Persist private media delivery receipts

bitchat/Noise/NoiseSessionManager.swift

@@ -141,6 +141,16 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Whether this peer has an inbound ordinary XX responder that still
+    /// needs message 3 before its receive keys can become authoritative.
+    func isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(for peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
+        managerQueue.sync {
+            guard let session = sessions[peerID] else { return false }
+            return session.role == .responder
+                && session.getState() == .handshaking
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Transfers one bounded recovery generation to whatever ordinary XX
     /// handshake currently owns the peer, or starts the generation's single
     /// retry. The request token prevents stale transport callbacks from
@@ -1121,12 +1131,22 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
     /// the exact session object that authenticated these bytes.
     func decryptWithSessionGeneration(
         _ ciphertext: Data,
-        from peerID: PeerID
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        establishedGenerationIsReady: (UUID) -> Bool = { _ in true },
+        authorizeDecrypt: () throws -> Void = {}
     ) throws -> (plaintext: Data, sessionGeneration: UUID) {
         try managerQueue.sync {
             if let session = sessions[peerID],
                session.isEstablished(),
                let generation = sessionGenerations[peerID] {
+                // Keep the generation lease across the transport-readiness
+                // check and decrypt. Promotion/restoration needs this queue's
+                // barrier, so no new receive nonce can be consumed before BLE
+                // installs state for the exact generation.
+                guard establishedGenerationIsReady(generation) else {
+                    throw NoiseEncryptionError.transportGenerationNotReady
+                }
+                try authorizeDecrypt()
                 return (try session.decrypt(ciphertext), generation)
             }
 
@@ -1138,6 +1158,7 @@ final class NoiseSessionManager {
                responder.role == .responder,
                responder.getState() == .handshaking,
                let quarantined = quarantinedTransports[peerID] {
+                try authorizeDecrypt()
                 return (
                     try quarantined.session.decrypt(ciphertext),
                     quarantined.generation

bitchat/Protocols/BitchatFilePacket.swift

@@ -154,3 +154,90 @@ struct BitchatFilePacket {
         )
     }
 }
+
+/// Wire-compatible identity for private media exchanged by clients using the
+/// current iOS entropy-bearing filenames, without extending the deployed file
+/// TLV. Android clients reject unknown file tags, so eligible senders and
+/// receivers derive the receipt key from fields already on the wire.
+///
+/// Locally-created image and voice-note filenames contain a UUID or live-voice
+/// burst ID. Including the normalized direction keeps a reused filename
+/// distinct across chats while allowing short and full Noise-key peer IDs to
+/// converge. Android and older-iOS timestamp-only names remain ineligible and
+/// retain their legacy random local IDs (transfer-compatible, no receipts).
+enum PrivateMediaMessageIdentity {
+    private static let domain = Data("bitchat-private-media-message-v1".utf8)
+    private static let idPrefix = "media-"
+    private static let digestHexLength = 32
+
+    static func isStableID(_ candidate: String) -> Bool {
+        guard candidate.hasPrefix(idPrefix) else { return false }
+        let digest = candidate.dropFirst(idPrefix.count)
+        guard digest.utf8.count == digestHexLength else { return false }
+        return digest.utf8.allSatisfy { byte in
+            (UInt8(ascii: "0")...UInt8(ascii: "9")).contains(byte)
+                || (UInt8(ascii: "a")...UInt8(ascii: "f")).contains(byte)
+        }
+    }
+
+    static func stableID(
+        senderPeerID: PeerID,
+        recipientPeerID: PeerID,
+        fileName: String?
+    ) -> String? {
+        guard let fileName, !fileName.isEmpty else { return nil }
+        let leafName = (fileName as NSString).lastPathComponent
+        guard leafName == fileName else { return nil }
+
+        let path = leafName as NSString
+        let stem = path.deletingPathExtension
+        let fileExtension = path.pathExtension.lowercased()
+        switch true {
+        case stem.hasPrefix("img_"):
+            guard fileExtension == "jpg" || fileExtension == "jpeg" else { return nil }
+        case stem.hasPrefix("voice_"):
+            guard fileExtension == "m4a" else { return nil }
+        default:
+            return nil
+        }
+        let entropyToken = stem.split(separator: "_").last.map(String.init)
+        let hasUUIDEntropy = entropyToken.flatMap(UUID.init(uuidString:)) != nil
+        let voiceBurstID = stem.hasPrefix("voice_")
+            ? String(stem.dropFirst("voice_".count))
+            : ""
+        let hasBurstEntropy = voiceBurstID.count == 16
+            && voiceBurstID.allSatisfy(\.isHexDigit)
+        guard hasUUIDEntropy || hasBurstEntropy else {
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        let fields = [
+            Data(senderPeerID.toShort().bare.utf8),
+            Data(recipientPeerID.toShort().bare.utf8),
+            Data(leafName.utf8)
+        ]
+        var input = domain
+        for field in fields {
+            guard let length = UInt32(exactly: field.count) else { return nil }
+            var bigEndianLength = length.bigEndian
+            withUnsafeBytes(of: &bigEndianLength) {
+                input.append(contentsOf: $0)
+            }
+            input.append(field)
+        }
+
+        return "\(idPrefix)\(input.sha256Hex().prefix(digestHexLength))"
+    }
+
+    static func stableID(
+        for packet: BitchatFilePacket,
+        senderPeerID: PeerID,
+        recipientPeerID: PeerID
+    ) -> String? {
+        stableID(
+            senderPeerID: senderPeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: recipientPeerID,
+            fileName: packet.fileName
+        )
+    }
+}

bitchat/Protocols/PeerCapabilities+Local.swift

@@ -3,5 +3,11 @@ import BitFoundation
 extension PeerCapabilities {
     /// Capabilities this build advertises in its announce packets.
     /// Each feature adds its bit here when it ships.
-    static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [.vouch, .prekeys, .groups, .privateMedia]
+    static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [
+        .vouch,
+        .prekeys,
+        .groups,
+        .privateMedia,
+        .privateMediaReceipts
+    ]
 }

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEFileTransferHandler.swift

@@ -32,10 +32,79 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment {
         _ fallbackExtension: String?,
         _ defaultPrefix: String
     ) -> URL?
+    /// Resolves the durable receiver decision for a stable private-media ID.
+    let privateMediaReceiptState: (
+        _ messageID: String
+    ) -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState
+    /// Atomically records a stable private-media ID after the payload save.
+    let commitPrivateMediaFile: (_ messageID: String, _ storedURL: URL) -> Bool
+    /// Rolls back a saved payload when its durable receipt commit fails.
+    let removeIncomingFile: (_ storedURL: URL) -> Void
+    /// Checks the authenticated sender before any private-media disk work.
+    let isPrivateMediaSenderBlocked: (PeerID) -> Bool
     /// Updates the registry last-seen timestamp for the peer (async barrier write).
     let updatePeerLastSeen: (PeerID) -> Void
-    /// Delivers `.messageReceived` to the UI as one main-actor hop.
+    /// Acknowledges stable private media only after its synchronous
-    let deliverMessage: (BitchatMessage) -> Void
+    /// conversation delivery has completed.
+    let acknowledgePrivateMedia: (_ messageID: String, _ peerID: PeerID) -> Void
+    /// Delivers `.messageReceived` as one main-actor hop while
+    /// `shouldDeliver` remains true before and after the synchronous sink.
+    /// The completion authorizes the stable-media ACK.
+    let deliverMessage: (
+        _ message: BitchatMessage,
+        _ shouldDeliver: @escaping () -> Bool,
+        _ completion: @escaping () -> Void
+    ) -> Void
+}
+
+/// Process-lifetime reservation cache for stable private-media IDs.
+///
+/// The first arrival reserves its ID before quota enforcement. Concurrent
+/// arrivals remain coalesced in memory, while accepted state is resolved from
+/// the durable ID-to-file ledger so it survives relaunch and becomes retryable
+/// if quota cleanup removed the file.
+private final class PrivateMediaArrivalDeduplicator {
+    enum Reservation {
+        case reserved
+        case pending
+        case accepted(URL)
+        case tombstoned
+        case unavailable
+    }
+
+    private let lock = NSLock()
+    private var pending: Set<String> = []
+
+    func reserve(
+        _ messageID: String,
+        receiptState: () -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState
+    ) -> Reservation {
+        lock.lock()
+        defer { lock.unlock() }
+        if pending.contains(messageID) {
+            return .pending
+        }
+
+        switch receiptState() {
+        case .accepted(let existingURL):
+            return .accepted(existingURL)
+        case .tombstoned:
+            return .tombstoned
+        case .unavailable:
+            return .unavailable
+        case .absent:
+            break
+        }
+
+        pending.insert(messageID)
+        return .reserved
+    }
+
+    func finish(_ messageID: String) {
+        lock.lock()
+        defer { lock.unlock() }
+        pending.remove(messageID)
+    }
 }
 
 /// Orchestrates inbound file transfers: self-echo policy, sender display-name
@@ -43,6 +112,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment {
 /// and UI delivery.
 final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
     private let environment: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
+    private let privateMediaArrivals = PrivateMediaArrivalDeduplicator()
 
     init(environment: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment) {
         self.environment = environment
@@ -86,6 +156,7 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             senderNickname: senderNickname,
             timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000),
             isPrivate: deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage,
+            usesDurableReceipts: false,
             env: env
         )
         // Once authenticated, a local decode/quota/save failure is not proof
@@ -116,6 +187,11 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             senderNickname: senderNickname,
             timestamp: timestamp,
             isPrivate: true,
+            // Every authenticated Noise private-file keeps the stable ID/ACK
+            // contract introduced with capability bit 8. Bit 9 advertises
+            // sender-side automatic retry support; it must not downgrade
+            // prior iOS clients to random IDs or single-check delivery.
+            usesDurableReceipts: true,
             env: env
         )
     }
@@ -126,9 +202,11 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
         senderNickname: String,
         timestamp: Date,
         isPrivate: Bool,
+        usesDurableReceipts: Bool,
         env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
     ) -> Bool {
 
+        let localPeerID = env.localPeerID()
         let filePacket: BitchatFilePacket
         let mime: MimeType
         switch BLEIncomingFileValidator.validate(payload: payload) {
@@ -149,6 +227,89 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             return false
         }
 
+        if isPrivate, env.isPrivateMediaSenderBlocked(peerID) {
+            SecureLogger.debug(
+                "🚫 Dropping private media from blocked peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… before disk write",
+                category: .security
+            )
+            return true
+        }
+
+        let messageID = usesDurableReceipts
+            ? PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+                for: filePacket,
+                senderPeerID: peerID,
+                recipientPeerID: localPeerID
+            )
+            : nil
+        if let messageID {
+            switch privateMediaArrivals.reserve(
+                messageID,
+                receiptState: { env.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID) }
+            ) {
+            case .reserved:
+                break
+            case .pending:
+                // The first arrival has not reached durable storage yet.
+                // Coalesce this retry without ACKing so a failed first save
+                // remains retryable by the sender.
+                SecureLogger.debug(
+                    "📁 Coalesced in-flight private media id=\(messageID.prefix(12))… from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return true
+            case .accepted(let existingFile):
+                env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
+                let message = incomingMessage(
+                    messageID: messageID,
+                    senderNickname: senderNickname,
+                    timestamp: timestamp,
+                    isPrivate: true,
+                    peerID: peerID,
+                    destination: existingFile,
+                    category: storedMediaCategory(
+                        for: existingFile,
+                        fallback: mime.category
+                    ),
+                    env: env
+                )
+                SecureLogger.debug(
+                    "📁 Restored durable private media duplicate id=\(messageID.prefix(12))… from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… -> \(existingFile.lastPathComponent)",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                deliverStableMessage(
+                    message,
+                    messageID: messageID,
+                    peerID: peerID,
+                    expectedURL: existingFile,
+                    env: env
+                )
+                return true
+            case .tombstoned:
+                // Explicit deletion is a durable terminal receiver decision.
+                env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
+                env.acknowledgePrivateMedia(messageID, peerID)
+                SecureLogger.debug(
+                    "📁 Dropped explicitly deleted private media id=\(messageID.prefix(12))… from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return true
+            case .unavailable:
+                // Never turn an unreadable ledger into an empty ledger. The
+                // sender can retry after the transient storage failure clears.
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "📁 Withholding private media id=\(messageID.prefix(12))… while durable receipt state is unavailable",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return true
+            }
+        }
+        defer {
+            if let messageID {
+                privateMediaArrivals.finish(messageID)
+            }
+        }
+
         // BCH-01-002: Enforce storage quota before saving
         env.enforceStorageQuota(filePacket.content.count)
 
@@ -162,13 +323,82 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             return false
         }
 
+        if let messageID,
+           !env.commitPrivateMediaFile(messageID, destination) {
+            // A payload without its durable ID mapping cannot safely suppress
+            // a retry after relaunch. Roll it back and withhold UI/ACK.
+            env.removeIncomingFile(destination)
+            return false
+        }
+
         if isPrivate {
             env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
         }
 
-        let message = BitchatMessage(
+        let message = incomingMessage(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            senderNickname: senderNickname,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            isPrivate: isPrivate,
+            peerID: peerID,
+            destination: destination,
+            category: mime.category,
+            env: env
+        )
+
+        SecureLogger.debug("📁 Stored incoming media from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… -> \(destination.lastPathComponent)", category: .session)
+
+        if let messageID {
+            deliverStableMessage(
+                message,
+                messageID: messageID,
+                peerID: peerID,
+                expectedURL: destination,
+                env: env
+            )
+        } else {
+            env.deliverMessage(message, { true }, {})
+        }
+        return true
+    }
+
+    private func deliverStableMessage(
+        _ message: BitchatMessage,
+        messageID: String,
+        peerID: PeerID,
+        expectedURL: URL,
+        env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
+    ) {
+        env.deliverMessage(
+            message,
+            {
+                guard case .accepted(let resolvedURL) =
+                        env.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID) else {
+                    return false
+                }
+                return resolvedURL.standardizedFileURL
+                    == expectedURL.standardizedFileURL
+            },
+            {
+                env.acknowledgePrivateMedia(messageID, peerID)
+            }
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func incomingMessage(
+        messageID: String?,
+        senderNickname: String,
+        timestamp: Date,
+        isPrivate: Bool,
+        peerID: PeerID,
+        destination: URL,
+        category: MimeType.Category,
+        env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
+    ) -> BitchatMessage {
+        BitchatMessage(
+            id: messageID,
             sender: senderNickname,
-            content: "\(mime.category.messagePrefix)\(destination.lastPathComponent)",
+            content: "\(category.messagePrefix)\(destination.lastPathComponent)",
             timestamp: timestamp,
             isRelay: false,
             originalSender: nil,
@@ -176,17 +406,35 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
             recipientNickname: nil,
             senderPeerID: peerID,
             // Received messages need an explicit status: BitchatMessage
-            // defaults private messages to .sending, which the media views
+            // defaults private messages to .sending, which media views render
-            // render as an in-flight send (empty reveal mask, disabled tap).
+            // as an in-flight send.
             deliveryStatus: isPrivate
                 ? .delivered(to: env.localNickname(), at: timestamp)
                 : nil
         )
+    }
 
-        SecureLogger.debug("📁 Stored incoming media from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… -> \(destination.lastPathComponent)", category: .session)
+    /// The durable URL is authoritative during reconstruction. A sender that
-
+    /// reuses a stable filename with a different MIME type must not change how
-        env.deliverMessage(message)
+    /// the already-stored payload renders.
-        return true
+    private func storedMediaCategory(
+        for url: URL,
+        fallback: MimeType.Category
+    ) -> MimeType.Category {
+        let mediaDirectory = url
+            .deletingLastPathComponent()
+            .deletingLastPathComponent()
+            .lastPathComponent
+        switch mediaDirectory {
+        case MimeType.Category.audio.mediaDir:
+            return .audio
+        case MimeType.Category.image.mediaDir:
+            return .image
+        case MimeType.Category.file.mediaDir:
+            return .file
+        default:
+            return fallback
+        }
     }
 
     /// Every remaining raw file transfer is signed, regardless of whether it

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEIncomingFileStore.swift

@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
     private let baseDirectory: URL?
     private let dateProvider: () -> Date
     private let panicMarkerWriter: (Data, URL) throws -> Void
+    private let privateMediaReceipts: BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore
 
     init(
         fileManager: FileManager = .default,
@@ -147,6 +148,11 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
         self.baseDirectory = baseDirectory
         self.dateProvider = dateProvider
         self.panicMarkerWriter = panicMarkerWriter
+        self.privateMediaReceipts = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(
+            fileManager: fileManager,
+            baseDirectory: baseDirectory,
+            now: dateProvider
+        )
     }
 
     /// Panic-wipe every managed incoming and outgoing media artifact before
@@ -159,6 +165,11 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
     func panicWipe(
         hasDurablePendingMarker: Bool = false
     ) throws {
+        // The receipt index caches tombstones as well as accepted payloads.
+        // Always invalidate it on return, including partial-failure paths, so
+        // no pre-panic receiver decision survives after identity reset.
+        defer { privateMediaReceipts.resetForPanic() }
+
         let markerError: Error?
         do {
             try markPanicRecoveryPending()
@@ -257,6 +268,35 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
         }
     }
 
+    func privateMediaReceiptState(
+        messageID: String
+    ) -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState {
+        privateMediaReceipts.state(for: messageID)
+    }
+
+    func commitPrivateMediaFile(
+        messageID: String,
+        storedURL: URL
+    ) -> Bool {
+        privateMediaReceipts.commitAccepted(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            storedURL: storedURL
+        )
+    }
+
+    /// Best-effort rollback for a payload whose durable receipt commit failed.
+    func removeIncomingFile(at storedURL: URL) {
+        guard isURLInsideFilesDirectory(storedURL) else { return }
+        do {
+            try fileManager.removeItem(at: storedURL)
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "⚠️ Failed to roll back uncommitted incoming media: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Frees least-recently-modified incoming files until `reservingBytes`
     /// fits under the quota. Files named `voice_live_*` (in-flight live
     /// captures) are never evicted regardless of who triggers enforcement —
@@ -349,6 +389,13 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
         ]
     }
 
+    private func isURLInsideFilesDirectory(_ url: URL) -> Bool {
+        guard let filesDirectory = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
+            return false
+        }
+        return url.standardizedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(filesDirectory.path + "/")
+    }
+
     private func sanitizedFileName(_ name: String?, defaultName: String, fallbackExtension: String?) -> String {
         var candidate = (name ?? "")
             .replacingOccurrences(of: "\0", with: "")

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLENoisePacketHandler.swift

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import BitFoundation
 import BitLogger
+import CryptoKit
 import Foundation
 
 struct BLENoiseHandshakeHandlingResult {
@@ -33,6 +34,8 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment {
             -> NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult
     /// Whether any Noise session (established or pending) exists for the peer (crypto).
     let hasNoiseSession: (PeerID) -> Bool
+    /// Whether an inbound ordinary XX responder is waiting for message 3.
+    let isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion: (PeerID) -> Bool
     /// Initiates a fresh Noise handshake with the peer (crypto + send).
     let initiateHandshake: (PeerID) -> Void
     /// Broadcasts a packet on the mesh (caller is already on the message queue).
@@ -63,7 +66,28 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment {
 /// processing (with response), encrypted payload decryption and dispatch,
 /// and session recovery on decrypt failure.
 final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
+    private struct DeferredCiphertext {
+        let packet: BitchatPacket
+        let receivedAt: Date
+    }
+
+    /// Early post-handshake packets are normally tiny control messages or
+    /// queued DMs. Keep the recovery surface deliberately small so an
+    /// unauthenticated half-handshake cannot create an unbounded memory queue.
+    private static let maxDeferredPacketsPerPeer = 4
+    private static let maxDeferredPacketsGlobal = 32
+    /// One legacy sender can immediately follow message 3 with the largest
+    /// valid private-file ciphertext and has no application-level retry. Keep
+    /// room for that packet plus a small control-message budget.
+    private static let maxDeferredBytes =
+        NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize + 256 * 1024
+    private static let deferredLifetime =
+        NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
+
     private let environment: BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment
+    private let deferredLock = NSLock()
+    private var deferredCiphertexts: [PeerID: [DeferredCiphertext]] = [:]
+    private var deferredCiphertextBytes = 0
 
     init(environment: BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment) {
         self.environment = environment
@@ -105,8 +129,8 @@ final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
                     env.broadcastPacket(responsePacket)
                 }
 
-                // Session establishment will trigger onPeerAuthenticated callback
+                // The serialized authentication callback installs transport
-                // which will send any pending messages at the right time
+                // state before it drains any bounded early ciphertext.
                 return BLENoiseHandshakeHandlingResult(
                     processed: true,
                     didEstablishAuthenticatedSession:
@@ -151,6 +175,30 @@ final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
     }
 
     func handleEncrypted(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        handleEncrypted(packet, from: peerID, isDeferredRetry: false)
+    }
+
+    /// Called by the transport's serialized authentication callback after it
+    /// has installed state for the promoted or restored session generation.
+    func handleSessionAuthenticated(_ peerID: PeerID) {
+        drainDeferredCiphertextsIfReady(for: peerID)
+    }
+
+    /// Synchronously discards ciphertext retained for a pre-panic Noise
+    /// generation. The handler survives the service's identity replacement,
+    /// so keeping this queue would replay old bytes after post-panic auth.
+    func resetForPanic() {
+        deferredLock.lock()
+        deferredCiphertexts.removeAll(keepingCapacity: false)
+        deferredCiphertextBytes = 0
+        deferredLock.unlock()
+    }
+
+    private func handleEncrypted(
+        _ packet: BitchatPacket,
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        isDeferredRetry: Bool
+    ) {
         let env = environment
         guard let recipientID = PeerID(hexData: packet.recipientID) else {
             SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Encrypted message has no recipient ID", category: .session)
@@ -192,19 +240,205 @@ final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
 
             let ts = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000)
             env.deliverNoisePayload(peerID, noisePayloadType, Data(payloadData), ts)
+        } catch NoiseEncryptionError.transportGenerationNotReady {
+            if isDeferredRetry {
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "Dropping deferred Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… because its authenticated transport generation changed again",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return
+            }
+            // The manager promoted or restored keys before BLE's serialized
+            // callback installed generation-bound transport state. The
+            // manager rejected this before decrypting, so replay is safe.
+            deferCiphertext(packet, from: peerID)
         } catch NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished {
+            if isDeferredRetry {
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "Dropping deferred Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… because the authenticated session is unavailable",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return
+            }
             // We received an encrypted message before establishing a session with this peer.
-            // Trigger a handshake so future messages can be decrypted.
+            // An initiator may already have sent message 3 followed by this
+            // ciphertext, with BLE delivering the ciphertext first.
+            if env.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(peerID) {
+                deferCiphertext(packet, from: peerID)
+                return
+            }
+            // Otherwise trigger a handshake so future messages can decrypt.
             SecureLogger.debug("🔑 Encrypted message from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… without session; initiating handshake")
             if !env.hasNoiseSession(peerID) {
                 env.initiateHandshake(peerID)
             }
         } catch {
+            if isDeferredRetry {
+                // An early packet cannot tear down the authenticated session
+                // merely because its single bounded retry still fails.
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "Dropping deferred Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… after retry failed: \(error)",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return
+            }
+            // A responder may retain an older transport as receive-only
+            // rollback state while ordinary XX waits for message 3. New-key
+            // ciphertext can fail against those retained receive keys first.
+            if env.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(peerID) {
+                if isDeferrableEarlyHandshakeFailure(error) {
+                    deferCiphertext(packet, from: peerID)
+                } else {
+                    SecureLogger.warning(
+                        "Dropping invalid Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… while responder handshake is completing: \(error)",
+                        category: .session
+                    )
+                }
+                return
+            }
+            if isDropOnlyCiphertextFailure(error) {
+                // The packet is attacker-controlled and did not prove a
+                // transport-state failure. Never let malformed, replayed,
+                // forged, oversized, or rate-limited bytes evict working keys.
+                SecureLogger.warning(
+                    "Dropping rejected Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… without clearing its session: \(error)",
+                    category: .security
+                )
+                return
+            }
             // Decryption failed - clear the corrupted session and re-initiate handshake
-            // This handles cases where session state got out of sync (nonce mismatch, etc.)
+            // Only local/session lifecycle failures reach this path.
             SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decrypt message from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…: \(error) - clearing session and re-initiating handshake")
             env.clearSession(peerID)
             env.initiateHandshake(peerID)
         }
     }
+
+    private func isDeferrableEarlyHandshakeFailure(_ error: Error) -> Bool {
+        if let noiseError = error as? NoiseError {
+            switch noiseError {
+            case .authenticationFailure, .replayDetected:
+                return true
+            default:
+                return false
+            }
+        }
+        if let cryptoError = error as? CryptoKitError,
+           case .authenticationFailure = cryptoError {
+            return true
+        }
+        return false
+    }
+
+    private func isDropOnlyCiphertextFailure(_ error: Error) -> Bool {
+        if let securityError = error as? NoiseSecurityError {
+            switch securityError {
+            case .messageTooLarge, .rateLimitExceeded, .invalidPeerID:
+                return true
+            case .sessionExpired, .sessionExhausted:
+                return false
+            }
+        }
+        if let noiseError = error as? NoiseError {
+            switch noiseError {
+            case .invalidCiphertext, .authenticationFailure, .replayDetected:
+                return true
+            case .uninitializedCipher, .handshakeComplete,
+                    .handshakeNotComplete, .missingLocalStaticKey,
+                    .missingKeys, .invalidMessage, .invalidPublicKey,
+                    .nonceExceeded:
+                return false
+            }
+        }
+        return error is CryptoKitError
+    }
+
+    private func deferCiphertext(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
+        guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(
+            packet.payload
+        ) else {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "Dropping oversized early Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…",
+                category: .security
+            )
+            return
+        }
+
+        let now = environment.now()
+        deferredLock.lock()
+        defer { deferredLock.unlock() }
+        purgeExpiredCiphertextsLocked(now: now)
+
+        let peerCount = deferredCiphertexts[peerID]?.count ?? 0
+        let globalCount = deferredCiphertexts.values.reduce(0) {
+            $0 + $1.count
+        }
+        guard peerCount < Self.maxDeferredPacketsPerPeer,
+              globalCount < Self.maxDeferredPacketsGlobal,
+              deferredCiphertextBytes + packet.payload.count
+                <= Self.maxDeferredBytes else {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "Dropping early Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… because the handshake buffer is full",
+                category: .security
+            )
+            return
+        }
+
+        deferredCiphertexts[peerID, default: []].append(
+            DeferredCiphertext(packet: packet, receivedAt: now)
+        )
+        deferredCiphertextBytes += packet.payload.count
+        SecureLogger.debug(
+            "Deferring early Noise ciphertext from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… until responder handshake completion",
+            category: .session
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func drainDeferredCiphertextsIfReady(for peerID: PeerID) {
+        let env = environment
+        guard !env.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(peerID),
+              env.hasNoiseSession(peerID) else {
+            return
+        }
+
+        let now = env.now()
+        deferredLock.lock()
+        purgeExpiredCiphertextsLocked(now: now)
+        let deferred = deferredCiphertexts.removeValue(forKey: peerID) ?? []
+        deferredCiphertextBytes -= deferred.reduce(0) {
+            $0 + $1.packet.payload.count
+        }
+        deferredLock.unlock()
+
+        guard !deferred.isEmpty else { return }
+        SecureLogger.debug(
+            "Retrying \(deferred.count) early Noise ciphertext packet(s) from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… after handshake completion",
+            category: .session
+        )
+        for item in deferred {
+            handleEncrypted(item.packet, from: peerID, isDeferredRetry: true)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func purgeExpiredCiphertextsLocked(now: Date) {
+        for peerID in Array(deferredCiphertexts.keys) {
+            guard let items = deferredCiphertexts[peerID] else { continue }
+            let retained = items.filter {
+                now.timeIntervalSince($0.receivedAt) <= Self.deferredLifetime
+            }
+            guard retained.count != items.count else { continue }
+
+            deferredCiphertextBytes -= items.reduce(0) {
+                $0 + $1.packet.payload.count
+            }
+            deferredCiphertextBytes += retained.reduce(0) {
+                $0 + $1.packet.payload.count
+            }
+            if retained.isEmpty {
+                deferredCiphertexts.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
+            } else {
+                deferredCiphertexts[peerID] = retained
+            }
+        }
+    }
 }

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,556 @@
+import BitLogger
+import Foundation
+
+enum BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState: Equatable {
+    /// No durable receiver decision exists for this stable message ID.
+    case absent
+    /// The payload is durably mapped to a file that still exists.
+    case accepted(URL)
+    /// The user explicitly deleted the payload; retries must not resurrect it.
+    case tombstoned
+    /// Durable state could not be read safely. Callers must fail closed and
+    /// must not save, deliver, or acknowledge the payload.
+    case unavailable
+}
+
+/// Durable, per-message receiver decisions for stable private media.
+///
+/// Each ID has its own atomic record so one hot lookup never rewrites or
+/// decodes the entire ledger. The process-lifetime index is installed only
+/// after a complete, successful directory scan. An enumeration, read, decode,
+/// or structural-validation failure therefore remains retryable and cannot be
+/// mistaken for an empty ledger.
+final class BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore: @unchecked Sendable {
+    typealias DirectoryReader = (_ directory: URL) throws -> [URL]
+    typealias DataReader = (_ url: URL) throws -> Data
+    private static let receiptDirectoryName = ".private-media-receipts"
+
+    private struct ReceiptRecord: Codable, Equatable {
+        enum Kind: String, Codable {
+            case accepted
+            case tombstone
+        }
+
+        let kind: Kind
+        /// Path below the app's `files/` root. Absolute application-container
+        /// prefixes are not stable across updates, restores, or reinstalls.
+        let relativePath: String?
+        let recordedAt: Date
+    }
+
+    private final class Runtime: @unchecked Sendable {
+        let lock = NSLock()
+        var records: [String: ReceiptRecord]?
+        var volatileTombstones: [String: Date] = [:]
+    }
+
+    private let fileManager: FileManager
+    private let baseDirectory: URL?
+    private let capacity: Int
+    private let ttl: TimeInterval
+    private let now: () -> Date
+    private let directoryReader: DirectoryReader?
+    private let dataReader: DataReader?
+    private let runtime = Runtime()
+
+    init(
+        fileManager: FileManager = .default,
+        baseDirectory: URL? = nil,
+        capacity: Int = TransportConfig.privateMediaReceivedLedgerCapacity,
+        ttl: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.privateMediaReceivedLedgerTTLSeconds,
+        now: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init,
+        directoryReader: DirectoryReader? = nil,
+        dataReader: DataReader? = nil
+    ) {
+        self.fileManager = fileManager
+        self.baseDirectory = baseDirectory
+        self.capacity = max(1, capacity)
+        self.ttl = max(0, ttl)
+        self.now = now
+        self.directoryReader = directoryReader
+        self.dataReader = dataReader
+    }
+
+    /// Drops process-lifetime decisions after the enclosing media directory
+    /// has been panic-wiped. A later lookup must rebuild from the durable
+    /// ledger instead of retaining an accepted receipt or tombstone whose
+    /// backing files no longer exist.
+    func resetForPanic() {
+        runtime.lock.lock()
+        runtime.records = nil
+        runtime.volatileTombstones.removeAll(keepingCapacity: false)
+        runtime.lock.unlock()
+    }
+
+    func state(for messageID: String) -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState {
+        guard PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(messageID) else {
+            return .absent
+        }
+
+        runtime.lock.lock()
+        defer { runtime.lock.unlock() }
+
+        let date = now()
+        if let tombstonedAt = runtime.volatileTombstones[messageID] {
+            if !isExpired(tombstonedAt, at: date) {
+                return .tombstoned
+            }
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+        }
+
+        guard let directory = resolvedReceiptDirectory(),
+              var records = loadIndexIfNeeded(from: directory, at: date) else {
+            return .unavailable
+        }
+        guard let record = records[messageID] else { return .absent }
+
+        if isExpired(record.recordedAt, at: date) {
+            records.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            runtime.records = records
+            removeRecord(messageID: messageID, from: directory)
+            return .absent
+        }
+
+        switch record.kind {
+        case .tombstone:
+            removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(record)
+            return .tombstoned
+
+        case .accepted:
+            guard let relativePath = record.relativePath,
+                  let existingURL = existingPayload(relativePath: relativePath) else {
+                // Quota cleanup is not explicit deletion. Remove the stale
+                // receipt so a sender retry can restore the payload and bubble.
+                records.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+                runtime.records = records
+                removeRecord(messageID: messageID, from: directory)
+                return .absent
+            }
+            return .accepted(existingURL)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Records an accepted ID only after the payload is on disk. Callers must
+    /// roll the payload back and withhold UI delivery/ACK when this returns
+    /// false.
+    func commitAccepted(messageID: String, storedURL: URL) -> Bool {
+        guard PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(messageID),
+              validExistingPayload(storedURL) != nil,
+              let relativePath = relativePath(for: storedURL) else {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        runtime.lock.lock()
+        defer { runtime.lock.unlock() }
+
+        let date = now()
+        if let tombstonedAt = runtime.volatileTombstones[messageID],
+           !isExpired(tombstonedAt, at: date) {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        guard let directory = resolvedReceiptDirectory(),
+              var records = loadIndexIfNeeded(from: directory, at: date) else {
+            return false
+        }
+        if let existing = records[messageID],
+           existing.kind == .tombstone,
+           !isExpired(existing.recordedAt, at: date) {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        let victim = capacityVictim(
+            for: .accepted,
+            replacing: messageID,
+            in: records
+        )
+        if records[messageID]?.kind != .accepted,
+           records.values.lazy.filter({ $0.kind == .accepted }).count >= capacity,
+           victim == nil {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        let record = ReceiptRecord(
+            kind: .accepted,
+            relativePath: relativePath,
+            recordedAt: date
+        )
+        guard persist(record, messageID: messageID, to: directory) else {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        records[messageID] = record
+        if let victim, victim != messageID {
+            records.removeValue(forKey: victim)
+            removeRecord(messageID: victim, from: directory)
+        }
+        runtime.records = records
+        return true
+    }
+
+    /// Foundation for explicit media deletion. This branch does not wire the
+    /// chat-clear UI; it only makes a tombstone durable and fail closed.
+    func recordDeleted(messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        guard PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(messageID) else {
+            return false
+        }
+
+        runtime.lock.lock()
+        defer { runtime.lock.unlock() }
+
+        let date = now()
+        addVolatileTombstone(messageID, at: date)
+
+        guard let directory = resolvedReceiptDirectory(),
+              var records = loadIndexIfNeeded(from: directory, at: date) else {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            return false
+        }
+        if let existing = records[messageID],
+           existing.kind == .tombstone,
+           !isExpired(existing.recordedAt, at: date) {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(existing)
+            return true
+        }
+
+        let victim = capacityVictim(
+            for: .tombstone,
+            replacing: messageID,
+            in: records
+        )
+        if records[messageID]?.kind != .tombstone,
+           records.values.lazy.filter({ $0.kind == .tombstone }).count >= capacity,
+           victim == nil {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            return false
+        }
+
+        let tombstone = ReceiptRecord(
+            kind: .tombstone,
+            // Retain the accepted path so a crash between the atomic record
+            // write and payload unlink can finish cleanup after relaunch.
+            relativePath: records[messageID]?.relativePath,
+            recordedAt: date
+        )
+        guard persist(tombstone, messageID: messageID, to: directory) else {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+            return false
+        }
+
+        records[messageID] = tombstone
+        if let victim, victim != messageID {
+            records.removeValue(forKey: victim)
+            removeRecord(messageID: victim, from: directory)
+        }
+        runtime.records = records
+        runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+        removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(tombstone)
+        return true
+    }
+
+    private func loadIndexIfNeeded(
+        from directory: URL,
+        at date: Date
+    ) -> [String: ReceiptRecord]? {
+        if let records = runtime.records {
+            return records
+        }
+
+        do {
+            try fileManager.createDirectory(
+                at: directory,
+                withIntermediateDirectories: true,
+                attributes: nil
+            )
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error(
+                "❌ Failed to create private-media receipt directory: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        let urls: [URL]
+        do {
+            if let directoryReader {
+                urls = try directoryReader(directory)
+            } else {
+                urls = try fileManager.contentsOfDirectory(
+                    at: directory,
+                    includingPropertiesForKeys: nil,
+                    options: []
+                )
+            }
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error(
+                "❌ Failed to enumerate private-media receipts: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+            return nil
+        }
+
+        var records: [String: ReceiptRecord] = [:]
+        var expired: [String] = []
+        var tombstones: [ReceiptRecord] = []
+        for url in urls {
+            guard url.pathExtension == "json" else { continue }
+            let messageID = url.deletingPathExtension().lastPathComponent
+            guard PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(messageID) else {
+                continue
+            }
+
+            let record: ReceiptRecord
+            do {
+                let data = try dataReader?(url) ?? Data(contentsOf: url)
+                record = try JSONDecoder().decode(ReceiptRecord.self, from: data)
+            } catch {
+                // Never delete or skip an unreadable stable-ID record. Treating
+                // it as absent could resurrect accepted or deleted media.
+                SecureLogger.error(
+                    "❌ Failed to read private-media receipt \(messageID.prefix(12))…: \(error)",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return nil
+            }
+
+            guard isStructurallyValid(record) else {
+                SecureLogger.error(
+                    "❌ Invalid private-media receipt \(messageID.prefix(12))…",
+                    category: .session
+                )
+                return nil
+            }
+            if isExpired(record.recordedAt, at: date) {
+                expired.append(messageID)
+                continue
+            }
+            records[messageID] = record
+            if record.kind == .tombstone {
+                tombstones.append(record)
+            }
+        }
+
+        let overflow = overflowVictims(in: records)
+        for messageID in overflow {
+            records.removeValue(forKey: messageID)
+        }
+
+        // Install the index only after every stable-ID record was read and
+        // validated successfully. Cleanup cannot influence a failed scan.
+        runtime.records = records
+
+        for messageID in expired + overflow {
+            removeRecord(messageID: messageID, from: directory)
+        }
+        for tombstone in tombstones {
+            removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(tombstone)
+        }
+        return records
+    }
+
+    private func isStructurallyValid(_ record: ReceiptRecord) -> Bool {
+        switch record.kind {
+        case .tombstone:
+            guard let relativePath = record.relativePath else { return true }
+            return candidatePayload(relativePath: relativePath) != nil
+        case .accepted:
+            guard let relativePath = record.relativePath else { return false }
+            return candidatePayload(relativePath: relativePath) != nil
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func isExpired(_ recordedAt: Date, at date: Date) -> Bool {
+        date.timeIntervalSince(recordedAt) > ttl
+    }
+
+    private func overflowVictims(
+        in records: [String: ReceiptRecord]
+    ) -> [String] {
+        var victims: [String] = []
+        for kind in [ReceiptRecord.Kind.accepted, .tombstone] {
+            let matching = records.filter { $0.value.kind == kind }
+            let overflow = matching.count - capacity
+            guard overflow > 0 else { continue }
+            victims.append(contentsOf: matching.sorted { lhs, rhs in
+                if lhs.value.recordedAt == rhs.value.recordedAt {
+                    return lhs.key < rhs.key
+                }
+                return lhs.value.recordedAt < rhs.value.recordedAt
+            }
+            .prefix(overflow)
+            .map(\.key))
+        }
+        return victims
+    }
+
+    /// Accepted receipts and tombstones have independent capacity. High media
+    /// volume cannot evict explicit deletion intent, and vice versa.
+    private func capacityVictim(
+        for incomingKind: ReceiptRecord.Kind,
+        replacing messageID: String,
+        in records: [String: ReceiptRecord]
+    ) -> String? {
+        guard records[messageID]?.kind != incomingKind else { return nil }
+        let matching = records.filter {
+            $0.key != messageID && $0.value.kind == incomingKind
+        }
+        guard matching.count >= capacity else { return nil }
+        return matching.min { lhs, rhs in
+            if lhs.value.recordedAt == rhs.value.recordedAt {
+                return lhs.key < rhs.key
+            }
+            return lhs.value.recordedAt < rhs.value.recordedAt
+        }?.key
+    }
+
+    private func persist(
+        _ record: ReceiptRecord,
+        messageID: String,
+        to directory: URL
+    ) -> Bool {
+        do {
+            try fileManager.createDirectory(
+                at: directory,
+                withIntermediateDirectories: true,
+                attributes: nil
+            )
+            let data = try JSONEncoder().encode(record)
+            var options: Data.WritingOptions = [.atomic]
+            #if os(iOS)
+            options.insert(.completeFileProtectionUntilFirstUserAuthentication)
+            #endif
+            let url = recordURL(messageID: messageID, in: directory)
+            try data.write(to: url, options: options)
+            return true
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.error(
+                "❌ Failed to persist private-media receipt \(messageID.prefix(12))…: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+            return false
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func removeRecord(messageID: String, from directory: URL) {
+        let url = recordURL(messageID: messageID, in: directory)
+        guard fileManager.fileExists(atPath: url.path) else { return }
+        do {
+            try fileManager.removeItem(at: url)
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "⚠️ Failed to prune private-media receipt \(messageID.prefix(12))…: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func recordURL(messageID: String, in directory: URL) -> URL {
+        directory
+            .appendingPathComponent(messageID, isDirectory: false)
+            .appendingPathExtension("json")
+    }
+
+    private func removePayloadRecordedByTombstone(_ record: ReceiptRecord) {
+        guard record.kind == .tombstone,
+              let relativePath = record.relativePath,
+              let payload = candidatePayload(relativePath: relativePath),
+              fileManager.fileExists(atPath: payload.path) else {
+            return
+        }
+        do {
+            try fileManager.removeItem(at: payload)
+        } catch {
+            SecureLogger.warning(
+                "⚠️ Failed to remove explicitly deleted private media: \(error)",
+                category: .session
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func addVolatileTombstone(_ messageID: String, at date: Date) {
+        runtime.volatileTombstones[messageID] = date
+        let overflow = runtime.volatileTombstones.count - capacity
+        guard overflow > 0 else { return }
+        let oldest = runtime.volatileTombstones.sorted {
+            if $0.value == $1.value { return $0.key < $1.key }
+            return $0.value < $1.value
+        }
+        for (oldMessageID, _) in oldest.prefix(overflow) {
+            runtime.volatileTombstones.removeValue(forKey: oldMessageID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func validExistingPayload(_ url: URL) -> URL? {
+        let standardized = url.standardizedFileURL
+        guard isInsideFilesDirectory(standardized) else { return nil }
+        var isDirectory: ObjCBool = false
+        guard fileManager.fileExists(
+            atPath: standardized.path,
+            isDirectory: &isDirectory
+        ), !isDirectory.boolValue else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return standardized
+    }
+
+    private func relativePath(for url: URL) -> String? {
+        guard let filesRoot = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        let prefix = filesRoot.path + "/"
+        let standardized = url.standardizedFileURL
+        guard standardized.path.hasPrefix(prefix) else { return nil }
+        let relativePath = String(standardized.path.dropFirst(prefix.count))
+        return relativePath.isEmpty ? nil : relativePath
+    }
+
+    private func existingPayload(relativePath: String) -> URL? {
+        guard let candidate = candidatePayload(relativePath: relativePath) else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        return validExistingPayload(candidate)
+    }
+
+    private func candidatePayload(relativePath: String) -> URL? {
+        guard !relativePath.isEmpty,
+              let filesRoot = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
+            return nil
+        }
+        let candidate = filesRoot
+            .appendingPathComponent(relativePath, isDirectory: false)
+            .standardizedFileURL
+        guard candidate.path.hasPrefix(filesRoot.path + "/") else { return nil }
+        return candidate
+    }
+
+    private func isInsideFilesDirectory(_ url: URL) -> Bool {
+        guard let filesRoot = try? filesDirectory().standardizedFileURL else {
+            return false
+        }
+        return url.standardizedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(filesRoot.path + "/")
+    }
+
+    private func resolvedReceiptDirectory() -> URL? {
+        return try? filesDirectory().appendingPathComponent(
+            Self.receiptDirectoryName,
+            isDirectory: true
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func filesDirectory() throws -> URL {
+        let root = try baseDirectory ?? fileManager.url(
+            for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
+            in: .userDomainMask,
+            appropriateFor: nil,
+            create: true
+        )
+        let files = root.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
+        try fileManager.createDirectory(
+            at: files,
+            withIntermediateDirectories: true,
+            attributes: nil
+        )
+        return files
+    }
+}

bitchat/Services/BLE/BLEService.swift

@@ -707,6 +707,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
     /// or advertising while the full panic transaction is incomplete.
     func suspendForPanicReset() {
         setPanicSuspended(true)
+        noisePacketHandler.resetForPanic()
         gossipSyncManager?.stop()
         gossipSyncManager = nil
         // Stop the radio and drain CoreBluetooth's delegate queue first. A
@@ -717,7 +718,11 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         // Drain every receive/send submitted by callbacks that finished ahead
         // of the radio stop. Later callbacks observe the closed lifecycle, and
         // generation-bound handoffs that raced this barrier reject themselves.
-        messageQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {}
+        // Clear the old identity's bounded early-ciphertext queue again after
+        // those callbacks drain so none can repopulate it after the first wipe.
+        messageQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+            noisePacketHandler.resetForPanic()
+        }
         clearEmergencySessionState()
     }
 
@@ -736,6 +741,7 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         gossipSyncManager?.stop()
         gossipSyncManager = nil
         messageQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
+            noisePacketHandler.resetForPanic()
             pendingNoiseSessionQueues.removeAll()
         }
 
@@ -1113,6 +1119,28 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
         collectionsQueue.sync { peerRegistry.capabilities(for: peerID) }
     }
 
+    private func privateMediaPolicyFingerprint(
+        for peerID: PeerID,
+        expectedSessionGeneration: UUID?
+    ) -> String? {
+        let normalizedPeerID = peerID.toShort()
+        if let expectedSessionGeneration,
+           noiseService.sessionGeneration(for: normalizedPeerID)
+                == expectedSessionGeneration,
+           let fingerprint = noiseService.getPeerFingerprint(normalizedPeerID),
+           noiseService.sessionGeneration(for: normalizedPeerID)
+                == expectedSessionGeneration {
+            // The exact authenticated Noise static key is stronger than a
+            // registry entry populated by a public announce.
+            return fingerprint
+        }
+        return collectionsQueue.sync {
+            peerRegistry.info(for: normalizedPeerID)?
+                .noisePublicKey?
+                .sha256Fingerprint()
+        }
+    }
+
     func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy {
         let normalizedPeerID = peerID.toShort()
         let state: (
@@ -1140,7 +1168,10 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
             return .awaitingCapabilityProof
         }
 
-        guard let fingerprint = state.fingerprint else {
+        guard let fingerprint = privateMediaPolicyFingerprint(
+            for: normalizedPeerID,
+            expectedSessionGeneration: state.sessionGeneration
+        ) ?? state.fingerprint else {
             // A raw fallback must be bound to the stable Noise key from a
             // verified registry entry; a routing ID alone can rotate or be
             // spoofed. Without that key neither proof nor safe migration state
@@ -1194,11 +1225,13 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                 return
             }
 
-            let fingerprint: String? = self.collectionsQueue.sync {
+            let generation = self.collectionsQueue.sync {
-                self.peerRegistry.info(for: normalizedPeerID)?
+                self.privateMediaSessionGenerations[normalizedPeerID]
-                    .noisePublicKey?
-                    .sha256Fingerprint()
             }
+            let fingerprint = self.privateMediaPolicyFingerprint(
+                for: normalizedPeerID,
+                expectedSessionGeneration: generation
+            )
             guard let fingerprint else {
                 self.completePrivateMediaPolicyResolution([completion], with: .blockedDowngrade)
                 return
@@ -2521,12 +2554,50 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
                     defaultPrefix: defaultPrefix
                 )
             },
+            privateMediaReceiptState: { [weak self] messageID in
+                self?.incomingFileStore.privateMediaReceiptState(
+                    messageID: messageID
+                ) ?? .unavailable
+            },
+            commitPrivateMediaFile: { [weak self] messageID, storedURL in
+                self?.incomingFileStore.commitPrivateMediaFile(
+                    messageID: messageID,
+                    storedURL: storedURL
+                ) ?? false
+            },
+            removeIncomingFile: { [weak self] storedURL in
+                self?.incomingFileStore.removeIncomingFile(at: storedURL)
+            },
+            isPrivateMediaSenderBlocked: { [weak self] peerID in
+                guard let self else { return false }
+                let senderStaticKey = self.noiseService.getPeerPublicKeyData(peerID)
+                    ?? self.collectionsQueue.sync {
+                        self.peerRegistry.info(for: peerID)?.noisePublicKey
+                    }
+                guard let senderStaticKey else { return false }
+                return self.identityManager.isBlocked(
+                    fingerprint: senderStaticKey.sha256Fingerprint()
+                )
+            },
             updatePeerLastSeen: { [weak self] peerID in
                 self?.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
             },
-            deliverMessage: { [weak self] message in
+            acknowledgePrivateMedia: { [weak self] messageID, peerID in
-                // Single main-actor hop delivering `.messageReceived`.
+                guard let self,
-                self?.emitTransportEvent(.messageReceived(message))
+                      let senderStaticKey = self.noiseService.getPeerPublicKeyData(peerID),
+                      !self.identityManager.isBlocked(
+                        fingerprint: senderStaticKey.sha256Fingerprint()
+                      ) else {
+                    return
+                }
+                self.sendDeliveryAck(for: messageID, to: peerID)
+            },
+            deliverMessage: { [weak self] message, shouldDeliver, completion in
+                self?.emitTransportEvent(
+                    .messageReceived(message),
+                    shouldDeliver: shouldDeliver,
+                    completion: completion
+                )
             }
         )
     }
@@ -3556,6 +3627,28 @@ extension BLEService {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Replays the current generation's ready callback. Restore tests use
+    /// this to prove same-generation reconciliation is idempotent.
+    func _test_reconcileCurrentNoiseSession(for peerID: PeerID) {
+        let normalizedPeerID = peerID.toShort()
+        messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
+            guard let self,
+                  let generation = self.noiseService.sessionGeneration(
+                    for: normalizedPeerID
+                  ),
+                  let fingerprint = self.noiseService.getPeerFingerprint(
+                    normalizedPeerID
+                  ) else {
+                return
+            }
+            self.handleNoisePeerAuthenticated(
+                peerID: normalizedPeerID,
+                fingerprint: fingerprint,
+                sessionGeneration: generation
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Builds an authenticated-session packet from an exact typed plaintext.
     /// Compatibility tests use this to model Android's deployed 0x20 file
     /// payload and the short-lived 0x09 prerelease payload without exposing a
@@ -4221,18 +4314,55 @@ extension BLEService {
         }
     }
 
-    private func emitTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) {
+    private func emitTransportEvent(
+        _ event: TransportEvent,
+        shouldDeliver: (() -> Bool)? = nil,
+        completion: (() -> Void)? = nil
+    ) {
         notifyUI { [weak self] in
-            self?.deliverTransportEvent(event)
+            guard let self,
+                  shouldDeliver?() ?? true,
+                  self.deliverTransportEvent(event),
+                  // Quota cleanup can race the asynchronous main-actor hop or
+                  // the synchronous ConversationStore upsert. ACK only while
+                  // the exact durable mapping and file still resolve.
+                  shouldDeliver?() ?? true else {
+                return
+            }
+            completion?()
         }
     }
 
     @MainActor
-    private func deliverTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) {
+    @discardableResult
+    private func deliverTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) -> Bool {
+        if case .messageReceived(let message) = event {
+            if let synchronousDelegate =
+                eventDelegate as? SynchronousMessageTransportEventDelegate {
+                return synchronousDelegate
+                    .didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(message)
+            }
+            if let eventDelegate {
+                eventDelegate.didReceiveTransportEvent(event)
+                return false
+            }
+            if let synchronousDelegate =
+                delegate as? SynchronousMessageTransportEventDelegate {
+                return synchronousDelegate
+                    .didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(message)
+            }
+        }
+
         if let eventDelegate {
             eventDelegate.didReceiveTransportEvent(event)
+            return true
         } else {
-            delegate?.receiveTransportEvent(event)
+            guard let delegate else { return false }
+            delegate.receiveTransportEvent(event)
+            if case .messageReceived = event {
+                return false
+            }
+            return true
         }
     }
 
@@ -4649,7 +4779,10 @@ extension BLEService {
     private func configureNoiseServiceCallbacks(for service: NoiseEncryptionService) {
         service.onPeerAuthenticatedWithGeneration = { [weak self] peerID, fingerprint, generation in
             SecureLogger.debug("🔐 Noise session authenticated with \(peerID.id.prefix(8))…, fingerprint: \(fingerprint.prefix(16))…")
-            self?.messageQueue.async { [weak self] in
+            // Authentication can be reported while an initiator is still
+            // returning XX message 3. Serialize generation-bound state and
+            // every post-handshake drain behind the handshake packet handler.
+            self?.messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
                 self?.handleNoisePeerAuthenticated(
                     peerID: peerID,
                     fingerprint: fingerprint,
@@ -4724,7 +4857,9 @@ extension BLEService {
         }
         service.onSessionRestoredWithGeneration = { [weak self, weak service] peerID, generation in
             guard let self, let service else { return }
-            self.messageQueue.async { [weak self, weak service] in
+            // The manager makes restored keys visible atomically. Reconcile
+            // transport state and queued sends as the next serialized phase.
+            self.messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self, weak service] in
                 guard let self,
                       let service,
                       self.noiseService === service,
@@ -4792,7 +4927,16 @@ extension BLEService {
             }
         ) else { return }
 
-        guard let watchdog = transition.watchdog else { return }
+        guard let watchdog = transition.watchdog else {
+            // A quarantined transport restored the same cryptographic
+            // generation. Its capability proof and announce state never
+            // became stale; only work queued while outbound keys were paused
+            // needs one idempotent ready transition.
+            noisePacketHandler.handleSessionAuthenticated(normalizedPeerID)
+            sendPendingMessagesAfterHandshake(for: normalizedPeerID)
+            sendPendingNoisePayloadsAfterHandshake(for: normalizedPeerID)
+            return
+        }
 
         completePrivateMediaPolicyResolution(transition.rejected, with: .blockedDowngrade)
         schedulePrivateMediaProofTimeout(
@@ -4801,6 +4945,10 @@ extension BLEService {
             sessionGeneration: generation,
             nonce: watchdog.nonce
         )
+        // Cross-link delivery can put ciphertext sent immediately after
+        // message 3 ahead of message 3 itself. Retry the bounded queue only
+        // after this generation's transport state has been fully installed.
+        noisePacketHandler.handleSessionAuthenticated(normalizedPeerID)
 
         // `onPeerAuthenticated` can fire while the initiator is returning XX
         // message 3. This callback is queued behind the handshake handler, so
@@ -6415,7 +6563,12 @@ extension BLEService {
     // MARK: Packet Reception
     
     private func handleReceivedPacket(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
-        // Call directly if already on messageQueue, otherwise dispatch
+        let isNoisePacket = packet.type == MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue
+            || packet.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue
+
+        // Capture the panic lifecycle at the first off-messageQueue handoff.
+        // Noise packets still enter through a barrier so handshake promotion,
+        // quarantine, and encrypted delivery share one ordered session.
         if DispatchQueue.getSpecific(key: messageQueueKey) == nil {
             guard let lifecycleGeneration =
                     capturePanicLifecycleGeneration() else {
@@ -6424,7 +6577,8 @@ extension BLEService {
             #if DEBUG
             _test_beforeReceivePacketHandoff?()
             #endif
-            messageQueue.async { [weak self] in
+            let flags: DispatchWorkItemFlags = isNoisePacket ? .barrier : []
+            messageQueue.async(flags: flags) { [weak self] in
                 guard let self,
                       self.isCurrentPanicLifecycleGeneration(
                           lifecycleGeneration
@@ -6434,11 +6588,34 @@ extension BLEService {
                 #if DEBUG
                 self._test_onReceivePacketHandoff?()
                 #endif
-                self.handleReceivedPacket(packet, from: peerID)
+                self.handleReceivedPacketOnQueue(packet, from: peerID)
             }
             return
         }
 
+        if isNoisePacket {
+            guard let lifecycleGeneration =
+                    capturePanicLifecycleGeneration() else {
+                return
+            }
+            messageQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
+                guard let self,
+                      self.isCurrentPanicLifecycleGeneration(
+                          lifecycleGeneration
+                      ) else {
+                    return
+                }
+                self.handleReceivedPacketOnQueue(packet, from: peerID)
+            }
+        } else {
+            handleReceivedPacketOnQueue(packet, from: peerID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private func handleReceivedPacketOnQueue(
+        _ packet: BitchatPacket,
+        from peerID: PeerID
+    ) {
         let context = BLEReceivePipeline.context(for: packet, localPeerID: myPeerID)
         let senderID = context.senderID
         let messageID = context.messageID
@@ -7214,16 +7391,16 @@ extension BLEService {
     }
 
     private func handleNoiseHandshake(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
-        let wasEstablished = noiseService.hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID)
         let result = noisePacketHandler.handleHandshakeWithResult(
             packet,
             from: peerID
         )
-        let isEstablished = noiseService.hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID)
+        // An inbound message 1 quarantines the old transport receive-only.
-        if wasEstablished, result.processed,
+        // Keep its generation-bound BLE state intact: the manager's new
-           !isEstablished {
+        // handshaking generation already gates every outbound policy, while
-            noteNoiseSessionCleared(for: peerID)
+        // a rollback can become ready again without repeating capability
-        }
+        // proof or announce side effects. Only the exact handshake candidate's
+        // authenticated completion may promote the physical ingress link.
         if result.didEstablishAuthenticatedSession {
             markNoiseAuthenticatedIngressLink(for: packet, peerID: peerID)
         }
@@ -7261,6 +7438,11 @@ extension BLEService {
             hasNoiseSession: { [weak self] peerID in
                 self?.noiseService.hasSession(with: peerID) ?? false
             },
+            isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion: { [weak self] peerID in
+                self?.noiseService.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(
+                    with: peerID
+                ) ?? false
+            },
             initiateHandshake: { [weak self] peerID in
                 self?.initiateNoiseHandshake(with: peerID)
             },
@@ -7274,7 +7456,14 @@ extension BLEService {
                 guard let self = self else { throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished }
                 let result = try self.noiseService.decryptWithSessionGeneration(
                     payload,
-                    from: peerID
+                    from: peerID,
+                    establishedGenerationIsReady: { generation in
+                        self.collectionsQueue.sync {
+                            self.privateMediaSessionGenerations[
+                                peerID.toShort()
+                            ] == generation
+                        }
+                    }
                 )
                 return BLENoiseDecryptionResult(
                     plaintext: result.plaintext,

bitchat/Services/NoiseEncryptionService.swift

@@ -853,6 +853,13 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
     func hasSession(with peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
         return sessionManager.getSession(for: peerID) != nil
     }
+
+    /// True while an inbound ordinary XX responder is waiting for message 3.
+    /// A small amount of immediately-following ciphertext may arrive first
+    /// over BLE and must be retried only after responder promotion.
+    func isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(with peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
+        sessionManager.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(for: peerID)
+    }
     
     // MARK: - Encryption/Decryption
     
@@ -920,20 +927,15 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
 
     func decryptWithSessionGeneration(
         _ data: Data,
-        from peerID: PeerID
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        establishedGenerationIsReady: (UUID) -> Bool = { _ in true }
     ) throws -> (plaintext: Data, sessionGeneration: UUID) {
         // Standard transport ciphertext has 20 bytes of nonce/tag overhead.
-        // A larger candidate is admitted only up to the framed-file ceiling;
+        // A larger ciphertext is admitted only up to the framed-file ceiling;
         // after authenticated decryption it must prove it is `.privateFile`.
         let isStandardCiphertext = NoiseSecurityValidator.validateCiphertextSize(data)
-        guard isStandardCiphertext || NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(data) else {
+        let isAdmittedCiphertext = isStandardCiphertext
-            throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
+            || NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(data)
-        }
-        
-        // Check rate limit
-        guard rateLimiter.allowMessage(from: peerID) else {
-            throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
-        }
         
         // A quarantined transport is deliberately unavailable for outbound
         // state, but remains receive-only until the responder proves identity
@@ -942,7 +944,20 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
             throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
         }
         
-        let result = try sessionManager.decryptWithSessionGeneration(data, from: peerID)
+        let result = try sessionManager.decryptWithSessionGeneration(
+            data,
+            from: peerID,
+            establishedGenerationIsReady:
+                establishedGenerationIsReady,
+            authorizeDecrypt: { [rateLimiter] in
+                guard isAdmittedCiphertext else {
+                    throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
+                }
+                guard rateLimiter.allowMessage(from: peerID) else {
+                    throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
+                }
+            }
+        )
         if !isStandardCiphertext {
             guard NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: result.plaintext.first),
                   NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileMessageSize(result.plaintext) else {
@@ -1159,6 +1174,9 @@ struct NoiseMessage: Codable {
 enum NoiseEncryptionError: Error {
     case handshakeRequired
     case sessionNotEstablished
+    /// Manager keys are established or restored, but BLE has not installed
+    /// generation-bound transport state. No receive nonce was consumed.
+    case transportGenerationNotReady
     /// Envelope references a prekey ID we don't hold (never ours, already
     /// deleted after its grace window, or wiped in a panic).
     case unknownPrekey

bitchat/Services/Transport.swift

@@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ protocol TransportEventDelegate: AnyObject {
     @MainActor func didReceiveTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent)
 }
 
+/// Optional typed-event contract for sinks that can synchronously decide
+/// whether an inbound message was accepted.
+protocol SynchronousMessageTransportEventDelegate: TransportEventDelegate {
+    @MainActor
+    func didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool
+}
+
 protocol Transport: AnyObject {
     // Event sink
     var delegate: BitchatDelegate? { get set }

bitchat/Services/TransportConfig.swift

@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ enum TransportConfig {
     static let privateMediaCapabilityProofTimeoutSeconds: TimeInterval = 5
     static let privateMediaCapabilityProofPendingPeerCap: Int = 64
     static let privateMediaCapabilityProofWaitersPerPeerCap: Int = 16
+    /// Accepted private-media receipts and explicit-deletion tombstones each
+    /// receive this independent capacity.
+    static let privateMediaReceivedLedgerCapacity: Int = 4_096
+    /// A bounded retry horizon prevents stable receipt state from growing into
+    /// permanent application history.
+    static let privateMediaReceivedLedgerTTLSeconds: TimeInterval =
+        7 * 24 * 60 * 60
     static let bleFragmentRelayMinDelayMs: Int = 8          // Faster forwarding for media fragments
     static let bleFragmentRelayMaxDelayMs: Int = 25         // Upper jitter bound for fragment relays
     // Fragment relay TTL in sparse graphs; matches messageTTLDefault so media

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator.swift

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import Foundation
 @MainActor
 protocol ChatLiveVoiceContext: AnyObject {
     var nickname: String { get }
+    var myPeerID: PeerID { get }
     var selectedPrivateChatPeer: PeerID? { get }
     /// Whether the public mesh timeline is what's on screen (autoplay gate
     /// for public bursts).
@@ -30,6 +31,12 @@ protocol ChatLiveVoiceContext: AnyObject {
     func upsertPublicMeshMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage)
     @discardableResult
     func removePrivateMessage(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage?
+    /// Records and sends the finalized note's read receipt after a live
+    /// bubble adopts its wire-derivable message ID.
+    func hasSentReadReceipt(_ messageID: String) -> Bool
+    @discardableResult
+    func markReadReceiptSent(_ messageID: String) -> Bool
+    func sendMeshReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID)
     /// Removes a message from whichever conversation holds it.
     func removeMessage(withID messageID: String, cleanupFile: Bool)
     /// Publishes who is currently talking live in the public mesh channel
@@ -272,8 +279,16 @@ final class ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator {
         guard let entry = finishedBursts.first(where: { matches($0.key) }) else { return false }
         let finished = entry.value
 
+        // A DM live bubble starts before the finalized file exists and
+        // therefore has a receiver-local random ID. Adopt the finalized
+        // message's deterministic ID so delivery/read ACKs address the same
+        // row as the sender's media placeholder. Public notes retain their
+        // live-bubble ID because public transfers have no private receipts.
+        let replacementID = finished.scope == .directMessage
+            ? message.id
+            : finished.messageID
         let replacement = BitchatMessage(
-            id: finished.messageID,
+            id: replacementID,
             sender: message.sender,
             content: message.content,
             timestamp: finished.messageTimestamp,
@@ -287,7 +302,31 @@ final class ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator {
         )
         switch finished.scope {
         case .directMessage:
+            // Capture read state before rekeying. The user may have read the
+            // live bubble and navigated away before the finalized .m4a lands.
+            let shouldSendAdoptedReadReceipt =
+                context.hasSentReadReceipt(finished.messageID)
+                || context.selectedPrivateChatPeer == finished.peerID
+
+            // Insert first so replacing the only row in a DM never
+            // transiently deletes its conversation, unread state, or current
+            // selection. Then remove the receiver-local live-bubble alias.
             context.upsertPrivateMessage(replacement, in: finished.peerID)
+            if replacementID != finished.messageID {
+                context.removePrivateMessage(withID: finished.messageID)
+            }
+            // The live bubble may already have emitted a receiver-local READ
+            // before the sender created its finalized media row. Re-emit once
+            // for the adopted stable ID now that the file has arrived.
+            if shouldSendAdoptedReadReceipt,
+               context.markReadReceiptSent(replacementID) {
+                let receipt = ReadReceipt(
+                    originalMessageID: replacementID,
+                    readerID: context.myPeerID,
+                    readerNickname: context.nickname
+                )
+                context.sendMeshReadReceipt(receipt, to: finished.peerID)
+            }
         case .publicMesh:
             context.upsertPublicMeshMessage(replacement)
         }

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatMediaTransferCoordinator.swift

@@ -252,9 +252,17 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
         }
 
         let targetPeer = context.selectedPrivateChatPeer
+        let privateMessageID = targetPeer.flatMap { peerID in
+            PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+                senderPeerID: context.myPeerID,
+                recipientPeerID: peerID,
+                fileName: url.lastPathComponent
+            )
+        }
         let message = enqueueMediaMessage(
             content: "\(MimeType.Category.audio.messagePrefix)\(url.lastPathComponent)",
-            targetPeer: targetPeer
+            targetPeer: targetPeer,
+            messageID: privateMessageID
         )
         let messageID = message.id
         let transferId = makeTransferID(messageID: messageID)
@@ -419,9 +427,17 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
                         try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: prepared.outputURL)
                         return
                     }
+                    let privateMessageID = targetPeer.flatMap { peerID in
+                        PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+                            for: prepared.packet,
+                            senderPeerID: self.context.myPeerID,
+                            recipientPeerID: peerID
+                        )
+                    }
                     let message = self.enqueueMediaMessage(
                         content: "\(MimeType.Category.image.messagePrefix)\(prepared.outputURL.lastPathComponent)",
-                        targetPeer: targetPeer
+                        targetPeer: targetPeer,
+                        messageID: privateMessageID
                     )
                     let messageID = message.id
                     let transferId = self.makeTransferID(messageID: messageID)
@@ -459,12 +475,17 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
         }
     }
 
-    func enqueueMediaMessage(content: String, targetPeer: PeerID?) -> BitchatMessage {
+    func enqueueMediaMessage(
+        content: String,
+        targetPeer: PeerID?,
+        messageID: String? = nil
+    ) -> BitchatMessage {
         let timestamp = Date()
         let message: BitchatMessage
 
         if let peerID = targetPeer {
             message = BitchatMessage(
+                id: messageID,
                 sender: context.nickname,
                 content: content,
                 timestamp: timestamp,

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatPeerListCoordinator.swift

@@ -100,9 +100,14 @@ final class ChatPeerListCoordinator: @unchecked Sendable {
 
     func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {
         Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
-            self?.handlePeerListUpdate(peers)
+            self?.didUpdatePeerListSynchronously(peers)
         }
     }
+
+    @MainActor
+    func didUpdatePeerListSynchronously(_ peers: [PeerID]) {
+        handlePeerListUpdate(peers)
+    }
 }
 
 private extension ChatPeerListCoordinator {

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatTransportEventCoordinator.swift

@@ -163,21 +163,20 @@ final class ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
     }
 
     func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
-        runOnMain { context in
+        runOnMain { [self] context in
-            guard !context.isMessageBlocked(message) else { return }
+            handleReceivedMessage(message, in: context)
-            guard !message.content.trimmed.isEmpty || message.isPrivate else { return }
-
-            if message.isPrivate {
-                context.handlePrivateMessage(message)
-            } else {
-                context.handlePublicMessage(message)
-            }
-
-            context.checkForMentions(message)
-            context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
         }
     }
 
+    /// Typed transport events already arrive on the main actor. Handle them
+    /// synchronously so observers see the ConversationStore mutation before
+    /// the transport completes delivery.
+    @MainActor
+    @discardableResult
+    func didReceiveMessageSynchronously(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
+        handleReceivedMessage(message, in: context)
+    }
+
     func didReceivePublicMessage(
         from peerID: PeerID,
         nickname: String,
@@ -185,28 +184,36 @@ final class ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
         timestamp: Date,
         messageID: String?
     ) {
-        runOnMain { context in
+        runOnMain { [self] context in
-            let normalized = content.trimmed
+            handlePublicMessage(
-            let mentions = context.parseMentions(from: normalized)
+                from: peerID,
-            let message = BitchatMessage(
+                nickname: nickname,
-                id: messageID,
+                content: content,
-                sender: nickname,
-                content: normalized,
                 timestamp: timestamp,
-                isRelay: false,
+                messageID: messageID,
-                originalSender: nil,
+                in: context
-                isPrivate: false,
-                recipientNickname: nil,
-                senderPeerID: peerID,
-                mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
             )
-
-            context.handlePublicMessage(message)
-            context.checkForMentions(message)
-            context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
         }
     }
 
+    @MainActor
+    func didReceivePublicMessageSynchronously(
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        nickname: String,
+        content: String,
+        timestamp: Date,
+        messageID: String?
+    ) {
+        handlePublicMessage(
+            from: peerID,
+            nickname: nickname,
+            content: content,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            messageID: messageID,
+            in: context
+        )
+    }
+
     func didReceiveNoisePayload(
         from peerID: PeerID,
         type: NoisePayloadType,
@@ -224,59 +231,134 @@ final class ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
         }
     }
 
+    @MainActor
+    func didReceiveNoisePayloadSynchronously(
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        type: NoisePayloadType,
+        payload: Data,
+        timestamp: Date
+    ) {
+        handleNoisePayload(
+            from: peerID,
+            type: type,
+            payload: payload,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            in: context
+        )
+    }
+
     func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {
-        SecureLogger.debug("🤝 Peer connected: \(peerID)", category: .session)
+        runOnMain { [weak self] _ in
-
+            self?.didConnectToPeerSynchronously(peerID)
-        runOnMain { context in
-            context.isConnected = true
-            context.registerEphemeralSession(peerID: peerID)
-            context.notifyUIChanged()
-
-            if let peer = context.unifiedPeer(for: peerID) {
-                let stablePeerID = PeerID(hexData: peer.noisePublicKey)
-                context.cacheStablePeerID(stablePeerID, for: peerID)
-            }
-
-            context.flushRouterOutbox(for: peerID)
-            context.retryCourierDeposits(via: peerID)
         }
     }
 
+    @MainActor
+    func didConnectToPeerSynchronously(_ peerID: PeerID) {
+        SecureLogger.debug("🤝 Peer connected: \(peerID)", category: .session)
+
+        context.isConnected = true
+        context.registerEphemeralSession(peerID: peerID)
+        context.notifyUIChanged()
+
+        if let peer = context.unifiedPeer(for: peerID) {
+            let stablePeerID = PeerID(hexData: peer.noisePublicKey)
+            context.cacheStablePeerID(stablePeerID, for: peerID)
+        }
+
+        context.flushRouterOutbox(for: peerID)
+        context.retryCourierDeposits(via: peerID)
+    }
+
     func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {
+        runOnMain { [weak self] _ in
+            self?.didDisconnectFromPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    func didDisconnectFromPeerSynchronously(_ peerID: PeerID) {
         SecureLogger.debug("👋 Peer disconnected: \(peerID)", category: .session)
 
-        runOnMain { context in
+        context.removeEphemeralSession(peerID: peerID)
-            context.removeEphemeralSession(peerID: peerID)
 
-            var stablePeerID = context.cachedStablePeerID(for: peerID)
+        var stablePeerID = context.cachedStablePeerID(for: peerID)
-            if stablePeerID == nil,
+        if stablePeerID == nil,
-               let key = context.noiseSessionPublicKeyData(for: peerID) {
+           let key = context.noiseSessionPublicKeyData(for: peerID) {
-                let derivedPeerID = PeerID(hexData: key)
+            let derivedPeerID = PeerID(hexData: key)
-                context.cacheStablePeerID(derivedPeerID, for: peerID)
+            context.cacheStablePeerID(derivedPeerID, for: peerID)
-                stablePeerID = derivedPeerID
+            stablePeerID = derivedPeerID
-            }
-
-            if let currentPeerID = context.selectedPrivateChatPeer,
-               currentPeerID == peerID,
-               let stablePeerID {
-                self.migrateSelectedConversationIfNeeded(
-                    from: peerID,
-                    to: stablePeerID,
-                    in: context
-                )
-            }
-
-            let receiptIDs = context.privateMessages(for: peerID)
-                .filter { $0.senderPeerID == peerID }
-                .map(\.id)
-            context.unmarkReadReceiptsSent(receiptIDs)
-
-            context.notifyUIChanged()
         }
+
+        if let currentPeerID = context.selectedPrivateChatPeer,
+           currentPeerID == peerID,
+           let stablePeerID {
+            migrateSelectedConversationIfNeeded(
+                from: peerID,
+                to: stablePeerID,
+                in: context
+            )
+        }
+
+        let receiptIDs = context.privateMessages(for: peerID)
+            .filter { $0.senderPeerID == peerID }
+            .map(\.id)
+        context.unmarkReadReceiptsSent(receiptIDs)
+
+        context.notifyUIChanged()
     }
 }
 
 private extension ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
+    @MainActor
+    func handlePublicMessage(
+        from peerID: PeerID,
+        nickname: String,
+        content: String,
+        timestamp: Date,
+        messageID: String?,
+        in context: any ChatTransportEventContext
+    ) {
+        let normalized = content.trimmed
+        let mentions = context.parseMentions(from: normalized)
+        let message = BitchatMessage(
+            id: messageID,
+            sender: nickname,
+            content: normalized,
+            timestamp: timestamp,
+            isRelay: false,
+            originalSender: nil,
+            isPrivate: false,
+            recipientNickname: nil,
+            senderPeerID: peerID,
+            mentions: mentions.isEmpty ? nil : mentions
+        )
+
+        context.handlePublicMessage(message)
+        context.checkForMentions(message)
+        context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    @discardableResult
+    func handleReceivedMessage(
+        _ message: BitchatMessage,
+        in context: any ChatTransportEventContext
+    ) -> Bool {
+        guard !context.isMessageBlocked(message) else { return false }
+        guard !message.content.trimmed.isEmpty || message.isPrivate else { return false }
+
+        if message.isPrivate {
+            context.handlePrivateMessage(message)
+        } else {
+            context.handlePublicMessage(message)
+        }
+
+        context.checkForMentions(message)
+        context.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
+        return true
+    }
+
     func runOnMain(_ action: @escaping @MainActor (any ChatTransportEventContext) -> Void) {
         Task { @MainActor [weak context = self.context] in
             guard let context else { return }

bitchat/ViewModels/ChatViewModel.swift

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct PanicNetworkLifecycle {
 /// Manages the application state and business logic for BitChat.
 /// Acts as the primary coordinator between UI components and backend services,
 /// implementing the BitchatDelegate protocol to handle network events.
-final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDelegate, CommandContextProvider, GeohashParticipantContext, MessageFormattingContext {
+final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, SynchronousMessageTransportEventDelegate, CommandContextProvider, GeohashParticipantContext, MessageFormattingContext {
     // Use MessageFormattingEngine.Patterns for regex matching (shared, precompiled)
     typealias Patterns = MessageFormattingEngine.Patterns
 
@@ -495,6 +495,12 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
         }
     }
 
+    /// Whether a read receipt has already been recorded for `messageID`.
+    @MainActor
+    func hasSentReadReceipt(_ messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        sentReadReceipts.contains(messageID)
+    }
+
     /// Records that a read receipt is being sent for `messageID`.
     /// Returns `false` when one was already recorded — the caller must skip sending.
     @MainActor
@@ -1701,7 +1707,81 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
 
     @MainActor
     func didReceiveTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) {
-        receiveTransportEvent(event)
+        switch event {
+        case .messageReceived(let message):
+            _ = didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(message)
+
+        case let .publicMessageReceived(
+            peerID,
+            nickname,
+            content,
+            timestamp,
+            messageID
+        ):
+            transportEventCoordinator.didReceivePublicMessageSynchronously(
+                from: peerID,
+                nickname: nickname,
+                content: content,
+                timestamp: timestamp,
+                messageID: messageID
+            )
+
+        case let .noisePayloadReceived(peerID, type, payload, timestamp):
+            transportEventCoordinator.didReceiveNoisePayloadSynchronously(
+                from: peerID,
+                type: type,
+                payload: payload,
+                timestamp: timestamp
+            )
+
+        case let .groupMessageReceived(payload, timestamp):
+            groupCoordinator.handleGroupMessagePayload(
+                payload,
+                timestamp: timestamp
+            )
+
+        case let .publicVoiceFrameReceived(
+            peerID,
+            nickname,
+            payload,
+            timestamp
+        ):
+            liveVoiceCoordinator.handlePublicVoiceFramePayload(
+                from: peerID,
+                nickname: nickname,
+                payload: payload,
+                timestamp: timestamp
+            )
+
+        case .peerConnected(let peerID):
+            transportEventCoordinator.didConnectToPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+
+        case .peerDisconnected(let peerID):
+            transportEventCoordinator.didDisconnectFromPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+
+        case .peerListUpdated(let peers):
+            peerListCoordinator.didUpdatePeerListSynchronously(peers)
+            // A peer-list update follows every verified announce, which is
+            // where a peer's `.vouch` capability actually arrives.
+            vouchCoordinator.peersUpdated(peers)
+
+        case .peerSnapshotsUpdated:
+            break
+
+        case let .messageDeliveryStatusUpdated(messageID, status):
+            deliveryCoordinator.didUpdateMessageDeliveryStatus(
+                messageID,
+                status: status
+            )
+
+        case .bluetoothStateUpdated(let state):
+            updateBluetoothState(state)
+        }
+    }
+
+    @MainActor
+    func didReceiveTransportMessageSynchronously(_ message: BitchatMessage) -> Bool {
+        transportEventCoordinator.didReceiveMessageSynchronously(message)
     }
 
     func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {

bitchatTests/BLEServiceCoreTests.swift

@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
     }
 
     @Test
-    func failedInboundReconnectRestoresAndDrainsTypedPayloadQueue() async throws {
+    func failedInboundReconnectRestoresAndDrainsWaitingWorkOnce() async throws {
         let ble = makeService()
         let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
         let mallory = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
@@ -722,21 +722,48 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
                 message: forgedMessage2
             )
         )
+        let forgedEarlyPayload = try #require(
+            BLENoisePayloadFactory.privateMessage(
+                content: "forged early message",
+                messageID: "forged-early"
+            )
+        )
+        try #require(
+            mallory.hasEstablishedSession(with: ble.myPeerID),
+            "forged initiator did not establish after producing message three"
+        )
+        let forgedEarlyCiphertext = try mallory.encrypt(
+            forgedEarlyPayload,
+            for: ble.myPeerID
+        )
+        let earlyPacket = BitchatPacket(
+            type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
+            senderID: Data(hexString: alicePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id),
+            timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1_000) + 1,
+            payload: forgedEarlyCiphertext,
+            signature: nil,
+            ttl: 7
+        )
+        ble._test_handlePacket(earlyPacket, fromPeerID: alicePeerID)
+        await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
+
         let thirdPacket = BitchatPacket(
             type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
             senderID: Data(hexString: alicePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
             recipientID: Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id),
-            timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1_000) + 1,
+            timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1_000) + 2,
             payload: forgedMessage3,
             signature: nil,
             ttl: 7
         )
         ble._test_handlePacket(thirdPacket, fromPeerID: alicePeerID)
 
-        // Restore re-enters the generation-bound authentication transition:
+        // Rollback restores the same generation. It retries the bounded early
-        // authenticated state and both outbound queues drain exactly once.
+        // ciphertext and drains both outbound queues, but must not repeat a
+        // new-generation capability proof or forced announce.
         let drained = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
-            { outbound.count(ofType: .noiseEncrypted) >= 3 },
+            { outbound.count(ofType: .noiseEncrypted) >= 2 },
             timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
         )
         try #require(drained)
@@ -744,11 +771,11 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
         let plaintexts = try outbound.snapshot()
             .filter { $0.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue }
             .map { try alice.decrypt($0.payload, from: ble.myPeerID) }
-        #expect(plaintexts.count == 3)
+        #expect(plaintexts.count == 2)
         #expect(
             plaintexts.filter {
                 $0.first == NoisePayloadType.authenticatedPeerState.rawValue
-            }.count == 1
+            }.isEmpty
         )
         #expect(
             plaintexts.filter {
@@ -760,6 +787,13 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
                 $0.first == NoisePayloadType.groupInvite.rawValue
             }.count == 1
         )
+        #expect(outbound.count(ofType: .announce) == 0)
+
+        // A duplicate ready callback cannot replay either buffer.
+        ble._test_reconcileCurrentNoiseSession(for: alicePeerID)
+        await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
+        #expect(outbound.count(ofType: .noiseEncrypted) == 2)
+        #expect(outbound.count(ofType: .announce) == 0)
     }
 
     /// A legitimate rotation announce necessarily arrives on a link still
@@ -1255,6 +1289,7 @@ private final class PublicCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
         defer { lock.unlock() }
         return publicMessages
     }
+
 }
 
 @MainActor

bitchatTests/ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests.swift

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import BitFoundation
 @MainActor
 private final class MockChatLiveVoiceContext: ChatLiveVoiceContext {
     var nickname = "me"
+    var myPeerID = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
     var selectedPrivateChatPeer: PeerID?
     var isViewingPublicMeshTimeline = false
     var blockedPeers: Set<PeerID> = []
@@ -23,7 +24,10 @@ private final class MockChatLiveVoiceContext: ChatLiveVoiceContext {
     private(set) var upsertedMessages: [(message: BitchatMessage, peerID: PeerID)] = []
     private(set) var upsertedPublicMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
     private(set) var removedMessageIDs: [String] = []
+    private(set) var sentReadReceipts: [(receipt: ReadReceipt, peerID: PeerID)] = []
     private(set) var talkerUpdates: [String?] = []
+    private(set) var privateMutationLog: [String] = []
+    private var readReceiptMessageIDs: Set<String> = []
 
     func isPeerBlocked(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool { blockedPeers.contains(peerID) }
     func resolveNickname(for peerID: PeerID) -> String { "alice" }
@@ -31,6 +35,7 @@ private final class MockChatLiveVoiceContext: ChatLiveVoiceContext {
     func appendPublicMeshMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) { appendedPublicMessages.append(message) }
     func upsertPrivateMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage, in peerID: PeerID) {
         upsertedMessages.append((message, peerID))
+        privateMutationLog.append("upsert:\(message.id)")
     }
     func upsertPublicMeshMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {
         upsertedPublicMessages.append(message)
@@ -38,8 +43,18 @@ private final class MockChatLiveVoiceContext: ChatLiveVoiceContext {
     @discardableResult
     func removePrivateMessage(withID messageID: String) -> BitchatMessage? {
         removedMessageIDs.append(messageID)
+        privateMutationLog.append("remove:\(messageID)")
         return nil
     }
+    func hasSentReadReceipt(_ messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        readReceiptMessageIDs.contains(messageID)
+    }
+    func markReadReceiptSent(_ messageID: String) -> Bool {
+        readReceiptMessageIDs.insert(messageID).inserted
+    }
+    func sendMeshReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID) {
+        sentReadReceipts.append((receipt, peerID))
+    }
     func removeMessage(withID messageID: String, cleanupFile: Bool) {
         removedMessageIDs.append(messageID)
     }
@@ -151,17 +166,29 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
 
     @Test func absorbsFinalizedNoteIntoLiveBubble() throws {
         let context = MockChatLiveVoiceContext()
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peer
         let coordinator = ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator(context: context, sweepsOnInit: false)
         let burstID = makeBurstID(0xB2)
         let hex = burstID.hexEncodedString()
+        let fileName = "voice_\(hex).m4a"
+        let stableMessageID = try #require(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: peer,
+            recipientPeerID: context.myPeerID,
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
 
         send(try #require(VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: 1, kind: .frames([Data(repeating: 7, count: 50)]))), to: coordinator, from: peer)
         send(try #require(VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: 2, kind: .end(totalDataPackets: 1, durationMs: 64))), to: coordinator, from: peer)
         let bubble = try #require(context.handledPrivateMessages.first)
+        // The user read the live bubble, then left before the finalized file
+        // arrived. Stable-ID adoption must preserve that read state.
+        #expect(context.markReadReceiptSent(bubble.id))
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = nil
 
         let note = BitchatMessage(
+            id: stableMessageID,
             sender: "alice",
-            content: "[voice] voice_\(hex).m4a",
+            content: "[voice] \(fileName)",
             timestamp: Date(),
             isRelay: false,
             isPrivate: true,
@@ -170,12 +197,21 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
         )
         #expect(coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(note))
 
-        // The note replaced the live bubble in place: same message ID, new
+        // The finalized note adopts the sender-correlatable ID, removes the
-        // content, partial capture deleted.
+        // receiver-local live ID, and emits a fresh READ now that the sender
+        // has created its finalized media row.
         let replacement = try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last)
-        #expect(replacement.message.id == bubble.id)
+        #expect(replacement.message.id == stableMessageID)
         #expect(replacement.message.content == note.content)
         #expect(replacement.peerID == peer)
+        #expect(context.removedMessageIDs.contains(bubble.id))
+        #expect(Array(context.privateMutationLog.suffix(2)) == [
+            "upsert:\(stableMessageID)",
+            "remove:\(bubble.id)"
+        ])
+        #expect(context.sentReadReceipts.count == 1)
+        #expect(context.sentReadReceipts.first?.receipt.originalMessageID == stableMessageID)
+        #expect(context.sentReadReceipts.first?.peerID == peer)
         // The promoted partial capture is deleted in favor of the note.
         let url = try #require(fallbackFileURL(burstID: burstID, peerID: peer))
         #expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: url.path))
@@ -449,7 +485,8 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
             isRelay: false, isPrivate: true, recipientNickname: "me", senderPeerID: peer
         )
         #expect(coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(dmNote))
-        #expect(try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last).message.id == dmBubble.id)
+        #expect(try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last).message.id == dmNote.id)
+        #expect(context.removedMessageIDs.contains(dmBubble.id))
     }
 
     @Test func finalizedNoteBindsToItsAuthenticatedSender() throws {
@@ -479,8 +516,9 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
         )
         #expect(coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(note))
         let replacement = try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last)
-        #expect(replacement.message.id == victimBubble.id)
+        #expect(replacement.message.id == note.id)
         #expect(replacement.peerID == peer)
+        #expect(context.removedMessageIDs.contains(victimBubble.id))
 
         // The attacker's note can only ever claim the attacker's own bubble.
         let attackerNote = BitchatMessage(
@@ -489,8 +527,9 @@ struct ChatLiveVoiceCoordinatorTests {
         )
         #expect(coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(attackerNote))
         let attackerReplacement = try #require(context.upsertedMessages.last)
-        #expect(attackerReplacement.message.id == attackerBubble.id)
+        #expect(attackerReplacement.message.id == attackerNote.id)
         #expect(attackerReplacement.peerID == attacker)
+        #expect(context.removedMessageIDs.contains(attackerBubble.id))
 
         // Both registry entries are consumed — nothing left to hijack.
         #expect(!coordinator.absorbFinalizedVoiceNote(note))

bitchatTests/ChatMediaTransferCoordinatorContextTests.swift

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 // `ChatPrivateConversationCoordinatorContextTests` exemplars.
 //
 // Real file/codec work remains covered by `ChatMediaPreparationTests`. These
-// tests inject a paused voice-note preparer to exercise cancellation ownership
+// tests inject paused media preparers to exercise cancellation ownership
 // across the detached-preparation/MainActor boundary deterministically.
 //
 
@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ private final class MockChatMediaTransferContext: ChatMediaTransferContext {
     }
 
     // Mesh file transfer
-    private(set) var privateFileSends: [(peerID: PeerID, transferId: String)] = []
+    private(set) var privateFileSends: [(
+        packet: BitchatFilePacket,
+        peerID: PeerID,
+        transferId: String
+    )] = []
     private(set) var privateFileLegacyAllowances: [Bool] = []
     private(set) var broadcastFileSends: [String] = []
     private(set) var cancelledTransfers: [String] = []
@@ -154,7 +158,7 @@ private final class MockChatMediaTransferContext: ChatMediaTransferContext {
         transferId: String,
         allowLegacyFallback: Bool
     ) {
-        privateFileSends.append((peerID, transferId))
+        privateFileSends.append((packet, peerID, transferId))
         privateFileLegacyAllowances.append(allowLegacyFallback)
     }
 
@@ -172,19 +176,8 @@ private final class PausedVoiceNotePreparer: @unchecked Sendable {
     private var started = false
     private var released = false
     private var finished = false
-    private let packet: BitchatFilePacket
 
-    init() {
+    func prepare(_ url: URL) throws -> BitchatFilePacket {
-        let content = Data("voice".utf8)
-        packet = BitchatFilePacket(
-            fileName: "paused.m4a",
-            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
-            mimeType: "audio/mp4",
-            content: content
-        )
-    }
-
-    func prepare(_: URL) throws -> BitchatFilePacket {
         condition.lock()
         started = true
         condition.broadcast()
@@ -194,7 +187,13 @@ private final class PausedVoiceNotePreparer: @unchecked Sendable {
         finished = true
         condition.broadcast()
         condition.unlock()
-        return packet
+        let content = Data("voice".utf8)
+        return BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: url.lastPathComponent,
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "audio/mp4",
+            content: content
+        )
     }
 
     var hasStarted: Bool {
@@ -452,6 +451,109 @@ struct ChatMediaTransferCoordinatorContextTests {
         #expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs.isEmpty)
     }
 
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func privateVoiceNoteUsesWireDerivableMessageID() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent("voice_receipt_\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
+        try Data("voice".utf8).write(to: url)
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) }
+
+        coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
+
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let message = try #require(context.privateChats[peerID]?.first)
+        let sentPacket = try #require(context.privateFileSends.first?.packet)
+        #expect(message.id == PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            for: sentPacket,
+            senderPeerID: context.myPeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: peerID
+        ))
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func privateImageUsesWireDerivableMessageID() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "99aabbccddeeff00")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        let sourceURL = try makeCoordinatorTestImageURL()
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: sourceURL) }
+
+        coordinator.sendImage(from: sourceURL)
+
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { context.privateFileSends.count == 1 },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        let message = try #require(context.privateChats[peerID]?.first)
+        let sentPacket = try #require(context.privateFileSends.first?.packet)
+        #expect(message.id == PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            for: sentPacket,
+            senderPeerID: context.myPeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: peerID
+        ))
+        coordinator.cleanupLocalFile(forMessage: message)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func panicDuringImagePreparationDeletesStaleOutputWithoutSideEffects() async throws {
+        let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "99aabbccddeeff00")
+        context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
+        let sourceURL = try makeCoordinatorTestImageURL()
+        let outputURL = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent(
+                "panic-stale-image-\(UUID().uuidString).jpg"
+            )
+        let preparer = PausedImagePreparer(outputURL: outputURL)
+        let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
+            context: context,
+            prepareImagePacket: { url in try preparer.prepare(url) }
+        )
+        defer {
+            preparer.release()
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: sourceURL)
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: outputURL)
+        }
+
+        coordinator.sendImage(from: sourceURL)
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { preparer.hasStarted },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+
+        DispatchQueue.global(qos: .userInitiated).asyncAfter(
+            deadline: .now() + .milliseconds(100)
+        ) {
+            preparer.release()
+        }
+        coordinator.resetForPanic()
+
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { preparer.hasFinished },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        #expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
+            { !FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: outputURL.path) },
+            timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
+        ))
+        #expect(context.privateChats[peerID]?.isEmpty != false)
+        #expect(context.appendedPublicMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.broadcastFileSends.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.systemMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.deliveryStatusUpdates.isEmpty)
+        #expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs.isEmpty)
+        #expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId.isEmpty)
+    }
+
     @Test @MainActor
     func cancelVoiceNoteDuringDetachedPreparationCannotSendOrRestoreMapping() async throws {
         let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()

bitchatTests/ChatPeerListCoordinatorContextTests.swift

@@ -104,6 +104,20 @@ private func makeMessage(id: String, senderPeerID: PeerID? = nil) -> BitchatMess
 /// no `ChatViewModel`.
 struct ChatPeerListCoordinatorContextTests {
 
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func synchronousPeerListUpdate_appliesBeforeReturning() {
+        let context = MockChatPeerListContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatPeerListCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
+
+        coordinator.didUpdatePeerListSynchronously([peerID])
+
+        #expect(context.isConnected)
+        #expect(context.registeredEphemeralSessions == [peerID])
+        #expect(context.updateEncryptionStatusForPeersCount == 1)
+        #expect(context.cleanupOldReadReceiptsCount == 1)
+    }
+
     @Test @MainActor
     func didUpdatePeerList_updatesConnectionSessionsAndEncryptionStatus() async {
         let context = MockChatPeerListContext()

bitchatTests/ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests.swift

@@ -220,26 +220,85 @@ struct ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests {
     func didReceiveMessage_routesPrivateAndPublic_skipsBlockedAndEmpty() async {
         let context = MockChatTransportEventContext()
         let coordinator = ChatTransportEventCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
 
         // Blocked messages are dropped before any handling.
-        context.blockedMessageIDs = ["blocked"]
+        context.blockedMessageIDs = ["blocked", "blocked-private"]
         coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "blocked"))
+        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(
+            id: "blocked-private",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        ))
         // Empty public content is dropped too.
         coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "empty", content: "   "))
         await drainMainActorTasks()
         #expect(context.handledPublicMessages.isEmpty)
         #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.isEmpty)
         #expect(context.mentionCheckedMessageIDs.isEmpty)
+        #expect(context.meshDeliveryAcks.isEmpty)
 
         // Private goes to the private handler, public to the public handler;
-        // both get mention checks and haptics.
+        // both get mention checks and haptics. Stable-media ACK authorization
-        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "pm", isPrivate: true))
+        // belongs to BLEFileTransferHandler after its durable commit and this
+        // synchronous acceptance result, not to the generic UI coordinator.
+        let stableMediaID = "media-\(String(repeating: "a", count: 32))"
+        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(
+            id: stableMediaID,
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        ))
+        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(
+            id: "legacy-media",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        ))
+        coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "pm-missing-sender", isPrivate: true))
         coordinator.didReceiveMessage(makeMessage(id: "pub"))
         await drainMainActorTasks()
-        #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.map(\.id) == ["pm"])
+        #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.map(\.id) == [
+            stableMediaID,
+            "legacy-media",
+            "pm-missing-sender"
+        ])
         #expect(context.handledPublicMessages.map(\.id) == ["pub"])
-        #expect(context.mentionCheckedMessageIDs == ["pm", "pub"])
+        #expect(context.mentionCheckedMessageIDs == [
-        #expect(context.hapticMessageIDs == ["pm", "pub"])
+            stableMediaID,
+            "legacy-media",
+            "pm-missing-sender",
+            "pub"
+        ])
+        #expect(context.hapticMessageIDs == [
+            stableMediaID,
+            "legacy-media",
+            "pm-missing-sender",
+            "pub"
+        ])
+        #expect(context.meshDeliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func synchronousMessageDeliveryReportsAcceptanceForAckGating() {
+        let context = MockChatTransportEventContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatTransportEventCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        let blocked = makeMessage(
+            id: "blocked-private-media",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        )
+        context.blockedMessageIDs = [blocked.id]
+
+        #expect(coordinator.didReceiveMessageSynchronously(blocked) == false)
+        #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.isEmpty)
+
+        let accepted = makeMessage(
+            id: "accepted-private-media",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        )
+        #expect(coordinator.didReceiveMessageSynchronously(accepted) == true)
+        #expect(context.handledPrivateMessages.map(\.id) == [accepted.id])
     }
 
     @Test @MainActor
@@ -295,6 +354,32 @@ struct ChatTransportEventCoordinatorContextTests {
         #expect(context.notifyUIChangedCount == 2)
     }
 
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func synchronousConnectAndDisconnect_applyBeforeReturning() {
+        let context = MockChatTransportEventContext()
+        let coordinator = ChatTransportEventCoordinator(context: context)
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "2233445566778899")
+        let incoming = makeMessage(
+            id: "incoming-receipt",
+            isPrivate: true,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        )
+        context.privateChats[peerID] = [incoming]
+
+        coordinator.didConnectToPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+
+        #expect(context.isConnected)
+        #expect(context.registeredEphemeralSessions == [peerID])
+        #expect(context.flushedOutboxPeerIDs == [peerID])
+        #expect(context.courierRetryPeerIDs == [peerID])
+
+        coordinator.didDisconnectFromPeerSynchronously(peerID)
+
+        #expect(context.removedEphemeralSessions == [peerID])
+        #expect(context.unmarkedReadReceiptBatches == [[incoming.id]])
+        #expect(context.notifyUIChangedCount == 2)
+    }
+
     @Test @MainActor
     func didDisconnect_whileViewingChat_migratesConversationToStablePeerID() async {
         let context = MockChatTransportEventContext()

bitchatTests/ChatViewModelTests.swift

@@ -864,6 +864,80 @@ struct ChatViewModelPublicConversationTests {
 
 struct ChatViewModelPeerTests {
 
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func typedPeerLifecycleEvents_applyBeforeReturning() {
+        let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
+        let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
+        let incoming = BitchatMessage(
+            id: "typed-peer-incoming",
+            sender: "Alice",
+            content: "Hello",
+            timestamp: Date(),
+            isRelay: false,
+            isPrivate: true,
+            recipientNickname: viewModel.nickname,
+            senderPeerID: peerID
+        )
+        viewModel.seedPrivateChat([incoming], for: peerID)
+        viewModel.sentReadReceipts.insert(incoming.id)
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.peerConnected(peerID))
+
+        #expect(viewModel.isConnected)
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.peerDisconnected(peerID))
+
+        #expect(!viewModel.sentReadReceipts.contains(incoming.id))
+    }
+
+    @Test @MainActor
+    func typedPeerListDeliveryAndBluetoothEvents_applyBeforeReturning() {
+        let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()
+        let stalePeer = PeerID(str: "00000000000000a2")
+        let deliveryPeer = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
+        let messageID = "typed-delivery-status"
+        let delivered = DeliveryStatus.delivered(
+            to: "Alice",
+            at: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        )
+        let outgoing = BitchatMessage(
+            id: messageID,
+            sender: viewModel.nickname,
+            content: "On the way",
+            timestamp: Date(),
+            isRelay: false,
+            isPrivate: true,
+            recipientNickname: "Alice",
+            senderPeerID: transport.myPeerID,
+            deliveryStatus: .sent
+        )
+        viewModel.markPrivateChatUnread(stalePeer)
+        viewModel.seedPrivateChat([outgoing], for: deliveryPeer)
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.peerListUpdated([]))
+        #expect(!viewModel.unreadPrivateMessages.contains(stalePeer))
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(
+            .messageDeliveryStatusUpdated(
+                messageID: messageID,
+                status: delivered
+            )
+        )
+        #expect(
+            viewModel.privateMessages(for: deliveryPeer).first?.deliveryStatus
+                == delivered
+        )
+
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.bluetoothStateUpdated(.poweredOff))
+        #expect(viewModel.bluetoothState == .poweredOff)
+        #expect(viewModel.showBluetoothAlert)
+
+        // Snapshot events belong to TransportPeerEventsDelegate and are
+        // intentionally ignored at this typed sink.
+        viewModel.didReceiveTransportEvent(.peerSnapshotsUpdated([]))
+        #expect(viewModel.bluetoothState == .poweredOff)
+    }
+
     @Test @MainActor
     func didConnectToPeer_notifiesDelegate() async {
         let (_, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()

bitchatTests/EndToEnd/PrivateMediaEndToEndTests.swift

@@ -682,13 +682,18 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
         #expect(!identity.hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(
             fingerprint: impostorKey.sha256Fingerprint()
         ))
+        #expect(identity.hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(
+            fingerprint: bob.noiseStaticPublicKeyData().sha256Fingerprint()
+        ))
         alice._test_seedConnectedPeer(
             bob.myPeerID,
             nickname: "Bob",
             capabilities: [],
             noisePublicKey: impostorKey
         )
-        #expect(alice.privateMediaSendPolicy(to: bob.myPeerID) == .legacyRequiresConsent)
+        // The exact live Noise identity remains authoritative over a later
+        // impostor registry rewrite.
+        #expect(alice.privateMediaSendPolicy(to: bob.myPeerID) == .encrypted)
     }
 
     @Test
@@ -866,7 +871,7 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
             + marker
             + Data(repeating: 0x4A, count: 6 * 1024)
         try await assertPrivateMediaRoundTrip(
-            fileName: "private.jpg",
+            fileName: "img_20260725_120000_11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111.jpg",
             mimeType: "image/jpeg",
             content: content,
             marker: marker,
@@ -1137,6 +1142,17 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
         #expect(message.isPrivate)
         #expect(message.senderPeerID == alice.myPeerID)
         #expect(message.content.hasPrefix(expectedMessagePrefix))
+        if let stableMessageID = PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            for: file,
+            senderPeerID: alice.myPeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: bob.myPeerID
+        ) {
+            #expect(message.id == stableMessageID)
+        } else {
+            // Generic/legacy filenames retain random per-arrival IDs so two
+            // unrelated "photo.jpg" transfers are never deduplicated.
+            #expect(!message.id.hasPrefix("media-"))
+        }
 
         let stored = recursivelyStoredFiles(under: bobRoot)
         #expect(stored.count == 1)
@@ -1279,6 +1295,8 @@ struct PrivateMediaEndToEndTests {
 
         return enumerator.compactMap { item in
             guard let url = item as? URL,
+                  !url.pathComponents.contains(".private-media-receipts"),
+                  url.lastPathComponent != ".private-media-receipts.json",
                   (try? url.resourceValues(forKeys: [.isRegularFileKey]).isRegularFile) == true else {
                 return nil
             }

bitchatTests/Protocols/BitchatFilePacketTests.swift

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import BitFoundation
 import XCTest
 @testable import bitchat
 
@@ -73,4 +74,85 @@ final class BitchatFilePacketTests: XCTestCase {
         XCTAssertEqual(decoded.fileSize, UInt64(content.count))
         XCTAssertEqual(decoded.content, content)
     }
+
+    func testPrivateMediaMessageIdentityConvergesAcrossPeerIDAliases() throws {
+        let senderKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
+        let recipientKey = Data(repeating: 0x22, count: 32)
+        let senderStable = PeerID(hexData: senderKey)
+        let recipientStable = PeerID(hexData: recipientKey)
+        let fileName = "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+
+        let senderID = try XCTUnwrap(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: senderStable.toShort(),
+            recipientPeerID: PeerID(str: "mesh:\(recipientStable.toShort().bare)"),
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+        let receiverID = try XCTUnwrap(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: senderStable,
+            recipientPeerID: recipientStable.toShort(),
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+
+        XCTAssertEqual(senderID, receiverID)
+        XCTAssertTrue(senderID.hasPrefix("media-"))
+        XCTAssertEqual(senderID.count, 38)
+        XCTAssertTrue(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(senderID))
+        XCTAssertFalse(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID("media-\(String(repeating: "A", count: 32))"))
+        XCTAssertFalse(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID("media-\(String(repeating: "a", count: 31))"))
+        XCTAssertFalse(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.isStableID(UUID().uuidString))
+    }
+
+    func testPrivateMediaMessageIdentitySeparatesDirectionAndFilename() throws {
+        let alice = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
+        let bob = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
+        let firstName = "voice_20260725_105708_11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111.m4a"
+        let secondName = "voice_20260725_105709_22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222.m4a"
+        let first = try XCTUnwrap(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: firstName
+        ))
+
+        XCTAssertNotEqual(first, PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: bob,
+            recipientPeerID: alice,
+            fileName: firstName
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNotEqual(first, PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: secondName
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNil(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: nil
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNil(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: "photo.jpg"
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNil(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: "img_11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111.pdf"
+        ))
+        XCTAssertNotNil(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: alice,
+            recipientPeerID: bob,
+            fileName: "voice_0011223344556677.m4a"
+        ))
+    }
+
+    func testPrivateMediaMessageIdentityMatchesVersionOneGoldenVector() {
+        XCTAssertEqual(
+            PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+                senderPeerID: PeerID(str: "0011223344556677"),
+                recipientPeerID: PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff"),
+                fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+            ),
+            "media-910bd42c65060ab76bb6406f220c4516"
+        )
+    }
 }

bitchatTests/Services/BLEFileTransferHandlerTests.swift

@@ -13,11 +13,27 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
 
         var signatureVerifyCount = 0
         var signedNameQueries: [PeerID] = []
+        var blockedPeers: Set<PeerID> = []
         var trackedPackets: [BitchatPacket] = []
         var quotaReservations: [Int] = []
         var saveCalls: [(data: Data, preferredName: String?, subdirectory: String, fallbackExtension: String?, defaultPrefix: String)] = []
+        var receiptStates: [String: BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState] = [:]
+        var receiptCommits: [(messageID: String, storedURL: URL)] = []
+        var receiptCommitSucceeds = true
+        var removedIncomingFiles: [URL] = []
         var lastSeenUpdates: [PeerID] = []
+        var deliveryAcks: [(messageID: String, peerID: PeerID)] = []
         var deliveredMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
+        var saveOverride: ((
+            _ data: Data,
+            _ preferredName: String?,
+            _ subdirectory: String,
+            _ fallbackExtension: String?,
+            _ defaultPrefix: String
+        ) -> URL?)?
+        var receiptStateOverride: ((String) -> BLEPrivateMediaReceiptState)?
+        var receiptCommitOverride: ((String, URL) -> Bool)?
+        var removeIncomingFileOverride: ((URL) -> Void)?
     }
 
     private let localPeerID = PeerID(str: "0102030405060708")
@@ -46,13 +62,44 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
             },
             saveIncomingFile: { data, preferredName, subdirectory, fallbackExtension, defaultPrefix in
                 recorder.saveCalls.append((data, preferredName, subdirectory, fallbackExtension, defaultPrefix))
+                if let saveOverride = recorder.saveOverride {
+                    return saveOverride(data, preferredName, subdirectory, fallbackExtension, defaultPrefix)
+                }
                 return recorder.saveResult
             },
+            privateMediaReceiptState: { messageID in
+                if let receiptStateOverride = recorder.receiptStateOverride {
+                    return receiptStateOverride(messageID)
+                }
+                return recorder.receiptStates[messageID] ?? .absent
+            },
+            commitPrivateMediaFile: { messageID, storedURL in
+                recorder.receiptCommits.append((messageID, storedURL))
+                if let receiptCommitOverride = recorder.receiptCommitOverride {
+                    return receiptCommitOverride(messageID, storedURL)
+                }
+                guard recorder.receiptCommitSucceeds else { return false }
+                recorder.receiptStates[messageID] = .accepted(storedURL)
+                return true
+            },
+            removeIncomingFile: { storedURL in
+                recorder.removedIncomingFiles.append(storedURL)
+                recorder.removeIncomingFileOverride?(storedURL)
+            },
+            isPrivateMediaSenderBlocked: { peerID in
+                recorder.blockedPeers.contains(peerID)
+            },
             updatePeerLastSeen: { peerID in
                 recorder.lastSeenUpdates.append(peerID)
             },
-            deliverMessage: { message in
+            acknowledgePrivateMedia: { messageID, peerID in
+                recorder.deliveryAcks.append((messageID, peerID))
+            },
+            deliverMessage: { message, shouldDeliver, completion in
+                guard shouldDeliver() else { return }
                 recorder.deliveredMessages.append(message)
+                guard shouldDeliver() else { return }
+                completion()
             }
         )
         return BLEFileTransferHandler(environment: environment)
@@ -284,6 +331,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates == [remotePeerID])
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.isPrivate == true)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.id.hasPrefix("media-") == false)
         // Must be explicit: BitchatMessage defaults private messages to
         // .sending, which the media views render as an in-flight send
         // (empty reveal mask, disabled reveal tap).
@@ -291,13 +339,14 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
     }
 
     @Test
-    func decryptedPrivateFileUsesValidationQuotaAndPrivateDeliveryWithoutRawSignature() throws {
+    func bit8EncryptedPrivateFileKeepsStableIDAndAckWithoutBit9Proof() throws {
         let recorder = Recorder()
         recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
         let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
         let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let fileName = "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
         let file = BitchatFilePacket(
-            fileName: "secret.jpg",
+            fileName: fileName,
             fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
             mimeType: "image/jpeg",
             content: content
@@ -316,6 +365,357 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.isPrivate == true)
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.timestamp == timestamp)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.id == PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: remotePeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: localPeerID,
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.receiptCommits.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.first?.messageID == recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.id)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func rawLegacyPrivateFileWithRetryShapedNameNeverUsesReceiptLedger() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(
+            remotePeerID,
+            nickname: "Alice",
+            isVerified: true,
+            signingPublicKey: sampleSigningKey
+        )]
+        recorder.signatureVerifies = true
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9])
+        let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket(
+            sender: remotePeerID,
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content,
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+        )
+
+        #expect(handler.handle(packet, from: remotePeerID))
+        #expect(recorder.receiptCommits.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.id.hasPrefix("media-") == false)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func repeatedLegacyPrivateImageNamesKeepDistinctRandomMessageIDs() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "photo.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+        ))
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages[0].id != recorder.deliveredMessages[1].id)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.allSatisfy { !$0.id.hasPrefix("media-") })
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func lostCapabilityProofThenStableRetryReusesDurableIDWithoutSecondDiskWrite() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let fileName = "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: fileName,
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+        let expectedID = try #require(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: remotePeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: localPeerID,
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+
+        // First encrypted arrival may precede the sender's authenticated bit-9
+        // proof. It still uses the bit-8 stable ID/ACK contract.
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        // A later automatic retry after proof must resolve the same durable ID
+        // rather than create a legacy random-ID bubble.
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+        ))
+
+        #expect(recorder.quotaReservations == [content.count])
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 1)
+        // The handler re-offers a durable duplicate so a relaunched UI can
+        // restore its bubble; the synchronous conversation sink deduplicates.
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates == [remotePeerID, remotePeerID])
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.allSatisfy {
+            $0.messageID == expectedID && $0.peerID == remotePeerID
+        })
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func acceptedPrivateMediaAfterRelaunchRedeliversDurableURLBeforeAck() throws {
+        let root = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory.appendingPathComponent(
+            "private-media-handler-relaunch-\(UUID().uuidString)",
+            isDirectory: true
+        )
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let store = BLEIncomingFileStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9])
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+
+        func configure(_ recorder: Recorder) {
+            recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(
+                remotePeerID,
+                nickname: "Alice",
+                isVerified: true
+            )]
+            recorder.saveOverride = {
+                data,
+                preferredName,
+                subdirectory,
+                fallbackExtension,
+                defaultPrefix in
+                store.save(
+                    data: data,
+                    preferredName: preferredName,
+                    subdirectory: subdirectory,
+                    fallbackExtension: fallbackExtension,
+                    defaultPrefix: defaultPrefix
+                )
+            }
+            recorder.receiptStateOverride = {
+                store.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID: $0)
+            }
+            recorder.receiptCommitOverride = {
+                store.commitPrivateMediaFile(messageID: $0, storedURL: $1)
+            }
+            recorder.removeIncomingFileOverride = {
+                store.removeIncomingFile(at: $0)
+            }
+        }
+
+        let first = Recorder()
+        configure(first)
+        #expect(makeHandler(recorder: first).handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        let originalMessage = try #require(first.deliveredMessages.first)
+        #expect(first.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
+
+        // A fresh handler models process relaunch: its in-memory reservation
+        // cache is empty, so only the durable receipt can suppress disk work.
+        let relaunched = Recorder()
+        configure(relaunched)
+        #expect(makeHandler(recorder: relaunched).handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+        ))
+
+        #expect(relaunched.quotaReservations.isEmpty)
+        #expect(relaunched.saveCalls.isEmpty)
+        #expect(relaunched.receiptCommits.isEmpty)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveredMessages.first?.id == originalMessage.id)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveredMessages.first?.content == originalMessage.content)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
+        #expect(relaunched.deliveryAcks.first?.messageID == originalMessage.id)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func inFlightStableDuplicateIsNotAcknowledgedAndFailedSaveRemainsRetryable() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+        var handler: BLEFileTransferHandler!
+        var nestedResult: Bool?
+        var failFirstSave = true
+        recorder.saveOverride = { _, _, _, _, _ in
+            if failFirstSave {
+                failFirstSave = false
+                nestedResult = handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+                    payload,
+                    from: self.remotePeerID,
+                    timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+                )
+                return nil
+            }
+            return recorder.saveResult
+        }
+        handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+
+        // The nested arrival sees the first reservation as pending. It is
+        // coalesced without an ACK; then the first durable save fails.
+        #expect(!handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        #expect(nestedResult == true)
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
+
+        // Failure released the reservation, so the sender's later retry can
+        // persist and deliver normally.
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_236)
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func unavailableDurableReceiptStateWithholdsDiskDeliveryAndAck() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(
+            remotePeerID,
+            nickname: "Alice",
+            isVerified: true
+        )]
+        let fileName =
+            "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg"
+        let messageID = try #require(PrivateMediaMessageIdentity.stableID(
+            senderPeerID: remotePeerID,
+            recipientPeerID: localPeerID,
+            fileName: fileName
+        ))
+        recorder.receiptStates[messageID] = .unavailable
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9])
+        let payload = try #require(BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: fileName,
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        ).encode())
+
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.quotaReservations.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.receiptCommits.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func durableReceiptCommitFailureRollsBackAndWithholdsDeliveryAck() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(
+            remotePeerID,
+            nickname: "Alice",
+            isVerified: true
+        )]
+        recorder.receiptCommitSucceeds = false
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9])
+        let payload = try #require(BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        ).encode())
+
+        #expect(!handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.receiptCommits.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.removedIncomingFiles.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.removedIncomingFiles.first == recorder.saveResult)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func blockedPrivateMediaIsDroppedBeforeQuotaDiskAndDedupState() throws {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.blockedPeers = [remotePeerID]
+        recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
+        let file = BitchatFilePacket(
+            fileName: "img_20260725_105708_1CC2760D-76AA-40C3-8013-C7FAA6C2EF99.jpg",
+            fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
+            mimeType: "image/jpeg",
+            content: content
+        )
+        let payload = try #require(file.encode())
+
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
+        ))
+
+        #expect(recorder.quotaReservations.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
+
+        // Unblocking must allow a retry through; the blocked attempt cannot
+        // poison the stable-ID dedup reservation.
+        recorder.blockedPeers = []
+        #expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(
+            payload,
+            from: remotePeerID,
+            timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_235)
+        ))
+        #expect(recorder.saveCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.count == 1)
     }
 
     @Test
@@ -337,6 +737,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.quotaReservations.isEmpty)
         #expect(recorder.saveCalls.isEmpty)
         #expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveryAcks.isEmpty)
         #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
     }
 
@@ -468,6 +869,33 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
         }
     }
 
+    @Test
+    func panicWipeClearsCachedPrivateMediaReceiptDecisions() throws {
+        let base = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
+            .appendingPathComponent(
+                "panic-receipt-cache-\(UUID().uuidString)",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: base) }
+        let messageID = "media-00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
+
+        let seed = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: base)
+        #expect(seed.recordDeleted(messageID: messageID))
+
+        let store = BLEIncomingFileStore(baseDirectory: base)
+        #expect(
+            store.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID: messageID)
+                == .tombstoned
+        )
+
+        try store.panicWipe()
+
+        #expect(
+            store.privateMediaReceiptState(messageID: messageID)
+                == .absent
+        )
+    }
+
     @Test
     func panicWipeAttemptsDeletionWhenMarkerPersistenceFails() throws {
         enum MarkerFailure: Error { case unavailable }

bitchatTests/Services/BLENoisePacketHandlerTests.swift

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import BitFoundation
+import CryptoKit
 import Foundation
 import Testing
 @testable import bitchat
@@ -11,7 +12,11 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
         var handshakeAuthenticated = false
         var hasSession = false
         let sessionGeneration = UUID()
+        var awaitingResponderHandshake = false
         var decryptResult: Result<Data, Error> = .success(Data())
+        var currentDate = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
+        var transportGenerationReady = false
+        var forcedServiceDecryptError: Error?
 
         var processedHandshakes: [(peerID: PeerID, message: Data)] = []
         var hasSessionQueries: [PeerID] = []
@@ -34,11 +39,12 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
         recorder: Recorder,
         now: Date = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
     ) -> BLENoisePacketHandler {
+        recorder.currentDate = now
         let environment = BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment(
             localPeerID: { [localPeerID] in localPeerID },
             localPeerIDData: { [localPeerIDData] in localPeerIDData },
             messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
-            now: { now },
+            now: { recorder.currentDate },
             processHandshakeMessage: { peerID, message in
                 recorder.processedHandshakes.append((peerID, message))
                 return NoiseHandshakeProcessingResult(
@@ -51,6 +57,9 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
                 recorder.hasSessionQueries.append(peerID)
                 return recorder.hasSession
             },
+            isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion: { _ in
+                recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake
+            },
             initiateHandshake: { peerID in
                 recorder.initiatedHandshakes.append(peerID)
                 recorder.events.append("initiateHandshake")
@@ -82,6 +91,120 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
         return BLENoisePacketHandler(environment: environment)
     }
 
+    private func makeServiceBackedHandler(
+        service: NoiseEncryptionService,
+        localPeerID: PeerID,
+        recorder: Recorder,
+        transportGenerationIsReady:
+            @escaping (UUID) -> Bool
+    ) -> BLENoisePacketHandler {
+        BLENoisePacketHandler(
+            environment: BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment(
+                localPeerID: { localPeerID },
+                localPeerIDData: {
+                    Data(hexString: localPeerID.id) ?? Data()
+                },
+                messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
+                now: { recorder.currentDate },
+                processHandshakeMessage: { peerID, message in
+                    try service.processHandshakeMessageWithResult(
+                        from: peerID,
+                        message: message
+                    )
+                },
+                hasNoiseSession: { peerID in
+                    service.hasSession(with: peerID)
+                },
+                isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion: { peerID in
+                    service.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(
+                        with: peerID
+                    )
+                },
+                initiateHandshake: { peerID in
+                    recorder.initiatedHandshakes.append(peerID)
+                },
+                broadcastPacket: { packet in
+                    recorder.broadcastPackets.append(packet)
+                },
+                updatePeerLastSeen: { peerID in
+                    recorder.lastSeenUpdates.append(peerID)
+                },
+                decrypt: { payload, peerID in
+                    recorder.decryptCalls.append((payload, peerID))
+                    if let error = recorder.forcedServiceDecryptError {
+                        throw error
+                    }
+                    let result =
+                        try service.decryptWithSessionGeneration(
+                            payload,
+                            from: peerID,
+                            establishedGenerationIsReady:
+                                transportGenerationIsReady
+                        )
+                    return BLENoiseDecryptionResult(
+                        plaintext: result.plaintext,
+                        sessionGeneration: result.sessionGeneration
+                    )
+                },
+                clearSession: { peerID in
+                    recorder.clearedSessions.append(peerID)
+                    service.clearSession(for: peerID)
+                },
+                handleAuthenticatedPeerState: {
+                    peerID, payload, generation in
+                    recorder.authenticatedPeerStates.append(
+                        (peerID, payload, generation)
+                    )
+                },
+                deliverNoisePayload: {
+                    peerID, type, payload, timestamp in
+                    recorder.deliveries.append(
+                        (peerID, type, payload, timestamp)
+                    )
+                }
+            )
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func establishedServices() throws -> (
+        sender: NoiseEncryptionService,
+        receiver: NoiseEncryptionService,
+        senderPeerID: PeerID,
+        receiverPeerID: PeerID
+    ) {
+        let sender = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let receiver = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let senderPeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: sender.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let receiverPeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: receiver.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let message1 = try sender.initiateHandshake(with: receiverPeerID)
+        let message2 = try #require(
+            try receiver.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: senderPeerID,
+                message: message1
+            )
+        )
+        let message3 = try #require(
+            try sender.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: receiverPeerID,
+                message: message2
+            )
+        )
+        _ = try receiver.processHandshakeMessage(
+            from: senderPeerID,
+            message: message3
+        )
+        return (
+            sender,
+            receiver,
+            senderPeerID,
+            receiverPeerID
+        )
+    }
+
     // MARK: Handshake
 
     @Test
@@ -364,6 +487,799 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
         #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
     }
 
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextIsRetriedAfterResponderHandshakeCompletes() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0xCA, 0xFE])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .privateMessage)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0xCA, 0xFE]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func panicResetDiscardsDeferredCiphertextBeforeFutureAuthentication() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let prePanicCiphertext = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+            payload: Data(
+                count: NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
+                    + NoiseSecurityConstants.transportCiphertextOverhead
+            )
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(prePanicCiphertext, from: remotePeerID)
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+
+        handler.resetForPanic()
+
+        // Three maximum-sized packets fit only when reset also zeroed the
+        // global byte accounting. They model ciphertext received under the
+        // replacement identity before that responder handshake completes.
+        for index in 0..<3 {
+            handler.handleEncrypted(
+                makeEncryptedPacket(
+                    recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                    timestamp: UInt64(901_000 + index),
+                    payload: Data(
+                        count: NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
+                            + NoiseSecurityConstants.transportCiphertextOverhead
+                    )
+                ),
+                from: remotePeerID
+            )
+        }
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 4)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0xCA, 0xFE])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        // Only the three post-reset packets replay; the pre-panic packet does
+        // not survive into the replacement session.
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 7)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 3)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func ciphertextQueuedAheadOfEstablishmentCallbackDoesNotConsumeNonce()
+        throws {
+        let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let alicePeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let bobPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
+
+        let message1 = try alice.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
+        let message2 = try #require(
+            try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: message1
+            )
+        )
+        let message3 = try #require(
+            try alice.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: bobPeerID,
+                message: message2
+            )
+        )
+        let typedPayload = Data([
+            NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue,
+            0xCA, 0xFE
+        ])
+        let ciphertext = try alice.encrypt(
+            typedPayload,
+            for: bobPeerID
+        )
+
+        // Manager promotion has completed, but the serialized BLE callback is
+        // deliberately still behind this ciphertext.
+        _ = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+            from: alicePeerID,
+            message: message3
+        )
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = false
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: bob,
+            localPeerID: bobPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let packet = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: bobPeerID.id),
+            payload: ciphertext
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(packet, from: alicePeerID)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        // The exact ciphertext must still authenticate, proving the readiness
+        // rejection happened before the receive nonce was consumed.
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(alicePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .privateMessage)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0xCA, 0xFE]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func ciphertextQueuedAheadOfRestoreCallbackDoesNotConsumeNonce()
+        throws {
+        let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let mallory = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let alicePeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let bobPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
+
+        let initial1 = try alice.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
+        let initial2 = try #require(
+            try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: initial1
+            )
+        )
+        let initial3 = try #require(
+            try alice.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: bobPeerID,
+                message: initial2
+            )
+        )
+        _ = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+            from: alicePeerID,
+            message: initial3
+        )
+        let typedPayload = Data([
+            NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue,
+            0xBE, 0xEF
+        ])
+        let delayedCiphertext = try alice.encrypt(
+            typedPayload,
+            for: bobPeerID
+        )
+
+        let forged1 = try mallory.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
+        let forged2 = try #require(
+            try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: forged1
+            )
+        )
+        let forged3 = try #require(
+            try mallory.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: bobPeerID,
+                message: forged2
+            )
+        )
+        #expect(throws: NoiseSessionError.peerIdentityMismatch) {
+            try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: forged3
+            )
+        }
+        #expect(bob.hasEstablishedSession(with: alicePeerID))
+
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = false
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: bob,
+            localPeerID: bobPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let packet = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: bobPeerID.id),
+            payload: delayedCiphertext
+        )
+
+        // Manager rollback is visible, while the BLE restore callback is
+        // deliberately still queued behind this ciphertext.
+        handler.handleEncrypted(packet, from: alicePeerID)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(alicePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .privateMessage)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0xBE, 0xEF]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func oversizedCiphertextCannotEvictEstablishedTransport() throws {
+        let pair = try establishedServices()
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: pair.receiver,
+            localPeerID: pair.receiverPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data(
+                    count:
+                        NoiseSecurityConstants
+                            .maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize + 1
+                )
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+        #expect(
+            pair.receiver.hasEstablishedSession(with: pair.senderPeerID)
+        )
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        let valid = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x01]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: valid
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0x01]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func forgedAuthenticationFailureCannotEvictEstablishedTransport()
+        throws {
+        let pair = try establishedServices()
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: pair.receiver,
+            localPeerID: pair.receiverPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let valid = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x02]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+        var forged = valid
+        forged[forged.index(before: forged.endIndex)] ^= 0xFF
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: forged
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+        #expect(
+            pair.receiver.hasEstablishedSession(with: pair.senderPeerID)
+        )
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        // Authentication failure leaves nonce state untouched, so the exact
+        // original ciphertext remains valid.
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: valid
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0x02]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func replayCannotEvictEstablishedTransportOrBlockNextNonce() throws {
+        let pair = try establishedServices()
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: pair.receiver,
+            localPeerID: pair.receiverPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let first = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x03]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+        let firstPacket = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+            payload: first
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(firstPacket, from: pair.senderPeerID)
+        handler.handleEncrypted(firstPacket, from: pair.senderPeerID)
+        #expect(
+            pair.receiver.hasEstablishedSession(with: pair.senderPeerID)
+        )
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        let next = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x04]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: next
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.map { $0.payload } == [
+            Data([0x03]), Data([0x04])
+        ])
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func rateLimitFailureCannotEvictEstablishedTransportOrConsumeNonce()
+        throws {
+        let pair = try establishedServices()
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.transportGenerationReady = true
+        recorder.forcedServiceDecryptError =
+            NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
+        let handler = makeServiceBackedHandler(
+            service: pair.receiver,
+            localPeerID: pair.receiverPeerID,
+            recorder: recorder,
+            transportGenerationIsReady: { _ in
+                recorder.transportGenerationReady
+            }
+        )
+        let valid = try pair.sender.encrypt(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue, 0x05]),
+            for: pair.receiverPeerID
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data(repeating: 0xA5, count: 20)
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+        #expect(
+            pair.receiver.hasEstablishedSession(with: pair.senderPeerID)
+        )
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+
+        recorder.forcedServiceDecryptError = nil
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: pair.receiverPeerID.id),
+                payload: valid
+            ),
+            from: pair.senderPeerID
+        )
+
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.payload == Data([0x05]))
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func maximumPrivateFileCiphertextIsEligibleForDeferredRetry() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+            payload: Data(
+                count: NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize
+            )
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.privateFile.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .privateFile)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func oversizedEarlyCiphertextIsNotDeferred() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+            payload: Data(
+                count:
+                    NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize + 1
+            )
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func missingSessionCiphertextIsRetriedAfterResponderHandshakeCompletes() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func lowNonceCiphertextIsRetriedAfterResponderHandshakeCompletes() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(NoiseError.replayDetected)
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.readReceipt.rawValue, 0x02])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.first?.type == .readReceipt)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func invalidDeferredCiphertextDoesNotClearAuthenticatedSession() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let encrypted = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(encrypted, from: remotePeerID)
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func nonCipherFailureDuringResponderHandshakeIsDroppedNotDeferred() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(TestError())
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+            ),
+            from: remotePeerID
+        )
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextBufferIsBoundedPerPeer() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+
+        for index in 0..<5 {
+            handler.handleEncrypted(
+                makeEncryptedPacket(
+                    recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                    timestamp: UInt64(900_000 + index)
+                ),
+                from: remotePeerID
+            )
+        }
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 5)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 9)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 4)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextBufferIsBoundedGlobally() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let peers = (1...33).map {
+            PeerID(str: String(format: "%016llx", UInt64($0)))
+        }
+        let packet = makeEncryptedPacket(
+            recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+        )
+
+        for peerID in peers {
+            handler.handleEncrypted(packet, from: peerID)
+        }
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 33)
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        for peerID in peers {
+            handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(peerID)
+        }
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 65)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 32)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextBufferKeepsPrivateFileRoomAndByteBound() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        let peers = [
+            PeerID(str: "0000000000000001"),
+            PeerID(str: "0000000000000002"),
+            PeerID(str: "0000000000000003")
+        ]
+
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data(
+                    count:
+                        NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize
+                )
+            ),
+            from: peers[0]
+        )
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data(count: 256 * 1024)
+            ),
+            from: peers[1]
+        )
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id),
+                payload: Data([0x01])
+            ),
+            from: peers[2]
+        )
+
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        for peerID in peers {
+            handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(peerID)
+        }
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 5)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func expiredEarlyCiphertextIsNotRetried() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+            ),
+            from: remotePeerID
+        )
+
+        recorder.currentDate =
+            recorder.currentDate.addingTimeInterval(
+                NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
+                    + 0.001
+            )
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func earlyCiphertextSurvivesResponderHandshakeWindow() {
+        let recorder = Recorder()
+        recorder.hasSession = true
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = true
+        recorder.decryptResult = .failure(
+            CryptoKitError.authenticationFailure
+        )
+        let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
+        handler.handleEncrypted(
+            makeEncryptedPacket(
+                recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
+            ),
+            from: remotePeerID
+        )
+
+        recorder.currentDate =
+            recorder.currentDate.addingTimeInterval(
+                NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout
+                    - 0.001
+            )
+        recorder.awaitingResponderHandshake = false
+        recorder.decryptResult = .success(
+            Data([NoisePayloadType.delivered.rawValue, 0x01])
+        )
+        handler.handleSessionAuthenticated(remotePeerID)
+
+        #expect(recorder.decryptCalls.count == 2)
+        #expect(recorder.deliveries.count == 1)
+        #expect(recorder.clearedSessions.isEmpty)
+        #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
+    }
+
     private func makeHandshakePacket(recipientID: Data?) -> BitchatPacket {
         BitchatPacket(
             type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
@@ -378,14 +1294,15 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
 
     private func makeEncryptedPacket(
         recipientID: Data?,
-        timestamp: UInt64 = 900_000
+        timestamp: UInt64 = 900_000,
+        payload: Data = Data([0xC0, 0xFF, 0xEE])
     ) -> BitchatPacket {
         BitchatPacket(
             type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
             senderID: Data(hexString: remotePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
             recipientID: recipientID,
             timestamp: timestamp,
-            payload: Data([0xC0, 0xFF, 0xEE]),
+            payload: payload,
             signature: nil,
             ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
         )

bitchatTests/Services/BLENoiseReconnectPolicyTests.swift

@@ -111,5 +111,8 @@ struct BLENoiseReconnectPolicyTests {
             )
         )
         #expect(PeerCapabilities.localSupported.contains(.privateMedia))
+        #expect(
+            PeerCapabilities.localSupported.contains(.privateMediaReceipts)
+        )
     }
 }

bitchatTests/Services/BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStoreTests.swift

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+import Foundation
+import Testing
+@testable import bitchat
+
+struct BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStoreTests {
+    private struct TestError: Error {}
+
+    private let messageID = "media-00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
+
+    @Test
+    func acceptedReceiptPersistsAcrossStoreInstances() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("persist")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+
+        let first = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(first.commitAccepted(messageID: messageID, storedURL: payload))
+        #expect(first.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+
+        let relaunched = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(relaunched.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func directoryEnumerationFailureIsUnavailableAndRetriesWithoutCachingEmpty() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("list-failure")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+        #expect(BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root).commitAccepted(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            storedURL: payload
+        ))
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+
+        var shouldFail = true
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(
+            baseDirectory: root,
+            directoryReader: { directory in
+                if shouldFail {
+                    shouldFail = false
+                    throw TestError()
+                }
+                return try FileManager.default.contentsOfDirectory(
+                    at: directory,
+                    includingPropertiesForKeys: nil
+                )
+            }
+        )
+
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .unavailable)
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func recordReadFailureIsUnavailableAndPreservesReceiptForRetry() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("read-failure")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+        #expect(BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root).commitAccepted(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            storedURL: payload
+        ))
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+
+        var shouldFail = true
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(
+            baseDirectory: root,
+            dataReader: { url in
+                if shouldFail {
+                    shouldFail = false
+                    throw TestError()
+                }
+                return try Data(contentsOf: url)
+            }
+        )
+
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .unavailable)
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func decodeFailureIsUnavailableAndDoesNotDeleteOrCachePastRepair() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("decode-failure")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+        #expect(BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root).commitAccepted(
+            messageID: messageID,
+            storedURL: payload
+        ))
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+        let durableBytes = try Data(contentsOf: record)
+        let corruptBytes = Data("{not-json".utf8)
+        try corruptBytes.write(to: record, options: .atomic)
+
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .unavailable)
+        #expect(!store.commitAccepted(messageID: messageID, storedURL: payload))
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+        #expect(try Data(contentsOf: record) == corruptBytes)
+
+        try durableBytes.write(to: record, options: .atomic)
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .accepted(payload))
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func unreadableTombstoneNeverBecomesAbsentOrGetsDeleted() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("tombstone-decode")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let payload = try makePayload(in: root)
+        let seed = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(seed.commitAccepted(messageID: messageID, storedURL: payload))
+        #expect(seed.recordDeleted(messageID: messageID))
+        #expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: payload.path))
+
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+        let durableBytes = try Data(contentsOf: record)
+        try Data([0xFF, 0x00, 0x7B]).write(to: record, options: .atomic)
+
+        let relaunched = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(relaunched.state(for: messageID) == .unavailable)
+        #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: record.path))
+
+        try durableBytes.write(to: record, options: .atomic)
+        #expect(relaunched.state(for: messageID) == .tombstoned)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func failedTombstonePersistenceDoesNotPoisonVolatileState() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("failed-tombstone-write")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .absent)
+
+        // Force the atomic record write itself to fail after the store has
+        // successfully loaded its empty index.
+        let record = receiptRecord(in: root)
+        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
+            at: record,
+            withIntermediateDirectories: true
+        )
+        #expect(!store.recordDeleted(messageID: messageID))
+        try FileManager.default.removeItem(at: record)
+
+        // The UI must be able to report the deletion failure without a
+        // process-lifetime tombstone silently hiding a later retry.
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .absent)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    func unreleasedAggregateLedgerIsIgnoredAndLeftUntouched() throws {
+        let root = makeRoot("no-legacy-migration")
+        defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: root) }
+        let files = root.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
+        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
+            at: files,
+            withIntermediateDirectories: true
+        )
+        let legacy = files.appendingPathComponent(
+            ".private-media-receipts.json",
+            isDirectory: false
+        )
+        let bytes = Data(
+            #"{"entries":{"media-00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff":{"relativePath":"images/incoming/old.jpg","acceptedAt":0}}}"#
+                .utf8
+        )
+        try bytes.write(to: legacy, options: .atomic)
+
+        let store = BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore(baseDirectory: root)
+        #expect(store.state(for: messageID) == .absent)
+        #expect(try Data(contentsOf: legacy) == bytes)
+    }
+
+    private func makeRoot(_ label: String) -> URL {
+        FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory.appendingPathComponent(
+            "private-media-receipt-\(label)-\(UUID().uuidString)",
+            isDirectory: true
+        )
+    }
+
+    private func makePayload(in root: URL) throws -> URL {
+        let directory = root.appendingPathComponent(
+            "files/images/incoming",
+            isDirectory: true
+        )
+        try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
+            at: directory,
+            withIntermediateDirectories: true
+        )
+        let payload = directory.appendingPathComponent("image.jpg")
+        try Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF, 0xD9]).write(to: payload)
+        return payload
+    }
+
+    private func receiptRecord(in root: URL) -> URL {
+        root
+            .appendingPathComponent(
+                "files/.private-media-receipts",
+                isDirectory: true
+            )
+            .appendingPathComponent(messageID)
+            .appendingPathExtension("json")
+    }
+}

bitchatTests/Services/NoiseEncryptionServiceTests.swift

@@ -1344,6 +1344,89 @@ struct NoiseEncryptionServiceTests {
         }
     }
 
+    @Test("Responder completion state spans ordinary XX message three")
+    func responderCompletionStateTracksOrdinaryHandshake() throws {
+        let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let alicePeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let bobPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
+
+        let message1 = try alice.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
+        #expect(
+            !bob.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(with: alicePeerID)
+        )
+
+        let message2 = try #require(
+            try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: alicePeerID,
+                message: message1
+            )
+        )
+        #expect(
+            bob.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(with: alicePeerID)
+        )
+
+        let message3 = try #require(
+            try alice.processHandshakeMessage(
+                from: bobPeerID,
+                message: message2
+            )
+        )
+        #expect(
+            bob.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(with: alicePeerID)
+        )
+
+        _ = try bob.processHandshakeMessage(
+            from: alicePeerID,
+            message: message3
+        )
+        #expect(
+            !bob.isAwaitingResponderHandshakeCompletion(with: alicePeerID)
+        )
+    }
+
+    @Test("Transport readiness rejection spends no message budget")
+    func transportReadinessRejectionSpendsNoMessageBudget() throws {
+        let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let bob = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
+        let alicePeerID = PeerID(
+            publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData()
+        )
+        let bobPeerID = PeerID(publicKey: bob.getStaticPublicKeyData())
+        try establishSessions(alice: alice, bob: bob)
+        let plaintext = Data([
+            NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue,
+            0xAB, 0xCD
+        ])
+        let ciphertext = try alice.encrypt(plaintext, for: bobPeerID)
+
+        for _ in 0...NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessagesPerSecond {
+            do {
+                _ = try bob.decryptWithSessionGeneration(
+                    ciphertext,
+                    from: alicePeerID,
+                    establishedGenerationIsReady: { _ in false }
+                )
+                Issue.record(
+                    "Expected transport generation readiness rejection"
+                )
+            } catch NoiseEncryptionError.transportGenerationNotReady {
+                // Expected: authorization and nonce mutation are both later.
+            } catch {
+                Issue.record("Unexpected readiness error: \(error)")
+            }
+        }
+
+        let decrypted = try bob.decryptWithSessionGeneration(
+            ciphertext,
+            from: alicePeerID,
+            establishedGenerationIsReady: { _ in true }
+        )
+        #expect(decrypted.plaintext == plaintext)
+    }
+
     @Test("NoiseMessage JSON and binary encoding round-trip")
     func noiseMessageRoundTrips() throws {
         let message = NoiseMessage(

docs/PRIVATE-MEDIA-MIGRATION.md

@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ peer's Noise session before BLE fragmentation.
   `0x21`. A valid bit-8 proof selects Noise `0x20`; a valid no-bit proof or a
   no-proof timeout reaches the explicit legacy-consent path for an unpinned
   peer. No timeout automatically sends raw bytes.
+- `PeerCapabilities.privateMediaReceipts` is bit 9. Its exact-session
+  authenticated proof enables bounded sender-side automatic retry; a public
+  announce never does. It does not replace bit 8: encrypted `0x20` media from
+  bit-8-only prior iOS clients keeps the same deterministic stable ID and
+  delivery ACK. Receivers durably commit that ID before UI delivery or ACK, so
+  a lost proof followed by a later bit-9 retry cannot create a second,
+  random-ID bubble.
 - An unpinned peer with a stable Noise key but without that capability is
   eligible for one signed, directed
   `fileTransfer`, matching the pre-migration wire form used by older iOS and

localPackages/BitFoundation/Sources/BitFoundation/PeerCapabilities.swift

@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ public struct PeerCapabilities: OptionSet, Equatable, Hashable, Sendable {
     /// before outer BLE fragmentation. Peers that omit this bit require the
     /// signed directed raw-file migration fallback.
     public static let privateMedia = PeerCapabilities(rawValue: 1 << 8)
+    /// Stable private-media IDs are durably deduplicated by the receiver and
+    /// correlated delivery/read receipts permit bounded automatic resend.
+    ///
+    /// Bit 8 remains the encrypted-media compatibility contract. Bit 9 only
+    /// enables sender-side automatic retry after exact-session proof.
+    public static let privateMediaReceipts =
+        PeerCapabilities(rawValue: 1 << 9)
     /// Reserved for test builds that briefly advertised non-destructive Noise
     /// replacement. Current clients intentionally do not advertise or act on
     /// this bit; keep it decodable so the wire assignment is never reused.

localPackages/BitFoundation/Tests/BitFoundationTests/PeerCapabilitiesTests.swift

@@ -18,14 +18,30 @@ struct PeerCapabilitiesTests {
         #expect(PeerCapabilities.meshDiagnostics.encoded() == Data([0x40]))
         #expect(PeerCapabilities.privateMedia.encoded() == Data([0x00, 0x01]))
 
-        let high = PeerCapabilities(rawValue: 1 << 9)
+        #expect(
-        #expect(high.encoded() == Data([0x00, 0x02]))
+            PeerCapabilities.privateMediaReceipts.encoded()
+                == Data([0x00, 0x02])
+        )
         #expect(
             PeerCapabilities.nonDestructiveNoiseReplacement.encoded()
                 == Data([0x00, 0x04])
         )
 
-        let all: PeerCapabilities = [.prekeys, .wifiBulk, .gateway, .groups, .board, .vouch, .meshDiagnostics, .privateMedia]
+        let high = PeerCapabilities(rawValue: 1 << 11)
+        #expect(high.encoded() == Data([0x00, 0x08]))
+
+        let all: PeerCapabilities = [
+            .prekeys,
+            .wifiBulk,
+            .gateway,
+            .groups,
+            .board,
+            .vouch,
+            .meshDiagnostics,
+            .privateMedia,
+            .privateMediaReceipts,
+            .nonDestructiveNoiseReplacement
+        ]
         #expect(PeerCapabilities(encoded: all.encoded()) == all)
         #expect(PeerCapabilities(encoded: high.encoded()) == high)
         #expect(PeerCapabilities(encoded: PeerCapabilities([]).encoded()) == [])