephemeral_enc_pubkey,
-            size_t n_subcredentials,
-            const hs_subcredential_t *subcredentials,
-            hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out);
-
-int hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys(
-            const struct ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey,
-            const struct curve25519_keypair_t *intro_enc_keypair,
-            const struct curve25519_public_key_t *client_ephemeral_enc_pubkey,
-            const hs_subcredential_t *subcredential,
-            hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out);
-
-int hs_ntor_service_get_rendezvous1_keys(
-            const struct ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey,
-            const struct curve25519_keypair_t *intro_enc_keypair,
-            const struct curve25519_keypair_t *service_ephemeral_rend_keypair,
-            const struct curve25519_public_key_t *client_ephemeral_enc_pubkey,
-            hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_out);
-
-int hs_ntor_circuit_key_expansion(const uint8_t *ntor_key_seed,
-                                  size_t seed_len,
-                                  uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len);
-
-int hs_ntor_client_rendezvous2_mac_is_good(
-                        const hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys,
-                        const uint8_t *rcvd_mac);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_HS_NTOR_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file onion_crypto.h
- * \brief Header file for onion_crypto.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_ONION_CRYPTO_H
-#define TOR_ONION_CRYPTO_H
-
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
-
-typedef struct server_onion_keys_t {
-  uint8_t my_identity[DIGEST_LEN];
-  ed25519_public_key_t my_ed_identity;
-  crypto_pk_t *onion_key;
-  crypto_pk_t *last_onion_key;
-  struct di_digest256_map_t *curve25519_key_map;
-  struct curve25519_keypair_t *junk_keypair;
-} server_onion_keys_t;
-
-void onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state);
-
-/**
- * Parameters negotiated as part of a circuit handshake.
- */
-typedef struct circuit_params_t {
-  /** Is true if congestion control is enabled in consensus or param,
-   * as per congestion_control_enabled() result. */
-  bool cc_enabled;
-  /** The number of cells in a sendme increment. Only used if cc_enabled=1. */
-  uint8_t sendme_inc_cells;
-} circuit_params_t;
-
-int onion_skin_create(int type,
-                      const extend_info_t *node,
-                      onion_handshake_state_t *state_out,
-                      uint8_t *onion_skin_out,
-                      size_t onion_skin_out_maxlen);
-int onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
-                      const uint8_t *onion_skin, size_t onionskin_len,
-                      const server_onion_keys_t *keys,
-                      const circuit_params_t *ns_params,
-                      uint8_t *reply_out,
-                      size_t reply_out_maxlen,
-                      uint8_t *keys_out, size_t key_out_len,
-                      uint8_t *rend_nonce_out,
-                      circuit_params_t *negotiated_params_out);
-int onion_skin_client_handshake(int type,
-                      const onion_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
-                      const uint8_t *reply, size_t reply_len,
-                      uint8_t *keys_out, size_t key_out_len,
-                      uint8_t *rend_authenticator_out,
-                      circuit_params_t *negotiated_params_out,
-                      const char **msg_out);
-
-server_onion_keys_t *server_onion_keys_new(void);
-void server_onion_keys_free_(server_onion_keys_t *keys);
-#define server_onion_keys_free(keys) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(server_onion_keys_t, server_onion_keys_free_, (keys))
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_ONION_CRYPTO_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/crypto/onion_fast.h

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file onion_fast.h
- * \brief Header file for onion_fast.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_ONION_FAST_H
-#define TOR_ONION_FAST_H
-
-#define CREATE_FAST_LEN DIGEST_LEN
-#define CREATED_FAST_LEN (DIGEST_LEN*2)
-
-typedef struct fast_handshake_state_t {
-  uint8_t state[DIGEST_LEN];
-} fast_handshake_state_t;
-
-void fast_handshake_state_free_(fast_handshake_state_t *victim);
-#define fast_handshake_state_free(st) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(fast_handshake_state_t, fast_handshake_state_free_, (st))
-
-int fast_onionskin_create(fast_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
-                          uint8_t *handshake_out);
-
-int fast_server_handshake(const uint8_t *message_in,
-                          uint8_t *handshake_reply_out,
-                          uint8_t *key_out,
-                          size_t key_out_len);
-
-int fast_client_handshake(const fast_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
-                          const uint8_t *handshake_reply_out,
-                          uint8_t *key_out,
-                          size_t key_out_len,
-                          const char **msg_out);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_ONION_FAST_H) */
-

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2012-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file onion_ntor.h
- * @brief Header for onion_ntor.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_ONION_NTOR_H
-#define TOR_ONION_NTOR_H
-
-#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
-
-struct di_digest256_map_t;
-struct curve25519_public_key_t;
-struct curve25519_keypair_t;
-
-/** State to be maintained by a client between sending an ntor onionskin
- * and receiving a reply. */
-typedef struct ntor_handshake_state_t ntor_handshake_state_t;
-
-/** Length of an ntor onionskin, as sent from the client to server. */
-#define NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN 84
-/** Length of an ntor reply, as sent from server to client. */
-#define NTOR_REPLY_LEN 64
-
-void ntor_handshake_state_free_(ntor_handshake_state_t *state);
-#define ntor_handshake_state_free(state) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(ntor_handshake_state_t, ntor_handshake_state_free_, (state))
-
-int onion_skin_ntor_create(const uint8_t *router_id,
-                           const struct curve25519_public_key_t *router_key,
-                           ntor_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
-                           uint8_t *onion_skin_out);
-
-int onion_skin_ntor_server_handshake(const uint8_t *onion_skin,
-                           const struct di_digest256_map_t *private_keys,
-                           const struct curve25519_keypair_t *junk_keypair,
-                           const uint8_t *my_node_id,
-                           uint8_t *handshake_reply_out,
-                           uint8_t *key_out,
-                           size_t key_out_len);
-
-int onion_skin_ntor_client_handshake(
-                             const ntor_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
-                             const uint8_t *handshake_reply,
-                             uint8_t *key_out,
-                             size_t key_out_len,
-                             const char **msg_out);
-
-#ifdef ONION_NTOR_PRIVATE
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h"
-
-/** Storage held by a client while waiting for an ntor reply from a server. */
-struct ntor_handshake_state_t {
-  /** Identity digest of the router we're talking to. */
-  uint8_t router_id[DIGEST_LEN];
-  /** Onion key of the router we're talking to. */
-  curve25519_public_key_t pubkey_B;
-
-  /**
-   * Short-lived keypair for use with this handshake.
-   * @{ */
-  curve25519_secret_key_t seckey_x;
-  curve25519_public_key_t pubkey_X;
-  /** @} */
-};
-#endif /* defined(ONION_NTOR_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_ONION_NTOR_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.h

@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file onion_ntor_v3.h
- * @brief Header for core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CORE_CRYPTO_ONION_NTOR_V3_H
-#define TOR_CORE_CRYPTO_ONION_NTOR_V3_H
-
-#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
-#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
-#include "lib/malloc/malloc.h"
-
-/**
- * Client-side state held while an ntor v3 handshake is in progress.
- **/
-typedef struct ntor3_handshake_state_t ntor3_handshake_state_t;
-
-/**
- * Server-side state held while the relay is handling a client's
- * encapsulated message, before replying to the v3 handshake.
- **/
-typedef struct ntor3_server_handshake_state_t ntor3_server_handshake_state_t;
-
-void ntor3_handshake_state_free_(ntor3_handshake_state_t *st);
-#define ntor3_handshake_state_free(ptr) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(ntor3_handshake_state_t, ntor3_handshake_state_free_, (ptr))
-void ntor3_server_handshake_state_free_(ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *st);
-#define ntor3_server_handshake_state_free(ptr) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(ntor3_server_handshake_state_t, \
-                ntor3_server_handshake_state_free_, (ptr))
-
-int onion_skin_ntor3_create(const ed25519_public_key_t *relay_id,
-                            const curve25519_public_key_t *relay_key,
-                            const uint8_t *verification,
-                            const size_t verification_len,
-                            const uint8_t *message,
-                            const size_t message_len,
-                            ntor3_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
-                            uint8_t **onion_skin_out,
-                            size_t *onion_skin_len_out);
-
-int onion_ntor3_client_handshake(
-                             const ntor3_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
-                             const uint8_t *handshake_reply,
-                             size_t reply_len,
-                             const uint8_t *verification,
-                             size_t verification_len,
-                             uint8_t *keys_out,
-                             size_t keys_out_len,
-                             uint8_t **message_out,
-                             size_t *message_len_out);
-
-struct di_digest256_map_t;
-int onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part1(
-                const struct di_digest256_map_t *private_keys,
-                const curve25519_keypair_t *junk_key,
-                const ed25519_public_key_t *my_id,
-                const uint8_t *client_handshake,
-                size_t client_handshake_len,
-                const uint8_t *verification,
-                size_t verification_len,
-                uint8_t **client_message_out,
-                size_t *client_message_len_out,
-                ntor3_server_handshake_state_t **state_out);
-
-int onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2(
-                const ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *state,
-                const uint8_t *verification,
-                size_t verification_len,
-                const uint8_t *server_message,
-                size_t server_message_len,
-                uint8_t **handshake_out,
-                size_t *handshake_len_out,
-                uint8_t *keys_out,
-                size_t keys_out_len);
-
-#ifdef ONION_NTOR_V3_PRIVATE
-struct ntor3_handshake_state_t {
-  /** Ephemeral (x,X) keypair. */
-  curve25519_keypair_t client_keypair;
-  /** Relay's ed25519 identity key (ID) */
-  ed25519_public_key_t relay_id;
-  /** Relay's public key (B) */
-  curve25519_public_key_t relay_key;
-  /** Shared secret (Bx). */
-  uint8_t bx[CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN];
-  /** MAC of the client's encrypted message data (MAC) */
-  uint8_t msg_mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
-};
-
-struct ntor3_server_handshake_state_t {
-  /** Relay's ed25519 identity key (ID) */
-  ed25519_public_key_t my_id;
-  /** Relay's public key (B) */
-  curve25519_public_key_t my_key;
-  /** Client's public ephemeral key (X). */
-  curve25519_public_key_t client_key;
-
-  /** Shared secret (Xb) */
-  uint8_t xb[CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN];
-  /** MAC of the client's encrypted message data */
-  uint8_t msg_mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
-};
-
-STATIC int onion_skin_ntor3_create_nokeygen(
-                        const curve25519_keypair_t *client_keypair,
-                        const ed25519_public_key_t *relay_id,
-                        const curve25519_public_key_t *relay_key,
-                        const uint8_t *verification,
-                        const size_t verification_len,
-                        const uint8_t *message,
-                        const size_t message_len,
-                        ntor3_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
-                        uint8_t **onion_skin_out,
-                        size_t *onion_skin_len_out);
-
-STATIC int onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2_nokeygen(
-                const curve25519_keypair_t *relay_keypair_y,
-                const ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *state,
-                const uint8_t *verification,
-                size_t verification_len,
-                const uint8_t *server_message,
-                size_t server_message_len,
-                uint8_t **handshake_out,
-                size_t *handshake_len_out,
-                uint8_t *keys_out,
-                size_t keys_out_len);
-
-#endif
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CORE_CRYPTO_ONION_NTOR_V3_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/crypto/onion_tap.h

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file onion_tap.h
- * \brief Header file for onion_tap.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_ONION_TAP_H
-#define TOR_ONION_TAP_H
-
-#define TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN (PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD+\
-                                 CIPHER_KEY_LEN+\
-                                 DH1024_KEY_LEN)
-#define TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN (DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN)
-
-struct crypto_dh_t;
-struct crypto_pk_t;
-
-int onion_skin_TAP_create(struct crypto_pk_t *router_key,
-                      struct crypto_dh_t **handshake_state_out,
-                      char *onion_skin_out);
-
-int onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(const char *onion_skin,
-                                struct crypto_pk_t *private_key,
-                                struct crypto_pk_t *prev_private_key,
-                                char *handshake_reply_out,
-                                char *key_out,
-                                size_t key_out_len);
-
-int onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(struct crypto_dh_t *handshake_state,
-                                const char *handshake_reply,
-                                char *key_out,
-                                size_t key_out_len,
-                                const char **msg_out);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_ONION_TAP_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/crypto/relay_crypto.h

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file relay.h
- * \brief Header file for relay.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_RELAY_CRYPTO_H
-#define TOR_RELAY_CRYPTO_H
-
-int relay_crypto_init(relay_crypto_t *crypto,
-                      const char *key_data, size_t key_data_len,
-                      int reverse, int is_hs_v3);
-
-int relay_decrypt_cell(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell,
-                       cell_direction_t cell_direction,
-                       crypt_path_t **layer_hint, char *recognized);
-void relay_encrypt_cell_outbound(cell_t *cell, origin_circuit_t *or_circ,
-                            crypt_path_t *layer_hint);
-void relay_encrypt_cell_inbound(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *or_circ);
-
-void relay_crypto_clear(relay_crypto_t *crypto);
-
-void relay_crypto_assert_ok(const relay_crypto_t *crypto);
-
-uint8_t *relay_crypto_get_sendme_digest(relay_crypto_t *crypto);
-
-void relay_crypto_record_sendme_digest(relay_crypto_t *crypto,
-                                       bool is_foward_digest);
-
-void
-relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_t *cipher, uint8_t *in);
-
-void
-relay_set_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest, cell_t *cell);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_RELAY_CRYPTO_H) */
-

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/mainloop/connection.h

@@ -1,396 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file connection.h
- * \brief Header file for connection.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CONNECTION_H
-#define TOR_CONNECTION_H
-
-#include "lib/smartlist_core/smartlist_core.h"
-#include "lib/log/log.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#endif
-
-struct listener_connection_t;
-struct connection_t;
-struct dir_connection_t;
-struct or_connection_t;
-struct edge_connection_t;
-struct entry_connection_t;
-struct control_connection_t;
-struct port_cfg_t;
-struct tor_addr_t;
-struct or_options_t;
-
-struct listener_connection_t *TO_LISTENER_CONN(struct connection_t *);
-const struct listener_connection_t *CONST_TO_LISTENER_CONN(
-                                      const struct connection_t *);
-
-struct buf_t;
-
-#define CONN_TYPE_MIN_ 3
-/** Type for sockets listening for OR connections. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER 3
-/** A bidirectional TLS connection transmitting a sequence of cells.
- * May be from an OR to an OR, or from an OP to an OR. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_OR 4
-/** A TCP connection from an onion router to a stream's destination. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_EXIT 5
-/** Type for sockets listening for SOCKS connections. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER 6
-/** A SOCKS proxy connection from the user application to the onion
- * proxy. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_AP 7
-/** Type for sockets listening for HTTP connections to the directory server. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER 8
-/** Type for HTTP connections to the directory server. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_DIR 9
-/* Type 10 is unused. */
-/** Type for listening for connections from user interface process. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER 11
-/** Type for connections from user interface process. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_CONTROL 12
-/** Type for sockets listening for transparent connections redirected by pf or
- * netfilter. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER 13
-/** Type for sockets listening for transparent connections redirected by
- * natd. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER 14
-/** Type for sockets listening for DNS requests. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER 15
-
-/** Type for connections from the Extended ORPort. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR 16
-/** Type for sockets listening for Extended ORPort connections. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER 17
-/** Type for sockets listening for HTTP CONNECT tunnel connections. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER 18
-/** Type for sockets listening for Metrics query connections. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_METRICS_LISTENER 19
-/** Type for connections from metrics listener. */
-#define CONN_TYPE_METRICS 20
-
-#define CONN_TYPE_MAX_ 21
-/* !!!! If _CONN_TYPE_MAX is ever over 31, we must grow the type field in
- * struct connection_t. */
-
-/* Proxy client handshake states */
-/* We use a proxy but we haven't even connected to it yet. */
-#define PROXY_INFANT 1
-/* We use an HTTP proxy and we've sent the CONNECT command. */
-#define PROXY_HTTPS_WANT_CONNECT_OK 2
-/* We use a SOCKS4 proxy and we've sent the CONNECT command. */
-#define PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK 3
-/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we try to negotiate without
-   any authentication . */
-#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE 4
-/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we try to negotiate with
-   Username/Password authentication . */
-#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929 5
-/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we just sent our credentials. */
-#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK 6
-/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we just sent our CONNECT command. */
-#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK 7
-/* We use an HAPROXY proxy and we just sent the proxy header. */
-#define PROXY_HAPROXY_WAIT_FOR_FLUSH 8
-/* We use a proxy and we CONNECTed successfully!. */
-#define PROXY_CONNECTED 9
-
-/** State for any listener connection. */
-#define LISTENER_STATE_READY 0
-
-/**
- * This struct associates an old listener connection to be replaced
- * by new connection described by port configuration. Only used when
- * moving listeners to/from wildcard IP address.
- */
-typedef struct
-{
-  struct connection_t *old_conn; /* Old listener connection to be replaced */
-  const struct port_cfg_t *new_port; /* New port configuration */
-} listener_replacement_t;
-
-const char *conn_type_to_string(int type);
-const char *conn_state_to_string(int type, int state);
-int conn_listener_type_supports_af_unix(int type);
-
-const char *connection_describe(const connection_t *conn);
-const char *connection_describe_peer(const connection_t *conn);
-
-struct dir_connection_t *dir_connection_new(int socket_family);
-struct or_connection_t *or_connection_new(int type, int socket_family);
-struct edge_connection_t *edge_connection_new(int type, int socket_family);
-struct entry_connection_t *entry_connection_new(int type, int socket_family);
-struct control_connection_t *control_connection_new(int socket_family);
-struct listener_connection_t *listener_connection_new(int type,
-                                                      int socket_family);
-struct connection_t *connection_new(int type, int socket_family);
-int connection_init_accepted_conn(struct connection_t *conn,
-                                const struct listener_connection_t *listener);
-void connection_link_connections(struct connection_t *conn_a,
-                                 struct connection_t *conn_b);
-MOCK_DECL(void,connection_free_,(struct connection_t *conn));
-#define connection_free(conn) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(struct connection_t, connection_free_, (conn))
-void connection_free_all(void);
-void connection_about_to_close_connection(struct connection_t *conn);
-void connection_close_immediate(struct connection_t *conn);
-void connection_mark_for_close_(struct connection_t *conn,
-                                int line, const char *file);
-MOCK_DECL(void, connection_mark_for_close_internal_,
-          (struct connection_t *conn, int line, const char *file));
-
-#define connection_mark_for_close(c) \
-  connection_mark_for_close_((c), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__)
-#define connection_mark_for_close_internal(c) \
-  connection_mark_for_close_internal_((c), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__)
-
-/**
- * Mark 'c' for close, but try to hold it open until all the data is written.
- * Use the _internal versions of connection_mark_for_close; this should be
- * called when you either are sure that if this is an or_connection_t the
- * controlling channel has been notified (e.g. with
- * connection_or_notify_error()), or you actually are the
- * connection_or_close_for_error() or connection_or_close_normally function.
- * For all other cases, use connection_mark_and_flush() instead, which
- * checks for struct or_connection_t properly, instead.  See below.
- */
-#define connection_mark_and_flush_internal_(c,line,file)                \
-  do {                                                                  \
-    struct connection_t *tmp_conn__ = (c);                              \
-    connection_mark_for_close_internal_(tmp_conn__, (line), (file));    \
-    tmp_conn__->hold_open_until_flushed = 1;                            \
-  } while (0)
-
-#define connection_mark_and_flush_internal(c)            \
-  connection_mark_and_flush_internal_((c), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__)
-
-/**
- * Mark 'c' for close, but try to hold it open until all the data is written.
- */
-#define connection_mark_and_flush_(c,line,file)                           \
-  do {                                                                    \
-    struct connection_t *tmp_conn_ = (c);                                 \
-    if (tmp_conn_->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {                                \
-      log_warn(LD_CHANNEL | LD_BUG,                                       \
-               "Something tried to close (and flush) an or_connection_t"  \
-               " without going through channels at %s:%d",                \
-               file, line);                                               \
-      connection_or_close_for_error(TO_OR_CONN(tmp_conn_), 1);            \
-    } else {                                                              \
-      connection_mark_and_flush_internal_(c, line, file);                 \
-    }                                                                     \
-  } while (0)
-
-#define connection_mark_and_flush(c)            \
-  connection_mark_and_flush_((c), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__)
-
-void connection_expire_held_open(void);
-
-int connection_connect(struct connection_t *conn, const char *address,
-                       const struct tor_addr_t *addr,
-                       uint16_t port, int *socket_error);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
-
-int connection_connect_unix(struct connection_t *conn, const char *socket_path,
-                            int *socket_error);
-
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */
-
-/** Maximum size of information that we can fit into SOCKS5 username
-    or password fields. */
-#define MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE 255
-
-/** Total maximum size of information that we can fit into SOCKS5
-    username and password fields. */
-#define MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL 2*MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE
-
-int connection_proxy_connect(struct connection_t *conn, int type);
-int connection_read_proxy_handshake(struct connection_t *conn);
-void log_failed_proxy_connection(struct connection_t *conn);
-int get_proxy_addrport(struct tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port,
-                       int *proxy_type,
-                       int *is_pt_out, const struct connection_t *conn);
-
-int retry_all_listeners(struct smartlist_t *new_conns,
-                        int close_all_noncontrol);
-
-void connection_mark_all_noncontrol_listeners(void);
-void connection_mark_all_noncontrol_connections(void);
-
-ssize_t connection_bucket_write_limit(struct connection_t *conn, time_t now);
-bool connection_dir_is_global_write_low(const struct connection_t *conn,
-                                        size_t attempt);
-void connection_bucket_init(void);
-void connection_bucket_adjust(const struct or_options_t *options);
-void connection_bucket_refill_all(time_t now,
-                                  uint32_t now_ts);
-void connection_read_bw_exhausted(struct connection_t *conn,
-                                  bool is_global_bw);
-void connection_write_bw_exhausted(struct connection_t *conn,
-                                   bool is_global_bw);
-void connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(struct connection_t *conn);
-void connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(struct connection_t *conn);
-
-int connection_handle_read(struct connection_t *conn);
-
-int connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len,
-                             struct connection_t *conn);
-int connection_buf_get_line(struct connection_t *conn, char *data,
-                            size_t *data_len);
-int connection_fetch_from_buf_http(struct connection_t *conn,
-                               char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen,
-                               char **body_out, size_t *body_used,
-                               size_t max_bodylen, int force_complete);
-
-int connection_wants_to_flush(struct connection_t *conn);
-int connection_outbuf_too_full(struct connection_t *conn);
-int connection_handle_write(struct connection_t *conn, int force);
-int connection_flush(struct connection_t *conn);
-int connection_process_inbuf(struct connection_t *conn, int package_partial);
-
-MOCK_DECL(void, connection_write_to_buf_impl_,
-          (const char *string, size_t len, struct connection_t *conn,
-           int zlib));
-/* DOCDOC connection_write_to_buf */
-static void connection_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len,
-                                    struct connection_t *conn);
-void connection_dir_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len,
-                            struct dir_connection_t *dir_conn, int done);
-static inline void
-connection_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len, struct connection_t *conn)
-{
-  connection_write_to_buf_impl_(string, len, conn, 0);
-}
-void connection_buf_add_compress(const char *string, size_t len,
-                                 struct dir_connection_t *conn, int done);
-void connection_buf_add_buf(struct connection_t *conn, struct buf_t *buf);
-
-size_t connection_get_inbuf_len(const struct connection_t *conn);
-size_t connection_get_outbuf_len(const struct connection_t *conn);
-struct connection_t *connection_get_by_global_id(uint64_t id);
-
-struct connection_t *connection_get_by_type(int type);
-MOCK_DECL(struct connection_t *,connection_get_by_type_nonlinked,(int type));
-MOCK_DECL(struct connection_t *,connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose,
-                                               (int type,
-                                                const struct tor_addr_t *addr,
-                                                uint16_t port, int purpose));
-struct connection_t *connection_get_by_type_state(int type, int state);
-struct connection_t *connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(
-                                                     int type, int state,
-                                                     const char *rendquery);
-struct smartlist_t *connection_list_by_type_state(int type, int state);
-struct smartlist_t *connection_list_by_type_purpose(int type, int purpose);
-struct smartlist_t *connection_dir_list_by_purpose_and_resource(
-                                                  int purpose,
-                                                  const char *resource);
-struct smartlist_t *connection_dir_list_by_purpose_resource_and_state(
-                                                  int purpose,
-                                                  const char *resource,
-                                                  int state);
-
-#define CONN_LEN_AND_FREE_TEMPLATE(sl) \
-  STMT_BEGIN                           \
-    int len = smartlist_len(sl);       \
-    smartlist_free(sl);                \
-    return len;                        \
-  STMT_END
-
-/** Return a count of directory connections that are fetching the item
- * described by <b>purpose</b>/<b>resource</b>. */
-static inline int
-connection_dir_count_by_purpose_and_resource(
-                                             int purpose,
-                                             const char *resource)
-{
-  struct smartlist_t *conns = connection_dir_list_by_purpose_and_resource(
-                                                                   purpose,
-                                                                   resource);
-  CONN_LEN_AND_FREE_TEMPLATE(conns);
-}
-
-/** Return a count of directory connections that are fetching the item
- * described by <b>purpose</b>/<b>resource</b>/<b>state</b>. */
-static inline int
-connection_dir_count_by_purpose_resource_and_state(
-                                                   int purpose,
-                                                   const char *resource,
-                                                   int state)
-{
-  struct smartlist_t *conns =
-    connection_dir_list_by_purpose_resource_and_state(
-                                                      purpose,
-                                                      resource,
-                                                      state);
-  CONN_LEN_AND_FREE_TEMPLATE(conns);
-}
-
-#undef CONN_LEN_AND_FREE_TEMPLATE
-
-int any_other_active_or_conns(const struct or_connection_t *this_conn);
-
-/* || 0 is for -Wparentheses-equality (-Wall?) appeasement under clang */
-#define connection_speaks_cells(conn) (((conn)->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) || 0)
-int connection_is_listener(struct connection_t *conn);
-int connection_state_is_open(struct connection_t *conn);
-int connection_state_is_connecting(struct connection_t *conn);
-
-char *alloc_http_authenticator(const char *authenticator);
-
-void assert_connection_ok(struct connection_t *conn, time_t now);
-int connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(struct or_connection_t *conn);
-void connection_dump_buffer_mem_stats(int severity);
-
-MOCK_DECL(void, clock_skew_warning,
-          (const struct connection_t *conn, long apparent_skew, int trusted,
-           log_domain_mask_t domain, const char *received,
-           const char *source));
-
-int connection_is_moribund(struct connection_t *conn);
-void connection_check_oos(int n_socks, int failed);
-
-/** Execute the statement <b>stmt</b>, which may log events concerning the
- * connection <b>conn</b>.  To prevent infinite loops, disable log messages
- * being sent to controllers if <b>conn</b> is a control connection.
- *
- * Stmt must not contain any return or goto statements.
- */
-#define CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, stmt)                                    \
-  STMT_BEGIN                                                            \
-    int _log_conn_is_control;                                           \
-    tor_assert(conn);                                                   \
-    _log_conn_is_control = (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL);           \
-    if (_log_conn_is_control)                                           \
-      disable_control_logging();                                        \
-  STMT_BEGIN stmt; STMT_END;                                            \
-    if (_log_conn_is_control)                                           \
-      enable_control_logging();                                         \
-  STMT_END
-
-#ifdef CONNECTION_PRIVATE
-STATIC void connection_free_minimal(struct connection_t *conn);
-
-/* Used only by connection.c and test*.c */
-MOCK_DECL(STATIC int,connection_connect_sockaddr,
-                                            (struct connection_t *conn,
-                                             const struct sockaddr *sa,
-                                             socklen_t sa_len,
-                                             const struct sockaddr *bindaddr,
-                                             socklen_t bindaddr_len,
-                                             int *socket_error));
-MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, kill_conn_list_for_oos, (struct smartlist_t *conns));
-MOCK_DECL(STATIC struct smartlist_t *, pick_oos_victims, (int n));
-
-#endif /* defined(CONNECTION_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CONNECTION_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/mainloop/cpuworker.h

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2024, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file cpuworker.h
- * \brief Header file for cpuworker.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CPUWORKER_H
-#define TOR_CPUWORKER_H
-
-int cpuworker_init(void);
-void cpuworker_free_all(void);
-void cpuworkers_rotate_keyinfo(void);
-
-void cpuworker_consensus_has_changed(const networkstatus_t *ns);
-
-struct workqueue_entry_t;
-enum workqueue_reply_t;
-enum workqueue_priority_t;
-MOCK_DECL(struct workqueue_entry_t *, cpuworker_queue_work, (
-                    enum workqueue_priority_t priority,
-                    enum workqueue_reply_t (*fn)(void *, void *),
-                    void (*reply_fn)(void *),
-                    void *arg));
-
-struct create_cell_t;
-int assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker(or_circuit_t *circ,
-                                  struct create_cell_t *onionskin);
-
-uint64_t estimated_usec_for_onionskins(uint32_t n_requests,
-                                       uint16_t onionskin_type);
-void cpuworker_log_onionskin_overhead(int severity, int onionskin_type,
-                                      const char *onionskin_type_name);
-void cpuworker_cancel_circ_handshake(or_circuit_t *circ);
-
-unsigned int cpuworker_get_n_threads(void);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CPUWORKER_H) */
-

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/mainloop/mainloop.h

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file mainloop.h
- * \brief Header file for mainloop.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_MAINLOOP_H
-#define TOR_MAINLOOP_H
-
-int have_completed_a_circuit(void);
-void note_that_we_completed_a_circuit(void);
-void note_that_we_maybe_cant_complete_circuits(void);
-
-int connection_add_impl(connection_t *conn, int is_connecting);
-#define connection_add(conn) connection_add_impl((conn), 0)
-#define connection_add_connecting(conn) connection_add_impl((conn), 1)
-int connection_remove(connection_t *conn);
-void connection_unregister_events(connection_t *conn);
-int connection_in_array(connection_t *conn);
-void add_connection_to_closeable_list(connection_t *conn);
-int connection_is_on_closeable_list(connection_t *conn);
-
-MOCK_DECL(smartlist_t *, get_connection_array, (void));
-MOCK_DECL(uint64_t,get_bytes_read,(void));
-MOCK_DECL(uint64_t,get_bytes_written,(void));
-void stats_increment_bytes_read_and_written(uint64_t r, uint64_t w);
-
-/** Bitmask for events that we can turn on and off with
- * connection_watch_events. */
-typedef enum watchable_events {
-  /* Yes, it is intentional that these match Libevent's EV_READ and EV_WRITE */
-  READ_EVENT=0x02, /**< We want to know when a connection is readable */
-  WRITE_EVENT=0x04 /**< We want to know when a connection is writable */
-} watchable_events_t;
-void connection_watch_events(connection_t *conn, watchable_events_t events);
-int connection_is_reading(const connection_t *conn);
-MOCK_DECL(void,connection_stop_reading,(connection_t *conn));
-MOCK_DECL(void,connection_start_reading,(connection_t *conn));
-
-int connection_is_writing(connection_t *conn);
-MOCK_DECL(void,connection_stop_writing,(connection_t *conn));
-MOCK_DECL(void,connection_start_writing,(connection_t *conn));
-
-void tor_shutdown_event_loop_and_exit(int exitcode);
-int tor_event_loop_shutdown_is_pending(void);
-
-void connection_stop_reading_from_linked_conn(connection_t *conn);
-
-MOCK_DECL(int, connection_count_moribund, (void));
-
-void directory_all_unreachable(time_t now);
-void directory_info_has_arrived(time_t now, int from_cache, int suppress_logs);
-
-void ip_address_changed(int on_client_conn);
-void dns_servers_relaunch_checks(void);
-void reset_all_main_loop_timers(void);
-void reschedule_directory_downloads(void);
-void reschedule_or_state_save(void);
-void mainloop_schedule_postloop_cleanup(void);
-void rescan_periodic_events(const or_options_t *options);
-MOCK_DECL(void, schedule_rescan_periodic_events,(void));
-
-void update_current_time(time_t now);
-
-MOCK_DECL(long,get_uptime,(void));
-MOCK_DECL(void,reset_uptime,(void));
-
-unsigned get_signewnym_epoch(void);
-
-int do_main_loop(void);
-
-void reset_main_loop_counters(void);
-uint64_t get_main_loop_success_count(void);
-uint64_t get_main_loop_error_count(void);
-uint64_t get_main_loop_idle_count(void);
-
-void periodic_events_on_new_options(const or_options_t *options);
-
-void do_signewnym(time_t);
-time_t get_last_signewnym_time(void);
-
-void mainloop_schedule_shutdown(int delay_sec);
-
-void tor_init_connection_lists(void);
-void initialize_mainloop_events(void);
-void initialize_periodic_events(void);
-void tor_mainloop_free_all(void);
-
-struct token_bucket_rw_t;
-
-extern time_t time_of_process_start;
-extern struct token_bucket_rw_t global_bucket;
-extern struct token_bucket_rw_t global_relayed_bucket;
-
-#ifdef MAINLOOP_PRIVATE
-STATIC int run_main_loop_until_done(void);
-STATIC void close_closeable_connections(void);
-STATIC void teardown_periodic_events(void);
-STATIC int get_my_roles(const or_options_t *);
-STATIC int check_network_participation_callback(time_t now,
-                                                const or_options_t *options);
-
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-extern smartlist_t *connection_array;
-
-/* We need the periodic_event_item_t definition. */
-#include "core/mainloop/periodic.h"
-extern periodic_event_item_t mainloop_periodic_events[];
-#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
-#endif /* defined(MAINLOOP_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_MAINLOOP_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.h

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file mainloop_pubsub.h
- * @brief Header for mainloop_pubsub.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_MAINLOOP_PUBSUB_H
-#define TOR_MAINLOOP_PUBSUB_H
-
-struct pubsub_builder_t;
-
-/**
- * Describe when and how messages are delivered on message channel.
- *
- * Every message channel must be associated with one of these strategies.
- **/
-typedef enum {
-   /**
-    * Never deliver messages automatically.
-    *
-    * If a message channel uses this strategy, then no matter now many
-    * messages are published on it, they are not delivered until something
-    * manually calls dispatch_flush() for that channel
-    **/
-   DELIV_NEVER=0,
-   /**
-    * Deliver messages promptly, via the event loop.
-    *
-    * If a message channel uses this strategy, then publishing a messages
-    * that channel activates an event that causes messages to be handled
-    * later in the mainloop.  The messages will be processed at some point
-    * very soon, delaying only for pending IO events and the like.
-    *
-    * Generally this is the best choice for a delivery strategy, since
-    * it avoids stack explosion.
-    **/
-   DELIV_PROMPT,
-   /**
-    * Deliver messages immediately, skipping the event loop.
-    *
-    * Every event on this channel is flushed immediately after it is queued,
-    * using the stack.
-    *
-    * This delivery type should be used with caution, since it can cause
-    * unexpected call chains, resource starvation, and the like.
-    **/
-   DELIV_IMMEDIATE,
-} deliv_strategy_t;
-
-int tor_mainloop_connect_pubsub(struct pubsub_builder_t *builder);
-void tor_mainloop_connect_pubsub_events(void);
-int tor_mainloop_set_delivery_strategy(const char *msg_channel_name,
-                                        deliv_strategy_t strategy);
-void tor_mainloop_disconnect_pubsub(void);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_MAINLOOP_PUBSUB_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/mainloop/mainloop_state_st.h

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file mainloop_state_st.h
- * @brief Declare a state structure for mainloop-relevant fields
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CORE_MAINLOOP_MAINLOOP_STATE_ST_H
-#define TOR_CORE_MAINLOOP_MAINLOOP_STATE_ST_H
-
-#include "lib/conf/confdecl.h"
-
-#define CONF_CONTEXT STRUCT
-#include "core/mainloop/mainloop_state.inc"
-#undef CONF_CONTEXT
-
-typedef struct mainloop_state_t mainloop_state_t;
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CORE_MAINLOOP_MAINLOOP_STATE_ST_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.h

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file mainloop_sys.h
- * @brief Header for mainloop_sys.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef MAINLOOP_SYS_H
-#define MAINLOOP_SYS_H
-
-extern const struct subsys_fns_t sys_mainloop;
-
-#endif /* !defined(MAINLOOP_SYS_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/mainloop/netstatus.h

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file netstatus.h
- * @brief Header for netstatus.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_NETSTATUS_H
-#define TOR_NETSTATUS_H
-
-int net_is_disabled(void);
-int net_is_completely_disabled(void);
-
-void note_user_activity(time_t now);
-void reset_user_activity(time_t now);
-time_t get_last_user_activity_time(void);
-
-void set_network_participation(bool participation);
-bool is_participating_on_network(void);
-
-struct mainloop_state_t;
-
-void netstatus_flush_to_state(struct mainloop_state_t *state, time_t now);
-void netstatus_load_from_state(const struct mainloop_state_t *state,
-                               time_t now);
-void netstatus_note_clock_jumped(time_t seconds_diff);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_NETSTATUS_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/mainloop/periodic.h

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2015-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file periodic.h
- * @brief Header for periodic.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_PERIODIC_H
-#define TOR_PERIODIC_H
-
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE (-1)
-
-/* Tor roles for which a periodic event item is for. An event can be for
- * multiple roles, they can be combined. */
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_CLIENT      (1U << 0)
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_RELAY       (1U << 1)
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGE      (1U << 2)
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_DIRAUTH     (1U << 3)
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGEAUTH  (1U << 4)
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_HS_SERVICE  (1U << 5)
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_DIRSERVER   (1U << 6)
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_CONTROLEV   (1U << 7)
-
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_NET_PARTICIPANT (1U << 8)
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL         (1U << 9)
-
-/* Helper macro to make it a bit less annoying to defined groups of roles that
- * are often used. */
-
-/* Router that is a Bridge or Relay. */
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER \
-  (PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGE | PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_RELAY)
-/* Authorities that is both bridge and directory. */
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_AUTHORITIES \
-  (PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGEAUTH | PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_DIRAUTH)
-
-/*
- * Event flags which can change the behavior of an event.
- */
-
-/* Indicate that the event needs the network meaning that if we are in
- * DisableNetwork or hibernation mode, the event won't be enabled. This obey
- * the net_is_disabled() check. */
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET  (1U << 0)
-
-/* Indicate that if the event is enabled, it needs to be run once before
- * it becomes disabled.
- */
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_RUN_ON_DISABLE  (1U << 1)
-
-/** Callback function for a periodic event to take action.  The return value
-* influences the next time the function will get called.  Return
-* PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE to not update <b>last_action_time</b> and be polled
-* again in the next second. If a positive value is returned it will update the
-* interval time. */
-typedef int (*periodic_event_helper_t)(time_t now,
-                                      const or_options_t *options);
-
-struct mainloop_event_t;
-
-/** A single item for the periodic-events-function table. */
-typedef struct periodic_event_item_t {
-  periodic_event_helper_t fn; /**< The function to run the event */
-  time_t last_action_time; /**< The last time the function did something */
-  struct mainloop_event_t *ev; /**< Libevent callback we're using to implement
-                                * this */
-  const char *name; /**< Name of the function -- for debug */
-
-  /* Bitmask of roles define above for which this event applies. */
-  uint32_t roles;
-  /* Bitmask of flags which can change the behavior of the event. */
-  uint32_t flags;
-  /* Indicate that this event has been enabled that is scheduled. */
-  unsigned int enabled : 1;
-} periodic_event_item_t;
-
-/** events will get their interval from first execution */
-#ifndef COCCI
-#define PERIODIC_EVENT(fn, r, f) { fn##_callback, 0, NULL, #fn, r, f, 0 }
-#define END_OF_PERIODIC_EVENTS { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0 }
-#endif
-
-/* Return true iff the given event was setup before thus is enabled to be
- * scheduled. */
-static inline int
-periodic_event_is_enabled(const periodic_event_item_t *item)
-{
-  return item->enabled;
-}
-
-void periodic_event_launch(periodic_event_item_t *event);
-void periodic_event_connect(periodic_event_item_t *event);
-//void periodic_event_disconnect(periodic_event_item_t *event);
-void periodic_event_reschedule(periodic_event_item_t *event);
-void periodic_event_enable(periodic_event_item_t *event);
-void periodic_event_disable(periodic_event_item_t *event);
-void periodic_event_schedule_and_disable(periodic_event_item_t *event);
-
-void periodic_events_register(periodic_event_item_t *item);
-void periodic_events_connect_all(void);
-void periodic_events_reset_all(void);
-periodic_event_item_t *periodic_events_find(const char *name);
-void periodic_events_rescan_by_roles(int roles, bool net_disabled);
-void periodic_events_disconnect_all(void);
-
-int safe_timer_diff(time_t now, time_t next);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_PERIODIC_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/addr_policy_st.h

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file addr_policy_st.h
- * @brief Address policy structures.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_ADDR_POLICY_ST_H
-#define TOR_ADDR_POLICY_ST_H
-
-#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
-#include "lib/net/address.h"
-
-/** What action type does an address policy indicate: accept or reject? */
-typedef enum {
-  ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPT=1,
-  ADDR_POLICY_REJECT=2,
-} addr_policy_action_t;
-#define addr_policy_action_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(addr_policy_action_t)
-
-/** A reference-counted address policy rule. */
-struct addr_policy_t {
-  int refcnt; /**< Reference count */
-  /** What to do when the policy matches.*/
-  addr_policy_action_bitfield_t policy_type:2;
-  unsigned int is_private:1; /**< True iff this is the pseudo-address,
-                              * "private". */
-  unsigned int is_canonical:1; /**< True iff this policy is the canonical
-                                * copy (stored in a hash table to avoid
-                                * duplication of common policies) */
-  maskbits_t maskbits; /**< Accept/reject all addresses <b>a</b> such that the
-                 * first <b>maskbits</b> bits of <b>a</b> match
-                 * <b>addr</b>. */
-  /** Base address to accept or reject.
-   *
-   * Note that wildcards are treated
-   * differently depending on address family. An AF_UNSPEC address means
-   * "All addresses, IPv4 or IPv6." An AF_INET address with maskbits==0 means
-   * "All IPv4 addresses" and an AF_INET6 address with maskbits == 0 means
-   * "All IPv6 addresses".
-  **/
-  tor_addr_t addr;
-  uint16_t prt_min; /**< Lowest port number to accept/reject. */
-  uint16_t prt_max; /**< Highest port number to accept/reject. */
-};
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_ADDR_POLICY_ST_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/address_set.h

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2018-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file address_set.h
- * \brief Types to handle sets of addresses.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_ADDRESS_SET_H
-#define TOR_ADDRESS_SET_H
-
-#include "orconfig.h"
-#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
-#include "lib/container/bloomfilt.h"
-
-struct tor_addr_t;
-
-/**
- * An address_set_t represents a set of tor_addr_t values. The implementation
- * is probabilistic: false negatives cannot occur but false positives are
- * possible.
- */
-typedef struct bloomfilt_t address_set_t;
-
-address_set_t *address_set_new(int max_addresses_guess);
-#define address_set_free(set) bloomfilt_free(set)
-void address_set_add(address_set_t *set, const struct tor_addr_t *addr);
-void address_set_add_ipv4h(address_set_t *set, uint32_t addr);
-int address_set_probably_contains(const address_set_t *set,
-                                  const struct tor_addr_t *addr);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_ADDRESS_SET_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/cell_queue_st.h

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file cell_queue_st.h
- * @brief Cell queue structures
- **/
-
-#ifndef PACKED_CELL_ST_H
-#define PACKED_CELL_ST_H
-
-#include "tor_queue.h"
-
-/** A cell as packed for writing to the network. */
-struct packed_cell_t {
-  /** Next cell queued on this circuit. */
-  TOR_SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(packed_cell_t) next;
-  char body[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE]; /**< Cell as packed for network. */
-  uint32_t inserted_timestamp; /**< Time (in timestamp units) when this cell
-                                * was inserted */
-};
-
-/** A queue of cells on a circuit, waiting to be added to the
- * or_connection_t's outbuf. */
-struct cell_queue_t {
-  /** Linked list of packed_cell_t*/
-  TOR_SIMPLEQ_HEAD(cell_simpleq_t, packed_cell_t) head;
-  int n; /**< The number of cells in the queue. */
-};
-
-#endif /* !defined(PACKED_CELL_ST_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/cell_st.h

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file cell_st.h
- * @brief Fixed-size cell structure.
- **/
-
-#ifndef CELL_ST_H
-#define CELL_ST_H
-
-/** Parsed onion routing cell.  All communication between nodes
- * is via cells. */
-struct cell_t {
-  circid_t circ_id; /**< Circuit which received the cell. */
-  uint8_t command; /**< Type of the cell: one of CELL_PADDING, CELL_CREATE,
-                    * CELL_DESTROY, etc */
-  uint8_t payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; /**< Cell body. */
-};
-
-#endif /* !defined(CELL_ST_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/channel.h

@@ -1,775 +0,0 @@
-/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file channel.h
- * \brief Header file for channel.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CHANNEL_H
-#define TOR_CHANNEL_H
-
-#include "core/or/or.h"
-#include "core/or/circuitmux.h"
-#include "lib/container/handles.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
-
-#include "ext/ht.h"
-#include "tor_queue.h"
-
-#define tor_timer_t timeout
-struct tor_timer_t;
-
-/* Channel handler function pointer typedefs */
-typedef void (*channel_listener_fn_ptr)(channel_listener_t *, channel_t *);
-typedef void (*channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr)(channel_t *, cell_t *);
-
-/**
- * This enum is used by channelpadding to decide when to pad channels.
- * Don't add values to it without updating the checks in
- * channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel().
- */
-typedef enum {
-    CHANNEL_USED_NOT_USED_FOR_FULL_CIRCS = 0,
-    CHANNEL_USED_FOR_FULL_CIRCS,
-    CHANNEL_USED_FOR_USER_TRAFFIC,
-} channel_usage_info_t;
-
-/** Possible rules for generating circuit IDs on an OR connection. */
-typedef enum {
-  CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER=0, /**< Pick from 0..1<<15-1. */
-  CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER=1, /**< Pick from 1<<15..1<<16-1. */
-  /** The other side of a connection is an OP: never create circuits to it,
-   * and let it use any circuit ID it wants. */
-  CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER=2
-} circ_id_type_t;
-#define circ_id_type_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(circ_id_type_t)
-
-/* channel states for channel_t */
-
-typedef enum {
-  /**
-   * Closed state - channel is inactive
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
-   */
-  CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED = 0,
-  /**
-   * Opening state - channel is trying to connect
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
-   */
-  CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING,
-  /**
-   * Open state - channel is active and ready for use
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
-   */
-  CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN,
-  /**
-   * Maintenance state - channel is temporarily offline for subclass specific
-   *   maintenance activities such as TLS renegotiation.
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
-   */
-  CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT,
-  /**
-   * Closing state - channel is shutting down
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED,
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
-   */
-  CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING,
-  /**
-   * Error state - channel has experienced a permanent error
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - None
-   */
-  CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR,
-  /**
-   * Placeholder for maximum state value
-   */
-  CHANNEL_STATE_LAST
-} channel_state_t;
-
-/* channel listener states for channel_listener_t */
-
-typedef enum {
-  /**
-   * Closed state - channel listener is inactive
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING
-   */
-  CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED = 0,
-  /**
-   * Listening state - channel listener is listening for incoming
-   * connections
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING
-   *   - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR
-   */
-  CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING,
-  /**
-   * Closing state - channel listener is shutting down
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED,
-   *   - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR
-   */
-  CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING,
-  /**
-   * Error state - channel listener has experienced a permanent error
-   *
-   * Permitted transitions from:
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
-   *   - CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING
-   * Permitted transitions to:
-   *   - None
-   */
-  CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR,
-  /**
-   * Placeholder for maximum state value
-   */
-  CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LAST
-} channel_listener_state_t;
-
-/**
- * Channel struct; see the channel_t typedef in or.h.  A channel is an
- * abstract interface for the OR-to-OR connection, similar to connection_or_t,
- * but without the strong coupling to the underlying TLS implementation.  They
- * are constructed by calling a protocol-specific function to open a channel
- * to a particular node, and once constructed support the abstract operations
- * defined below.
- */
-struct channel_t {
-  /** Magic number for type-checking cast macros */
-  uint32_t magic;
-
-  /** List entry for hashtable for global-identifier lookup. */
-  HT_ENTRY(channel_t) gidmap_node;
-
-  /** Handle entry for handle-based lookup */
-  HANDLE_ENTRY(channel, channel_t);
-
-  /** Current channel state */
-  channel_state_t state;
-
-  /** Globally unique ID number for a channel over the lifetime of a Tor
-   * process.  This may not be 0.
-   */
-  uint64_t global_identifier;
-
-  /** Should we expect to see this channel in the channel lists? */
-  unsigned char registered:1;
-
-  /** has this channel ever been open? */
-  unsigned int has_been_open:1;
-
-  /**
-   * This field indicates if the other side has enabled or disabled
-   * padding via either the link protocol version or
-   * channelpadding_negotiate cells.
-   *
-   * Clients can override this with ConnectionPadding in torrc to
-   * disable or force padding to relays, but relays cannot override the
-   * client's request.
-   */
-  unsigned int padding_enabled:1;
-
-  /** Cached value of our decision to pad (to avoid expensive
-   * checks during critical path statistics counting). */
-  unsigned int currently_padding:1;
-
-  /** Is there a pending netflow padding callback? */
-  unsigned int pending_padding_callback:1;
-
-  /** Is our peer likely to consider this channel canonical? */
-  unsigned int is_canonical_to_peer:1;
-
-  /** Has this channel ever been used for non-directory traffic?
-   * Used to decide what channels to pad, and when. */
-  channel_usage_info_t channel_usage;
-
-  /** When should we send a cell for netflow padding? 0 means no padding is
-   *  scheduled. */
-  monotime_coarse_t next_padding_time;
-
-  /** The callback pointer for the padding callbacks */
-  struct tor_timer_t *padding_timer;
-  /** The handle to this channel (to free on canceled timers) */
-  struct channel_handle_t *timer_handle;
-
-  /** If not UNSPEC, the address that the peer says we have. */
-  tor_addr_t addr_according_to_peer;
-
-  /**
-   * These two fields specify the minimum and maximum negotiated timeout
-   * values for inactivity (send or receive) before we decide to pad a
-   * channel. These fields can be set either via a PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell,
-   * or the torrc option ReducedConnectionPadding. The consensus parameters
-   * nf_ito_low and nf_ito_high are used to ensure that padding can only be
-   * negotiated to be less frequent than what is specified in the consensus.
-   * (This is done to prevent wingnut clients from requesting excessive
-   * padding).
-   *
-   * The actual timeout value is randomly chosen between these two values
-   * as per the table in channelpadding_get_netflow_inactive_timeout_ms(),
-   * after ensuring that these values do not specify lower timeouts than
-   * the consensus parameters.
-   *
-   * If these are 0, we have not negotiated or specified custom padding
-   * times, and instead use consensus defaults. */
-  uint16_t padding_timeout_low_ms;
-  uint16_t padding_timeout_high_ms;
-
-  /** Why did we close?
-   */
-  enum {
-    CHANNEL_NOT_CLOSING = 0,
-    CHANNEL_CLOSE_REQUESTED,
-    CHANNEL_CLOSE_FROM_BELOW,
-    CHANNEL_CLOSE_FOR_ERROR
-  } reason_for_closing;
-
-  /** State variable for use by the scheduler */
-  enum {
-    /**
-     * The channel is not open, or it has a full output buffer but no queued
-     * cells.
-     */
-    SCHED_CHAN_IDLE = 0,
-    /**
-     * The channel has space on its output buffer to write, but no queued
-     * cells.
-     */
-    SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS,
-    /**
-     * The scheduler has queued cells but no output buffer space to write.
-     */
-    SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE,
-    /**
-     * The scheduler has both queued cells and output buffer space, and is
-     * eligible for the scheduler loop.
-     */
-    SCHED_CHAN_PENDING
-  } scheduler_state;
-
-  /** Heap index for use by the scheduler */
-  int sched_heap_idx;
-
-  /** Timestamps for both cell channels and listeners */
-  time_t timestamp_created; /* Channel created */
-  time_t timestamp_active; /* Any activity */
-
-  /**
-   * This is a monotonic timestamp that marks when we
-   * believe the channel has actually sent or received data to/from
-   * the wire. Right now, it is used to determine when we should send
-   * a padding cell for channelpadding.
-   *
-   * XXX: Are we setting timestamp_xfer_ms in the right places to
-   * accurately reflect actual network data transfer? Or might this be
-   * very wrong wrt when bytes actually go on the wire?
-   */
-  monotime_coarse_t timestamp_xfer;
-
-  /* Methods implemented by the lower layer */
-
-  /** Free a channel */
-  void (*free_fn)(channel_t *);
-  /** Close an open channel */
-  void (*close)(channel_t *);
-  /** Describe the transport subclass for this channel */
-  const char * (*describe_transport)(channel_t *);
-  /** Optional method to dump transport-specific statistics on the channel */
-  void (*dumpstats)(channel_t *, int);
-
-  /** Registered handlers for incoming cells */
-  channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr cell_handler;
-
-  /* Methods implemented by the lower layer */
-
-  /**
-   * Ask the lower layer for an estimate of the average overhead for
-   * transmissions on this channel.
-   */
-  double (*get_overhead_estimate)(channel_t *);
-  /*
-   * Ask the underlying transport what the remote endpoint address is, in a
-   * tor_addr_t.  Write the address out to the provided tor_addr_t *, and
-   * return 1 if successful or 0 if no address available.
-   */
-  int (*get_remote_addr)(const channel_t *, tor_addr_t *);
-  int (*get_transport_name)(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out);
-
-  /**
-   * Get a human-readable text description of the remote endpoint, for
-   * logging.
-   */
-  const char * (*describe_peer)(const channel_t *);
-  /** Check if the lower layer has queued writes */
-  int (*has_queued_writes)(channel_t *);
-  /**
-   * Ask the lower layer if this is 'canonical', for a transport-specific
-   * definition of canonical.
-   */
-  int (*is_canonical)(channel_t *);
-  /** Check if this channel matches a specified extend_info_t */
-  int (*matches_extend_info)(channel_t *, extend_info_t *);
-  /** Check if this channel matches a target address when extending */
-  int (*matches_target)(channel_t *, const tor_addr_t *);
-  /* Ask the lower layer how many bytes it has queued but not yet sent */
-  size_t (*num_bytes_queued)(channel_t *);
-  /* Ask the lower layer how many cells can be written */
-  int (*num_cells_writeable)(channel_t *);
-  /* Write a cell to an open channel */
-  int (*write_cell)(channel_t *, cell_t *);
-  /** Write a packed cell to an open channel */
-  int (*write_packed_cell)(channel_t *, packed_cell_t *);
-  /** Write a variable-length cell to an open channel */
-  int (*write_var_cell)(channel_t *, var_cell_t *);
-
-  /**
-   * Hash of the public RSA key for the other side's RSA identity key -- or
-   * zeroes if we don't have an RSA identity in mind for the other side, and
-   * it hasn't shown us one.
-   *
-   * Note that this is the RSA identity that we hope the other side has -- not
-   * necessarily its true identity.  Don't believe this identity unless
-   * authentication has happened.
-   */
-  char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
-  /**
-   * Ed25519 key for the other side of this channel -- or zeroes if we don't
-   * have an Ed25519 identity in mind for the other side, and it hasn't shown
-   * us one.
-   *
-   * Note that this is the identity that we hope the other side has -- not
-   * necessarily its true identity.  Don't believe this identity unless
-   * authentication has happened.
-   */
-  struct ed25519_public_key_t ed25519_identity;
-
-  /**
-   * Linked list of channels with the same RSA identity digest, for use with
-   * the digest->channel map
-   */
-  TOR_LIST_ENTRY(channel_t) next_with_same_id;
-
-  /** Circuit mux for circuits sending on this channel */
-  circuitmux_t *cmux;
-
-  /** Circuit ID generation stuff for use by circuitbuild.c */
-
-  /**
-   * When we send CREATE cells along this connection, which half of the
-   * space should we use?
-   */
-  circ_id_type_bitfield_t circ_id_type:2;
-  /* DOCDOC */
-  unsigned wide_circ_ids:1;
-
-  /** For how many circuits are we n_chan?  What about p_chan? */
-  unsigned int num_n_circuits, num_p_circuits;
-
-  /**
-   * True iff this channel shouldn't get any new circs attached to it,
-   * because the connection is too old, or because there's a better one.
-   * More generally, this flag is used to note an unhealthy connection;
-   * for example, if a bad connection fails we shouldn't assume that the
-   * router itself has a problem.
-   */
-  unsigned int is_bad_for_new_circs:1;
-
-  /** True iff we have decided that the other end of this connection
-   * is a client or bridge relay.  Connections with this flag set should never
-   * be used to satisfy an EXTEND request. */
-  unsigned int is_client:1;
-
-  /** Set if the channel was initiated remotely (came from a listener) */
-  unsigned int is_incoming:1;
-
-  /** Set by lower layer if this is local; i.e., everything it communicates
-   * with for this channel returns true for is_local_addr().  This is used
-   * to decide whether to declare reachability when we receive something on
-   * this channel in circuitbuild.c
-   */
-  unsigned int is_local:1;
-
-  /** Have we logged a warning about circID exhaustion on this channel?
-   * If so, when? */
-  ratelim_t last_warned_circ_ids_exhausted;
-
-  /** Channel timestamps for cell channels */
-  time_t timestamp_client; /*(< Client used this, according to relay.c */
-  time_t timestamp_recv; /**< Cell received from lower layer */
-  time_t timestamp_xmit; /**< Cell sent to lower layer */
-
-  /** Timestamp for run_connection_housekeeping(). We update this once a
-   * second when we run housekeeping and find a circuit on this channel, and
-   * whenever we add a circuit to the channel. */
-  time_t timestamp_last_had_circuits;
-
-  /** Unique ID for measuring direct network status requests;vtunneled ones
-   * come over a circuit_t, which has a dirreq_id field as well, but is a
-   * distinct namespace. */
-  uint64_t dirreq_id;
-
-  /** Channel counters for cells and bytes we have received. */
-  uint64_t n_cells_recved, n_bytes_recved;
-  /** Channel counters for cells and bytes we have sent. */
-  uint64_t n_cells_xmitted, n_bytes_xmitted;
-};
-
-struct channel_listener_t {
-  /** Current channel listener state */
-  channel_listener_state_t state;
-
-  /** Globally unique ID number for a channel over the lifetime of a Tor
-   * process.
-   */
-  uint64_t global_identifier;
-
-  /** Should we expect to see this channel in the channel lists? */
-  unsigned char registered:1;
-
-  /** Why did we close?
-   */
-  enum {
-    CHANNEL_LISTENER_NOT_CLOSING = 0,
-    CHANNEL_LISTENER_CLOSE_REQUESTED,
-    CHANNEL_LISTENER_CLOSE_FROM_BELOW,
-    CHANNEL_LISTENER_CLOSE_FOR_ERROR
-  } reason_for_closing;
-
-  /** Timestamps for both cell channels and listeners */
-  time_t timestamp_created; /* Channel created */
-  time_t timestamp_active; /* Any activity */
-
-  /* Methods implemented by the lower layer */
-
-  /** Free a channel */
-  void (*free_fn)(channel_listener_t *);
-  /** Close an open channel */
-  void (*close)(channel_listener_t *);
-  /** Describe the transport subclass for this channel */
-  const char * (*describe_transport)(channel_listener_t *);
-  /** Optional method to dump transport-specific statistics on the channel */
-  void (*dumpstats)(channel_listener_t *, int);
-
-  /** Registered listen handler to call on incoming connection */
-  channel_listener_fn_ptr listener;
-
-  /** List of pending incoming connections */
-  smartlist_t *incoming_list;
-
-  /** Timestamps for listeners */
-  time_t timestamp_accepted;
-
-  /** Counters for listeners */
-  uint64_t n_accepted;
-};
-
-/* Channel state manipulations */
-
-int channel_state_is_valid(channel_state_t state);
-int channel_listener_state_is_valid(channel_listener_state_t state);
-
-int channel_state_can_transition(channel_state_t from, channel_state_t to);
-int channel_listener_state_can_transition(channel_listener_state_t from,
-                                          channel_listener_state_t to);
-
-const char * channel_state_to_string(channel_state_t state);
-const char *
-channel_listener_state_to_string(channel_listener_state_t state);
-
-/* Abstract channel operations */
-
-void channel_mark_for_close(channel_t *chan);
-int channel_write_packed_cell(channel_t *chan, packed_cell_t *cell);
-
-void channel_listener_mark_for_close(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
-void channel_mark_as_used_for_origin_circuit(channel_t *chan);
-
-/* Channel callback registrations */
-
-/* Listener callback */
-void channel_listener_set_listener_fn(channel_listener_t *chan,
-                                      channel_listener_fn_ptr listener);
-
-/* Incoming cell callbacks */
-channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr channel_get_cell_handler(channel_t *chan);
-
-void channel_set_cell_handlers(channel_t *chan,
-                               channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr cell_handler);
-
-/* Clean up closed channels and channel listeners periodically; these are
- * called from run_scheduled_events() in main.c.
- */
-void channel_run_cleanup(void);
-void channel_listener_run_cleanup(void);
-
-/* Close all channels and deallocate everything */
-void channel_free_all(void);
-
-/* Dump some statistics in the log */
-void channel_dumpstats(int severity);
-void channel_listener_dumpstats(int severity);
-
-#ifdef CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE
-
-#ifdef CHANNEL_FILE_PRIVATE
-
-STATIC void channel_add_to_digest_map(channel_t *chan);
-STATIC bool channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(
-                                          channel_t *chan,
-                                          const tor_addr_t *target_ipv4_addr,
-                                          const tor_addr_t *target_ipv6_addr);
-#endif /* defined(CHANNEL_FILE_PRIVATE) */
-
-/* Channel operations for subclasses and internal use only */
-
-/* Initialize a newly allocated channel - do this first in subclass
- * constructors.
- */
-
-void channel_init(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_init_listener(channel_listener_t *chan);
-
-/* Channel registration/unregistration */
-void channel_register(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_unregister(channel_t *chan);
-
-/* Channel listener registration/unregistration */
-void channel_listener_register(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
-void channel_listener_unregister(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
-
-/* Close from below */
-void channel_close_from_lower_layer(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_close_for_error(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_closed(channel_t *chan);
-
-/* Free a channel */
-void channel_free_(channel_t *chan);
-#define channel_free(chan) FREE_AND_NULL(channel_t, channel_free_, (chan))
-void channel_listener_free_(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
-#define channel_listener_free(chan_l) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(channel_listener_t, channel_listener_free_, (chan_l))
-
-/* State/metadata setters */
-
-void channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state);
-void channel_change_state_open(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_clear_identity_digest(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_clear_remote_end(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_mark_local(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_mark_incoming(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_mark_outgoing(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_mark_remote(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_set_identity_digest(channel_t *chan,
-                             const char *identity_digest,
-                             const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity);
-
-void channel_listener_change_state(channel_listener_t *chan_l,
-                                   channel_listener_state_t to_state);
-
-/* Timestamp updates */
-void channel_timestamp_created(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_timestamp_active(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_timestamp_recv(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_timestamp_xmit(channel_t *chan);
-
-void channel_listener_timestamp_created(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
-void channel_listener_timestamp_active(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
-void channel_listener_timestamp_accepted(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
-
-/* Incoming channel handling */
-void channel_listener_process_incoming(channel_listener_t *listener);
-void channel_listener_queue_incoming(channel_listener_t *listener,
-                                     channel_t *incoming);
-
-/* Incoming cell handling */
-void channel_process_cell(channel_t *chan, cell_t *cell);
-
-/* Request from lower layer for more cells if available */
-MOCK_DECL(ssize_t, channel_flush_some_cells,
-          (channel_t *chan, ssize_t num_cells));
-
-/* Query if data available on this channel */
-MOCK_DECL(int, channel_more_to_flush, (channel_t *chan));
-
-/* Notify flushed outgoing for dirreq handling */
-void channel_notify_flushed(channel_t *chan);
-
-/* Handle stuff we need to do on open like notifying circuits */
-void channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan);
-
-#endif /* defined(CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE) */
-
-/* Helper functions to perform operations on channels */
-
-int channel_send_destroy(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan,
-                         int reason);
-
-/*
- * Outside abstract interfaces that should eventually get turned into
- * something transport/address format independent.
- */
-
-channel_t * channel_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
-                            const char *rsa_id_digest,
-                            const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id);
-
-MOCK_DECL(channel_t *, channel_get_for_extend,(
-                                   const char *rsa_id_digest,
-                                   const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
-                                   const tor_addr_t *target_ipv4_addr,
-                                   const tor_addr_t *target_ipv6_addr,
-                                   bool for_origin_circ,
-                                   const char **msg_out,
-                                   int *launch_out));
-
-/* Ask which of two channels is better for circuit-extension purposes */
-int channel_is_better(channel_t *a, channel_t *b);
-
-/** Channel lookups
- */
-
-channel_t * channel_find_by_global_id(uint64_t global_identifier);
-channel_t * channel_find_by_remote_identity(const char *rsa_id_digest,
-                                    const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id);
-
-/** For things returned by channel_find_by_remote_digest(), walk the list.
- * The RSA key will match for all returned elements; the Ed25519 key might not.
- */
-channel_t * channel_next_with_rsa_identity(channel_t *chan);
-
-/*
- * Helper macros to lookup state of given channel.
- */
-
-#define CHANNEL_IS_CLOSED(chan) (channel_is_in_state((chan), \
-                                 CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED))
-#define CHANNEL_IS_OPENING(chan) (channel_is_in_state((chan), \
-                                  CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING))
-#define CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(chan) (channel_is_in_state((chan), \
-                               CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN))
-#define CHANNEL_IS_MAINT(chan) (channel_is_in_state((chan), \
-                                CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT))
-#define CHANNEL_IS_CLOSING(chan) (channel_is_in_state((chan), \
-                                  CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING))
-#define CHANNEL_IS_ERROR(chan) (channel_is_in_state((chan), \
-                                CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR))
-
-#define CHANNEL_FINISHED(chan) (CHANNEL_IS_CLOSED(chan) || \
-                                CHANNEL_IS_ERROR(chan))
-
-#define CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan) (CHANNEL_IS_CLOSING(chan) || \
-                                 CHANNEL_FINISHED(chan))
-
-#define CHANNEL_CAN_HANDLE_CELLS(chan) (CHANNEL_IS_OPENING(chan) || \
-                                        CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(chan) || \
-                                        CHANNEL_IS_MAINT(chan))
-
-static inline int
-channel_is_in_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t state)
-{
-  return chan->state == state;
-}
-
-/*
- * Metadata queries/updates
- */
-
-const char * channel_describe_transport(channel_t *chan);
-MOCK_DECL(void, channel_dump_statistics, (channel_t *chan, int severity));
-void channel_dump_transport_statistics(channel_t *chan, int severity);
-MOCK_DECL(int, channel_get_addr_if_possible, (const channel_t *chan,
-                                              tor_addr_t *addr_out));
-MOCK_DECL(const char *, channel_describe_peer,(channel_t *chan));
-int channel_has_queued_writes(channel_t *chan);
-int channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan);
-int channel_is_canonical(channel_t *chan);
-int channel_is_client(const channel_t *chan);
-int channel_is_local(channel_t *chan);
-int channel_is_incoming(channel_t *chan);
-int channel_is_outgoing(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_mark_client(channel_t *chan);
-void channel_clear_client(channel_t *chan);
-int channel_matches_extend_info(channel_t *chan, extend_info_t *extend_info);
-int channel_remote_identity_matches(const channel_t *chan,
-                                    const char *rsa_id_digest,
-                                    const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id);
-unsigned int channel_num_circuits(channel_t *chan);
-MOCK_DECL(void,channel_set_circid_type,(channel_t *chan,
-                                        crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd,
-                                        int consider_identity));
-void channel_timestamp_client(channel_t *chan);
-
-const char * channel_listener_describe_transport(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
-void channel_listener_dump_statistics(channel_listener_t *chan_l,
-                                      int severity);
-void channel_listener_dump_transport_statistics(channel_listener_t *chan_l,
-                                                int severity);
-void channel_check_for_duplicates(void);
-
-void channel_update_bad_for_new_circs(const char *digest, int force);
-
-/* Flow control queries */
-int channel_num_cells_writeable(channel_t *chan);
-
-/* Timestamp queries */
-time_t channel_when_created(channel_t *chan);
-time_t channel_when_last_client(channel_t *chan);
-time_t channel_when_last_xmit(channel_t *chan);
-
-/* Counter queries */
-int packed_cell_is_destroy(channel_t *chan,
-                           const packed_cell_t *packed_cell,
-                           circid_t *circid_out);
-
-/* Declare the handle helpers */
-HANDLE_DECL(channel, channel_t,)
-#define channel_handle_free(h)    \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(channel_handle_t, channel_handle_free_, (h))
-#undef tor_timer_t
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CHANNEL_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/channelpadding.h

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file circuitbuild.h
- * \brief Header file for circuitbuild.c.
- **/
-#ifndef TOR_CHANNELPADDING_H
-#define TOR_CHANNELPADDING_H
-
-#include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h"
-
-#define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM  "nf_pad_single_onion"
-#define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_DEFAULT 1
-
-typedef enum {
-  CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD,
-  CHANNELPADDING_PADLATER,
-  CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_SCHEDULED,
-  CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_ALREADY_SCHEDULED,
-  CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_SENT,
-} channelpadding_decision_t;
-
-channelpadding_decision_t channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(channel_t
-                                                               *chan);
-int channelpadding_update_padding_for_channel(channel_t *,
-                                              const channelpadding_negotiate_t
-                                              *chan);
-
-void channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(channel_t *chan);
-void channelpadding_reduce_padding_on_channel(channel_t *chan);
-int channelpadding_send_enable_command(channel_t *chan, uint16_t low_timeout,
-                                       uint16_t high_timeout);
-
-int channelpadding_get_circuits_available_timeout(void);
-unsigned int channelpadding_get_channel_idle_timeout(const channel_t *, int);
-void channelpadding_new_consensus_params(const networkstatus_t *ns);
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CHANNELPADDING_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/channeltls.h

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file channeltls.h
- * \brief Header file for channeltls.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CHANNELTLS_H
-#define TOR_CHANNELTLS_H
-
-#include "core/or/or.h"
-#include "core/or/channel.h"
-
-struct ed25519_public_key_t;
-struct curve25519_public_key_t;
-
-#define TLS_PER_CELL_OVERHEAD 29
-
-#define BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(c) (channel_tls_from_base((c)))
-#define TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(c) (channel_tls_to_base((c)))
-#define CONST_BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(c) (channel_tls_from_base_const((c)))
-#define CONST_TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(c) (channel_tls_to_base_const((c)))
-
-#define TLS_CHAN_MAGIC 0x8a192427U
-
-#ifdef CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE
-
-struct channel_tls_t {
-  /* Base channel_t struct */
-  channel_t base_;
-  /* or_connection_t pointer */
-  or_connection_t *conn;
-};
-
-#endif /* defined(CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE) */
-
-channel_t * channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
-                                const char *id_digest,
-                                const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id);
-channel_listener_t * channel_tls_get_listener(void);
-channel_listener_t * channel_tls_start_listener(void);
-channel_t * channel_tls_handle_incoming(or_connection_t *orconn);
-
-/* Casts */
-
-channel_t * channel_tls_to_base(channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-channel_tls_t * channel_tls_from_base(channel_t *chan);
-const channel_t * channel_tls_to_base_const(const channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-const channel_tls_t * channel_tls_from_base_const(const channel_t *chan);
-
-/* Things for connection_or.c to call back into */
-void channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
-void channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan,
-                                               or_connection_t *conn,
-                                               uint8_t state);
-void channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell,
-                                 or_connection_t *conn);
-void channel_tls_update_marks(or_connection_t *conn);
-
-/* Cleanup at shutdown */
-void channel_tls_free_all(void);
-
-extern uint64_t stats_n_authorize_cells_processed;
-extern uint64_t stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed;
-extern uint64_t stats_n_versions_cells_processed;
-extern uint64_t stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed;
-extern uint64_t stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed;
-extern uint64_t stats_n_certs_cells_processed;
-extern uint64_t stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed;
-
-#ifdef CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE
-STATIC void channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
-                                           channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-STATIC void channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
-                                                    channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-STATIC void channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-STATIC void channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
-                                                  channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-#endif /* defined(CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CHANNELTLS_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/circuit_st.h

@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * @file circuit_st.h
- * @brief Base circuit structure.
- **/
-
-#ifndef CIRCUIT_ST_H
-#define CIRCUIT_ST_H
-
-#include "core/or/or.h"
-
-#include "lib/container/handles.h"
-
-#include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h"
-#include "ext/ht.h"
-
-struct hs_token_t;
-struct circpad_machine_spec_t;
-struct circpad_machine_runtime_t;
-struct congestion_control_t;
-
-/** Number of padding state machines on a circuit. */
-#define CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES (2)
-
-/** "magic" value for an origin_circuit_t */
-#define ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0x35315243u
-/** "magic" value for an or_circuit_t */
-#define OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0x98ABC04Fu
-/** "magic" value for a circuit that would have been freed by circuit_free,
- * but which we're keeping around until a cpuworker reply arrives.  See
- * circuit_free() for more documentation. */
-#define DEAD_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0xdeadc14c
-
-/**
- * A circuit is a path over the onion routing
- * network. Applications can connect to one end of the circuit, and can
- * create exit connections at the other end of the circuit. AP and exit
- * connections have only one circuit associated with them (and thus these
- * connection types are closed when the circuit is closed), whereas
- * OR connections multiplex many circuits at once, and stay standing even
- * when there are no circuits running over them.
- *
- * A circuit_t structure can fill one of two roles.  First, a or_circuit_t
- * links two connections together: either an edge connection and an OR
- * connection, or two OR connections.  (When joined to an OR connection, a
- * circuit_t affects only cells sent to a particular circID on that
- * connection.  When joined to an edge connection, a circuit_t affects all
- * data.)
-
- * Second, an origin_circuit_t holds the cipher keys and state for sending data
- * along a given circuit.  At the OP, it has a sequence of ciphers, each
- * of which is shared with a single OR along the circuit.  Separate
- * ciphers are used for data going "forward" (away from the OP) and
- * "backward" (towards the OP).  At the OR, a circuit has only two stream
- * ciphers: one for data going forward, and one for data going backward.
- */
-struct circuit_t {
-  uint32_t magic; /**< For memory and type debugging: must equal
-                   * ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC or OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC. */
-
-  /** Handle entry for handle-based lookup */
-  HANDLE_ENTRY(circuit, circuit_t);
-
-  /** The channel that is next in this circuit. */
-  channel_t *n_chan;
-
-  /**
-   * The circuit_id used in the next (forward) hop of this circuit;
-   * this is unique to n_chan, but this ordered pair is globally
-   * unique:
-   *
-   * (n_chan->global_identifier, n_circ_id)
-   */
-  circid_t n_circ_id;
-
-  /** Queue of cells waiting to be transmitted on n_chan */
-  cell_queue_t n_chan_cells;
-
-  /**
-   * The hop to which we want to extend this circuit.  Should be NULL if
-   * the circuit has attached to a channel.
-   */
-  extend_info_t *n_hop;
-
-  /** True iff we are waiting for n_chan_cells to become less full before
-   * allowing any more cells on this circuit. (Origin circuit only.) */
-  unsigned int circuit_blocked_on_n_chan : 1;
-  /** True iff we are waiting for p_chan_cells to become less full before
-   * allowing any more cells on this circuit. (OR circuit only.) */
-  unsigned int circuit_blocked_on_p_chan : 1;
-
-  /** True iff we have queued a delete backwards on this circuit, but not put
-   * it on the output buffer. */
-  unsigned int p_delete_pending : 1;
-  /** True iff we have queued a delete forwards on this circuit, but not put
-   * it on the output buffer. */
-  unsigned int n_delete_pending : 1;
-
-  /** True iff this circuit has received a DESTROY cell in either direction */
-  unsigned int received_destroy : 1;
-
-  /** True iff we have sent a sufficiently random data cell since last
-   * we reset send_randomness_after_n_cells. */
-  unsigned int have_sent_sufficiently_random_cell : 1;
-
-  uint8_t state; /**< Current status of this circuit. */
-  uint8_t purpose; /**< Why are we creating this circuit? */
-
-  /** How many relay data cells can we package (read from edge streams)
-   * on this circuit before we receive a circuit-level sendme cell asking
-   * for more? */
-  int package_window;
-  /** How many relay data cells will we deliver (write to edge streams)
-   * on this circuit? When deliver_window gets low, we send some
-   * circuit-level sendme cells to indicate that we're willing to accept
-   * more. */
-  int deliver_window;
-  /**
-   * How many cells do we have until we need to send one that contains
-   * sufficient randomness?  Used to ensure that authenticated SENDME cells
-   * will reflect some unpredictable information.
-   **/
-  uint16_t send_randomness_after_n_cells;
-
-  /** FIFO containing the digest of the cells that are just before a SENDME is
-   * sent by the client. It is done at the last cell before our package_window
-   * goes down to 0 which is when we expect a SENDME.
-   *
-   * Our current circuit package window is capped to 1000
-   * (CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) which is also the start value. The increment is
-   * set to 100 (CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT) which means we don't allow more than
-   * 1000/100 = 10 outstanding SENDME cells worth of data. Meaning that this
-   * list can not contain more than 10 digests of DIGEST_LEN bytes (20).
-   *
-   * At position i in the list, the digest corresponds to the
-   * (CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT * i)-nth cell received since we expect a SENDME to
-   * be received containing that cell digest.
-   *
-   * For example, position 2 (starting at 0) means that we've received 300
-   * cells so the 300th cell digest is kept at index 2.
-   *
-   * At maximum, this list contains 200 bytes plus the smartlist overhead. */
-  smartlist_t *sendme_last_digests;
-
-  /** Temporary field used during circuits_handle_oom. */
-  uint32_t age_tmp;
-
-  /** For storage while n_chan is pending (state CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT). */
-  struct create_cell_t *n_chan_create_cell;
-
-  /** When did circuit construction actually begin (ie send the
-   * CREATE cell or begin cannibalization).
-   *
-   * Note: This timer will get reset if we decide to cannibalize
-   * a circuit. It may also get reset during certain phases of hidden
-   * service circuit use.
-   *
-   * We keep this timestamp with a higher resolution than most so that the
-   * circuit-build-time tracking code can get millisecond resolution.
-   */
-  struct timeval timestamp_began;
-
-  /** This timestamp marks when the init_circuit_base constructor ran. */
-  struct timeval timestamp_created;
-
-  /** When the circuit was first used, or 0 if the circuit is clean.
-   *
-   * XXXX Note that some code will artificially adjust this value backward
-   * in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new
-   * streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it.
-   * That's a kludge we should fix.
-   *
-   * XXX The CBT code uses this field to record when HS-related
-   * circuits entered certain states.  This usage probably won't
-   * interfere with this field's primary purpose, but we should
-   * document it more thoroughly to make sure of that.
-   *
-   * XXX The SocksPort option KeepaliveIsolateSOCKSAuth will artificially
-   * adjust this value forward each time a suitable stream is attached to an
-   * already constructed circuit, potentially keeping the circuit alive
-   * indefinitely.
-   */
-  time_t timestamp_dirty;
-
-  uint16_t marked_for_close; /**< Should we close this circuit at the end of
-                              * the main loop? (If true, holds the line number
-                              * where this circuit was marked.) */
-  const char *marked_for_close_file; /**< For debugging: in which file was this
-                                      * circuit marked for close? */
-  /** For what reason (See END_CIRC_REASON...) is this circuit being closed?
-   * This field is set in circuit_mark_for_close and used later in
-   * circuit_about_to_free. */
-  int marked_for_close_reason;
-  /** As marked_for_close_reason, but reflects the underlying reason for
-   * closing this circuit.
-   */
-  int marked_for_close_orig_reason;
-
-  /** Unique ID for measuring tunneled network status requests. */
-  uint64_t dirreq_id;
-
-  /** Index in smartlist of all circuits (global_circuitlist). */
-  int global_circuitlist_idx;
-
-  /** Various statistics about cells being added to or removed from this
-   * circuit's queues; used only if CELL_STATS events are enabled and
-   * cleared after being sent to control port. */
-  smartlist_t *testing_cell_stats;
-
-  /** If set, points to an HS token that this circuit might be carrying.
-   *  Used by the HS circuitmap.  */
-  struct hs_token_t *hs_token;
-  /** Hashtable node: used to look up the circuit by its HS token using the HS
-      circuitmap. */
-  HT_ENTRY(circuit_t) hs_circuitmap_node;
-
-  /** Adaptive Padding state machines: these are immutable. The state machines
-   *  that come from the consensus are saved to a global structure, to avoid
-   *  per-circuit allocations. This merely points to the global copy in
-   *  origin_padding_machines or relay_padding_machines that should never
-   *  change or get deallocated.
-   *
-   *  Each element of this array corresponds to a different padding machine,
-   *  and we can have up to CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES such machines. */
-  const struct circpad_machine_spec_t *padding_machine[CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES];
-
-  /** Adaptive Padding machine runtime info for above machines. This is
-   *  the per-circuit mutable information, such as the current state and
-   *  histogram token counts. Some of it is optional (aka NULL).
-   *  If a machine is being shut down, these indexes can be NULL
-   *  without the corresponding padding_machine being NULL, while we
-   *  wait for the other end to respond to our shutdown request.
-   *
-   *  Each element of this array corresponds to a different padding machine,
-   *  and we can have up to CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES such machines. */
-  struct circpad_machine_runtime_t *padding_info[CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES];
-
-  /** padding_machine_ctr increments each time a new padding machine
-   * is negotiated. It is used for shutdown conditions, to ensure
-   * that STOP commands actually correspond to the current machine,
-   * and not a previous one. */
-  uint32_t padding_machine_ctr;
-
-  /** Congestion control fields */
-  struct congestion_control_t *ccontrol;
-
-  /** Conflux linked circuit information.
-   *
-   * If this is non-NULL, the circuit is linked and part of a usable set,
-   * and for origin_circuit_t subtypes, the circuit purpose is
-   * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED.
-   *
-   * If this is NULL, the circuit could still be part of a pending conflux
-   * object, in which case the conflux_pending_nonce field is set, and for
-   * origin_circuit_t subtypes, the purpose is
-   * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED.
-  */
-  struct conflux_t *conflux;
-
-  /** If set, this circuit is considered *unlinked* and in the pending pool.
-   * The nonce value is used to find the other legs. Origin circuits that
-   * have this set are in the CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED purpose.
-   *
-   * If this is NULL, and conflux object is set, it means this circuit is
-   * linked and thus part of a usable set. */
-  uint8_t *conflux_pending_nonce;
-};
-
-#endif /* !defined(CIRCUIT_ST_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/circuitbuild.h

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file circuitbuild.h
- * \brief Header file for circuitbuild.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CIRCUITBUILD_H
-#define TOR_CIRCUITBUILD_H
-
-struct ed25519_public_key_t;
-struct curve25519_public_key_t;
-
-int route_len_for_purpose(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei);
-char *circuit_list_path(origin_circuit_t *circ, int verbose);
-char *circuit_list_path_for_controller(origin_circuit_t *circ);
-void circuit_log_path(int severity, unsigned int domain,
-                      origin_circuit_t *circ);
-origin_circuit_t *origin_circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int flags);
-origin_circuit_t *circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose,
-                                            extend_info_t *exit,
-                                            int flags);
-MOCK_DECL(origin_circuit_t *, circuit_establish_circuit_conflux, (
-                                            const uint8_t *nonce,
-                                            uint8_t purpose,
-                                            extend_info_t *exit,
-                                            int flags));
-
-struct circuit_guard_state_t *origin_circuit_get_guard_state(
-                                            origin_circuit_t *circ);
-int circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ);
-void circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status,
-                         int close_origin_circuits);
-int circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(const origin_circuit_t *circ);
-int circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ);
-void circuit_note_clock_jumped(int64_t seconds_elapsed, bool was_idle);
-struct created_cell_t;
-int circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ,
-                             const struct created_cell_t *created_cell);
-int circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason);
-MOCK_DECL(int, circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled, (time_t now,
-                                                     int *need_uptime,
-                                                     int *need_capacity));
-
-int circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info);
-int circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info);
-int circuit_can_use_tap(const origin_circuit_t *circ);
-int circuit_has_usable_onion_key(const origin_circuit_t *circ);
-const uint8_t *build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(cpath_build_state_t *state);
-MOCK_DECL(const node_t *,
-          build_state_get_exit_node,(cpath_build_state_t *state));
-const char *build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state);
-
-struct circuit_guard_state_t;
-
-const node_t *choose_good_entry_server(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
-                           uint8_t purpose,
-                           cpath_build_state_t *state,
-                           struct circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out);
-void circuit_upgrade_circuits_from_guard_wait(void);
-
-MOCK_DECL(channel_t *, channel_connect_for_circuit,(const extend_info_t *ei));
-
-struct create_cell_t;
-MOCK_DECL(int,
-circuit_deliver_create_cell,(circuit_t *circ,
-                             const struct create_cell_t *create_cell,
-                             int relayed));
-
-int client_circ_negotiation_message(const extend_info_t *ei,
-                                    uint8_t **msg_out,
-                                    size_t *msg_len_out);
-
-#ifdef CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE
-STATIC circid_t get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(channel_t *chan);
-STATIC int new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei,
-                         const smartlist_t *nodes);
-MOCK_DECL(STATIC int, count_acceptable_nodes, (const smartlist_t *nodes,
-                                               int direct));
-
-STATIC int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ);
-
-STATIC int
-onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei);
-STATIC int cpath_build_state_to_crn_flags(const cpath_build_state_t *state);
-STATIC int cpath_build_state_to_crn_ipv6_extend_flag(
-                                             const cpath_build_state_t *state,
-                                             int cur_len);
-
-#endif /* defined(CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITBUILD_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/circuitlist.h

@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file circuitlist.h
- * \brief Header file for circuitlist.c.
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H
-#define TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H
-
-#include "lib/container/handles.h"
-#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
-#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h"
-#include "core/or/ocirc_event.h"
-
-/** Circuit state: I'm the origin, still haven't done all my handshakes. */
-#define CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING 0
-/** Circuit state: Waiting to process the onionskin. */
-#define CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING 1
-/** Circuit state: I'd like to deliver a create, but my n_chan is still
- * connecting. */
-#define CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT 2
-/** Circuit state: the circuit is open but we don't want to actually use it
- * until we find out if a better guard will be available.
- */
-#define CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT 3
-/** Circuit state: onionskin(s) processed, ready to send/receive cells. */
-#define CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN 4
-
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ 1
-
-/* these circuits were initiated elsewhere */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MIN_ 1
-/** OR-side circuit purpose: normal circuit, at OR. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR 1
-/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the service, waiting for intro from
- * clients. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT 2
-/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the client, waiting for the service.
- */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING 3
-/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, both circuits have this purpose. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED 4
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ 4
-
-/* these circuits originate at this node */
-
-/* here's how circ client-side purposes work:
- *   normal circuits are C_GENERAL.
- *   circuits that are c_introducing are either on their way to
- *     becoming open, or they are open and waiting for a
- *     suitable rendcirc before they send the intro.
- *   circuits that are c_introduce_ack_wait have sent the intro,
- *     but haven't gotten a response yet.
- *   circuits that are c_establish_rend are either on their way
- *     to becoming open, or they are open and have sent the
- *     establish_rendezvous cell but haven't received an ack.
- *   circuits that are c_rend_ready are open and have received a
- *     rend ack, but haven't heard from the service yet.
- *   circuits that are c_rend_ready_intro_acked are open, and
- *     some intro circ has sent its intro and received an ack.
- *   circuits that are c_rend_joined are open, have heard from
- *     the service, and are talking to it.
- */
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: Normal circuit, with cpath. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL 5
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MIN_ 6
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, connecting to intro point. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING 6
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, sent INTRODUCE1 to intro point,
- * waiting for ACK/NAK. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT 7
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, introduced and acked, closing.
- */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED 8
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for ack. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND 9
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY 10
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service,
- * INTRODUCE has been acknowledged. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED 11
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, rendezvous established. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED 12
-/** This circuit is used for getting hsdirs */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET 13
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MAX_ 13
-/** This circuit is used for build time measurement only */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT 14
-/** This circuit is being held open by circuit padding */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING 15
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_ 15
-
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MIN_ 16
-/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, waiting for
- * introductions. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO 16
-/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, successfully
- * established intro. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO 17
-/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, connecting to rend
- * point. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND 18
-/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, rendezvous
- * established. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED 19
-/** This circuit is used for uploading hsdirs */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST 20
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MAX_ 20
-
-/** A testing circuit; not meant to be used for actual traffic. It is used for
- * bandwidth measurement, reachability test and address discovery from an
- * authority using the NETINFO cell. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING 21
-/** A controller made this circuit and Tor should not cannibalize it or attach
- * streams to it without explicitly being told. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER 22
-/** This circuit is used for path bias probing only */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING 23
-
-/** This circuit is used for vanguards/restricted paths.
- *
- *  This type of circuit is *only* created preemptively and never
- *  on-demand. When an HS operation needs to take place (e.g. connect to an
- *  intro point), these circuits are then cannibalized and repurposed to the
- *  actual needed HS purpose. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS 24
-
-/**
- * These two purposes are for conflux. The first is for circuits that are
- * being built, but not yet linked. The second is for circuits that are
- * linked and ready to use for streams. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_UNLINKED 25
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONFLUX_LINKED 26
-
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 26
-/** A catch-all for unrecognized purposes. Currently we don't expect
- * to make or see any circuits with this purpose. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN 255
-
-/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for a circuit that
- * originated at this node. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(p) ((p)>CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_)
-/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for a circuit that originated
- * here to serve as a client.  (Hidden services don't count here.) */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_CLIENT(p)  \
-  ((p)> CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ &&    \
-   (p)<=CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_)
-/** True iff the circuit_t <b>c</b> is actually an origin_circuit_t. */
-#define CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c) (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN((c)->purpose))
-/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for an established rendezvous
- * circuit. */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ESTABLISHED_REND(p) \
-  ((p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED ||     \
-   (p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED)
-/** True iff the circuit_t c is actually an or_circuit_t */
-#define CIRCUIT_IS_ORCIRC(c) (((circuit_t *)(c))->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC)
-
-/** True iff this circuit purpose should count towards the global
- * pending rate limit (set by MaxClientCircuitsPending). We count all
- * general purpose circuits, as well as the first step of client onion
- * service connections (HSDir gets). */
-#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_COUNTS_TOWARDS_MAXPENDING(p) \
-    ((p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || \
-     (p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET)
-
-/** Stats. */
-extern double cc_stats_circ_close_cwnd_ma;
-extern double cc_stats_circ_close_ss_cwnd_ma;
-extern uint64_t cc_stats_circs_closed;
-
-/** Convert a circuit_t* to a pointer to the enclosing or_circuit_t.  Assert
- * if the cast is impossible. */
-or_circuit_t *TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circuit_t *);
-const or_circuit_t *CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(const circuit_t *);
-/** Convert a circuit_t* to a pointer to the enclosing origin_circuit_t.
- * Assert if the cast is impossible. */
-origin_circuit_t *TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circuit_t *);
-const origin_circuit_t *CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(const circuit_t *);
-
-MOCK_DECL(smartlist_t *, circuit_get_global_list, (void));
-smartlist_t *circuit_get_global_origin_circuit_list(void);
-int circuit_any_opened_circuits(void);
-int circuit_any_opened_circuits_cached(void);
-void circuit_cache_opened_circuit_state(int circuits_are_opened);
-
-const char *circuit_state_to_string(int state);
-const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose);
-const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_hs_state_string(uint8_t purpose);
-const char *circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose);
-void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity);
-void circuit_set_p_circid_chan(or_circuit_t *circ, circid_t id,
-                               channel_t *chan);
-void circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circuit_t *circ, circid_t id,
-                               channel_t *chan);
-void channel_mark_circid_unusable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id);
-void channel_mark_circid_usable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id);
-time_t circuit_id_when_marked_unusable_on_channel(circid_t circ_id,
-                                                  channel_t *chan);
-int circuit_event_status(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_status_event_t tp,
-                         int reason_code);
-void circuit_set_state(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t state);
-void circuit_close_all_marked(void);
-int32_t circuit_initial_package_window(void);
-origin_circuit_t *origin_circuit_new(void);
-or_circuit_t *or_circuit_new(circid_t p_circ_id, channel_t *p_chan);
-circuit_t *circuit_get_by_circid_channel(circid_t circ_id,
-                                         channel_t *chan);
-circuit_t *
-circuit_get_by_circid_channel_even_if_marked(circid_t circ_id,
-                                             channel_t *chan);
-int circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan);
-circuit_t *circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_connection_t *conn);
-void circuit_unlink_all_from_channel(channel_t *chan, int reason);
-origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id);
-origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start,
-                                              uint8_t purpose);
-origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_intro_circ(const origin_circuit_t *start,
-                                              bool want_client_circ);
-origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_service_rp_circ(origin_circuit_t *start);
-origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_service_hsdir_circ(origin_circuit_t *start);
-origin_circuit_t *circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose,
-                                              extend_info_t *info, int flags);
-void circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(void);
-void circuit_mark_all_dirty_circs_as_unusable(void);
-void circuit_synchronize_written_or_bandwidth(const circuit_t *c,
-                                              circuit_channel_direction_t dir);
-MOCK_DECL(void, circuit_mark_for_close_, (circuit_t *circ, int reason,
-                                          int line, const char *cfile));
-int circuit_get_cpath_len(origin_circuit_t *circ);
-int circuit_get_cpath_opened_len(const origin_circuit_t *);
-void circuit_clear_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ);
-crypt_path_t *circuit_get_cpath_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ, int hopnum);
-void circuit_get_all_pending_on_channel(smartlist_t *out,
-                                        channel_t *chan);
-int circuit_count_pending_on_channel(channel_t *chan);
-
-#define circuit_mark_for_close(c, reason)                               \
-  circuit_mark_for_close_((c), (reason), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__)
-
-MOCK_DECL(void, assert_circuit_ok,(const circuit_t *c));
-void circuit_free_all(void);
-size_t circuits_handle_oom(size_t current_allocation);
-
-void circuit_clear_testing_cell_stats(circuit_t *circ);
-
-void channel_note_destroy_pending(channel_t *chan, circid_t id);
-MOCK_DECL(void, channel_note_destroy_not_pending,
-          (channel_t *chan, circid_t id));
-
-smartlist_t *circuit_find_circuits_to_upgrade_from_guard_wait(void);
-
-bool circuit_is_queue_full(const circuit_t *circ, cell_direction_t direction);
-
-/* Declare the handle helpers */
-HANDLE_DECL(circuit, circuit_t, )
-#define circuit_handle_free(h)    \
-    FREE_AND_NULL(circuit_handle_t, circuit_handle_free_, (h))
-
-#ifdef CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE
-STATIC void circuit_free_(circuit_t *circ);
-#define circuit_free(circ) FREE_AND_NULL(circuit_t, circuit_free_, (circ))
-STATIC size_t n_cells_in_circ_queues(const circuit_t *c);
-STATIC uint32_t circuit_max_queued_data_age(const circuit_t *c, uint32_t now);
-STATIC uint32_t circuit_max_queued_cell_age(const circuit_t *c, uint32_t now);
-STATIC uint32_t circuit_max_queued_item_age(const circuit_t *c, uint32_t now);
-#endif /* defined(CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H) */

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/circuitmux.h

@@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
-/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file circuitmux.h
- * \brief Header file for circuitmux.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H
-#define TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H
-
-#include "core/or/or.h"
-#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
-
-typedef struct circuitmux_policy_t circuitmux_policy_t;
-typedef struct circuitmux_policy_data_t circuitmux_policy_data_t;
-typedef struct circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t;
-
-struct circuitmux_policy_t {
-  /* Allocate cmux-wide policy-specific data */
-  circuitmux_policy_data_t * (*alloc_cmux_data)(circuitmux_t *cmux);
-  /* Free cmux-wide policy-specific data */
-  void (*free_cmux_data)(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                         circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data);
-  /* Allocate circuit policy-specific data for a newly attached circuit */
-  circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *
-    (*alloc_circ_data)(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                       circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data,
-                       circuit_t *circ,
-                       cell_direction_t direction,
-                       unsigned int cell_count);
-  /* Free circuit policy-specific data */
-  void (*free_circ_data)(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                         circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data,
-                         circuit_t *circ,
-                         circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *pol_circ_data);
-  /* Notify that a circuit has become active/inactive */
-  void (*notify_circ_active)(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                             circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data,
-                             circuit_t *circ,
-                             circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *pol_circ_data);
-  void (*notify_circ_inactive)(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                               circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data,
-                               circuit_t *circ,
-                               circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *pol_circ_data);
-  /* Notify of arriving/transmitted cells on a circuit */
-  void (*notify_set_n_cells)(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                             circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data,
-                             circuit_t *circ,
-                             circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *pol_circ_data,
-                             unsigned int n_cells);
-  void (*notify_xmit_cells)(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                            circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data,
-                            circuit_t *circ,
-                            circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *pol_circ_data,
-                            unsigned int n_cells);
-  /* Choose a circuit */
-  circuit_t * (*pick_active_circuit)(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                                     circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data);
-  /* Optional: channel comparator for use by the scheduler */
-  int (*cmp_cmux)(circuitmux_t *cmux_1, circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data_1,
-                  circuitmux_t *cmux_2, circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data_2);
-};
-
-/*
- * Circuitmux policy implementations can subclass this to store circuitmux-
- * wide data; it just has the magic number in the base struct.
- */
-
-struct circuitmux_policy_data_t {
-  uint32_t magic;
-};
-
-/*
- * Circuitmux policy implementations can subclass this to store circuit-
- * specific data; it just has the magic number in the base struct.
- */
-
-struct circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t {
-  uint32_t magic;
-};
-
-/*
- * Upcast #defines for the above types
- */
-
-/**
- * Convert a circuitmux_policy_data_t subtype to a circuitmux_policy_data_t.
- */
-
-#define TO_CMUX_POL_DATA(x)  (&((x)->base_))
-
-/**
- * Convert a circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t subtype to a
- * circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t.
- */
-
-#define TO_CMUX_POL_CIRC_DATA(x)  (&((x)->base_))
-
-/* Consistency check */
-void circuitmux_assert_okay(circuitmux_t *cmux);
-
-/* Create/destroy */
-circuitmux_t * circuitmux_alloc(void);
-void circuitmux_detach_all_circuits(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                                    smartlist_t *detached_out);
-void circuitmux_free_(circuitmux_t *cmux);
-#define circuitmux_free(cmux) \
-  FREE_AND_NULL(circuitmux_t, circuitmux_free_, (cmux))
-
-/* Policy control */
-void circuitmux_clear_policy(circuitmux_t *cmux);
-MOCK_DECL(const circuitmux_policy_t *,
-          circuitmux_get_policy, (circuitmux_t *cmux));
-void circuitmux_set_policy(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                           const circuitmux_policy_t *pol);
-
-/* Status inquiries */
-cell_direction_t circuitmux_attached_circuit_direction(
-    circuitmux_t *cmux,
-    circuit_t *circ);
-int circuitmux_is_circuit_attached(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ);
-int circuitmux_is_circuit_active(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ);
-unsigned int circuitmux_num_cells_for_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                                              circuit_t *circ);
-MOCK_DECL(unsigned int, circuitmux_num_cells, (circuitmux_t *cmux));
-unsigned int circuitmux_num_circuits(circuitmux_t *cmux);
-unsigned int circuitmux_num_active_circuits(circuitmux_t *cmux);
-
-/* Debugging interface - slow. */
-int64_t circuitmux_count_queued_destroy_cells(const channel_t *chan,
-                                              const circuitmux_t *cmux);
-
-/* Channel interface */
-circuit_t * circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                                    destroy_cell_queue_t **destroy_queue_out);
-void circuitmux_notify_xmit_cells(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ,
-                                  unsigned int n_cells);
-void circuitmux_notify_xmit_destroy(circuitmux_t *cmux);
-
-/* Circuit interface */
-MOCK_DECL(void, circuitmux_attach_circuit, (circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                                            circuit_t *circ,
-                                            cell_direction_t direction));
-MOCK_DECL(void, circuitmux_detach_circuit,
-          (circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ));
-void circuitmux_clear_num_cells(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ);
-void circuitmux_set_num_cells(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ,
-                              unsigned int n_cells);
-
-void circuitmux_append_destroy_cell(channel_t *chan,
-                                    circuitmux_t *cmux, circid_t circ_id,
-                                    uint8_t reason);
-void circuitmux_mark_destroyed_circids_usable(circuitmux_t *cmux,
-                                              channel_t *chan);
-
-/* Optional interchannel comparisons for scheduling */
-MOCK_DECL(int, circuitmux_compare_muxes,
-          (circuitmux_t *cmux_1, circuitmux_t *cmux_2));
-
-#ifdef CIRCUITMUX_PRIVATE
-
-#include "core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h"
-
-/*
- * Map of muxinfos for circuitmux_t to use; struct is defined below (name
- * of struct must match HT_HEAD line).
- */
-typedef HT_HEAD(chanid_circid_muxinfo_map, chanid_circid_muxinfo_t)
-  chanid_circid_muxinfo_map_t;
-
-/*
- * Structures for circuitmux.c
- */
-
-struct circuitmux_t {
-  /* Keep count of attached, active circuits */
-  unsigned int n_circuits, n_active_circuits;
-
-  /* Total number of queued cells on all circuits */
-  unsigned int n_cells;
-
-  /*
-   * Map from (channel ID, circuit ID) pairs to circuit_muxinfo_t
-   */
-  chanid_circid_muxinfo_map_t *chanid_circid_map;
-
-  /** List of queued destroy cells */
-  destroy_cell_queue_t destroy_cell_queue;
-  /** Boolean: True iff the last cell to circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit
-   * returned the destroy queue. Used to force alternation between
-   * destroy/non-destroy cells.
-   *
-   * XXXX There is no reason to think that alternating is a particularly good
-   * approach -- it's just designed to prevent destroys from starving other
-   * cells completely.
-   */
-  unsigned int last_cell_was_destroy : 1;
-  /** Destroy counter: increment this when a destroy gets queued, decrement
-   * when we unqueue it, so we can test to make sure they don't starve.
-   */
-  int64_t destroy_ctr;
-
-  /*
-   * Circuitmux policy; if this is non-NULL, it can override the built-
-   * in round-robin active circuits behavior.  This is how EWMA works in
-   * the new circuitmux_t world.
-   */
-  const circuitmux_policy_t *policy;
-
-  /* Policy-specific data */
-  circuitmux_policy_data_t *policy_data;
-};
-
-#endif /* defined(CIRCUITMUX_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H) */
-

localPackages/Tor/Frameworks/tor-nolzma.xcframework/ios-arm64-simulator/tor-nolzma.framework/Headers/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file circuitmux_ewma.h
- * \brief Header file for circuitmux_ewma.c
- **/
-
-#ifndef TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_H
-#define TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_H
-
-#include "core/or/or.h"
-#include "core/or/circuitmux.h"
-
-/* The public EWMA policy callbacks object. */
-extern circuitmux_policy_t ewma_policy;
-
-/* Externally visible EWMA functions */
-void cmux_ewma_set_options(const or_options_t *options,
-                           const networkstatus_t *consensus);
-
-void circuitmux_ewma_free_all(void);
-
-#ifdef CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_PRIVATE
-
-/*** EWMA structures ***/
-
-typedef struct cell_ewma_t cell_ewma_t;
-typedef struct ewma_policy_data_t ewma_policy_data_t;
-typedef struct ewma_policy_circ_data_t ewma_policy_circ_data_t;
-
-/**
- * The cell_ewma_t structure keeps track of how many cells a circuit has
- * transferred recently.  It keeps an EWMA (exponentially weighted moving
- * average) of the number of cells flushed from the circuit queue onto a
- * connection in channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit().
- */
-
-struct cell_ewma_t {
-  /** The last 'tick' at which we recalibrated cell_count.
-   *
-   * A cell sent at exactly the start of this tick has weight 1.0. Cells sent
-   * since the start of this tick have weight greater than 1.0; ones sent
-   * earlier have less weight. */
-  unsigned int last_adjusted_tick;
-  /** The EWMA of the cell count. */
-  double cell_count;
-  /** True iff this is the cell count for a circuit's previous
-   * channel. */
-  unsigned int is_for_p_chan : 1;
-  /** The position of the circuit within the OR connection's priority
-   * queue. */
-  int heap_index;
-};
-
-struct ewma_policy_data_t {
-  circuitmux_policy_data_t base_;
-
-  /**
-   * Priority queue of cell_ewma_t for circuits with queued cells waiting
-   * for room to free up on the channel that owns this circuitmux.  Kept
-   * in heap order according to EWMA.  This was formerly in channel_t, and
-   * in or_connection_t before that.
-   */
-  smartlist_t *active_circuit_pqueue;
-
-  /**
-   * The tick on which the cell_ewma_ts in active_circuit_pqueue last had
-   * their ewma values rescaled.  This was formerly in channel_t, and in
-   * or_connection_t before that.
-   */
-  unsigned int active_circuit_pqueue_last_recalibrated;
-};
-
-struct ewma_policy_circ_data_t {
-  circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t base_;
-
-  /**
-   * The EWMA count for the number of cells flushed from this circuit
-   * onto this circuitmux.  Used to determine which circuit to flush
-   * from next.  This was formerly in circuit_t and or_circuit_t.
-   */
-  cell_ewma_t cell_ewma;
-
-  /**
-   * Pointer back to the circuit_t this is for; since we're separating
-   * out circuit selection policy like this, we can't attach cell_ewma_t
-   * to the circuit_t any more, so we can't use SUBTYPE_P directly to a
-   * circuit_t like before; instead get it here.
-   */
-  circuit_t *circ;
-};
-
-#define EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC 0x2fd8b16aU
-#define EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA_MAGIC 0x761e7747U
-
-/*** Downcasts for the above types ***/
-
-/**
- * Downcast a circuitmux_policy_data_t to an ewma_policy_data_t and assert
- * if the cast is impossible.
- */
-
-static inline ewma_policy_data_t *
-TO_EWMA_POL_DATA(circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol)
-{
-  if (!pol) return NULL;
-  else {
-    tor_assertf(pol->magic == EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC,
-                "Mismatch: %"PRIu32" != %"PRIu32,
-                pol->magic, EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC);
-    return DOWNCAST(ewma_policy_data_t, pol);
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Downcast a circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t to an ewma_policy_circ_data_t
- * and assert if the cast is impossible.
- */
-
-static inline ewma_policy_circ_data_t *
-TO_EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA(circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *pol)
-{
-  if (!pol) return NULL;
-  else {
-    tor_assertf(pol->magic == EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA_MAGIC,
-                "Mismatch: %"PRIu32" != %"PRIu32,
-                pol->magic, EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA_MAGIC);
-    return DOWNCAST(ewma_policy_circ_data_t, pol);
-  }
-}
-
-STATIC unsigned cell_ewma_get_current_tick_and_fraction(double *remainder_out);
-STATIC void cell_ewma_initialize_ticks(void);
-
-#endif /* defined(CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_PRIVATE) */
-
-#endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_H) */