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Author SHA1 Message Date
jackandClaude Fable 5 6f02319f6f i18n: machine-translate remaining feature strings into 23 languages (needs_review)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 00:37:17 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 970802c923 i18n: uppercase Spanish section headers (SÍMBOLOS, RED) to match English
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 00:01:23 +02:00
jack 935dcdbd51 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/fix/i18n-defaultvalue-net' into feat/integration-all-observability 2026-07-06 23:59:31 +02:00
jack bf5c9a3850 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/fix/es-translations' into feat/integration-all-observability 2026-07-06 23:59:22 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 9cbfd131da i18n: add English defaultValue fallback to key-only localized strings so no language shows raw keys
Non-en languages are each missing ~138 of 336 catalog keys, so a key
absent from that language's table renders as the raw dot-key on device
(no English fallback). This adds English defaultValues so every miss
resolves to English instead of a raw key.

- Class (a): 217 String(localized: "dot.key") calls missing defaultValue
  now carry defaultValue: "<en value>" pulled verbatim from the catalog
  (format specifiers preserved).
- Class (b): 41 SwiftUI LocalizedStringKey literals (Text/Button/alert/
  confirmationDialog/TextField) wrapped as
  Text(String(localized: "key", defaultValue: "en")) so they resolve to
  English too. Existing comments folded into the resolved String.

No catalog or en values changed; Swift source only. Both schemes build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 23:58:29 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 20255c9916 Fill missing Spanish (es) translations for feature + UI strings
Add es localizations for the 138 string keys that had an en entry but no
es entry, so Spanish-language devices no longer render raw dot-keys.
Covers bulletin/legend, network topology, groups, gateway, media/image,
voice notes, delivery, payment, vouching, and mesh system messages.
Format specifiers, plural substitutions, punctuation, and the app's
lowercase aesthetic are preserved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 23:51:28 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 b62f98cc62 App Info: uppercase SYMBOLS/NETWORK headers, move network under HOW TO USE
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 23:45:29 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 02aa1d67db Observability: DEBUG debug-level default, greppable decision tags, log export + UDP LAN sink
Debugging the integration build on real iOS 26.5 devices over the air.

- BitLogger DEBUG default minimumLevel now .debug (was .info) so a
  tap-launched sideload surfaces .debug decision logs without the
  BITCHAT_LOG_LEVEL env var; env still wins; release unchanged (.info,
  emits nothing). Extracted defaultMinimumLevel + a test asserting it.
- Greppable bracket decision tags at .info (visible even at .info) via
  SecureLogger, ID-prefixes only, sanitized:
  [ROUTE] source-route vs flood origination (+reason) + fragment
  targeted-resync; [GW] uplink accept/reject, downlink rebroadcast/drop,
  loop skips, drain-timer; [WIFI] offer/accept/decline, AWDL connect,
  transfer start/complete+bytes, fallback+reason; [PREKEY] seal choice,
  consume, unknown-prekey open fail, bundle ingest, re-gossip;
  [SYNC] one concise summary per cycle + per-request served counts (no
  per-packet spam); [PING]/[TRACE] RTT + computed path.
- New OSLog categories: mesh, gateway, transport.
- Refactored BLESourceRouteOriginationPolicy.route -> decide returning a
  Decision enum (flood(reason)/route(hops)) so the flood reason is
  greppable and unit-tested.
- DEBUG-only in-memory ring buffer (LogExportBuffer, ~2000 lines/512KB,
  thread-safe, off main thread) + App Info "Export Logs" share sheet
  (iOS UIActivityViewController / macOS NSSavePanel), VoiceOver labels.
- DEBUG-only UDP LAN log sink (LogNetworkSink): opt-in, off by default,
  fire-and-forget, never blocks/throws; each line prefixed with the
  device nickname for demux; configured via App Info host:port fields.
  Same sanitized formatted line feeds buffer, sink, and export.

All new code is #if DEBUG; release emits nothing and ships no export/sink UI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 23:04:33 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 e0e90af9fd Integration test fixes: reconcile SyncTypeFlags phantom-bit assertions and sync-round counts
- SyncTypeFlags phantom-bit tests used bits 8/9/10 as unmapped examples;
  board/prekey/group now map those, so use bits 11+ (still unmapped).
- rawValueInitNormalizesPhantomBits: highest known bit is now 10, so the
  flags serialize to 2 bytes, not 1.
- Board/fragment/announce sync tests silence the prekey round (added by the
  prekeys feature; default 60s schedule fires at the maintenance barrier).
- DiagnosticsMockContext: conform to the CommandContextProvider members added
  by private-groups (group*) and cashu-chips (sendPublicMessage).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 22:38:45 +02:00
jack 94e7f91b7b Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/docs/whitepaper-reconcile' into feat/integration-all 2026-07-06 22:31:24 +02:00
jack 00c7f0460a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/cashu-chips' into feat/integration-all
# Conflicts:
#	bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings
#	bitchat/Models/CommandInfo.swift
#	bitchat/Services/CommandProcessor.swift
2026-07-06 22:31:20 +02:00
jack 175da268dd Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/geohash-pow' into feat/integration-all 2026-07-06 22:29:19 +02:00
jack f6f7fa704a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/geo-board' into feat/integration-all
# Conflicts:
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.swift
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift
#	bitchat/Services/Transport.swift
#	bitchat/Sync/GossipSyncManager.swift
#	bitchat/Sync/SyncTypeFlags.swift
#	bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift
#	localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/MessageType.swift
2026-07-06 22:29:16 +02:00
jack 4f5d25808f Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/source-route-send' into feat/integration-all
# Conflicts:
#	bitchat/Models/RequestSyncPacket.swift
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift
#	bitchatTests/GossipSyncManagerTests.swift
2026-07-06 22:25:19 +02:00
jack a05c583fb5 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/mesh-diagnostics' into feat/integration-all
# Conflicts:
#	bitchat/Models/CommandInfo.swift
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.swift
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEReceivePipeline.swift
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift
#	bitchat/Services/CommandProcessor.swift
#	bitchat/Services/Transport.swift
#	bitchat/Sync/SyncTypeFlags.swift
#	bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift
#	bitchatTests/BLEServiceCoreTests.swift
#	localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/MessageType.swift
2026-07-06 22:22:40 +02:00
jack 25efa62587 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/wifi-bulk-transport' into feat/integration-all
# Conflicts:
#	bitchat/Protocols/BitchatProtocol.swift
#	bitchat/Protocols/PeerCapabilities+Local.swift
#	bitchat/ViewModels/ChatTransportEventCoordinator.swift
#	bitchat/ViewModels/NostrInboundPipeline.swift
2026-07-06 22:18:59 +02:00
jack 0d93ce0874 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/gateway-mode' into feat/integration-all
# Conflicts:
#	bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.swift
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift
#	bitchat/Sync/SyncTypeFlags.swift
#	localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/MessageType.swift
2026-07-06 22:17:35 +02:00
jack 20cdd6653a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/private-groups' into feat/integration-all
# Conflicts:
#	bitchat/Protocols/BitchatProtocol.swift
#	bitchat/Protocols/PeerCapabilities+Local.swift
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.swift
#	bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift
#	bitchat/Services/Transport.swift
#	bitchat/Sync/GossipSyncManager.swift
#	bitchat/Sync/SyncTypeFlags.swift
#	bitchat/ViewModels/ChatTransportEventCoordinator.swift
#	bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift
#	bitchat/ViewModels/NostrInboundPipeline.swift
#	bitchatTests/ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests.swift
#	bitchatTests/GossipSyncManagerTests.swift
#	localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/MessageType.swift
2026-07-06 22:13:31 +02:00
jack 862484c0d4 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/vouching' into feat/integration-all
# Conflicts:
#	bitchat/Protocols/PeerCapabilities+Local.swift
#	bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift
2026-07-06 22:08:06 +02:00
jack e1e481a1a7 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/prekeys' into feat/integration-all
# Conflicts:
#	bitchat/Sync/GossipSyncManager.swift
2026-07-06 22:07:37 +02:00
jack aed3e6a273 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/capability-bits' into feat/integration-all 2026-07-06 22:06:33 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 b481a70458 Prekeys: authenticate bundle packets, fix consume-republish, deflake CI
Fixes the prekey-bundle PR review + CI failure:

- CI root cause: the receive queue (mesh.message) is concurrent, so a
  gossiped prekey bundle can be processed before the announce that binds
  its owner's signing key. The old handler dropped such bundles outright,
  so under CI parallel load the bundle was permanently lost and the
  cache/gossip tests flaked (verifiedBundleEntersGossipStore,
  prekeySealedMailTravelsViaCourierAndOpens). Bundles that arrive before
  their binding are now retained per-owner (bounded) and re-attempted when
  the verified announce lands, atomically to avoid a check-then-act race.

- Authenticate the OUTER prekey-bundle packet (Codex P2 / review MEDIUM):
  require senderID == PeerID(bundle.noiseStaticPublicKey) and verify the
  packet's Ed25519 signature (covers senderID + timestamp) against the
  owner's bound signing key, in addition to the inner bundle signature.
  Stops replay under a fresh timestamp / fake senderID.

- Key the gossip prekey-bundle store/dedup by the bundle's authenticated
  identity (noiseStaticPublicKey), not the unauthenticated packet
  senderID, so one valid bundle sprayed under many fabricated sender IDs
  can't multiply entries and exhaust the 200-owner cap.

- Bump published-bundle generatedAt strictly on consume (Codex P1):
  consuming a prekey shrinks the published bundle, so it now republishes
  with a strictly newer generatedAt and re-gossips, so peers replace the
  cached copy and stop assigning the consumed ID before its 48h grace.

- Guard the panic/clear detached Application Support tree-deletes behind
  TestEnvironment.isRunningTests: the SPM test process shares that tree,
  so the wipe could land mid-test and flake file-dependent tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:27:41 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 2b7fd2002b Wi-Fi bulk: normalize peer ID before eligibility checks
Stable/verified private chats address a peer by its full 64-hex Noise
key, but the Noise session, advertised capabilities, and connection state
are keyed by the short (SHA256-derived 16-hex) routing ID. sendFilePrivate
resolved the Wi-Fi bulk SendCandidate with the raw peerID, so a 64-hex key
made hasEstablishedSession return false; shouldOffer never selected Wi-Fi
and a >BLE-cap payload cancelled as "Wi-Fi unavailable" even when the
direct peer advertised .wifiBulk.

Normalize with peerID.toShort() once before the session/capability checks
(extracted into wifiBulkSendCandidate) and use the normalized ID for the
negotiation packet and the BLE fallback too.

Test: eligibility + offer path resolves when addressed by a 64-hex Noise
key — the session is established under the short ID, the raw-key lookup
misses it, and the normalized send path still offers Wi-Fi.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:21:37 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 ccccb2dd8c Private groups: fix TLV truncation, roster downgrade, removal notice, block, media, signable bytes
Addresses the Codex review and adversarial-review findings on #1383:

- TLV encoding now throws GroupTLVError.valueTooLong instead of clamping to
  65535 and truncating, so an oversize group message fails to seal and
  surfaces send_failed rather than shipping ciphertext recipients drop.
- Roster nicknames truncate on a Character boundary (never mid-scalar), so a
  multi-byte nickname can no longer make the whole signed roster undecodable.
- Invites now bump the epoch (rotate the key) like removals, giving every
  roster change a strictly-increasing epoch so out-of-order invite states no
  longer last-writer-wins a just-added member back out.
- Removing a member now sends them a creator-signed roster-without-them under
  a throwaway all-zero key (never the rotated key), so their client
  deactivates the group and surfaces "removed" instead of going silently dark.
- /block is enforced in the group receive path: a blocked member's messages
  are dropped from display and notifications, consistent with every other
  inbound path.
- Media affordances are disabled in group chats (both computed sites) so the
  composer can't strand a media placeholder that never sends; media-in-groups
  is a documented v2 item.
- Creator signature now covers the group name and the sender signature covers
  the epoch (wire-format-affecting; needs Android parity before ship).
- Explicit isGroup guard in markPrivateMessagesAsRead so read/delivered
  receipts can never leak into group conversations under a future refactor.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:17:15 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 385e9e2aab Skip media-wipe detached tasks under tests (shared-filesystem race)
panicClearAllData and clearCurrentPublicTimeline delete the real
~/Library/Application Support/files tree in detached utility-priority
tasks. The SPM test process shares that tree and ChatViewModelTests
invoke both methods, so under parallel scheduling the wipe lands at a
nondeterministic time — deleting media a concurrently running test just
wrote (and the developer's real app data with it). Guard both with the
existing TestEnvironment.isRunningTests pattern, mirroring the same fix
on feat/mesh-diagnostics (#1377).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:16:11 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 48035872e1 Fix CI deadlock in vouch tests and live-refresh the fingerprint sheet on vouch acceptance
Two fixes for PR #1380 review findings:

1. CI "Run Swift Tests (app)" hang (exit 137): the new
   SecureIdentityStateManagerVouchTests suite was nonisolated, so Swift
   Testing ran its tests in parallel on the Swift Concurrency cooperative
   pool. Each test enqueues a queue.async(.barrier) write (setVerified)
   and immediately blocks in queue.sync / queue.sync(.barrier)
   (recordVouch / effectiveTrustLevel). On CI's few-core runners every
   cooperative-pool thread ended up parked behind a pending barrier that
   never got a dispatch worker, deadlocking the whole test process until
   the watchdog SIGKILLed it. The suite is now @MainActor, matching the
   production isolation of the vouch API (ChatVouchCoordinator is
   @MainActor) and keeping blocking syncs off the cooperative pool.

2. Codex P2: an open fingerprint sheet did not refresh its vouched badge
   when a vouch batch was accepted - VerificationModel.bind() never
   observed the trust-change signal. It now subscribes to the
   "peerStatusUpdated" notification that
   ChatVouchCoordinator.notifyPeerTrustChanged() posts (same source
   PeerListModel uses) and forwards it to objectWillChange. Added a
   regression test that pins VerificationModel's own subscription
   (verified to fail without the fix).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:13:29 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 d4594b9504 Gateway: harden downlink freshness, uplink verify ordering, and drain
Fixes the confirmed downlink/uplink defects from the PR #1384 review +
Codex findings:

- Downlink age + #g gate (Codex P2 / review #1): rebroadcastRelayEvent
  now drops events outside the same freshness window receivers enforce
  and whose #g tag mismatches the carrier geohash, BEFORE spending any
  budget — so a 1h/200-event channel-resubscribe backfill no longer
  burns the 30/min BLE budget on events every receiver drops.
- Rate-limit + dedup before Schnorr (review #2): handleUplinkDeposit now
  runs cheap structural checks + carried-ID dedup + rate-token consume
  before isValidSignature(), so a replay flood is bounded by cheap work
  instead of unbounded main-actor verifies.
- Quota-dropped deposits not rendered (review #3): enqueueUplink reports
  acceptance and injectInbound only fires for events actually
  published/queued, ending the local-timeline divergence.
- Drain timer + mark-after-send (Codex P2 / review #4): a burst beyond
  budget now arms a timer to drain when the window frees; rebroadcast
  IDs are marked only after an event is actually sent, so overflow-
  dropped events stay retryable.
- Symmetric publish path (review #5): the gateway publish closure now
  refuses when no geo relay is known, matching the local send path
  instead of publishing dead traffic to default relays.
- Loop-rule doc (review #7): softened to reflect that rule 3 is a
  call-site convention with unit-tested backstops; added tests for the
  publishedEventIDs backstop, downlink freshness/mismatch, drain timer,
  and quota-drop non-injection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:13:10 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 9ae440be6a Geohash: serialize PoW sends so order matches send order
Two location-channel sends back-to-back only cancelled the previous
mining task and started a new one. Cancellation merely *expedites* NIP-13
mining (the target is polled and steps down; it never aborts the send),
so the cancelled task still appended + relayed once mining returned. Both
tasks ran concurrently and the second (shorter to mine) could finish
first, reordering messages in the timeline and on relays.

Chain the mining tasks: each geohash send captures the previous send's
task, cancels it (to expedite, so delays never stack), and awaits its
completion before it echoes and relays. Order is now always send order.
The >2s mining cap is preserved: cancellation expedites the awaited task,
so a send is never blocked beyond NostrPoW.miningTimeCap.

Test: two rapid sends where the first mines longer (larger content) still
land in send order for both the local echo and the relayed events.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:12:52 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 fd2dffdda7 Fix CI media-wipe race, per-link ping rate limiting, and /ping output routing
Three fixes for PR #1377 review:

1. CI flake (sendImage_privateChatProcessesAndTransfersImage): the
   panicClearAllData / clearCurrentPublicTimeline detached utility-priority
   tasks delete the real ~/Library/Application Support/files tree, which the
   test process shares. The wipe fires at a nondeterministic time and raced
   the sendImage test's JPEG in files/images/outgoing (write then re-read),
   so prepareImagePacket threw and the test timed out. Both wipes are now
   skipped under tests (existing TestEnvironment.isRunningTests pattern);
   this also stops test runs from deleting the developer's real media.

2. Codex P1: ping packets are unsigned, so keying the pong rate limiter on
   packet.senderID let one connected peer rotate forged sender IDs to bypass
   the 5-per-10s budget. The limiter now keys on the ingress link (the
   directly connected peer that delivered the packet); the pong still goes
   to the claimed sender. Regression test proves rotating senders over one
   link exhaust one budget (fails 10 vs 5 pongs on the old code).

3. Codex P2: /ping output arrived up to 10s later and was routed from
   selectedPrivateChatPeer at callback time, misrouting the result after a
   chat switch. The origin conversation is now captured when the command is
   issued (CommandOutputDestination) and deferred output is routed there:
   a DM result lands in the origin chat's history even if deselected, and a
   mesh-timeline result pins to #mesh instead of the active channel.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:12:18 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 953d24f7f2 Cashu: strict decode on the /pay SEND path
The permissive decoder turned any non-empty cashuB… base64 that failed
CBOR parsing into a generic TokenInfo, so the /pay guard accepted base64
junk and truncated V4 tokens and relayed them with a success message.

Add a `strict` flag to CashuTokenDecoder.decode: in strict mode there is
no permissive V4 fallback and the token must resolve to a known version
with a positive amount, else it returns nil. Rendering keeps the
permissive path (an unknown chip is fine for display). /pay now decodes
with strict:true and surfaces "invalid cashu token" instead of sending.

Tests: /pay with truncated cashuB / base64 junk is rejected; valid V3
and valid definite-length V4 still send; decoder strict-mode unit tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:07:59 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 6dd8dd055a Board: bound orphan tombstones and reject future-dated posts at ingest
Two hardening fixes from Codex review of the geohash bulletin board:

- Orphan tombstones (P1): retention was derived solely from the
  sender-chosen deletedAt, so self-signed tombstones for unseen post IDs
  with far-future deletedAt persisted and re-entered sync unboundedly.
  Retention is now also clamped to receive time (now + 7d + 1h skew --
  no post can outlive that), and orphans are capped at 100 globally and
  5 per author key with oldest-received evicted first. Matched
  tombstones and disk restores keep their existing behavior.

- Future-dated posts (P2): ingest only checked expiresAt > now, letting
  posts dated years ahead sort above honest posts and squat the 200
  global slots without ever pruning. The single ingest chokepoint
  (radio, sync, and disk restore all funnel through it) now rejects
  createdAt > now + 1h skew and expiresAt > now + 7d + 1h skew; the
  decoder's span rule is unchanged.

Adds tests for the skew boundary, far-future expiry, receive-time
tombstone clamping, orphan caps/eviction, and matched-tombstone
exemption.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 21:01:02 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 85112d809b Fix stall-clock refresh on duplicates and overflow suppression in fragment resync
Two fixes to stalledBroadcastFragmentIDs bookkeeping in
BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer:

- Duplicate fragments no longer reset the stall clock. Fragment packets
  bypass the packet deduplicator, so relayed duplicates of an
  already-held index arriving every few seconds kept lastFragmentAt
  fresh and suppressed the targeted REQUEST_SYNC indefinitely. Now
  lastFragmentAt only updates when the index is new (actual progress).

- Only the streams that will actually be encoded on the wire are
  rate-limited. Previously every stalled candidate got
  lastResyncRequestAt set, but encodeFragmentIdFilter serializes at most
  RequestSyncPacket.maxFragmentIdFilterCount (60) IDs, so overflow
  streams were suppressed for retryAfter without ever being requested.
  Selection now caps at that shared constant, oldest stall first, so
  overflow stays eligible and rotates fairly on the next pass.

Tests: duplicates arriving periodically still trigger the stall report;
70 stalled streams yield the 60 oldest on the first pass and the
remaining 10 on the next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:58:42 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 e4b3cff5fa Wi-Fi bulk transport: AWDL data plane for large media with BLE fallback
BLE stays the control plane: a sender with a queued file > 64 KiB to a
directly connected peer advertising the wifiBulk capability sends a
bulkTransferOffer (0x04) inside the established Noise session — transferID,
file size, payload SHA-256, a fresh 32-byte token, and a random per-transfer
Bonjour instance name. The receiver answers bulkTransferResponse (0x05) with
its own token half, then both sides meet on a per-transfer
_bitchat-bulk._tcp channel over peer-to-peer Wi-Fi (AWDL).

The TCP stream is secured independently of TLS: both tokens traveled inside
Noise, so only the two peers can derive the ChaChaPoly channel key
(HKDF-SHA256, domain "bitchat-bulk-v1", transferID as salt). Frames are
length-prefixed sealed boxes with structured direction+counter nonces; the
first frame must prove knowledge of the key or the client is disconnected,
and the final hash is verified against the offer before delivery.

Decline, timeout, or any mid-transfer error falls back to BLE fragmentation
exactly once, driving the same TransferProgressManager stream so the UI is
unchanged. Wi-Fi-negotiated transfers may carry up to 8 MiB (new
FileTransferLimits.maxWifiBulkPayloadBytes, enforced by the receiver from
the accepted offer); the BLE path keeps its existing caps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:35:40 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 fb80403cd4 Gateway mode: opt-in mesh↔Nostr uplink for geohash channels
An opt-in "internet gateway" toggle lets one connected phone bridge the
local geohash channel for mesh-only peers: signed kind-20000 events ride
a new nostrCarrier (0x28) packet — directed to the gateway for uplink,
broadcast with TTL for downlink — with Schnorr verification at every
hop, CourierStore-style quotas, and explicit loop-prevention rules.

- BitFoundation: MessageType.nostrCarrier = 0x28
- NostrCarrierPacket: 2-byte-length TLV codec (direction, geohash,
  signed event JSON), 16 KiB cap, tolerant decoder
- GatewayService: closure-injected policy layer — verify gates (sig,
  kind, #g tag, age, size), uplink quotas (10/min/depositor rate limit,
  offline queue of 20 total / 5 per depositor, drop-oldest, flush on
  reconnect), downlink budget (30/min, bounded drop-oldest backlog),
  bounded loop-prevention ID sets
- BLEService: runtime capability bits (advertise .gateway only while
  the toggle is on, re-announce on change), signed directed uplink
  sends, carrier ingress with depositor signature verification
- Mesh-only senders uplink automatically from sendGeohash when no relay
  is connected and a reachable peer advertises .gateway; once-per-
  channel "sent via mesh gateway" notice
- UI: gateway toggle beside the Tor toggle, globe header indicator,
  VoiceOver labels, xcstrings entries

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:31:09 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 7ad19ab4c3 Private groups: creator-managed encrypted group chat over the mesh
Small encrypted crews (hard cap 16) between public broadcast and 1:1 DMs:

Protocol
- MessageType.groupMessage = 0x25: broadcast packets with a cleartext
  16-byte group ID + epoch, ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphertext (epoch bound as
  AEAD AAD), inner Ed25519 sender signature over
  "bitchat-group-msg-v1"|groupID|messageID|timestamp|content
- NoisePayloadType.groupInvite = 0x06 / .groupKeyUpdate = 0x07:
  creator-signed group state (key, epoch, roster) 1:1 over Noise; signature
  over "bitchat-group-v1"|groupID|epoch|key-hash|roster-hash and the Noise
  session peer must BE the creator
- SyncTypeFlags bit 10 (groupMessage): variable-length LE bitfield widens
  1 -> 2 bytes inside the length-prefixed REQUEST_SYNC TLV; old clients
  ignore unknown bits and answer with types they know
- PeerCapabilities.localSupported now advertises .groups

Storage
- GroupStore: symmetric keys in the keychain, roster/name/epoch as
  protected JSON in Application Support; wiped in panicClearAllData()

Behavior
- Non-members relay 0x25 like any broadcast but cannot read it; group
  messages join gossip-sync backfill with the public-message window
- Receivers drop wrong-epoch envelopes, bad sender signatures, and
  senders missing from the creator-signed roster
- Fire-and-flood delivery (no per-member acks in v1)

UI
- Groups open as chat windows through the private-chat sheet (virtual
  "group_" peer IDs); groups section in the people sheet; /group
  create/invite/remove/leave/list commands; invitees get a system message
  + notification and the group appears in their people sheet

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:22:38 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 b1ff5e6b82 NIP-13 proof-of-work for geohash channels: mine on send, relax rate limits for PoW senders
Outgoing kind-20000 geohash messages mine a NIP-13 nonce tag (8 leading
zero bits, ~256 hashes, typically <1 ms) off the main actor before
signing. Mining is hard-capped at 2 s and cancellable (newer send or
channel switch): on cap/cancel the committed target steps down so the
message still ships promptly with an honest commitment - sending is
never blocked and nothing is dropped. The hot loop serializes the
canonical event once and rewrites only the fixed-width nonce bytes.

Inbound kind-20000 events are scored per NIP-13 commitment semantics
(committed target counts; the ID must actually meet it, extra work
earns nothing) and never hard-rejected: validated PoW >= 8 bits skips
the per-sender rate-limit bucket while the per-content flood bucket
still applies, so old non-mining clients keep working under today's
strict limits while bulk spam gets expensive.

Presence heartbeats (kind 20001), kind-1 notes, and DMs are unchanged;
no UI beyond a pow= field in an existing sampled debug log.

Reimplemented from scratch rather than cherry-picking the stale
feature/pow-geohash-mining-ui branch (unbounded loop, hard receive
filtering, mining UI, XCTest, force unwraps).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:18:00 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 ee148a018b Prekey bundles: forward-secret async first contact for courier mail
Courier envelopes were sealed with one-way Noise X to the recipient's
long-lived static key, so a later compromise of that key exposed every
envelope captured in transit. This adds one-time prekey bundles:

- PrekeyBundle (MessageType 0x24): 8 one-time Curve25519 public prekeys
  bound to the owner's Noise static key by an Ed25519 signature over
  "bitchat-prekey-bundle-v1" canonical bytes; gossiped mesh-wide on its
  own 60s sync round (SyncTypeFlags bit 9, 200-peer cap, 24h freshness)
  and verified against the announce-bound signing key before caching.
- Sealed envelope v2: Noise X where the responder static is the one-time
  prekey, prologue "bitchat-prekey-v1" || prekeyID. Sender identity rides
  encrypted inside and is authenticated exactly like v1 (blocked-sender
  check included). CourierEnvelope gains an optional prekeyID TLV that
  v1 decoders skip as unknown.
- Local prekeys live in the Keychain; consumed privates survive a 48h
  grace window for spray-and-wait redeliveries, then are deleted (the
  forward-secrecy clock starts at deletion). The batch tops back up and
  re-gossips when unconsumed count drops below 3, and everything is
  wiped in panic mode.
- Routing: courier sealing picks a cached verified bundle when one
  exists (one prekey per message, reused across deposit retries), with
  the advertised .prekeys capability as a veto for on-mesh peers, and
  falls back to static sealing otherwise.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:14:05 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 26b247c329 Transitive verification: vouch for verified peers over Noise
When a Noise session establishes with a peer I verified and that peer
advertises the .vouch capability, send signed attestations (up to 16,
most recently verified first, at most once per peer per 24h) for the
OTHER fingerprints I verified. Receivers accept vouches only from
senders they verified themselves, verify the Ed25519 signature against
the sender's announce-bound signing key, and surface the result as a
new derived trust tier: vouched (unfilled seal) between casual and
trusted.

Protocol:
- NoisePayloadType.vouch = 0x12 carries a batch of TLV attestations:
  voucheeFingerprint (32B), voucheeSigningKey (32B), timestamp
  (uint64 ms BE), Ed25519 signature over
  "bitchat-vouch-v1" | fingerprint | signingKey | timestamp.
  The voucher is implicit in the authenticated session.
- PeerCapabilities.localSupported now advertises .vouch.

Storage (SecureIdentityStateManager / IdentityCache):
- vouches keyed by vouchee, capped at 8 vouchers each; validity is
  recomputed on read (voucher still verified-by-me, < 30 days old), so
  unverifying a voucher retires their vouches without cascade deletes.
- New IdentityCache fields are Optional so pre-existing encrypted
  caches decode cleanly; TrustLevel.vouched is inserted mid-ladder but
  raw values are strings, so persisted values are unaffected (and
  vouched itself is never persisted).
- Panic wipe clears vouch state with the rest of the identity cache.

UI: unfilled checkmark.seal badge in the mesh peer list (filled seal
stays exclusive to verified) and a "vouched for by N people you
verified" section with voucher names in FingerprintView; VoiceOver
labels and xcstrings entries included.

Tests: attestation encode/decode + signature (forged/tampered/expired),
accept-policy gates, batch cap, trust-level derivation incl. voucher
invalidation, persistence compat, and coordinator exchange/accept
policies. Full macOS suite: 1088 tests passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:13:48 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 81168adad1 Add geohash bulletin board: persistent signed notices over mesh sync
New MessageType 0x23 carries TLV-encoded board posts and tombstones,
self-signed with the author's Ed25519 key ("bitchat-board-v1" /
"bitchat-board-del-v1" domains) so notices verify without the author
present. BoardStore persists raw signed packets under Application
Support/board/ (200 posts, 5 per author, oldest evicted; expiry sweep;
tombstones retained until the deleted post's original expiry) and is
wiped on panic.

Board packets join gossip sync as bit 8 of the existing variable-length
types bitfield (a second byte old decoders already accept and ignore),
with a 60s round and its own capacity, served straight from the board
store so retention has one owner. Posts relay like broadcasts; urgent
posts get the announce-class TTL cap.

UI: a pin button in the header opens the board for the current channel
(geohash board, or mesh-local board), with urgent-pinned newest-first
listing, compose with urgent toggle and 1/3/7-day expiry, and
swipe-delete on own posts. Geohash posts also publish one-way as
Nostr kind-1 location notes when relays are reachable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:11:17 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 18dcc747d7 Originate v2 source routes and wire fragmentIdFilter targeted resync
Part A — source-route origination policy:
- Gate route application (BLESourceRouteOriginationPolicy): only packets we
  author, directed at a single peer, with TTL headroom, whose recipient is
  not directly connected. Relays no longer attach routes to (and re-sign)
  packets they merely forward.
- Version-gate paths: MeshTopologyTracker records the highest protocol
  version observed per peer; BFS routes require every intermediate hop and
  the recipient to be v2-observed, capped at 4 intermediate hops.
- Degrade on failure: BLESourceRouteFailureCache marks a routed send that
  sees no inbound traffic from the recipient within 10s as failed and floods
  for 60s before retrying routes.

Part B — REQUEST_SYNC fragmentIdFilter (TLV 0x06):
- Requester: BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer reports stalled broadcast
  reassemblies (no new fragment for 5s, retried at most every 10s); the
  maintenance pass sends a types=fragment REQUEST_SYNC naming the stalled
  8-byte fragment stream IDs to each connected peer.
- Responder: GossipSyncManager restricts the fragment diff to exactly the
  named streams, bypassing the since-cursor while the GCS filter still
  excludes pieces the requester holds; RSR/TTL-0/rate-limit semantics
  unchanged and REQUEST_SYNC stays link-local.
- Bounds: at most 60 IDs per request (60*17-1 = 1019 bytes <= the 1024-byte
  decoder cap); oversized 0x06 values are ignored, not fatal.

Docs: SOURCE_ROUTING.md gains the iOS origination policy (§8);
REQUEST_SYNC_MANAGER.md documents 0x05/0x06 as implemented.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:02:12 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 6056d20a13 Add mesh diagnostics: /ping, /trace, and topology map
- New protocol types ping=0x26 / pong=0x27 (9-byte payload: 8-byte nonce
  + origin TTL) with per-peer inbound rate limiting (5 per 10s)
- /ping @name reports RTT and hop count, 10s timeout
- /trace @name prints the estimated path from gossiped directNeighbors
- Topology map sheet (circular Canvas layout) reachable from App Info
- Ping/pong ride the deterministic directed-relay path like DMs
- Tests: payload round-trip, hop-count math, command output, edge
  normalization, layout

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 20:00:55 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 112c0ec1ed Cashu ecash chips: detect, render, and redeem tokens + /pay command
Content-level Cashu support, no wire-protocol changes:

- CashuTokenDecoder: summarizes V3 (cashuA base64url-JSON) tokens —
  amount summed across proofs, unit, mint host, memo — and V4 (cashuB)
  via a minimal bounded CBOR reader. All input is treated as
  adversarial: size caps, depth/item budgets, overflow guards, display
  sanitization; malformed payloads fail closed to a generic chip.
- PaymentChipView: cashu chips now show "500 sat · mint.example.com"
  (+ memo) instead of a generic label; tap opens a cashu: wallet URL
  and falls back to https://redeem.cashu.me when no wallet handles it;
  context menu adds copy token / redeem in wallet / redeem on web.
- extractCashuLinks now returns bare deduplicated bearer strings so the
  chip can decode them (cashu: URIs still detected via the embedded
  token).
- /pay <token>: validates the token decodes, sends it as the message
  body; DMs send directly, public channels require an explicit
  "/pay <token> public" confirm since tokens are bearer instruments.
  Suggested everywhere except public geohash channels.
- Tests: decoder (V3/V4 decode, summation, URI forms, truncation/
  garbage/huge fuzzing, CBOR depth bounds) and /pay command flows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:54:39 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 688b954fb8 Add capability bits to announce TLV
Announces now carry an optional capabilities TLV (0x05): a little-endian
bitfield with named bits for upcoming features (prekeys, wifiBulk,
gateway, groups, board, vouch, meshDiagnostics). Old clients skip the
unknown TLV; peers without it decode as nil so features can distinguish
"legacy peer" from "advertises nothing".

PeerCapabilities lives in BitFoundation with a minimal-length encoding
that preserves unknown bits for forward compatibility. Peer capabilities
are stored in the BLE peer registry on verified announce and exposed via
BLEService.peerCapabilities(_:). The local advertisement set is empty
until each feature ships its bit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:44:55 +02:00
jackandClaude Fable 5 f5dde45c18 docs: reconcile protocol docstrings with implementation
- BitchatProtocol.swift: stop advertising "timing obfuscation prevents
  traffic analysis" — what exists is randomized relay jitter
  (RelayController, 10-220 ms) and PKCS#7-style padding to
  256/512/1024/2048-byte blocks (MessagePadding); there is no cover
  traffic or per-message timing obfuscation. Also update the stale
  Message Types list (Delivery/Read are Noise payloads, no Version
  negotiation type; add CourierEnvelope/RequestSync/FileTransfer).
- MessageType.swift: header said "6 essential" types; the enum has 9
  cases.

WHITEPAPER.md needed no changes: the #1372 rewrite already replaced the
old Bloom-filter and MessageRetryService claims, and its numbers
(dedup 1000/5min, jitter, outbox 100/peer 24h 8 attempts, courier
16 KiB/24h/40-20-5-2 quotas, spray 4/8, gossip 1000/15s/6h) all match
the code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:40:36 +02:00
334 changed files with 12267 additions and 41758 deletions
-30
View File
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
name: Dead Code
on:
push:
branches:
- main
pull_request:
jobs:
periphery:
name: Periphery scan
runs-on: macos-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
# Advisory, like SwiftLint (#1361): findings annotate the PR but don't
# block merges. Drop continue-on-error once the baseline proves stable.
continue-on-error: true
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Install Periphery
# homebrew-core formula; the peripheryapp tap lags years behind.
run: brew install periphery
- name: Scan for dead code
# Config comes from .periphery.yml; known findings (mostly iOS-only
# code invisible to a macOS scan) are suppressed by the committed
# baseline. --strict fails the step when NEW dead code appears.
run: periphery scan --strict --disable-update-check
+5 -23
View File
@@ -131,10 +131,10 @@ jobs:
echo "No coverage data found; skipping summary." echo "No coverage data found; skipping summary."
fi fi
# SPM tests do not link the shipping app targets. This job covers the # SPM tests above only compile the macOS slice; this job covers the
# iOS-conditional paths and both universal Release link configurations. # iOS-conditional code paths (UIKit, CoreBluetooth restoration, etc.).
ios-build: ios-build:
name: Build Release apps (universal) name: Build iOS app (simulator)
runs-on: macos-latest runs-on: macos-latest
timeout-minutes: 15 timeout-minutes: 15
@@ -142,33 +142,15 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout code - name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5 uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Check clean recipe safety
run: bash scripts/check-just-clean-safety.sh
- name: Build iOS (simulator, no signing) - name: Build iOS (simulator, no signing)
# Build both simulator architectures so CI validates every vendored # arm64 only: the vendored arti.xcframework has no x86_64 simulator slice.
# Arti simulator slice and the configuration that ships.
run: | run: |
set -o pipefail set -o pipefail
xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj \ xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj \
-scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \ -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \
-configuration Release \
-sdk iphonesimulator \ -sdk iphonesimulator \
-destination 'generic/platform=iOS Simulator' \ -destination 'generic/platform=iOS Simulator' \
ARCHS='arm64 x86_64' \ ARCHS=arm64 \
ONLY_ACTIVE_ARCH=NO \
CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
build
- name: Build macOS (universal, no signing)
run: |
set -o pipefail
xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj \
-scheme "bitchat (macOS)" \
-configuration Release \
-destination 'generic/platform=macOS' \
ARCHS='arm64 x86_64' \
ONLY_ACTIVE_ARCH=NO \
CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \ CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
build build
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"v1":{"usrs":["param-buf-arti_bootstrap_summary(_:_:)-s:3Tor22arti_bootstrap_summary33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSpys4Int8VG_AEtF","param-dataDir-arti_start(_:_:)-s:3Tor10arti_start33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSPys4Int8VG_s6UInt16VtF","param-len-arti_bootstrap_summary(_:_:)-s:3Tor22arti_bootstrap_summary33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSpys4Int8VG_AEtF","param-socksPort-arti_start(_:_:)-s:3Tor10arti_start33_954FD7701B4E47ABB5F166D1CF862DC9LLys5Int32VSPys4Int8VG_s6UInt16VtF","s:13BitFoundation16PeerCapabilitiesV8wifiBulkACvpZ","s:13BitFoundation18KeychainReadResultO18isRecoverableErrorSbvp","s:13BitFoundation23KeychainManagerProtocolP11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS12MockKeychainC11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC11resetCountsyyF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC25totalSecureClearCallCountSivp","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC26secureClearStringCallCountSivp","s:18bitchatTests_macOS20TrackingMockKeychainC27_secureClearStringCallCount06_AB6D1M24FD239F2969C82F4108818260LLSivp","s:18bitchatTests_macOS24FailingCacheSaveKeychain33_22380C7A11A569A0B83FA83F34C498A7LLC11secureClearyySSzF","s:18bitchatTests_macOS24MockGeohashPresenceTimer33_483587EFB96650EE130EFB09BBA2A1AALLC7handleryycvp","s:3Tor0A7ManagerC21goDormantOnBackgroundyyF","s:7bitchat10AppRuntimeC24handleScreenshotCaptured33_C8B369AD8BC1D9963A50CEDA77A4332ALLyyF","s:7bitchat10AppRuntimeC33handleDidBecomeActiveNotificationyyF","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC18logBluetoothStatus33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LLyySSF","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC20centralRestorationID33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LLSSvpZ","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC22captureBluetoothStatus33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LL7contextySS_tF","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC23peripheralRestorationID33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LLSSvpZ","s:7bitchat10BLEServiceC29scheduleBluetoothStatusSample33_69191C53E68500C17D98DBCF2BDA7100LL5after7contextySd_SStF","s:7bitchat10QRScanViewV8isActiveSbvp","s:7bitchat15BLEPeerRegistryV5countSivp","s:7bitchat15KeychainManagerC11secureClearyySSzF","s:7bitchat15PaymentChipViewV7openURL33_10AC50641B1EBCD52E5092A2E521D236LL7SwiftUI13OpenURLActionVvp","s:7bitchat15TransportConfigO29uiBatchDispatchStaggerSecondsSdvpZ","s:7bitchat15TransportConfigO35uiShareExtensionDismissDelaySecondsSdvpZ","s:7bitchat15TransportConfigO38bleBackgroundPendingConnectSlotReserveSivpZ","s:7bitchat17GossipSyncManagerC10persistNowyyF","s:7bitchat17NostrRelayManagerC15InboundEventKey33_E4160FE8A9A2C9D6308EAAD5A8B5CB07LLV7eventIDSSvp","s:7bitchat25LocationNotesDependenciesV3now10Foundation4DateVycvp","s:7bitchat25NWPathReachabilityMonitorC7monitor33_84633C9DBCAF57538179C1E04DB8E015LL7Network0bD0CSgvp"]}}
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# Periphery dead-code scan configuration (https://github.com/peripheryapp/periphery)
#
# CI runs the macOS scheme only (an iOS scan needs a device destination and
# doubles the build time). macOS-only scans falsely flag iOS-only code —
# state restoration, screenshot handlers, background BLE sampling — so those
# findings live in .periphery.baseline.json rather than being "fixed".
# When auditing by hand, scan BOTH schemes and intersect:
# periphery scan --schemes "bitchat (iOS)" -- -destination 'generic/platform=iOS' ARCHS=arm64
project: bitchat.xcodeproj
schemes:
- bitchat (macOS)
retain_swift_ui_previews: true
# Codable properties are (de)serialized via synthesized conformances the
# indexer doesn't always attribute reads to: PrekeyBundleStore.StoredBundle
# .noiseKey flaked CI as "assign-only" even while read in loadFromDisk —
# and slipped past its baselined USR. Retaining Codable properties outright
# is deterministic; a truly-dead Codable field is a persisted-format change
# anyway, never a safe mechanical delete.
retain_codable_properties: true
relative_results: true
baseline: .periphery.baseline.json
-1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
# (CI checkouts are fresh, so this only matters in a working tree). # (CI checkouts are fresh, so this only matters in a working tree).
excluded: excluded:
- .build - .build
- .claude
- .swiftpm - .swiftpm
- .DerivedData - .DerivedData
- DerivedData - DerivedData
-3
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,3 @@ DEVELOPMENT_TEAM = ABC123
// Unique bundle id to be able to register and run locally // Unique bundle id to be able to register and run locally
PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = chat.bitchat.$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM) PRODUCT_BUNDLE_IDENTIFIER = chat.bitchat.$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)
// App and share extension must use an App Group registered to your team.
APP_GROUP_ID = group.chat.bitchat.$(DEVELOPMENT_TEAM)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
MARKETING_VERSION = 1.7.1 MARKETING_VERSION = 1.5.4
CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION = 1 CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION = 1
IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = 16.0 IPHONEOS_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET = 16.0
+95 -54
View File
@@ -1,66 +1,107 @@
# BitChat developer commands # BitChat macOS Build Justfile
# # Handles temporary modifications needed to build and run on macOS
# Builds use a repository-local, ignored DerivedData directory. No recipe
# patches, restores, or removes tracked project/configuration files.
project := "bitchat.xcodeproj"
macos_scheme := "bitchat (macOS)"
ios_scheme := "bitchat (iOS)"
derived_data := ".DerivedData"
# Default recipe - shows available commands
default: default:
@echo "BitChat developer commands:" @echo "BitChat macOS Build Commands:"
@echo " just run Build and run the macOS app" @echo " just run - Build and run the macOS app"
@echo " just build Build the macOS app without signing" @echo " just build - Build the macOS app only"
@echo " just test Run the SwiftPM test suite" @echo " just clean - Clean build artifacts and restore original files"
@echo " just test-ios Run tests on the iPhone 17 simulator" @echo " just check - Check prerequisites"
@echo " just clean Remove repo-local build artifacts only" @echo ""
@echo " just nuke Also remove nested package build caches" @echo "Original files are preserved - modifications are temporary for builds only"
@echo " just check Validate the development environment"
# Static guard against reintroducing source-restoring or source-deleting clean # Check prerequisites
# behavior. CI runs the same script directly. check:
check-clean-safety:
@bash scripts/check-just-clean-safety.sh
check: check-clean-safety
@echo "Checking prerequisites..." @echo "Checking prerequisites..."
@command -v xcodebuild >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ xcodebuild not found. Install full Xcode." && exit 1) @command -v xcodebuild >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ xcodebuild not found. Install Xcode from App Store" && exit 1)
@developer_dir="$$(xcode-select -p 2>/dev/null)"; case "$$developer_dir" in *.app/Contents/Developer) ;; *) echo "❌ Full Xcode is not selected. Run: sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer"; exit 1;; esac @xcode-select -p | grep -q "Xcode.app" || (echo "❌ Full Xcode required, not just command line tools. Install from App Store and run:\n sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer" && exit 1)
@xcodebuild -version @test -d "/Applications/Xcode.app" || (echo "❌ Xcode.app not found in Applications folder. Install from App Store" && exit 1)
@echo "✅ Development environment ready (a signing identity is not required for just build)" @xcodebuild -version >/dev/null 2>&1 || (echo "❌ Xcode not properly configured. Try:\n sudo xcode-select -s /Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer" && exit 1)
@security find-identity -v -p codesigning | grep -q "Apple Development\|Developer ID" || (echo "⚠️ No Developer ID found - code signing may fail" && exit 0)
@echo "✅ All prerequisites met"
build: check # Backup original files
backup:
@echo "Backing up original project configuration..."
@if [ -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj ]; then cp bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup; fi
@if [ -f bitchat/Info.plist ]; then cp bitchat/Info.plist bitchat/Info.plist.backup; fi
# Restore original files
restore:
@echo "Restoring original project configuration..."
@if [ -f project.yml.backup ]; then mv project.yml.backup project.yml; fi
@# Restore iOS-specific files
@if [ -f bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios ]; then mv bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard; fi
@# Use git to restore all modified files except Justfile
@git checkout -- project.yml bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj bitchat/Info.plist 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️ Could not restore some files with git"
@# Remove any backup files
@rm -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup bitchat/Info.plist.backup 2>/dev/null || true
# Apply macOS-specific modifications
patch-for-macos: backup
@echo "Temporarily hiding iOS-specific files for macOS build..."
@# Move iOS-specific files out of the way temporarily
@if [ -f bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard ]; then mv bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios; fi
# Build the macOS app
build: #check generate
@echo "Building BitChat for macOS..." @echo "Building BitChat for macOS..."
@xcodebuild -project "{{project}}" -scheme "{{macos_scheme}}" -configuration Debug -derivedDataPath "{{derived_data}}" CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build @xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS="" build
# Run the macOS app
run: build run: build
@app="{{derived_data}}/Build/Products/Debug/bitchat.app"; test -d "$$app" || (echo "❌ Built app not found at $$app" && exit 1); open "$$app" @echo "Launching BitChat..."
@find ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData -name "bitchat.app" -path "*/Debug/*" -not -path "*/Index.noindex/*" | head -1 | xargs -I {} open "{}"
# Backward-compatible alias for the old quick-run recipe. # Clean build artifacts and restore original files
dev-run: run clean: restore
@echo "Cleaning build artifacts..."
@rm -rf ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData/bitchat-* 2>/dev/null || true
@# Only remove the generated project if we have a backup, otherwise use git
@if [ -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup ]; then \
rm -rf bitchat.xcodeproj; \
else \
git checkout -- bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️ Could not restore project.pbxproj"; \
fi
@rm -f project-macos.yml 2>/dev/null || true
@echo "✅ Cleaned and restored original files"
test: # Quick run without cleaning (for development)
@swift test dev-run: check
@echo "Quick development build..."
test-ios: check @xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat_macOS" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO CODE_SIGN_ENTITLEMENTS="" build
@xcodebuild -project "{{project}}" -scheme "{{ios_scheme}}" -sdk iphonesimulator -destination 'platform=iOS Simulator,name=iPhone 17' -derivedDataPath "{{derived_data}}" test @find ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData -name "bitchat.app" -path "*/Debug/*" -not -path "*/Index.noindex/*" | head -1 | xargs -I {} open "{}"
# Artifact-only cleanup. In particular, this recipe never invokes Git and
# never writes, moves, restores, or removes source/configuration files.
clean:
@echo "Cleaning repo-local build artifacts..."
@rm -rf -- "{{derived_data}}" ".build"
@echo "✅ Cleaned {{derived_data}} and .build; tracked files were untouched"
# Retain the familiar command, but keep it artifact-only as well.
nuke: clean
@echo "Cleaning nested package build caches..."
@find localPackages -type d -name .build -prune -exec rm -rf -- {} +
@rm -rf -- ".cache"
@echo "✅ Removed repository build caches; tracked files were untouched"
# Show app info
info: info:
@echo "BitChat - decentralized mesh messaging" @echo "BitChat - Decentralized Mesh Messaging"
@echo "macOS 13+ and iOS 16+" @echo "======================================"
@echo "Bluetooth mesh behavior requires physical Bluetooth-capable devices" @echo "• Native macOS SwiftUI app"
@echo "• Bluetooth LE mesh networking"
@echo "• End-to-end encryption"
@echo "• No internet required"
@echo "• Works offline with nearby devices"
@echo ""
@echo "Requirements:"
@echo "• macOS 13.0+ (Ventura)"
@echo "• Bluetooth LE capable Mac"
@echo "• Physical device (no simulator support)"
@echo ""
@echo "Usage:"
@echo "• Set nickname and start chatting"
@echo "• Use /join #channel for group chats"
@echo "• Use /msg @user for private messages"
@echo "• Triple-tap logo for emergency wipe"
# Force clean everything (nuclear option)
nuke:
@echo "🧨 Nuclear clean - removing all build artifacts and backups..."
@rm -rf ~/Library/Developer/Xcode/DerivedData/bitchat-* 2>/dev/null || true
@rm -rf bitchat.xcodeproj 2>/dev/null || true
@rm -f bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj.backup 2>/dev/null || true
@rm -f bitchat/Info.plist.backup 2>/dev/null || true
@# Restore iOS-specific files if they were moved
@if [ -f bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios ]; then mv bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard.ios bitchat/LaunchScreen.storyboard; fi
@git checkout bitchat.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj bitchat/Info.plist 2>/dev/null || echo "⚠️ Not a git repo or no changes to restore"
@echo "✅ Nuclear clean complete"
+117 -107
View File
@@ -1,155 +1,165 @@
# bitchat Privacy Policy # bitchat Privacy Policy
*Last updated: July 2026* *Last updated: June 2026*
## Our Commitment ## Our Commitment
bitchat is designed for private, account-free communication. This policy describes what the app keeps on your device, what it sends when you use mesh or optional internet features, and how long local data can remain. bitchat is designed with privacy as its foundation. We believe private communication is a fundamental human right. This policy explains how bitchat protects your privacy.
## Summary ## Summary
- **No project-operated accounts or messaging servers** — Bluetooth mesh is peer-to-peer; optional internet features use public or user-selected Nostr relays. - **No personal data collection** - We don't collect names, emails, or phone numbers
- **No analytics, advertising, telemetry, or tracking** — the app does not contain an analytics or advertising SDK. - **No accounts or company servers** - Mesh chat works peer-to-peer; optional Nostr features use public or user-selected relays
- **No sale of data** — the project does not sell user data or build advertising profiles. - **No tracking** - We have no analytics, telemetry, or user tracking
- **Open source** — the storage, networking, and cryptography described here can be inspected in the source code. - **Open source** - You can verify these claims by reading our code
## What bitchat Stores on Your Device ## What Information bitchat Stores
1. **Identity and cryptographic keys** ### On Your Device Only
- Noise, signing, group, prekey, and optional Nostr identity material is generated locally.
- Secret keys are stored in the system keychain. Public keys are shared when required for messaging, verification, groups, or Nostr events.
- Keys remain until they are rotated, removed by the relevant feature, erased with panic wipe, or removed with the app.
2. **Nickname, preferences, and relationships** 1. **Identity Keys**
- Your nickname, settings, favorites, petnames, read-receipt identifiers, and bounded operational metadata are stored locally. - Cryptographic private keys generated on first launch or when optional Nostr identities are created
- The share extension briefly places content you choose to share in the app-group preferences so the main app can import it. - Stored locally in your device's secure storage
- Allows you to maintain "favorite" relationships across app restarts
- Private keys never leave your device; public keys are shared when needed for messaging
3. **Private group state** 2. **Nickname**
- Group names, rosters, creator identity, and key epoch are stored as protected files in Application Support. - The display name you choose (or auto-generated)
- Current group keys are stored in the keychain. Group state remains until you leave or remove the group, panic-wipe the app, or remove the app. - Stored only on your device
- Shared with peers you communicate with
4. **Queued and carried private messages** 3. **Message History** (if enabled)
- An outgoing private message that has not been acknowledged may remain for up to 24 hours in a bounded, encrypted outbox. The outbox is sealed with ChaCha20-Poly1305 and its key is stored in the keychain. - When room owners enable retention, messages are saved locally
- A device acting as a courier may store a bounded opaque end-to-end encrypted envelope for another user for up to 24 hours. The courier cannot read its message content. - Stored encrypted on your device
- A panic wipe deletes both stores. - You can delete this at any time
5. **Recent public mesh messages and notices** 4. **Favorite Peers**
- Signed public mesh messages may be kept in a protected local gossip archive for up to 15 minutes so they can cross mesh partitions and survive a short relaunch. - Public keys of peers you mark as favorites
- Public bulletin-board posts and deletion tombstones persist until the post's author-selected expiry, at most seven days. Both stores are bounded and panic-wipeable. - Stored only on your device
- These items are public to the mesh or board where they are posted; they are not confidential messages. - Allows you to recognize these peers in future sessions
6. **Media attachments** 5. **Optional Location Channel State**
- Voice notes and images you send or receive can be stored under Application Support so they remain playable while referenced by the app. - Your selected geohash channel, bookmarked geohashes, teleport flags, and bookmark display names
- Incoming media is subject to a 100 MB quota with oldest-file eviction. Media is deleted by panic wipe or app removal; some outgoing media can otherwise remain on disk. - Stored locally on your device so the location-channel UI can restore your choices
- Per-geohash Nostr identities are derived locally from a device seed stored in secure storage
- Exact latitude and longitude are not persisted by bitchat
7. **Optional location-channel state** ### Temporary Session Data
- Your selected geohash channel, bookmarks, teleport flags, and bookmark display names are stored locally so the UI can restore them.
- Per-geohash Nostr identities are derived locally from a device seed stored in the keychain.
- bitchat does not persist exact latitude or longitude and does not include exact coordinates in mesh or Nostr messages.
## Temporary Session Data During each session, bitchat temporarily maintains:
- Active peer connections (forgotten when app closes)
- Routing information for message delivery
- Cached messages for offline peers (12 hours max)
- Your current location while optional location channels are enabled, used locally to compute geohash channels and friendly place names
While running, bitchat maintains active connections, routing state, deduplication state, and bounded in-memory conversation timelines. Closing the app clears the in-memory timelines and active connections, but it does not erase the persistent stores listed above. ## What Information is Shared
## What Is Shared ### With Other bitchat Users
### With Nearby Mesh Users When you use bitchat, nearby peers can see:
- Your chosen nickname
- Your ephemeral public key (changes each session)
- Messages you send to public rooms or directly to them
- Your approximate Bluetooth signal strength (for connection quality)
Depending on the feature you use, nearby peers can receive: ### With Room Members
- Your chosen nickname and public Noise/signing identity material. When you join a password-protected room:
- Announce metadata such as supported capability flags and a bounded list of short direct-neighbor identifiers. When the bridge is enabled, an announce can also include its coarse rendezvous geohash cell. - Your messages are visible to others with the password
- Public mesh messages, public notices, and group-control packets you intentionally send. - Your nickname appears in the member list
- Private ciphertext addressed to them, or opaque courier ciphertext they agree to carry. - Room owners can see you've joined
- Radio metadata available to the receiver, such as approximate Bluetooth signal strength.
Noise identity keys can persist across sessions; do not treat them as anonymous identifiers. Panic wipe rotates local identity state. ### With Nostr Relays (Optional Features)
### With Private Group Members If you enable Nostr-backed features:
- Private fallback messages to mutual favorites are sent as encrypted NIP-17 gift wraps. Relays can see event metadata, but not message content.
- Public location-channel messages, location notes, and presence are scoped with geohash tags. Relays and other participants can see the geohash tag, event kind, timestamp, and public key used for that geohash.
- Exact GPS coordinates are not included in Nostr events by bitchat. The geohash precision you choose can still reveal an approximate area, from region-level to building-level.
- Automatic presence heartbeats are limited to low-precision geohashes (region, province, and city). More precise geohash posts happen only when you use those channels or location notes.
Private group members receive the group's name, roster, key epoch, and encrypted group traffic needed to participate. Group messages are confidential to devices holding the current group key, subject to the security of those devices and members. ## What We DON'T Do
### With Nostr Relays and Internet Gateways bitchat **never**:
- Collects personal information
- Sells or shares your exact GPS location
- Stores data on servers we operate
- Sells your data to advertisers or data brokers
- Uses analytics or telemetry
- Creates user profiles
- Requires registration
Internet-backed features are optional. When enabled or used: ## Encryption
- Private fallback messages use encrypted NIP-17 gift wraps. Relays can observe event and network metadata but not the message plaintext. All private messages use end-to-end encryption:
- Public location-channel messages, notes, notices, and presence include a geohash tag, event kind, timestamp, and a public key. A geohash reveals an approximate area; finer precision reveals a smaller area. - **X25519** for key exchange
- The optional mesh bridge publishes bridge-enabled public mesh messages and presence to a neighborhood rendezvous cell. Those messages are public to participants and relays for that cell. A per-message “nearby only” choice prevents that message from crossing the bridge. - **AES-256-GCM** for message encryption
- Bridge courier drops contain opaque end-to-end encrypted envelopes and a rotating recipient tag. Relays still observe timing and network metadata. - **Ed25519** for digital signatures
- A device with gateway features enabled may relay signed bridge/location traffic or opaque courier envelopes for nearby mesh devices. - **Argon2id** for password-protected rooms
Nostr relays are operated by third parties. Their retention, logging, availability, and privacy practices are outside the project's control. Public events and encrypted events may remain on relays according to each relay's policy. ## Your Rights
## Location and Apple Services You have complete control:
- **Delete Local State**: Triple-tap the logo to instantly wipe local keys, sessions, caches, and preferences
- **Leave Anytime**: Close the app and local presence stops; relay-backed presence ages out
- **No Account**: No account record exists for you to delete from us
- **Portability**: Your local state stays on your device unless you send messages, use optional relay-backed features, or export it
Location permission is optional and requested as when-in-use access. It is used to compute geohash channels, bridge rendezvous cells, and nearby place labels. ## Bluetooth & Permissions
- Exact coordinates are not included in bitchat mesh or Nostr payloads and are not persisted by bitchat. bitchat requires Bluetooth permission to function:
- A selected geohash can still reveal an approximate area to peers and relays. - Used only for peer-to-peer communication
- When bitchat asks the operating system for a friendly place name, Apple's `CLGeocoder` service may process the location under Apple's privacy terms. - Bluetooth is not used for tracking
- Revoking location permission stops live location sampling. Saved bookmarks remain until you remove them, panic-wipe the app, or remove the app. - You can revoke this permission at any time in system settings
## Microphone, Camera, and Media Permissions ## Location Permission
- Microphone access is used only while you record a voice note or actively hold live push-to-talk. The resulting audio is sent to the mesh conversation you selected; public-conversation audio is public to that mesh, while private-conversation audio uses the private transport protections described below. Location permission is optional and is used only for location channels:
- Voice-note and live-audio files can remain in Application Support under the media retention rules above. - Used to compute local geohash channels and display names
- Camera access is used to scan peer-verification QR codes. Photo-library access is used when you choose an image to send. - Requested as when-in-use permission
- These permissions can be revoked in system settings. bitchat does not record microphone or camera input while the related capture UI is inactive. - Exact coordinates are not shared in messages or stored by bitchat
- Selected and bookmarked geohashes may persist locally until you remove them, use panic wipe, or delete the app
## Cryptography - You can revoke this permission at any time in system settings
Private and public features use different protections:
- Mesh private sessions use Noise XX with X25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305, and SHA-256.
- Private group messages use ChaCha20-Poly1305; group state and relevant mesh packets use Ed25519 signatures.
- Nostr events use secp256k1 Schnorr signatures. NIP-44 v2 private payloads use secp256k1 key agreement, HKDF-SHA256, and XChaCha20-Poly1305.
- The persistent private-message outbox uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 with a key held in the keychain. Some other protected local identity state uses AES-GCM.
- Public mesh, bridge, geohash, and board content is signed or authenticated as appropriate but is intentionally not confidential.
No cryptographic system can protect content after a recipient reads, copies, screenshots, or exports it.
## Data Retention Summary
- **In-memory chat timelines and active connections:** until the app closes or state is cleared.
- **Queued outgoing private messages:** until acknowledged, dropped by bounded policy, or 24 hours, whichever comes first.
- **Opaque courier envelopes:** until handed off, evicted by bounded policy, or 24 hours, whichever comes first.
- **Recent public mesh gossip:** up to 15 minutes.
- **Public board posts and tombstones:** until expiry, at most seven days.
- **Groups, favorites, preferences, identity keys, bookmarks, and media:** until removed by the feature, panic wipe, quota eviction where applicable, or app removal.
- **Nostr data:** according to the policies of the relays that receive it.
## Your Controls
- **Panic wipe:** Triple-tap the logo to clear local keys, sessions, preferences, groups, queues, carried mail, public archives, board data, and media managed by the app.
- **Feature controls:** Location channels, mesh bridge, internet gateway, and related internet behaviors can be disabled in the app. Some already-published relay data cannot be recalled.
- **System permissions:** Bluetooth, location, microphone, camera, and photo-library access can be revoked in system settings.
- **No account:** The project operates no account record for you to request or export.
## What the Project Does Not Do
bitchat does not:
- Operate an account database or project-owned messaging backend.
- Include advertising, analytics, or tracking SDKs.
- Sell user data or create advertising profiles.
- Include exact GPS coordinates in bitchat mesh or Nostr message payloads.
## Children's Privacy ## Children's Privacy
The project does not knowingly operate a service that collects children's personal data. The app has no account registration or age-verification system. Users and guardians should understand that public mesh, board, bridge, and location-channel posts are visible to other participants and may be relayed. bitchat does not knowingly collect information from children. The app has no age verification because it collects no personal information from anyone.
## Data Retention
- **Messages**: Deleted from memory when app closes (unless room retention is enabled)
- **Identity Key**: Persists until you delete the app
- **Favorites**: Persist until you remove them or delete the app
- **Location channel choices**: Selected/bookmarked geohashes persist locally until removed, panic-wiped, or the app is deleted
- **Nostr relay data**: Public geohash events and encrypted gift wraps may be retained by relays according to each relay's policy
- **Everything Else**: Exists only during active sessions
## Security Measures
- All communication is encrypted
- No accounts or company servers
- Optional Nostr relays receive only the events needed for Nostr-backed private fallback or public location channels
- Open source code for public audit
- Regular security updates
- Cryptographic signatures prevent tampering
## Changes to This Policy ## Changes to This Policy
Material behavior changes will be reflected in this document and its “Last updated” date. Updating this policy cannot retroactively retrieve data that remained only on a user's device. If we update this policy:
- The "Last updated" date will change
- The updated policy will be included in the app
- No retroactive changes can make us collect data already held only in your app
## Contact ## Contact
bitchat is an open source project. For privacy questions: bitchat is an open source project. For privacy questions:
- View our source code: [https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat/tree/main](https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat/tree/main)
- Open an issue on GitHub
- Join the discussion in public rooms
- View the source: [https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat](https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat) ## Philosophy
- Open an issue on GitHub.
Privacy isn't just a feature—it's the entire point. bitchat proves that modern communication doesn't require surrendering your privacy. No accounts, no company servers, no analytics. Just people talking freely.
--- ---
*This policy is released into the public domain under The Unlicense, like the project itself.* *This policy is released into the public domain under The Unlicense, just like bitchat itself.*
+17 -49
View File
@@ -93,62 +93,30 @@ For detailed protocol documentation, see the [Technical Whitepaper](WHITEPAPER.m
### Option 1: Using Xcode ### Option 1: Using Xcode
```bash ```bash
open bitchat.xcodeproj cd bitchat
``` open bitchat.xcodeproj
```
For a signed device build, create your ignored local configuration and replace To run on a device there're a few steps to prepare the code:
the example team ID with your Apple Developer Team ID: - Clone the local configs: `cp Configs/Local.xcconfig.example Configs/Local.xcconfig`
- Add your Developer Team ID into the newly created `Configs/Local.xcconfig`
```bash - Bundle ID would be set to `chat.bitchat.<team_id>` (unless you set to something else)
cp Configs/Local.xcconfig.example Configs/Local.xcconfig - Entitlements need to be updated manually (TODO: Automate):
``` - Search and replace `group.chat.bitchat` with `group.<your_bundle_id>` (e.g. `group.chat.bitchat.ABC123`)
`Local.xcconfig.example` derives unique app and App Group identifiers from that
team ID. The entitlement files already reference `$(APP_GROUP_ID)`, so tracked
project or entitlement files do not need to be edited.
Useful command-line checks from the repository root:
```bash
# macOS Debug build without signing
xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" \
-configuration Debug CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build
# Full SwiftPM test suite
swift test
# iOS simulator tests
xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \
-sdk iphonesimulator \
-destination 'platform=iOS Simulator,name=iPhone 17' test
```
If `iPhone 17` is unavailable, choose an installed simulator from:
```bash
xcodebuild -showdestinations -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (iOS)"
```
### Option 2: Using `just` ### Option 2: Using `just`
```bash ```bash
brew install just brew install just
just check ```
just run
```
`just build` and `just run` use the current `bitchat (macOS)` scheme and keep Want to try this on macos: `just run` will set it up and run from source.
Xcode output in the ignored `.DerivedData/` directory. They never patch source, Run `just clean` afterwards to restore things to original state for mobile app building and development.
project, configuration, or entitlement files.
`just clean` removes only `.DerivedData/` and `.build/`. It does not invoke Git
or restore tracked files, so uncommitted work is preserved. `just test` runs the
SwiftPM suite and `just test-ios` runs the iPhone 17 simulator suite.
## Localization ## Localization
- App localizations live in `bitchat/Localizable.xcstrings`. - Base app resources live under `bitchat/Localization/Base.lproj/`. Add new copy to `Localizable.strings` and plural rules to `Localizable.stringsdict`.
- Share extension strings are separate in `bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Localizable.xcstrings`. - Share extension strings are separate in `bitchatShareExtension/Localization/Base.lproj/Localizable.strings`.
- Prefer keys that describe intent (`app_info.features.offline.title`) and reuse existing ones where possible. - Prefer keys that describe intent (`app_info.features.offline.title`) and reuse existing ones where possible.
- Run `xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build` to compile-check any localization updates. - Run `xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (macOS)" -configuration Debug CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO build` to compile-check any localization updates.
+1 -13
View File
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@
A6E32D232E762EAB0032EA8A /* Exceptions for "bitchatShareExtension" folder in "bitchatShareExtension" target */ = { A6E32D232E762EAB0032EA8A /* Exceptions for "bitchatShareExtension" folder in "bitchatShareExtension" target */ = {
isa = PBXFileSystemSynchronizedBuildFileExceptionSet; isa = PBXFileSystemSynchronizedBuildFileExceptionSet;
membershipExceptions = ( membershipExceptions = (
Info.plist, ShareViewController.swift,
bitchatShareExtension.entitlements,
); );
target = 57CA17A36A2532A6CFF367BB /* bitchatShareExtension */; target = 57CA17A36A2532A6CFF367BB /* bitchatShareExtension */;
}; };
@@ -259,13 +258,9 @@
buildConfigurationList = E4EA6DC648DF55FF84032EB5 /* Build configuration list for PBXNativeTarget "bitchatShareExtension" */; buildConfigurationList = E4EA6DC648DF55FF84032EB5 /* Build configuration list for PBXNativeTarget "bitchatShareExtension" */;
buildPhases = ( buildPhases = (
0A08E70F08F55FD5BA8C7EF3 /* Sources */, 0A08E70F08F55FD5BA8C7EF3 /* Sources */,
7E9B64F63F93443FB7BA12DF /* Resources */,
); );
buildRules = ( buildRules = (
); );
fileSystemSynchronizedGroups = (
A6E32D212E762EAB0032EA8A /* bitchatShareExtension */,
);
name = bitchatShareExtension; name = bitchatShareExtension;
productName = bitchatShareExtension; productName = bitchatShareExtension;
productReference = 61F92EBA29C47C0FCC482F1F /* bitchatShareExtension.appex */; productReference = 61F92EBA29C47C0FCC482F1F /* bitchatShareExtension.appex */;
@@ -393,13 +388,6 @@
E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678E /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */, E0A1B2C3D4E5F6012345678E /* relays/online_relays_gps.csv in Resources */,
); );
}; };
7E9B64F63F93443FB7BA12DF /* Resources */ = {
isa = PBXResourcesBuildPhase;
buildActionMask = 2147483647;
files = (
);
runOnlyForDeploymentPostprocessing = 0;
};
/* End PBXResourcesBuildPhase section */ /* End PBXResourcesBuildPhase section */
/* Begin PBXSourcesBuildPhase section */ /* Begin PBXSourcesBuildPhase section */
+22
View File
@@ -36,12 +36,34 @@ enum AppEvent: Sendable, Equatable {
actor AppEventStream { actor AppEventStream {
private var continuations: [UUID: AsyncStream<AppEvent>.Continuation] = [:] private var continuations: [UUID: AsyncStream<AppEvent>.Continuation] = [:]
func stream() -> AsyncStream<AppEvent> {
let id = UUID()
return AsyncStream { continuation in
continuations[id] = continuation
continuation.onTermination = { [id] _ in
Task {
await self.removeContinuation(id)
}
}
}
}
func emit(_ event: AppEvent) { func emit(_ event: AppEvent) {
for continuation in continuations.values { for continuation in continuations.values {
continuation.yield(event) continuation.yield(event)
} }
} }
func finish() {
for continuation in continuations.values {
continuation.finish()
}
continuations.removeAll()
}
private func removeContinuation(_ id: UUID) {
continuations.removeValue(forKey: id)
}
} }
/// Identity key for a direct conversation. Equality and hashing use the /// Identity key for a direct conversation. Equality and hashing use the
-9
View File
@@ -10,10 +10,6 @@ final class AppChromeModel: ObservableObject {
@Published var showingFingerprintFor: PeerID? @Published var showingFingerprintFor: PeerID?
@Published var isAppInfoPresented = false @Published var isAppInfoPresented = false
@Published var isLocationChannelsSheetPresented = false @Published var isLocationChannelsSheetPresented = false
@Published var isNoticesSheetPresented = false
/// When the sheet is opened for "notes left here" (empty mesh timeline),
/// it should land on the geo tab instead of the channel-derived default.
@Published var noticesSheetPrefersGeoTab = false
@Published var showBluetoothAlert = false @Published var showBluetoothAlert = false
@Published var bluetoothAlertMessage = "" @Published var bluetoothAlertMessage = ""
@Published var bluetoothState: CBManagerState = .unknown @Published var bluetoothState: CBManagerState = .unknown
@@ -66,11 +62,6 @@ final class AppChromeModel: ObservableObject {
isAppInfoPresented = true isAppInfoPresented = true
} }
func presentNotices(geoTab: Bool = false) {
noticesSheetPrefersGeoTab = geoTab
isNoticesSheetPresented = true
}
/// Builds the mesh topology map model from the transport's gossiped /// Builds the mesh topology map model from the transport's gossiped
/// graph plus the live nickname table. Unknown nodes (heard about via a /// graph plus the live nickname table. Unknown nodes (heard about via a
/// neighbor claim but never announced to us) fall back to a short ID. /// neighbor claim but never announced to us) fall back to a short ID.
+13 -45
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
/// (docs/CONVERSATION-STORE-DESIGN.md). Owned here; the feature models /// (docs/CONVERSATION-STORE-DESIGN.md). Owned here; the feature models
/// and `ChatViewModel` observe and mutate it through its intent API. /// and `ChatViewModel` observe and mutate it through its intent API.
let conversations: ConversationStore let conversations: ConversationStore
let peerIdentityStore: PeerIdentityStore
let locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore
let publicChatModel: PublicChatModel let publicChatModel: PublicChatModel
let privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel let privateInboxModel: PrivateInboxModel
let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel
@@ -26,7 +28,6 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
let locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel let locationChannelsModel: LocationChannelsModel
let peerListModel: PeerListModel let peerListModel: PeerListModel
let appChromeModel: AppChromeModel let appChromeModel: AppChromeModel
let boardAlertsModel: BoardAlertsModel
private let idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge private let idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>() private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
#endif #endif
init( init(
keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager.makeDefault(), keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager(),
idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge = NostrIdentityBridge() idBridge: NostrIdentityBridge = NostrIdentityBridge()
) { ) {
self.idBridge = idBridge self.idBridge = idBridge
@@ -49,6 +50,8 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
let locationPresenceStore = LocationPresenceStore() let locationPresenceStore = LocationPresenceStore()
let locationManager = LocationChannelManager.shared let locationManager = LocationChannelManager.shared
self.conversations = conversations self.conversations = conversations
self.peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore
self.locationPresenceStore = locationPresenceStore
self.chatViewModel = ChatViewModel( self.chatViewModel = ChatViewModel(
keychain: keychain, keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge, idBridge: idBridge,
@@ -88,24 +91,6 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel, chatViewModel: self.chatViewModel,
privateInboxModel: self.privateInboxModel privateInboxModel: self.privateInboxModel
) )
let chatViewModel = self.chatViewModel
self.boardAlertsModel = BoardAlertsModel(
arrivals: BoardStore.shared.postArrivals.eraseToAnyPublisher(),
wipes: BoardStore.shared.didWipe.eraseToAnyPublisher(),
dependencies: BoardAlertsModel.Dependencies(
isOwnPost: { post in
let key = chatViewModel.meshService.noiseSigningPublicKeyData()
return !key.isEmpty && key == post.authorSigningKey
},
emitSystemLine: { content, geohash in
if geohash.isEmpty {
chatViewModel.addMeshOnlySystemMessage(content)
} else {
chatViewModel.addGeohashSystemMessage(content, geohash: geohash)
}
}
)
)
GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded() GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded()
bindRuntimeObservers() bindRuntimeObservers()
@@ -217,16 +202,7 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
chatViewModel.applicationWillTerminate() chatViewModel.applicationWillTerminate()
} }
func handleNotificationResponse( func handleNotificationResponse(identifier: String, userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any]) {
identifier: String,
actionIdentifier: String = UNNotificationDefaultActionIdentifier,
userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any]
) {
if actionIdentifier == NotificationService.waveActionID {
chatViewModel.sendMeshWave()
return
}
if identifier.hasPrefix("private-"), let peerID = PeerID(str: userInfo["peerID"] as? String) { if identifier.hasPrefix("private-"), let peerID = PeerID(str: userInfo["peerID"] as? String) {
record(.notificationOpened(peerID: peerID)) record(.notificationOpened(peerID: peerID))
chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID) chatViewModel.startPrivateChat(with: peerID)
@@ -313,29 +289,21 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
} }
func checkForSharedContent() { func checkForSharedContent() {
guard let userDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: BitchatApp.groupID) else { return } guard let userDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: BitchatApp.groupID),
let clearSharedContent = { let sharedContent = userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContent"),
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContent")
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentType")
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentDate")
}
guard let sharedContent = userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContent"),
let sharedDate = userDefaults.object(forKey: "sharedContentDate") as? Date else { let sharedDate = userDefaults.object(forKey: "sharedContentDate") as? Date else {
// A partial or malformed handoff must not linger in the shared
// app-group container indefinitely.
clearSharedContent()
return return
} }
guard Date().timeIntervalSince(sharedDate) < TransportConfig.uiShareAcceptWindowSeconds else { guard Date().timeIntervalSince(sharedDate) < TransportConfig.uiShareAcceptWindowSeconds else {
clearSharedContent()
return return
} }
let contentKind = SharedContentKind(rawValue: userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContentType") ?? "") ?? .text let contentKind = SharedContentKind(rawValue: userDefaults.string(forKey: "sharedContentType") ?? "") ?? .text
clearSharedContent() userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContent")
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentType")
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContentDate")
switch contentKind { switch contentKind {
case .url: case .url:
@@ -381,12 +349,12 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() { TorManager.shared.isAutoStartAllowed() {
chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage( chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
String(localized: "system.tor.starting", comment: "System message when Tor is starting") String(localized: "system.tor.starting", defaultValue: "starting tor...", comment: "System message when Tor is starting")
) )
} else if !TorManager.shared.torEnforced && !chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced { } else if !TorManager.shared.torEnforced && !chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced {
chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true chatViewModel.torStatusAnnounced = true
chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage( chatViewModel.addGeohashOnlySystemMessage(
String(localized: "system.tor.dev_bypass", comment: "System message when Tor bypass is enabled in development") String(localized: "system.tor.dev_bypass", defaultValue: "development build: Tor bypass enabled.", comment: "System message when Tor bypass is enabled in development")
) )
} }
} }
+11 -18
View File
@@ -225,25 +225,8 @@ final class Conversation: ObservableObject, Identifiable {
guard let current else { return false } guard let current else { return false }
if current == new { return true } if current == new { return true }
// Never downgrade to a weaker delivery state. Ordering of certainty:
// sending < sent < carried < delivered < read. A late `.sent` write
// (e.g. the optimistic stamp after routing) must not clobber the
// `.carried` the router already set when it handed a copy to a
// courier/bridge, nor a `.delivered`/`.read` ack. A late asynchronous
// failure is weaker than a confirmed recipient receipt too, so it may
// not replace `.delivered`/`.read`. Same for the
// `.sending` stamp a pre-handshake resend emits asynchronously: it
// can land after the message already reached `.sent`, and "Sent" was
// already truthful. (`.failed` `.sending` stays allowed so a real
// failure retry is visible.)
switch (current, new) { switch (current, new) {
case (.read, .delivered), (.read, .carried), (.read, .sent), (.read, .sending), (.read, .failed): case (.read, .delivered), (.read, .sent):
return true
case (.delivered, .carried), (.delivered, .sent), (.delivered, .sending), (.delivered, .failed):
return true
case (.carried, .sent), (.carried, .sending):
return true
case (.sent, .sending):
return true return true
default: default:
return false return false
@@ -813,6 +796,16 @@ extension ConversationStore {
return messageIDs return messageIDs
} }
/// Removes every direct conversation (panic clear).
func removeAllDirectConversations() {
let directIDs = conversationIDs.filter { id in
if case .direct = id { return true }
return false
}
for id in directIDs {
removeConversation(id)
}
}
} }
// MARK: - Diagnostics support // MARK: - Diagnostics support
-18
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,6 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var currentNickname: String @Published private(set) var currentNickname: String
@Published private(set) var isBatchingPublic = false @Published private(set) var isBatchingPublic = false
@Published private(set) var canSendMediaInCurrentContext = true @Published private(set) var canSendMediaInCurrentContext = true
/// Who is talking live in the public mesh channel right now (floor
/// courtesy: the composer mic tints "busy" while someone holds the floor).
@Published private(set) var activeLiveVoiceTalker: String?
private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
private let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel private let privateConversationModel: PrivateConversationModel
@@ -153,17 +150,6 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
chatViewModel.sendVoiceNote(at: url) chatViewModel.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
} }
/// Capture backend for the mic gesture: live PTT when the current DM
/// peer can hear it now, classic voice note otherwise.
func makeVoiceCaptureSession() -> VoiceCaptureSession {
chatViewModel.makeVoiceCaptureSession()
}
/// Whether this message is a live voice burst still streaming in.
func isLiveVoiceMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
chatViewModel.liveVoiceCoordinator.isLiveVoiceMessage(message)
}
func cancelMediaSend(messageID: String) { func cancelMediaSend(messageID: String) {
chatViewModel.cancelMediaSend(messageID: messageID) chatViewModel.cancelMediaSend(messageID: messageID)
} }
@@ -189,10 +175,6 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main) .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$isBatchingPublic) .assign(to: &$isBatchingPublic)
chatViewModel.$activePublicVoiceTalker
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$activeLiveVoiceTalker)
conversations.$activeChannel conversations.$activeChannel
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main) .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] channel in .sink { [weak self] channel in
+6
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import BitFoundation
import Combine import Combine
import Foundation import Foundation
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@ final class LocationChannelsModel: ObservableObject {
private let manager: LocationChannelManager private let manager: LocationChannelManager
private let network: NetworkActivationService private let network: NetworkActivationService
private let gateway: GatewayService private let gateway: GatewayService
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
init( init(
manager: LocationChannelManager? = nil, manager: LocationChannelManager? = nil,
@@ -100,6 +102,10 @@ final class LocationChannelsModel: ObservableObject {
network.setUserTorEnabled(enabled) network.setUserTorEnabled(enabled)
} }
func setGatewayEnabled(_ enabled: Bool) {
gateway.setEnabled(enabled)
}
func refreshMeshChannelsIfNeeded() { func refreshMeshChannelsIfNeeded() {
guard case .mesh = selectedChannel, guard case .mesh = selectedChannel,
permissionState == .authorized, permissionState == .authorized,
-138
View File
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
//
// NearbyNotesCounter.swift
// bitchat
//
// Counts unexpired location notes left at the user's current building-level
// geohash so the empty mesh timeline can say "📍 3 notes left here". Only
// subscribes while a view holds it active, and only when location notes are
// enabled and location permission is already granted (it never prompts).
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
//
import Combine
import Foundation
@MainActor
final class NearbyNotesCounter: ObservableObject {
static let shared = NearbyNotesCounter()
@Published private(set) var noteCount = 0
/// Whether an explicit notes act (the empty-timeline "check for notes"
/// tap, opening the notices sheet's geo tab, or a successful /drop) has
/// unlocked the counter this session. Until then nothing subscribes:
/// merely looking at the mesh timeline must not open a building-precision
/// relay REQ that leaks location passively.
@Published private(set) var revealed = false
private var manager: LocationNotesManager?
private var managerCancellable: AnyCancellable?
private var channelsCancellable: AnyCancellable?
private var permissionCancellable: AnyCancellable?
private var settingCancellable: AnyCancellable?
private var activeHolders = 0
private let locationManager: LocationChannelManager
private let managerFactory: @MainActor (String) -> LocationNotesManager
private let releaseManager: @MainActor (LocationNotesManager?) -> Void
init(
locationManager: LocationChannelManager = .shared,
managerFactory: @escaping @MainActor (String) -> LocationNotesManager = { LocationNotesPool.shared.acquire($0) },
releaseManager: @escaping @MainActor (LocationNotesManager?) -> Void = { LocationNotesPool.shared.release($0) }
) {
self.locationManager = locationManager
self.managerFactory = managerFactory
self.releaseManager = releaseManager
}
/// Whether the empty-timeline "check for notes" hint should render.
/// The permission gate matters: `retarget()` never subscribes without
/// location authorization, so offering the hint to an unauthorized
/// install would be a silent dead-end tap, `revealed` flips, the hint
/// vanishes, and nothing else happens for the session. The hint never
/// prompts; it simply stays hidden until permission exists. The caller
/// passes its own observed permission state so the hint re-renders when
/// authorization changes.
func offersRevealHint(permissionState: LocationChannelManager.PermissionState) -> Bool {
!revealed && LocationNotesSettings.enabled && permissionState == .authorized
}
/// Marks the one explicit act that lets the counter subscribe. Sticky for
/// the rest of the session (the singleton's lifetime); `deactivate()`
/// deliberately does not reset it.
func reveal() {
guard !revealed else { return }
revealed = true
retarget()
}
/// Begins (or keeps) the notes subscription for the current building
/// geohash. Balanced by `deactivate()`; ref-counted so multiple views can
/// hold it.
func activate() {
activeHolders += 1
guard activeHolders == 1 else { return }
channelsCancellable = locationManager.$availableChannels
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in self?.retarget() }
// CoreLocation can revoke authorization while the view remains
// mounted. `availableChannels` deliberately retains its last value,
// so permission must be an independent invalidation signal or the
// building REQ survives on stale coordinates.
permissionCancellable = locationManager.$permissionState
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in self?.retarget() }
// The app-info kill switch must take effect immediately, not on the
// next location change or remount.
settingCancellable = NotificationCenter.default
.publisher(for: LocationNotesSettings.didChangeNotification)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in self?.retarget() }
retarget()
}
func deactivate() {
activeHolders = max(0, activeHolders - 1)
guard activeHolders == 0 else { return }
channelsCancellable = nil
permissionCancellable = nil
settingCancellable = nil
managerCancellable = nil
releaseManager(manager)
manager = nil
noteCount = 0
}
private func retarget() {
guard activeHolders > 0,
revealed,
LocationNotesSettings.enabled,
locationManager.permissionState == .authorized,
let geohash = locationManager.availableChannels
.first(where: { $0.level == .building })?.geohash
else {
managerCancellable = nil
releaseManager(manager)
manager = nil
noteCount = 0
return
}
if let manager {
guard manager.geohash != geohash.lowercased() else { return }
// Pooled managers are shared; never retarget one in place
// release the old cell and acquire the new one.
managerCancellable = nil
releaseManager(manager)
self.manager = nil
}
let fresh = managerFactory(geohash)
manager = fresh
managerCancellable = fresh.$notes
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] notes in
let now = Date()
self?.noteCount = notes.filter { $0.expiresAt.map { $0 > now } ?? true }.count
}
}
}
+8
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ final class PeerIdentityStore: ObservableObject {
stablePeerIDsByShortID[peerID] = stablePeerID stablePeerIDsByShortID[peerID] = stablePeerID
} }
func replaceStablePeerIDs(_ mappings: [PeerID: PeerID]) {
stablePeerIDsByShortID = mappings
}
func fingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? { func fingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? {
peerFingerprintsByPeerID[peerID] peerFingerprintsByPeerID[peerID]
} }
@@ -90,6 +94,10 @@ final class PeerIdentityStore: ObservableObject {
invalidateEncryptionCache(for: peerID) invalidateEncryptionCache(for: peerID)
} }
func replaceEncryptionStatuses(_ statuses: [PeerID: EncryptionStatus]) {
encryptionStatuses = statuses
}
func setVerifiedFingerprints(_ fingerprints: Set<String>) { func setVerifiedFingerprints(_ fingerprints: Set<String>) {
verifiedFingerprints = fingerprints verifiedFingerprints = fingerprints
} }
+2 -2
View File
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ final class PrivateConversationModel: ObservableObject {
if let group = chatViewModel.groupStore.group(for: conversationPeerID) { if let group = chatViewModel.groupStore.group(for: conversationPeerID) {
displayName = "#\(group.name) (\(group.members.count))" displayName = "#\(group.name) (\(group.members.count))"
} else { } else {
displayName = String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer") displayName = String(localized: "common.unknown", defaultValue: "unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer")
} }
return PrivateConversationHeaderState( return PrivateConversationHeaderState(
conversationPeerID: conversationPeerID, conversationPeerID: conversationPeerID,
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ final class PrivateConversationModel: ObservableObject {
} }
} }
return String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer") return String(localized: "common.unknown", defaultValue: "unknown", comment: "Fallback label for unknown peer")
} }
private func resolveAvailability(for headerPeerID: PeerID, peer: BitchatPeer?) -> PrivateConversationAvailability { private func resolveAvailability(for headerPeerID: PeerID, peer: BitchatPeer?) -> PrivateConversationAvailability {
+7 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import Combine
import Foundation import Foundation
struct FingerprintPresentationState: Equatable { struct FingerprintPresentationState: Equatable {
let statusPeerID: PeerID
let peerNickname: String let peerNickname: String
let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus let encryptionStatus: EncryptionStatus
let theirFingerprint: String? let theirFingerprint: String?
@@ -55,6 +56,10 @@ final class VerificationModel: ObservableObject {
return VerificationService.shared.buildMyQRString(nickname: currentNickname, npub: npub) ?? "" return VerificationService.shared.buildMyQRString(nickname: currentNickname, npub: npub) ?? ""
} }
func beginQRVerification(with qr: VerificationService.VerificationQR) -> Bool {
chatViewModel.beginQRVerification(with: qr)
}
func verifyScannedPayload(_ payload: String) -> VerificationScanOutcome { func verifyScannedPayload(_ payload: String) -> VerificationScanOutcome {
guard let qr = VerificationService.shared.verifyScannedQR(payload) else { guard let qr = VerificationService.shared.verifyScannedQR(payload) else {
return .invalid return .invalid
@@ -105,6 +110,7 @@ final class VerificationModel: ObservableObject {
} }
return FingerprintPresentationState( return FingerprintPresentationState(
statusPeerID: statusPeerID,
peerNickname: peerNickname, peerNickname: peerNickname,
encryptionStatus: encryptionStatus, encryptionStatus: encryptionStatus,
theirFingerprint: theirFingerprint, theirFingerprint: theirFingerprint,
@@ -180,6 +186,6 @@ final class VerificationModel: ObservableObject {
} }
} }
return String(localized: "common.unknown", comment: "Label for an unknown peer") return String(localized: "common.unknown", defaultValue: "unknown", comment: "Label for an unknown peer")
} }
} }
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@@ -27,66 +27,6 @@
"idiom" : "universal", "idiom" : "universal",
"platform" : "ios", "platform" : "ios",
"size" : "1024x1024" "size" : "1024x1024"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_16x16.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "16x16"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_16x16@2x.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "16x16"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_32x32.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "32x32"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_32x32@2x.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "32x32"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_128x128.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "128x128"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_128x128@2x.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "128x128"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_256x256.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "256x256"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_256x256@2x.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "256x256"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_512x512.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "1x",
"size" : "512x512"
},
{
"filename" : "mac_512x512@2x.png",
"idiom" : "mac",
"scale" : "2x",
"size" : "512x512"
} }
], ],
"info" : { "info" : {
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+10 -11
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@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
import SwiftUI import SwiftUI
import UserNotifications import UserNotifications
#if DEBUG
import BitLogger
#endif
@main @main
struct BitchatApp: App { struct BitchatApp: App {
@@ -40,10 +43,14 @@ struct BitchatApp: App {
.environmentObject(runtime.locationChannelsModel) .environmentObject(runtime.locationChannelsModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.peerListModel) .environmentObject(runtime.peerListModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.appChromeModel) .environmentObject(runtime.appChromeModel)
.environmentObject(runtime.boardAlertsModel)
.onAppear { .onAppear {
appDelegate.runtime = runtime appDelegate.runtime = runtime
runtime.start() runtime.start()
#if DEBUG
// Arm the opt-in UDP log sink from persisted config (no-op
// until a collector host is set in the App Info sheet).
LogNetworkSink.shared.reloadConfiguration()
#endif
} }
.onOpenURL { url in .onOpenURL { url in
runtime.handleOpenURL(url) runtime.handleOpenURL(url)
@@ -104,20 +111,12 @@ final class NotificationDelegate: NSObject, UNUserNotificationCenterDelegate {
func userNotificationCenter(_ center: UNUserNotificationCenter, didReceive response: UNNotificationResponse, withCompletionHandler completionHandler: @escaping () -> Void) { func userNotificationCenter(_ center: UNUserNotificationCenter, didReceive response: UNNotificationResponse, withCompletionHandler completionHandler: @escaping () -> Void) {
let identifier = response.notification.request.identifier let identifier = response.notification.request.identifier
let actionIdentifier = response.actionIdentifier
let userInfo = response.notification.request.content.userInfo let userInfo = response.notification.request.content.userInfo
// Complete only after the response is handled: for a background
// action (👋 wave) the system may suspend the app the moment the
// completion handler runs, which would drop the queued send.
Task { @MainActor in Task { @MainActor in
self.runtime?.handleNotificationResponse( self.runtime?.handleNotificationResponse(identifier: identifier, userInfo: userInfo)
identifier: identifier,
actionIdentifier: actionIdentifier,
userInfo: userInfo
)
completionHandler()
} }
completionHandler()
} }
func userNotificationCenter(_ center: UNUserNotificationCenter, willPresent notification: UNNotification, withCompletionHandler completionHandler: @escaping (UNNotificationPresentationOptions) -> Void) { func userNotificationCenter(_ center: UNUserNotificationCenter, willPresent notification: UNNotification, withCompletionHandler completionHandler: @escaping (UNNotificationPresentationOptions) -> Void) {
@@ -1,472 +0,0 @@
//
// AudioSessionCoordinator.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import AVFoundation
import BitLogger
import Foundation
/// The raw audio-session calls the coordinator makes, abstracted so the
/// state machine is unit-testable with a mock (and compiles on the macOS
/// test host, where `AVAudioSession` doesn't exist).
///
/// Calls arrive on the coordinator's private serial queue never the main
/// thread. `setCategory`/`setActive` block on IPC to the audio server
/// (observed >1 s under contention on device, tripping the system gesture
/// gate), and Apple explicitly recommends activating the session off the
/// main thread.
protocol SessionApplying: Sendable {
func setCategory(_ category: AudioSessionCoordinator.Category) throws
func setActive(_ active: Bool, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: Bool) throws
}
/// Sole owner of `AVAudioSession` category/activation for voice features.
///
/// Talk-over means capture (push-to-talk) and playback (inbound bursts,
/// voice notes) can be live simultaneously; letting each engine configure
/// the shared session directly made them stomp each other's category and
/// route mid-flight (the AURemoteIO -10851 dead-input class). Instead every
/// client acquires a `Token` and the coordinator:
///
/// - reference-counts activation: `setActive(true)` only on the first
/// holder, `setActive(false, notifyOthersOnDeactivation:)` only when the
/// last one releases no client can deactivate another's session;
/// - keeps one escalating category: playback-only holders get `.playback`,
/// any capture holder escalates to `.playAndRecord`, and the category is
/// never downgraded while anyone still holds a token (capture ending must
/// not yank the route out from under live playback);
/// - fans out `onInterrupted` on system interruptions and when the active
/// route's device disappears (no auto-resume: bursts are transient, the
/// next press or burst simply re-acquires). The escalating category change
/// fans out separately as `onCategoryEscalated` the session stays live,
/// so holders that can rebuild their engine against the new configuration
/// keep playing (talk-over is bidirectional); holders that don't provide
/// it fall back to `onInterrupted`.
///
/// Threading: all state lives on a private serial queue, which both
/// serializes rapid acquire/release pairs and keeps the blocking session IPC
/// off the main thread (`acquire` is `async` for exactly that hop; `release`
/// is fire-and-forget onto the queue). Holder callbacks always run on the
/// main actor.
///
/// Microphone *permission* queries stay with their callers; this type owns
/// only category and activation.
///
/// `@unchecked Sendable`: every mutable property is confined to `queue`.
final class AudioSessionCoordinator: @unchecked Sendable {
enum Use {
case playback
case capture
}
/// The session category the coordinator has applied (the `SessionApplying`
/// adapter maps these to concrete `AVAudioSession` category/mode/options).
enum Category {
case playback
case playAndRecord
}
/// Opaque handle for one client's hold on the session. Release exactly
/// once when done (extra releases are ignored).
///
/// `@unchecked` because the stored callbacks are `@MainActor`-isolated
/// closures (non-Sendable as stored types). Lifecycle state is protected
/// by `stateLock`, and callbacks are only ever invoked on the main actor.
final class Token: @unchecked Sendable {
fileprivate enum CallbackKind: Sendable {
case interrupted
case categoryEscalated
}
/// A callback snapshot is only valid for the lifecycle epoch in which
/// it was captured. `release` advances the epoch synchronously before
/// its queue work, so a callback already headed to the main actor can't
/// reach a client that has since released this token and reacquired a
/// different one.
fileprivate struct CallbackTicket: Sendable {
let token: Token
let kind: CallbackKind
let lifecycleEpoch: UInt64
}
private enum Lifecycle {
/// Registered on the session queue, but `acquire` has not yet
/// returned into the client's main-actor call frame.
case acquiring
case ready
case released
}
fileprivate let onInterrupted: @MainActor () -> Void
fileprivate let onCategoryEscalated: (@MainActor () -> Void)?
private let stateLock = NSLock()
private var lifecycle = Lifecycle.acquiring
private var lifecycleEpoch: UInt64 = 0
/// A terminal event that lands while the token is registered but not
/// yet handed off invalidates the acquire before its caller can start.
private var terminalEventPendingHandoff = false
fileprivate init(
onInterrupted: @escaping @MainActor () -> Void,
onCategoryEscalated: (@MainActor () -> Void)?
) {
self.onInterrupted = onInterrupted
self.onCategoryEscalated = onCategoryEscalated
}
/// Records an event at the same linearization point at which the
/// coordinator snapshots its holders. An acquiring token cannot safely
/// receive a callback yet: terminal events invalidate the acquire,
/// while category escalation needs no callback because its engine will
/// start against the already-escalated configuration.
fileprivate func record(_ kind: CallbackKind) -> CallbackTicket? {
stateLock.withLock {
switch lifecycle {
case .acquiring:
switch kind {
case .interrupted:
terminalEventPendingHandoff = true
case .categoryEscalated:
break
}
return nil
case .ready:
return CallbackTicket(token: self, kind: kind, lifecycleEpoch: lifecycleEpoch)
case .released:
return nil
}
}
}
/// Completes the main-actor ownership handoff if no terminal event
/// invalidated it. Because `acquire` itself is main-actor isolated, a
/// successful handoff returns directly into the caller without another
/// actor hop; no callback can interleave before the caller stores the
/// returned token.
fileprivate func completeHandoff() -> Bool {
stateLock.withLock {
guard lifecycle == .acquiring,
!terminalEventPendingHandoff
else { return false }
lifecycle = .ready
return true
}
}
/// Marks the token dead synchronously, before the asynchronous holder
/// removal. Returns false for an already-released token.
fileprivate func markReleased() -> Bool {
stateLock.withLock {
guard lifecycle != .released else { return false }
lifecycle = .released
lifecycleEpoch &+= 1
terminalEventPendingHandoff = false
return true
}
}
/// Revalidates a queue snapshot at the main-actor delivery boundary.
/// The lock is deliberately released before invoking client code: real
/// callbacks commonly call `release` on this same token.
@MainActor
fileprivate func deliver(_ ticket: CallbackTicket) {
let isLive = stateLock.withLock {
lifecycle == .ready && lifecycleEpoch == ticket.lifecycleEpoch
}
guard isLive else { return }
switch ticket.kind {
case .interrupted:
onInterrupted()
case .categoryEscalated:
(onCategoryEscalated ?? onInterrupted)()
}
}
}
/// Deterministic suspension points for lifecycle race tests. Production
/// instances use the nil defaults; the hooks never move session calls off
/// the coordinator queue or callback execution off the main actor.
struct TestingHooks: Sendable {
let beforeAcquireHandoff: (@Sendable () async -> Void)?
let beforeCallbackDelivery: (@Sendable () async -> Void)?
init(
beforeAcquireHandoff: (@Sendable () async -> Void)? = nil,
beforeCallbackDelivery: (@Sendable () async -> Void)? = nil
) {
self.beforeAcquireHandoff = beforeAcquireHandoff
self.beforeCallbackDelivery = beforeCallbackDelivery
}
}
static let shared = AudioSessionCoordinator(session: SystemAudioSession())
private let session: SessionApplying
private let testingHooks: TestingHooks
/// Confines all mutable state, serializes whole acquire/release
/// operations (two rapid presses can't interleave their category and
/// activation calls), and hosts the blocking session IPC off main.
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.audio-session", qos: .userInitiated)
// Queue-confined state.
private var holders: [ObjectIdentifier: Token] = [:]
private var currentCategory: Category?
private var sessionActive = false
/// Written once in init, read in deinit never touched concurrently.
private var observers: [NSObjectProtocol] = []
init(session: SessionApplying, testingHooks: TestingHooks = TestingHooks()) {
self.session = session
self.testingHooks = testingHooks
observeSystemNotifications()
}
deinit {
for observer in observers {
NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
}
}
/// Configures + activates the session for `use` and registers the caller
/// as a holder. The blocking `AVAudioSession` calls run on the session
/// queue the caller suspends instead of stalling its thread (a PTT
/// press used to block main >1 s in `setActive`, tripping the system
/// gesture gate). `onInterrupted` fires (on the main actor) when the
/// client must stop using the session: a system interruption began or
/// its route's device went away. The client should stop its engine,
/// finalize any artifacts, and release resuming means acquiring again.
///
/// `onCategoryEscalated` fires instead when the session category
/// escalated underneath the holder (a capture client joined): the session
/// stays active, so a holder that can rebuild its engine against the new
/// configuration should restart and keep going. Holders that pass `nil`
/// get `onInterrupted` for escalation too. Escalation is delivered before
/// `acquire` returns, so the new holder starts its engine strictly after
/// existing ones were told to rebuild. Main-actor isolation is also the
/// ownership handoff boundary: if interruption or route loss lands after
/// queue registration but before that boundary, the provisional holder is
/// removed and `acquire` throws `CancellationError` instead of returning a
/// token whose callback already fired.
@MainActor
func acquire(
_ use: Use,
onInterrupted: @escaping @MainActor () -> Void,
onCategoryEscalated: (@MainActor () -> Void)? = nil
) async throws -> Token {
let token = Token(onInterrupted: onInterrupted, onCategoryEscalated: onCategoryEscalated)
let reconfigured: [Token.CallbackTicket] = try await withCheckedThrowingContinuation { continuation in
queue.async {
do {
continuation.resume(returning: try self.activateOnQueue(use, registering: token))
} catch {
continuation.resume(throwing: error)
}
}
}
// Escalating playback -> playAndRecord reconfigures the hardware
// route; engines started against the old configuration must restart.
if !reconfigured.isEmpty {
SecureLogger.info("AudioSession: category escalated to playAndRecord with \(reconfigured.count) live holder(s)", category: .session)
await deliver(reconfigured)
}
if let beforeAcquireHandoff = testingHooks.beforeAcquireHandoff {
await beforeAcquireHandoff()
}
guard token.completeHandoff() else {
// A call/Siri interruption or route loss landed after registration
// but before ownership handoff. Remove the provisional holder and
// fail instead of starting a client engine after the stop event.
release(token)
throw CancellationError()
}
return token
}
/// Drops one holder. Deactivates the session (notifying other apps) only
/// when the last holder releases. Safe to call more than once, from any
/// thread (including `deinit` paths): the work is fire-and-forget onto
/// the session queue, so the blocking deactivation IPC never runs on the
/// caller.
func release(_ token: Token) {
guard token.markReleased() else { return }
queue.async {
self.releaseOnQueue(token)
}
}
// MARK: - Queue-confined core
/// Returns callback tickets for pre-existing live holders whose engines
/// must restart because this acquire escalated the category.
private func activateOnQueue(_ use: Use, registering token: Token) throws -> [Token.CallbackTicket] {
let target: Category = (use == .capture || currentCategory == .playAndRecord) ? .playAndRecord : .playback
let categoryChanged = target != currentCategory
let previousCategory = currentCategory
if categoryChanged {
try session.setCategory(target)
currentCategory = target
}
if !sessionActive {
do {
try session.setActive(true, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: false)
} catch {
// Activation failed (e.g. a phone call owns the hardware):
// with no holder registered, an escalated category recorded
// here would stick and pin later playback-only acquires to
// .playAndRecord. Existing holders keep the category the
// hardware really has.
if categoryChanged, holders.isEmpty {
currentCategory = previousCategory
}
throw error
}
sessionActive = true
}
let reconfigured = categoryChanged
? holders.values.compactMap { $0.record(.categoryEscalated) }
: []
holders[ObjectIdentifier(token)] = token
return reconfigured
}
private func releaseOnQueue(_ token: Token) {
guard holders.removeValue(forKey: ObjectIdentifier(token)) != nil else { return }
guard holders.isEmpty else { return }
currentCategory = nil
guard sessionActive else { return }
sessionActive = false
do {
try session.setActive(false, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: true)
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("AudioSession: deactivation failed: \(error)", category: .session)
}
}
private func onQueue<T: Sendable>(_ body: @escaping @Sendable () -> T) async -> T {
await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
queue.async {
continuation.resume(returning: body())
}
}
}
@MainActor
private func deliver(_ tickets: [Token.CallbackTicket]) async {
guard !tickets.isEmpty else { return }
if let beforeCallbackDelivery = testingHooks.beforeCallbackDelivery {
await beforeCallbackDelivery()
}
for ticket in tickets {
ticket.token.deliver(ticket)
}
}
// MARK: - System events (internal so tests can drive them directly)
/// A system interruption began: the session is already deactivated by the
/// OS, so just mark it inactive and tell every ready holder (on the main
/// actor) to stop. A provisional acquiring holder is invalidated instead.
/// No auto-resume the next acquire re-activates.
func handleInterruptionBegan() async {
let tickets = await onQueue { () -> [Token.CallbackTicket] in
self.sessionActive = false
return self.holders.values.compactMap { $0.record(.interrupted) }
}
await deliver(tickets)
}
/// The active route's input/output device disappeared (e.g. BT headset
/// off): ready holders' engines are wedged against a dead route stop
/// them; invalidate a holder whose acquire has not returned yet.
func handleRouteDeviceUnavailable() async {
let tickets = await onQueue {
self.holders.values.compactMap { $0.record(.interrupted) }
}
await deliver(tickets)
}
/// Test hook: suspends until every session operation enqueued before this
/// call including fire-and-forget `release`s has completed.
func drain() async {
await onQueue {}
}
private func observeSystemNotifications() {
#if os(iOS)
let center = NotificationCenter.default
observers.append(center.addObserver(
forName: AVAudioSession.interruptionNotification,
object: AVAudioSession.sharedInstance(),
queue: .main
) { [weak self] note in
guard let raw = note.userInfo?[AVAudioSessionInterruptionTypeKey] as? UInt,
AVAudioSession.InterruptionType(rawValue: raw) == .began,
let self
else { return }
SecureLogger.info("AudioSession: interruption began", category: .session)
Task { await self.handleInterruptionBegan() }
})
observers.append(center.addObserver(
forName: AVAudioSession.routeChangeNotification,
object: AVAudioSession.sharedInstance(),
queue: .main
) { [weak self] note in
guard let raw = note.userInfo?[AVAudioSessionRouteChangeReasonKey] as? UInt,
AVAudioSession.RouteChangeReason(rawValue: raw) == .oldDeviceUnavailable,
let self
else { return }
SecureLogger.info("AudioSession: route device became unavailable", category: .session)
Task { await self.handleRouteDeviceUnavailable() }
})
#endif
}
}
// MARK: - Production adapter
#if os(iOS)
private struct SystemAudioSession: SessionApplying {
func setCategory(_ category: AudioSessionCoordinator.Category) throws {
let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
switch category {
case .playback:
try session.setCategory(.playback, mode: .spokenAudio, options: [.mixWithOthers])
case .playAndRecord:
// allowBluetoothHFP is not available on iOS Simulator
#if targetEnvironment(simulator)
try session.setCategory(
.playAndRecord,
mode: .default,
options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP, .mixWithOthers]
)
#else
try session.setCategory(
.playAndRecord,
mode: .default,
options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP, .allowBluetoothHFP, .mixWithOthers]
)
#endif
}
}
func setActive(_ active: Bool, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: Bool) throws {
try AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().setActive(
active,
options: notifyOthersOnDeactivation ? [.notifyOthersOnDeactivation] : []
)
}
}
#else
/// macOS has no app-level audio session; the coordinator still runs its
/// bookkeeping so client code is identical across platforms.
private struct SystemAudioSession: SessionApplying {
func setCategory(_ category: AudioSessionCoordinator.Category) throws {}
func setActive(_ active: Bool, notifyOthersOnDeactivation: Bool) throws {}
}
#endif
-175
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@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
//
// PTTAudioCodec.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import AVFoundation
import BitLogger
import Foundation
/// Streaming PCM -> AAC-LC encoder for live voice. Stateful (the AAC encoder
/// carries a bit reservoir across frames); one instance per burst.
/// Not thread-safe confine to one queue.
final class PTTFrameEncoder {
private let converter: AVAudioConverter
private var pendingInput: [AVAudioPCMBuffer] = []
init?() {
guard let pcm = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat,
let aac = PTTAudioFormat.aacFormat,
let converter = AVAudioConverter(from: pcm, to: aac)
else { return nil }
converter.bitRate = PTTAudioFormat.bitRate
self.converter = converter
}
/// Feeds PCM (16 kHz mono float) and returns every complete AAC frame the
/// encoder produced. Frames come out ~130 bytes each at 16 kbps.
func encode(_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer) -> [Data] {
pendingInput.append(buffer)
return drainConverter()
}
private func drainConverter() -> [Data] {
var frames: [Data] = []
while true {
let output = AVAudioCompressedBuffer(
format: converter.outputFormat,
packetCapacity: 8,
maximumPacketSize: max(converter.maximumOutputPacketSize, 1)
)
var error: NSError?
let status = converter.convert(to: output, error: &error) { [weak self] _, outStatus in
guard let self, let next = self.pendingInput.first else {
outStatus.pointee = .noDataNow
return nil
}
self.pendingInput.removeFirst()
outStatus.pointee = .haveData
return next
}
if status == .error {
SecureLogger.error("PTT encode failed: \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "unknown")", category: .session)
return frames
}
frames.append(contentsOf: Self.extractPackets(from: output))
// .haveData means the output buffer filled and more may be ready;
// anything else means the converter wants more input.
if status != .haveData { return frames }
}
}
private static func extractPackets(from buffer: AVAudioCompressedBuffer) -> [Data] {
guard buffer.packetCount > 0, let descriptions = buffer.packetDescriptions else { return [] }
var frames: [Data] = []
frames.reserveCapacity(Int(buffer.packetCount))
for index in 0..<Int(buffer.packetCount) {
let description = descriptions[index]
guard description.mDataByteSize > 0 else { continue }
let start = buffer.data.advanced(by: Int(description.mStartOffset))
frames.append(Data(bytes: start, count: Int(description.mDataByteSize)))
}
return frames
}
}
/// Streaming AAC-LC -> PCM decoder for live voice. Stateful; one instance per
/// inbound burst. Not thread-safe confine to one queue/actor.
final class PTTFrameDecoder {
private let converter: AVAudioConverter
private let pcmFormat: AVAudioFormat
private let aacFormat: AVAudioFormat
init?() {
guard let pcm = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat,
let aac = PTTAudioFormat.aacFormat,
let converter = AVAudioConverter(from: aac, to: pcm)
else { return nil }
self.converter = converter
self.pcmFormat = pcm
self.aacFormat = aac
}
/// Decodes one raw AAC frame to PCM. Returns nil for malformed input or
/// while the decoder is still priming (the first frame of a stream).
func decode(_ frame: Data) -> AVAudioPCMBuffer? {
guard !frame.isEmpty, frame.count <= 8 * 1024 else { return nil }
let input = AVAudioCompressedBuffer(format: aacFormat, packetCapacity: 1, maximumPacketSize: frame.count)
frame.withUnsafeBytes { raw in
guard let base = raw.baseAddress else { return }
input.data.copyMemory(from: base, byteCount: frame.count)
}
input.byteLength = UInt32(frame.count)
input.packetCount = 1
input.packetDescriptions?.pointee = AudioStreamPacketDescription(
mStartOffset: 0,
mVariableFramesInPacket: 0,
mDataByteSize: UInt32(frame.count)
)
guard let output = AVAudioPCMBuffer(
pcmFormat: pcmFormat,
frameCapacity: PTTAudioFormat.samplesPerFrame * 2
) else { return nil }
var consumed = false
var error: NSError?
let status = converter.convert(to: output, error: &error) { _, outStatus in
if consumed {
outStatus.pointee = .noDataNow
return nil
}
consumed = true
outStatus.pointee = .haveData
return input
}
guard status != .error else {
SecureLogger.debug("PTT decode failed: \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "unknown")", category: .session)
return nil
}
return output.frameLength > 0 ? output : nil
}
}
/// Sample-rate/channel converter from the microphone's native format to the
/// 16 kHz mono processing format. Stateful; not thread-safe.
final class PTTInputResampler {
private let converter: AVAudioConverter
private let outputFormat: AVAudioFormat
private let ratio: Double
init?(inputFormat: AVAudioFormat) {
guard let pcm = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat,
let converter = AVAudioConverter(from: inputFormat, to: pcm)
else { return nil }
self.converter = converter
self.outputFormat = pcm
self.ratio = PTTAudioFormat.sampleRate / inputFormat.sampleRate
}
func resample(_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer) -> AVAudioPCMBuffer? {
let capacity = AVAudioFrameCount(Double(buffer.frameLength) * ratio) + 64
guard let output = AVAudioPCMBuffer(pcmFormat: outputFormat, frameCapacity: capacity) else { return nil }
var consumed = false
var error: NSError?
let status = converter.convert(to: output, error: &error) { _, outStatus in
if consumed {
outStatus.pointee = .noDataNow
return nil
}
consumed = true
outStatus.pointee = .haveData
return buffer
}
guard status != .error else {
SecureLogger.debug("PTT resample failed: \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "unknown")", category: .session)
return nil
}
return output.frameLength > 0 ? output : nil
}
}
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
//
// PTTAudioFormat.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import AVFoundation
import Foundation
/// Shared audio parameters for live push-to-talk: AAC-LC, 16 kHz, mono,
/// ~16 kbps deliberately identical to `VoiceRecorder`'s voice-note settings
/// so a burst's finalized `.m4a` and its live frames sound the same.
enum PTTAudioFormat {
static let sampleRate: Double = 16_000
static let channelCount: AVAudioChannelCount = 1
static let bitRate = 16_000
/// AAC-LC frame size is fixed by the codec: 1024 samples = 64 ms at 16 kHz.
static let samplesPerFrame: AVAudioFrameCount = 1024
static var frameDuration: TimeInterval { Double(samplesPerFrame) / sampleRate }
/// Uncompressed processing format (deinterleaved float PCM).
static var pcmFormat: AVAudioFormat? {
AVAudioFormat(standardFormatWithSampleRate: sampleRate, channels: channelCount)
}
/// Compressed wire format.
static var aacFormat: AVAudioFormat? {
var description = AudioStreamBasicDescription(
mSampleRate: sampleRate,
mFormatID: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
mFormatFlags: 0,
mBytesPerPacket: 0,
mFramesPerPacket: samplesPerFrame,
mBytesPerFrame: 0,
mChannelsPerFrame: channelCount,
mBitsPerChannel: 0,
mReserved: 0
)
return AVAudioFormat(streamDescription: &description)
}
/// Voice-note container settings for the finalized `.m4a`, mirroring
/// `VoiceRecorder.startRecording()`.
static var voiceNoteFileSettings: [String: Any] {
[
AVFormatIDKey: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
AVSampleRateKey: sampleRate,
AVNumberOfChannelsKey: Int(channelCount),
AVEncoderBitRateKey: bitRate
]
}
}
/// Builds ADTS-framed AAC so a receiver can persist a burst progressively:
/// unlike `.m4a` (whose moov atom only exists after close), an ADTS `.aac`
/// stream is playable at any prefix a partially received burst is still a
/// replayable voice note.
enum ADTSFramer {
private static let headerSize = 7
/// MPEG-4 sampling frequency index for 16 kHz.
private static let samplingFrequencyIndex: UInt8 = 8
private static let channelConfiguration: UInt8 = 1
/// Wraps one raw AAC-LC frame in an ADTS header.
static func frame(_ aacFrame: Data) -> Data {
let frameLength = aacFrame.count + headerSize
var data = Data(capacity: frameLength)
// Syncword 0xFFF, MPEG-4, layer 00, no CRC.
data.append(0xFF)
data.append(0xF1)
// Profile AAC-LC (audio object type 2 -> bits 01), frequency index,
// private bit 0, channel config high bit.
data.append((0b01 << 6) | (samplingFrequencyIndex << 2) | ((channelConfiguration >> 2) & 0x1))
data.append(((channelConfiguration & 0x3) << 6) | UInt8((frameLength >> 11) & 0x3))
data.append(UInt8((frameLength >> 3) & 0xFF))
data.append(UInt8((frameLength & 0x7) << 5) | 0x1F)
// Buffer fullness 0x7FF (VBR), one AAC frame per ADTS frame.
data.append(0xFC)
data.append(aacFrame)
return data
}
}
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//
// PTTBurstPlayer.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
@preconcurrency import AVFoundation
import BitLogger
import Foundation
/// The engine operations behind live-burst playback, abstracted so the
/// player's lifecycle (jitter start, category-escalation restart, stop) is
/// unit-testable without real audio hardware.
@MainActor
protocol PTTPlaybackEngine: AnyObject {
/// The object `AVAudioEngineConfigurationChange` notifications are posted
/// for (nil for mocks no observer is registered).
var configChangeObject: AnyObject? { get }
func start() throws
func play()
func stop()
func schedule(
_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer,
completionType: PTTPlaybackCompletionType,
completionHandler: @escaping @Sendable (PTTPlaybackCompletionEvent) -> Void
)
}
/// The lifecycle point requested from `AVAudioPlayerNode` for a scheduled
/// buffer. `dataConsumed` only means the node no longer needs the bytes; it
/// may arrive before the render pipeline has made the audio audible.
enum PTTPlaybackCompletionType: Equatable, Sendable {
case dataConsumed
case dataPlayedBack
}
enum PTTPlaybackCompletionEvent: Equatable, Sendable {
case dataConsumed
case dataPlayedBack
/// AVAudioPlayerNode invokes the requested callback when the node is
/// stopped too. That is not audible completion and must remain replayable.
case playbackStopped
}
/// One `AVAudioEngine` + `AVAudioPlayerNode` pair. Created fresh per (re)start:
/// an engine instantiated against an earlier audio-session configuration keeps
/// rendering to the stale route (same class of failure as the capture side's
/// fresh-engine-per-press rule).
@MainActor
private final class SystemPTTPlaybackEngine: PTTPlaybackEngine {
private let engine = AVAudioEngine()
private let node = AVAudioPlayerNode()
init(format: AVAudioFormat) {
engine.attach(node)
engine.connect(node, to: engine.mainMixerNode, format: format)
}
var configChangeObject: AnyObject? { engine }
func start() throws {
engine.prepare()
try engine.start()
}
func play() {
node.play()
}
func stop() {
node.stop()
engine.stop()
}
func schedule(
_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer,
completionType: PTTPlaybackCompletionType,
completionHandler: @escaping @Sendable (PTTPlaybackCompletionEvent) -> Void
) {
let callbackType: AVAudioPlayerNodeCompletionCallbackType = switch completionType {
case .dataConsumed: .dataConsumed
case .dataPlayedBack: .dataPlayedBack
}
let scheduledEngine = engine
node.scheduleBuffer(buffer, completionCallbackType: callbackType) { [weak scheduledEngine] callbackType in
// The API invokes this callback when the player is stopped as
// well. A configuration change can stop the engine before its
// notification reaches MainActor, so do not misclassify that
// flushed tail as audible playback.
guard scheduledEngine?.isRunning == true else {
completionHandler(.playbackStopped)
return
}
switch callbackType {
case .dataConsumed:
completionHandler(.dataConsumed)
case .dataRendered:
completionHandler(.dataConsumed)
case .dataPlayedBack:
completionHandler(.dataPlayedBack)
@unknown default:
completionHandler(.playbackStopped)
}
}
}
}
/// Completion callbacks arrive off the main actor, while engine rebuilds are
/// serialized on it. This small lock-backed latch lets a rebuild atomically
/// claim only buffers whose completion has not already fired even when the
/// callback's hop back to the main actor is still queued.
private final class PTTPlaybackCompletionState: @unchecked Sendable {
private enum State {
case scheduled
case completed
case retired
}
private let lock = NSLock()
private var state: State = .scheduled
/// Returns true exactly once when playback completion wins the race with
/// an engine rebuild or stop.
func complete() -> Bool {
lock.withLock {
guard case .scheduled = state else { return false }
state = .completed
return true
}
}
/// Returns true exactly once when a rebuild or stop claims this
/// still-pending schedule. Later callbacks from that engine are stale.
func retireIfPending() -> Bool {
lock.withLock {
guard case .scheduled = state else { return false }
state = .retired
return true
}
}
}
/// Plays one inbound live voice burst with a small jitter buffer.
///
/// Frames are decoded and scheduled back-to-back on an `AVAudioPlayerNode`;
/// an underrun (missing/late packets) simply pauses output until the next
/// buffer arrives, which self-heals timing without explicit silence
/// insertion. Playback starts once `TransportConfig.pttJitterBufferSeconds`
/// of audio is queued or `pttJitterDeadlineSeconds` has elapsed.
///
/// Talk-over is bidirectional: when push-to-talk capture starts while this
/// burst plays, the session category escalates underneath the engine the
/// player rebuilds a fresh engine against the new configuration and keeps
/// streaming instead of dying. Real interruptions (phone call, route device
/// gone) still stop it; the burst keeps assembling to file either way.
@MainActor
final class PTTBurstPlayer {
/// Restart-on-reconfigure ceiling: a burst is at most ~2 minutes, so a
/// handful of category/route changes is plenty beyond it something is
/// thrashing and stopping cleanly beats an engine-rebuild loop.
private static let maxEngineRestarts = 8
private let makeEngine: @MainActor () -> PTTPlaybackEngine
private var engine: PTTPlaybackEngine
private let decoder: PTTFrameDecoder
private let coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator
/// Injectable so tests don't fight over the app-wide exclusive-playback
/// slot (a parallel test's `play()` would stop this player mid-test).
private let exclusivity: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator
private var queuedBuffers: [AVAudioPCMBuffer] = []
private var queuedDuration: TimeInterval = 0
private struct ScheduledBuffer {
let id: UInt64
let buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer
let completionState: PTTPlaybackCompletionState
}
/// Buffers handed to the current engine whose completion has not yet
/// been processed on the main actor. Keeping the buffers themselves lets
/// a category-escalation rebuild replay the unfinished tail in order.
private var scheduledBuffers: [ScheduledBuffer] = []
private var nextScheduledBufferID: UInt64 = 0
/// Bumped on every engine rebuild or stop so completion tasks from a
/// torn-down engine cannot mutate the current generation's pending list.
private var engineGeneration = 0
private var engineRestarts = 0
private var engineStarted = false
private var finished = false
/// Latched off (internal read so tests can await the async failure path).
private(set) var stopped = false
/// A session acquire is in flight (it suspends off-main for the blocking
/// session IPC); gates `startIfReady` against double acquisition.
private var acquiringSession = false
private var deadlineTask: Task<Void, Never>?
private var sessionToken: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
/// Reserved before the session acquire suspends. Activation succeeds only
/// if no newer playback request claimed the floor in the meantime.
private var playbackReservation: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.Reservation?
private var configChangeObserver: NSObjectProtocol?
private(set) var isPlaying = false
/// Fires exactly once when the player stops for good (drain-out, cancel,
/// interruption, failure). `ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator` uses it to unpark
/// the draining player it keeps alive after the assembly the player's
/// only long-lived owner is discarded on burst END.
var onStopped: (() -> Void)?
init?(
coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator? = nil,
exclusivity: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator? = nil,
makeEngine: (@MainActor () -> PTTPlaybackEngine)? = nil
) {
guard let format = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat, let decoder = PTTFrameDecoder() else { return nil }
self.decoder = decoder
self.coordinator = coordinator ?? .shared
self.exclusivity = exclusivity ?? .shared
let factory = makeEngine ?? { SystemPTTPlaybackEngine(format: format) }
self.makeEngine = factory
self.engine = factory()
deadlineTask = Task { [weak self] in
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(TransportConfig.pttJitterDeadlineSeconds * 1_000_000_000))
self?.startIfReady(force: true)
}
}
deinit {
// Backstop for an owner dropping the player before it stopped: the
// session coordinator retains registered tokens strongly, so a token
// leaked here would keep the session active (and pin any escalated
// category) for the app's lifetime. `release` is fire-and-forget
// onto the coordinator's queue, so it is deinit-safe.
if let token = sessionToken {
coordinator.release(token)
}
if let observer = configChangeObserver {
NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
}
deadlineTask?.cancel()
}
/// Decodes and queues frames (in burst order). Starts playback when the
/// jitter buffer fills.
func enqueue(_ frames: [Data]) {
guard !stopped else { return }
for frame in frames {
guard let pcm = decoder.decode(frame) else { continue }
if engineStarted {
schedule(pcm)
} else {
queuedBuffers.append(pcm)
queuedDuration += Double(pcm.frameLength) / PTTAudioFormat.sampleRate
}
}
startIfReady(force: false)
}
/// The burst ended: stop once everything scheduled has played out.
func finishAfterDrain() {
finished = true
// The complete burst is queued no jitter left to wait for. This
// also matters when END lands while the async session acquire is
// still in flight: the queued audio must play out, not be treated
// as already drained.
startIfReady(force: true)
stopIfDrained()
}
/// Immediate stop (cancel, another playback taking over, interruption,
/// teardown).
func stop() {
guard !stopped else { return }
stopped = true
deadlineTask?.cancel()
removeConfigObserver()
queuedBuffers = []
retireScheduledBuffers()
if engineStarted {
engine.stop()
}
isPlaying = false
releaseSessionToken()
exclusivity.deactivate(self)
onStopped?()
}
private func startIfReady(force: Bool) {
guard !engineStarted, !acquiringSession, !stopped, !queuedBuffers.isEmpty else { return }
guard force || queuedDuration >= TransportConfig.pttJitterBufferSeconds else { return }
// Acquiring the session suspends for its blocking IPC (off the main
// actor); frames arriving meanwhile keep queueing and are flushed
// onto the engine once it starts.
acquiringSession = true
playbackReservation = exclusivity.reserve(self)
Task { [weak self] in
await self?.acquireSessionAndStart()
}
}
private func acquireSessionAndStart() async {
let token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token
do {
token = try await coordinator.acquire(
.playback,
onInterrupted: { [weak self] in self?.stop() },
onCategoryEscalated: { [weak self] in self?.restartEngine() }
)
} catch {
acquiringSession = false
SecureLogger.error("PTT playback session activation failed: \(error)", category: .session)
// Playing unregistered would leave the engine exposed: another
// holder's last release deactivates the session mid-play, and no
// interruption/escalation fan-out ever reaches us. Bail like the
// engine-start failure below; the burst still assembles to file.
// (stop() also fires onStopped so a parked draining player is
// unparked instead of leaking.)
stop()
return
}
acquiringSession = false
// stop() (cancel, exclusivity, teardown) may have landed while the
// session was activating: hand the token straight back.
guard !stopped else {
coordinator.release(token)
return
}
sessionToken = token
guard let playbackReservation,
exclusivity.isCurrent(playbackReservation, for: self)
else {
// The request was superseded while audio-session activation was
// suspended. Do not even start the retired engine.
stop()
return
}
// Observe reconfiguration before starting so nothing lands between.
registerConfigObserver()
do {
try engine.start()
} catch {
// A capture racing this start can reconfigure the session while
// the engine spins up (its escalation fan-out no-ops on a player
// that never started): rebuild once against the settled
// configuration counted against the restart cap before
// giving up.
SecureLogger.warning("PTT playback engine failed to start (\(error)) — rebuilding once", category: .session)
removeConfigObserver()
engineRestarts += 1
engine = makeEngine()
registerConfigObserver()
do {
try engine.start()
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("PTT playback engine failed to start: \(error)", category: .session)
// stop() removes the observer, hands the token back, and
// fires onStopped for any parked draining owner.
stop()
return
}
}
engineStarted = true
guard exclusivity.activate(self, reservation: playbackReservation)
else {
// A newer user-initiated playback reserved the floor while this
// older PTT request was suspended in audio-session activation.
// Never let the late completion steal playback back.
stop()
return
}
isPlaying = true
engine.play()
let buffered = queuedBuffers
queuedBuffers = []
queuedDuration = 0
for buffer in buffered {
schedule(buffer)
}
}
/// The audio session was reconfigured underneath the running engine
/// (category escalation for talk-over, or an engine configuration
/// change): rebuild a fresh engine against the new configuration and
/// keep streaming. Buffers already completed stay completed; the
/// unfinished scheduled tail is replayed in order on the fresh engine,
/// and frames still arriving continue scheduling after it.
private func restartEngine() {
guard engineStarted, !stopped else { return }
engineRestarts += 1
guard engineRestarts <= Self.maxEngineRestarts else {
SecureLogger.warning("PTT playback: engine reconfigured \(engineRestarts) times in one burst — stopping", category: .session)
stop()
return
}
removeConfigObserver()
// Claim the unfinished tail before stopping the old engine. Stopping
// a player node may itself invoke its completion handlers; retiring
// the claimed entries first makes those callbacks unambiguously stale.
// A completion that fired just before this rebuild wins the latch and
// is excluded even if its MainActor task has not run yet.
let buffersToReplay = scheduledBuffers.compactMap { scheduled in
scheduled.completionState.retireIfPending() ? scheduled.buffer : nil
}
scheduledBuffers = []
engineGeneration += 1
engine.stop()
engine = makeEngine()
registerConfigObserver()
do {
try engine.start()
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("PTT playback engine failed to restart after session reconfigure: \(error)", category: .session)
stop()
return
}
engine.play()
for buffer in buffersToReplay {
schedule(buffer)
}
SecureLogger.info("PTT playback: engine restarted after session reconfigure", category: .session)
// If every old buffer completed before the rebuild, a finished burst
// can stop now. Otherwise the replayed tail keeps it alive until its
// new-generation completions arrive.
stopIfDrained()
}
private func registerConfigObserver() {
guard let object = engine.configChangeObject else { return }
configChangeObserver = NotificationCenter.default.addObserver(
forName: .AVAudioEngineConfigurationChange,
object: object,
queue: .main
) { [weak self] _ in
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
self?.restartEngine()
}
}
}
private func removeConfigObserver() {
if let observer = configChangeObserver {
NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
configChangeObserver = nil
}
}
private func schedule(_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer) {
let id = nextScheduledBufferID
nextScheduledBufferID &+= 1
let completionState = PTTPlaybackCompletionState()
scheduledBuffers.append(ScheduledBuffer(
id: id,
buffer: buffer,
completionState: completionState
))
let generation = engineGeneration
engine.schedule(buffer, completionType: .dataPlayedBack) { [weak self, completionState] event in
guard event == .dataPlayedBack else { return }
// Mark completion before hopping to MainActor. A rebuild can then
// distinguish already-completed audio from an unfinished tail
// even when this task has not run yet.
guard completionState.complete() else { return }
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
guard let self, self.engineGeneration == generation else { return }
self.scheduledBuffers.removeAll { $0.id == id }
self.stopIfDrained()
}
}
}
private func retireScheduledBuffers() {
engineGeneration += 1
for scheduled in scheduledBuffers {
_ = scheduled.completionState.retireIfPending()
}
scheduledBuffers = []
}
private func stopIfDrained() {
guard finished, scheduledBuffers.isEmpty else { return }
// Started: everything scheduled has played out. Never started with
// nothing queued or in flight (e.g. no decodable frames): nothing
// will ever play. Otherwise the engine start is still pending (the
// async session acquire) and the queued audio must play out first.
guard engineStarted || (!acquiringSession && queuedBuffers.isEmpty) else { return }
stop()
}
private func releaseSessionToken() {
sessionToken.map(coordinator.release)
sessionToken = nil
}
}
extension PTTBurstPlayer: ExclusivePlayback {
/// A live stream can't meaningfully pause; yielding the floor stops it.
/// The burst keeps assembling to file, so nothing is lost.
nonisolated func pauseForExclusivity() {
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
self?.stop()
}
}
}
@@ -1,326 +0,0 @@
//
// PTTCaptureEngine.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import AVFoundation
import BitLogger
import Foundation
/// Owns one capture token and returns it even when the capture engine's owner
/// disappears without reaching its normal stop/cancel path. The coordinator
/// retains registered tokens strongly, so relying on `Token.deinit` cannot
/// reclaim an abandoned hold.
final class PTTCaptureSessionLease: @unchecked Sendable {
private let coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator
private let lock = NSLock()
private var token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
init(coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator) {
self.coordinator = coordinator
}
func install(_ token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token) {
let previous = lock.withLock {
let previous = self.token
self.token = token
return previous
}
previous.map(coordinator.release)
}
func release() {
let token = lock.withLock {
let token = self.token
self.token = nil
return token
}
token.map(coordinator.release)
}
deinit {
release()
}
}
/// Monotonic capture identity shared by main-actor lifecycle code and queued
/// engine callbacks. Removing a notification observer does not cancel a block
/// already enqueued on the main queue, so every callback must also prove it
/// still belongs to the current hold before mutating capture state.
final class PTTCaptureGeneration: @unchecked Sendable {
private let lock = NSLock()
private var value: UInt = 0
func begin() -> UInt {
lock.withLock {
value &+= 1
return value
}
}
func invalidate() {
lock.withLock { value &+= 1 }
}
func invalidate(ifCurrent generation: UInt) -> Bool {
lock.withLock {
guard value == generation else { return false }
value &+= 1
return true
}
}
func isCurrent(_ generation: UInt) -> Bool {
lock.withLock { value == generation }
}
}
/// Captures microphone audio for a live push-to-talk burst, producing both:
/// - live AAC frames via `onFrames` (called on the capture queue), and
/// - a finalized `.m4a` voice note on `stop()` the same artifact
/// `VoiceRecorder` produces, so the existing voice-note send pipeline
/// handles delivery to receivers that missed the live stream.
/// `@unchecked Sendable`: every mutable property is confined to one executor
/// the capture `queue` (resampler/encoder/file/counters) or the main actor
/// (`engine`, `engineStarted`, `sessionLease`, `configChangeObserver`) so
/// weak references may cross the `@Sendable` tap/notification closures, which
/// immediately hop back to the owning executor.
final class PTTCaptureEngine: @unchecked Sendable {
/// Hard cap matching `VoiceRecorder.maxRecordingDuration`: past it the
/// engine keeps running (the UI owns the gesture) but stops encoding.
private static let maxCaptureDuration: TimeInterval = 120
/// Recreated on every `start()`: an engine whose input unit was
/// instantiated against an earlier (playback-only or inactive) audio
/// session keeps reporting a dead 0 Hz / 2 ch input format and fails to
/// enable the mic (AURemoteIO -10851, observed on iPhone field tests).
private var engine = AVAudioEngine()
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.ptt.capture", qos: .userInitiated)
private let coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator
private let sessionLease: PTTCaptureSessionLease
private let captureGeneration = PTTCaptureGeneration()
// Capture-queue-confined state.
private var resampler: PTTInputResampler?
private var encoder: PTTFrameEncoder?
private var file: AVAudioFile?
private var fileURL: URL?
private var encodedFrameCount = 0
private var running = false
private var captureStart = Date()
/// Whether `engine.start()` succeeded for the current capture
/// (see `stopEngineIfStarted`).
@MainActor private var engineStarted = false
@MainActor private var configChangeObserver: NSObjectProtocol?
/// Called on the capture queue with each batch of encoded AAC frames.
var onFrames: (([Data]) -> Void)?
enum CaptureError: Error {
case inputUnavailable
case audioSetupFailed
}
init(coordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator = .shared) {
self.coordinator = coordinator
self.sessionLease = PTTCaptureSessionLease(coordinator: coordinator)
}
deinit {
sessionLease.release()
}
/// Async because acquiring the session hops its blocking IPC off the main
/// actor (a PTT press used to stall main >1 s in `setActive`); the engine
/// itself still starts back on main once the session is configured.
@MainActor
func start(outputURL: URL) async throws {
let generation = captureGeneration.begin()
let token = try await coordinator.acquire(.capture) { [weak self] in
self?.handleInterruption(for: generation)
}
// The hold ended (stop/cancel) while the session was activating:
// starting the engine now would leave a hot mic after release.
guard captureGeneration.isCurrent(generation) else {
coordinator.release(token)
throw CancellationError()
}
sessionLease.install(token)
do {
try beginCapture(outputURL: outputURL, generation: generation)
} catch {
releaseSessionToken()
throw error
}
}
@MainActor
private func beginCapture(outputURL: URL, generation: UInt) throws {
// Fresh engine per capture so its input unit binds to the session
// that is active *now* (see `engine` doc comment).
engine = AVAudioEngine()
let inputFormat = engine.inputNode.outputFormat(forBus: 0)
guard inputFormat.sampleRate > 0, inputFormat.channelCount > 0 else {
SecureLogger.error("PTT: capture input unavailable (input reports \(Int(inputFormat.sampleRate)) Hz, \(inputFormat.channelCount) ch)", category: .session)
throw CaptureError.inputUnavailable
}
guard let resampler = PTTInputResampler(inputFormat: inputFormat),
let encoder = PTTFrameEncoder(),
let pcmFormat = PTTAudioFormat.pcmFormat
else { throw CaptureError.audioSetupFailed }
let file = try AVAudioFile(
forWriting: outputURL,
settings: PTTAudioFormat.voiceNoteFileSettings,
commonFormat: pcmFormat.commonFormat,
interleaved: pcmFormat.isInterleaved
)
queue.sync {
self.resampler = resampler
self.encoder = encoder
self.file = file
self.fileURL = outputURL
self.encodedFrameCount = 0
self.captureStart = Date()
self.running = true
}
engine.inputNode.installTap(onBus: 0, bufferSize: 4096, format: inputFormat) { [weak self] buffer, _ in
self?.queue.async { self?.process(buffer, generation: generation) }
}
// Route/category changes reconfigure the engine underneath the tap;
// stop and finalize cleanly the .m4a captured so far still sends.
// Registered before start() so no reconfigure lands unobserved
// (handleInterruption also validates this capture generation).
configChangeObserver = NotificationCenter.default.addObserver(
forName: .AVAudioEngineConfigurationChange,
object: engine,
queue: .main
) { [weak self] _ in
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
self?.handleInterruption(for: generation)
}
}
engine.prepare()
do {
try engine.start()
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("PTT: capture engine failed to start (input: \(Int(inputFormat.sampleRate)) Hz, \(inputFormat.channelCount) ch): \(error)", category: .session)
if let observer = configChangeObserver {
NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
configChangeObserver = nil
}
engine.inputNode.removeTap(onBus: 0)
queue.sync { self.teardown(deleteFile: true) }
throw error
}
engineStarted = true
SecureLogger.info("PTT: capture engine running (input: \(Int(inputFormat.sampleRate)) Hz, \(inputFormat.channelCount) ch)", category: .session)
}
/// Stops capture and finalizes the `.m4a`. Returns the file URL and the
/// number of encoded AAC frames (each `PTTAudioFormat.frameDuration` long).
@MainActor
func stop() -> (url: URL?, encodedFrames: Int) {
captureGeneration.invalidate()
stopEngineIfStarted()
let result: (URL?, Int) = queue.sync {
let url = fileURL
let frames = encodedFrameCount
teardown(deleteFile: false)
return (url, frames)
}
releaseSessionToken()
return result
}
@MainActor
func cancel() {
captureGeneration.invalidate()
stopEngineIfStarted()
queue.sync { teardown(deleteFile: true) }
releaseSessionToken()
}
/// Audio session interrupted (call, Siri) or the engine was reconfigured
/// mid-capture: behave like `stop()` finalize the `.m4a` container but
/// keep `fileURL`/`encodedFrameCount` so the caller's pending `stop()`
/// still returns the note for delivery.
@MainActor
private func handleInterruption(for generation: UInt) {
// Also invalidate a start whose acquire has registered its token but
// has not returned to this actor yet. Without this bump the callback
// is lost while `engineStarted == false`, and the resumed start can
// open the mic after the stop signal.
guard captureGeneration.invalidate(ifCurrent: generation) else { return }
guard engineStarted else {
releaseSessionToken()
return
}
stopEngineIfStarted()
queue.sync {
running = false
// Releasing the AVAudioFile finalizes the .m4a container.
file = nil
encoder = nil
resampler = nil
}
releaseSessionToken()
SecureLogger.info("PTT: capture interrupted — burst finalized early", category: .session)
}
/// Touching `inputNode` on an engine that never started instantiates its
/// input unit against whatever session is active and spams AURemoteIO
/// errors a canceled-before-start hold must not touch the engine.
@MainActor
private func stopEngineIfStarted() {
if let observer = configChangeObserver {
NotificationCenter.default.removeObserver(observer)
configChangeObserver = nil
}
guard engineStarted else { return }
engineStarted = false
engine.inputNode.removeTap(onBus: 0)
engine.stop()
}
@MainActor
private func releaseSessionToken() {
sessionLease.release()
}
// MARK: - Capture queue
private func process(_ buffer: AVAudioPCMBuffer, generation: UInt) {
guard captureGeneration.isCurrent(generation),
running,
Date().timeIntervalSince(captureStart) < Self.maxCaptureDuration,
let resampled = resampler?.resample(buffer)
else { return }
do {
try file?.write(from: resampled)
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("PTT capture file write failed: \(error)", category: .session)
}
guard let frames = encoder?.encode(resampled), !frames.isEmpty else { return }
encodedFrameCount += frames.count
onFrames?(frames)
}
private func teardown(deleteFile: Bool) {
running = false
// Releasing the AVAudioFile finalizes the .m4a container.
file = nil
encoder = nil
resampler = nil
if deleteFile, let url = fileURL {
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url)
}
fileURL = nil
}
}
-39
View File
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
//
// PTTSettings.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
#if os(iOS)
import UIKit
#elseif os(macOS)
import AppKit
#endif
/// User preference for live push-to-talk voice. One switch controls both
/// directions: streaming your holds live, and auto-playing inbound bursts.
/// Off means voice messages behave exactly like classic voice notes.
enum PTTSettings {
private static let liveVoiceEnabledKey = "ptt.liveVoiceEnabled"
static var liveVoiceEnabled: Bool {
get { UserDefaults.standard.object(forKey: liveVoiceEnabledKey) as? Bool ?? true }
set { UserDefaults.standard.set(newValue, forKey: liveVoiceEnabledKey) }
}
/// Autoplay is foreground-only: audio must never start from the
/// background.
@MainActor
static var isAppActive: Bool {
#if os(iOS)
return UIApplication.shared.applicationState == .active
#elseif os(macOS)
return NSApplication.shared.isActive
#else
return true
#endif
}
}
@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
//
// VoiceCaptureSession.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitFoundation
import BitLogger
import Foundation
/// Capture backend behind the composer's hold-to-record gesture.
/// `VoiceRecordingViewModel` drives one session per press; the concrete type
/// decides *how* audio leaves the device: `VoiceNoteCaptureSession` records a
/// note delivered on release (today's behavior), `PTTLiveVoiceSession`
/// additionally streams frames live while the button is held.
@MainActor
protocol VoiceCaptureSession: AnyObject {
/// Whether audio is leaving the device in real time while recording
/// drives the composer's LIVE treatment.
var isLive: Bool { get }
func requestPermission() async -> Bool
func start() async throws
/// Stops capture and returns the finalized voice-note file, or nil when
/// nothing valid was captured.
func finish() async -> URL?
func cancel() async
}
/// The classic record-then-send backend, wrapping the shared `VoiceRecorder`.
@MainActor
final class VoiceNoteCaptureSession: VoiceCaptureSession {
private let recorder: VoiceRecorder
private let owner = VoiceRecorder.RecordingOwner()
var isLive: Bool { false }
init(recorder: VoiceRecorder = .shared) {
self.recorder = recorder
}
func requestPermission() async -> Bool {
await recorder.requestPermission()
}
func start() async throws {
try await recorder.startRecording(owner: owner)
}
func finish() async -> URL? {
await recorder.stopRecording(owner: owner)
}
func cancel() async {
await recorder.cancelRecording(owner: owner)
}
}
/// Testable surface of the live capture engine. Production uses
/// `PTTCaptureEngine`; tests can supply captured-frame counts without opening
/// real audio hardware.
@MainActor
protocol PTTCapturing: AnyObject {
var onFrames: (([Data]) -> Void)? { get set }
func start(outputURL: URL) async throws
func stop() -> (url: URL?, encodedFrames: Int)
func cancel()
}
extension PTTCaptureEngine: PTTCapturing {}
/// Live push-to-talk backend: streams `VoiceBurstPacket`s to one peer while
/// recording, then finalizes the same audio as a standard voice note whose
/// file name carries the burst ID (`voice_<burstID>.m4a`) so receivers that
/// heard the live stream absorb the note silently instead of seeing a
/// duplicate.
@MainActor
final class PTTLiveVoiceSession: VoiceCaptureSession {
let burstID: Data
private let sendPacket: (Data) -> Void
private let capture: any PTTCapturing
private let now: () -> Date
/// Capture-queue-confined stream state: packetizes frames and lazily
/// emits START so packet order is guaranteed by queue serialization.
private final class StreamState {
var packetizer: VoiceBurstPacketizer
var sentStart = false
init(burstID: Data) {
packetizer = VoiceBurstPacketizer(burstID: burstID)
}
}
private let stream: StreamState
private var startDate: Date?
private var completed = false
var isLive: Bool { true }
/// - Parameter sendPacket: delivers one encoded `VoiceBurstPacket` to the
/// target peer; must be safe to call from any queue (BLEService hops to
/// its own message queue internally).
init(
sendPacket: @escaping (Data) -> Void,
capture: (any PTTCapturing)? = nil,
now: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init,
burstID: Data? = nil
) {
self.burstID = burstID ?? VoiceBurstPacket.makeBurstID()
self.sendPacket = sendPacket
self.capture = capture ?? PTTCaptureEngine()
self.now = now
self.stream = StreamState(burstID: self.burstID)
}
func requestPermission() async -> Bool {
await VoiceRecorder.shared.requestPermission()
}
func start() async throws {
let outputURL = try Self.makeOutputURL(burstID: burstID)
let sendPacket = sendPacket
let stream = stream
capture.onFrames = { frames in
if !stream.sentStart {
stream.sentStart = true
if let start = VoiceBurstPacket(
burstID: stream.packetizer.burstID,
seq: 0,
kind: .start(codec: .aacLC16kMono)
) {
sendPacket(start.encode())
}
}
for frame in frames {
for packet in stream.packetizer.add(frame) {
sendPacket(packet)
}
}
// Flush per callback batch: at ~130-byte frames the budget fits
// one frame per packet anyway, and holding residue would add
// ~100 ms of avoidable latency.
for packet in stream.packetizer.flush() {
sendPacket(packet)
}
}
do {
try await capture.start(outputURL: outputURL)
} catch is CancellationError {
// The hold was released/canceled while the session acquire was
// in flight: the engine never started and the capture already
// handed its token back nothing to retry. A coordinator-side
// interruption during handoff also cancels acquire, but that is
// not a successful start and must propagate to the view model.
guard completed else { throw CancellationError() }
return
} catch {
// The HAL can briefly report a dead input right after the audio
// session (re)activates while the route settles; one retry after
// a short pause covers it (observed on iPhone field tests).
SecureLogger.warning("PTT: capture start failed (\(error)) — retrying once after route settle", category: .session)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 150_000_000)
// The hold may have been released/canceled during the retry pause.
// Starting the mic now would leave it live and streaming after the
// user let go, so bail instead of opening a hot mic.
guard !completed else {
capture.cancel()
return
}
try await capture.start(outputURL: outputURL)
}
startDate = now()
SecureLogger.info("PTT: live burst \(burstID.hexEncodedString()) capture started", category: .session)
}
func finish() async -> URL? {
guard !completed else { return nil }
completed = true
let elapsed = startDate.map { now().timeIntervalSince($0) } ?? 0
let (url, encodedFrames) = capture.stop()
// stop() drained the capture queue, so touching `stream` is safe now.
let capturedDuration = Double(encodedFrames) * PTTAudioFormat.frameDuration
guard elapsed >= VoiceRecorder.minRecordingDuration,
capturedDuration >= VoiceRecorder.minRecordingDuration,
let url
else {
sendControlPacket(.canceled)
if let url {
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url)
}
return nil
}
for packet in stream.packetizer.flush() {
sendPacket(packet)
}
let durationMs = UInt32((capturedDuration * 1000).rounded())
sendControlPacket(.end(totalDataPackets: stream.packetizer.dataPacketCount, durationMs: durationMs))
SecureLogger.info("PTT: live burst \(burstID.hexEncodedString()) finished — \(stream.packetizer.dataPacketCount) data packets, \(encodedFrames) frames, \(durationMs) ms", category: .session)
return url
}
func cancel() async {
let alreadyCompleted = completed
completed = true
// Always tear down the capture, even if a quick-release already marked
// us completed: the engine can start late (during start()'s retry
// pause), and only capture.cancel() stops the mic and deactivates the
// session. It is idempotent, so a redundant call is harmless.
capture.cancel()
if !alreadyCompleted {
sendControlPacket(.canceled)
}
}
private func sendControlPacket(_ kind: VoiceBurstPacket.Kind) {
guard let packet = VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: stream.packetizer.nextSeq, kind: kind) else { return }
sendPacket(packet.encode())
}
private static func makeOutputURL(burstID: Data) throws -> URL {
let base = try FileManager.default.url(
for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
in: .userDomainMask,
appropriateFor: nil,
create: true
)
let directory = base
.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
.appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: directory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
return directory.appendingPathComponent("voice_\(burstID.hexEncodedString()).m4a")
}
}
@@ -9,9 +9,6 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
@Published private(set) var duration: TimeInterval = 0 @Published private(set) var duration: TimeInterval = 0
@Published private(set) var progress: Double = 0 @Published private(set) var progress: Double = 0
/// Internal lifecycle visibility for deterministic acquisition tests.
var isPlaybackStartPending: Bool { sessionAcquireInFlight }
/// rounded so 4.9s shows "00:05" /// rounded so 4.9s shows "00:05"
var roundedDuration: Int { var roundedDuration: Int {
guard duration.isFinite else { return 0 } guard duration.isFinite else { return 0 }
@@ -27,24 +24,9 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
private var player: AVAudioPlayer? private var player: AVAudioPlayer?
private var timer: Timer? private var timer: Timer?
private var url: URL private var url: URL
/// Test seam; `AudioSessionCoordinator.shared` when nil.
private let sessionCoordinatorOverride: AudioSessionCoordinator?
/// Injectable so tests don't fight over the app-wide exclusive-playback
/// slot (a parallel test's `play()` would pause this controller mid-test).
private let exclusivity: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator
private var sessionToken: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
/// A session acquire is in flight (it suspends off-main for the blocking
/// session IPC); gates against double acquisition on rapid play taps.
private var sessionAcquireInFlight = false
init( init(url: URL) {
url: URL,
sessionCoordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator? = nil,
exclusivity: VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator? = nil
) {
self.url = url self.url = url
self.sessionCoordinatorOverride = sessionCoordinator
self.exclusivity = exclusivity ?? .shared
super.init() super.init()
// Don't load anything eagerly - wait until user interaction or view is fully displayed // Don't load anything eagerly - wait until user interaction or view is fully displayed
} }
@@ -69,16 +51,6 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
deinit { deinit {
timer?.invalidate() timer?.invalidate()
player?.stop()
// A per-row @StateObject can be discarded mid-playback (navigating
// away). Leaking the token here would hold the session forever
// never deactivating it, and pinning any escalated category for the
// app's lifetime. `release` is fire-and-forget onto the coordinator's
// queue, so it is deinit-safe: only the Sendable token crosses.
if let token = sessionToken {
sessionToken = nil
(sessionCoordinatorOverride ?? .shared).release(token)
}
} }
func replaceURL(_ url: URL) { func replaceURL(_ url: URL) {
@@ -96,15 +68,11 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
func play() { func play() {
guard ensurePlayerReady() else { return } guard ensurePlayerReady() else { return }
exclusivity.activate(self) VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.activate(self)
isPlaying = true player?.play()
startTimer() startTimer()
updateProgress() updateProgress()
// Acquired here (not in ensurePlayerReady): scrubbing a paused note isPlaying = true
// must not hold the session while nothing is audible. The session
// calls block on audio-server IPC, so they run off the main thread;
// the player starts once the session is configured.
startPlayerAfterAcquiringSession()
} }
func pause() { func pause() {
@@ -112,7 +80,6 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
stopTimer() stopTimer()
updateProgress() updateProgress()
isPlaying = false isPlaying = false
releaseSession()
} }
func stop() { func stop() {
@@ -121,8 +88,7 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
stopTimer() stopTimer()
updateProgress() updateProgress()
isPlaying = false isPlaying = false
releaseSession() VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.deactivate(self)
exclusivity.deactivate(self)
} }
func seek(to fraction: Double) { func seek(to fraction: Double) {
@@ -130,11 +96,8 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
let clamped = max(0, min(1, fraction)) let clamped = max(0, min(1, fraction))
if let player = player { if let player = player {
player.currentTime = clamped * player.duration player.currentTime = clamped * player.duration
// While the session acquire is still in flight, don't start if isPlaying {
// audio pre-activation the pending acquire's completion starts player.play()
// playback (from the new position) once the session resolves.
if isPlaying, !sessionAcquireInFlight {
startPreparedPlayer()
} }
updateProgress() updateProgress()
} }
@@ -149,20 +112,18 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
self.stopTimer() self.stopTimer()
self.updateProgress() self.updateProgress()
self.isPlaying = false self.isPlaying = false
self.releaseSession() VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator.shared.deactivate(self)
self.exclusivity.deactivate(self)
} }
} }
// MARK: - Private Helpers // MARK: - Private Helpers
private func preparePlayer(for url: URL) { private func preparePlayer(for url: URL) {
// Load metadata synchronously, but do not call prepareToPlay here: // Prepare player synchronously (only called when playback is requested)
// paused scrubbing reaches this path and must not acquire playback
// hardware outside the AudioSessionCoordinator token lifetime.
do { do {
let player = try AVAudioPlayer(contentsOf: url) let player = try AVAudioPlayer(contentsOf: url)
player.delegate = self player.delegate = self
player.prepareToPlay()
self.player = player self.player = player
duration = player.duration duration = player.duration
currentTime = player.currentTime currentTime = player.currentTime
@@ -180,81 +141,18 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
if player == nil { if player == nil {
preparePlayer(for: url) preparePlayer(for: url)
} }
#if os(iOS)
let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
do {
try session.setCategory(.playback, mode: .spokenAudio, options: [.mixWithOthers])
try session.setActive(true, options: [])
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to activate audio session: \(error)", category: .session)
}
#endif
return player != nil return player != nil
} }
/// All entry points (SwiftUI actions, `pauseForExclusivity`, the
/// delegate's main-queue hop) run on the main thread; the acquire itself
/// suspends while the blocking session IPC runs on the coordinator's
/// queue, and the player starts when it resolves. An acquire failure
/// leaves playback stopped: starting without a registered token would
/// bypass interruption fan-out and the coordinator's refcount. A
/// pause/stop landing mid-acquire hands the token straight back.
private func startPlayerAfterAcquiringSession() {
if sessionToken != nil {
startPreparedPlayer()
return
}
guard !sessionAcquireInFlight else { return }
sessionAcquireInFlight = true
let coordinator = sessionCoordinatorOverride ?? AudioSessionCoordinator.shared
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
var token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
do {
token = try await coordinator.acquire(.playback) { [weak self] in
self?.pause()
}
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to activate audio session: \(error)", category: .session)
}
guard let self else {
// The row was discarded while acquiring; deinit had no token
// to release yet.
token.map(coordinator.release)
return
}
self.sessionAcquireInFlight = false
guard self.isPlaying else {
// Paused/stopped while the session was activating.
token.map(coordinator.release)
return
}
guard let token else {
self.failPlaybackStart()
return
}
self.sessionToken = token
self.startPreparedPlayer()
}
}
@discardableResult
private func startPreparedPlayer() -> Bool {
guard let player,
player.prepareToPlay(),
player.play()
else {
SecureLogger.error("Voice note player refused to start " + url.lastPathComponent, category: .session)
failPlaybackStart()
return false
}
return true
}
private func failPlaybackStart() {
player?.pause()
stopTimer()
updateProgress()
isPlaying = false
releaseSession()
exclusivity.deactivate(self)
}
private func releaseSession() {
sessionToken.map((sessionCoordinatorOverride ?? .shared).release)
sessionToken = nil
}
private func startTimer() { private func startTimer() {
if timer != nil { return } if timer != nil { return }
timer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: 0.05, repeats: true) { [weak self] _ in timer = Timer.scheduledTimer(withTimeInterval: 0.05, repeats: true) { [weak self] _ in
@@ -283,75 +181,25 @@ final class VoiceNotePlaybackController: NSObject, ObservableObject, AVAudioPlay
} }
} }
/// Something that can hold the app's single audio-playback slot and yield it /// Ensures only one voice note plays at a time.
/// when another playback starts (voice notes pause; live bursts stop).
protocol ExclusivePlayback: AnyObject {
func pauseForExclusivity()
}
extension VoiceNotePlaybackController: ExclusivePlayback {
func pauseForExclusivity() {
pause()
}
}
/// Ensures only one voice playback (note or live burst) runs at a time.
final class VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator { final class VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator {
static let shared = VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator() static let shared = VoiceNotePlaybackCoordinator()
struct Reservation: Equatable { private weak var activeController: VoiceNotePlaybackController?
fileprivate let generation: UInt64
}
private weak var activeController: (any ExclusivePlayback)? private init() {}
private weak var latestReservedController: (any ExclusivePlayback)?
private var latestReservation = Reservation(generation: 0)
/// Internal so tests can isolate their own exclusivity slot; the app func activate(_ controller: VoiceNotePlaybackController) {
/// uses `shared`.
init() {}
/// Records playback intent without interrupting audio that is already
/// audible. Async starters reserve before suspension, then activate only
/// after their audio resource is ready.
func reserve(_ controller: any ExclusivePlayback) -> Reservation {
latestReservation = Reservation(generation: latestReservation.generation &+ 1)
latestReservedController = controller
return latestReservation
}
/// Immediate activation for synchronous/user-initiated playback.
@discardableResult
func activate(_ controller: any ExclusivePlayback) -> Reservation {
let reservation = reserve(controller)
_ = activate(controller, reservation: reservation)
return reservation
}
/// Commits an earlier reservation only when it is still the newest
/// playback request. This prevents an older async acquire from stealing
/// the floor after a newer play gesture.
@discardableResult
func activate(_ controller: any ExclusivePlayback, reservation: Reservation) -> Bool {
guard isCurrent(reservation, for: controller) else { return false }
if activeController === controller { if activeController === controller {
return true return
} }
activeController?.pauseForExclusivity() activeController?.pause()
activeController = controller activeController = controller
return true
} }
func isCurrent(_ reservation: Reservation, for controller: any ExclusivePlayback) -> Bool { func deactivate(_ controller: VoiceNotePlaybackController) {
latestReservation == reservation && latestReservedController === controller
}
func deactivate(_ controller: any ExclusivePlayback) {
if activeController === controller { if activeController === controller {
activeController = nil activeController = nil
} }
if latestReservedController === controller {
latestReservedController = nil
}
} }
} }
+62 -216
View File
@@ -1,95 +1,22 @@
import Foundation import Foundation
import AVFoundation import AVFoundation
/// The small surface of `AVAudioRecorder` that `VoiceRecorder` owns. Keeping
/// it behind a protocol lets lifecycle races be tested without opening the
/// microphone on the test host.
protocol VoiceAudioRecording: AnyObject {
var isRecording: Bool { get }
var isMeteringEnabled: Bool { get set }
func prepareToRecord() -> Bool
func record(forDuration duration: TimeInterval) -> Bool
func stop()
}
extension AVAudioRecorder: VoiceAudioRecording {}
protocol VoiceAudioRecorderCreating {
func makeRecorder(url: URL) throws -> any VoiceAudioRecording
}
private struct SystemVoiceAudioRecorderFactory: VoiceAudioRecorderCreating {
func makeRecorder(url: URL) throws -> any VoiceAudioRecording {
let settings: [String: Any] = [
AVFormatIDKey: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
AVSampleRateKey: 16_000,
AVNumberOfChannelsKey: 1,
AVEncoderBitRateKey: 16_000
]
return try AVAudioRecorder(url: url, settings: settings)
}
}
/// Manages audio capture for mesh voice notes with predictable encoding settings. /// Manages audio capture for mesh voice notes with predictable encoding settings.
actor VoiceRecorder { actor VoiceRecorder {
enum RecorderError: Error, Equatable { enum RecorderError: Error {
case microphoneAccessDenied case microphoneAccessDenied
case recorderInitializationFailed
case recordingInProgress case recordingInProgress
case failedToStartRecording
} }
static let shared = VoiceRecorder() static let shared = VoiceRecorder()
private let paddingInterval: TimeInterval = 0.5
private let maxRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 120
static let minRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 1 static let minRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 1
/// Identity of one press/hold. Every lifecycle mutation must present the private var recorder: AVAudioRecorder?
/// same owner that started the recorder, so a stale finish or cancel from
/// another hold cannot stop or delete the current recording.
final class RecordingOwner: @unchecked Sendable {}
/// Test-only scheduling seams for lifecycle boundaries that otherwise rely
/// on wall-clock sleeps. Production uses the real padding delay.
struct TestingHooks: Sendable {
let waitForStopPadding: (@Sendable (TimeInterval) async -> Void)?
init(waitForStopPadding: (@Sendable (TimeInterval) async -> Void)? = nil) {
self.waitForStopPadding = waitForStopPadding
}
}
private let sessionCoordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator
private let recorderFactory: any VoiceAudioRecorderCreating
private let permissionGranted: () -> Bool
private let paddingInterval: TimeInterval
private let maxRecordingDuration: TimeInterval
private let outputDirectory: URL?
private let testingHooks: TestingHooks
private var recorder: (any VoiceAudioRecording)?
private var currentURL: URL? private var currentURL: URL?
private var sessionToken: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token?
private var activeOwner: RecordingOwner?
/// True only while `startRecording()` is suspended in session acquire.
/// A second start is rejected instead of superseding the first one.
private var startInFlight = false
init(
sessionCoordinator: AudioSessionCoordinator = .shared,
recorderFactory: any VoiceAudioRecorderCreating = SystemVoiceAudioRecorderFactory(),
permissionGranted: (() -> Bool)? = nil,
paddingInterval: TimeInterval = 0.5,
maxRecordingDuration: TimeInterval = 120,
outputDirectory: URL? = nil,
testingHooks: TestingHooks = TestingHooks()
) {
self.sessionCoordinator = sessionCoordinator
self.recorderFactory = recorderFactory
self.permissionGranted = permissionGranted ?? Self.hasSystemPermission
self.paddingInterval = paddingInterval
self.maxRecordingDuration = maxRecordingDuration
self.outputDirectory = outputDirectory
self.testingHooks = testingHooks
}
// MARK: - Permissions // MARK: - Permissions
@@ -115,130 +42,82 @@ actor VoiceRecorder {
// MARK: - Recording Lifecycle // MARK: - Recording Lifecycle
@discardableResult @discardableResult
func startRecording(owner: RecordingOwner) async throws -> URL { func startRecording() throws -> URL {
if activeOwner != nil { if recorder?.isRecording == true {
throw RecorderError.recordingInProgress throw RecorderError.recordingInProgress
} }
guard permissionGranted() else { #if os(iOS)
let session = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance()
guard session.recordPermission == .granted else {
throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied
} }
#if targetEnvironment(simulator)
activeOwner = owner // allowBluetoothHFP is not available on iOS Simulator
startInFlight = true try session.setCategory(
.playAndRecord,
// The acquire suspends while the blocking session IPC runs on the mode: .default,
// coordinator's queue (never this actor's thread or main). options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP]
let token: AudioSessionCoordinator.Token )
do { #else
token = try await sessionCoordinator.acquire(.capture) { [weak self] in try session.setCategory(
Task { await self?.handleSessionInterruption(for: owner) } .playAndRecord,
} mode: .default,
} catch { options: [.defaultToSpeaker, .allowBluetoothA2DP, .allowBluetoothHFP]
guard activeOwner === owner else { )
throw CancellationError() #endif
} try session.setActive(true, options: .notifyOthersOnDeactivation)
startInFlight = false #endif
activeOwner = nil #if os(macOS)
throw error guard AVCaptureDevice.authorizationStatus(for: .audio) == .authorized else {
throw RecorderError.microphoneAccessDenied
} }
#endif
// Actor reentrancy: release/cancel may have ended this hold while the let outputURL = try makeOutputURL()
// blocking session activation was still in progress. let settings: [String: Any] = [
guard activeOwner === owner, startInFlight else { AVFormatIDKey: kAudioFormatMPEG4AAC,
sessionCoordinator.release(token) AVSampleRateKey: 16_000,
throw CancellationError() AVNumberOfChannelsKey: 1,
} AVEncoderBitRateKey: 16_000
startInFlight = false ]
sessionToken = token
var outputURL: URL? let audioRecorder = try AVAudioRecorder(url: outputURL, settings: settings)
do { audioRecorder.isMeteringEnabled = true
let newURL = try makeOutputURL() audioRecorder.prepareToRecord()
outputURL = newURL audioRecorder.record(forDuration: maxRecordingDuration)
let audioRecorder = try recorderFactory.makeRecorder(url: newURL)
audioRecorder.isMeteringEnabled = true
guard audioRecorder.prepareToRecord() else {
throw RecorderError.failedToStartRecording
}
guard audioRecorder.record(forDuration: maxRecordingDuration) else {
throw RecorderError.failedToStartRecording
}
recorder = audioRecorder recorder = audioRecorder
currentURL = newURL currentURL = outputURL
return newURL return outputURL
} catch {
releaseSessionToken()
recorder = nil
currentURL = nil
activeOwner = nil
if let outputURL {
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: outputURL)
}
throw error
}
} }
func stopRecording(owner: RecordingOwner) async -> URL? { func stopRecording() async -> URL? {
guard activeOwner === owner else { return nil } guard let recorder, recorder.isRecording else {
return currentURL
// `finish()` can race a still-suspended start on a direct caller even
// though the UI normally routes quick releases through cancel().
if startInFlight {
activeOwner = nil
startInFlight = false
return nil
}
guard let activeRecorder = recorder else {
let sessionURL = currentURL
releaseSessionToken()
currentURL = nil
activeOwner = nil
return sessionURL
} }
let sessionURL = currentURL let sessionURL = currentURL
if activeRecorder.isRecording, paddingInterval > 0 { try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(paddingInterval * 1_000_000_000))
if let waitForStopPadding = testingHooks.waitForStopPadding {
await waitForStopPadding(paddingInterval)
} else {
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: UInt64(paddingInterval * 1_000_000_000))
}
}
// Cancellation or interruption may have run during the padding sleep. recorder.stop()
// Only the recorder whose stop began here may be finalized by it.
guard activeOwner === owner,
let recorder = self.recorder,
recorder === activeRecorder
else { return nil }
if activeRecorder.isRecording { // A new session may have started during the sleep don't touch its state
activeRecorder.stop() if self.recorder === recorder {
cleanupSession()
self.recorder = nil
currentURL = nil
} }
releaseSessionToken()
self.recorder = nil
currentURL = nil
activeOwner = nil
return sessionURL return sessionURL
} }
func cancelRecording(owner: RecordingOwner) async { func cancelRecording() {
guard activeOwner === owner else { return }
// Invalidate ownership before cleanup. An actor-reentrant start whose
// session acquire resumes later will observe the mismatch and release
// its token without opening the microphone.
activeOwner = nil
startInFlight = false
if let recorder, recorder.isRecording { if let recorder, recorder.isRecording {
recorder.stop() recorder.stop()
} }
releaseSessionToken() cleanupSession()
if let currentURL { if let currentURL {
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: currentURL) try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: currentURL)
} }
@@ -246,45 +125,14 @@ actor VoiceRecorder {
currentURL = nil currentURL = nil
} }
/// The audio session was interrupted (call, Siri) or reconfigured: stop
/// the recorder but keep `recorder`/`currentURL` so the caller's pending
/// `stopRecording()` still returns the partial note.
private func handleSessionInterruption(for owner: RecordingOwner) async {
// A callback captured for a released token must never stop a newer
// recording. Conversely, an interruption delivered while acquire is
// still suspended invalidates that acquire before it can open the mic.
guard activeOwner === owner else { return }
if startInFlight {
activeOwner = nil
startInFlight = false
return
}
startInFlight = false
if let recorder, recorder.isRecording {
recorder.stop()
}
releaseSessionToken()
}
// MARK: - Helpers // MARK: - Helpers
private static func hasSystemPermission() -> Bool {
#if os(iOS)
AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().recordPermission == .granted
#elseif os(macOS)
AVCaptureDevice.authorizationStatus(for: .audio) == .authorized
#else
true
#endif
}
private func makeOutputURL() throws -> URL { private func makeOutputURL() throws -> URL {
let formatter = DateFormatter() let formatter = DateFormatter()
formatter.dateFormat = "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss" formatter.dateFormat = "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
let fileName = "voice_\(formatter.string(from: Date()))_\(UUID().uuidString).m4a" let fileName = "voice_\(formatter.string(from: Date())).m4a"
let baseDirectory = try outputDirectory let baseDirectory = try applicationFilesDirectory().appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
?? applicationFilesDirectory().appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: baseDirectory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil) try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: baseDirectory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
return baseDirectory.appendingPathComponent(fileName) return baseDirectory.appendingPathComponent(fileName)
} }
@@ -299,11 +147,9 @@ actor VoiceRecorder {
#endif #endif
} }
/// Fire-and-forget: the coordinator hops the blocking deactivation IPC private func cleanupSession() {
/// onto its own queue. #if os(iOS)
private func releaseSessionToken() { try? AVAudioSession.sharedInstance().setActive(false, options: .notifyOthersOnDeactivation)
guard let token = sessionToken else { return } #endif
sessionToken = nil
sessionCoordinator.release(token)
} }
} }
+6
View File
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@ final class WaveformCache {
} }
} }
func purgeAll() {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
self?.cache.removeAll()
}
}
private func computeWaveform(url: URL, bins: Int) -> [Float]? { private func computeWaveform(url: URL, bins: Int) -> [Float]? {
guard bins > 0 else { return nil } guard bins > 0 else { return nil }
// Use autoreleasepool to manage memory from audio buffer allocations // Use autoreleasepool to manage memory from audio buffer allocations
+7
View File
@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ import BitFoundation
/// Represents the ephemeral layer of identity - short-lived peer IDs that provide network privacy. /// Represents the ephemeral layer of identity - short-lived peer IDs that provide network privacy.
/// These IDs rotate periodically to prevent tracking while maintaining cryptographic relationships. /// These IDs rotate periodically to prevent tracking while maintaining cryptographic relationships.
struct EphemeralIdentity { struct EphemeralIdentity {
let peerID: PeerID // 8 random bytes
let sessionStart: Date
var handshakeState: HandshakeState var handshakeState: HandshakeState
} }
@@ -96,6 +98,7 @@ enum HandshakeState {
case initiated case initiated
case inProgress case inProgress
case completed(fingerprint: String) case completed(fingerprint: String)
case failed(reason: String)
} }
/// Represents the cryptographic layer of identity - the stable Noise Protocol static key pair. /// Represents the cryptographic layer of identity - the stable Noise Protocol static key pair.
@@ -107,6 +110,7 @@ struct CryptographicIdentity: Codable {
// Optional Ed25519 signing public key (used to authenticate public messages) // Optional Ed25519 signing public key (used to authenticate public messages)
var signingPublicKey: Data? = nil var signingPublicKey: Data? = nil
let firstSeen: Date let firstSeen: Date
let lastHandshake: Date?
} }
/// Represents the social layer of identity - user-assigned names and trust relationships. /// Represents the social layer of identity - user-assigned names and trust relationships.
@@ -189,6 +193,9 @@ struct IdentityCache: Codable {
// Fingerprint -> when we verified it (orders outgoing vouch batches; // Fingerprint -> when we verified it (orders outgoing vouch batches;
// entries verified before this field exists sort as oldest) // entries verified before this field exists sort as oldest)
var verifiedAt: [String: Date]? = nil var verifiedAt: [String: Date]? = nil
// Schema version for future migrations
var version: Int = 1
} }
// //
@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ protocol SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity)
// MARK: Favorites Management // MARK: Favorites Management
func getFavorites() -> Set<String>
func setFavorite(_ fingerprint: String, isFavorite: Bool)
func isFavorite(fingerprint: String) -> Bool func isFavorite(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
// MARK: Blocked Users Management // MARK: Blocked Users Management
@@ -121,6 +123,7 @@ protocol SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
// MARK: Ephemeral Session Management // MARK: Ephemeral Session Management
func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState) func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState)
func updateHandshakeState(peerID: PeerID, state: HandshakeState)
// MARK: Cleanup // MARK: Cleanup
func clearAllIdentityData() func clearAllIdentityData()
@@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ protocol SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
func recordVouch(voucheeFingerprint: String, voucherFingerprint: String, timestamp: Date) -> Bool func recordVouch(voucheeFingerprint: String, voucherFingerprint: String, timestamp: Date) -> Bool
func validVouchers(for fingerprint: String) -> [VouchRecord] func validVouchers(for fingerprint: String) -> [VouchRecord]
func isVouched(fingerprint: String) -> Bool func isVouched(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
func effectiveTrustLevel(for fingerprint: String) -> TrustLevel
func lastVouchBatchSent(to fingerprint: String) -> Date? func lastVouchBatchSent(to fingerprint: String) -> Date?
func markVouchBatchSent(to fingerprint: String, at date: Date) func markVouchBatchSent(to fingerprint: String, at date: Date)
func signingPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data? func signingPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data?
@@ -318,13 +322,21 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
fingerprint: fingerprint, fingerprint: fingerprint,
publicKey: noisePublicKey, publicKey: noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey, signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey,
firstSeen: existing.firstSeen firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
lastHandshake: now
) )
self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing
} else { } else {
// Update signing key // Update signing key and lastHandshake
existing.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey existing.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey ?? existing.signingPublicKey
self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = existing let updated = CryptographicIdentity(
fingerprint: existing.fingerprint,
publicKey: existing.publicKey,
signingPublicKey: existing.signingPublicKey,
firstSeen: existing.firstSeen,
lastHandshake: now
)
self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = updated
} }
// Persist updated state (already assigned in branches above) // Persist updated state (already assigned in branches above)
} else { } else {
@@ -333,7 +345,8 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
fingerprint: fingerprint, fingerprint: fingerprint,
publicKey: noisePublicKey, publicKey: noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey, signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
firstSeen: now firstSeen: now,
lastHandshake: now
) )
self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = entry self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = entry
} }
@@ -498,7 +511,11 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState = .none) { func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState = .none) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) { queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
self.ephemeralSessions[peerID] = EphemeralIdentity(handshakeState: handshakeState) self.ephemeralSessions[peerID] = EphemeralIdentity(
peerID: peerID,
sessionStart: Date(),
handshakeState: handshakeState
)
} }
} }
+8 -4
View File
@@ -31,20 +31,24 @@
</array> </array>
<key>CFBundleVersion</key> <key>CFBundleVersion</key>
<string>$(CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION)</string> <string>$(CURRENT_PROJECT_VERSION)</string>
<key>LSApplicationCategoryType</key>
<string>public.app-category.social-networking</string>
<key>LSMinimumSystemVersion</key> <key>LSMinimumSystemVersion</key>
<string>$(MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET)</string> <string>$(MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET)</string>
<key>NSBonjourServices</key>
<array>
<string>_bitchat-bulk._tcp</string>
</array>
<key>NSBluetoothAlwaysUsageDescription</key> <key>NSBluetoothAlwaysUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses Bluetooth to create a secure mesh network for chatting with nearby users.</string> <string>bitchat uses Bluetooth to create a secure mesh network for chatting with nearby users.</string>
<key>NSBluetoothPeripheralUsageDescription</key> <key>NSBluetoothPeripheralUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses Bluetooth to discover and connect with other bitchat users nearby.</string> <string>bitchat uses Bluetooth to discover and connect with other bitchat users nearby.</string>
<key>NSCameraUsageDescription</key> <key>NSCameraUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses the camera to scan QR codes to verify peers.</string> <string>bitchat uses the camera to scan QR codes to verify peers.</string>
<key>NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses peer-to-peer Wi-Fi to transfer large photos and voice notes directly between nearby devices.</string>
<key>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription</key> <key>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses your location to compute optional geohash channels, bridge cells, and nearby place labels. Exact coordinates are not included in bitchat messages.</string> <string>bitchat uses your approximate location to compute local geohash channels for optional public chats. Exact GPS is never shared.</string>
<key>NSMicrophoneUsageDescription</key> <key>NSMicrophoneUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat uses the microphone while you record voice notes or hold live push-to-talk, then sends that audio to your selected mesh conversation.</string> <string>bitchat uses the microphone to record voice notes that relay across the mesh.</string>
<key>NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription</key> <key>NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription</key>
<string>bitchat lets you pick images from your photo library to share with nearby peers.</string> <string>bitchat lets you pick images from your photo library to share with nearby peers.</string>
<key>UIBackgroundModes</key> <key>UIBackgroundModes</key>
+4732 -16044
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ extension BitchatMessage {
enum Media { enum Media {
case voice(URL) case voice(URL)
case image(URL) case image(URL)
var url: URL {
switch self {
case .voice(let url), .image(let url):
return url
}
}
} }
// Cache the directory lookup to avoid repeated FileManager calls during view rendering // Cache the directory lookup to avoid repeated FileManager calls during view rendering
+3 -1
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
let peerID: PeerID // Hex-encoded peer ID let peerID: PeerID // Hex-encoded peer ID
let noisePublicKey: Data let noisePublicKey: Data
let nickname: String let nickname: String
let lastSeen: Date
let isConnected: Bool let isConnected: Bool
let isReachable: Bool let isReachable: Bool
@@ -76,13 +77,14 @@ struct BitchatPeer: Equatable {
peerID: PeerID, peerID: PeerID,
noisePublicKey: Data, noisePublicKey: Data,
nickname: String, nickname: String,
lastSeen _: Date = Date(), lastSeen: Date = Date(),
isConnected: Bool = false, isConnected: Bool = false,
isReachable: Bool = false isReachable: Bool = false
) { ) {
self.peerID = peerID self.peerID = peerID
self.noisePublicKey = noisePublicKey self.noisePublicKey = noisePublicKey
self.nickname = nickname self.nickname = nickname
self.lastSeen = lastSeen
self.isConnected = isConnected self.isConnected = isConnected
self.isReachable = isReachable self.isReachable = isReachable
+21 -25
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
case unfavorite = "unfav" case unfavorite = "unfav"
case ping case ping
case trace case trace
case drop
var id: String { rawValue } var id: String { rawValue }
@@ -37,13 +36,11 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
var placeholder: String? { var placeholder: String? {
switch self { switch self {
case .block, .hug, .message, .slap, .unblock, .favorite, .unfavorite, .ping, .trace: case .block, .hug, .message, .slap, .unblock, .favorite, .unfavorite, .ping, .trace:
return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.nickname_placeholder") + ">" return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.nickname_placeholder", defaultValue: "nickname") + ">"
case .group: case .group:
return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.group_placeholder") + ">" return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.group_placeholder", defaultValue: "create|invite|leave|list") + ">"
case .pay: case .pay:
return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.token_placeholder") + ">" return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.token_placeholder", defaultValue: "token") + ">"
case .drop:
return "<" + String(localized: "content.input.note_placeholder") + ">"
case .clear, .help, .who: case .clear, .help, .who:
return nil return nil
} }
@@ -51,26 +48,25 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
var description: String { var description: String {
switch self { switch self {
case .block: String(localized: "content.commands.block") case .block: String(localized: "content.commands.block", defaultValue: "block or list blocked peers")
case .clear: String(localized: "content.commands.clear") case .clear: String(localized: "content.commands.clear", defaultValue: "clear chat messages")
case .group: String(localized: "content.commands.group") case .group: String(localized: "content.commands.group", defaultValue: "create or manage private groups")
case .help: String(localized: "content.commands.help") case .help: String(localized: "content.commands.help", defaultValue: "show available commands")
case .hug: String(localized: "content.commands.hug") case .hug: String(localized: "content.commands.hug", defaultValue: "send someone a warm hug")
case .message: String(localized: "content.commands.message") case .message: String(localized: "content.commands.message", defaultValue: "send private message")
case .pay: String(localized: "content.commands.pay") case .pay: String(localized: "content.commands.pay", defaultValue: "send a cashu ecash token in this chat")
case .slap: String(localized: "content.commands.slap") case .slap: String(localized: "content.commands.slap", defaultValue: "slap someone with a trout")
case .unblock: String(localized: "content.commands.unblock") case .unblock: String(localized: "content.commands.unblock", defaultValue: "unblock a peer")
case .who: String(localized: "content.commands.who") case .who: String(localized: "content.commands.who", defaultValue: "see who's online")
case .favorite: String(localized: "content.commands.favorite") case .favorite: String(localized: "content.commands.favorite", defaultValue: "add to favorites")
case .unfavorite: String(localized: "content.commands.unfavorite") case .unfavorite: String(localized: "content.commands.unfavorite", defaultValue: "remove from favorites")
case .ping: String(localized: "content.commands.ping") case .ping: String(localized: "content.commands.ping", defaultValue: "measure round-trip time to a mesh peer")
case .trace: String(localized: "content.commands.trace") case .trace: String(localized: "content.commands.trace", defaultValue: "estimate the mesh path to a peer")
case .drop: String(localized: "content.commands.drop")
} }
} }
static func all(isGeoPublic: Bool, isGeoDM: Bool) -> [CommandInfo] { static func all(isGeoPublic: Bool, isGeoDM: Bool) -> [CommandInfo] {
var commands: [CommandInfo] = [.block, .unblock, .clear, .drop, .help, .hug, .message, .slap, .who] var commands: [CommandInfo] = [.block, .unblock, .clear, .help, .hug, .message, .slap, .who]
// Cashu tokens are bearer instruments: in a public geohash any nearby // Cashu tokens are bearer instruments: in a public geohash any nearby
// stranger can redeem one, so don't *suggest* /pay there (the // stranger can redeem one, so don't *suggest* /pay there (the
// processor still allows it behind an explicit "public" confirm). // processor still allows it behind an explicit "public" confirm).
@@ -78,11 +74,11 @@ enum CommandInfo: String, Identifiable {
if !isGeoPublic { if !isGeoPublic {
commands.append(.pay) commands.append(.pay)
} }
// The processor rejects favorites, groups, and mesh diagnostics in // The processor rejects favorites, groups and mesh diagnostics in
// geohash contexts, so only suggest them where they work: mesh. // geohash contexts, so only suggest them where they actually work: mesh.
if isGeoPublic || isGeoDM { if isGeoPublic || isGeoDM {
return commands return commands
} }
return commands + [.favorite, .unfavorite, .ping, .trace, .group] return commands + [.favorite, .unfavorite, .group, .ping, .trace]
} }
} }
+1 -1
View File
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ final class NoiseHandshakeState {
return messageBuffer return messageBuffer
} }
func readMessage(_ message: Data, expectedPayloadLength _: Int = 0) throws -> Data { func readMessage(_ message: Data, expectedPayloadLength: Int = 0) throws -> Data {
guard currentPattern < messagePatterns.count else { guard currentPattern < messagePatterns.count else {
throw NoiseError.handshakeComplete throw NoiseError.handshakeComplete
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ enum NoiseSecurityConstants {
// Maximum number of messages before rekey (2^64 - 1 is the nonce limit) // Maximum number of messages before rekey (2^64 - 1 is the nonce limit)
static let maxMessagesPerSession: UInt64 = 1_000_000_000 // 1 billion messages static let maxMessagesPerSession: UInt64 = 1_000_000_000 // 1 billion messages
// Handshake timeout - abandon incomplete handshakes
static let handshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 60 // 1 minute
// Maximum concurrent sessions per peer
static let maxSessionsPerPeer = 3
// Rate limiting // Rate limiting
static let maxHandshakesPerMinute = 10 static let maxHandshakesPerMinute = 10
static let maxMessagesPerSecond = 100 static let maxMessagesPerSecond = 100
+1
View File
@@ -14,4 +14,5 @@ enum NoiseSecurityError: Error {
case messageTooLarge case messageTooLarge
case invalidPeerID case invalidPeerID
case rateLimitExceeded case rateLimitExceeded
case handshakeTimeout
} }
+8 -2
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ import BitFoundation
final class NoiseSessionManager { final class NoiseSessionManager {
private var sessions: [PeerID: NoiseSession] = [:] private var sessions: [PeerID: NoiseSession] = [:]
private let localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
private let sessionFactory: (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession private let sessionFactory: (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
private let managerQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.manager", attributes: .concurrent) private let managerQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.manager", attributes: .concurrent)
@@ -21,6 +23,8 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
var onSessionFailed: ((PeerID, Error) -> Void)? var onSessionFailed: ((PeerID, Error) -> Void)?
init(localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey, keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) { init(localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey, keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
self.localStaticKey = localStaticKey
self.keychain = keychain
self.sessionFactory = { peerID, role in self.sessionFactory = { peerID, role in
SecureNoiseSession( SecureNoiseSession(
peerID: peerID, peerID: peerID,
@@ -33,10 +37,12 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
#if DEBUG #if DEBUG
init( init(
localStaticKey _: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey, localStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey,
keychain _: KeychainManagerProtocol, keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
sessionFactory: @escaping (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession sessionFactory: @escaping (PeerID, NoiseRole) -> NoiseSession
) { ) {
self.localStaticKey = localStaticKey
self.keychain = keychain
self.sessionFactory = sessionFactory self.sessionFactory = sessionFactory
} }
#endif #endif
+9 -1
View File
@@ -6,12 +6,14 @@ struct NostrIdentity: Codable {
let privateKey: Data let privateKey: Data
let publicKey: Data let publicKey: Data
let npub: String // Bech32-encoded public key let npub: String // Bech32-encoded public key
let createdAt: Date
/// Memberwise initializer /// Memberwise initializer
init(privateKey: Data, publicKey: Data, npub: String, createdAt _: Date) { init(privateKey: Data, publicKey: Data, npub: String, createdAt: Date) {
self.privateKey = privateKey self.privateKey = privateKey
self.publicKey = publicKey self.publicKey = publicKey
self.npub = npub self.npub = npub
self.createdAt = createdAt
} }
/// Generate a new Nostr identity /// Generate a new Nostr identity
@@ -37,6 +39,12 @@ struct NostrIdentity: Codable {
self.privateKey = privateKeyData self.privateKey = privateKeyData
self.publicKey = xOnlyPubkey self.publicKey = xOnlyPubkey
self.npub = try Bech32.encode(hrp: "npub", data: xOnlyPubkey) self.npub = try Bech32.encode(hrp: "npub", data: xOnlyPubkey)
self.createdAt = Date()
}
/// Get signing key for event signatures
func signingKey() throws -> P256K.Signing.PrivateKey {
try P256K.Signing.PrivateKey(dataRepresentation: privateKey)
} }
/// Get Schnorr signing key for Nostr event signatures /// Get Schnorr signing key for Nostr event signatures
+32 -12
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ final class NostrIdentityBridge {
private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol private let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager.makeDefault()) { init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol = KeychainManager()) {
self.keychain = keychain self.keychain = keychain
} }
@@ -37,6 +37,14 @@ final class NostrIdentityBridge {
return nostrIdentity return nostrIdentity
} }
/// Associate a Nostr identity with a Noise public key (for favorites)
func associateNostrIdentity(_ nostrPubkey: String, with noisePublicKey: Data) {
let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
if let data = nostrPubkey.data(using: .utf8) {
keychain.save(key: key, data: data, service: keychainService, accessible: nil)
}
}
/// Get Nostr public key associated with a Noise public key /// Get Nostr public key associated with a Noise public key
func getNostrPublicKey(for noisePublicKey: Data) -> String? { func getNostrPublicKey(for noisePublicKey: Data) -> String? {
let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())" let key = "nostr-noise-\(noisePublicKey.base64EncodedString())"
@@ -49,10 +57,29 @@ final class NostrIdentityBridge {
/// Clear all Nostr identity associations and current identity /// Clear all Nostr identity associations and current identity
func clearAllAssociations() { func clearAllAssociations() {
// Must go through the injected keychain, not raw SecItem calls: let query: [String: Any] = [
// under test that keychain is in-memory, and a direct delete here kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
// would wipe the developer's real Nostr identity on every test run. kSecAttrService as String: keychainService,
keychain.deleteAll(service: keychainService) kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitAll,
kSecReturnAttributes as String: true
]
var result: AnyObject?
let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &result)
if status == errSecSuccess, let items = result as? [[String: Any]] {
for item in items {
var deleteQuery: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: keychainService
]
if let account = item[kSecAttrAccount as String] as? String {
deleteQuery[kSecAttrAccount as String] = account
}
SecItemDelete(deleteQuery as CFDictionary)
}
} else if status == errSecItemNotFound {
// nothing persisted; no action needed
}
deviceSeedCache = nil deviceSeedCache = nil
// Also drop the in-memory derived per-geohash identities. These hold the // Also drop the in-memory derived per-geohash identities. These hold the
@@ -86,13 +113,6 @@ final class NostrIdentityBridge {
return seed return seed
} }
/// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a mesh-bridge
/// rendezvous cell. Distinct HMAC label keeps it unlinkable from the
/// geohash-chat identity for the same cell string.
func deriveIdentity(forBridgeRendezvous cell: String) throws -> NostrIdentity {
try deriveIdentity(forGeohash: "bridge|" + cell)
}
/// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a given geohash. /// Derive a deterministic, unlinkable Nostr identity for a given geohash.
/// Uses HMAC-SHA256(deviceSeed, geohash) as private key material, with fallback rehashing /// Uses HMAC-SHA256(deviceSeed, geohash) as private key material, with fallback rehashing
/// if the candidate is not a valid secp256k1 private key. /// if the candidate is not a valid secp256k1 private key.
+35 -122
View File
@@ -19,11 +19,6 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
case giftWrap = 1059 // NIP-59 gift wrap case giftWrap = 1059 // NIP-59 gift wrap
case ephemeralEvent = 20000 case ephemeralEvent = 20000
case geohashPresence = 20001 case geohashPresence = 20001
case deletion = 5 // NIP-09 event deletion request
/// Sealed courier envelope parked on relays under its rotating
/// recipient tag (`#x`). Regular (stored) kind so it survives until
/// its NIP-40 expiration the whole point is store-and-forward.
case courierDrop = 1401
} }
/// Create a NIP-17 private message /// Create a NIP-17 private message
@@ -260,115 +255,17 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey) return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
} }
// MARK: - Mesh bridge (rendezvous) events
/// Create a mesh-bridge public message (kind 20000) for a geohash-cell
/// rendezvous. The distinct `r` tag keeps bridge traffic out of geohash
/// channel subscriptions (which filter on `#g`); `m` is
/// `[stable ID, mesh sender ID, wire timestamp in ms]`. Element 1 is the
/// content-stable mesh message ID (`MeshMessageIdentity`) for v1.7.0
/// parsers, which key their dedup on `m[1]` unconditionally and need it
/// per-message-unique. Current parsers key bridge rows by the authenticated
/// event ID and recompute elements 2-3 only as a radio-copy hint; the mesh
/// coordinates are public and cannot authenticate the Nostr signer.
static func createBridgeMeshEvent(
content: String,
cell: String,
senderIdentity: NostrIdentity,
nickname: String? = nil,
meshSenderID: String? = nil,
meshTimestampMs: UInt64? = nil
) throws -> NostrEvent {
var tags = [["r", cell]]
if let nickname = nickname?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty {
tags.append(["n", nickname])
}
if let meshSenderID = meshSenderID?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty, let meshTimestampMs {
let stableID = MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(
senderIDHex: meshSenderID,
timestampMs: meshTimestampMs,
content: content
)
tags.append(["m", stableID, meshSenderID, String(meshTimestampMs)])
}
let event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .ephemeralEvent,
tags: tags,
content: content
)
let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
}
/// Create a mesh-bridge presence heartbeat (kind 20001) on a rendezvous
/// cell: empty content, `r` tag only the bridge analogue of geohash
/// presence, counted into "people across the bridge".
static func createBridgePresenceEvent(
cell: String,
senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
) throws -> NostrEvent {
let event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .geohashPresence,
tags: [["r", cell]],
content: ""
)
let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
}
/// Create a courier drop (kind 1401): an opaque sealed courier envelope
/// parked on relays. `x` is the hex recipient tag the recipient (or a
/// gateway acting for them) subscribes for; the NIP-40 expiration tracks
/// the envelope expiry so honoring relays garbage-collect the drop. The
/// signing identity should be a throwaway the envelope authenticates
/// its sender internally via Noise-X, and linking drops to a stable
/// publisher key would leak courier traffic patterns.
static func createCourierDropEvent(
envelope: Data,
recipientTagHex: String,
expiresAt: Date,
senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
) throws -> NostrEvent {
let tags = [
["x", recipientTagHex],
["expiration", String(Int(expiresAt.timeIntervalSince1970))]
]
let event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .courierDrop,
tags: tags,
content: envelope.base64EncodedString()
)
let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
}
/// Create a persistent location note (kind 1: text note) tagged to a street-level geohash. /// Create a persistent location note (kind 1: text note) tagged to a street-level geohash.
/// An optional `expiresAt` adds a NIP-40 expiration tag so honoring relays
/// drop the note in step with a bridged board post's expiry.
static func createGeohashTextNote( static func createGeohashTextNote(
content: String, content: String,
geohash: String, geohash: String,
senderIdentity: NostrIdentity, senderIdentity: NostrIdentity,
nickname: String? = nil, nickname: String? = nil
expiresAt: Date? = nil,
urgent: Bool = false
) throws -> NostrEvent { ) throws -> NostrEvent {
var tags = [["g", geohash]] var tags = [["g", geohash]]
if let nickname = nickname?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty { if let nickname = nickname?.trimmedOrNilIfEmpty {
tags.append(["n", nickname]) tags.append(["n", nickname])
} }
if let expiresAt {
tags.append(["expiration", String(Int(expiresAt.timeIntervalSince1970))])
}
if urgent {
tags.append(["t", "urgent"])
}
let event = NostrEvent( let event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex, pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(), createdAt: Date(),
@@ -380,24 +277,6 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey) return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
} }
/// Create a NIP-09 deletion request for one of our own events. Relays that
/// honor NIP-09 drop the referenced event; it must be signed by the same
/// key that signed the original.
static func createDeleteEvent(
ofEventID eventID: String,
senderIdentity: NostrIdentity
) throws -> NostrEvent {
let event = NostrEvent(
pubkey: senderIdentity.publicKeyHex,
createdAt: Date(),
kind: .deletion,
tags: [["e", eventID]],
content: ""
)
let schnorrKey = try senderIdentity.schnorrSigningKey()
return try event.sign(with: schnorrKey)
}
// MARK: - Private Methods // MARK: - Private Methods
private static func createSeal( private static func createSeal(
@@ -644,6 +523,37 @@ struct NostrProtocol {
return sharedSecretData return sharedSecretData
} }
// Direct version that doesn't try to add prefixes
private static func deriveSharedSecretDirect(
privateKey: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey,
publicKey: Data
) throws -> Data {
// Direct shared secret calculation
// Convert Schnorr private key to KeyAgreement private key
let keyAgreementPrivateKey = try P256K.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey(
dataRepresentation: privateKey.dataRepresentation
)
// Use the public key as-is (should already have prefix)
let keyAgreementPublicKey = try P256K.KeyAgreement.PublicKey(
dataRepresentation: publicKey,
format: .compressed
)
// Perform ECDH
let sharedSecret = try keyAgreementPrivateKey.sharedSecretFromKeyAgreement(
with: keyAgreementPublicKey,
format: .compressed
)
// Convert SharedSecret to Data
let sharedSecretData = sharedSecret.withUnsafeBytes { Data($0) }
// Return raw ECDH shared secret; HKDF is applied by deriveNIP44V2Key
return sharedSecretData
}
private static func randomizedTimestamp() -> Date { private static func randomizedTimestamp() -> Date {
// Add random offset to current time for privacy // Add random offset to current time for privacy
// This prevents timing correlation attacks while the actual message timestamp // This prevents timing correlation attacks while the actual message timestamp
@@ -773,8 +683,11 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
enum NostrError: Error { enum NostrError: Error {
case invalidPublicKey case invalidPublicKey
case invalidPrivateKey
case invalidEvent case invalidEvent
case invalidCiphertext case invalidCiphertext
case signingFailed
case encryptionFailed
} }
// MARK: - NIP-44 v2 helpers (XChaCha20-Poly1305) // MARK: - NIP-44 v2 helpers (XChaCha20-Poly1305)
+16 -217
View File
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
let url: String let url: String
var isConnected: Bool = false var isConnected: Bool = false
var lastError: Error? var lastError: Error?
var lastConnectedAt: Date?
var messagesSent: Int = 0 var messagesSent: Int = 0
var messagesReceived: Int = 0 var messagesReceived: Int = 0
var reconnectAttempts: Int = 0 var reconnectAttempts: Int = 0
@@ -183,26 +184,11 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
} }
private var subscriptionRequestState: [String: SubscriptionRequestState] = [:] private var subscriptionRequestState: [String: SubscriptionRequestState] = [:]
// Track EOSE per subscription to signal when initial stored events are // Track EOSE per subscription to signal when initial stored events are done
// done. Completion is scoped to relays the REQ actually reached: targets
// still mid-connect must not hold the callback hostage until the fallback
// timer (a dead relay of five used to pin "loading" for the full 10s).
private struct EOSETracker { private struct EOSETracker {
/// Targets the REQ has not been delivered to yet (still connecting). var pendingRelays: Set<String>
var awaitingSend: Set<String>
/// Relays that received the REQ and have not sent EOSE yet.
var awaitingEOSE: Set<String>
/// True once any relay received the REQ (or answered with EOSE)
/// completion with zero sends would mean "done" without ever asking.
var didSend = false
var callback: () -> Void var callback: () -> Void
let epoch: Int let epoch: Int
/// Done when every relay that got the REQ has resolved, provided at
/// least one did or when every target dropped out entirely.
var isComplete: Bool {
(didSend && awaitingEOSE.isEmpty) || (awaitingSend.isEmpty && awaitingEOSE.isEmpty)
}
} }
private var eoseTrackers: [String: EOSETracker] = [:] private var eoseTrackers: [String: EOSETracker] = [:]
private var eoseTrackerEpoch = 0 private var eoseTrackerEpoch = 0
@@ -216,15 +202,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
} }
private var messageQueue: [PendingSend] = [] private var messageQueue: [PendingSend] = []
private let messageQueueLock = NSLock() private let messageQueueLock = NSLock()
/// Non-queued sends whose callers require relay durability. A WebSocket
/// write only proves bytes left this process; NIP-20 OK is the relay's
/// accept/reject acknowledgment.
private struct ConfirmedSendState {
let token: UUID
var awaitingRelays: Set<String>
let completion: (Bool) -> Void
}
private var confirmedSends: [String: ConfirmedSendState] = [:]
// Total pending sends dropped at the queue cap; drives the sampled // Total pending sends dropped at the queue cap; drives the sampled
// overflow warning (first + every Nth drop). // overflow warning (first + every Nth drop).
private var pendingSendDropCount = 0 private var pendingSendDropCount = 0
@@ -321,9 +298,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
for (_, tracker) in trackers { for (_, tracker) in trackers {
tracker.callback() tracker.callback()
} }
let confirmed = confirmedSends.values.map(\.completion)
confirmedSends.removeAll()
confirmed.forEach { $0(false) }
pendingTorConnectionURLs.removeAll() pendingTorConnectionURLs.removeAll()
awaitingTorForConnections = false awaitingTorForConnections = false
torReadyWaitAttempts = 0 torReadyWaitAttempts = 0
@@ -357,7 +331,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
duplicateInboundEventDropCountBySubscription.removeAll() duplicateInboundEventDropCountBySubscription.removeAll()
inboundEventLogCount = 0 inboundEventLogCount = 0
Self.pendingGiftWrapIDs.removeAll() Self.pendingGiftWrapIDs.removeAll()
confirmedSends.removeAll()
messageQueueLock.lock() messageQueueLock.lock()
messageQueue.removeAll() messageQueue.removeAll()
@@ -374,6 +347,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
relays[index].nextReconnectTime = nil relays[index].nextReconnectTime = nil
if resetState { if resetState {
relays[index].lastError = nil relays[index].lastError = nil
relays[index].lastConnectedAt = nil
relays[index].lastDisconnectedAt = nil relays[index].lastDisconnectedAt = nil
relays[index].messagesSent = 0 relays[index].messagesSent = 0
relays[index].messagesReceived = 0 relays[index].messagesReceived = 0
@@ -432,97 +406,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
} }
} }
/// Attempts an event only on currently connected target relays and
/// reports whether at least one relay explicitly accepted it via NIP-20
/// OK. A successful WebSocket write alone is not durable acceptance.
/// Unlike `sendEvent`, this never enters the process-local pending queue;
/// callers use it when success unlocks durable state or user-visible
/// delivery progress.
func sendEventImmediately(
_ event: NostrEvent,
to relayUrls: [String]? = nil,
completion: @escaping (Bool) -> Void
) {
guard dependencies.activationAllowed() else {
completion(false)
return
}
guard !(shouldUseTor && dependencies.torEnforced() && !dependencies.torIsReady()) else {
completion(false)
return
}
let requestedRelays = relayUrls ?? Self.defaultRelays
let targetRelays = allowedRelayList(from: requestedRelays)
let connectedTargets = targetRelays.compactMap { relayUrl -> (String, NostrRelayConnectionProtocol)? in
guard let connection = connectedConnection(for: relayUrl) else { return nil }
return (relayUrl, connection)
}
guard !connectedTargets.isEmpty else {
completion(false)
return
}
let token = UUID()
let eventID = event.id
if let replaced = confirmedSends.removeValue(forKey: eventID) {
replaced.completion(false)
}
confirmedSends[eventID] = ConfirmedSendState(
token: token,
awaitingRelays: Set(connectedTargets.map(\.0)),
completion: completion
)
dependencies.scheduleAfter(TransportConfig.nostrConfirmedSendAckTimeoutSeconds) { [weak self] in
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
self?.timeoutConfirmedSend(eventID: eventID, token: token)
}
}
for (relayUrl, connection) in connectedTargets {
sendToRelay(event: event, connection: connection, relayUrl: relayUrl) { [weak self] succeeded in
guard let self else { return }
// Success only means the bytes reached the socket; wait for
// the matching relay OK. A failed write settles this target
// as rejected because no OK can arrive for it.
if !succeeded {
self.resolveConfirmedSend(
eventID: eventID,
relayURL: relayUrl,
accepted: false,
token: token
)
}
}
}
}
private func resolveConfirmedSend(
eventID: String,
relayURL: String,
accepted: Bool,
token: UUID? = nil
) {
guard var state = confirmedSends[eventID],
token == nil || state.token == token,
state.awaitingRelays.remove(relayURL) != nil else { return }
if accepted {
confirmedSends.removeValue(forKey: eventID)
state.completion(true)
} else if state.awaitingRelays.isEmpty {
confirmedSends.removeValue(forKey: eventID)
state.completion(false)
} else {
confirmedSends[eventID] = state
}
}
private func timeoutConfirmedSend(eventID: String, token: UUID) {
guard let state = confirmedSends[eventID], state.token == token else { return }
confirmedSends.removeValue(forKey: eventID)
state.completion(false)
}
private func enqueuePendingSend(_ event: NostrEvent, pendingRelays: Set<String>) { private func enqueuePendingSend(_ event: NostrEvent, pendingRelays: Set<String>) {
messageQueueLock.lock() messageQueueLock.lock()
messageQueue.append(PendingSend(event: event, pendingRelays: pendingRelays)) messageQueue.append(PendingSend(event: event, pendingRelays: pendingRelays))
@@ -912,7 +795,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
private func startEOSETracking(id: String, relayURLs: Set<String>, callback: @escaping () -> Void) { private func startEOSETracking(id: String, relayURLs: Set<String>, callback: @escaping () -> Void) {
eoseTrackerEpoch += 1 eoseTrackerEpoch += 1
let epoch = eoseTrackerEpoch let epoch = eoseTrackerEpoch
eoseTrackers[id] = EOSETracker(awaitingSend: relayURLs, awaitingEOSE: [], callback: callback, epoch: epoch) eoseTrackers[id] = EOSETracker(pendingRelays: relayURLs, callback: callback, epoch: epoch)
// Fallback timeout to avoid hanging if a relay never sends EOSE. // Fallback timeout to avoid hanging if a relay never sends EOSE.
dependencies.scheduleAfter(TransportConfig.nostrSubscriptionEOSEFallbackSeconds) { [weak self] in dependencies.scheduleAfter(TransportConfig.nostrSubscriptionEOSEFallbackSeconds) { [weak self] in
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
@@ -1027,7 +910,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
// Send initial ping to verify connection // Send initial ping to verify connection
task.sendPing { [weak self] error in task.sendPing { [weak self] error in
DispatchQueue.main.async { DispatchQueue.main.async {
guard self?.connections[urlString] === task else { return }
if error == nil { if error == nil {
SecureLogger.debug("✅ Connected to Nostr relay: \(urlString)", category: .session) SecureLogger.debug("✅ Connected to Nostr relay: \(urlString)", category: .session)
self?.updateRelayStatus(urlString, isConnected: true) self?.updateRelayStatus(urlString, isConnected: true)
@@ -1037,11 +919,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to connect to Nostr relay \(urlString): \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "Unknown error")", category: .session) SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to connect to Nostr relay \(urlString): \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "Unknown error")", category: .session)
self?.updateRelayStatus(urlString, isConnected: false, error: error) self?.updateRelayStatus(urlString, isConnected: false, error: error)
// Trigger disconnection handler for proper backoff // Trigger disconnection handler for proper backoff
self?.handleDisconnection( self?.handleDisconnection(relayUrl: urlString, error: error ?? NSError(domain: "NostrRelay", code: -1, userInfo: nil))
relayUrl: urlString,
error: error ?? NSError(domain: "NostrRelay", code: -1, userInfo: nil),
connection: task
)
} }
} }
} }
@@ -1057,19 +935,8 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
toSend[id] = state.messageString toSend[id] = state.messageString
} }
for (id, messageString) in toSend { for (id, messageString) in toSend {
if self.subscriptions[relayUrl]?.contains(id) == true { if self.subscriptions[relayUrl]?.contains(id) == true { continue }
// Already subscribed on this relay (e.g. a tracker promoted
// after an earlier flush): its EOSE is coming, count it.
markEOSESubscribed(id: id, relayUrl: relayUrl)
continue
}
startPendingEOSETrackingIfNeeded(id: id) startPendingEOSETrackingIfNeeded(id: id)
// Mark at send *initiation*, not in the async completion: a fast
// relay's EOSE could otherwise complete the tracker while this
// relay REQ already on the wire still sat in awaitingSend.
// If the send fails the socket is going down with it, and the
// disconnect settle (or the fallback timer) releases the wait.
markEOSESubscribed(id: id, relayUrl: relayUrl)
connection.send(.string(messageString)) { [weak self, weak connection] error in connection.send(.string(messageString)) { [weak self, weak connection] error in
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
guard let self else { return } guard let self else { return }
@@ -1099,20 +966,18 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
Task.detached(priority: .utility) { Task.detached(priority: .utility) {
guard let parsed = ParsedInbound(message) else { return } guard let parsed = ParsedInbound(message) else { return }
await MainActor.run { await MainActor.run {
guard self.connections[relayUrl] === task else { return }
self.handleParsedMessage(parsed, from: relayUrl) self.handleParsedMessage(parsed, from: relayUrl)
} }
} }
// Continue receiving // Continue receiving
Task { @MainActor in Task { @MainActor in
guard self.connections[relayUrl] === task else { return }
self.receiveMessage(from: task, relayUrl: relayUrl) self.receiveMessage(from: task, relayUrl: relayUrl)
} }
case .failure(let error): case .failure(let error):
DispatchQueue.main.async { DispatchQueue.main.async {
self.handleDisconnection(relayUrl: relayUrl, error: error, connection: task) self.handleDisconnection(relayUrl: relayUrl, error: error)
} }
} }
} }
@@ -1153,12 +1018,8 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
} }
case .eose(let subId): case .eose(let subId):
if var tracker = eoseTrackers[subId] { if var tracker = eoseTrackers[subId] {
// An EOSE proves the relay received the REQ even if the local tracker.pendingRelays.remove(relayUrl)
// send completion hasn't run yet. if tracker.pendingRelays.isEmpty {
tracker.awaitingSend.remove(relayUrl)
tracker.awaitingEOSE.remove(relayUrl)
tracker.didSend = true
if tracker.isComplete {
eoseTrackers.removeValue(forKey: subId) eoseTrackers.removeValue(forKey: subId)
tracker.callback() tracker.callback()
} else { } else {
@@ -1166,7 +1027,6 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
} }
} }
case .ok(let eventId, let success, let reason): case .ok(let eventId, let success, let reason):
resolveConfirmedSend(eventID: eventId, relayURL: relayUrl, accepted: success)
if success { if success {
_ = Self.pendingGiftWrapIDs.remove(eventId) _ = Self.pendingGiftWrapIDs.remove(eventId)
SecureLogger.debug("✅ Accepted id=\(eventId.prefix(16))… relay=\(relayUrl)", category: .session) SecureLogger.debug("✅ Accepted id=\(eventId.prefix(16))… relay=\(relayUrl)", category: .session)
@@ -1183,12 +1043,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
} }
} }
private func sendToRelay( private func sendToRelay(event: NostrEvent, connection: NostrRelayConnectionProtocol, relayUrl: String) {
event: NostrEvent,
connection: NostrRelayConnectionProtocol,
relayUrl: String,
completion: ((Bool) -> Void)? = nil
) {
let req = NostrRequest.event(event) let req = NostrRequest.event(event)
do { do {
@@ -1201,20 +1056,17 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
DispatchQueue.main.async { DispatchQueue.main.async {
if let error = error { if let error = error {
SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to send event to \(relayUrl): \(error)", category: .session) SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to send event to \(relayUrl): \(error)", category: .session)
completion?(false)
} else { } else {
// SecureLogger.debug(" Event sent to relay: \(relayUrl)", category: .session) // SecureLogger.debug(" Event sent to relay: \(relayUrl)", category: .session)
// Update relay stats // Update relay stats
if let index = self?.relays.firstIndex(where: { $0.url == relayUrl }) { if let index = self?.relays.firstIndex(where: { $0.url == relayUrl }) {
self?.relays[index].messagesSent += 1 self?.relays[index].messagesSent += 1
} }
completion?(true)
} }
} }
} }
} catch { } catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to encode event: \(error)", category: .session) SecureLogger.error("Failed to encode event: \(error)", category: .session)
completion?(false)
} }
} }
@@ -1223,6 +1075,7 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
relays[index].isConnected = isConnected relays[index].isConnected = isConnected
relays[index].lastError = error relays[index].lastError = error
if isConnected { if isConnected {
relays[index].lastConnectedAt = dependencies.now()
relays[index].reconnectAttempts = 0 // Reset on successful connection relays[index].reconnectAttempts = 0 // Reset on successful connection
relays[index].nextReconnectTime = nil relays[index].nextReconnectTime = nil
} else { } else {
@@ -1247,11 +1100,9 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
/// callbacks; treat it as done and let the remaining relays (or the /// callbacks; treat it as done and let the remaining relays (or the
/// fallback timeout) drive completion. /// fallback timeout) drive completion.
private func settleEOSETrackers(droppingRelay relayUrl: String) { private func settleEOSETrackers(droppingRelay relayUrl: String) {
for (id, var tracker) in eoseTrackers for (id, var tracker) in eoseTrackers where tracker.pendingRelays.contains(relayUrl) {
where tracker.awaitingSend.contains(relayUrl) || tracker.awaitingEOSE.contains(relayUrl) { tracker.pendingRelays.remove(relayUrl)
tracker.awaitingSend.remove(relayUrl) if tracker.pendingRelays.isEmpty {
tracker.awaitingEOSE.remove(relayUrl)
if tracker.isComplete {
eoseTrackers.removeValue(forKey: id) eoseTrackers.removeValue(forKey: id)
tracker.callback() tracker.callback()
} else { } else {
@@ -1260,38 +1111,9 @@ final class NostrRelayManager: ObservableObject {
} }
} }
/// Whether any of `relayUrls` currently holds a live connection. Lets private func handleDisconnection(relayUrl: String, error: Error) {
/// subscribers distinguish "loaded, empty" from "never reached a relay"
/// when an EOSE fallback fires.
func isAnyRelayConnected(among relayUrls: [String]) -> Bool {
let targets = Set(relayUrls)
return relays.contains { targets.contains($0.url) && $0.isConnected }
}
/// Marks the REQ as delivered to `relayUrl`: EOSE completion now waits on
/// this relay instead of the never-connected remainder.
private func markEOSESubscribed(id: String, relayUrl: String) {
guard var tracker = eoseTrackers[id],
tracker.awaitingSend.remove(relayUrl) != nil else { return }
tracker.awaitingEOSE.insert(relayUrl)
tracker.didSend = true
eoseTrackers[id] = tracker
}
private func handleDisconnection(
relayUrl: String,
error: Error,
connection: NostrRelayConnectionProtocol? = nil
) {
if let connection, connections[relayUrl] !== connection { return }
connections.removeValue(forKey: relayUrl) connections.removeValue(forKey: relayUrl)
subscriptions.removeValue(forKey: relayUrl) subscriptions.removeValue(forKey: relayUrl)
let awaitingConfirmation = confirmedSends.compactMap { eventID, state in
state.awaitingRelays.contains(relayUrl) ? eventID : nil
}
for eventID in awaitingConfirmation {
resolveConfirmedSend(eventID: eventID, relayURL: relayUrl, accepted: false)
}
updateRelayStatus(relayUrl, isConnected: false, error: error) updateRelayStatus(relayUrl, isConnected: false, error: error)
settleEOSETrackers(droppingRelay: relayUrl) settleEOSETrackers(droppingRelay: relayUrl)
// If networking is disallowed, do not schedule reconnection // If networking is disallowed, do not schedule reconnection
@@ -1641,29 +1463,6 @@ struct NostrFilter: Encodable {
filter.limit = limit filter.limit = limit
return filter return filter
} }
// For the mesh bridge: rendezvous messages (kind 20000) and presence
// (kind 20001) tagged `#r` with one or more cells (own + neighbors).
static func bridgeRendezvous(_ cells: [String], since: Date? = nil, limit: Int = 200) -> NostrFilter {
var filter = NostrFilter()
filter.kinds = [20000, 20001]
filter.since = since?.timeIntervalSince1970.toInt()
filter.tagFilters = ["r": cells]
filter.limit = limit
return filter
}
// For courier drops: sealed envelopes (kind 1401) parked under rotating
// recipient tags (`#x`, hex). Callers pass every candidate tag (adjacent
// UTC days x recipients) in one filter.
static func courierDrops(recipientTagsHex: [String], since: Date? = nil, limit: Int = 100) -> NostrFilter {
var filter = NostrFilter()
filter.kinds = [NostrProtocol.EventKind.courierDrop.rawValue]
filter.since = since?.timeIntervalSince1970.toInt()
filter.tagFilters = ["x": recipientTagsHex]
filter.limit = limit
return filter
}
} }
// Dynamic coding key for tag filters // Dynamic coding key for tag filters
-41
View File
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>NSPrivacyTracking</key>
<false/>
<key>NSPrivacyTrackingDomains</key>
<array/>
<key>NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes</key>
<array/>
<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypes</key>
<array>
<dict>
<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key>
<string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategoryFileTimestamp</string>
<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key>
<array>
<string>C617.1</string>
<string>3B52.1</string>
</array>
</dict>
<dict>
<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key>
<string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategorySystemBootTime</string>
<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key>
<array>
<string>35F9.1</string>
</array>
</dict>
<dict>
<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPIType</key>
<string>NSPrivacyAccessedAPICategoryUserDefaults</string>
<key>NSPrivacyAccessedAPITypeReasons</key>
<array>
<string>CA92.1</string>
<string>1C8F.1</string>
</array>
</dict>
</array>
</dict>
</plist>
+11 -7
View File
@@ -28,12 +28,14 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
/// Encodes the packet using v2 canonical TLVs (4-byte FILE_SIZE, 4-byte CONTENT length). /// Encodes the packet using v2 canonical TLVs (4-byte FILE_SIZE, 4-byte CONTENT length).
/// Returns `nil` when fields exceed protocol limits (e.g., content > UInt32.max). /// Returns `nil` when fields exceed protocol limits (e.g., content > UInt32.max).
func encode() -> Data? { /// `limit` defaults to the Bluetooth payload cap; Wi-Fi bulk transfers pass
/// `FileTransferLimits.maxWifiBulkPayloadBytes`.
func encode(limit: Int = FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) -> Data? {
let resolvedSize = fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count) let resolvedSize = fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count)
guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(UInt32.max) else { return nil } guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(UInt32.max) else { return nil }
guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) else { return nil } guard resolvedSize <= UInt64(limit) else { return nil }
guard content.count <= Int(UInt32.max) else { return nil } guard content.count <= Int(UInt32.max) else { return nil }
guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count) else { return nil } guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count, limit: limit) else { return nil }
func appendBE<T: FixedWidthInteger>(_ value: T, into data: inout Data) { func appendBE<T: FixedWidthInteger>(_ value: T, into data: inout Data) {
var big = value.bigEndian var big = value.bigEndian
@@ -66,7 +68,9 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
} }
/// Decodes TLV payloads, tolerating legacy encodings (FILE_SIZE len=8, CONTENT len=2) when possible. /// Decodes TLV payloads, tolerating legacy encodings (FILE_SIZE len=8, CONTENT len=2) when possible.
static func decode(_ data: Data) -> BitchatFilePacket? { /// `limit` defaults to the Bluetooth payload cap; Wi-Fi bulk transfers pass
/// the (smaller of the) accepted-offer size and the Wi-Fi bulk ceiling.
static func decode(_ data: Data, limit: Int = FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) -> BitchatFilePacket? {
var cursor = data.startIndex var cursor = data.startIndex
let end = data.endIndex let end = data.endIndex
@@ -126,7 +130,7 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
for byte in value { for byte in value {
size = (size << 8) | UInt64(byte) size = (size << 8) | UInt64(byte)
} }
if size > UInt64(FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) { if size > UInt64(limit) {
return nil return nil
} }
fileSize = size fileSize = size
@@ -135,7 +139,7 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
mimeType = String(data: Data(value), encoding: .utf8) mimeType = String(data: Data(value), encoding: .utf8)
case .content: case .content:
let proposedSize = content.count + value.count let proposedSize = content.count + value.count
if proposedSize > FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes { if proposedSize > limit {
return nil return nil
} }
content.append(contentsOf: value) content.append(contentsOf: value)
@@ -145,7 +149,7 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
} }
guard !content.isEmpty else { return nil } guard !content.isEmpty else { return nil }
guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count) else { return nil } guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(content.count, limit: limit) else { return nil }
return BitchatFilePacket( return BitchatFilePacket(
fileName: fileName, fileName: fileName,
fileSize: fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count), fileSize: fileSize ?? UInt64(content.count),
+6 -11
View File
@@ -74,11 +74,12 @@ enum NoisePayloadType: UInt8 {
case privateMessage = 0x01 // Private chat message case privateMessage = 0x01 // Private chat message
case readReceipt = 0x02 // Message was read case readReceipt = 0x02 // Message was read
case delivered = 0x03 // Message was delivered case delivered = 0x03 // Message was delivered
// Private groups (0x04/0x05 reserved by other features) // Wi-Fi bulk transport negotiation (AWDL data plane for large media)
case bulkTransferOffer = 0x04 // Offer to move a large file over peer-to-peer Wi-Fi
case bulkTransferResponse = 0x05 // Accept/decline reply to a bulk transfer offer
// Private groups
case groupInvite = 0x06 // Creator-signed group state (invite) case groupInvite = 0x06 // Creator-signed group state (invite)
case groupKeyUpdate = 0x07 // Creator-signed group state (key rotation / roster update) case groupKeyUpdate = 0x07 // Creator-signed group state (key rotation / roster update)
// Live voice (push-to-talk)
case voiceFrame = 0x08 // One live voice-burst packet (see VoiceBurstPacket)
// Verification (QR-based OOB binding) // Verification (QR-based OOB binding)
case verifyChallenge = 0x10 // Verification challenge case verifyChallenge = 0x10 // Verification challenge
case verifyResponse = 0x11 // Verification response case verifyResponse = 0x11 // Verification response
@@ -90,9 +91,10 @@ enum NoisePayloadType: UInt8 {
case .privateMessage: return "privateMessage" case .privateMessage: return "privateMessage"
case .readReceipt: return "readReceipt" case .readReceipt: return "readReceipt"
case .delivered: return "delivered" case .delivered: return "delivered"
case .bulkTransferOffer: return "bulkTransferOffer"
case .bulkTransferResponse: return "bulkTransferResponse"
case .groupInvite: return "groupInvite" case .groupInvite: return "groupInvite"
case .groupKeyUpdate: return "groupKeyUpdate" case .groupKeyUpdate: return "groupKeyUpdate"
case .voiceFrame: return "voiceFrame"
case .verifyChallenge: return "verifyChallenge" case .verifyChallenge: return "verifyChallenge"
case .verifyResponse: return "verifyResponse" case .verifyResponse: return "verifyResponse"
case .vouch: return "vouch" case .vouch: return "vouch"
@@ -130,9 +132,6 @@ protocol BitchatDelegate: AnyObject {
// Encrypted group broadcast (opaque envelope; decrypted by the group coordinator) // Encrypted group broadcast (opaque envelope; decrypted by the group coordinator)
func didReceiveGroupMessage(payload: Data, timestamp: Date) func didReceiveGroupMessage(payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
// Public live-voice burst packet (signature-verified by the transport)
func didReceivePublicVoiceFrame(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, payload: Data, timestamp: Date)
// Bluetooth state updates for user notifications // Bluetooth state updates for user notifications
func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState) func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState)
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?)
@@ -156,10 +155,6 @@ extension BitchatDelegate {
// Default empty implementation // Default empty implementation
} }
func didReceivePublicVoiceFrame(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
// Default empty implementation
}
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) { func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {
// Default empty implementation // Default empty implementation
} }
+4 -4
View File
@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ enum Geohash {
return map return map
}() }()
/// Validates a geohash string at any channel precision (1-12 characters). /// Validates a geohash string for building-level precision (8 characters).
/// - Parameter geohash: The geohash string to validate /// - Parameter geohash: The geohash string to validate
/// - Returns: true if a non-empty base32 geohash of at most 12 characters /// - Returns: true if valid 8-character base32 geohash, false otherwise
static func isValidGeohash(_ geohash: String) -> Bool { static func isValidBuildingGeohash(_ geohash: String) -> Bool {
guard (1...12).contains(geohash.count) else { return false } guard geohash.count == 8 else { return false }
return geohash.lowercased().allSatisfy { base32Map[$0] != nil } return geohash.lowercased().allSatisfy { base32Map[$0] != nil }
} }
+6 -6
View File
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ enum GeohashChannelLevel: CaseIterable, Codable, Equatable {
var displayName: String { var displayName: String {
switch self { switch self {
case .building: case .building:
return String(localized: "location_levels.building", comment: "Name for building-level location channel") return String(localized: "location_levels.building", defaultValue: "building", comment: "Name for building-level location channel")
case .block: case .block:
return String(localized: "location_levels.block", comment: "Name for block-level location channel") return String(localized: "location_levels.block", defaultValue: "block", comment: "Name for block-level location channel")
case .neighborhood: case .neighborhood:
return String(localized: "location_levels.neighborhood", comment: "Name for neighborhood-level location channel") return String(localized: "location_levels.neighborhood", defaultValue: "neighborhood", comment: "Name for neighborhood-level location channel")
case .city: case .city:
return String(localized: "location_levels.city", comment: "Name for city-level location channel") return String(localized: "location_levels.city", defaultValue: "city", comment: "Name for city-level location channel")
case .province: case .province:
return String(localized: "location_levels.province", comment: "Name for province-level location channel") return String(localized: "location_levels.province", defaultValue: "province", comment: "Name for province-level location channel")
case .region: case .region:
return String(localized: "location_levels.region", comment: "Name for region-level location channel") return String(localized: "location_levels.region", defaultValue: "region", comment: "Name for region-level location channel")
} }
} }
} }
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
//
// MeshMessageIdentity.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
/// Content-derived identity for public mesh messages.
///
/// The BLE wire carries no message ID for public broadcasts, so every device
/// recomputes the same stable ID from the signed wire fields (sender ID,
/// millisecond timestamp, content). That gives the mesh bridge a
/// cross-device-consistent radio identity with zero wire change. Bridge events
/// carry this value only as a hint for detecting a radio copy that is already
/// present: sender/timestamp/content are public, so a different Nostr signer
/// can copy them and must never be allowed to reserve the genuine event's
/// authenticated dedup slot.
enum MeshMessageIdentity {
/// Matches the wire truncation in `BLEService.sendMessage`.
static func millisecondTimestamp(_ date: Date) -> UInt64 {
UInt64(date.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
}
static func stableID(senderIDHex: String, timestampMs: UInt64, content: String) -> String {
let input = senderIDHex.lowercased() + "|" + String(timestampMs) + "|" + content.trimmed
return String(Data(input.utf8).sha256Hex().prefix(32))
}
}
@@ -32,14 +32,6 @@ struct NostrCarrierPacket: Equatable {
enum Direction: UInt8 { enum Direction: UInt8 {
case toGateway = 0x01 case toGateway = 0x01
case fromGateway = 0x02 case fromGateway = 0x02
/// Mesh-bridge uplink: a mesh-only peer asks a bridge gateway to
/// publish its signed rendezvous event. Directed, like `toGateway`.
case toBridge = 0x03
/// Mesh-bridge downlink: a bridge gateway rebroadcasts a rendezvous
/// event from a remote island. Broadcast, like `fromGateway`.
/// Old clients fail the Direction decode on 0x03/0x04 and drop the
/// carrier quietly bridge traffic degrades to invisible, not junk.
case fromBridge = 0x04
} }
let direction: Direction let direction: Direction
+2 -24
View File
@@ -9,25 +9,19 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
let signingPublicKey: Data // Ed25519 public key for signing let signingPublicKey: Data // Ed25519 public key for signing
let directNeighbors: [Data]? // 8-byte peer IDs let directNeighbors: [Data]? // 8-byte peer IDs
let capabilities: PeerCapabilities? // advertised feature bits; nil when absent (old clients) let capabilities: PeerCapabilities? // advertised feature bits; nil when absent (old clients)
/// Rendezvous geohash cell this peer bridges, when advertising `.bridge`.
/// Coarse (cell-level) by design; lets mesh-only peers compose correctly
/// tagged rendezvous events without their own location fix.
let bridgeGeohash: String?
init( init(
nickname: String, nickname: String,
noisePublicKey: Data, noisePublicKey: Data,
signingPublicKey: Data, signingPublicKey: Data,
directNeighbors: [Data]?, directNeighbors: [Data]?,
capabilities: PeerCapabilities? = nil, capabilities: PeerCapabilities? = nil
bridgeGeohash: String? = nil
) { ) {
self.nickname = nickname self.nickname = nickname
self.noisePublicKey = noisePublicKey self.noisePublicKey = noisePublicKey
self.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey self.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey
self.directNeighbors = directNeighbors self.directNeighbors = directNeighbors
self.capabilities = capabilities self.capabilities = capabilities
self.bridgeGeohash = bridgeGeohash
} }
private enum TLVType: UInt8 { private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
@@ -36,7 +30,6 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
case signingPublicKey = 0x03 case signingPublicKey = 0x03
case directNeighbors = 0x04 case directNeighbors = 0x04
case capabilities = 0x05 case capabilities = 0x05
case bridgeGeohash = 0x06
} }
func encode() -> Data? { func encode() -> Data? {
@@ -81,15 +74,6 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
data.append(capabilityBytes) data.append(capabilityBytes)
} }
// TLV for bridge rendezvous cell (optional; old clients skip it)
if let bridgeGeohash = bridgeGeohash,
let cellData = bridgeGeohash.data(using: .utf8),
!cellData.isEmpty, cellData.count <= 12 {
data.append(TLVType.bridgeGeohash.rawValue)
data.append(UInt8(cellData.count))
data.append(cellData)
}
return data return data
} }
@@ -100,7 +84,6 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
var signingPublicKey: Data? var signingPublicKey: Data?
var directNeighbors: [Data]? var directNeighbors: [Data]?
var capabilities: PeerCapabilities? var capabilities: PeerCapabilities?
var bridgeGeohash: String?
while offset + 2 <= data.count { while offset + 2 <= data.count {
let typeRaw = data[offset] let typeRaw = data[offset]
@@ -133,10 +116,6 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
} }
case .capabilities: case .capabilities:
capabilities = PeerCapabilities(encoded: Data(value)) capabilities = PeerCapabilities(encoded: Data(value))
case .bridgeGeohash:
if length <= 12 {
bridgeGeohash = String(data: value, encoding: .utf8)
}
} }
} else { } else {
// Unknown TLV; skip (tolerant decoder for forward compatibility) // Unknown TLV; skip (tolerant decoder for forward compatibility)
@@ -150,8 +129,7 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey, noisePublicKey: noisePublicKey,
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey, signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
directNeighbors: directNeighbors, directNeighbors: directNeighbors,
capabilities: capabilities, capabilities: capabilities
bridgeGeohash: bridgeGeohash
) )
} }
} }
@@ -3,5 +3,9 @@ import BitFoundation
extension PeerCapabilities { extension PeerCapabilities {
/// Capabilities this build advertises in its announce packets. /// Capabilities this build advertises in its announce packets.
/// Each feature adds its bit here when it ships. /// Each feature adds its bit here when it ships.
static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [.vouch, .prekeys, .groups] static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = {
var caps: PeerCapabilities = [.prekeys, .vouch, .groups]
if TransportConfig.wifiBulkEnabled { caps.insert(.wifiBulk) }
return caps
}()
} }
-220
View File
@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
//
// VoiceBurstPacket.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Foundation
import Security
/// Audio codec of a live voice burst. START packets carry it so receivers can
/// reject bursts they can't decode instead of feeding garbage to the decoder.
enum VoiceBurstCodec: UInt8 {
/// AAC-LC, 16 kHz, mono, ~16 kbps matches the voice-note recorder, so
/// the finalized `.m4a` and the live frames come from the same encoder
/// settings.
case aacLC16kMono = 0x01
}
/// One packet of a live push-to-talk voice burst (the inner payload of
/// `NoisePayloadType.voiceFrame`, and for public mesh bursts the payload
/// of `MessageType.voiceFrame`).
///
/// Wire format:
/// ```
/// [burstID: 8][seq: UInt16 BE][flags: UInt8][payload]
/// ```
/// - flags 0x01 (START): payload = [codec: UInt8]
/// - flags 0x02 (END): payload = [totalDataPackets: UInt16 BE][durationMs: UInt32 BE]
/// - flags 0x04 (CANCELED): empty payload; receivers discard the burst
/// - flags 0x00 (data): payload = repeated [length: UInt16 BE][AAC frame]
struct VoiceBurstPacket: Equatable {
enum Kind: Equatable {
case start(codec: VoiceBurstCodec)
case frames([Data])
case end(totalDataPackets: UInt16, durationMs: UInt32)
case canceled
}
static let burstIDSize = 8
private static let headerSize = burstIDSize + 2 + 1
/// Sanity cap on frames per packet; real packets carry 1-2 frames.
static let maxFramesPerPacket = 8
private enum Flags {
static let start: UInt8 = 0x01
static let end: UInt8 = 0x02
static let canceled: UInt8 = 0x04
}
let burstID: Data
let seq: UInt16
let kind: Kind
init?(burstID: Data, seq: UInt16, kind: Kind) {
guard burstID.count == Self.burstIDSize else { return nil }
if case .frames(let frames) = kind {
guard !frames.isEmpty,
frames.count <= Self.maxFramesPerPacket,
frames.allSatisfy({ !$0.isEmpty && $0.count <= Int(UInt16.max) })
else { return nil }
}
self.burstID = burstID
self.seq = seq
self.kind = kind
}
func encode() -> Data {
var data = Data(capacity: Self.headerSize + payloadSize)
data.append(burstID)
data.append(UInt8((seq >> 8) & 0xFF))
data.append(UInt8(seq & 0xFF))
switch kind {
case .start(let codec):
data.append(Flags.start)
data.append(codec.rawValue)
case .frames(let frames):
data.append(0)
for frame in frames {
let length = UInt16(frame.count)
data.append(UInt8((length >> 8) & 0xFF))
data.append(UInt8(length & 0xFF))
data.append(frame)
}
case .end(let totalDataPackets, let durationMs):
data.append(Flags.end)
data.append(UInt8((totalDataPackets >> 8) & 0xFF))
data.append(UInt8(totalDataPackets & 0xFF))
for shift in stride(from: 24, through: 0, by: -8) {
data.append(UInt8((durationMs >> UInt32(shift)) & 0xFF))
}
case .canceled:
data.append(Flags.canceled)
}
return data
}
static func decode(_ data: Data) -> VoiceBurstPacket? {
// Work on a re-based copy so subscripting is offset-safe.
let data = Data(data)
guard data.count >= headerSize else { return nil }
let burstID = data.prefix(burstIDSize)
let seq = (UInt16(data[burstIDSize]) << 8) | UInt16(data[burstIDSize + 1])
let flags = data[burstIDSize + 2]
let payload = data.dropFirst(headerSize)
let kind: Kind
switch flags {
case Flags.start:
guard let codecByte = payload.first,
let codec = VoiceBurstCodec(rawValue: codecByte)
else { return nil }
kind = .start(codec: codec)
case Flags.end:
guard payload.count >= 6 else { return nil }
let bytes = Array(payload)
let total = (UInt16(bytes[0]) << 8) | UInt16(bytes[1])
let duration = bytes[2...5].reduce(UInt32(0)) { ($0 << 8) | UInt32($1) }
kind = .end(totalDataPackets: total, durationMs: duration)
case Flags.canceled:
kind = .canceled
case 0:
var frames: [Data] = []
var offset = payload.startIndex
while offset < payload.endIndex {
guard payload.distance(from: offset, to: payload.endIndex) >= 2 else { return nil }
let length = (Int(payload[offset]) << 8) | Int(payload[payload.index(after: offset)])
offset = payload.index(offset, offsetBy: 2)
guard length > 0,
payload.distance(from: offset, to: payload.endIndex) >= length,
frames.count < maxFramesPerPacket
else { return nil }
let end = payload.index(offset, offsetBy: length)
frames.append(Data(payload[offset..<end]))
offset = end
}
guard !frames.isEmpty else { return nil }
kind = .frames(frames)
default:
return nil
}
return VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: Data(burstID), seq: seq, kind: kind)
}
static func makeBurstID() -> Data {
var bytes = Data(count: burstIDSize)
let result = bytes.withUnsafeMutableBytes {
SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault, burstIDSize, $0.baseAddress!)
}
guard result == errSecSuccess else {
return Data((0..<burstIDSize).map { _ in UInt8.random(in: .min ... .max) })
}
return bytes
}
private var payloadSize: Int {
switch kind {
case .start: return 1
case .frames(let frames): return frames.reduce(0) { $0 + 2 + $1.count }
case .end: return 6
case .canceled: return 0
}
}
}
/// Greedy packetizer for outgoing bursts: batches encoded frames into
/// `VoiceBurstPacket`s without exceeding the byte budget that keeps each
/// packet in a single BLE frame after Noise encryption and padding.
/// Not thread-safe confine to one queue.
struct VoiceBurstPacketizer {
let burstID: Data
private let budget: Int
private var pendingFrames: [Data] = []
private var pendingSize = 0
/// seq 0 is reserved for START; data packets start at 1.
private(set) var nextSeq: UInt16 = 1
private(set) var dataPacketCount: UInt16 = 0
init(burstID: Data, budget: Int = TransportConfig.pttMaxBurstContentBytes) {
self.burstID = burstID
self.budget = budget
}
/// Adds one encoded frame, returning any packets that became full.
/// Frames larger than the budget are dropped (the encoder's ~130-byte
/// frames never hit this; it guards against misconfiguration looping).
mutating func add(_ frame: Data) -> [Data] {
let frameCost = 2 + frame.count
guard VoiceBurstPacket.burstIDSize + 3 + frameCost <= budget else { return [] }
var packets: [Data] = []
if !pendingFrames.isEmpty,
VoiceBurstPacket.burstIDSize + 3 + pendingSize + frameCost > budget
|| pendingFrames.count >= VoiceBurstPacket.maxFramesPerPacket {
packets.append(contentsOf: flush())
}
pendingFrames.append(frame)
pendingSize += frameCost
return packets
}
/// Emits any buffered frames as a final data packet.
mutating func flush() -> [Data] {
guard !pendingFrames.isEmpty,
let packet = VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: nextSeq, kind: .frames(pendingFrames))
else {
pendingFrames = []
pendingSize = 0
return []
}
pendingFrames = []
pendingSize = 0
nextSeq &+= 1
dataPacketCount &+= 1
return [packet.encode()]
}
}
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ import Foundation
/// Manages autocomplete functionality for chat /// Manages autocomplete functionality for chat
final class AutocompleteService { final class AutocompleteService {
private let mentionRegex = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "@([\\p{L}0-9_]*)$", options: []) private let mentionRegex = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "@([\\p{L}0-9_]*)$", options: [])
private let commandRegex = try? NSRegularExpression(pattern: "^/([a-z]*)$", options: [])
private let commands = [
"/msg", "/who", "/clear",
"/hug", "/slap", "/fav", "/unfav",
"/block", "/unblock"
]
/// Get autocomplete suggestions for current text /// Get autocomplete suggestions for current text
func getSuggestions(for text: String, peers: [String], cursorPosition: Int) -> (suggestions: [String], range: NSRange?) { func getSuggestions(for text: String, peers: [String], cursorPosition: Int) -> (suggestions: [String], range: NSRange?) {
@@ -66,6 +73,26 @@ final class AutocompleteService {
return suggestions.isEmpty ? nil : (Array(suggestions), fullRange) return suggestions.isEmpty ? nil : (Array(suggestions), fullRange)
} }
private func getCommandSuggestions(_ text: String) -> ([String], NSRange)? {
guard let regex = commandRegex else { return nil }
let nsText = text as NSString
let matches = regex.matches(in: text, options: [], range: NSRange(location: 0, length: nsText.length))
guard let match = matches.last else { return nil }
let fullRange = match.range(at: 0)
let captureRange = match.range(at: 1)
let prefix = nsText.substring(with: captureRange).lowercased()
let suggestions = commands
.filter { $0.hasPrefix("/\(prefix)") }
.sorted()
.prefix(5)
return suggestions.isEmpty ? nil : (Array(suggestions), fullRange)
}
private func needsArgument(command: String) -> Bool { private func needsArgument(command: String) -> Bool {
switch command { switch command {
case "/who", "/clear": case "/who", "/clear":
+1 -24
View File
@@ -20,12 +20,6 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
let verifySignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool let verifySignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool
/// Direct link state for the peer (BLE-queue read). /// Direct link state for the peer (BLE-queue read).
let linkState: (PeerID) -> (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool) let linkState: (PeerID) -> (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool)
/// Whether the link this packet arrived on is already bound to a
/// different peer ID (ingress-registry + BLE-queue read). Directness
/// rides on the unsigned TTL, so a replayed announce can look "direct"
/// on the replayer's link; that link must not shortcut an absent peer
/// into "connected".
let linkBoundToOtherPeer: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool
/// Runs the registry mutation phase under the collections barrier. /// Runs the registry mutation phase under the collections barrier.
let withRegistryBarrier: (() -> Void) -> Void let withRegistryBarrier: (() -> Void) -> Void
/// Upserts the verified announce into the peer registry. /// Upserts the verified announce into the peer registry.
@@ -141,23 +135,6 @@ final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
var isReconnectedPeer = false var isReconnectedPeer = false
let directLinkState = env.linkState(peerID) let directLinkState = env.linkState(peerID)
let isDirectAnnounce = packet.ttl == env.messageTTL let isDirectAnnounce = packet.ttl == env.messageTTL
// A "direct" announce arriving on a link that another peer already
// owns is either a rotation heal or a replay with its TTL restored;
// both are ambiguous, so only the rebind (which containment-checks
// the claimed identity) may promote it never this shortcut.
//
// Known limitation: denying the shortcut cannot prevent forged
// presence outright. A rebind that passes the containment checks
// promotes the claimed peer to connected it must, or a legitimate
// rotation on an open link would read as disconnected so a replay
// that wins the rebind (absent victim, cooldown clear) still forges
// presence. That residue is presence display only: DMs stay gated on
// canDeliverSecurely (no Noise session means retain + courier, see
// MessageRouter.sendPrivate). What this check buys: the ambiguous
// announce alone never flips presence forging requires winning the
// containment-checked rebind (never steals an identity that owns a
// live link; at most one rebind per link per cooldown window).
let linkBoundToOtherPeer = isDirectAnnounce && env.linkBoundToOtherPeer(packet, peerID)
env.withRegistryBarrier { env.withRegistryBarrier {
let hasPeripheralConnection = directLinkState.hasPeripheral let hasPeripheralConnection = directLinkState.hasPeripheral
@@ -175,7 +152,7 @@ final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
let update = env.upsertVerifiedAnnounce( let update = env.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID, peerID,
announcement, announcement,
hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription || (isDirectAnnounce && !linkBoundToOtherPeer), isDirectAnnounce || hasPeripheralConnection || hasCentralSubscription,
now now
) )
isNewPeer = update.isNewPeer isNewPeer = update.isNewPeer
+11 -47
View File
@@ -15,10 +15,7 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
excludedLinks: Set<BLEIngressLinkID> = [], excludedLinks: Set<BLEIngressLinkID> = [],
peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:], peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:], centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
preferredPeripheralPerPeer: [PeerID: String] = [:],
collapseDuplicatePeerLinks: Bool = true,
directedPeerHint: PeerID?, directedPeerHint: PeerID?,
requireDirectPeerLink: Bool = false,
packetType: UInt8, packetType: UInt8,
messageID: String messageID: String
) -> BLEFanoutSelection { ) -> BLEFanoutSelection {
@@ -34,14 +31,10 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
to: directedPeerHint, to: directedPeerHint,
links: rawAllowed, links: rawAllowed,
peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings, peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings, centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
preferredPeripheralPerPeer: preferredPeripheralPerPeer
) { ) {
return directedSelection return directedSelection
} }
if directedPeerHint != nil, requireDirectPeerLink {
return BLEFanoutSelection(peripheralIDs: [], centralIDs: [])
}
if let directedPeerHint, if let directedPeerHint,
hasBoundLink( hasBoundLink(
to: directedPeerHint, to: directedPeerHint,
@@ -53,20 +46,11 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
return BLEFanoutSelection(peripheralIDs: [], centralIDs: []) return BLEFanoutSelection(peripheralIDs: [], centralIDs: [])
} }
// Direct announces are the packet that binds a link to its peer let allowed = collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
// (BLEService's raw bind and verified rebind). Collapsing them per rawAllowed,
// peer starves duplicate same-peer links of the announce they need to peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
// become bound the duplicates then look "pre-announce" forever and centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
// every broadcast sprays down all of them. Announces are small and )
// throttled, so they go on every live link.
let allowed = collapseDuplicatePeerLinks
? collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
rawAllowed,
peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings,
preferredPeripheralPerPeer: preferredPeripheralPerPeer
)
: rawAllowed
guard shouldSubset(packetType: packetType, directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint) else { guard shouldSubset(packetType: packetType, directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint) else {
return BLEFanoutSelection( return BLEFanoutSelection(
@@ -113,8 +97,7 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
to peerID: PeerID, to peerID: PeerID,
links: (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]), links: (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]),
peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID], peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID], centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID]
preferredPeripheralPerPeer: [PeerID: String]
) -> BLEFanoutSelection? { ) -> BLEFanoutSelection? {
let directLinks = collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer( let directLinks = collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
( (
@@ -122,8 +105,7 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
centralIDs: links.centralIDs.filter { centralPeerBindings[$0] == peerID } centralIDs: links.centralIDs.filter { centralPeerBindings[$0] == peerID }
), ),
peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings, peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings, centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings
preferredPeripheralPerPeer: preferredPeripheralPerPeer
) )
guard !directLinks.peripheralIDs.isEmpty || !directLinks.centralIDs.isEmpty else { guard !directLinks.peripheralIDs.isEmpty || !directLinks.centralIDs.isEmpty else {
@@ -158,8 +140,7 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
private static func collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer( private static func collapseDuplicateLinksPerPeer(
_ links: (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]), _ links: (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]),
peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID], peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID],
centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID], centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID]
preferredPeripheralPerPeer: [PeerID: String]
) -> (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]) { ) -> (peripheralIDs: [String], centralIDs: [String]) {
guard !peripheralPeerBindings.isEmpty || !centralPeerBindings.isEmpty else { guard !peripheralPeerBindings.isEmpty || !centralPeerBindings.isEmpty else {
return links return links
@@ -167,30 +148,13 @@ enum BLEFanoutSelector {
var seenPeers = Set<PeerID>() var seenPeers = Set<PeerID>()
var keptPeripheralIDs: [String] = [] var keptPeripheralIDs: [String] = []
// When a peer has several bound peripheral links (duplicate
// connections after a restore), collapse onto its preferred one (the
// most recently bound) instead of dictionary order an arbitrary
// pick could route a peer's single collapsed copy down a stale link.
for id in links.peripheralIDs { for id in links.peripheralIDs {
guard let peer = peripheralPeerBindings[id], if let peer = peripheralPeerBindings[id], !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted {
preferredPeripheralPerPeer[peer] == id, continue
seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted else { continue }
keptPeripheralIDs.append(id)
}
for id in links.peripheralIDs {
if let peer = peripheralPeerBindings[id] {
if preferredPeripheralPerPeer[peer] == id { continue }
if !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted { continue }
} }
keptPeripheralIDs.append(id) keptPeripheralIDs.append(id)
} }
// Known limitation: centrals collapse in subscription order (oldest
// first) there is no recency signal like the peripheral reverse
// map. A central-only peer with duplicate subscriptions rides the
// oldest one until the remote side (which owns those connections)
// consolidates on its next verified announce (bounded by its
// retirement cooldown).
var keptCentralIDs: [String] = [] var keptCentralIDs: [String] = []
for id in links.centralIDs { for id in links.centralIDs {
if let peer = centralPeerBindings[id], !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted { if let peer = centralPeerBindings[id], !seenPeers.insert(peer).inserted {
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment {
let localNickname: () -> String let localNickname: () -> String
/// Snapshot of known peers keyed by ID (registry read). /// Snapshot of known peers keyed by ID (registry read).
let peersSnapshot: () -> [PeerID: BLEPeerInfo] let peersSnapshot: () -> [PeerID: BLEPeerInfo]
/// Verifies a packet's signature against a candidate signing key (registry path).
let verifyPacketSignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool
/// Resolves a display name from a verified packet signature for peers missing from the registry. /// Resolves a display name from a verified packet signature for peers missing from the registry.
let signedSenderDisplayName: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ peerID: PeerID) -> String? let signedSenderDisplayName: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ peerID: PeerID) -> String?
/// Tracks the broadcast file packet for gossip sync. /// Tracks the broadcast file packet for gossip sync.
@@ -46,54 +44,49 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
self.environment = environment self.environment = environment
} }
/// Returns `false` when the packet fails sender authentication and must /// `payloadLimit` defaults to the Bluetooth cap; Wi-Fi bulk deliveries
/// not be relayed onward. Every other outcome returns `true`: files /// pass the ceiling that was enforced against the accepted offer.
/// directed to another peer are forwarded untouched, and local-only drops func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID, payloadLimit: Int = FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes) {
/// (malformed payload, quota, save failure) don't affect multi-hop
/// delivery to nodes that may handle them fine.
@discardableResult
func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
let env = environment let env = environment
if BLEFileTransferPolicy.isSelfEcho(packet: packet, from: peerID, localPeerID: env.localPeerID()) { return true } if BLEFileTransferPolicy.isSelfEcho(packet: packet, from: peerID, localPeerID: env.localPeerID()) { return }
guard let deliveryPlan = BLEFileTransferPolicy.deliveryPlan(packet: packet, localPeerID: env.localPeerID()) else {
return true
}
let peersSnapshot = env.peersSnapshot() let peersSnapshot = env.peersSnapshot()
guard let senderNickname = resolveSenderNickname( guard let senderNickname = BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.resolveKnownPeer(
packet: packet, peerID: peerID,
from: peerID, localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
isBroadcast: !deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage, localNickname: env.localNickname(),
peers: peersSnapshot, peers: peersSnapshot,
env: env allowConnectedUnverified: true
) else { ) ?? env.signedSenderDisplayName(packet, peerID) else {
SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping file transfer from unverified or unknown peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security) SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping file transfer from unverified or unknown peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security)
return false return
} }
guard let deliveryPlan = BLEFileTransferPolicy.deliveryPlan(packet: packet, localPeerID: env.localPeerID()) else {
return
}
if deliveryPlan.shouldTrackForSync { if deliveryPlan.shouldTrackForSync {
env.trackPacketSeen(packet) env.trackPacketSeen(packet)
} }
let filePacket: BitchatFilePacket let filePacket: BitchatFilePacket
let mime: MimeType let mime: MimeType
switch BLEIncomingFileValidator.validate(payload: packet.payload) { switch BLEIncomingFileValidator.validate(payload: packet.payload, limit: payloadLimit) {
case .success(let acceptance): case .success(let acceptance):
filePacket = acceptance.filePacket filePacket = acceptance.filePacket
mime = acceptance.mime mime = acceptance.mime
case .failure(.malformedPayload): case .failure(.malformedPayload):
SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decode file transfer payload", category: .session) SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decode file transfer payload", category: .session)
return true return
case .failure(.payloadTooLarge(let bytes)): case .failure(.payloadTooLarge(let bytes)):
SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping file transfer exceeding size cap (\(bytes) bytes)", category: .security) SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping file transfer exceeding size cap (\(bytes) bytes)", category: .security)
return true return
case .failure(.unsupportedMime(let mimeType, let bytes)): case .failure(.unsupportedMime(let mimeType, let bytes)):
SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MIME REJECT: '\(mimeType ?? "<empty>")' not supported. Size=\(bytes)b from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security) SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MIME REJECT: '\(mimeType ?? "<empty>")' not supported. Size=\(bytes)b from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security)
return true return
case .failure(.magicMismatch(let mime, let bytes, let prefixHex)): case .failure(.magicMismatch(let mime, let bytes, let prefixHex)):
SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MAGIC REJECT: MIME='\(mime)' size=\(bytes)b prefix=[\(prefixHex)] from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security) SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MAGIC REJECT: MIME='\(mime)' size=\(bytes)b prefix=[\(prefixHex)] from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security)
return true return
} }
// BCH-01-002: Enforce storage quota before saving // BCH-01-002: Enforce storage quota before saving
@@ -106,7 +99,7 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
mime.defaultExtension, mime.defaultExtension,
mime.category.rawValue mime.category.rawValue
) else { ) else {
return true return
} }
if deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage { if deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage {
@@ -122,66 +115,11 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
originalSender: nil, originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage, isPrivate: deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage,
recipientNickname: nil, recipientNickname: nil,
senderPeerID: peerID, senderPeerID: peerID
// Received messages need an explicit status: BitchatMessage
// defaults private messages to .sending, which the media views
// render as an in-flight send (empty reveal mask, disabled tap).
deliveryStatus: deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage
? .delivered(to: env.localNickname(), at: ts)
: nil
) )
SecureLogger.debug("📁 Stored incoming media from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… -> \(destination.lastPathComponent)", category: .session) SecureLogger.debug("📁 Stored incoming media from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… -> \(destination.lastPathComponent)", category: .session)
env.deliverMessage(message) env.deliverMessage(message)
return true
}
/// Resolves the authenticated display name for a file transfer's sender.
///
/// Directed (private) transfers are addressed to us specifically and keep
/// the lenient connected-peer path. Broadcast transfers carry an
/// attacker-controllable `senderID` exactly like public messages and public
/// voice frames registry membership alone is NOT proof of identity, so a
/// valid packet signature from the claimed sender is required before we
/// trust it. Without this, a peer that observed a public voice burst could
/// spoof a broadcast `voice_<burstID>.m4a` note under the talker's ID and
/// overwrite the signature-verified live bubble with attacker audio.
private func resolveSenderNickname(
packet: BitchatPacket,
from peerID: PeerID,
isBroadcast: Bool,
peers: [PeerID: BLEPeerInfo],
env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
) -> String? {
guard isBroadcast else {
return BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.resolveKnownPeer(
peerID: peerID,
localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
localNickname: env.localNickname(),
peers: peers,
allowConnectedUnverified: true
) ?? env.signedSenderDisplayName(packet, peerID)
}
// Our own broadcasts replayed back via gossip sync (ttl==0) are
// trivially authentic and cannot be verified against the peer registry
// or identity cache, so exempt self exactly as `BLEPublicMessageHandler`
// does. Verify against the signing key already in the
// (synchronously-updated) registry first, then fall back to the
// persisted-identity signature lookup for peers not yet cached there.
let isSelf = peerID == env.localPeerID()
let registrySigningKey = peers[peerID]?.signingPublicKey
let verifiedViaRegistry = !isSelf && (registrySigningKey.map { env.verifyPacketSignature(packet, $0) } ?? false)
let signedDisplayName = (isSelf || verifiedViaRegistry) ? nil : env.signedSenderDisplayName(packet, peerID)
guard isSelf || verifiedViaRegistry || signedDisplayName != nil else { return nil }
return BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.resolveKnownPeer(
peerID: peerID,
localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
localNickname: env.localNickname(),
peers: peers,
allowConnectedUnverified: false
) ?? signedDisplayName
} }
} }
@@ -42,12 +42,17 @@ enum BLEIncomingFileRejection: Error, Equatable {
} }
enum BLEIncomingFileValidator { enum BLEIncomingFileValidator {
static func validate(payload: Data) -> Result<BLEIncomingFileAcceptance, BLEIncomingFileRejection> { /// `limit` defaults to the Bluetooth payload cap; Wi-Fi bulk deliveries
guard let filePacket = BitchatFilePacket.decode(payload) else { /// pass the ceiling enforced against the accepted offer.
static func validate(
payload: Data,
limit: Int = FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes
) -> Result<BLEIncomingFileAcceptance, BLEIncomingFileRejection> {
guard let filePacket = BitchatFilePacket.decode(payload, limit: limit) else {
return .failure(.malformedPayload) return .failure(.malformedPayload)
} }
guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(filePacket.content.count) else { guard FileTransferLimits.isValidPayload(filePacket.content.count, limit: limit) else {
return .failure(.payloadTooLarge(bytes: filePacket.content.count)) return .failure(.payloadTooLarge(bytes: filePacket.content.count))
} }
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer {
} }
private struct Metadata { private struct Metadata {
let type: UInt8
let total: Int let total: Int
let timestamp: Date let timestamp: Date
let isBroadcast: Bool let isBroadcast: Bool
@@ -149,6 +150,7 @@ struct BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer {
fragmentsByKey[header.key] = [:] fragmentsByKey[header.key] = [:]
metadataByKey[header.key] = Metadata( metadataByKey[header.key] = Metadata(
type: header.originalType,
total: header.total, total: header.total,
timestamp: now, timestamp: now,
isBroadcast: header.isBroadcastFragment, isBroadcast: header.isBroadcastFragment,
+3 -11
View File
@@ -33,21 +33,13 @@ final class BLEFragmentHandler {
func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) { func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
let env = environment let env = environment
guard let header = BLEFragmentHeader(packet: packet) else { return } // Don't process our own fragments
// Sync replay legitimately hands us our own fragments back (the RSR
// ttl=0 restore path): after a relaunch the fragment store starts
// empty, so our sync filter doesn't cover them and peers re-offer
// them. Record them as seen the next round's filter then covers
// them and the redelivery stops but skip assembly: we authored
// the original, there is nothing to reassemble.
if peerID == env.localPeerID() { if peerID == env.localPeerID() {
if header.isBroadcastFragment {
env.trackPacketSeen(packet)
}
return return
} }
guard let header = BLEFragmentHeader(packet: packet) else { return }
if header.isBroadcastFragment { if header.isBroadcastFragment {
env.trackPacketSeen(packet) env.trackPacketSeen(packet)
} }
@@ -5,16 +5,7 @@ import Foundation
struct BLEIncomingFileStore { struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
private static let quotaBytes: Int64 = 100 * 1024 * 1024 private static let quotaBytes: Int64 = 100 * 1024 * 1024
/// Name prefix of in-flight live voice captures (progressively written by private let fileManager: FileManager
/// `ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator`). Quota eviction skips them by pattern
/// deleting one mid-stream unlinks the inode under an open `FileHandle`
/// and kills playback and the coordinator's startup sweep deletes any
/// orphans a previous session left behind.
static let liveCapturePrefix = "voice_live_"
/// Exposed so callers that write progressively into the store's
/// directories (live voice captures) share the same file manager.
let fileManager: FileManager
private let baseDirectory: URL? private let baseDirectory: URL?
private let dateProvider: () -> Date private let dateProvider: () -> Date
@@ -24,14 +15,6 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
self.dateProvider = dateProvider self.dateProvider = dateProvider
} }
/// Resolves (and creates) an incoming-media directory for callers that
/// write progressively instead of via `save` (live voice captures).
func incomingDirectory(subdirectory: String) throws -> URL {
let directory = try filesDirectory().appendingPathComponent(subdirectory, isDirectory: true)
try fileManager.createDirectory(at: directory, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
return directory
}
func save( func save(
data: Data, data: Data,
preferredName: String?, preferredName: String?,
@@ -56,11 +39,6 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
} }
} }
/// Frees least-recently-modified incoming files until `reservingBytes`
/// fits under the quota. Files named `voice_live_*` (in-flight live
/// captures) are never evicted regardless of who triggers enforcement
/// a finalized transfer can arrive at quota while a burst is still
/// streaming but they still count toward usage.
func enforceQuota(reservingBytes: Int) { func enforceQuota(reservingBytes: Int) {
do { do {
let base = try filesDirectory() let base = try filesDirectory()
@@ -94,7 +72,6 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
var freedSpace: Int64 = 0 var freedSpace: Int64 = 0
for file in allFiles.sorted(by: { $0.modified < $1.modified }) { for file in allFiles.sorted(by: { $0.modified < $1.modified }) {
guard freedSpace < needToFree else { break } guard freedSpace < needToFree else { break }
guard !file.url.lastPathComponent.hasPrefix(Self.liveCapturePrefix) else { continue }
do { do {
try fileManager.removeItem(at: file.url) try fileManager.removeItem(at: file.url)
freedSpace += file.size freedSpace += file.size
@@ -78,21 +78,10 @@ struct BLEIngressLinkRegistry {
return .failure(.selfLoopback(packetType: packet.type)) return .failure(.selfLoopback(packetType: packet.type))
} }
if let boundPeerID, boundPeerID != claimedSenderID { if let boundPeerID,
if requiresDirectSenderBinding(packet) { boundPeerID != claimedSenderID,
return .failure(.directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: boundPeerID, claimedSenderID: claimedSenderID)) requiresDirectSenderBinding(packet, directAnnounceTTL: directAnnounceTTL) {
} return .failure(.directSenderMismatch(boundPeerID: boundPeerID, claimedSenderID: claimedSenderID))
// A direct announce claiming a new sender on a bound link is either
// a spoof or a legitimate peer-ID rotation on a connection that
// outlived the old ID. Attribute it to the claimed sender and let
// it through: announces are self-authenticating, and only a
// signature-verified announce may rebind the link (BLEService).
if isDirectAnnounce(packet, directAnnounceTTL: directAnnounceTTL) {
return .success(BLEIngressPacketContext(
receivedFromPeerID: claimedSenderID,
validationPeerID: claimedSenderID
))
}
} }
let receivedFromPeerID = boundPeerID ?? claimedSenderID let receivedFromPeerID = boundPeerID ?? claimedSenderID
@@ -109,15 +98,12 @@ struct BLEIngressLinkRegistry {
return "\(senderID)-\(packet.timestamp)-\(packet.type)-\(digestPrefix)" return "\(senderID)-\(packet.timestamp)-\(packet.type)-\(digestPrefix)"
} }
private static func requiresDirectSenderBinding(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> Bool { private static func requiresDirectSenderBinding(_ packet: BitchatPacket, directAnnounceTTL: UInt8) -> Bool {
// REQUEST_SYNC is never relayed, so on a bound link the claimed sender // REQUEST_SYNC is never relayed, so on a bound link the claimed sender
// must be the link peer it elicits a full store replay, and the // must be the link peer it elicits a full store replay, and the
// response is addressed to whoever the sender claims to be. // response is addressed to whoever the sender claims to be.
packet.type == MessageType.requestSync.rawValue if packet.type == MessageType.requestSync.rawValue { return true }
} return packet.type == MessageType.announce.rawValue && packet.ttl == directAnnounceTTL
static func isDirectAnnounce(_ packet: BitchatPacket, directAnnounceTTL: UInt8) -> Bool {
packet.type == MessageType.announce.rawValue && packet.ttl == directAnnounceTTL
} }
private static func isSelfAuthoredSyncResponse(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> Bool { private static func isSelfAuthoredSyncResponse(_ packet: BitchatPacket) -> Bool {
+5 -37
View File
@@ -164,11 +164,7 @@ final class BLELinkStateStore {
guard let peerID else { return [] } guard let peerID else { return [] }
var links: Set<BLEIngressLinkID> = [] var links: Set<BLEIngressLinkID> = []
// Scan all states rather than the 1:1 reverse map: after a state if let peripheralUUID = peerToPeripheralUUID[peerID] {
// restoration the same device can hold several live peripheral links
// bound to one peer (it reappears under a fresh UUID while the
// restored connection lives on).
for (peripheralUUID, state) in peripherals where state.peerID == peerID {
links.insert(.peripheral(peripheralUUID)) links.insert(.peripheral(peripheralUUID))
} }
for (centralUUID, mappedPeerID) in centralToPeerID where mappedPeerID == peerID { for (centralUUID, mappedPeerID) in centralToPeerID where mappedPeerID == peerID {
@@ -177,13 +173,6 @@ final class BLELinkStateStore {
return links return links
} }
/// The peer's most recently bound peripheral link, per peer. Used to keep
/// duplicate-link fanout collapse deterministic (see BLEFanoutSelector).
var preferredPeripheralBindings: [PeerID: String] {
assertOwned()
return peerToPeripheralUUID
}
func peerID(forPeripheralID peripheralID: String) -> PeerID? { func peerID(forPeripheralID peripheralID: String) -> PeerID? {
assertOwned() assertOwned()
return peripherals[peripheralID]?.peerID return peripherals[peripheralID]?.peerID
@@ -214,37 +203,16 @@ final class BLELinkStateStore {
func bindPeripheral(_ peripheralUUID: String, to peerID: PeerID) { func bindPeripheral(_ peripheralUUID: String, to peerID: PeerID) {
assertOwned() assertOwned()
var previousPeerID: PeerID? if updatePeripheral(peripheralUUID, { $0.peerID = peerID }) != nil {
let updated = updatePeripheral(peripheralUUID) { peerToPeripheralUUID[peerID] = peripheralUUID
previousPeerID = $0.peerID
$0.peerID = peerID
} }
guard updated != nil else { return }
// Rebinding (peer-ID rotation): drop the retired ID's reverse mapping
// so the old peer no longer claims this link.
if let previousPeerID, previousPeerID != peerID,
peerToPeripheralUUID[previousPeerID] == peripheralUUID {
peerToPeripheralUUID.removeValue(forKey: previousPeerID)
}
peerToPeripheralUUID[peerID] = peripheralUUID
} }
func removePeripheral(_ peripheralID: String) -> PeerID? { func removePeripheral(_ peripheralID: String) -> PeerID? {
assertOwned() assertOwned()
let peerID = peripherals.removeValue(forKey: peripheralID)?.peerID let peerID = peripherals.removeValue(forKey: peripheralID)?.peerID
// Only clear (or repair) the reverse map when it points at the removed if let peerID {
// link: with duplicate links to one peer, removing a stale duplicate peerToPeripheralUUID.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
// must not strand the peer's surviving bound link.
if let peerID, peerToPeripheralUUID[peerID] == peripheralID {
// Prefer a writable survivor: repairing onto a link that is
// mid-service-rediscovery would strand directed sends until the
// characteristic comes back.
let survivors = peripherals.filter { $0.value.peerID == peerID && $0.value.isConnected }
if let survivorUUID = survivors.first(where: { $0.value.characteristic != nil })?.key ?? survivors.first?.key {
peerToPeripheralUUID[peerID] = survivorUUID
} else {
peerToPeripheralUUID.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
}
} }
return peerID return peerID
} }
@@ -25,4 +25,9 @@ final class BLELogRateLimiter {
} }
} }
func removeAll() {
queue.sync {
lastLogTimeByKey.removeAll()
}
}
} }
@@ -7,54 +7,11 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest {
let maxChunk: Int? let maxChunk: Int?
let directedPeer: PeerID? let directedPeer: PeerID?
let transferId: String? let transferId: String?
let requireDirectPeerLink: Bool
let requireNoiseAuthenticatedPeerLink: Bool
init(
packet: BitchatPacket,
pad: Bool,
maxChunk: Int?,
directedPeer: PeerID?,
transferId: String?,
requireDirectPeerLink: Bool = false,
requireNoiseAuthenticatedPeerLink: Bool = false
) {
self.packet = packet
self.pad = pad
self.maxChunk = maxChunk
self.directedPeer = directedPeer
self.transferId = transferId
self.requireDirectPeerLink = requireDirectPeerLink
self.requireNoiseAuthenticatedPeerLink = requireNoiseAuthenticatedPeerLink
}
var resolvedTransferId: String? { var resolvedTransferId: String? {
guard packet.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue else { return nil } guard packet.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue else { return nil }
return transferId ?? packet.payload.sha256Hex() return transferId ?? packet.payload.sha256Hex()
} }
/// Content identity independent of the caller-chosen transfer ID: the
/// same file resent through another path (gossip-sync replay, retry)
/// arrives with a different explicit transferId but identical payload.
var contentKey: String? {
guard packet.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue else { return nil }
return packet.payload.sha256Hex()
}
}
/// Transactional admission for strict fragment trains. Durable callers may
/// commit only when every fragment was accepted; the first rejection stops
/// the train and reports failure so the original remains retryable.
enum BLEStrictFragmentAdmission {
static func admitAll<Fragment>(
_ fragments: [Fragment],
accepting: (Fragment) -> Bool
) -> Bool {
for fragment in fragments where !accepting(fragment) {
return false
}
return true
}
} }
struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler { struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler {
@@ -66,16 +23,6 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler {
enum SubmitResult { enum SubmitResult {
case start(request: BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest, reservedTransferId: String?) case start(request: BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest, reservedTransferId: String?)
case queued(request: BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest, transferId: String?, position: QueuePosition) case queued(request: BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest, transferId: String?, position: QueuePosition)
/// Strict direct-link requests are transactional: returning false to
/// their durable owner must mean no process-local copy remains that
/// can transmit later. They are therefore start-or-reject, never
/// admitted to `pendingTransfers`.
case rejectedStrict(request: BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest, transferId: String?)
/// The same file is already being (or waiting to be) fragmented out
/// to an audience covering this request; sending it again would just
/// double the airtime (field-verified: one 41KB voice file went out
/// as two complete fragment streams).
case droppedDuplicate(request: BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest, activeTransferId: String?)
} }
enum CancelResult { enum CancelResult {
@@ -91,34 +38,14 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler {
} }
private struct ActiveTransferState { private struct ActiveTransferState {
var totalFragments: Int let totalFragments: Int
var sentFragments: Int var sentFragments: Int
var workItems: [DispatchWorkItem] var workItems: [DispatchWorkItem]
var contentKey: String?
var directedPeer: PeerID?
} }
private var activeTransfers: [String: ActiveTransferState] = [:] private var activeTransfers: [String: ActiveTransferState] = [:]
private var pendingTransfers: [BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest] = [] private var pendingTransfers: [BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest] = []
/// A transfer of the same content whose audience covers `directedPeer`:
/// a broadcast covers every peer; a directed transfer covers only its
/// recipient. A directed resend to a peer NOT covered by what's in
/// flight (different recipient of a private file) is never a duplicate.
private func coveringDuplicate(contentKey: String, directedPeer: PeerID?) -> String? {
for (transferId, state) in activeTransfers where state.contentKey == contentKey {
if state.directedPeer == nil || state.directedPeer == directedPeer {
return transferId
}
}
for request in pendingTransfers where request.contentKey == contentKey {
if request.directedPeer == nil || request.directedPeer == directedPeer {
return request.resolvedTransferId
}
}
return nil
}
var activeCount: Int { var activeCount: Int {
activeTransfers.count activeTransfers.count
} }
@@ -142,39 +69,17 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler {
return .start(request: request, reservedTransferId: nil) return .start(request: request, reservedTransferId: nil)
} }
// Only requests without an explicit transferId are dropped as
// duplicates: those are resend paths (gossip-sync replay, directed
// spool) with no UI waiting on them. An app-initiated send carries a
// transferId whose progress events the UI tracks, so it always runs.
if request.transferId == nil,
let contentKey = request.contentKey,
let coveringId = coveringDuplicate(contentKey: contentKey, directedPeer: request.directedPeer) {
return .droppedDuplicate(request: request, activeTransferId: coveringId)
}
guard activeTransfers.count < maxConcurrentTransfers else { guard activeTransfers.count < maxConcurrentTransfers else {
if request.requireDirectPeerLink {
return .rejectedStrict(request: request, transferId: transferId)
}
pendingTransfers.append(request) pendingTransfers.append(request)
return .queued(request: request, transferId: transferId, position: .back) return .queued(request: request, transferId: transferId, position: .back)
} }
guard activeTransfers[transferId] == nil else { guard activeTransfers[transferId] == nil else {
if request.requireDirectPeerLink {
return .rejectedStrict(request: request, transferId: transferId)
}
pendingTransfers.insert(request, at: 0) pendingTransfers.insert(request, at: 0)
return .queued(request: request, transferId: transferId, position: .front) return .queued(request: request, transferId: transferId, position: .front)
} }
activeTransfers[transferId] = ActiveTransferState( activeTransfers[transferId] = ActiveTransferState(totalFragments: 0, sentFragments: 0, workItems: [])
totalFragments: 0,
sentFragments: 0,
workItems: [],
contentKey: request.contentKey,
directedPeer: request.directedPeer
)
return .start(request: request, reservedTransferId: transferId) return .start(request: request, reservedTransferId: transferId)
} }
@@ -183,11 +88,12 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler {
totalFragments: Int, totalFragments: Int,
workItems: [DispatchWorkItem] workItems: [DispatchWorkItem]
) -> Bool { ) -> Bool {
guard var state = activeTransfers[transferId] else { return false } guard activeTransfers[transferId] != nil else { return false }
state.totalFragments = totalFragments activeTransfers[transferId] = ActiveTransferState(
state.sentFragments = 0 totalFragments: totalFragments,
state.workItems = workItems sentFragments: 0,
activeTransfers[transferId] = state workItems: workItems
)
return true return true
} }
@@ -243,25 +149,13 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler {
while availableSlots > 0, !pendingTransfers.isEmpty { while availableSlots > 0, !pendingTransfers.isEmpty {
let request = pendingTransfers.removeFirst() let request = pendingTransfers.removeFirst()
availableSlots -= 1
guard let transferId = request.resolvedTransferId else { guard let transferId = request.resolvedTransferId else {
availableSlots -= 1
results.append(.start(request: request, reservedTransferId: nil)) results.append(.start(request: request, reservedTransferId: nil))
continue continue
} }
// A queued duplicate of content that started while it waited
// must not resend the whole file once the slot frees up (same
// explicit-transferId exemption as submit).
if request.transferId == nil,
let contentKey = request.contentKey,
let coveringId = coveringDuplicate(contentKey: contentKey, directedPeer: request.directedPeer) {
results.append(.droppedDuplicate(request: request, activeTransferId: coveringId))
continue
}
availableSlots -= 1
guard activeTransfers.count < maxConcurrentTransfers else { guard activeTransfers.count < maxConcurrentTransfers else {
pendingTransfers.insert(request, at: 0) pendingTransfers.insert(request, at: 0)
results.append(.queued(request: request, transferId: transferId, position: .front)) results.append(.queued(request: request, transferId: transferId, position: .front))
@@ -274,13 +168,7 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler {
continue continue
} }
activeTransfers[transferId] = ActiveTransferState( activeTransfers[transferId] = ActiveTransferState(totalFragments: 0, sentFragments: 0, workItems: [])
totalFragments: 0,
sentFragments: 0,
workItems: [],
contentKey: request.contentKey,
directedPeer: request.directedPeer
)
results.append(.start(request: request, reservedTransferId: transferId)) results.append(.start(request: request, reservedTransferId: transferId))
} }
@@ -20,15 +20,22 @@ enum BLEOutboundLinkPlanner {
excludedLinks: Set<BLEIngressLinkID>, excludedLinks: Set<BLEIngressLinkID>,
peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:], peripheralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:], centralPeerBindings: [String: PeerID] = [:],
preferredPeripheralPerPeer: [PeerID: String] = [:], directedOnlyPeer: PeerID?
directAnnounceTTL: UInt8 = TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
directedOnlyPeer: PeerID?,
requireDirectPeerLink: Bool = false
) -> BLEOutboundLinkPlan { ) -> BLEOutboundLinkPlan {
if let minLimit = minimumLinkLimit(
peripheralWriteLimits: peripheralWriteLimits,
centralNotifyLimits: centralNotifyLimits
), packet.type != MessageType.fragment.rawValue,
dataCount > minLimit {
return BLEOutboundLinkPlan(
directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint(for: packet, explicitPeer: directedOnlyPeer),
fragmentChunkSize: BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.fragmentChunkSize(forLinkLimit: minLimit),
selectedLinks: BLEFanoutSelection(peripheralIDs: [], centralIDs: []),
shouldSpoolDirectedPacket: false
)
}
let directedPeerHint = directedPeerHint(for: packet, explicitPeer: directedOnlyPeer) let directedPeerHint = directedPeerHint(for: packet, explicitPeer: directedOnlyPeer)
// Direct announces bypass the per-peer duplicate-link collapse so
// every live link gets bound (see BLEFanoutSelector.selectLinks).
let isDirectAnnounce = packet.type == MessageType.announce.rawValue && packet.ttl == directAnnounceTTL
let selectedLinks = BLEFanoutSelector.selectLinks( let selectedLinks = BLEFanoutSelector.selectLinks(
peripheralIDs: peripheralIDs, peripheralIDs: peripheralIDs,
centralIDs: centralIDs, centralIDs: centralIDs,
@@ -36,37 +43,11 @@ enum BLEOutboundLinkPlanner {
excludedLinks: excludedLinks, excludedLinks: excludedLinks,
peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings, peripheralPeerBindings: peripheralPeerBindings,
centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings, centralPeerBindings: centralPeerBindings,
preferredPeripheralPerPeer: preferredPeripheralPerPeer,
collapseDuplicatePeerLinks: !isDirectAnnounce,
directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint, directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint,
requireDirectPeerLink: requireDirectPeerLink,
packetType: packet.type, packetType: packet.type,
messageID: BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.messageID(for: packet) messageID: BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.messageID(for: packet)
) )
// Fragment only for links that this packet can actually use. Looking
// at every connected link before directed-peer selection lets an
// unrelated peer's MTU make an oversized directed send look routable,
// even though every resulting fragment will select zero target links.
let selectedPeripheralLimits = zip(peripheralIDs, peripheralWriteLimits).compactMap { id, limit in
selectedLinks.peripheralIDs.contains(id) ? limit : nil
}
let selectedCentralLimits = zip(centralIDs, centralNotifyLimits).compactMap { id, limit in
selectedLinks.centralIDs.contains(id) ? limit : nil
}
if let minLimit = minimumLinkLimit(
peripheralWriteLimits: selectedPeripheralLimits,
centralNotifyLimits: selectedCentralLimits
), packet.type != MessageType.fragment.rawValue,
dataCount > minLimit {
return BLEOutboundLinkPlan(
directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint,
fragmentChunkSize: BLEOutboundPacketPolicy.fragmentChunkSize(forLinkLimit: minLimit),
selectedLinks: selectedLinks,
shouldSpoolDirectedPacket: false
)
}
return BLEOutboundLinkPlan( return BLEOutboundLinkPlan(
directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint, directedPeerHint: directedPeerHint,
fragmentChunkSize: nil, fragmentChunkSize: nil,
@@ -44,16 +44,4 @@ struct BLEOutboundNotificationBuffer<Target> {
guard !pending.isEmpty else { return } guard !pending.isEmpty else { return }
notifications.insert(contentsOf: pending, at: 0) notifications.insert(contentsOf: pending, at: 0)
} }
/// Removes a disconnected target from target-specific retries. Broadcast
/// entries (`targets == nil`) remain valid for the surviving subscriber
/// set; an entry with no targets left is discarded entirely.
mutating func removeTarget(where matches: (Target) -> Bool) {
notifications = notifications.compactMap { notification in
guard let targets = notification.targets else { return notification }
let remaining = targets.filter { !matches($0) }
guard !remaining.isEmpty else { return nil }
return BLEPendingNotification(data: notification.data, targets: remaining)
}
}
} }
@@ -12,15 +12,12 @@ enum BLEOutboundPacketPolicy {
switch MessageType(rawValue: packetType) { switch MessageType(rawValue: packetType) {
case .noiseEncrypted, .noiseHandshake: case .noiseEncrypted, .noiseHandshake:
return true return true
// voiceFrame is deliberately unpadded: padding to the 512 block would case .none, .announce, .message, .leave, .requestSync, .fragment, .fileTransfer, .courierEnvelope, .boardPost, .prekeyBundle, .groupMessage, .nostrCarrier, .ping, .pong:
// push every ~490-byte signed voice packet over the MTU into the
// fragment path.
case .none, .announce, .message, .leave, .requestSync, .fragment, .fileTransfer, .courierEnvelope, .boardPost, .ping, .pong, .nostrCarrier, .prekeyBundle, .groupMessage, .voiceFrame:
return false return false
} }
} }
static func priority(for packet: BitchatPacket, data _: Data) -> BLEOutboundWritePriority { static func priority(for packet: BitchatPacket, data: Data) -> BLEOutboundWritePriority {
guard let messageType = MessageType(rawValue: packet.type) else { return .low } guard let messageType = MessageType(rawValue: packet.type) else { return .low }
switch messageType { switch messageType {
case .fragment: case .fragment:
@@ -46,25 +46,8 @@ struct BLEOutboundWriteBuffer {
priority: BLEOutboundWritePriority, priority: BLEOutboundWritePriority,
capBytes: Int capBytes: Int
) -> EnqueueResult { ) -> EnqueueResult {
enqueueReportingAcceptance(
data: data,
for: peripheralID,
priority: priority,
capBytes: capBytes
).result
}
/// Enqueues while also reporting whether the newly offered write survived
/// priority trimming. `EnqueueResult.enqueued` alone cannot express that:
/// a full queue may immediately trim the new lowest-priority item.
mutating func enqueueReportingAcceptance(
data: Data,
for peripheralID: String,
priority: BLEOutboundWritePriority,
capBytes: Int
) -> (result: EnqueueResult, accepted: Bool) {
guard data.count <= capBytes else { guard data.count <= capBytes else {
return (.oversized(bytes: data.count), false) return .oversized(bytes: data.count)
} }
var queue = writesByPeripheralID[peripheralID] ?? [] var queue = writesByPeripheralID[peripheralID] ?? []
@@ -82,8 +65,7 @@ struct BLEOutboundWriteBuffer {
} }
writesByPeripheralID[peripheralID] = queue.isEmpty ? nil : queue writesByPeripheralID[peripheralID] = queue.isEmpty ? nil : queue
let accepted = insertIndex < queue.count return .enqueued(trimmedBytes: trimmedBytes, remainingBytes: total)
return (.enqueued(trimmedBytes: trimmedBytes, remainingBytes: total), accepted)
} }
mutating func takeAll(for peripheralID: String) -> [BLEPendingWrite] { mutating func takeAll(for peripheralID: String) -> [BLEPendingWrite] {
@@ -92,13 +74,6 @@ struct BLEOutboundWriteBuffer {
return items return items
} }
/// Drops link-specific ciphertext when that physical link is gone. Keeping
/// the dictionary entry would let rotating peripheral UUIDs accumulate a
/// fresh per-link byte cap indefinitely.
mutating func discardAll(for peripheralID: String) {
writesByPeripheralID[peripheralID] = nil
}
mutating func prepend(_ items: [BLEPendingWrite], for peripheralID: String) { mutating func prepend(_ items: [BLEPendingWrite], for peripheralID: String) {
guard !items.isEmpty else { return } guard !items.isEmpty else { return }
var existing = writesByPeripheralID[peripheralID] ?? [] var existing = writesByPeripheralID[peripheralID] ?? []
+10 -25
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ struct BLEPeerInfo: Equatable {
var isVerifiedNickname: Bool var isVerifiedNickname: Bool
var lastSeen: Date var lastSeen: Date
var capabilities: PeerCapabilities = [] var capabilities: PeerCapabilities = []
/// Rendezvous cell from the peer's announce when it advertises `.bridge`.
var bridgeGeohash: String?
} }
struct BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate: Equatable { struct BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate: Equatable {
@@ -119,15 +117,6 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
peers.values.filter { $0.capabilities.contains(capability) }.map(\.peerID) peers.values.filter { $0.capabilities.contains(capability) }.map(\.peerID)
} }
/// A rendezvous cell advertised by any bridge-capable peer, if one is
/// known lets location-less devices join the island's rendezvous.
func advertisedBridgeGeohash() -> String? {
peers.values
.filter { $0.capabilities.contains(.bridge) }
.compactMap(\.bridgeGeohash)
.first
}
func displayNicknames(selfNickname: String) -> [PeerID: String] { func displayNicknames(selfNickname: String) -> [PeerID: String] {
let connected = peers.filter { $0.value.isConnected } let connected = peers.filter { $0.value.isConnected }
let tuples = connected.map { ($0.key, $0.value.nickname, true) } let tuples = connected.map { ($0.key, $0.value.nickname, true) }
@@ -152,22 +141,20 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
} }
} }
func collisionResolvedNickname(for peerID: PeerID, selfNickname: String) -> String? {
guard let info = peers[peerID], info.isVerifiedNickname else { return nil }
let hasCollision = peers.values.contains {
$0.isConnected && $0.nickname == info.nickname && $0.peerID != peerID
} || selfNickname == info.nickname
return hasCollision ? info.nickname + "#" + String(peerID.id.prefix(4)) : info.nickname
}
mutating func markDisconnected(_ peerID: PeerID) { mutating func markDisconnected(_ peerID: PeerID) {
guard var info = peers[peerID] else { return } guard var info = peers[peerID] else { return }
info.isConnected = false info.isConnected = false
peers[peerID] = info peers[peerID] = info
} }
/// Flips an already-known peer to connected. Returns false when the peer
/// is unknown or already connected (nothing changed).
@discardableResult
mutating func markConnected(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
guard var info = peers[peerID], !info.isConnected else { return false }
info.isConnected = true
peers[peerID] = info
return true
}
mutating func updateLastSeen(_ peerID: PeerID, at date: Date) { mutating func updateLastSeen(_ peerID: PeerID, at date: Date) {
guard var peer = peers[peerID] else { return } guard var peer = peers[peerID] else { return }
peer.lastSeen = date peer.lastSeen = date
@@ -181,8 +168,7 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
signingPublicKey: Data?, signingPublicKey: Data?,
isConnected: Bool, isConnected: Bool,
now: Date, now: Date,
capabilities: PeerCapabilities = [], capabilities: PeerCapabilities = []
bridgeGeohash: String? = nil
) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate { ) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate {
let existing = peers[peerID] let existing = peers[peerID]
let update = BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate( let update = BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate(
@@ -199,8 +185,7 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey, signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
isVerifiedNickname: true, isVerifiedNickname: true,
lastSeen: now, lastSeen: now,
capabilities: capabilities, capabilities: capabilities
bridgeGeohash: bridgeGeohash
) )
return update return update
@@ -122,18 +122,10 @@ final class BLEPublicMessageHandler {
SecureLogger.debug("💬 [\(senderNickname)] TTL:\(packet.ttl) (\(pathTag)) chars=\(content.count) bytes=\(packet.payload.count)", category: .session) SecureLogger.debug("💬 [\(senderNickname)] TTL:\(packet.ttl) (\(pathTag)) chars=\(content.count) bytes=\(packet.payload.count)", category: .session)
let ts = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000) let ts = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000)
let messageID: String? var resolvedSelfMessageID: String? = nil
if peerID == env.localPeerID() { if peerID == env.localPeerID() {
messageID = env.takeSelfBroadcastMessageID(packet) resolvedSelfMessageID = env.takeSelfBroadcastMessageID(packet)
} else {
// The wire carries no message ID; derive the stable one every
// device agrees on so bridged copies dedup against the radio copy.
messageID = MeshMessageIdentity.stableID(
senderIDHex: peerID.id,
timestampMs: packet.timestamp,
content: content
)
} }
env.deliverPublicMessage(peerID, senderNickname, content, ts, messageID) env.deliverPublicMessage(peerID, senderNickname, content, ts, resolvedSelfMessageID)
} }
} }
@@ -51,16 +51,16 @@ struct BLEReceivePipeline {
// Courier envelopes are directed opaque ciphertext like DMs; a // Courier envelopes are directed opaque ciphertext like DMs; a
// remote handover toward a relayed announce rides this same // remote handover toward a relayed announce rides this same
// deterministic relay treatment instead of the broadcast clamp. // deterministic relay treatment instead of the broadcast clamp.
// Ping/pong diagnostics ride it too: probes need the same
// deterministic multi-hop relay as DMs (always relay, jitter,
// no TTL cap) so RTT and hop counts reflect the real path.
// Directed nostrCarrier uplinks (mesh-only peer -> gateway) need // Directed nostrCarrier uplinks (mesh-only peer -> gateway) need
// the same multi-hop treatment to reach a non-adjacent gateway. // the same multi-hop treatment to reach a non-adjacent gateway.
// Ping/pong diagnostics also ride it: probes need the same
// deterministic multi-hop relay as DMs (always relay, jitter,
// no TTL cap) so RTT and hop counts reflect the real path.
isDirectedEncrypted: (packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue isDirectedEncrypted: (packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue
|| packet.type == MessageType.courierEnvelope.rawValue || packet.type == MessageType.courierEnvelope.rawValue
|| packet.type == MessageType.nostrCarrier.rawValue
|| packet.type == MessageType.ping.rawValue || packet.type == MessageType.ping.rawValue
|| packet.type == MessageType.pong.rawValue || packet.type == MessageType.pong.rawValue) && packet.recipientID != nil,
|| packet.type == MessageType.nostrCarrier.rawValue) && packet.recipientID != nil,
isFragment: packet.type == MessageType.fragment.rawValue, isFragment: packet.type == MessageType.fragment.rawValue,
isDirectedFragment: packet.type == MessageType.fragment.rawValue && packet.recipientID != nil, isDirectedFragment: packet.type == MessageType.fragment.rawValue && packet.recipientID != nil,
isHandshake: packet.type == MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue, isHandshake: packet.type == MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@ struct BLEReceivePipeline {
// announce-class TTL headroom so alerts travel the extra hop. // announce-class TTL headroom so alerts travel the extra hop.
isUrgentBoardPost: packet.type == MessageType.boardPost.rawValue isUrgentBoardPost: packet.type == MessageType.boardPost.rawValue
&& BoardWire.urgentFlag(in: packet.payload), && BoardWire.urgentFlag(in: packet.payload),
isVoiceFrame: packet.type == MessageType.voiceFrame.rawValue,
degree: degree, degree: degree,
highDegreeThreshold: highDegreeThreshold highDegreeThreshold: highDegreeThreshold
) )
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
/// Remembers recently seen bitchat peripherals (fresh discoveries and dropped
/// links) so the service can arm pending background connections against them
/// when the app leaves the foreground. Generic over the peripheral type so
/// the eviction/expiry logic is testable without CoreBluetooth.
final class BLERecentPeripheralCache<Peripheral> {
private struct Entry {
let peripheral: Peripheral
var lastSeen: Date
}
private var entries: [String: Entry] = [:]
private let capacity: Int
private let maxAge: TimeInterval
init(
capacity: Int = TransportConfig.bleRecentPeripheralCacheCap,
maxAge: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.bleRecentPeripheralMaxAgeSeconds
) {
self.capacity = capacity
self.maxAge = maxAge
}
var count: Int { entries.count }
func record(_ peripheral: Peripheral, peripheralID: String, at now: Date) {
entries[peripheralID] = Entry(peripheral: peripheral, lastSeen: now)
guard entries.count > capacity else { return }
// Inserts overshoot capacity by at most one; evict the stalest entry
if let stalest = entries.min(by: { $0.value.lastSeen < $1.value.lastSeen }) {
entries.removeValue(forKey: stalest.key)
}
}
/// Most-recently-seen peripherals eligible for a pending background
/// connect, freshest first, capped at `limit`. Expired entries are
/// pruned as a side effect.
func reconnectTargets(
now: Date,
limit: Int,
excluding: (String) -> Bool
) -> [(peripheralID: String, peripheral: Peripheral)] {
let cutoff = now.addingTimeInterval(-maxAge)
entries = entries.filter { $0.value.lastSeen >= cutoff }
guard limit > 0 else { return [] }
return entries
.filter { !excluding($0.key) }
.sorted { $0.value.lastSeen > $1.value.lastSeen }
.prefix(limit)
.map { (peripheralID: $0.key, peripheral: $0.value.peripheral) }
}
}
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
/// Decides which central-role connections (peripheral links we own) are
/// redundant duplicates of a peer's live link.
///
/// One connection per role per peer is the normal dual-role topology (each
/// device is both central and peripheral). After a BLE state-restoration
/// relaunch, though, the same phone can reappear under a fresh peripheral
/// UUID while the restored connection lives on leaving several live
/// central-role connections to one peer, each carrying every packet
/// (field-verified: 2-3x airtime on all traffic). Only same-role duplicates
/// are retired; the peer's central-role subscription on our peripheral
/// manager is its own connection to manage, and it runs the same policy.
enum BLERedundantLinkPolicy {
struct PeripheralLink: Equatable {
let uuid: String
let peerID: PeerID?
let isConnected: Bool
/// Whether the link has a discovered characteristic (is writable).
/// A link mid-service-rediscovery (didModifyServices cleared it)
/// must never be kept over a writable duplicate.
let hasCharacteristic: Bool
init(uuid: String, peerID: PeerID?, isConnected: Bool, hasCharacteristic: Bool) {
self.uuid = uuid
self.peerID = peerID
self.isConnected = isConnected
self.hasCharacteristic = hasCharacteristic
}
}
/// The link to keep when a peer has several connected bound peripheral
/// links, or nil when there is nothing to consolidate. Prefers the
/// ingress link of the verified direct announce that triggered the check
/// (the strongest liveness proof available), falling back to the peer's
/// most recently bound link but only among writable links while any
/// exist: keeping a characteristic-less link and cancelling the writable
/// duplicate would strand outbound traffic on the central link until
/// rediscovery finishes. When neither anchor is a viable candidate,
/// consolidation waits for a later announce rather than guessing.
static func keptPeripheralUUID(
ingressPeripheralUUID: String?,
mostRecentlyBoundUUID: String?,
links: [PeripheralLink],
peerID: PeerID
) -> String? {
let bound = links.filter { $0.peerID == peerID && $0.isConnected }
guard bound.count > 1 else { return nil }
let writable = bound.filter(\.hasCharacteristic)
let candidates = writable.isEmpty ? bound : writable
if let ingressPeripheralUUID, candidates.contains(where: { $0.uuid == ingressPeripheralUUID }) {
return ingressPeripheralUUID
}
if let mostRecentlyBoundUUID, candidates.contains(where: { $0.uuid == mostRecentlyBoundUUID }) {
return mostRecentlyBoundUUID
}
return nil
}
/// Connected peripheral links bound to the peer other than the kept one.
static func peripheralUUIDsToRetire(
links: [PeripheralLink],
peerID: PeerID,
keeping keptUUID: String
) -> [String] {
links
.filter { $0.peerID == peerID && $0.isConnected && $0.uuid != keptUUID }
.map(\.uuid)
}
}
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