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Author SHA1 Message Date
jack 15524b1ae6 Serialize iOS tests in CI 2026-07-10 15:11:12 -04:00
jack e5c924bf10 Run iOS tests and repair coverage reporting 2026-07-10 20:30:38 +02:00
103 changed files with 638 additions and 14039 deletions
+64 -16
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@@ -94,6 +94,24 @@ jobs:
kill "$watchdog_pid" 2>/dev/null || true kill "$watchdog_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
exit "$status" exit "$status"
# Read coverage before the serial benchmark command below rebuilds the
# test binary without instrumentation. Reporting against that newer
# binary makes llvm-cov reject the profile as out of date.
# Informational only: there is deliberately no percentage threshold, but
# a broken/missing report is a CI configuration error and must be visible.
- name: Coverage summary
run: |
BIN_PATH=$(swift build --show-bin-path --package-path ${{ matrix.path }})
PROF="$BIN_PATH/codecov/default.profdata"
XCTEST=$(find "$BIN_PATH" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.xctest' | head -1)
BINARY="$XCTEST/Contents/MacOS/$(basename "$XCTEST" .xctest)"
if [ ! -f "$PROF" ] || [ ! -f "$BINARY" ]; then
echo "::error::Coverage profile or test binary is missing"
exit 1
fi
xcrun llvm-cov report "$BINARY" -instr-profile "$PROF" \
-ignore-filename-regex='(Tests|\.build|checkouts|Mocks|_PreviewHelpers)'
# Benchmarks run serially on an otherwise idle runner for stable # Benchmarks run serially on an otherwise idle runner for stable
# numbers; BITCHAT_PERF_LOG captures the PERF[...] lines for the gate. # numbers; BITCHAT_PERF_LOG captures the PERF[...] lines for the gate.
- name: Run performance benchmarks (serial) - name: Run performance benchmarks (serial)
@@ -115,22 +133,6 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 10 timeout-minutes: 10
run: ./scripts/check-perf-floors.sh perf-output.log run: ./scripts/check-perf-floors.sh perf-output.log
# Informational only: surfaces per-file and total line coverage in the
# job log so coverage trends are visible on every PR. No thresholds —
# this must never be the reason a build goes red.
- name: Coverage summary
run: |
BIN_PATH=$(swift build --show-bin-path --package-path ${{ matrix.path }})
PROF="$BIN_PATH/codecov/default.profdata"
XCTEST=$(find "$BIN_PATH" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.xctest' | head -1)
BINARY="$XCTEST/Contents/MacOS/$(basename "$XCTEST" .xctest)"
if [ -f "$PROF" ] && [ -f "$BINARY" ]; then
xcrun llvm-cov report "$BINARY" -instr-profile "$PROF" \
-ignore-filename-regex='(Tests|\.build|checkouts|Mocks|_PreviewHelpers)' || true
else
echo "No coverage data found; skipping summary."
fi
# SPM tests do not link the shipping app targets. This job covers the # SPM tests do not link the shipping app targets. This job covers the
# iOS-conditional paths and both universal Release link configurations. # iOS-conditional paths and both universal Release link configurations.
ios-build: ios-build:
@@ -169,6 +171,52 @@ jobs:
CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \ CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
build build
# The SwiftPM matrix runs on macOS and cannot execute UIKit/CoreBluetooth
# conditional tests. Build the shared iOS test target and run it on the first
# available iPhone simulator from the runner image instead of hard-coding a
# model that changes when GitHub updates Xcode. The suite intentionally runs
# in one test runner: a number of integration tests exercise process-global
# stores and notification centers, so overlapping workers can corrupt each
# other's fixtures and turn sub-second tests into multi-minute timeouts.
ios-tests:
name: Run iOS simulator tests
runs-on: macos-latest
timeout-minutes: 20
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Select available iPhone simulator
id: destination
run: |
destinations=$(xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj -scheme "bitchat (iOS)" -showdestinations)
destination_id=$(awk -F'id:' '
/platform:iOS Simulator/ && /name:iPhone/ && !found {
value=$2
sub(/,.*/, "", value)
gsub(/^[[:space:]]+|[[:space:]]+$/, "", value)
print value
found=1
}
' <<< "$destinations")
if [ -z "$destination_id" ]; then
echo "::error::No available iPhone simulator destination found"
exit 1
fi
echo "id=$destination_id" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Run iOS tests
run: |
set -o pipefail
xcodebuild -project bitchat.xcodeproj \
-scheme "bitchat (iOS)" \
-sdk iphonesimulator \
-destination "platform=iOS Simulator,id=${{ steps.destination.outputs.id }}" \
-parallel-testing-enabled NO \
CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
test
# Advisory only: SwiftLint reports style violations without ever failing the # Advisory only: SwiftLint reports style violations without ever failing the
# build. Runs in a pinned container (no Xcode plugin, no pbxproj changes) so # build. Runs in a pinned container (no Xcode plugin, no pbxproj changes) so
# it can never break the documented xcodebuild path or block a merge. # it can never break the documented xcodebuild path or block a merge.
+3 -3
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@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ bitchat is designed for private, account-free communication. This policy describ
1. **Identity and cryptographic keys** 1. **Identity and cryptographic keys**
- Noise, signing, group, prekey, and optional Nostr identity material is generated locally. - Noise, signing, group, prekey, and optional Nostr identity material is generated locally.
- Secret keys are stored in the system keychain as device-only items. Public keys are shared when required for messaging, verification, groups, or Nostr events. - Secret keys are stored in the system keychain. Public keys are shared when required for messaging, verification, groups, or Nostr events.
- Keys remain until they are rotated, removed by the relevant feature, or erased with panic wipe. Because operating-system keychains can outlive an uninstall, bitchat records a non-secret install marker and deletes surviving app keys before use after a later reinstall. - Keys remain until they are rotated, removed by the relevant feature, erased with panic wipe, or removed with the app.
2. **Nickname, preferences, and relationships** 2. **Nickname, preferences, and relationships**
- Your nickname, settings, favorites, petnames, read-receipt identifiers, and bounded operational metadata are stored locally. - Your nickname, settings, favorites, petnames, read-receipt identifiers, and bounded operational metadata are stored locally.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ No cryptographic system can protect content after a recipient reads, copies, scr
## Your Controls ## Your Controls
- **Panic wipe:** Triple-tap the logo to synchronously cancel in-flight media work and clear local keys, sessions, preferences, groups, queues, carried mail, public archives, board data, and media managed by the app. - **Panic wipe:** Triple-tap the logo to clear local keys, sessions, preferences, groups, queues, carried mail, public archives, board data, and media managed by the app.
- **Feature controls:** Location channels, mesh bridge, internet gateway, and related internet behaviors can be disabled in the app. Some already-published relay data cannot be recalled. - **Feature controls:** Location channels, mesh bridge, internet gateway, and related internet behaviors can be disabled in the app. Some already-published relay data cannot be recalled.
- **System permissions:** Bluetooth, location, microphone, camera, and photo-library access can be revoked in system settings. - **System permissions:** Bluetooth, location, microphone, camera, and photo-library access can be revoked in system settings.
- **No account:** The project operates no account record for you to request or export. - **No account:** The project operates no account record for you to request or export.
-1
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@@ -337,7 +337,6 @@
es, es,
ar, ar,
de, de,
fa,
fr, fr,
he, he,
id, id,
-8
View File
@@ -21,9 +21,6 @@ final class AppChromeModel: ObservableObject {
private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel private let chatViewModel: ChatViewModel
private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>() private var cancellables = Set<AnyCancellable>()
/// The composer owns capture state above ChatViewModel. ContentView
/// installs this hook so both panic entry points synchronously stop it.
private var prepareForPanic: (@MainActor () -> Void)?
/// Bulletin-board coordinator, created on first use of the board sheet. /// Bulletin-board coordinator, created on first use of the board sheet.
private(set) lazy var boardManager = BoardManager(transport: chatViewModel.meshService) private(set) lazy var boardManager = BoardManager(transport: chatViewModel.meshService)
@@ -100,12 +97,7 @@ final class AppChromeModel: ObservableObject {
showScreenshotPrivacyWarning = true showScreenshotPrivacyWarning = true
} }
func setPanicPreparation(_ preparation: (@MainActor () -> Void)?) {
prepareForPanic = preparation
}
func panicClearAllData() { func panicClearAllData() {
prepareForPanic?()
chatViewModel.panicClearAllData() chatViewModel.panicClearAllData()
} }
+2 -20
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@@ -107,15 +107,12 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
) )
) )
if chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed { GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded()
GeoRelayDirectory.shared.prefetchIfNeeded()
}
bindRuntimeObservers() bindRuntimeObservers()
NotificationDelegate.shared.runtime = self NotificationDelegate.shared.runtime = self
} }
func start() { func start() {
guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
guard !started else { guard !started else {
checkForSharedContent() checkForSharedContent()
return return
@@ -154,14 +151,12 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
} }
func handleDidBecomeActiveNotification() { func handleDidBecomeActiveNotification() {
guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive() chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
checkForSharedContent() checkForSharedContent()
} }
#if os(macOS) #if os(macOS)
func handleMacDidBecomeActiveNotification() { func handleMacDidBecomeActiveNotification() {
guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active)) record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active))
chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive() chatViewModel.handleDidBecomeActive()
checkForSharedContent() checkForSharedContent()
@@ -180,7 +175,6 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
didEnterBackground = true didEnterBackground = true
case .active: case .active:
guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active)) record(.scenePhaseChanged(.active))
chatViewModel.meshService.startServices() chatViewModel.meshService.startServices()
TorManager.shared.setAppForeground(true) TorManager.shared.setAppForeground(true)
@@ -228,7 +222,6 @@ final class AppRuntime: ObservableObject {
actionIdentifier: String = UNNotificationDefaultActionIdentifier, actionIdentifier: String = UNNotificationDefaultActionIdentifier,
userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any] userInfo: [AnyHashable: Any]
) { ) {
guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
if actionIdentifier == NotificationService.waveActionID { if actionIdentifier == NotificationService.waveActionID {
chatViewModel.sendMeshWave() chatViewModel.sendMeshWave()
return return
@@ -280,8 +273,6 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillRestart) NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillRestart)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main) .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in .sink { [weak self] _ in
guard self?.chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed == true
else { return }
self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willRestart)) self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willRestart))
self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillRestart() self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillRestart()
} }
@@ -290,8 +281,6 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorDidBecomeReady) NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorDidBecomeReady)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main) .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in .sink { [weak self] _ in
guard self?.chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed == true
else { return }
self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.didBecomeReady)) self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.didBecomeReady))
self?.chatViewModel.handleTorDidBecomeReady() self?.chatViewModel.handleTorDidBecomeReady()
} }
@@ -300,8 +289,6 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillStart) NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorWillStart)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main) .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] _ in .sink { [weak self] _ in
guard self?.chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed == true
else { return }
self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willStart)) self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.willStart))
self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillStart() self?.chatViewModel.handleTorWillStart()
} }
@@ -310,8 +297,6 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorUserPreferenceChanged) NotificationCenter.default.publisher(for: .TorUserPreferenceChanged)
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main) .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] notification in .sink { [weak self] notification in
guard self?.chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed == true
else { return }
self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.preferenceChanged)) self?.record(.torLifecycleChanged(.preferenceChanged))
self?.chatViewModel.handleTorPreferenceChanged(notification) self?.chatViewModel.handleTorPreferenceChanged(notification)
} }
@@ -328,7 +313,6 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
} }
func checkForSharedContent() { func checkForSharedContent() {
guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed else { return }
guard let userDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: BitchatApp.groupID) else { return } guard let userDefaults = UserDefaults(suiteName: BitchatApp.groupID) else { return }
let clearSharedContent = { let clearSharedContent = {
userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContent") userDefaults.removeObject(forKey: "sharedContent")
@@ -375,9 +359,7 @@ private extension AppRuntime {
let becameConnected = isConnected && !lastNostrRelayConnectedState let becameConnected = isConnected && !lastNostrRelayConnectedState
lastNostrRelayConnectedState = isConnected lastNostrRelayConnectedState = isConnected
guard chatViewModel.networkActivationAllowed, guard started, becameConnected else { return }
started,
becameConnected else { return }
let isInitialConnection = !didHandleInitialNostrConnection let isInitialConnection = !didHandleInitialNostrConnection
didHandleInitialNostrConnection = true didHandleInitialNostrConnection = true
-12
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var currentNickname: String @Published private(set) var currentNickname: String
@Published private(set) var isBatchingPublic = false @Published private(set) var isBatchingPublic = false
@Published private(set) var canSendMediaInCurrentContext = true @Published private(set) var canSendMediaInCurrentContext = true
@Published private(set) var legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest: LegacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?
/// Who is talking live in the public mesh channel right now (floor /// Who is talking live in the public mesh channel right now (floor
/// courtesy: the composer mic tints "busy" while someone holds the floor). /// courtesy: the composer mic tints "busy" while someone holds the floor).
@Published private(set) var activeLiveVoiceTalker: String? @Published private(set) var activeLiveVoiceTalker: String?
@@ -154,13 +153,6 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
chatViewModel.sendVoiceNote(at: url) chatViewModel.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
} }
func resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(requestID: UUID, approved: Bool) {
chatViewModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
requestID: requestID,
approved: approved
)
}
/// Capture backend for the mic gesture: live PTT when the current DM /// Capture backend for the mic gesture: live PTT when the current DM
/// peer can hear it now, classic voice note otherwise. /// peer can hear it now, classic voice note otherwise.
func makeVoiceCaptureSession() -> VoiceCaptureSession { func makeVoiceCaptureSession() -> VoiceCaptureSession {
@@ -201,10 +193,6 @@ final class ConversationUIModel: ObservableObject {
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main) .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$activeLiveVoiceTalker) .assign(to: &$activeLiveVoiceTalker)
chatViewModel.$legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.assign(to: &$legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest)
conversations.$activeChannel conversations.$activeChannel
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main) .receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak self] channel in .sink { [weak self] channel in
+10 -111
View File
@@ -7,146 +7,45 @@ final class LocationPresenceStore: ObservableObject {
@Published private(set) var geoNicknames: [String: String] = [:] @Published private(set) var geoNicknames: [String: String] = [:]
@Published private(set) var teleportedGeo: Set<String> = [] @Published private(set) var teleportedGeo: Set<String> = []
private let teleportedGeoCapacity: Int
private var teleportedGeoOrder: [String] = []
private let geoNicknameCapacity: Int
private var geoNicknameOrder: [String] = []
init(
teleportedGeoCapacity: Int = TransportConfig.geoTeleportedParticipantsCap,
geoNicknameCapacity: Int = TransportConfig.geoNicknameParticipantsCap
) {
self.teleportedGeoCapacity = max(0, teleportedGeoCapacity)
self.geoNicknameCapacity = max(0, geoNicknameCapacity)
}
func setCurrentGeohash(_ geohash: String?) { func setCurrentGeohash(_ geohash: String?) {
let normalized = geohash?.lowercased() currentGeohash = geohash?.lowercased()
if currentGeohash != normalized {
// Presence markers are scoped to the active geohash channel.
clearTeleportedGeo()
clearGeoNicknames()
}
currentGeohash = normalized
} }
func setNickname(_ nickname: String, for pubkeyHex: String) { func setNickname(_ nickname: String, for pubkeyHex: String) {
guard geoNicknameCapacity > 0 else { geoNicknames[pubkeyHex.lowercased()] = nickname
clearGeoNicknames()
return
}
let key = pubkeyHex.lowercased()
if geoNicknames[key] != nil {
geoNicknames[key] = nickname
return
}
while geoNicknameOrder.count >= geoNicknameCapacity, let oldest = geoNicknameOrder.first {
geoNicknameOrder.removeFirst()
geoNicknames.removeValue(forKey: oldest)
}
geoNicknames[key] = nickname
geoNicknameOrder.append(key)
} }
func replaceGeoNicknames(_ nicknames: [String: String]) { func replaceGeoNicknames(_ nicknames: [String: String]) {
guard geoNicknameCapacity > 0 else { geoNicknames = Dictionary(
clearGeoNicknames() uniqueKeysWithValues: nicknames.map { key, value in
return (key.lowercased(), value)
} }
)
var seen: Set<String> = []
var ordered: [String] = []
var normalized: [String: String] = [:]
for (key, value) in nicknames {
let lower = key.lowercased()
guard seen.insert(lower).inserted else { continue }
ordered.append(lower)
normalized[lower] = value
}
if ordered.count > geoNicknameCapacity {
let kept = Array(ordered.suffix(geoNicknameCapacity))
ordered = kept
normalized = Dictionary(uniqueKeysWithValues: kept.compactMap { key in
normalized[key].map { (key, $0) }
})
}
geoNicknameOrder = ordered
geoNicknames = normalized
} }
func clearGeoNicknames() { func clearGeoNicknames() {
geoNicknames.removeAll() geoNicknames.removeAll()
geoNicknameOrder.removeAll()
}
func retainGeoNicknames(keeping pubkeys: Set<String>) {
let allowed = Set(pubkeys.map { $0.lowercased() })
geoNicknameOrder = geoNicknameOrder.filter { allowed.contains($0) }
geoNicknames = geoNicknames.filter { allowed.contains($0.key) }
} }
func markTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) { func markTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) {
guard teleportedGeoCapacity > 0 else { teleportedGeo.insert(pubkeyHex.lowercased())
clearTeleportedGeo()
return
}
let key = pubkeyHex.lowercased()
guard !teleportedGeo.contains(key) else { return }
while teleportedGeoOrder.count >= teleportedGeoCapacity, let oldest = teleportedGeoOrder.first {
teleportedGeoOrder.removeFirst()
teleportedGeo.remove(oldest)
}
teleportedGeo.insert(key)
teleportedGeoOrder.append(key)
} }
func clearTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) { func clearTeleported(_ pubkeyHex: String) {
let key = pubkeyHex.lowercased() teleportedGeo.remove(pubkeyHex.lowercased())
teleportedGeo.remove(key)
teleportedGeoOrder.removeAll { $0 == key }
} }
func replaceTeleportedGeo(_ pubkeys: Set<String>) { func replaceTeleportedGeo(_ pubkeys: Set<String>) {
guard teleportedGeoCapacity > 0 else { teleportedGeo = Set(pubkeys.map { $0.lowercased() })
clearTeleportedGeo()
return
}
var seen: Set<String> = []
var ordered: [String] = []
for key in pubkeys.map({ $0.lowercased() }) where !seen.contains(key) {
seen.insert(key)
ordered.append(key)
}
if ordered.count > teleportedGeoCapacity {
ordered = Array(ordered.suffix(teleportedGeoCapacity))
}
teleportedGeoOrder = ordered
teleportedGeo = Set(ordered)
}
func retainTeleportedGeo(keeping pubkeys: Set<String>) {
let allowed = Set(pubkeys.map { $0.lowercased() })
teleportedGeoOrder = teleportedGeoOrder.filter { allowed.contains($0) }
teleportedGeo = teleportedGeo.intersection(allowed)
} }
func clearTeleportedGeo() { func clearTeleportedGeo() {
teleportedGeo.removeAll() teleportedGeo.removeAll()
teleportedGeoOrder.removeAll()
} }
func reset() { func reset() {
currentGeohash = nil currentGeohash = nil
geoNicknames.removeAll() geoNicknames.removeAll()
geoNicknameOrder.removeAll()
teleportedGeo.removeAll() teleportedGeo.removeAll()
teleportedGeoOrder.removeAll()
} }
} }
@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ protocol VoiceCaptureSession: AnyObject {
/// nothing valid was captured. /// nothing valid was captured.
func finish() async -> URL? func finish() async -> URL?
func cancel() async func cancel() async
/// Stops capture and suppresses every later send before returning.
func panicCancelSynchronously()
} }
/// The classic record-then-send backend, wrapping the shared `VoiceRecorder`. /// The classic record-then-send backend, wrapping the shared `VoiceRecorder`.
@@ -57,10 +55,6 @@ final class VoiceNoteCaptureSession: VoiceCaptureSession {
func cancel() async { func cancel() async {
await recorder.cancelRecording(owner: owner) await recorder.cancelRecording(owner: owner)
} }
func panicCancelSynchronously() {
recorder.panicCancelSynchronously(owner: owner)
}
} }
/// Testable surface of the live capture engine. Production uses /// Testable surface of the live capture engine. Production uses
@@ -222,13 +216,6 @@ final class PTTLiveVoiceSession: VoiceCaptureSession {
} }
} }
func panicCancelSynchronously() {
// Do not emit a canceled packet: it would itself be pre-panic
// conversation data racing the emergency transport reset.
completed = true
capture.cancel()
}
private func sendControlPacket(_ kind: VoiceBurstPacket.Kind) { private func sendControlPacket(_ kind: VoiceBurstPacket.Kind) {
guard let packet = VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: stream.packetizer.nextSeq, kind: kind) else { return } guard let packet = VoiceBurstPacket(burstID: burstID, seq: stream.packetizer.nextSeq, kind: kind) else { return }
sendPacket(packet.encode()) sendPacket(packet.encode())
@@ -246,21 +246,6 @@ actor VoiceRecorder {
currentURL = nil currentURL = nil
} }
/// Panic is a synchronous security boundary: the caller must know the
/// microphone, audio-session lease, and partial file are gone before it
/// rotates identities or deletes the media tree. VoiceRecorder is an
/// independent actor and this cleanup path never hops to MainActor, so a
/// short semaphore join is safe even when invoked by the UI actor.
nonisolated
func panicCancelSynchronously(owner: RecordingOwner) {
let finished = DispatchSemaphore(value: 0)
Task {
await cancelRecording(owner: owner)
finished.signal()
}
finished.wait()
}
/// The audio session was interrupted (call, Siri) or reconfigured: stop /// The audio session was interrupted (call, Siri) or reconfigured: stop
/// the recorder but keep `recorder`/`currentURL` so the caller's pending /// the recorder but keep `recorder`/`currentURL` so the caller's pending
/// `stopRecording()` still returns the partial note. /// `stopRecording()` still returns the partial note.
-12
View File
@@ -189,18 +189,6 @@ struct IdentityCache: Codable {
// Fingerprint -> when we verified it (orders outgoing vouch batches; // Fingerprint -> when we verified it (orders outgoing vouch batches;
// entries verified before this field exists sort as oldest) // entries verified before this field exists sort as oldest)
var verifiedAt: [String: Date]? = nil var verifiedAt: [String: Date]? = nil
// Stable Noise fingerprints that proved encrypted private-media support
// inside an authenticated Noise session. Optional for decoding caches
// written before this migration. Entries are monotonic until a panic wipe
// so an old/replayed announce cannot silently downgrade a peer.
var privateMediaCapableFingerprints: Set<String>? = nil
// Noise-fingerprint -> Ed25519 announcement key, learned only from the
// authenticated peer-state payload. This prevents a self-signed announce
// containing a copied public Noise key from replacing a previously bound
// public-message signing identity. Optional for old cache compatibility.
var authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint: [String: Data]? = nil
} }
// //
@@ -140,14 +140,6 @@ protocol SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
func markVouchBatchSent(to fingerprint: String, at date: Date) func markVouchBatchSent(to fingerprint: String, at date: Date)
func signingPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data? func signingPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data?
func mostRecentlyVerifiedFingerprints(limit: Int, excluding fingerprint: String) -> [String] func mostRecentlyVerifiedFingerprints(limit: Int, excluding fingerprint: String) -> [String]
// MARK: Noise-authenticated announcement identity
func bindAuthenticatedSigningPublicKey(_ signingPublicKey: Data, fingerprint: String)
func authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data?
// MARK: Private-media downgrade protection
func markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: String)
func hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: String) -> Bool
} }
/// Singleton manager for secure identity state persistence and retrieval. /// Singleton manager for secure identity state persistence and retrieval.
@@ -165,7 +157,6 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
// Thread safety // Thread safety
private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "bitchat.identity.state", attributes: .concurrent) private let queue = DispatchQueue(label: "bitchat.identity.state", attributes: .concurrent)
private let queueSpecificKey = DispatchSpecificKey<UInt8>()
// Pending-save coalescing flag. Reads/writes are serialized on `queue`. // Pending-save coalescing flag. Reads/writes are serialized on `queue`.
// Persistence is done with a fire-and-forget `queue.async(.barrier)` rather // Persistence is done with a fire-and-forget `queue.async(.barrier)` rather
@@ -223,7 +214,6 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
self.encryptionKey = loadedKey self.encryptionKey = loadedKey
self.encryptionKeyIsEphemeral = keyIsEphemeral self.encryptionKeyIsEphemeral = keyIsEphemeral
queue.setSpecific(key: queueSpecificKey, value: 1)
// Only read the persisted cache when we hold the real key; with an // Only read the persisted cache when we hold the real key; with an
// ephemeral key the decrypt would fail and discard the real cache. // ephemeral key the decrypt would fail and discard the real cache.
@@ -380,66 +370,6 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
return cryptographicIdentities.values.filter { $0.fingerprint.hasPrefix(peerID.id) } return cryptographicIdentities.values.filter { $0.fingerprint.hasPrefix(peerID.id) }
} }
} }
// MARK: - Private-media downgrade protection
func markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: String) {
guard !fingerprint.isEmpty else { return }
let insertAndPersist = {
var pinned = self.cache.privateMediaCapableFingerprints ?? []
guard pinned.insert(fingerprint).inserted else { return }
self.cache.privateMediaCapableFingerprints = pinned
self.saveIdentityCache()
}
// Downgrade decisions can run immediately after an authenticated
// announce. Make the pin visible before returning; merely enqueueing a
// barrier leaves a cross-queue window where a replay can look legacy.
// The queue-specific fast path prevents self-deadlock if a future
// identity-state mutation records the capability from inside `queue`.
if DispatchQueue.getSpecific(key: queueSpecificKey) != nil {
insertAndPersist()
} else {
queue.sync(flags: .barrier, execute: insertAndPersist)
}
}
func hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
guard !fingerprint.isEmpty else { return false }
return queue.sync {
cache.privateMediaCapableFingerprints?.contains(fingerprint) == true
}
}
// MARK: - Noise-authenticated announcement identity
func bindAuthenticatedSigningPublicKey(_ signingPublicKey: Data, fingerprint: String) {
guard signingPublicKey.count == AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.signingPublicKeyLength,
!fingerprint.isEmpty else { return }
let bindAndPersist = {
var bindings = self.cache.authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint ?? [:]
let bindingChanged = bindings[fingerprint] != signingPublicKey
bindings[fingerprint] = signingPublicKey
self.cache.authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint = bindings
if var cryptoIdentity = self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] {
cryptoIdentity.signingPublicKey = signingPublicKey
self.cryptographicIdentities[fingerprint] = cryptoIdentity
}
guard bindingChanged else { return }
self.saveIdentityCache()
}
if DispatchQueue.getSpecific(key: queueSpecificKey) != nil {
bindAndPersist()
} else {
queue.sync(flags: .barrier, execute: bindAndPersist)
}
}
func authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data? {
guard !fingerprint.isEmpty else { return nil }
return queue.sync {
cache.authenticatedSigningKeysByFingerprint?[fingerprint]
}
}
func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) { func updateSocialIdentity(_ identity: SocialIdentity) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) { queue.async(flags: .barrier) {
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+1 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct NoisePayload {
// Safely get the first byte // Safely get the first byte
let firstByte = data[data.startIndex] let firstByte = data[data.startIndex]
guard let type = NoisePayloadType.decoded(rawValue: firstByte) else { guard let type = NoisePayloadType(rawValue: firstByte) else {
return nil return nil
} }
@@ -6,60 +6,14 @@
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org> // For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
// //
import BitFoundation
import Foundation import Foundation
enum NoiseSecurityConstants { enum NoiseSecurityConstants {
// Maximum message size to prevent memory exhaustion // Maximum message size to prevent memory exhaustion
static let maxMessageSize = 65535 // 64KB as per Noise spec static let maxMessageSize = 65535 // 64KB as per Noise spec
/// The extracted transport nonce (4 bytes) and Poly1305 tag (16 bytes)
/// added by `NoiseCipherState` around every transport plaintext.
static let transportCiphertextOverhead = 20
/// Private files are an explicit BitChat extension to the ordinary Noise
/// message-size ceiling. They remain bounded by the same framed-file cap
/// used by the binary and fragment decoders. Only the `.privateFile`
/// typed-payload path is allowed to use this larger budget.
private static let privateFileOuterPacketOverhead =
(BinaryProtocol.v1HeaderSize + 2) // v2 adds two length bytes
+ BinaryProtocol.senderIDSize
+ BinaryProtocol.recipientIDSize
static let maxPrivateFilePlaintextSize = FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes
- privateFileOuterPacketOverhead
- transportCiphertextOverhead
static let maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize =
maxPrivateFilePlaintextSize + transportCiphertextOverhead
// Maximum handshake message size // Maximum handshake message size
static let maxHandshakeMessageSize = 2048 // 2KB to accommodate XX pattern static let maxHandshakeMessageSize = 2048 // 2KB to accommodate XX pattern
// Noise XX message 1 contains only the initiator's 32-byte ephemeral key.
static let xxInitialMessageSize = 32
// Bounds an ordinary initiator whose message 1 or 2 is lost.
static let ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 10
// Bounds the receive-only rollback quarantine created by an unauthenticated
// inbound message 1. A lost message 3 must not strand outbound traffic.
static let ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval = 20
// A released client may immediately retry after both crossed initiators
// yielded. Give that unilateral retry a brief head start before the
// patched side spends its one bounded recovery.
static let handshakeCollisionRecoveryDelay: TimeInterval = 0.2
// Rate-limited recovery remains actionable without spinning.
static let handshakeRateLimitRecoveryDelay: TimeInterval = 60
// Covers only reordering between a winning message 3 and the losing
// crossed message 1.
static let recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: TimeInterval = 1
// After unauthenticated responder rollback, reject another attempt long
// enough that paced message 1 traffic cannot keep outbound paused. A
// legitimate peer converges through the one manager-owned local retry.
static let ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown: TimeInterval = 60
// Session timeout - sessions older than this should be renegotiated // Session timeout - sessions older than this should be renegotiated
static let sessionTimeout: TimeInterval = 86400 // 24 hours static let sessionTimeout: TimeInterval = 86400 // 24 hours
@@ -14,19 +14,6 @@ struct NoiseSecurityValidator {
static func validateMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool { static func validateMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize return data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
} }
static func validateCiphertextSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxMessageSize
+ NoiseSecurityConstants.transportCiphertextOverhead
}
static func validatePrivateFileMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFilePlaintextSize
}
static func validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
data.count <= NoiseSecurityConstants.maxPrivateFileCiphertextSize
}
/// Validate handshake message size /// Validate handshake message size
static func validateHandshakeMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool { static func validateHandshakeMessageSize(_ data: Data) -> Bool {
+1 -4
View File
@@ -66,10 +66,7 @@ class NoiseSession {
// Only initiator writes the first message // Only initiator writes the first message
if role == .initiator { if role == .initiator {
guard let handshake = handshakeState else { let message = try handshakeState!.writeMessage()
throw NoiseSessionError.invalidState
}
let message = try handshake.writeMessage()
sentHandshakeMessages.append(message) sentHandshakeMessages.append(message)
return message return message
} else { } else {
-7
View File
@@ -11,11 +11,4 @@ enum NoiseSessionError: Error, Equatable {
case notEstablished case notEstablished
case sessionNotFound case sessionNotFound
case alreadyEstablished case alreadyEstablished
case peerIdentityMismatch
}
/// The manager owns the exact attempt's one bounded recovery. Packet handling
/// must not launch its historical second, immediate restart for this failure.
struct NoiseManagedHandshakeFailure: Error {
let underlying: Error
} }
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+4 -11
View File
@@ -24,12 +24,8 @@ final class SecureNoiseSession: NoiseSession {
throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExhausted throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExhausted
} }
// Ordinary Noise messages keep the protocol ceiling. Finalized media // Validate message size
// is the sole typed-payload extension and remains under the framed-file guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(plaintext) else {
// cap enforced again at the service and file-decoder layers.
let isPrivateFile = NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: plaintext.first)
&& NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileMessageSize(plaintext)
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(plaintext) || isPrivateFile else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
} }
@@ -46,11 +42,8 @@ final class SecureNoiseSession: NoiseSession {
throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired throw NoiseSecurityError.sessionExpired
} }
// The payload type is encrypted, so a large candidate can only be // Validate message size
// bounded here; `NoiseEncryptionService.decrypt` authenticates it and guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(ciphertext) else {
// then requires the resulting type to be `.privateFile`.
guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateCiphertextSize(ciphertext)
|| NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(ciphertext) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
} }
-19
View File
@@ -700,10 +700,6 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
let content = dict["content"] as? String else { let content = dict["content"] as? String else {
throw NostrError.invalidEvent throw NostrError.invalidEvent
} }
guard Self.isWithinInboundTagLimits(tags) else {
throw NostrError.invalidEvent
}
self.id = dict["id"] as? String ?? "" self.id = dict["id"] as? String ?? ""
self.pubkey = pubkey self.pubkey = pubkey
@@ -713,21 +709,6 @@ struct NostrEvent: Codable {
self.content = content self.content = content
self.sig = dict["sig"] as? String self.sig = dict["sig"] as? String
} }
/// Bounds untrusted relay tag arrays so attackers cannot force large
/// allocations or expensive joins on the inbound hot path.
static func isWithinInboundTagLimits(_ tags: [[String]]) -> Bool {
guard tags.count <= TransportConfig.nostrMaxEventTags else { return false }
for tag in tags {
guard tag.count <= TransportConfig.nostrMaxEventTagValues else { return false }
guard tag.allSatisfy({ $0.utf8.count <= TransportConfig.nostrMaxEventTagValueBytes }) else {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func sign(with key: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey) throws -> NostrEvent { func sign(with key: P256K.Schnorr.PrivateKey) throws -> NostrEvent {
let (eventId, eventIdHash) = try calculateEventId() let (eventId, eventIdHash) = try calculateEventId()
+5 -13
View File
@@ -1480,7 +1480,7 @@ private enum ParsedInbound {
case notice(String) case notice(String)
init?(_ message: URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message) { init?(_ message: URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message) {
guard let data = message.dataWithinInboundLimit, guard let data = message.data,
let array = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [Any], let array = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: data) as? [Any],
array.count >= 2, array.count >= 2,
let type = array[0] as? String else { let type = array[0] as? String else {
@@ -1525,19 +1525,11 @@ private enum ParsedInbound {
} }
private extension URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message { private extension URLSessionWebSocketTask.Message {
/// Prefer rejecting oversized frames before UTF-8/Data materialization var data: Data? {
/// where we can (string length), and always before JSON parse.
var dataWithinInboundLimit: Data? {
let maxBytes = TransportConfig.nostrMaxInboundMessageBytes
switch self { switch self {
case .string(let text): case .string(let text): text.data(using: .utf8)
guard text.utf8.count <= maxBytes else { return nil } case .data(let data): data
return text.data(using: .utf8) @unknown default: nil
case .data(let data):
guard data.count <= maxBytes else { return nil }
return data
@unknown default:
return nil
} }
} }
} }
-25
View File
@@ -79,35 +79,12 @@ enum NoisePayloadType: UInt8 {
case groupKeyUpdate = 0x07 // Creator-signed group state (key rotation / roster update) case groupKeyUpdate = 0x07 // Creator-signed group state (key rotation / roster update)
// Live voice (push-to-talk) // Live voice (push-to-talk)
case voiceFrame = 0x08 // One live voice-burst packet (see VoiceBurstPacket) case voiceFrame = 0x08 // One live voice-burst packet (see VoiceBurstPacket)
// Finalized private media. `0x20` is the value already deployed by the
// Android client. The complete BitchatFilePacket is encrypted inside
// Noise before the outer noiseEncrypted packet is fragmented.
case privateFile = 0x20
// Versioned peer state authenticated by the surrounding Noise session.
// This is intentionally distinct from the public announce: announce
// capabilities are discovery hints, while this payload proves possession
// of the advertised Noise static key before downgrade state is pinned.
case authenticatedPeerState = 0x21
// Verification (QR-based OOB binding) // Verification (QR-based OOB binding)
case verifyChallenge = 0x10 // Verification challenge case verifyChallenge = 0x10 // Verification challenge
case verifyResponse = 0x11 // Verification response case verifyResponse = 0x11 // Verification response
// Transitive verification (web of trust) // Transitive verification (web of trust)
case vouch = 0x12 // Batch of vouch attestations case vouch = 0x12 // Batch of vouch attestations
/// #1434 briefly used 0x09 before release. Accept it while prerelease
/// builds age out, but never emit it. Decoders canonicalize both values to
/// `.privateFile` so the compatibility alias cannot leak into app logic.
static let prereleasePrivateFileRawValue: UInt8 = 0x09
static func decoded(rawValue: UInt8) -> NoisePayloadType? {
rawValue == prereleasePrivateFileRawValue ? .privateFile : Self(rawValue: rawValue)
}
static func isPrivateFile(rawValue: UInt8?) -> Bool {
guard let rawValue else { return false }
return rawValue == privateFile.rawValue || rawValue == prereleasePrivateFileRawValue
}
var description: String { var description: String {
switch self { switch self {
case .privateMessage: return "privateMessage" case .privateMessage: return "privateMessage"
@@ -116,8 +93,6 @@ enum NoisePayloadType: UInt8 {
case .groupInvite: return "groupInvite" case .groupInvite: return "groupInvite"
case .groupKeyUpdate: return "groupKeyUpdate" case .groupKeyUpdate: return "groupKeyUpdate"
case .voiceFrame: return "voiceFrame" case .voiceFrame: return "voiceFrame"
case .privateFile: return "privateFile"
case .authenticatedPeerState: return "authenticatedPeerState"
case .verifyChallenge: return "verifyChallenge" case .verifyChallenge: return "verifyChallenge"
case .verifyResponse: return "verifyResponse" case .verifyResponse: return "verifyResponse"
case .vouch: return "vouch" case .vouch: return "vouch"
-83
View File
@@ -156,89 +156,6 @@ struct AnnouncementPacket {
} }
} }
/// State that is authoritative only because it is carried inside an
/// established Noise session. The public announce remains useful for
/// discovery, but its self-signature cannot prove possession of the copied
/// Noise public key it contains.
///
/// Wire format (v1):
/// `[version=0x01][type][length][value]...`
/// - TLV `0x01`: canonical minimal little-endian `PeerCapabilities`
/// - TLV `0x02`: 32-byte Ed25519 signing public key
///
/// Unknown TLVs are skipped for forward compatibility. Unknown versions,
/// duplicates, non-canonical capability fields, and malformed lengths are
/// rejected without changing authenticated state.
struct AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket: Equatable {
static let currentVersion: UInt8 = 1
static let signingPublicKeyLength = 32
let capabilities: PeerCapabilities
let signingPublicKey: Data
private enum TLVType: UInt8 {
case capabilities = 0x01
case signingPublicKey = 0x02
}
func encode() -> Data? {
guard signingPublicKey.count == Self.signingPublicKeyLength else { return nil }
let capabilityBytes = capabilities.encoded()
guard !capabilityBytes.isEmpty, capabilityBytes.count <= 8 else { return nil }
var data = Data([Self.currentVersion])
data.append(TLVType.capabilities.rawValue)
data.append(UInt8(capabilityBytes.count))
data.append(capabilityBytes)
data.append(TLVType.signingPublicKey.rawValue)
data.append(UInt8(signingPublicKey.count))
data.append(signingPublicKey)
return data
}
static func decode(from data: Data) -> AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket? {
guard data.first == Self.currentVersion else { return nil }
var offset = 1
var capabilities: PeerCapabilities?
var signingPublicKey: Data?
while offset < data.count {
guard offset + 2 <= data.count else { return nil }
let typeRaw = data[offset]
let length = Int(data[offset + 1])
offset += 2
guard offset + length <= data.count else { return nil }
let value = Data(data[offset..<(offset + length)])
offset += length
guard let type = TLVType(rawValue: typeRaw) else {
continue
}
switch type {
case .capabilities:
guard capabilities == nil,
!value.isEmpty,
value.count <= 8 else { return nil }
let decoded = PeerCapabilities(encoded: value)
guard decoded.encoded() == value else { return nil }
capabilities = decoded
case .signingPublicKey:
guard signingPublicKey == nil,
value.count == Self.signingPublicKeyLength else { return nil }
signingPublicKey = value
}
}
guard let capabilities, let signingPublicKey else { return nil }
return AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket(
capabilities: capabilities,
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey
)
}
}
struct PrivateMessagePacket { struct PrivateMessagePacket {
let messageID: String let messageID: String
let content: String let content: String
@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@ import BitFoundation
extension PeerCapabilities { extension PeerCapabilities {
/// Capabilities this build advertises in its announce packets. /// Capabilities this build advertises in its announce packets.
/// Each feature adds its bit here when it ships. /// Each feature adds its bit here when it ships.
static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [.vouch, .prekeys, .groups, .privateMedia] static let localSupported: PeerCapabilities = [.vouch, .prekeys, .groups]
} }
+1 -14
View File
@@ -16,9 +16,6 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerEnvironment {
let now: () -> Date let now: () -> Date
/// Noise public key already recorded for the peer, if any (registry read). /// Noise public key already recorded for the peer, if any (registry read).
let existingNoisePublicKey: (PeerID) -> Data? let existingNoisePublicKey: (PeerID) -> Data?
/// Ed25519 key previously bound to this Noise identity by an authenticated
/// peer-state payload, if any (persistent identity-state read).
let authenticatedSigningPublicKey: (_ noisePublicKey: Data) -> Data?
/// Verifies the packet signature against the announced signing key. /// Verifies the packet signature against the announced signing key.
let verifySignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool let verifySignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool
/// Direct link state for the peer (BLE-queue read). /// Direct link state for the peer (BLE-queue read).
@@ -133,21 +130,11 @@ final class BLEAnnounceHandler {
hasSignature: hasSignature, hasSignature: hasSignature,
signatureValid: signatureValid, signatureValid: signatureValid,
existingNoisePublicKey: existingNoisePublicKey, existingNoisePublicKey: existingNoisePublicKey,
announcedNoisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey, announcedNoisePublicKey: announcement.noisePublicKey
authenticatedSigningPublicKey: env.authenticatedSigningPublicKey(
announcement.noisePublicKey
),
announcedSigningPublicKey: announcement.signingPublicKey
) )
if case .reject(.keyMismatch) = trustDecision { if case .reject(.keyMismatch) = trustDecision {
SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce key mismatch for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — keeping unverified", category: .security) SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Announce key mismatch for \(peerID.id.prefix(8))… — keeping unverified", category: .security)
} }
if case .reject(.authenticatedSigningKeyMismatch) = trustDecision {
SecureLogger.warning(
"⚠️ Announce signing-key replacement rejected for Noise-authenticated peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))",
category: .security
)
}
let verifiedAnnounce = trustDecision.isVerified let verifiedAnnounce = trustDecision.isVerified
var isNewPeer = false var isNewPeer = false
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ enum BLEAnnounceTrustRejection: Equatable {
case missingSignature case missingSignature
case invalidSignature case invalidSignature
case keyMismatch case keyMismatch
case authenticatedSigningKeyMismatch
} }
enum BLEAnnounceTrustDecision: Equatable { enum BLEAnnounceTrustDecision: Equatable {
@@ -73,19 +72,12 @@ enum BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy {
hasSignature: Bool, hasSignature: Bool,
signatureValid: Bool, signatureValid: Bool,
existingNoisePublicKey: Data?, existingNoisePublicKey: Data?,
announcedNoisePublicKey: Data, announcedNoisePublicKey: Data
authenticatedSigningPublicKey: Data? = nil,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data? = nil
) -> BLEAnnounceTrustDecision { ) -> BLEAnnounceTrustDecision {
if let existingNoisePublicKey, existingNoisePublicKey != announcedNoisePublicKey { if let existingNoisePublicKey, existingNoisePublicKey != announcedNoisePublicKey {
return .reject(.keyMismatch) return .reject(.keyMismatch)
} }
if let authenticatedSigningPublicKey,
announcedSigningPublicKey != authenticatedSigningPublicKey {
return .reject(.authenticatedSigningKeyMismatch)
}
guard hasSignature else { guard hasSignature else {
return .reject(.missingSignature) return .reject(.missingSignature)
} }
+61 -100
View File
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment {
let peersSnapshot: () -> [PeerID: BLEPeerInfo] let peersSnapshot: () -> [PeerID: BLEPeerInfo]
/// Verifies a packet's signature against a candidate signing key (registry path). /// Verifies a packet's signature against a candidate signing key (registry path).
let verifyPacketSignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool let verifyPacketSignature: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ signingPublicKey: Data) -> Bool
/// Local signing key used to authenticate our own gossip-sync replays.
let localSigningPublicKey: () -> Data
/// Resolves a display name from a verified packet signature for peers missing from the registry. /// Resolves a display name from a verified packet signature for peers missing from the registry.
let signedSenderDisplayName: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ peerID: PeerID) -> String? let signedSenderDisplayName: (_ packet: BitchatPacket, _ peerID: PeerID) -> String?
/// Tracks the broadcast file packet for gossip sync. /// Tracks the broadcast file packet for gossip sync.
@@ -48,105 +46,54 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
self.environment = environment self.environment = environment
} }
/// Returns `false` when the raw packet fails sender authentication (or is /// Returns `false` when the packet fails sender authentication and must
/// a live self-echo) and must not be relayed onward. Authentication runs /// not be relayed onward. Every other outcome returns `true`: files
/// before the routing decision, so a forged directed packet cannot use a /// directed to another peer are forwarded untouched, and local-only drops
/// node that is not its recipient as an unsigned forwarding hop. /// (malformed payload, quota, save failure) don't affect multi-hop
/// delivery to nodes that may handle them fine.
@discardableResult @discardableResult
func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool { func handle(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
let env = environment let env = environment
let localPeerID = env.localPeerID() if BLEFileTransferPolicy.isSelfEcho(packet: packet, from: peerID, localPeerID: env.localPeerID()) { return true }
let peersSnapshot = env.peersSnapshot()
guard let senderNickname = authenticatedRawSenderNickname( guard let deliveryPlan = BLEFileTransferPolicy.deliveryPlan(packet: packet, localPeerID: env.localPeerID()) else {
return true
}
let peersSnapshot = env.peersSnapshot()
guard let senderNickname = resolveSenderNickname(
packet: packet, packet: packet,
from: peerID, from: peerID,
isBroadcast: !deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage,
peers: peersSnapshot, peers: peersSnapshot,
env: env env: env
) else { ) else {
SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping raw file transfer with missing/invalid signature from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security) SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping file transfer from unverified or unknown peer \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .security)
return false return false
} }
if BLEFileTransferPolicy.isSelfEcho(packet: packet, from: peerID, localPeerID: localPeerID) {
return false
}
guard let deliveryPlan = BLEFileTransferPolicy.deliveryPlan(packet: packet, localPeerID: localPeerID) else {
return true
}
if deliveryPlan.shouldTrackForSync { if deliveryPlan.shouldTrackForSync {
env.trackPacketSeen(packet) env.trackPacketSeen(packet)
} }
_ = storeIncomingPayload(
packet.payload,
from: peerID,
senderNickname: senderNickname,
timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000),
isPrivate: deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage,
env: env
)
// Once authenticated, a local decode/quota/save failure is not proof
// that downstream nodes should be denied the valid signed packet.
return true
}
/// Accepts a file packet only after it has been authenticated and
/// decrypted by the peer's Noise session. The inner packet deliberately
/// has no redundant signature: Noise supplies sender authentication and
/// confidentiality, while this handler retains the same validation,
/// quota, persistence, and UI-delivery behavior as public files.
@discardableResult
func handlePrivatePayload(_ payload: Data, from peerID: PeerID, timestamp: Date) -> Bool {
let env = environment
let peers = env.peersSnapshot()
let senderNickname = BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.resolveKnownPeer(
peerID: peerID,
localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
localNickname: env.localNickname(),
peers: peers,
allowConnectedUnverified: true
) ?? BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.anonymousNickname(for: peerID)
return storeIncomingPayload(
payload,
from: peerID,
senderNickname: senderNickname,
timestamp: timestamp,
isPrivate: true,
env: env
)
}
private func storeIncomingPayload(
_ payload: Data,
from peerID: PeerID,
senderNickname: String,
timestamp: Date,
isPrivate: Bool,
env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
) -> Bool {
let filePacket: BitchatFilePacket let filePacket: BitchatFilePacket
let mime: MimeType let mime: MimeType
switch BLEIncomingFileValidator.validate(payload: payload) { switch BLEIncomingFileValidator.validate(payload: packet.payload) {
case .success(let acceptance): case .success(let acceptance):
filePacket = acceptance.filePacket filePacket = acceptance.filePacket
mime = acceptance.mime mime = acceptance.mime
case .failure(.malformedPayload): case .failure(.malformedPayload):
SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decode file transfer payload", category: .session) SecureLogger.error("❌ Failed to decode file transfer payload", category: .session)
return false return true
case .failure(.payloadTooLarge(let bytes)): case .failure(.payloadTooLarge(let bytes)):
SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping file transfer exceeding size cap (\(bytes) bytes)", category: .security) SecureLogger.warning("🚫 Dropping file transfer exceeding size cap (\(bytes) bytes)", category: .security)
return false return true
case .failure(.unsupportedMime(let mimeType, let bytes)): case .failure(.unsupportedMime(let mimeType, let bytes)):
SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MIME REJECT: '\(mimeType ?? "<empty>")' not supported. Size=\(bytes)b from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security) SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MIME REJECT: '\(mimeType ?? "<empty>")' not supported. Size=\(bytes)b from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security)
return false return true
case .failure(.magicMismatch(let mime, let bytes, let prefixHex)): case .failure(.magicMismatch(let mime, let bytes, let prefixHex)):
SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MAGIC REJECT: MIME='\(mime)' size=\(bytes)b prefix=[\(prefixHex)] from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security) SecureLogger.warning("🚫 MAGIC REJECT: MIME='\(mime)' size=\(bytes)b prefix=[\(prefixHex)] from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))...", category: .security)
return false return true
} }
// BCH-01-002: Enforce storage quota before saving // BCH-01-002: Enforce storage quota before saving
@@ -159,27 +106,28 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
mime.defaultExtension, mime.defaultExtension,
mime.category.rawValue mime.category.rawValue
) else { ) else {
return false return true
} }
if isPrivate { if deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage {
env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID) env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
} }
let ts = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000)
let message = BitchatMessage( let message = BitchatMessage(
sender: senderNickname, sender: senderNickname,
content: "\(mime.category.messagePrefix)\(destination.lastPathComponent)", content: "\(mime.category.messagePrefix)\(destination.lastPathComponent)",
timestamp: timestamp, timestamp: ts,
isRelay: false, isRelay: false,
originalSender: nil, originalSender: nil,
isPrivate: isPrivate, isPrivate: deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage,
recipientNickname: nil, recipientNickname: nil,
senderPeerID: peerID, senderPeerID: peerID,
// Received messages need an explicit status: BitchatMessage // Received messages need an explicit status: BitchatMessage
// defaults private messages to .sending, which the media views // defaults private messages to .sending, which the media views
// render as an in-flight send (empty reveal mask, disabled tap). // render as an in-flight send (empty reveal mask, disabled tap).
deliveryStatus: isPrivate deliveryStatus: deliveryPlan.isPrivateMessage
? .delivered(to: env.localNickname(), at: timestamp) ? .delivered(to: env.localNickname(), at: ts)
: nil : nil
) )
@@ -189,38 +137,51 @@ final class BLEFileTransferHandler {
return true return true
} }
/// Every remaining raw file transfer is signed, regardless of whether it /// Resolves the authenticated display name for a file transfer's sender.
/// is broadcast, addressed to us, or merely passing through. Registry ///
/// signing keys are preferred; persisted identities cover peers that have /// Directed (private) transfers are addressed to us specifically and keep
/// rotated or are not currently present in the registry. /// the lenient connected-peer path. Broadcast transfers carry an
private func authenticatedRawSenderNickname( /// attacker-controllable `senderID` exactly like public messages and public
/// voice frames registry membership alone is NOT proof of identity, so a
/// valid packet signature from the claimed sender is required before we
/// trust it. Without this, a peer that observed a public voice burst could
/// spoof a broadcast `voice_<burstID>.m4a` note under the talker's ID and
/// overwrite the signature-verified live bubble with attacker audio.
private func resolveSenderNickname(
packet: BitchatPacket, packet: BitchatPacket,
from peerID: PeerID, from peerID: PeerID,
isBroadcast: Bool,
peers: [PeerID: BLEPeerInfo], peers: [PeerID: BLEPeerInfo],
env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment env: BLEFileTransferHandlerEnvironment
) -> String? { ) -> String? {
guard packet.signature != nil else { return nil } guard isBroadcast else {
return BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.resolveKnownPeer(
peerID: peerID,
localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
localNickname: env.localNickname(),
peers: peers,
allowConnectedUnverified: true
) ?? env.signedSenderDisplayName(packet, peerID)
}
let localPeerID = env.localPeerID() // Our own broadcasts replayed back via gossip sync (ttl==0) are
let candidateKey = peerID == localPeerID // trivially authentic and cannot be verified against the peer registry
? env.localSigningPublicKey() // or identity cache, so exempt self exactly as `BLEPublicMessageHandler`
: peers[peerID]?.signingPublicKey // does. Verify against the signing key already in the
let verifiedWithKnownKey = candidateKey.map { // (synchronously-updated) registry first, then fall back to the
env.verifyPacketSignature(packet, $0) // persisted-identity signature lookup for peers not yet cached there.
} ?? false let isSelf = peerID == env.localPeerID()
let signedDisplayName = verifiedWithKnownKey let registrySigningKey = peers[peerID]?.signingPublicKey
? nil let verifiedViaRegistry = !isSelf && (registrySigningKey.map { env.verifyPacketSignature(packet, $0) } ?? false)
: env.signedSenderDisplayName(packet, peerID) let signedDisplayName = (isSelf || verifiedViaRegistry) ? nil : env.signedSenderDisplayName(packet, peerID)
guard verifiedWithKnownKey || signedDisplayName != nil else { return nil } guard isSelf || verifiedViaRegistry || signedDisplayName != nil else { return nil }
return BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.resolveKnownPeer( return BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.resolveKnownPeer(
peerID: peerID, peerID: peerID,
localPeerID: localPeerID, localPeerID: env.localPeerID(),
localNickname: env.localNickname(), localNickname: env.localNickname(),
peers: peers, peers: peers,
// The packet signature authenticates the announced peer; the old allowConnectedUnverified: false
// connected-but-unsigned leniency is not involved. ) ?? signedDisplayName
allowConnectedUnverified: true
) ?? signedDisplayName ?? BLEPeerSenderDisplayName.anonymousNickname(for: peerID)
} }
} }
@@ -201,11 +201,8 @@ struct BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer {
} }
private static func assemblyLimit(for originalType: UInt8) -> Int { private static func assemblyLimit(for originalType: UInt8) -> Int {
if originalType == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue if originalType == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue {
|| originalType == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue {
// Allow headroom for TLV metadata and binary framing overhead. // Allow headroom for TLV metadata and binary framing overhead.
// A large noiseEncrypted packet can be an E2E-encrypted private
// file; its authenticated plaintext is validated after decrypt.
return FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes return FileTransferLimits.maxFramedFileBytes
} }
+5 -230
View File
@@ -2,124 +2,8 @@ import BitLogger
import BitFoundation import BitFoundation
import Foundation import Foundation
struct PanicRecoveryIntent {
let fileMarkerEstablished: Bool
let externalMarkerEstablished: Bool
var hasDurableMarker: Bool {
fileMarkerEstablished || externalMarkerEstablished
}
}
/// Small, dependency-injectable transaction surface used by ChatViewModel.
/// Production persists the same intent in two independent locations before
/// any application state is erased. Tests can inject an ephemeral operation
/// set without touching the developer's Application Support directory.
struct PanicRecoveryOperations {
let isPending: () throws -> Bool
let begin: () -> PanicRecoveryIntent
let wipeMedia: (PanicRecoveryIntent) throws -> Void
let complete: () throws -> Void
static func ephemeral(
wipeMedia: @escaping () throws -> Void = {}
) -> PanicRecoveryOperations {
PanicRecoveryOperations(
isPending: { false },
begin: {
PanicRecoveryIntent(
fileMarkerEstablished: false,
externalMarkerEstablished: false
)
},
wipeMedia: { _ in try wipeMedia() },
complete: {}
)
}
static func live(
fileStore: BLEIncomingFileStore = BLEIncomingFileStore(),
defaults: UserDefaults = .standard
) -> PanicRecoveryOperations {
let defaultsKey = "bitchat.panicResetPending"
return PanicRecoveryOperations(
isPending: {
if defaults.bool(forKey: defaultsKey) {
return true
}
return try fileStore.isPanicRecoveryPending()
},
begin: {
defaults.set(true, forKey: defaultsKey)
let externalMarkerEstablished =
defaults.synchronize()
&& defaults.bool(forKey: defaultsKey)
let fileMarkerEstablished: Bool
do {
try fileStore.markPanicRecoveryPending()
fileMarkerEstablished = true
} catch {
fileMarkerEstablished = false
SecureLogger.error(
"Failed to persist file panic-recovery marker: \(error)",
category: .security
)
}
return PanicRecoveryIntent(
fileMarkerEstablished: fileMarkerEstablished,
externalMarkerEstablished: externalMarkerEstablished
)
},
wipeMedia: { intent in
try fileStore.panicWipe(
hasDurablePendingMarker: intent.hasDurableMarker
)
},
complete: {
// Keep the independent defaults latch until the file marker
// has definitely cleared. Any failure therefore remains
// visible to the next launch.
try fileStore.completePanicRecovery()
defaults.removeObject(forKey: defaultsKey)
guard defaults.synchronize(),
!defaults.bool(forKey: defaultsKey) else {
throw BLEIncomingFileStore.PanicRecoveryError
.externalMarkerCommitFailed
}
}
)
}
}
struct BLEIncomingFileStore { struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
enum PanicRecoveryError: Error {
case externalMarkerCommitFailed
case markerWriteFailed(Error)
case markerWriteAndMediaWipeFailed(
markerError: Error,
mediaError: Error
)
}
private static let quotaBytes: Int64 = 100 * 1024 * 1024 private static let quotaBytes: Int64 = 100 * 1024 * 1024
/// Kept outside `files/` so deleting the media tree cannot erase the
/// fail-closed startup decision before the full panic has committed.
private static let panicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName =
".panic-recovery-pending"
/// Compatibility with a short-lived development build that used the
/// media-specific name for the same full-transaction latch.
private static let legacyPanicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName =
".panic-media-wipe-pending"
private static let mediaSubdirectories = [
"voicenotes/incoming",
"voicenotes/outgoing",
"images/incoming",
"images/outgoing",
"files/incoming",
"files/outgoing"
]
/// Name prefix of in-flight live voice captures (progressively written by /// Name prefix of in-flight live voice captures (progressively written by
/// `ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator`). Quota eviction skips them by pattern /// `ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator`). Quota eviction skips them by pattern
@@ -133,96 +17,11 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
let fileManager: FileManager let fileManager: FileManager
private let baseDirectory: URL? private let baseDirectory: URL?
private let dateProvider: () -> Date private let dateProvider: () -> Date
private let panicMarkerWriter: (Data, URL) throws -> Void
init( init(fileManager: FileManager = .default, baseDirectory: URL? = nil, dateProvider: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init) {
fileManager: FileManager = .default,
baseDirectory: URL? = nil,
dateProvider: @escaping () -> Date = Date.init,
panicMarkerWriter: @escaping (Data, URL) throws -> Void = {
try $0.write(to: $1, options: .atomic)
}
) {
self.fileManager = fileManager self.fileManager = fileManager
self.baseDirectory = baseDirectory self.baseDirectory = baseDirectory
self.dateProvider = dateProvider self.dateProvider = dateProvider
self.panicMarkerWriter = panicMarkerWriter
}
/// Panic-wipe every managed incoming and outgoing media artifact before
/// returning. Recreating the directory tree keeps later capture/receive
/// paths usable without allowing a detached cleanup task to race them.
///
/// Marker persistence and deletion are deliberately separate error
/// domains: even when both durable marker channels fail, deletion is
/// still attempted before this method reports the marker failure.
func panicWipe(
hasDurablePendingMarker: Bool = false
) throws {
let markerError: Error?
do {
try markPanicRecoveryPending()
markerError = nil
} catch {
markerError = error
SecureLogger.error(
"Could not persist file panic-recovery marker; attempting media deletion anyway: \(error)",
category: .security
)
}
do {
let filesDirectory = try rootDirectory()
.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
if fileManager.fileExists(atPath: filesDirectory.path) {
try fileManager.removeItem(at: filesDirectory)
}
for subdirectory in Self.mediaSubdirectories {
try fileManager.createDirectory(
at: filesDirectory.appendingPathComponent(
subdirectory,
isDirectory: true
),
withIntermediateDirectories: true,
attributes: nil
)
}
} catch {
if let markerError {
throw PanicRecoveryError.markerWriteAndMediaWipeFailed(
markerError: markerError,
mediaError: error
)
}
throw error
}
if let markerError, !hasDurablePendingMarker {
throw PanicRecoveryError.markerWriteFailed(markerError)
}
}
func markPanicRecoveryPending() throws {
let markerURL = try panicRecoveryPendingMarkerURL()
try fileManager.createDirectory(
at: markerURL.deletingLastPathComponent(),
withIntermediateDirectories: true,
attributes: nil
)
try panicMarkerWriter(Data([1]), markerURL)
}
func isPanicRecoveryPending() throws -> Bool {
try panicRecoveryMarkerURLs().contains {
fileManager.fileExists(atPath: $0.path)
}
}
func completePanicRecovery() throws {
for markerURL in try panicRecoveryMarkerURLs()
where fileManager.fileExists(atPath: markerURL.path) {
try fileManager.removeItem(at: markerURL)
}
} }
/// Resolves (and creates) an incoming-media directory for callers that /// Resolves (and creates) an incoming-media directory for callers that
@@ -314,39 +113,15 @@ struct BLEIncomingFileStore {
} }
private func filesDirectory() throws -> URL { private func filesDirectory() throws -> URL {
let filesDir = try rootDirectory().appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true) let root = try baseDirectory ?? fileManager.url(
try fileManager.createDirectory(at: filesDir, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
return filesDir
}
private func rootDirectory() throws -> URL {
try baseDirectory ?? fileManager.url(
for: .applicationSupportDirectory, for: .applicationSupportDirectory,
in: .userDomainMask, in: .userDomainMask,
appropriateFor: nil, appropriateFor: nil,
create: true create: true
) )
} let filesDir = root.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
try fileManager.createDirectory(at: filesDir, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
private func panicRecoveryPendingMarkerURL() throws -> URL { return filesDir
try rootDirectory().appendingPathComponent(
Self.panicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName,
isDirectory: false
)
}
private func panicRecoveryMarkerURLs() throws -> [URL] {
let root = try rootDirectory()
return [
root.appendingPathComponent(
Self.panicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName,
isDirectory: false
),
root.appendingPathComponent(
Self.legacyPanicRecoveryPendingMarkerFileName,
isDirectory: false
)
]
} }
private func sanitizedFileName(_ name: String?, defaultName: String, fallbackExtension: String?) -> String { private func sanitizedFileName(_ name: String?, defaultName: String, fallbackExtension: String?) -> String {
@@ -2,11 +2,6 @@ import BitFoundation
import BitLogger import BitLogger
import Foundation import Foundation
struct BLENoiseDecryptionResult {
let plaintext: Data
let sessionGeneration: UUID
}
/// Narrow environment for `BLENoisePacketHandler`. /// Narrow environment for `BLENoisePacketHandler`.
/// ///
/// All queue hops (collections barrier writes, main-actor UI notification) /// All queue hops (collections barrier writes, main-actor UI notification)
@@ -32,16 +27,9 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerEnvironment {
/// Updates the registry last-seen timestamp for the peer (async barrier write). /// Updates the registry last-seen timestamp for the peer (async barrier write).
let updatePeerLastSeen: (PeerID) -> Void let updatePeerLastSeen: (PeerID) -> Void
/// Decrypts an encrypted payload from the peer (crypto). /// Decrypts an encrypted payload from the peer (crypto).
let decrypt: (_ payload: Data, _ peerID: PeerID) throws -> BLENoiseDecryptionResult let decrypt: (_ payload: Data, _ peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data
/// Clears the peer's Noise session after an unrecoverable decrypt failure (crypto). /// Clears the peer's Noise session after an unrecoverable decrypt failure (crypto).
let clearSession: (PeerID) -> Void let clearSession: (PeerID) -> Void
/// Consumes session-authenticated protocol state inside the transport. It
/// must never escape to UI or Nostr payload dispatch.
let handleAuthenticatedPeerState: (
_ peerID: PeerID,
_ payload: Data,
_ sessionGeneration: UUID
) -> Void
/// Delivers `.noisePayloadReceived` to the UI as one main-actor hop. /// Delivers `.noisePayloadReceived` to the UI as one main-actor hop.
let deliverNoisePayload: ( let deliverNoisePayload: (
_ peerID: PeerID, _ peerID: PeerID,
@@ -61,11 +49,7 @@ final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
self.environment = environment self.environment = environment
} }
/// Returns true when the handshake message was processed successfully. func handleHandshake(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
/// Callers use this to distinguish an authenticated reconnect completion
/// from a rejected ordinary responder while rollback state is restored.
@discardableResult
func handleHandshake(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
let env = environment let env = environment
// Use NoiseEncryptionService for handshake processing // Use NoiseEncryptionService for handshake processing
if PeerID(hexData: packet.recipientID) == env.localPeerID() { if PeerID(hexData: packet.recipientID) == env.localPeerID() {
@@ -88,31 +72,14 @@ final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
// Session establishment will trigger onPeerAuthenticated callback // Session establishment will trigger onPeerAuthenticated callback
// which will send any pending messages at the right time // which will send any pending messages at the right time
return true
} catch let managedFailure as NoiseManagedHandshakeFailure {
SecureLogger.error(
"Failed to process handshake; manager owns recovery: \(managedFailure.underlying)"
)
return false
} catch NoiseSessionError.peerIdentityMismatch {
// The responder was already discarded by the session manager.
// Do not let a spoofed claimed ID trigger a fresh outbound
// handshake or recreate state for the attacker-selected ID.
SecureLogger.warning(
"Rejected Noise handshake whose static key does not match \(peerID.id.prefix(8))",
category: .security
)
return false
} catch { } catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to process handshake: \(error)") SecureLogger.error("Failed to process handshake: \(error)")
// Try initiating a new handshake // Try initiating a new handshake
if !env.hasNoiseSession(peerID) { if !env.hasNoiseSession(peerID) {
env.initiateHandshake(peerID) env.initiateHandshake(peerID)
} }
return false
} }
} }
return false
} }
func handleEncrypted(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) { func handleEncrypted(_ packet: BitchatPacket, from peerID: PeerID) {
@@ -131,30 +98,20 @@ final class BLENoisePacketHandler {
env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID) env.updatePeerLastSeen(peerID)
do { do {
let decryption = try env.decrypt(packet.payload, peerID) let decrypted = try env.decrypt(packet.payload, peerID)
let decrypted = decryption.plaintext
guard decrypted.count > 0 else { return } guard decrypted.count > 0 else { return }
// First byte indicates the payload type // First byte indicates the payload type
let payloadType = decrypted[0] let payloadType = decrypted[0]
let payloadData = decrypted.dropFirst() let payloadData = decrypted.dropFirst()
guard let noisePayloadType = NoisePayloadType.decoded(rawValue: payloadType) else { guard let noisePayloadType = NoisePayloadType(rawValue: payloadType) else {
SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Unknown noise payload type: \(payloadType)") SecureLogger.warning("⚠️ Unknown noise payload type: \(payloadType)")
return return
} }
SecureLogger.debug("🔐 Decrypted noise payload type \(noisePayloadType.description) from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .session) SecureLogger.debug("🔐 Decrypted noise payload type \(noisePayloadType.description) from \(peerID.id.prefix(8))", category: .session)
if noisePayloadType == .authenticatedPeerState {
env.handleAuthenticatedPeerState(
peerID,
Data(payloadData),
decryption.sessionGeneration
)
return
}
let ts = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000) let ts = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: Double(packet.timestamp) / 1000)
env.deliverNoisePayload(peerID, noisePayloadType, Data(payloadData), ts) env.deliverNoisePayload(peerID, noisePayloadType, Data(payloadData), ts)
} catch NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished { } catch NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished {
@@ -17,16 +17,6 @@ enum BLENoisePayloadFactory {
typedPayload(.delivered, payload: Data(messageID.utf8)) typedPayload(.delivered, payload: Data(messageID.utf8))
} }
static func privateFile(_ filePacket: BitchatFilePacket) -> Data? {
guard let payload = filePacket.encode() else { return nil }
return typedPayload(.privateFile, payload: payload)
}
static func authenticatedPeerState(_ state: AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket) -> Data? {
guard let payload = state.encode() else { return nil }
return typedPayload(.authenticatedPeerState, payload: payload)
}
static func typedPayload(_ type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data) -> Data { static func typedPayload(_ type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data) -> Data {
var typed = Data([type.rawValue]) var typed = Data([type.rawValue])
typed.append(payload) typed.append(payload)
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
/// Bounds ordinary Noise revalidation to one attempt per physical-link epoch.
/// A live epoch may retry after the cooldown so a lost handshake cannot leave
/// the link permanently unauthenticated.
struct BLENoiseReconnectPolicy {
static let minimumRetryInterval: TimeInterval = 60
private var lastAttemptAt: [BLEIngressLinkID: Date] = [:]
mutating func shouldRevalidate(
on link: BLEIngressLinkID,
hasEstablishedSession: Bool,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: Bool,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: Bool,
now: Date
) -> Bool {
guard hasEstablishedSession,
!isNoiseAuthenticatedLink,
!hasAuthenticatedPeerLink else {
return false
}
if let previous = lastAttemptAt[link],
now.timeIntervalSince(previous) < Self.minimumRetryInterval {
return false
}
lastAttemptAt[link] = now
return true
}
/// Link identifiers can be stable across CoreBluetooth reconnects, so a
/// disconnect explicitly starts a new epoch and permits one fresh attempt.
mutating func endLinkEpoch(_ link: BLEIngressLinkID) {
lastAttemptAt.removeValue(forKey: link)
}
mutating func removeAll() {
lastAttemptAt.removeAll()
}
}
@@ -6,16 +6,9 @@ struct BLEPendingPrivateMessage: Equatable {
let messageID: String let messageID: String
} }
struct BLEPendingTypedPayload: Equatable {
let payload: Data
/// Present for app-initiated media so handshake queuing preserves the
/// fragment scheduler's progress/cancellation identity.
let transferId: String?
}
struct BLENoiseSessionQueues { struct BLENoiseSessionQueues {
private var privateMessagesByPeerID: [PeerID: [BLEPendingPrivateMessage]] = [:] private var privateMessagesByPeerID: [PeerID: [BLEPendingPrivateMessage]] = [:]
private var typedPayloadsByPeerID: [PeerID: [BLEPendingTypedPayload]] = [:] private var typedPayloadsByPeerID: [PeerID: [Data]] = [:]
var isEmpty: Bool { var isEmpty: Bool {
privateMessagesByPeerID.isEmpty && typedPayloadsByPeerID.isEmpty privateMessagesByPeerID.isEmpty && typedPayloadsByPeerID.isEmpty
@@ -41,35 +34,13 @@ struct BLENoiseSessionQueues {
privateMessagesByPeerID[peerID, default: []].insert(contentsOf: messages, at: 0) privateMessagesByPeerID[peerID, default: []].insert(contentsOf: messages, at: 0)
} }
mutating func appendTypedPayload(_ payload: Data, transferId: String? = nil, for peerID: PeerID) { mutating func appendTypedPayload(_ payload: Data, for peerID: PeerID) {
typedPayloadsByPeerID[peerID, default: []].append( typedPayloadsByPeerID[peerID, default: []].append(payload)
BLEPendingTypedPayload(payload: payload, transferId: transferId)
)
} }
mutating func takeTypedPayloads(for peerID: PeerID) -> [BLEPendingTypedPayload] { mutating func takeTypedPayloads(for peerID: PeerID) -> [Data] {
let payloads = typedPayloadsByPeerID[peerID] ?? [] let payloads = typedPayloadsByPeerID[peerID] ?? []
typedPayloadsByPeerID.removeValue(forKey: peerID) typedPayloadsByPeerID.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
return payloads return payloads
} }
func containsTypedPayload(transferId: String) -> Bool {
typedPayloadsByPeerID.values.contains { payloads in
payloads.contains { $0.transferId == transferId }
}
}
@discardableResult
mutating func removeTypedPayload(transferId: String) -> Bool {
for peerID in Array(typedPayloadsByPeerID.keys) {
guard var payloads = typedPayloadsByPeerID[peerID],
let index = payloads.firstIndex(where: { $0.transferId == transferId }) else {
continue
}
payloads.remove(at: index)
typedPayloadsByPeerID[peerID] = payloads.isEmpty ? nil : payloads
return true
}
return false
}
} }
@@ -17,9 +17,6 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentPlan {
} }
enum BLEOutboundFragmentPlanner { enum BLEOutboundFragmentPlanner {
/// Current Android receivers reject fragment sets above 256. Private
/// media v1 treats that deployed ceiling as a cross-platform contract.
static let privateMediaV1MaxFragments = 256
private static let minimumChunkSize = 64 private static let minimumChunkSize = 64
private static let fragmentIDLength = 8 private static let fragmentIDLength = 8
@@ -74,10 +71,6 @@ enum BLEOutboundFragmentPlanner {
) )
} }
static func isPrivateMediaV1Compatible(_ plan: BLEOutboundFragmentPlan) -> Bool {
plan.totalFragments <= privateMediaV1MaxFragments
}
private static func sizingPolicy( private static func sizingPolicy(
for packet: BitchatPacket, for packet: BitchatPacket,
requestedMaxChunk: Int?, requestedMaxChunk: Int?,
@@ -29,9 +29,8 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest {
} }
var resolvedTransferId: String? { var resolvedTransferId: String? {
if let transferId { return transferId }
guard packet.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue else { return nil } guard packet.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue else { return nil }
return packet.payload.sha256Hex() return transferId ?? packet.payload.sha256Hex()
} }
/// Content identity independent of the caller-chosen transfer ID: the /// Content identity independent of the caller-chosen transfer ID: the
+2 -18
View File
@@ -10,9 +10,6 @@ struct BLEPeerInfo: Equatable {
var isVerifiedNickname: Bool var isVerifiedNickname: Bool
var lastSeen: Date var lastSeen: Date
var capabilities: PeerCapabilities = [] var capabilities: PeerCapabilities = []
/// Distinguishes an old client that omitted the capabilities TLV from a
/// modern client that explicitly advertised a set without a given bit.
var capabilitiesWereExplicitlyAdvertised: Bool = false
/// Rendezvous cell from the peer's announce when it advertises `.bridge`. /// Rendezvous cell from the peer's announce when it advertises `.bridge`.
var bridgeGeohash: String? var bridgeGeohash: String?
} }
@@ -117,10 +114,6 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
peers[peerID.toShort()]?.capabilities ?? [] peers[peerID.toShort()]?.capabilities ?? []
} }
func capabilitiesWereExplicitlyAdvertised(for peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
peers[peerID.toShort()]?.capabilitiesWereExplicitlyAdvertised == true
}
/// Peers whose last verified announce advertised the given capability. /// Peers whose last verified announce advertised the given capability.
func peers(advertising capability: PeerCapabilities) -> [PeerID] { func peers(advertising capability: PeerCapabilities) -> [PeerID] {
peers.values.filter { $0.capabilities.contains(capability) }.map(\.peerID) peers.values.filter { $0.capabilities.contains(capability) }.map(\.peerID)
@@ -181,14 +174,6 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
peers[peerID] = peer peers[peerID] = peer
} }
/// Replaces the announcement signing key only after the surrounding Noise
/// session proved possession of this peer's static key.
mutating func bindAuthenticatedSigningPublicKey(_ key: Data, for peerID: PeerID) {
guard var peer = peers[peerID.toShort()] else { return }
peer.signingPublicKey = key
peers[peer.peerID] = peer
}
mutating func upsertVerifiedAnnounce( mutating func upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: PeerID, peerID: PeerID,
nickname: String, nickname: String,
@@ -196,7 +181,7 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
signingPublicKey: Data?, signingPublicKey: Data?,
isConnected: Bool, isConnected: Bool,
now: Date, now: Date,
capabilities: PeerCapabilities? = nil, capabilities: PeerCapabilities = [],
bridgeGeohash: String? = nil bridgeGeohash: String? = nil
) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate { ) -> BLEPeerAnnounceUpdate {
let existing = peers[peerID] let existing = peers[peerID]
@@ -214,8 +199,7 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistry {
signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey, signingPublicKey: signingPublicKey,
isVerifiedNickname: true, isVerifiedNickname: true,
lastSeen: now, lastSeen: now,
capabilities: capabilities ?? [], capabilities: capabilities,
capabilitiesWereExplicitlyAdvertised: capabilities != nil,
bridgeGeohash: bridgeGeohash bridgeGeohash: bridgeGeohash
) )
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+8 -56
View File
@@ -45,9 +45,6 @@ final class GeohashPresenceService: ObservableObject {
private var subscriptions = Set<AnyCancellable>() private var subscriptions = Set<AnyCancellable>()
private var heartbeatTimer: GeohashPresenceTimerProtocol? private var heartbeatTimer: GeohashPresenceTimerProtocol?
private var pendingBroadcastTasks: [UUID: Task<Void, Never>] = [:]
private var heartbeatGeneration: UInt64 = 0
private var started = false
private let availableChannelsProvider: () -> [GeohashChannel] private let availableChannelsProvider: () -> [GeohashChannel]
private let locationChanges: AnyPublisher<[GeohashChannel], Never> private let locationChanges: AnyPublisher<[GeohashChannel], Never>
private let torReadyPublisher: AnyPublisher<Void, Never> private let torReadyPublisher: AnyPublisher<Void, Never>
@@ -150,25 +147,10 @@ final class GeohashPresenceService: ObservableObject {
/// Start the service (safe to call multiple times) /// Start the service (safe to call multiple times)
func start() { func start() {
guard !started else { return }
started = true
heartbeatGeneration &+= 1
SecureLogger.info("Presence: service starting...", category: .session) SecureLogger.info("Presence: service starting...", category: .session)
scheduleNextHeartbeat() scheduleNextHeartbeat()
} }
/// Stops the timer and every decorrelation task synchronously at the panic
/// boundary. Generation checks also protect against custom sleepers that
/// ignore task cancellation and return later.
func stopForPanic() {
started = false
heartbeatGeneration &+= 1
heartbeatTimer?.invalidate()
heartbeatTimer = nil
pendingBroadcastTasks.values.forEach { $0.cancel() }
pendingBroadcastTasks.removeAll(keepingCapacity: false)
}
private func setupObservers() { private func setupObservers() {
// Monitor location channel changes // Monitor location channel changes
locationChanges locationChanges
@@ -187,26 +169,20 @@ final class GeohashPresenceService: ObservableObject {
} }
func handleLocationChange() { func handleLocationChange() {
guard started else { return }
// When location changes, we trigger an immediate (but slightly delayed) heartbeat // When location changes, we trigger an immediate (but slightly delayed) heartbeat
// to announce presence in the new zone, then reset the loop. // to announce presence in the new zone, then reset the loop.
SecureLogger.debug("Presence: location changed, scheduling update", category: .session) SecureLogger.debug("Presence: location changed, scheduling update", category: .session)
heartbeatTimer?.invalidate() heartbeatTimer?.invalidate()
// Small delay to allow location state to settle // Small delay to allow location state to settle
let generation = heartbeatGeneration
heartbeatTimer = scheduleTimer(5.0) { [weak self] in heartbeatTimer = scheduleTimer(5.0) { [weak self] in
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
guard let self, self?.performHeartbeat()
self.started,
self.heartbeatGeneration == generation else { return }
self.performHeartbeat()
} }
} }
} }
func handleConnectivityChange() { func handleConnectivityChange() {
guard started else { return }
SecureLogger.debug("Presence: connectivity restored, triggering heartbeat", category: .session) SecureLogger.debug("Presence: connectivity restored, triggering heartbeat", category: .session)
// If we were waiting for network, do it now // If we were waiting for network, do it now
if heartbeatTimer == nil || !heartbeatTimer!.isValid { if heartbeatTimer == nil || !heartbeatTimer!.isValid {
@@ -215,29 +191,18 @@ final class GeohashPresenceService: ObservableObject {
} }
func scheduleNextHeartbeat() { func scheduleNextHeartbeat() {
guard started else { return }
heartbeatTimer?.invalidate() heartbeatTimer?.invalidate()
let interval = TimeInterval.random(in: loopMinInterval...loopMaxInterval) let interval = TimeInterval.random(in: loopMinInterval...loopMaxInterval)
let generation = heartbeatGeneration
heartbeatTimer = scheduleTimer(interval) { [weak self] in heartbeatTimer = scheduleTimer(interval) { [weak self] in
Task { @MainActor [weak self] in Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
guard let self, self?.performHeartbeat()
self.started,
self.heartbeatGeneration == generation else { return }
self.performHeartbeat()
} }
} }
} }
func performHeartbeat() { func performHeartbeat() {
guard started else { return }
let generation = heartbeatGeneration
// Always schedule next loop first ensures continuity even if this one fails/skips // Always schedule next loop first ensures continuity even if this one fails/skips
defer { defer { scheduleNextHeartbeat() }
if started, heartbeatGeneration == generation {
scheduleNextHeartbeat()
}
}
// 1. Check preconditions // 1. Check preconditions
guard torIsReady() else { guard torIsReady() else {
@@ -263,27 +228,14 @@ final class GeohashPresenceService: ObservableObject {
} }
// Launch independent task for each channel's delay // Launch independent task for each channel's delay
let taskID = UUID() Task { @MainActor in
let sleeper = self.sleeper
let delay = TimeInterval.random(
in: burstMinDelay...burstMaxDelay
)
let nanoseconds = UInt64(delay * 1_000_000_000)
let task = Task { @MainActor [weak self] in
// Random delay for decorrelation // Random delay for decorrelation
await sleeper(nanoseconds) let delay = TimeInterval.random(in: self.burstMinDelay...self.burstMaxDelay)
let nanoseconds = UInt64(delay * 1_000_000_000)
guard let self else { return } await self.sleeper(nanoseconds)
guard !Task.isCancelled,
self.started,
self.heartbeatGeneration == generation else {
self.pendingBroadcastTasks.removeValue(forKey: taskID)
return
}
self.pendingBroadcastTasks.removeValue(forKey: taskID)
self.broadcastPresence(for: channel.geohash) self.broadcastPresence(for: channel.geohash)
} }
pendingBroadcastTasks[taskID] = task
} }
} }
+13 -103
View File
@@ -11,13 +11,6 @@ import BitFoundation
import Foundation import Foundation
import Security import Security
enum KeychainInstallLifecycleAction: Equatable {
case markerPresent
case bootstrapMarker
case clearStaleKeys
case retryLater
}
final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol { final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
/// Default keychain for components that construct their own rather than /// Default keychain for components that construct their own rather than
/// having one injected. Under test this is an in-memory keychain: the /// having one injected. Under test this is an in-memory keychain: the
@@ -48,80 +41,27 @@ final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
// Use consistent service name for all keychain items // Use consistent service name for all keychain items
private let service = BitchatApp.bundleID private let service = BitchatApp.bundleID
private let appGroup = "group.\(BitchatApp.bundleID)" private let appGroup = "group.\(BitchatApp.bundleID)"
// AfterFirstUnlock, not WhenUnlocked: the mesh keeps running with the // AfterFirstUnlock, not WhenUnlocked: the mesh keeps running with the
// device locked (identity-cache saves failed with -25308 throughout // device locked (identity-cache saves failed with -25308 throughout
// locked-phone testing), and a wake-on-proximity relaunch via BLE state // locked-phone testing), and a wake-on-proximity relaunch via BLE state
// restoration must be able to read the noise keys before the user // restoration must be able to read the noise keys before the user
// unlocks. ThisDeviceOnly prevents private identities and group keys from // unlocks. Backup/sync semantics are unchanged (not ThisDeviceOnly).
// migrating through device backups onto a second device. private static let itemAccessibility = kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock
private static let itemAccessibility = kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly
init() { init() {
#if os(iOS) #if os(iOS)
reconcileInstallLifecycle()
migrateAccessibilityIfNeeded() migrateAccessibilityIfNeeded()
#endif #endif
} }
static func installLifecycleAction(
containerKnowsMarker: Bool,
markerRead: KeychainReadResult
) -> KeychainInstallLifecycleAction {
switch markerRead {
case .success:
return containerKnowsMarker ? .markerPresent : .clearStaleKeys
case .itemNotFound:
return .bootstrapMarker
case .accessDenied, .deviceLocked, .authenticationFailed, .otherError:
return .retryLater
}
}
#if os(iOS) #if os(iOS)
private static let installMarkerAccount = "install_lifecycle_marker"
private static let installMarkerDefaultsKey = "keychain.installLifecycleMarker.present"
/// Keychain items can survive app removal while the app container and its
/// UserDefaults do not. The first version carrying this marker bootstraps
/// without deleting existing users' identities. On a later reinstall, a
/// surviving keychain marker plus a missing defaults marker proves the app
/// container was replaced, so stale secrets are removed before use.
private func reconcileInstallLifecycle() {
let defaults = UserDefaults.standard
let containerKnowsMarker = defaults.bool(forKey: Self.installMarkerDefaultsKey)
let markerRead = retrieveDataWithResult(forKey: Self.installMarkerAccount)
switch Self.installLifecycleAction(
containerKnowsMarker: containerKnowsMarker,
markerRead: markerRead
) {
case .markerPresent:
defaults.set(true, forKey: Self.installMarkerDefaultsKey)
case .bootstrapMarker:
if case .success = saveDataWithResult(Data([1]), forKey: Self.installMarkerAccount) {
defaults.set(true, forKey: Self.installMarkerDefaultsKey)
}
case .clearStaleKeys:
_ = deleteAllKeychainData()
defaults.set(true, forKey: Self.installMarkerDefaultsKey)
case .retryLater:
// Do not guess that a temporarily unreadable marker is absent.
// Leaving the defaults flag unchanged lets a later construction
// retry once protected keychain data is available.
break
}
}
/// One-time upgrade of items created under WhenUnlocked. New saves get /// One-time upgrade of items created under WhenUnlocked. New saves get
/// the right class on their own (saves are delete-then-add), but the /// the right class on their own (saves are delete-then-add), but the
/// long-lived identity keys are written once and would otherwise stay /// long-lived identity keys are written once and would otherwise stay
/// unreadable while the device is locked. /// unreadable while the device is locked.
private func migrateAccessibilityIfNeeded() { private func migrateAccessibilityIfNeeded() {
let flag = "keychain.accessibility.afterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly.migrated" let flag = "keychain.accessibility.afterFirstUnlock.migrated"
guard !UserDefaults.standard.bool(forKey: flag) else { return } guard !UserDefaults.standard.bool(forKey: flag) else { return }
let query: [String: Any] = [ let query: [String: Any] = [
@@ -136,7 +76,7 @@ final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
case errSecSuccess, errSecItemNotFound: case errSecSuccess, errSecItemNotFound:
// Nothing to migrate on a fresh install; both are terminal. // Nothing to migrate on a fresh install; both are terminal.
UserDefaults.standard.set(true, forKey: flag) UserDefaults.standard.set(true, forKey: flag)
SecureLogger.info("Keychain accessibility migrated to AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly (status \(status))", category: .keychain) SecureLogger.info("Keychain accessibility migrated to AfterFirstUnlock (status \(status))", category: .keychain)
default: default:
// Likely errSecInteractionNotAllowed (relaunched while locked) // Likely errSecInteractionNotAllowed (relaunched while locked)
// leave the flag unset so the next launch retries. // leave the flag unset so the next launch retries.
@@ -551,15 +491,6 @@ final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
} }
SecureLogger.warning("Panic mode cleanup completed. Total items deleted: \(totalDeleted)", category: .keychain) SecureLogger.warning("Panic mode cleanup completed. Total items deleted: \(totalDeleted)", category: .keychain)
#if os(iOS)
// The non-secret marker is intentionally recreated after a panic so a
// later uninstall/reinstall can still be distinguished from an in-place
// upgrade. It never restores any wiped identity or relationship data.
if case .success = saveDataWithResult(Data([1]), forKey: Self.installMarkerAccount) {
UserDefaults.standard.set(true, forKey: Self.installMarkerDefaultsKey)
}
#endif
return totalDeleted > 0 return totalDeleted > 0
} }
@@ -595,39 +526,18 @@ final class KeychainManager: KeychainManagerProtocol {
/// Save data with a custom service name /// Save data with a custom service name
func save(key: String, data: Data, service customService: String, accessible: CFString?) { func save(key: String, data: Data, service customService: String, accessible: CFString?) {
let primaryKeyQuery: [String: Any] = [ var query: [String: Any] = [
kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword, kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
kSecAttrService as String: customService, kSecAttrService as String: customService,
kSecAttrAccount as String: key kSecAttrAccount as String: key,
kSecValueData as String: data
] ]
var addQuery = primaryKeyQuery if let accessible = accessible {
addQuery.merge([ query[kSecAttrAccessible as String] = accessible
kSecValueData as String: data, }
kSecAttrAccessible as String: accessible ?? Self.itemAccessibility,
kSecAttrSynchronizable as String: false
]) { _, new in new }
// Delete by the item's primary key only. Value/accessibility fields SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
// are add attributes, not valid selectors for replacing an existing SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
// item; including them can leave the old item in place and make the
// subsequent add fail as a duplicate.
let deleteStatus = SecItemDelete(primaryKeyQuery as CFDictionary)
guard deleteStatus == errSecSuccess || deleteStatus == errSecItemNotFound else {
SecureLogger.error(
NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(deleteStatus)),
context: "Unable to replace custom-service keychain item",
category: .keychain
)
return
}
let addStatus = SecItemAdd(addQuery as CFDictionary, nil)
if addStatus != errSecSuccess {
SecureLogger.error(
NSError(domain: "Keychain", code: Int(addStatus)),
context: "Unable to save custom-service keychain item",
category: .keychain
)
}
} }
/// Load data from a custom service /// Load data from a custom service
@@ -251,9 +251,9 @@ final class MessageFormattingEngine {
isSelf: Bool, isSelf: Bool,
isMentioned: Bool isMentioned: Bool
) -> AttributedString { ) -> AttributedString {
// For very long content, use plain formatting to avoid expensive // For very long content without special tokens, use plain formatting
// regex/detector work. Cashu presence must not disable this guard. let containsCashu = containsCashuToken(content)
if content.isOversizedForRichFormatting() { if (content.count > 4000 || content.hasVeryLongToken(threshold: 1024)) && !containsCashu {
return formatPlainContent(content, baseColor: baseColor, isSelf: isSelf) return formatPlainContent(content, baseColor: baseColor, isSelf: isSelf)
} }
@@ -154,19 +154,6 @@ final class NetworkActivationService: ObservableObject {
.store(in: &cancellables) .store(in: &cancellables)
} }
/// Stops all internet-facing work at the synchronous panic boundary.
/// `start()` may be called again only after the full wipe commits.
func stopForPanic() {
cancellables.removeAll()
started = false
reachabilityMonitor.stop()
activationAllowed = false
torAutoStartDesired = false
relayController.disconnect()
torController.setAutoStartAllowed(false)
applyTorState(torDesired: false)
}
func setUserTorEnabled(_ enabled: Bool) { func setUserTorEnabled(_ enabled: Bool) {
guard enabled != userTorEnabled else { return } guard enabled != userTorEnabled else { return }
userTorEnabled = enabled userTorEnabled = enabled
@@ -180,7 +167,6 @@ final class NetworkActivationService: ObservableObject {
} }
private func reevaluate() { private func reevaluate() {
guard started else { return }
let allowed = effectiveAllowed() let allowed = effectiveAllowed()
let torDesired = allowed && userTorEnabled let torDesired = allowed && userTorEnabled
let statusChanged = allowed != activationAllowed let statusChanged = allowed != activationAllowed
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ protocol NetworkReachabilityMonitoring: AnyObject {
var reachabilityPublisher: AnyPublisher<Bool, Never> { get } var reachabilityPublisher: AnyPublisher<Bool, Never> { get }
/// Begin monitoring. Idempotent. /// Begin monitoring. Idempotent.
func start() func start()
/// Stop monitoring and discard pending debounce work. Idempotent.
func stop()
} }
/// Pure debounce/decision logic for reachability, split out so it can be /// Pure debounce/decision logic for reachability, split out so it can be
@@ -100,7 +98,6 @@ final class AlwaysReachableMonitor: NetworkReachabilityMonitoring {
Empty(completeImmediately: false).eraseToAnyPublisher() Empty(completeImmediately: false).eraseToAnyPublisher()
} }
func start() {} func start() {}
func stop() {}
} }
/// `NWPathMonitor`-backed reachability. All state lives on the main actor; the /// `NWPathMonitor`-backed reachability. All state lives on the main actor; the
@@ -149,18 +146,6 @@ final class NWPathReachabilityMonitor: NetworkReachabilityMonitoring {
#endif #endif
} }
func stop() {
guard started else { return }
started = false
flushWorkItem?.cancel()
flushWorkItem = nil
#if canImport(Network)
monitor?.pathUpdateHandler = nil
monitor?.cancel()
monitor = nil
#endif
}
/// Feed an observation into the debounce and publish committed changes. /// Feed an observation into the debounce and publish committed changes.
/// Exposed internally so higher layers/tests could drive it if needed. /// Exposed internally so higher layers/tests could drive it if needed.
func ingest(reachable: Bool) { func ingest(reachable: Bool) {
+28 -260
View File
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// Peer fingerprints (SHA256 hash of static public key) // Peer fingerprints (SHA256 hash of static public key)
private var peerFingerprints: [PeerID: String] = [:] private var peerFingerprints: [PeerID: String] = [:]
private var fingerprintToPeerID: [String: PeerID] = [:] private var fingerprintToPeerID: [String: PeerID] = [:]
// Thread safety // Thread safety
private let serviceQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.service", attributes: .concurrent) private let serviceQueue = DispatchQueue(label: "chat.bitchat.noise.service", attributes: .concurrent)
@@ -182,24 +183,12 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// Callbacks // Callbacks
private var onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers: [((PeerID, String) -> Void)] = [] // Array of handlers for peer authentication private var onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers: [((PeerID, String) -> Void)] = [] // Array of handlers for peer authentication
private var onPeerAuthenticatedWithGenerationHandlers: [((PeerID, String, UUID) -> Void)] = []
var onHandshakeRequired: ((PeerID) -> Void)? // peerID needs handshake var onHandshakeRequired: ((PeerID) -> Void)? // peerID needs handshake
/// Automatic rekey prepared XX message 1. The transport must claim the
/// exact attempt at its actual BLE handoff; a crossed inbound initiation
/// can invalidate the token before that point.
var onRekeyHandshakeReady:
((_ peerID: PeerID, _ initiation: NoiseHandshakeInitiation) -> Void)?
var onHandshakeRecoveryRequired:
((_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest) -> Void)?
/// An unauthenticated reconnect attempt failed or timed out and the
/// receive-only rollback session became the active transport again.
/// Transport queues must be drained for this exact restored generation.
var onSessionRestoredWithGeneration: ((_ peerID: PeerID, _ generation: UUID) -> Void)?
// Add a handler for peer authentication // Add a handler for peer authentication
func addOnPeerAuthenticatedHandler(_ handler: @escaping (PeerID, String) -> Void) { func addOnPeerAuthenticatedHandler(_ handler: @escaping (PeerID, String) -> Void) {
serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) { serviceQueue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers.append(handler) self?.onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers.append(handler)
} }
} }
@@ -212,30 +201,8 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
} }
} }
} }
/// Generation-aware authentication notifications are used by protocols
/// whose state must be bound to one exact Noise transport session.
var onPeerAuthenticatedWithGeneration: ((PeerID, String, UUID) -> Void)? {
get { nil }
set {
guard let handler = newValue else { return }
serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
onPeerAuthenticatedWithGenerationHandlers.append(handler)
}
}
}
init( init(keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol) {
keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol,
ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryHandshakeTimeout,
ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout: TimeInterval =
NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: TimeInterval =
NoiseSecurityConstants.recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod,
ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown: TimeInterval =
NoiseSecurityConstants.ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown
) {
self.keychain = keychain self.keychain = keychain
self.localPrekeys = LocalPrekeyStore(keychain: keychain) self.localPrekeys = LocalPrekeyStore(keychain: keychain)
@@ -325,31 +292,11 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
self.signingPublicKey = signingKey.publicKey self.signingPublicKey = signingKey.publicKey
// Initialize session manager // Initialize session manager
self.sessionManager = NoiseSessionManager( self.sessionManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: staticIdentityKey, keychain: keychain)
localStaticKey: staticIdentityKey,
keychain: keychain,
ordinaryHandshakeTimeout: ordinaryHandshakeTimeout,
ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout:
ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod:
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod,
ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown:
ordinaryReconnectRollbackCooldown
)
// Set up session callbacks // Set up session callbacks
sessionManager.onSessionEstablished = { [weak self] peerID, remoteStaticKey, generation in sessionManager.onSessionEstablished = { [weak self] peerID, remoteStaticKey in
self?.handleSessionEstablished( self?.handleSessionEstablished(peerID: peerID, remoteStaticKey: remoteStaticKey)
peerID: peerID,
remoteStaticKey: remoteStaticKey,
sessionGeneration: generation
)
}
sessionManager.onSessionRestored = { [weak self] peerID, generation in
self?.onSessionRestoredWithGeneration?(peerID, generation)
}
sessionManager.onHandshakeRecoveryRequired = { [weak self] request in
self?.onHandshakeRecoveryRequired?(request)
} }
// Start session maintenance timer // Start session maintenance timer
@@ -714,90 +661,6 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
let handshakeData = try sessionManager.initiateHandshake(with: peerID) let handshakeData = try sessionManager.initiateHandshake(with: peerID)
return handshakeData return handshakeData
} }
/// Atomically admits and prepares one initial ordinary handshake. Returns
/// nil when another discovery callback already created a session.
func initiateHandshakeIfNeeded(
with peerID: PeerID,
retryOnTimeout: Bool = false
) throws -> NoiseHandshakeInitiation? {
guard peerID.isValid else {
SecureLogger.warning(.authenticationFailed(peerID: peerID.id))
throw NoiseSecurityError.invalidPeerID
}
guard let initiation = try sessionManager.initiateHandshakeIfAbsent(
with: peerID,
notifyOnTimeout: retryOnTimeout,
authorize: { [rateLimiter] in
guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: peerID) else {
SecureLogger.warning(
.authenticationFailed(peerID: "Rate limited: \(peerID)")
)
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
}
) else {
return nil
}
SecureLogger.info(.handshakeStarted(peerID: peerID.id))
return initiation
}
/// Atomically prepares an ordinary reconnect for a peer whose cached
/// transport belongs to an earlier physical link. Failed authorization or
/// handshake setup preserves the established session.
func initiateReconnectHandshake(
with peerID: PeerID,
retryOnTimeout: Bool = false
) throws -> NoiseHandshakeInitiation {
guard peerID.isValid else {
SecureLogger.warning(.authenticationFailed(peerID: peerID.id))
throw NoiseSecurityError.invalidPeerID
}
return try sessionManager.initiateReconnectHandshake(
with: peerID,
notifyOnTimeout: retryOnTimeout,
authorize: { [rateLimiter] in
guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: peerID) else {
SecureLogger.warning(
.authenticationFailed(peerID: "Rate limited: \(peerID)")
)
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
}
)
}
func prepareHandshakeRecovery(
_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest
) throws -> NoiseHandshakeRecoveryPreparation? {
try sessionManager.prepareHandshakeRecovery(
request,
authorizeAttempt: { [rateLimiter] in
guard rateLimiter.allowHandshake(from: request.peerID) else {
SecureLogger.warning(
.authenticationFailed(
peerID: "Rate limited: \(request.peerID)"
)
)
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
}
)
}
func cancelHandshakeRecovery(_ request: NoiseHandshakeRecoveryRequest) {
sessionManager.cancelHandshakeRecovery(request)
}
func claimHandshakeInitiation(
_ initiation: NoiseHandshakeInitiation,
for peerID: PeerID
) -> Data? {
sessionManager.claimHandshakeInitiation(initiation, for: peerID)
}
/// Process an incoming handshake message /// Process an incoming handshake message
func processHandshakeMessage(from peerID: PeerID, message: Data) throws -> Data? { func processHandshakeMessage(from peerID: PeerID, message: Data) throws -> Data? {
@@ -822,10 +685,7 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// For handshakes, we process the raw data directly without NoiseMessage wrapper // For handshakes, we process the raw data directly without NoiseMessage wrapper
// The Noise protocol handles its own message format // The Noise protocol handles its own message format
let responsePayload = try sessionManager.handleIncomingHandshake( let responsePayload = try sessionManager.handleIncomingHandshake(from: peerID, message: message)
from: peerID,
message: message
)
// Return raw response without wrapper // Return raw response without wrapper
@@ -865,56 +725,11 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
return try sessionManager.encrypt(data, for: peerID) return try sessionManager.encrypt(data, for: peerID)
} }
/// Encrypts a finalized private-media packet. Ordinary Noise application
/// messages retain the 64 KiB ceiling; this purpose-specific path permits
/// the bounded `BitchatFilePacket` envelope and refuses every other typed
/// payload so the larger allocation budget cannot become a generic bypass.
func encryptPrivateFilePayload(
_ data: Data,
for peerID: PeerID,
sessionGeneration: UUID? = nil
) throws -> Data {
guard NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: data.first),
NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileMessageSize(data) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
guard rateLimiter.allowMessage(from: peerID) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
}
guard hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID) else {
onHandshakeRequired?(peerID)
throw NoiseEncryptionError.handshakeRequired
}
// `maxPrivateFilePlaintextSize` already subtracts the cipher's fixed
// nonce/tag overhead, so the result is bounded without a second copy.
if let sessionGeneration {
return try sessionManager.encrypt(
data,
for: peerID,
expectedSessionGeneration: sessionGeneration
)
}
return try sessionManager.encrypt(data, for: peerID)
}
/// Decrypt data from a specific peer /// Decrypt data from a specific peer
func decrypt(_ data: Data, from peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data { func decrypt(_ data: Data, from peerID: PeerID) throws -> Data {
try decryptWithSessionGeneration(data, from: peerID).plaintext // Validate message size
} guard NoiseSecurityValidator.validateMessageSize(data) else {
func decryptWithSessionGeneration(
_ data: Data,
from peerID: PeerID
) throws -> (plaintext: Data, sessionGeneration: UUID) {
// Standard transport ciphertext has 20 bytes of nonce/tag overhead.
// A larger candidate is admitted only up to the framed-file ceiling;
// after authenticated decryption it must prove it is `.privateFile`.
let isStandardCiphertext = NoiseSecurityValidator.validateCiphertextSize(data)
guard isStandardCiphertext || NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileCiphertextSize(data) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
} }
@@ -923,21 +738,12 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded throw NoiseSecurityError.rateLimitExceeded
} }
// A quarantined transport is deliberately unavailable for outbound // Check if we have an established session
// state, but remains receive-only until the responder proves identity guard hasEstablishedSession(with: peerID) else {
// or the bounded rollback restores it.
guard sessionManager.hasReceiveSession(for: peerID) else {
throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished throw NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished
} }
let result = try sessionManager.decryptWithSessionGeneration(data, from: peerID) return try sessionManager.decrypt(data, from: peerID)
if !isStandardCiphertext {
guard NoisePayloadType.isPrivateFile(rawValue: result.plaintext.first),
NoiseSecurityValidator.validatePrivateFileMessageSize(result.plaintext) else {
throw NoiseSecurityError.messageTooLarge
}
}
return result
} }
// MARK: - Peer Management // MARK: - Peer Management
@@ -949,25 +755,6 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
} }
} }
func sessionGeneration(for peerID: PeerID) -> UUID? {
sessionManager.sessionGeneration(for: peerID)
}
/// Runs `body` while holding a read lease on the exact session generation.
/// Session insertion, replacement, and removal use the same manager
/// barrier, so they cannot interleave with an authenticated-state commit.
func withCurrentSessionGeneration<Result>(
for peerID: PeerID,
expected: UUID,
_ body: () -> Result
) -> Result? {
sessionManager.withCurrentSessionGeneration(
for: peerID,
expected: expected,
body
)
}
func clearEphemeralStateForPanic() { func clearEphemeralStateForPanic() {
sessionManager.removeAllSessions() sessionManager.removeAllSessions()
serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) { serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
@@ -990,36 +777,24 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
// MARK: - Private Helpers // MARK: - Private Helpers
private func handleSessionEstablished( private func handleSessionEstablished(peerID: PeerID, remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey) {
peerID: PeerID,
remoteStaticKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey,
sessionGeneration: UUID
) {
// Calculate fingerprint // Calculate fingerprint
let fingerprint = remoteStaticKey.rawRepresentation.sha256Fingerprint() let fingerprint = remoteStaticKey.rawRepresentation.sha256Fingerprint()
// Registering handlers is synchronous, and this barrier snapshots them // Store fingerprint mapping
// with the fingerprint update. Invoke the snapshot outside the queue: serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
// parallel Swift Testing workers must not block behind queued callback
// registration or allow a handler to re-enter serviceQueue.
let handlers: (
generationAware: [(PeerID, String, UUID) -> Void],
legacy: [(PeerID, String) -> Void]
) = serviceQueue.sync(flags: .barrier) {
peerFingerprints[peerID] = fingerprint peerFingerprints[peerID] = fingerprint
fingerprintToPeerID[fingerprint] = peerID fingerprintToPeerID[fingerprint] = peerID
return (onPeerAuthenticatedWithGenerationHandlers, onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers)
} }
// Log security event // Log security event
SecureLogger.info(.handshakeCompleted(peerID: peerID.id)) SecureLogger.info(.handshakeCompleted(peerID: peerID.id))
// Notify all handlers about authentication. // Notify all handlers about authentication
handlers.generationAware.forEach { handler in serviceQueue.async { [weak self] in
handler(peerID, fingerprint, sessionGeneration) self?.onPeerAuthenticatedHandlers.forEach { handler in
} handler(peerID, fingerprint)
handlers.legacy.forEach { handler in }
handler(peerID, fingerprint)
} }
} }
@@ -1040,26 +815,19 @@ final class NoiseEncryptionService {
let sessionsNeedingRekey = sessionManager.getSessionsNeedingRekey() let sessionsNeedingRekey = sessionManager.getSessionsNeedingRekey()
for (peerID, needsRekey) in sessionsNeedingRekey where needsRekey { for (peerID, needsRekey) in sessionsNeedingRekey where needsRekey {
// Attempt to rekey the session
do { do {
try initiateAutomaticRekey(for: peerID) try sessionManager.initiateRekey(for: peerID)
SecureLogger.debug("Key rotation initiated for peer: \(peerID)", category: .security)
// Signal that handshake is needed
onHandshakeRequired?(peerID)
} catch { } catch {
SecureLogger.error(error, context: "Failed to initiate rekey for peer: \(peerID)", category: .session) SecureLogger.error(error, context: "Failed to initiate rekey for peer: \(peerID)", category: .session)
} }
} }
} }
private func initiateAutomaticRekey(for peerID: PeerID) throws {
let initiation = try sessionManager.initiateRekey(for: peerID)
SecureLogger.debug("Key rotation initiated for peer: \(peerID)", category: .security)
onRekeyHandshakeReady?(peerID, initiation)
onHandshakeRequired?(peerID)
}
#if DEBUG
func _test_initiateAutomaticRekey(for peerID: PeerID) throws {
try initiateAutomaticRekey(for: peerID)
}
#endif
deinit { deinit {
stopRekeyTimer() stopRekeyTimer()
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ final class TransferProgressManager {
case updated(id: String, sentFragments: Int, totalFragments: Int) case updated(id: String, sentFragments: Int, totalFragments: Int)
case completed(id: String, totalFragments: Int) case completed(id: String, totalFragments: Int)
case cancelled(id: String, sentFragments: Int, totalFragments: Int) case cancelled(id: String, sentFragments: Int, totalFragments: Int)
case rejected(id: String, reason: String)
} }
private let subject = PassthroughSubject<Event, Never>() private let subject = PassthroughSubject<Event, Never>()
@@ -50,17 +49,6 @@ final class TransferProgressManager {
} }
} }
/// Fails a preflight check while keeping the outgoing placeholder visible
/// with an actionable reason instead of treating policy/size rejection as
/// a user cancellation.
func rejectBeforeStart(id: String, reason: String) {
queue.async(flags: .barrier) { [weak self] in
guard let self = self else { return }
self.states.removeValue(forKey: id)
self.subject.send(.rejected(id: id, reason: reason))
}
}
func snapshot(id: String) -> (sent: Int, total: Int)? { func snapshot(id: String) -> (sent: Int, total: Int)? {
var result: (sent: Int, total: Int)? var result: (sent: Int, total: Int)?
queue.sync { queue.sync {
-44
View File
@@ -83,20 +83,6 @@ enum TransportEvent: @unchecked Sendable {
case bluetoothStateUpdated(CBManagerState) case bluetoothStateUpdated(CBManagerState)
} }
/// Downgrade-safe decision for a private-media recipient. Callers ask before
/// prompting, and BLEService checks again when it consumes any one-shot
/// legacy consent.
enum PrivateMediaSendPolicy: Equatable {
case encrypted
/// A public announce hinted at encrypted media (or a prior authenticated
/// pin exists), but this exact Noise session has not yet supplied its
/// authenticated peer-state proof. Callers wait boundedly; they must not
/// pre-queue encrypted bytes or silently select the legacy path.
case awaitingCapabilityProof
case legacyRequiresConsent
case blockedDowngrade
}
protocol TransportEventDelegate: AnyObject { protocol TransportEventDelegate: AnyObject {
@MainActor func didReceiveTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) @MainActor func didReceiveTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent)
} }
@@ -177,12 +163,6 @@ protocol Transport: AnyObject {
func sendDeliveryAck(for messageID: String, to peerID: PeerID) func sendDeliveryAck(for messageID: String, to peerID: PeerID)
func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String)
func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String) func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String)
func sendFilePrivate(
_ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
to peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
allowLegacyFallback: Bool
)
func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String) func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String)
// Live voice / push-to-talk (mesh transports only): one encoded // Live voice / push-to-talk (mesh transports only): one encoded
@@ -228,11 +208,6 @@ protocol Transport: AnyObject {
/// Capabilities the peer advertised in its last verified announce; /// Capabilities the peer advertised in its last verified announce;
/// empty for peers that predate the capabilities TLV. /// empty for peers that predate the capabilities TLV.
func peerCapabilities(_ peerID: PeerID) -> PeerCapabilities func peerCapabilities(_ peerID: PeerID) -> PeerCapabilities
func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy
func resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(
to peerID: PeerID,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
)
/// Sends an encoded vouch-attestation batch inside the Noise session. /// Sends an encoded vouch-attestation batch inside the Noise session.
func sendVouchAttestations(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) func sendVouchAttestations(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID)
/// Appends a peer-authenticated observer. Unlike /// Appends a peer-authenticated observer. Unlike
@@ -303,16 +278,6 @@ extension Transport {
func sendGroupKeyUpdate(_ statePayload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {} func sendGroupKeyUpdate(_ statePayload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {}
func broadcastGroupMessage(_ envelope: Data) {} func broadcastGroupMessage(_ envelope: Data) {}
func peerCapabilities(_ peerID: PeerID) -> PeerCapabilities { [] } func peerCapabilities(_ peerID: PeerID) -> PeerCapabilities { [] }
func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy { .blockedDowngrade }
func resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(
to peerID: PeerID,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
) {
let policy = privateMediaSendPolicy(to: peerID)
Task { @MainActor in
completion(policy == .awaitingCapabilityProof ? .blockedDowngrade : policy)
}
}
func sendVouchAttestations(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {} func sendVouchAttestations(_ payload: Data, to peerID: PeerID) {}
func addPeerAuthenticatedObserver(_ handler: @escaping (PeerID, String) -> Void) {} func addPeerAuthenticatedObserver(_ handler: @escaping (PeerID, String) -> Void) {}
func sendCourierMessage(_ content: String, messageID: String, recipientNoiseKey: Data, via couriers: [PeerID]) -> Bool { false } func sendCourierMessage(_ content: String, messageID: String, recipientNoiseKey: Data, via couriers: [PeerID]) -> Bool { false }
@@ -329,15 +294,6 @@ extension Transport {
func currentMeshTopology() -> MeshTopologySnapshot? { nil } func currentMeshTopology() -> MeshTopologySnapshot? { nil }
func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) {} func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) {}
func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String) {} func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String) {}
func sendFilePrivate(
_ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
to peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
allowLegacyFallback: Bool
) {
guard !allowLegacyFallback else { return }
sendFilePrivate(packet, to: peerID, transferId: transferId)
}
func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String) {} func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String) {}
func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String], messageID: String, timestamp: Date) { func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String], messageID: String, timestamp: Date) {
-18
View File
@@ -9,12 +9,6 @@ enum TransportConfig {
static let bleMaxInFlightAssemblies: Int = 128 // Cap concurrent fragment assemblies static let bleMaxInFlightAssemblies: Int = 128 // Cap concurrent fragment assemblies
static let bleHighDegreeThreshold: Int = 6 // For adaptive TTL/probabilistic relays static let bleHighDegreeThreshold: Int = 6 // For adaptive TTL/probabilistic relays
static let bleMaxConcurrentTransfers: Int = 2 // Limit simultaneous large media sends static let bleMaxConcurrentTransfers: Int = 2 // Limit simultaneous large media sends
// Bounded wait for the session-authenticated capability proof used by
// private-media migration. Expiry never auto-sends clear bytes; it only
// resolves to the existing one-shot consent or downgrade-blocked path.
static let privateMediaCapabilityProofTimeoutSeconds: TimeInterval = 5
static let privateMediaCapabilityProofPendingPeerCap: Int = 64
static let privateMediaCapabilityProofWaitersPerPeerCap: Int = 16
static let bleFragmentRelayMinDelayMs: Int = 8 // Faster forwarding for media fragments static let bleFragmentRelayMinDelayMs: Int = 8 // Faster forwarding for media fragments
static let bleFragmentRelayMaxDelayMs: Int = 25 // Upper jitter bound for fragment relays static let bleFragmentRelayMaxDelayMs: Int = 25 // Upper jitter bound for fragment relays
// Fragment relay TTL in sparse graphs; matches messageTTLDefault so media // Fragment relay TTL in sparse graphs; matches messageTTLDefault so media
@@ -52,7 +46,6 @@ enum TransportConfig {
static let privateChatCap: Int = 1337 static let privateChatCap: Int = 1337
static let meshTimelineCap: Int = 1337 static let meshTimelineCap: Int = 1337
static let geoTimelineCap: Int = 1337 static let geoTimelineCap: Int = 1337
static let geoNicknameParticipantsCap: Int = 1337
static let contentLRUCap: Int = 2000 static let contentLRUCap: Int = 2000
static let geoSamplingEventLRUCap: Int = 2000 static let geoSamplingEventLRUCap: Int = 2000
@@ -88,11 +81,6 @@ enum TransportConfig {
static let nostrDuplicateEventLogInterval: Int = 50 static let nostrDuplicateEventLogInterval: Int = 50
// Sample interval for per-event debug logs on the inbound hot path. // Sample interval for per-event debug logs on the inbound hot path.
static let nostrInboundEventLogInterval: Int = 100 static let nostrInboundEventLogInterval: Int = 100
// Reject oversized/untrusted relay frames before JSON parse / store.
static let nostrMaxInboundMessageBytes: Int = 256 * 1024
static let nostrMaxEventTags: Int = 64
static let nostrMaxEventTagValues: Int = 16
static let nostrMaxEventTagValueBytes: Int = 1024
// Conversation store diagnostics (field observability) // Conversation store diagnostics (field observability)
// Sample interval for the periodic store-audit "OK" heartbeat line // Sample interval for the periodic store-audit "OK" heartbeat line
@@ -110,12 +98,6 @@ enum TransportConfig {
static let uiSenderRateBucketRefillPerSec: Double = 1.0 static let uiSenderRateBucketRefillPerSec: Double = 1.0
static let uiContentRateBucketCapacity: Double = 3 static let uiContentRateBucketCapacity: Double = 3
static let uiContentRateBucketRefillPerSec: Double = 0.5 static let uiContentRateBucketRefillPerSec: Double = 0.5
// Bound attacker-keyed bucket maps (sender IDs / content digests).
static let uiSenderRateBucketMaxEntries: Int = 2000
static let uiContentRateBucketMaxEntries: Int = 2000
static let uiRateBucketIdleTTL: TimeInterval = 10 * 60
// Cap teleported-participant markers so remote events cannot grow the set.
static let geoTeleportedParticipantsCap: Int = 1337
// UI sleeps/delays // UI sleeps/delays
static let uiStartupInitialDelaySeconds: TimeInterval = 1.0 static let uiStartupInitialDelaySeconds: TimeInterval = 1.0
-40
View File
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
import Foundation
/// In-app override for the UI language, on top of the system per-app
/// language. Apple resolves localization from the AppleLanguages default at
/// process start, so a new choice takes effect on the next launch callers
/// surface a "restart to apply" note after changing it.
enum AppLanguageSettings {
/// "" means no override: follow the device (or per-app system) language.
static let overrideKey = "app.languageOverride"
private static let appleLanguagesKey = "AppleLanguages"
/// Language codes the app ships translations for, straight from the
/// built bundle so this never drifts from the string catalog.
static var availableLanguages: [String] {
Bundle.main.localizations
.filter { $0 != "Base" }
.sorted { endonym(for: $0).localizedCaseInsensitiveCompare(endonym(for: $1)) == .orderedAscending }
}
/// The language's name in that language ("فارسی", "") so every user
/// can find their own entry regardless of the current UI language.
static func endonym(for code: String) -> String {
let locale = Locale(identifier: code)
let name = locale.localizedString(forIdentifier: code) ?? code
return name.lowercased(with: locale)
}
/// Persists the override (nil clears it). AppleLanguages drives the
/// actual localization lookup on next launch.
static func setOverride(_ code: String?) {
let defaults = UserDefaults.standard
if let code, !code.isEmpty {
defaults.set(code, forKey: overrideKey)
defaults.set([code], forKey: appleLanguagesKey)
} else {
defaults.removeObject(forKey: overrideKey)
defaults.removeObject(forKey: appleLanguagesKey)
}
}
}
@@ -226,21 +226,6 @@ final class ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator {
assemblies.values.contains { $0.messageID == message.id } assemblies.values.contains { $0.messageID == message.id }
} }
/// Stop every live file handle/player before the panic media directory is
/// removed. This prevents an in-flight assembly from continuing to write
/// through an unlinked file after the wipe returns.
func resetForPanic() {
for assembly in Array(assemblies.values) {
cancelAssembly(assembly)
}
for player in drainingPlayers.values {
player.stop()
}
drainingPlayers.removeAll(keepingCapacity: false)
finishedBursts.removeAll(keepingCapacity: false)
updatePublicTalkerIndicator()
}
/// Called for every inbound private message: when it is the finalized /// Called for every inbound private message: when it is the finalized
/// voice note of a burst we assembled (matched by burst ID in the file /// voice note of a burst we assembled (matched by burst ID in the file
/// name), swap it into the existing live bubble and report `true` so the /// name), swap it into the existing live bubble and report `true` so the
@@ -6,19 +6,6 @@ import Foundation
import UIKit import UIKit
#endif #endif
struct LegacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest: Identifiable, Equatable {
let id: UUID
let peerID: PeerID
let peerName: String
let transferId: String
let messageID: String
}
struct PendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsent {
let request: LegacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest
let completion: @MainActor (Bool) -> Void
}
/// The narrow surface `ChatMediaTransferCoordinator` needs from its owner. /// The narrow surface `ChatMediaTransferCoordinator` needs from its owner.
/// ///
/// Follows the `ChatDeliveryContext` exemplar: the coordinator depends on the /// Follows the `ChatDeliveryContext` exemplar: the coordinator depends on the
@@ -56,24 +43,7 @@ protocol ChatMediaTransferContext: AnyObject {
func recordContentKey(_ key: String, timestamp: Date) func recordContentKey(_ key: String, timestamp: Date)
// MARK: Mesh file transfer // MARK: Mesh file transfer
func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String)
func resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(
to peerID: PeerID,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
)
func requestLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
messageID: String,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (Bool) -> Void
)
func cancelLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(transferId: String, messageID: String)
func sendFilePrivate(
_ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
to peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
allowLegacyFallback: Bool
)
func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String)
func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String) func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String)
} }
@@ -89,50 +59,8 @@ extension ChatViewModel: ChatMediaTransferContext {
// other contexts or satisfied by existing `ChatViewModel` members. The // other contexts or satisfied by existing `ChatViewModel` members. The
// members below flatten mesh service accesses. // members below flatten mesh service accesses.
func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy { func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String) {
meshService.privateMediaSendPolicy(to: peerID) meshService.sendFilePrivate(packet, to: peerID, transferId: transferId)
}
func resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(
to peerID: PeerID,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
) {
meshService.resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(to: peerID, completion: completion)
}
func requestLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
messageID: String,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (Bool) -> Void
) {
enqueueLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for: peerID,
transferId: transferId,
messageID: messageID,
completion: completion
)
}
func cancelLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(transferId: String, messageID: String) {
invalidateLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
transferId: transferId,
messageID: messageID
)
}
func sendFilePrivate(
_ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
to peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
allowLegacyFallback: Bool
) {
meshService.sendFilePrivate(
packet,
to: peerID,
transferId: transferId,
allowLegacyFallback: allowLegacyFallback
)
} }
func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) { func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) {
@@ -147,20 +75,12 @@ extension ChatViewModel: ChatMediaTransferContext {
@MainActor @MainActor
final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator { final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
private unowned let context: any ChatMediaTransferContext private unowned let context: any ChatMediaTransferContext
private let prepareVoiceNotePacket: @Sendable (URL) throws -> BitchatFilePacket
private(set) var transferIdToMessageIDs: [String: [String]] = [:] private(set) var transferIdToMessageIDs: [String: [String]] = [:]
private(set) var messageIDToTransferId: [String: String] = [:] private(set) var messageIDToTransferId: [String: String] = [:]
private var preparationGeneration: UInt64 = 0
init( init(context: any ChatMediaTransferContext) {
context: any ChatMediaTransferContext,
prepareVoiceNotePacket: @escaping @Sendable (URL) throws -> BitchatFilePacket = {
try ChatMediaPreparation.prepareVoiceNotePacket(at: $0)
}
) {
self.context = context self.context = context
self.prepareVoiceNotePacket = prepareVoiceNotePacket
} }
func sendVoiceNote(at url: URL) { func sendVoiceNote(at url: URL) {
@@ -178,30 +98,16 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
) )
let messageID = message.id let messageID = message.id
let transferId = makeTransferID(messageID: messageID) let transferId = makeTransferID(messageID: messageID)
// Own the transfer before detached preparation begins. Cancel/delete
// must be able to invalidate this exact invocation even while file I/O
// is still running off the main actor.
registerTransfer(transferId: transferId, messageID: messageID)
let prepareVoiceNotePacket = self.prepareVoiceNotePacket
let generation = preparationGeneration
Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { [weak self] in Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { [weak self] in
do { do {
let packet = try prepareVoiceNotePacket(url) let packet = try ChatMediaPreparation.prepareVoiceNotePacket(at: url)
await MainActor.run { [weak self] in await MainActor.run { [weak self] in
guard let self, guard let self else { return }
self.preparationGeneration == generation, self.registerTransfer(transferId: transferId, messageID: messageID)
self.isRegisteredTransfer(transferId, messageID: messageID) else {
return
}
if let peerID = targetPeer { if let peerID = targetPeer {
self.beginPrivateMediaSend( self.context.sendFilePrivate(packet, to: peerID, transferId: transferId)
packet,
to: peerID,
transferId: transferId,
messageID: messageID
)
} else { } else {
self.context.sendFileBroadcast(packet, transferId: transferId) self.context.sendFileBroadcast(packet, transferId: transferId)
} }
@@ -210,21 +116,13 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
SecureLogger.warning("Voice note exceeds size limit (\(size) bytes)", category: .session) SecureLogger.warning("Voice note exceeds size limit (\(size) bytes)", category: .session)
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url)
await MainActor.run { [weak self] in await MainActor.run { [weak self] in
guard let self, guard let self else { return }
self.preparationGeneration == generation,
self.isRegisteredTransfer(transferId, messageID: messageID) else {
return
}
self.handleMediaSendFailure(messageID: messageID, reason: String(localized: "content.delivery.reason.voice_too_large", comment: "Failure reason shown when a voice note exceeds the size limit")) self.handleMediaSendFailure(messageID: messageID, reason: String(localized: "content.delivery.reason.voice_too_large", comment: "Failure reason shown when a voice note exceeds the size limit"))
} }
} catch { } catch {
SecureLogger.error("Voice note send failed: \(error)", category: .session) SecureLogger.error("Voice note send failed: \(error)", category: .session)
await MainActor.run { [weak self] in await MainActor.run { [weak self] in
guard let self, guard let self else { return }
self.preparationGeneration == generation,
self.isRegisteredTransfer(transferId, messageID: messageID) else {
return
}
self.handleMediaSendFailure(messageID: messageID, reason: String(localized: "content.delivery.reason.voice_send_failed", comment: "Failure reason shown when a voice note could not be sent")) self.handleMediaSendFailure(messageID: messageID, reason: String(localized: "content.delivery.reason.voice_send_failed", comment: "Failure reason shown when a voice note could not be sent"))
} }
} }
@@ -234,15 +132,11 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
#if os(iOS) #if os(iOS)
func processThenSendImage(_ image: UIImage?) { func processThenSendImage(_ image: UIImage?) {
guard let image else { return } guard let image else { return }
let generation = preparationGeneration
Task.detached { [weak self] in Task.detached { [weak self] in
do { do {
let processedURL = try ImageUtils.processImage(image) let processedURL = try ImageUtils.processImage(image)
await MainActor.run { [weak self] in await MainActor.run { [weak self] in
guard let self, self.preparationGeneration == generation else { guard let self else { return }
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: processedURL)
return
}
self.sendImage(from: processedURL) self.sendImage(from: processedURL)
} }
} catch { } catch {
@@ -253,15 +147,11 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
#elseif os(macOS) #elseif os(macOS)
func processThenSendImage(from url: URL?) { func processThenSendImage(from url: URL?) {
guard let url else { return } guard let url else { return }
let generation = preparationGeneration
Task.detached { [weak self] in Task.detached { [weak self] in
do { do {
let processedURL = try ImageUtils.processImage(at: url) let processedURL = try ImageUtils.processImage(at: url)
await MainActor.run { [weak self] in await MainActor.run { [weak self] in
guard let self, self.preparationGeneration == generation else { guard let self else { return }
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: processedURL)
return
}
self.sendImage(from: processedURL) self.sendImage(from: processedURL)
} }
} catch { } catch {
@@ -280,7 +170,6 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
} }
let targetPeer = context.selectedPrivateChatPeer let targetPeer = context.selectedPrivateChatPeer
let generation = preparationGeneration
do { do {
try ImageUtils.validateImageSource(at: sourceURL) try ImageUtils.validateImageSource(at: sourceURL)
@@ -295,10 +184,7 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
let prepared = try ChatMediaPreparation.prepareImagePacket(from: sourceURL) let prepared = try ChatMediaPreparation.prepareImagePacket(from: sourceURL)
await MainActor.run { [weak self] in await MainActor.run { [weak self] in
guard let self, self.preparationGeneration == generation else { guard let self else { return }
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: prepared.outputURL)
return
}
let message = self.enqueueMediaMessage( let message = self.enqueueMediaMessage(
content: "\(MimeType.Category.image.messagePrefix)\(prepared.outputURL.lastPathComponent)", content: "\(MimeType.Category.image.messagePrefix)\(prepared.outputURL.lastPathComponent)",
targetPeer: targetPeer targetPeer: targetPeer
@@ -307,12 +193,7 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
let transferId = self.makeTransferID(messageID: messageID) let transferId = self.makeTransferID(messageID: messageID)
self.registerTransfer(transferId: transferId, messageID: messageID) self.registerTransfer(transferId: transferId, messageID: messageID)
if let peerID = targetPeer { if let peerID = targetPeer {
self.beginPrivateMediaSend( self.context.sendFilePrivate(prepared.packet, to: peerID, transferId: transferId)
prepared.packet,
to: peerID,
transferId: transferId,
messageID: messageID
)
} else { } else {
self.context.sendFileBroadcast(prepared.packet, transferId: transferId) self.context.sendFileBroadcast(prepared.packet, transferId: transferId)
} }
@@ -320,13 +201,13 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
} catch ChatMediaPreparationError.imageTooLarge(let size) { } catch ChatMediaPreparationError.imageTooLarge(let size) {
SecureLogger.warning("Processed image exceeds size limit (\(size) bytes)", category: .session) SecureLogger.warning("Processed image exceeds size limit (\(size) bytes)", category: .session)
await MainActor.run { [weak self] in await MainActor.run { [weak self] in
guard let self, self.preparationGeneration == generation else { return } guard let self else { return }
self.context.addSystemMessage("Image is too large to send.") self.context.addSystemMessage("Image is too large to send.")
} }
} catch { } catch {
SecureLogger.error("Image send preparation failed: \(error)", category: .session) SecureLogger.error("Image send preparation failed: \(error)", category: .session)
await MainActor.run { [weak self] in await MainActor.run { [weak self] in
guard let self, self.preparationGeneration == generation else { return } guard let self else { return }
self.context.addSystemMessage("Failed to prepare image for sending.") self.context.addSystemMessage("Failed to prepare image for sending.")
} }
} }
@@ -372,127 +253,17 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
return message return message
} }
private func beginPrivateMediaSend(
_ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
to peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
messageID: String
) {
continuePrivateMediaSend(
packet,
to: peerID,
transferId: transferId,
messageID: messageID,
policy: context.privateMediaSendPolicy(to: peerID)
)
}
private func continuePrivateMediaSend(
_ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
to peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
messageID: String,
policy: PrivateMediaSendPolicy
) {
switch policy {
case .encrypted:
context.sendFilePrivate(
packet,
to: peerID,
transferId: transferId,
allowLegacyFallback: false
)
case .awaitingCapabilityProof:
context.resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(to: peerID) { [weak self] resolvedPolicy in
guard let self,
self.isRegisteredTransfer(transferId, messageID: messageID) else {
return
}
guard resolvedPolicy != .awaitingCapabilityProof else {
self.handleMediaSendFailure(
messageID: messageID,
reason: String(
localized: "content.delivery.reason.private_media_capability_unresolved",
defaultValue: "Could not confirm encrypted media support",
comment: "Failure reason when private-media capability negotiation did not resolve"
)
)
return
}
self.continuePrivateMediaSend(
packet,
to: peerID,
transferId: transferId,
messageID: messageID,
policy: resolvedPolicy
)
}
case .legacyRequiresConsent:
context.requestLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for: peerID,
transferId: transferId,
messageID: messageID
) { [weak self] approved in
guard let self else { return }
// Consent belongs to this exact placeholder/transfer. A late
// dialog callback after cancel/delete must never resurrect it.
guard self.messageIDToTransferId[messageID] == transferId,
self.transferIdToMessageIDs[transferId]?.contains(messageID) == true else {
return
}
guard approved else {
self.handleMediaSendFailure(
messageID: messageID,
reason: String(
localized: "content.delivery.reason.legacy_media_declined",
defaultValue: "Not sent without end-to-end encryption",
comment: "Failure reason after declining the warning for a legacy clear private-media send"
)
)
return
}
self.context.sendFilePrivate(
packet,
to: peerID,
transferId: transferId,
allowLegacyFallback: true
)
}
case .blockedDowngrade:
handleMediaSendFailure(
messageID: messageID,
reason: String(
localized: "content.delivery.reason.private_media_downgrade_blocked",
defaultValue: "Encrypted media required; ask this contact to upgrade",
comment: "Failure reason when a peer that previously supported encrypted media appears to downgrade"
)
)
}
}
func registerTransfer(transferId: String, messageID: String) { func registerTransfer(transferId: String, messageID: String) {
transferIdToMessageIDs[transferId, default: []].append(messageID) transferIdToMessageIDs[transferId, default: []].append(messageID)
messageIDToTransferId[messageID] = transferId messageIDToTransferId[messageID] = transferId
} }
private func isRegisteredTransfer(_ transferId: String, messageID: String) -> Bool {
messageIDToTransferId[messageID] == transferId
&& transferIdToMessageIDs[transferId]?.contains(messageID) == true
}
func makeTransferID(messageID: String) -> String { func makeTransferID(messageID: String) -> String {
"\(messageID)-\(UUID().uuidString)" "\(messageID)-\(UUID().uuidString)"
} }
func clearTransferMapping(for messageID: String) { func clearTransferMapping(for messageID: String) {
guard let transferId = messageIDToTransferId.removeValue(forKey: messageID) else { return } guard let transferId = messageIDToTransferId.removeValue(forKey: messageID) else { return }
context.cancelLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
transferId: transferId,
messageID: messageID
)
guard var queue = transferIdToMessageIDs[transferId] else { return } guard var queue = transferIdToMessageIDs[transferId] else { return }
if !queue.isEmpty { if !queue.isEmpty {
@@ -527,9 +298,6 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
guard let messageID = transferIdToMessageIDs[id]?.first else { return } guard let messageID = transferIdToMessageIDs[id]?.first else { return }
clearTransferMapping(for: messageID) clearTransferMapping(for: messageID)
context.removeMessage(withID: messageID, cleanupFile: true) context.removeMessage(withID: messageID, cleanupFile: true)
case .rejected(let id, let reason):
guard let messageID = transferIdToMessageIDs[id]?.first else { return }
handleMediaSendFailure(messageID: messageID, reason: reason)
} }
} }
@@ -570,29 +338,9 @@ final class ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
} }
func deleteMediaMessage(messageID: String) { func deleteMediaMessage(messageID: String) {
// Delete is also a send cancellation. In particular, an approved
// legacy-clear send may still be waiting on BLEService.messageQueue;
// removing only the UI mapping would let that deferred work transmit.
if let transferId = messageIDToTransferId[messageID],
transferIdToMessageIDs[transferId]?.first == messageID {
context.cancelTransfer(transferId)
}
clearTransferMapping(for: messageID) clearTransferMapping(for: messageID)
context.removeMessage(withID: messageID, cleanupFile: true) context.removeMessage(withID: messageID, cleanupFile: true)
} }
/// Invalidates detached preparation work and cancels every transfer that
/// reached the transport. Stale tasks check the generation before they
/// can recreate a message or send after a panic wipe.
func resetForPanic() {
preparationGeneration &+= 1
let transferIDs = Set(transferIdToMessageIDs.keys)
transferIdToMessageIDs.removeAll(keepingCapacity: false)
messageIDToTransferId.removeAll(keepingCapacity: false)
for transferID in transferIDs {
context.cancelTransfer(transferID)
}
}
} }
private extension ChatMediaTransferCoordinator { private extension ChatMediaTransferCoordinator {
@@ -71,8 +71,12 @@ final class ChatMessageFormatter {
let content = message.content let content = message.content
let nsContent = content as NSString let nsContent = content as NSString
let nsLen = nsContent.length let nsLen = nsContent.length
let containsCashuEarly: Bool = {
let regex = Patterns.quickCashuPresence
return regex.numberOfMatches(in: content, options: [], range: NSRange(location: 0, length: nsLen)) > 0
}()
if content.isOversizedForRichFormatting() { if (content.count > 4000 || content.hasVeryLongToken(threshold: 1024)) && !containsCashuEarly {
var plainStyle = AttributeContainer() var plainStyle = AttributeContainer()
plainStyle.foregroundColor = baseColor plainStyle.foregroundColor = baseColor
plainStyle.font = isSelf plainStyle.font = isSelf
@@ -407,13 +407,6 @@ private extension ChatTransportEventCoordinator {
case .voiceFrame: case .voiceFrame:
context.handleVoiceFramePayload(from: peerID, payload: payload, timestamp: timestamp) context.handleVoiceFramePayload(from: peerID, payload: payload, timestamp: timestamp)
case .privateFile, .authenticatedPeerState:
// BLEService validates and persists decrypted private files before
// emitting a normal `.messageReceived` event, and consumes peer
// state inside the transport. Neither payload crosses this
// UI-facing typed-payload fallback.
break
} }
} }
+70 -266
View File
@@ -89,26 +89,6 @@ import UIKit
#endif #endif
import UniformTypeIdentifiers import UniformTypeIdentifiers
struct PanicNetworkLifecycle {
let stop: @MainActor () -> Void
let restart: @MainActor () -> Void
static let noop = PanicNetworkLifecycle(stop: {}, restart: {})
static var live: PanicNetworkLifecycle {
PanicNetworkLifecycle(
stop: {
GeohashPresenceService.shared.stopForPanic()
NetworkActivationService.shared.stopForPanic()
},
restart: {
NetworkActivationService.shared.start()
GeohashPresenceService.shared.start()
}
)
}
}
/// Manages the application state and business logic for BitChat. /// Manages the application state and business logic for BitChat.
/// Acts as the primary coordinator between UI components and backend services, /// Acts as the primary coordinator between UI components and backend services,
/// implementing the BitchatDelegate protocol to handle network events. /// implementing the BitchatDelegate protocol to handle network events.
@@ -162,8 +142,6 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
@Published var currentColorScheme: ColorScheme = .light @Published var currentColorScheme: ColorScheme = .light
@Published var currentTheme: AppTheme = .matrix @Published var currentTheme: AppTheme = .matrix
@Published var isConnected = false @Published var isConnected = false
@Published private(set) var panicRecoveryBlocked = false
var networkActivationAllowed: Bool { !panicRecoveryBlocked }
@Published var nickname: String = "" { @Published var nickname: String = "" {
didSet { didSet {
// Trim whitespace whenever nickname is set; whitespace-only becomes "" // Trim whitespace whenever nickname is set; whitespace-only becomes ""
@@ -173,7 +151,7 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
return return
} }
// Update mesh service nickname if it's initialized // Update mesh service nickname if it's initialized
if !isPanicResetting, !meshService.myPeerID.isEmpty { if !meshService.myPeerID.isEmpty {
meshService.setNickname(nickname) meshService.setNickname(nickname)
} }
} }
@@ -199,10 +177,7 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
lazy var privateConversationCoordinator = ChatPrivateConversationCoordinator(context: self) lazy var privateConversationCoordinator = ChatPrivateConversationCoordinator(context: self)
lazy var nostrCoordinator = ChatNostrCoordinator(context: self) lazy var nostrCoordinator = ChatNostrCoordinator(context: self)
lazy var mediaTransferCoordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: self) lazy var mediaTransferCoordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: self)
lazy var liveVoiceCoordinator = ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator( lazy var liveVoiceCoordinator = ChatLiveVoiceCoordinator(context: self)
context: self,
sweepsOnInit: !TestEnvironment.isRunningTests
)
lazy var verificationCoordinator = ChatVerificationCoordinator(context: self) lazy var verificationCoordinator = ChatVerificationCoordinator(context: self)
lazy var groupCoordinator = ChatGroupCoordinator(context: self) lazy var groupCoordinator = ChatGroupCoordinator(context: self)
lazy var vouchCoordinator = ChatVouchCoordinator(context: self) lazy var vouchCoordinator = ChatVouchCoordinator(context: self)
@@ -317,9 +292,6 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
var nostrRelayManager: NostrRelayManager? var nostrRelayManager: NostrRelayManager?
private let userDefaults = UserDefaults.standard private let userDefaults = UserDefaults.standard
let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol let keychain: KeychainManagerProtocol
private let panicRecoveryOperations: PanicRecoveryOperations
private let panicNetworkLifecycle: PanicNetworkLifecycle
private var isPanicResetting = false
/// Private group membership: keys in the keychain, metadata on disk. /// Private group membership: keys in the keychain, metadata on disk.
let groupStore: GroupStore let groupStore: GroupStore
private let nicknameKey = "bitchat.nickname" private let nicknameKey = "bitchat.nickname"
@@ -375,8 +347,6 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
@Published var showBluetoothAlert = false @Published var showBluetoothAlert = false
@Published var bluetoothAlertMessage = "" @Published var bluetoothAlertMessage = ""
@Published var bluetoothState: CBManagerState = .unknown @Published var bluetoothState: CBManagerState = .unknown
@Published private(set) var legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest: LegacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?
private var pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents: [PendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsent] = []
private func performDeliveryUpdate(_ update: @escaping @MainActor (ChatDeliveryCoordinator) -> Void) { private func performDeliveryUpdate(_ update: @escaping @MainActor (ChatDeliveryCoordinator) -> Void) {
if Thread.isMainThread { if Thread.isMainThread {
@@ -799,34 +769,7 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore? = nil, locationPresenceStore: LocationPresenceStore? = nil,
locationManager: LocationChannelManager = .shared locationManager: LocationChannelManager = .shared
) { ) {
let livePanicRecoveryOperations = PanicRecoveryOperations.live() let meshService = BLEService(keychain: keychain, idBridge: idBridge, identityManager: identityManager)
let startSuspendedForRecovery: Bool
do {
startSuspendedForRecovery =
try livePanicRecoveryOperations.isPending()
} catch {
startSuspendedForRecovery = true
}
// Preserve the preflight decision used to defer CoreBluetooth. A
// transiently successful second read must not skip recovery and leave
// the service permanently suspended without running the wipe.
let panicRecoveryOperations = PanicRecoveryOperations(
isPending: {
if startSuspendedForRecovery {
return true
}
return try livePanicRecoveryOperations.isPending()
},
begin: livePanicRecoveryOperations.begin,
wipeMedia: livePanicRecoveryOperations.wipeMedia,
complete: livePanicRecoveryOperations.complete
)
let meshService = BLEService(
keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: identityManager,
startSuspendedForPanicRecovery: startSuspendedForRecovery
)
meshService.sfMetrics = .shared meshService.sfMetrics = .shared
self.init( self.init(
keychain: keychain, keychain: keychain,
@@ -838,9 +781,7 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
locationPresenceStore: locationPresenceStore ?? LocationPresenceStore(), locationPresenceStore: locationPresenceStore ?? LocationPresenceStore(),
locationManager: locationManager, locationManager: locationManager,
outboxStore: MessageOutboxStore(keychain: keychain), outboxStore: MessageOutboxStore(keychain: keychain),
sfMetrics: .shared, sfMetrics: .shared
panicRecoveryOperations: panicRecoveryOperations,
panicNetworkLifecycle: .live
) )
} }
@@ -858,10 +799,7 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
locationManager: LocationChannelManager = .shared, locationManager: LocationChannelManager = .shared,
readReceiptsDefaults: UserDefaults? = nil, readReceiptsDefaults: UserDefaults? = nil,
outboxStore: MessageOutboxStore? = nil, outboxStore: MessageOutboxStore? = nil,
sfMetrics: StoreAndForwardMetrics? = nil, sfMetrics: StoreAndForwardMetrics? = nil
panicMediaWipe: (() throws -> Void)? = nil,
panicRecoveryOperations: PanicRecoveryOperations? = nil,
panicNetworkLifecycle: PanicNetworkLifecycle = .noop
) { ) {
let conversations = conversations ?? ConversationStore() let conversations = conversations ?? ConversationStore()
let peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore ?? PeerIdentityStore() let peerIdentityStore = peerIdentityStore ?? PeerIdentityStore()
@@ -876,9 +814,6 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
) )
self.keychain = keychain self.keychain = keychain
self.panicRecoveryOperations = panicRecoveryOperations
?? .ephemeral(wipeMedia: panicMediaWipe ?? {})
self.panicNetworkLifecycle = panicNetworkLifecycle
self.groupStore = GroupStore(keychain: keychain) self.groupStore = GroupStore(keychain: keychain)
self.idBridge = idBridge self.idBridge = idBridge
self.identityManager = identityManager self.identityManager = identityManager
@@ -914,31 +849,7 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
} }
.store(in: &cancellables) .store(in: &cancellables)
let recoveryRequired: Bool ChatViewModelBootstrapper(viewModel: self).configure()
do {
recoveryRequired = try self.panicRecoveryOperations.isPending()
} catch {
// Failure to read the latch cannot fail open. Re-run the complete
// transaction; a persistent storage failure leaves services
// blocked below.
recoveryRequired = true
SecureLogger.error(
"Could not read panic-recovery state; retrying the full wipe before startup: \(error)",
category: .security
)
}
if recoveryRequired {
SecureLogger.warning(
"Pending panic recovery detected; wiping before runtime services start",
category: .security
)
_ = panicClearAllData(restartServices: false)
}
if networkActivationAllowed {
ChatViewModelBootstrapper(viewModel: self).configure()
}
} }
// MARK: - Deinitialization // MARK: - Deinitialization
@@ -1242,37 +1153,8 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
// PANIC: Emergency data clearing for activist safety // PANIC: Emergency data clearing for activist safety
@MainActor @MainActor
@discardableResult func panicClearAllData() {
func panicClearAllData(restartServices: Bool = true) -> Bool { // Messages are processed immediately - nothing to flush
panicRecoveryBlocked = true
isPanicResetting = true
defer { isPanicResetting = false }
// Stop internet and location-presence work before clearing identity or
// state. These services cancel their subscriptions and delayed tasks,
// so old callbacks cannot reconnect during the transaction.
panicNetworkLifecycle.stop()
// Establish both independent durable intents before erasing anything.
// `wipeMedia` will still attempt deletion if neither write succeeds.
let recoveryIntent = panicRecoveryOperations.begin()
// Quiesce the mesh before clearing stores. Identity replacement below
// deliberately stays stopped until media deletion and marker commit.
if let bleService = meshService as? BLEService {
bleService.suspendForPanicReset()
} else {
meshService.emergencyDisconnectAll()
}
// Invalidate detached media preparation and close live capture file
// handles before clearing state or removing the media directory.
mediaTransferCoordinator.resetForPanic()
liveVoiceCoordinator.resetForPanic()
// Deny and release any clear-media confirmations before identities,
// message state, and local files are wiped.
cancelAllLegacyPrivateMediaConsents()
// Clear all messages (public timelines and private chats live in the // Clear all messages (public timelines and private chats live in the
// single-writer ConversationStore; the derived `messages` view and // single-writer ConversationStore; the derived `messages` view and
@@ -1294,14 +1176,13 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
// Reset nickname to anonymous // Reset nickname to anonymous
nickname = "anon\(Int.random(in: 1000...9999))" nickname = "anon\(Int.random(in: 1000...9999))"
userDefaults.set(nickname, forKey: nicknameKey) saveNickname()
// Clear favorites and peer mappings // Clear favorites and peer mappings
// Clear through SecureIdentityStateManager instead of directly // Clear through SecureIdentityStateManager instead of directly
identityManager.clearAllIdentityData() identityManager.clearAllIdentityData()
peerIdentityStore.clearAll() peerIdentityStore.clearAll()
locationPresenceStore.reset() locationPresenceStore.reset()
publicRateLimiter.reset()
// Clear persistent favorites from keychain // Clear persistent favorites from keychain
FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.clearAllFavorites() FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.clearAllFavorites()
@@ -1366,68 +1247,78 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
// Clear Nostr identity associations // Clear Nostr identity associations
idBridge.clearAllAssociations() idBridge.clearAllAssociations()
// Replace the BLE identity while keeping the radio stopped. It may // Disconnect from all peers and clear persistent identity
// reopen only after the durable panic transaction commits. // This will force creation of a new identity (new fingerprint) on next launch
meshService.emergencyDisconnectAll()
if let bleService = meshService as? BLEService { if let bleService = meshService as? BLEService {
bleService.resetIdentityForPanic( bleService.resetIdentityForPanic(currentNickname: nickname)
currentNickname: nickname,
restartServices: false
)
} else {
meshService.setNickname(nickname)
} }
// The wipe must finish before this security action returns. A detached // No need to force UserDefaults synchronization
// task could otherwise lose a race with a new capture or app exit and
// leave pre-panic media behind.
let panicCompleted: Bool
do {
try panicRecoveryOperations.wipeMedia(recoveryIntent)
try panicRecoveryOperations.complete()
panicCompleted = true
SecureLogger.info("🗑️ Deleted all media files during panic clear", category: .session)
} catch {
panicCompleted = false
SecureLogger.error(
"Panic transaction did not commit; services remain stopped: \(error)",
category: .security
)
}
panicRecoveryBlocked = !panicCompleted
// BCH-01-013: Clear iOS app switcher snapshots. Keep tests away from // Reinitialize Nostr with new identity
// the host user's real cache tree just as the default media wipe does. // This will generate new Nostr keys derived from new Noise keys.
#if os(iOS) // Skipped under tests: connecting the shared relay singleton starts
// real network/reconnect work that never completes and would keep the
// test process alive (the singleton, unlike a discardable instance, is
// never deallocated to cancel it).
if !TestEnvironment.isRunningTests { if !TestEnvironment.isRunningTests {
Self.clearAppSwitcherSnapshots() Task { @MainActor in
} // Small delay to ensure cleanup completes
#endif try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: TransportConfig.uiAsyncShortSleepNs) // 0.1 seconds
guard panicCompleted else { return false } // Reinitialize Nostr relay manager with new identity. Reuse the
// shared singleton every other component (NostrTransport, geohash
if let bleService = meshService as? BLEService { // subscriptions, AppRuntime observers) is bound to `.shared`, so
// Startup recovery reopens admission but leaves actual service // creating a fresh instance here would split relay state and leave
// start to the bootstrapper immediately after this method. // sends running against a disconnected manager.
bleService.completePanicReset(
restartServices: restartServices
)
}
if restartServices {
// All persistent state and media are gone. Bring each service back
// only now, under the new identity.
if !(meshService is BLEService) {
meshService.startServices()
}
if !TestEnvironment.isRunningTests {
nostrRelayManager = NostrRelayManager.shared nostrRelayManager = NostrRelayManager.shared
setupNostrMessageHandling() setupNostrMessageHandling()
nostrRelayManager?.connect()
} }
panicNetworkLifecycle.restart()
} }
return true // Delete ALL media files (incoming and outgoing) in background
Task.detached(priority: .utility) {
// Skipped under tests: the test process shares the user's real
// ~/Library/Application Support/files tree, and this detached
// utility-priority wipe fires at a nondeterministic time
// deleting media that concurrently running tests (e.g. the
// sendImage flow) just wrote there, and the developer's real
// app data with it.
guard !TestEnvironment.isRunningTests else { return }
do {
let base = try FileManager.default.url(for: .applicationSupportDirectory, in: .userDomainMask, appropriateFor: nil, create: true)
let filesDir = base.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
// Delete the entire files directory and recreate it
if FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: filesDir.path) {
try FileManager.default.removeItem(at: filesDir)
SecureLogger.info("🗑️ Deleted all media files during panic clear", category: .session)
}
// Recreate empty directory structure
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: filesDir, withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: filesDir.appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/incoming", isDirectory: true), withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: filesDir.appendingPathComponent("voicenotes/outgoing", isDirectory: true), withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: filesDir.appendingPathComponent("images/incoming", isDirectory: true), withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: filesDir.appendingPathComponent("images/outgoing", isDirectory: true), withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: filesDir.appendingPathComponent("files/incoming", isDirectory: true), withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: filesDir.appendingPathComponent("files/outgoing", isDirectory: true), withIntermediateDirectories: true, attributes: nil)
} catch {
SecureLogger.error("Failed to clear media files during panic: \(error)", category: .session)
}
// BCH-01-013: Clear iOS app switcher snapshots
// These are stored in Library/Caches/Snapshots/<bundle_id>/
#if os(iOS)
Self.clearAppSwitcherSnapshots()
#endif
}
// Force immediate UI update for panic mode
// UI updates immediately - no flushing needed
} }
/// BCH-01-013: Clear iOS app switcher snapshots during panic mode /// BCH-01-013: Clear iOS app switcher snapshots during panic mode
@@ -1913,91 +1804,4 @@ final class ChatViewModel: ObservableObject, BitchatDelegate, TransportEventDele
publicConversationCoordinator.sendHapticFeedback(for: message) publicConversationCoordinator.sendHapticFeedback(for: message)
} }
} }
@MainActor
extension ChatViewModel {
func enqueueLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
messageID: String,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (Bool) -> Void
) {
let request = LegacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest(
id: UUID(),
peerID: peerID,
peerName: nicknameForPeer(peerID),
transferId: transferId,
messageID: messageID
)
pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents.append(PendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
request: request,
completion: completion
))
if legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest == nil {
legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest = request
}
}
func resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(requestID: UUID, approved: Bool) {
// SwiftUI may report both the selected button and the presentation
// binding's dismissal. Resolve only the exact request that was shown;
// a duplicate callback for it must not consume the next queued send.
guard legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.id == requestID,
pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents.first?.request.id == requestID else {
return
}
let resolved = pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents.removeFirst()
// Drive the boolean presentation state through false before showing
// the next queued per-send warning. Otherwise SwiftUI sees truetrue,
// closes the first dialog, and never presents the second.
legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest = nil
resolved.completion(approved)
presentNextLegacyPrivateMediaConsentDeferred()
}
func invalidateLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(transferId: String, messageID: String) {
let invalidatedIDs = Set(
pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents.compactMap { pending -> UUID? in
let request = pending.request
return request.transferId == transferId && request.messageID == messageID
? request.id
: nil
}
)
guard !invalidatedIDs.isEmpty else { return }
pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents.removeAll {
invalidatedIDs.contains($0.request.id)
}
if let currentID = legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.id,
invalidatedIDs.contains(currentID) {
legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest = nil
presentNextLegacyPrivateMediaConsentDeferred()
}
}
func cancelAllLegacyPrivateMediaConsents() {
let pending = pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents
pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents.removeAll()
legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest = nil
for item in pending {
item.completion(false)
}
}
private func presentNextLegacyPrivateMediaConsentDeferred() {
guard legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest == nil,
let nextRequestID = pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents.first?.request.id else {
return
}
DispatchQueue.main.async { [weak self] in
guard let self,
self.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest == nil,
self.pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents.first?.request.id == nextRequestID else {
return
}
self.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest = self.pendingLegacyPrivateMediaConsents[0].request
}
}
}
// End of ChatViewModel class // End of ChatViewModel class
@@ -156,17 +156,6 @@ private extension ChatViewModelBootstrapper {
viewModel?.objectWillChange.send() viewModel?.objectWillChange.send()
} }
.store(in: &viewModel.cancellables) .store(in: &viewModel.cancellables)
viewModel.participantTracker.$visiblePeople
.receive(on: DispatchQueue.main)
.sink { [weak viewModel] people in
Task { @MainActor [weak viewModel] in
let visible = Set(people.map { $0.id })
viewModel?.locationPresenceStore.retainTeleportedGeo(keeping: visible)
viewModel?.locationPresenceStore.retainGeoNicknames(keeping: visible)
}
}
.store(in: &viewModel.cancellables)
} }
func loadPersistedViewState() { func loadPersistedViewState() {
+8 -79
View File
@@ -26,10 +26,6 @@ struct MessageRateLimiter {
} }
return false return false
} }
func isIdle(since now: Date, idleTTL: TimeInterval) -> Bool {
now.timeIntervalSince(lastRefill) >= idleTTL
}
} }
private var senderBuckets: [String: TokenBucket] = [:] private var senderBuckets: [String: TokenBucket] = [:]
@@ -39,26 +35,17 @@ struct MessageRateLimiter {
private let senderRefill: Double private let senderRefill: Double
private let contentCapacity: Double private let contentCapacity: Double
private let contentRefill: Double private let contentRefill: Double
private let maxSenderBuckets: Int
private let maxContentBuckets: Int
private let bucketIdleTTL: TimeInterval
init( init(
senderCapacity: Double, senderCapacity: Double,
senderRefillPerSec: Double, senderRefillPerSec: Double,
contentCapacity: Double, contentCapacity: Double,
contentRefillPerSec: Double, contentRefillPerSec: Double
maxSenderBuckets: Int = TransportConfig.uiSenderRateBucketMaxEntries,
maxContentBuckets: Int = TransportConfig.uiContentRateBucketMaxEntries,
bucketIdleTTL: TimeInterval = TransportConfig.uiRateBucketIdleTTL
) { ) {
self.senderCapacity = senderCapacity self.senderCapacity = senderCapacity
self.senderRefill = senderRefillPerSec self.senderRefill = senderRefillPerSec
self.contentCapacity = contentCapacity self.contentCapacity = contentCapacity
self.contentRefill = contentRefillPerSec self.contentRefill = contentRefillPerSec
self.maxSenderBuckets = max(1, maxSenderBuckets)
self.maxContentBuckets = max(1, maxContentBuckets)
self.bucketIdleTTL = bucketIdleTTL
} }
/// - Parameter powBits: validated NIP-13 difficulty of the event /// - Parameter powBits: validated NIP-13 difficulty of the event
@@ -71,83 +58,25 @@ struct MessageRateLimiter {
if powBits >= NostrPoW.rateLimitBypassBits { if powBits >= NostrPoW.rateLimitBypassBits {
senderAllowed = true senderAllowed = true
} else { } else {
var senderBucket = Self.bucket( var senderBucket = senderBuckets[senderKey] ?? TokenBucket(
for: senderKey,
in: &senderBuckets,
capacity: senderCapacity, capacity: senderCapacity,
tokens: senderCapacity,
refillPerSec: senderRefill, refillPerSec: senderRefill,
maxBuckets: maxSenderBuckets, lastRefill: now
idleTTL: bucketIdleTTL,
now: now
) )
senderAllowed = senderBucket.allow(now: now) senderAllowed = senderBucket.allow(now: now)
senderBuckets[senderKey] = senderBucket senderBuckets[senderKey] = senderBucket
} }
// Rejected senders must not mint attacker-keyed content entries. var contentBucket = contentBuckets[contentKey] ?? TokenBucket(
guard senderAllowed else { return false }
var contentBucket = Self.bucket(
for: contentKey,
in: &contentBuckets,
capacity: contentCapacity, capacity: contentCapacity,
tokens: contentCapacity,
refillPerSec: contentRefill, refillPerSec: contentRefill,
maxBuckets: maxContentBuckets, lastRefill: now
idleTTL: bucketIdleTTL,
now: now
) )
let contentAllowed = contentBucket.allow(now: now) let contentAllowed = contentBucket.allow(now: now)
contentBuckets[contentKey] = contentBucket contentBuckets[contentKey] = contentBucket
return contentAllowed return senderAllowed && contentAllowed
}
mutating func reset() {
senderBuckets.removeAll()
contentBuckets.removeAll()
}
var bucketCountsForTesting: (sender: Int, content: Int) {
(senderBuckets.count, contentBuckets.count)
}
// Static so we can take `inout` on a stored dictionary without overlapping
// exclusive access through a mutating method on `self`.
private static func bucket(
for key: String,
in buckets: inout [String: TokenBucket],
capacity: Double,
refillPerSec: Double,
maxBuckets: Int,
idleTTL: TimeInterval,
now: Date
) -> TokenBucket {
if let existing = buckets[key] {
return existing
}
evictIfNeeded(from: &buckets, maxBuckets: maxBuckets, idleTTL: idleTTL, now: now)
return TokenBucket(
capacity: capacity,
tokens: capacity,
refillPerSec: refillPerSec,
lastRefill: now
)
}
private static func evictIfNeeded(
from buckets: inout [String: TokenBucket],
maxBuckets: Int,
idleTTL: TimeInterval,
now: Date
) {
guard buckets.count >= maxBuckets else { return }
buckets = buckets.filter { !$0.value.isIdle(since: now, idleTTL: idleTTL) }
guard buckets.count >= maxBuckets else { return }
if let oldestKey = buckets.min(by: { $0.value.lastRefill < $1.value.lastRefill })?.key {
buckets.removeValue(forKey: oldestKey)
}
} }
} }
@@ -196,10 +196,7 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
// Sampled: fires for every geo event and floods dev logs in busy geohashes. // Sampled: fires for every geo event and floods dev logs in busy geohashes.
geoEventLogCount += 1 geoEventLogCount += 1
if geoEventLogCount == 1 || geoEventLogCount.isMultiple(of: TransportConfig.nostrInboundEventLogInterval) { if geoEventLogCount == 1 || geoEventLogCount.isMultiple(of: TransportConfig.nostrInboundEventLogInterval) {
SecureLogger.debug( SecureLogger.debug("GeoTeleport: recv #\(geoEventLogCount) pub=\(event.pubkey.prefix(8))… pow=\(powBits) tags=\(event.tags.map { "[" + $0.joined(separator: ",") + "]" }.joined(separator: ","))", category: .session)
"GeoTeleport: recv #\(geoEventLogCount) pub=\(event.pubkey.prefix(8))… pow=\(powBits) tagCount=\(event.tags.count)",
category: .session
)
} }
if context.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey) { if context.isNostrBlocked(pubkeyHexLowercased: event.pubkey) {
@@ -310,7 +307,7 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
// claiming to be group traffic over Nostr is ignored. // claiming to be group traffic over Nostr is ignored.
// Live voice is mesh-only: latency and relay cost make it // Live voice is mesh-only: latency and relay cost make it
// meaningless over Nostr. // meaningless over Nostr.
case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .groupInvite, .groupKeyUpdate, .vouch, .voiceFrame, .privateFile, .authenticatedPeerState: case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .groupInvite, .groupKeyUpdate, .vouch, .voiceFrame:
break break
} }
} }
@@ -366,7 +363,7 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
// claiming to be group traffic over Nostr is ignored. // claiming to be group traffic over Nostr is ignored.
// Live voice is mesh-only: latency and relay cost make it // Live voice is mesh-only: latency and relay cost make it
// meaningless over Nostr. // meaningless over Nostr.
case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .groupInvite, .groupKeyUpdate, .vouch, .voiceFrame, .privateFile, .authenticatedPeerState: case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .groupInvite, .groupKeyUpdate, .vouch, .voiceFrame:
break break
} }
} }
@@ -449,7 +446,7 @@ final class NostrInboundPipeline {
// in v1; group traffic over Nostr is ignored. // in v1; group traffic over Nostr is ignored.
// Live voice is mesh-only: latency and relay cost make it // Live voice is mesh-only: latency and relay cost make it
// meaningless over Nostr. // meaningless over Nostr.
case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .groupInvite, .groupKeyUpdate, .vouch, .voiceFrame, .privateFile, .authenticatedPeerState: case .verifyChallenge, .verifyResponse, .groupInvite, .groupKeyUpdate, .vouch, .voiceFrame:
break break
} }
} }
@@ -188,25 +188,8 @@ final class VoiceRecordingViewModel: ObservableObject {
Task { Task {
let finalDuration = Date().timeIntervalSince(startDate) let finalDuration = Date().timeIntervalSince(startDate)
if let url = await session.finish() { if let url = await session.finish(),
// Panic and a newer hold both invalidate this completion. isValidRecording(at: url, duration: finalDuration) {
// Never route an old recording using a post-panic target.
guard generation == holdGeneration else {
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url)
return
}
guard isValidRecording(
at: url,
duration: finalDuration
) else {
guard state == .idle else { return }
state = .error(
message: finalDuration < VoiceRecorder.minRecordingDuration
? "Recording is too short."
: "Recording failed to save."
)
return
}
completion(url) completion(url)
} else { } else {
guard generation == holdGeneration, state == .idle else { return } guard generation == holdGeneration, state == .idle else { return }
@@ -223,17 +206,6 @@ final class VoiceRecordingViewModel: ObservableObject {
finish(completion: nil) finish(completion: nil)
} }
/// Invalidates in-flight permission/start/finalize callbacks and tears
/// down an active microphone before the panic transaction continues.
func panicWipe() {
holdGeneration &+= 1
let session = activeSession
activeSession = nil
state = .idle
isLiveStreaming = false
session?.panicCancelSynchronously()
}
private func isValidRecording(at url: URL, duration: TimeInterval) -> Bool { private func isValidRecording(at url: URL, duration: TimeInterval) -> Bool {
if let attributes = try? FileManager.default.attributesOfItem(atPath: url.path), if let attributes = try? FileManager.default.attributesOfItem(atPath: url.path),
let fileSize = attributes[.size] as? NSNumber, let fileSize = attributes[.size] as? NSNumber,
-73
View File
@@ -26,10 +26,6 @@ struct AppInfoView: View {
/// introduction), and afterwards the sheet reopens wherever it was left. /// introduction), and afterwards the sheet reopens wherever it was left.
@AppStorage("appInfo.selectedPane") private var selectedPane: Pane = .info @AppStorage("appInfo.selectedPane") private var selectedPane: Pane = .info
@State private var showPanicConfirmation = false @State private var showPanicConfirmation = false
@AppStorage(AppLanguageSettings.overrideKey) private var languageOverride = ""
/// The override changed this session; localization resolves at process
/// start, so surface the restart hint.
@State private var showLanguageRestartNote = false
private enum Pane: String { private enum Pane: String {
case settings case settings
@@ -59,11 +55,6 @@ struct AppInfoView: View {
static let connectivityTitle = String(localized: "app_info.settings.connectivity.title", defaultValue: "CONNECTIVITY", comment: "Section header (uppercase) for the connectivity toggles: mesh bridge, internet gateway, tor routing") static let connectivityTitle = String(localized: "app_info.settings.connectivity.title", defaultValue: "CONNECTIVITY", comment: "Section header (uppercase) for the connectivity toggles: mesh bridge, internet gateway, tor routing")
static let languageTitle = String(localized: "app_info.settings.language.title", defaultValue: "LANGUAGE", comment: "Section header (uppercase) for the app language picker in settings")
static let languagePickerLabel = String(localized: "app_info.settings.language.picker_label", defaultValue: "app language", comment: "Label of the app language picker row in settings")
static let languageSystem = String(localized: "app_info.settings.language.system", defaultValue: "system default", comment: "Menu option that clears the in-app language override so the app follows the device language")
static let languageRestartNote = String(localized: "app_info.settings.language.restart_note", defaultValue: "restart bitchat to apply the new language", comment: "Caption shown after the user picks a different app language; the change takes effect on next launch")
static let bridgeTitle = String(localized: "app_info.settings.bridge.title", defaultValue: "mesh bridge", comment: "Title of the mesh bridge toggle in settings") static let bridgeTitle = String(localized: "app_info.settings.bridge.title", defaultValue: "mesh bridge", comment: "Title of the mesh bridge toggle in settings")
static let bridgeSubtitle = String(localized: "app_info.settings.bridge.subtitle", defaultValue: "joins nearby mesh islands over the internet: what you say in the mesh channel also reaches people in your area beyond radio range, and their messages appear here marked with the network glyph. while you have internet, your device also carries bridge and location-channel traffic for phones around you that have none.", comment: "Subtitle explaining what the mesh bridge toggle does") static let bridgeSubtitle = String(localized: "app_info.settings.bridge.subtitle", defaultValue: "joins nearby mesh islands over the internet: what you say in the mesh channel also reaches people in your area beyond radio range, and their messages appear here marked with the network glyph. while you have internet, your device also carries bridge and location-channel traffic for phones around you that have none.", comment: "Subtitle explaining what the mesh bridge toggle does")
static func bridgeCell(_ cell: String) -> String { static func bridgeCell(_ cell: String) -> String {
@@ -322,52 +313,6 @@ struct AppInfoView: View {
} }
} }
// Language an in-app override so the UI language can differ
// from the device language (takes effect on next launch).
VStack(alignment: .leading, spacing: 12) {
SectionHeader(verbatim: Strings.Settings.languageTitle)
settingsCard {
Menu {
Button {
selectLanguage(nil)
} label: {
menuItemLabel(Strings.Settings.languageSystem, isSelected: languageOverride.isEmpty)
}
Divider()
ForEach(AppLanguageSettings.availableLanguages, id: \.self) { code in
Button {
selectLanguage(code)
} label: {
menuItemLabel(AppLanguageSettings.endonym(for: code), isSelected: languageOverride == code)
}
}
} label: {
HStack {
Text(Strings.Settings.languagePickerLabel)
.bitchatFont(size: 12, weight: .semibold)
.foregroundColor(textColor)
Spacer()
Text(languageOverride.isEmpty ? Strings.Settings.languageSystem : AppLanguageSettings.endonym(for: languageOverride))
.bitchatFont(size: 12)
.foregroundColor(palette.accent)
Image(systemName: "chevron.up.chevron.down")
.font(.system(size: 10))
.foregroundColor(secondaryTextColor)
}
.contentShape(Rectangle())
}
.buttonStyle(.plain)
if showLanguageRestartNote {
Text(Strings.Settings.languageRestartNote)
.bitchatFont(size: 11)
.foregroundColor(secondaryTextColor)
.fixedSize(horizontal: false, vertical: true)
}
}
}
// Voice same card + IRC pill as every other toggle setting. // Voice same card + IRC pill as every other toggle setting.
VStack(alignment: .leading, spacing: 12) { VStack(alignment: .leading, spacing: 12) {
SectionHeader(Strings.Voice.title) SectionHeader(Strings.Voice.title)
@@ -513,24 +458,6 @@ struct AppInfoView: View {
.padding() .padding()
} }
private func selectLanguage(_ code: String?) {
let previous = languageOverride
AppLanguageSettings.setOverride(code)
languageOverride = code ?? ""
if languageOverride != previous {
showLanguageRestartNote = true
}
}
private func menuItemLabel(_ title: String, isSelected: Bool) -> some View {
HStack {
Text(title)
if isSelected {
Image(systemName: "checkmark")
}
}
}
private var bridgeToggleBinding: Binding<Bool> { private var bridgeToggleBinding: Binding<Bool> {
Binding( Binding(
get: { bridgeService.isEnabled }, get: { bridgeService.isEnabled },
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ struct TextMessageView: View {
// first text line; a fixed top padding left the lock's solid body // first text line; a fixed top padding left the lock's solid body
// hanging below the line's visual center. // hanging below the line's visual center.
HStack(alignment: .firstTextBaseline, spacing: 0) { HStack(alignment: .firstTextBaseline, spacing: 0) {
let isLong = message.content.isLongForDisplay() let isLong = (message.content.count > TransportConfig.uiLongMessageLengthThreshold || message.content.hasVeryLongToken(threshold: TransportConfig.uiVeryLongTokenThreshold)) && cashuLinks.isEmpty
let isExpanded = expandedMessageIDs.contains(message.id) let isExpanded = expandedMessageIDs.contains(message.id)
if message.isPrivate { if message.isPrivate {
Image(systemName: "lock.fill") Image(systemName: "lock.fill")
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ struct TextMessageView: View {
} }
// Expand/Collapse for very long messages // Expand/Collapse for very long messages
if message.content.isLongForDisplay() { if (message.content.count > TransportConfig.uiLongMessageLengthThreshold || message.content.hasVeryLongToken(threshold: TransportConfig.uiVeryLongTokenThreshold)) && cashuLinks.isEmpty {
let isExpanded = expandedMessageIDs.contains(message.id) let isExpanded = expandedMessageIDs.contains(message.id)
let labelKey = isExpanded ? LocalizedStringKey("content.message.show_less") : LocalizedStringKey("content.message.show_more") let labelKey = isExpanded ? LocalizedStringKey("content.message.show_less") : LocalizedStringKey("content.message.show_more")
Button(labelKey) { Button(labelKey) {
-58
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct ContentPeopleSheetView: View {
#endif #endif
var body: some View { var body: some View {
let legacyConsentRequest = conversationUIModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest
NavigationStack { NavigationStack {
Group { Group {
if privateConversationModel.selectedPeerID != nil { if privateConversationModel.selectedPeerID != nil {
@@ -98,63 +97,6 @@ struct ContentPeopleSheetView: View {
} }
.themedSheetBackground() .themedSheetBackground()
.foregroundColor(palette.primary) .foregroundColor(palette.primary)
.confirmationDialog(
String(
localized: "content.private_media.legacy_warning.title",
defaultValue: "Send without end-to-end encryption?",
comment: "Title warning before sending private media to an older client in a clear signed envelope"
),
isPresented: Binding(
get: { legacyConsentRequest != nil },
set: { isPresented in
if !isPresented, let requestID = legacyConsentRequest?.id {
conversationUIModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
requestID: requestID,
approved: false
)
}
}
),
titleVisibility: .visible
) {
Button(
String(
localized: "content.private_media.legacy_warning.send",
defaultValue: "send visible file",
comment: "Destructive confirmation action for one legacy clear private-media send"
),
role: .destructive
) {
if let requestID = legacyConsentRequest?.id {
conversationUIModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
requestID: requestID,
approved: true
)
}
}
Button("common.cancel", role: .cancel) {
if let requestID = legacyConsentRequest?.id {
conversationUIModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
requestID: requestID,
approved: false
)
}
}
} message: {
if let request = legacyConsentRequest {
Text(
String(
format: String(
localized: "content.private_media.legacy_warning.message",
defaultValue: "%@'s client does not advertise encrypted private media. This file will be signed but not end-to-end encrypted, so mesh relays can see it. Send this file anyway?",
comment: "Warning explaining the confidentiality loss for one legacy private-media send; parameter is the peer name"
),
locale: .current,
request.peerName
)
)
}
}
#if os(macOS) #if os(macOS)
.frame(minWidth: 420, minHeight: 520) .frame(minWidth: 420, minHeight: 520)
#endif #endif
-4
View File
@@ -79,9 +79,6 @@ struct ContentView: View {
voiceRecordingVM.sessionProvider = { [weak conversationUIModel] in voiceRecordingVM.sessionProvider = { [weak conversationUIModel] in
conversationUIModel?.makeVoiceCaptureSession() ?? VoiceNoteCaptureSession() conversationUIModel?.makeVoiceCaptureSession() ?? VoiceNoteCaptureSession()
} }
appChromeModel.setPanicPreparation { [weak voiceRecordingVM] in
voiceRecordingVM?.panicWipe()
}
#if os(macOS) #if os(macOS)
DispatchQueue.main.async { DispatchQueue.main.async {
isNicknameFieldFocused = false isNicknameFieldFocused = false
@@ -232,7 +229,6 @@ struct ContentView: View {
} }
.onDisappear { .onDisappear {
autocompleteDebounceTimer?.invalidate() autocompleteDebounceTimer?.invalidate()
appChromeModel.setPanicPreparation(nil)
} }
} }
-20
View File
@@ -21,26 +21,6 @@ extension String {
return current >= threshold return current >= threshold
} }
/// True when the message should collapse behind Show more in the UI.
/// Length alone decides this embedding a Cashu-looking token must not
/// disable the guard (remote DoS via unbounded layout).
func isLongForDisplay(
lengthThreshold: Int = TransportConfig.uiLongMessageLengthThreshold,
tokenThreshold: Int = TransportConfig.uiVeryLongTokenThreshold
) -> Bool {
count > lengthThreshold || hasVeryLongToken(threshold: tokenThreshold)
}
/// True when rich formatting (regex / link detectors) should be skipped.
/// Cashu presence used to exempt oversized content from the plain path;
/// that let untrusted input force expensive formatting work.
func isOversizedForRichFormatting(
lengthThreshold: Int = 4000,
tokenThreshold: Int = 1024
) -> Bool {
count > lengthThreshold || hasVeryLongToken(threshold: tokenThreshold)
}
// Extract up to `max` distinct Cashu tokens (cashuA/cashuB), as the bare // Extract up to `max` distinct Cashu tokens (cashuA/cashuB), as the bare
// bearer strings. Allow dot '.' and shorter lengths. The `cashu:` URI // bearer strings. Allow dot '.' and shorter lengths. The `cashu:` URI
// form matches too the token embedded after the scheme is the match. // form matches too the token embedded after the scheme is the match.
@@ -38,12 +38,6 @@
"comment" : "Fallback title when saving a shared link" "comment" : "Fallback title when saving a shared link"
} }
}, },
"fa" : {
"stringUnit" : {
"state" : "translated",
"value" : "پیوند اشتراک‌گذاری‌شده"
}
},
"fil" : { "fil" : {
"stringUnit" : { "stringUnit" : {
"state" : "needs_review", "state" : "needs_review",
@@ -239,12 +233,6 @@
"comment" : "Shown when the share payload cannot be encoded" "comment" : "Shown when the share payload cannot be encoded"
} }
}, },
"fa" : {
"stringUnit" : {
"state" : "translated",
"value" : "کدگذاری پیوند ناموفق بود"
}
},
"fil" : { "fil" : {
"stringUnit" : { "stringUnit" : {
"state" : "needs_review", "state" : "needs_review",
@@ -440,12 +428,6 @@
"comment" : "Shown when provided content cannot be shared" "comment" : "Shown when provided content cannot be shared"
} }
}, },
"fa" : {
"stringUnit" : {
"state" : "translated",
"value" : "محتوای قابل اشتراک‌گذاری وجود ندارد"
}
},
"fil" : { "fil" : {
"stringUnit" : { "stringUnit" : {
"state" : "needs_review", "state" : "needs_review",
@@ -641,12 +623,6 @@
"comment" : "Shown when the share extension receives no content" "comment" : "Shown when the share extension receives no content"
} }
}, },
"fa" : {
"stringUnit" : {
"state" : "translated",
"value" : "چیزی برای اشتراک‌گذاری نیست"
}
},
"fil" : { "fil" : {
"stringUnit" : { "stringUnit" : {
"state" : "needs_review", "state" : "needs_review",
@@ -842,12 +818,6 @@
"comment" : "Confirmation after successfully sharing a link" "comment" : "Confirmation after successfully sharing a link"
} }
}, },
"fa" : {
"stringUnit" : {
"state" : "translated",
"value" : "✓ پیوند در bitchat به اشتراک گذاشته شد"
}
},
"fil" : { "fil" : {
"stringUnit" : { "stringUnit" : {
"state" : "needs_review", "state" : "needs_review",
@@ -1043,12 +1013,6 @@
"comment" : "Confirmation after successfully sharing text" "comment" : "Confirmation after successfully sharing text"
} }
}, },
"fa" : {
"stringUnit" : {
"state" : "translated",
"value" : "✓ متن در bitchat به اشتراک گذاشته شد"
}
},
"fil" : { "fil" : {
"stringUnit" : { "stringUnit" : {
"state" : "needs_review", "state" : "needs_review",
-38
View File
@@ -147,44 +147,6 @@ struct AppArchitectureTests {
#expect(store.teleportedGeo.isEmpty) #expect(store.teleportedGeo.isEmpty)
} }
@Test("LocationPresenceStore bounds and prunes teleported geohash participants")
@MainActor
func locationPresenceStoreBoundsTeleportedParticipants() {
let store = LocationPresenceStore(teleportedGeoCapacity: 2)
store.setCurrentGeohash("u4pruy")
store.markTeleported("AAAAAA")
store.markTeleported("BBBBBB")
store.markTeleported("CCCCCC")
#expect(store.teleportedGeo == Set(["bbbbbb", "cccccc"]))
store.retainTeleportedGeo(keeping: Set(["CCCCCC"]))
#expect(store.teleportedGeo == Set(["cccccc"]))
store.setCurrentGeohash("u4pruz")
#expect(store.teleportedGeo.isEmpty)
}
@Test("LocationPresenceStore bounds geohash nicknames and clears on channel switch")
@MainActor
func locationPresenceStoreBoundsGeoNicknames() {
let store = LocationPresenceStore(geoNicknameCapacity: 2)
store.setCurrentGeohash("u4pruy")
store.setNickname("alice", for: "AAAAAA")
store.setNickname("bob", for: "BBBBBB")
store.setNickname("carol", for: "CCCCCC")
#expect(store.geoNicknames == ["bbbbbb": "bob", "cccccc": "carol"])
store.retainGeoNicknames(keeping: Set(["CCCCCC"]))
#expect(store.geoNicknames == ["cccccc": "carol"])
store.setCurrentGeohash("u4pruz")
#expect(store.geoNicknames.isEmpty)
}
@Test("PeerHandle equality and hashing use the canonical identity only") @Test("PeerHandle equality and hashing use the canonical identity only")
func peerHandleEqualityUsesCanonicalIdentity() { func peerHandleEqualityUsesCanonicalIdentity() {
let first = PeerHandle(id: "noise:abc123", routingPeerID: PeerID(str: "peer-a")) let first = PeerHandle(id: "noise:abc123", routingPeerID: PeerID(str: "peer-a"))
+4 -428
View File
@@ -99,95 +99,6 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
#expect(ble.currentPeerSnapshots().isEmpty) #expect(ble.currentPeerSnapshots().isEmpty)
} }
@Test
func unsignedAndBadSignatureLeaveDoNotEvictOrRelayClaimedPeer() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let mallory = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let alicePeerID = PeerID(publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData())
let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
let unsigned = makeLeavePacket(sender: alicePeerID, marker: "unsigned")
ble._test_handlePacket(
unsigned,
fromPeerID: alicePeerID,
signingPublicKey: alice.getSigningPublicKeyData()
)
let unsignedRelayed = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .leave) > 0 },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout
)
#expect(!unsignedRelayed)
#expect(ble.currentPeerSnapshots().contains { $0.peerID == alicePeerID })
let badSignature = try #require(
mallory.signPacket(makeLeavePacket(sender: alicePeerID, marker: "bad-signature"))
)
ble._test_handlePacket(
badSignature,
fromPeerID: alicePeerID,
signingPublicKey: alice.getSigningPublicKeyData()
)
let badSignatureRelayed = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .leave) > 0 },
timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout
)
#expect(!badSignatureRelayed)
#expect(ble.currentPeerSnapshots().contains { $0.peerID == alicePeerID })
}
@Test
func validSignedLeaveEvictsSessionAndRelays() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let alicePeerID = PeerID(publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData())
// Establish a real session so the leave regression also verifies that
// stale secure-delivery state is retired, not just the peer-list row.
let message1 = try ble._test_noiseInitiateHandshake(with: alicePeerID)
let message2 = try #require(
try alice.processHandshakeMessage(from: ble.myPeerID, message: message1)
)
let message3 = try #require(
try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(from: alicePeerID, message: message2)
)
_ = try alice.processHandshakeMessage(from: ble.myPeerID, message: message3)
#expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: alicePeerID))
let centralUUID = "central-valid-leave"
ble._test_bindCentral(centralUUID, to: alicePeerID)
ble._test_markNoiseAuthenticatedCentral(centralUUID, to: alicePeerID)
#expect(ble._test_isNoiseAuthenticatedCentral(centralUUID, for: alicePeerID))
let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
let signedLeave = try #require(
alice.signPacket(makeLeavePacket(sender: alicePeerID, marker: "valid"))
)
ble._test_handlePacket(
signedLeave,
fromPeerID: alicePeerID,
signingPublicKey: alice.getSigningPublicKeyData()
)
let evicted = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{
!ble.currentPeerSnapshots().contains { $0.peerID == alicePeerID }
&& !ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: alicePeerID)
&& !ble._test_isNoiseAuthenticatedCentral(centralUUID, for: alicePeerID)
},
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
#expect(evicted)
let relayed = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .leave) == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
#expect(relayed)
}
@Test @Test
func ingressAllowsRelayedSenderOnBoundLink() async throws { func ingressAllowsRelayedSenderOnBoundLink() async throws {
let ble = makeService() let ble = makeService()
@@ -502,26 +413,14 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
) )
let replay = try #require(victim.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign replayed announce") let replay = try #require(victim.signPacket(unsigned), "Failed to sign replayed announce")
#expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: replay, linkID: attackerLink)) #expect(ble._test_recordIngressIfNew(packet: replay, linkID: attackerLink))
let rebindGate = VerifiedDirectRebindGate()
ble._test_afterVerifiedDirectRebindEnqueued = rebindGate.pause
defer {
rebindGate.release()
ble._test_afterVerifiedDirectRebindEnqueued = nil
}
ble._test_handlePacket(replay, fromPeerID: victimPeerID, preseedPeer: false) ble._test_handlePacket(replay, fromPeerID: victimPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let announcePaused = await TestHelpers.waitUntil( let rebound = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ rebindGate.hasPaused }, { ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == victimPeerID },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
) )
try #require(announcePaused) #expect(rebound)
#expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
// Rebind and ordinary reconnect preparation are one bleQueue
// critical section. Once the binding is visible, stale sending keys
// must already be unavailable.
#expect(ble._test_centralBinding(attackerLink) == victimPeerID)
#expect(!ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: victimPeerID))
rebindGate.release()
let outbound = OutboundPacketTap() let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
ble._test_onOutboundPacket = { outbound.record($0) } ble._test_onOutboundPacket = { outbound.record($0) }
@@ -541,130 +440,6 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
#expect(outbound.count(ofType: .courierEnvelope) == 0) #expect(outbound.count(ofType: .courierEnvelope) == 0)
} }
@Test
func failedInboundReconnectRestoresAndDrainsTypedPayloadQueue() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let mallory = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let alicePeerID = PeerID(publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData())
// Establish BLE as responder so the following inbound reconnect is
// not intentionally coalesced by the initiator-completion grace path.
let message1 = try alice.initiateHandshake(with: ble.myPeerID)
let message2 = try #require(
try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(
from: alicePeerID,
message: message1
)
)
let message3 = try #require(
try alice.processHandshakeMessage(
from: ble.myPeerID,
message: message2
)
)
_ = try ble._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(
from: alicePeerID,
message: message3
)
await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
#expect(ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: alicePeerID))
let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
let forgedMessage1 = try mallory.initiateHandshake(with: ble.myPeerID)
let firstPacket = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: alicePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id),
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1_000),
payload: forgedMessage1,
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
ble._test_handlePacket(firstPacket, fromPeerID: alicePeerID)
let responseReady = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{
outbound.snapshot().contains {
$0.type == MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue
&& PeerID(hexData: $0.senderID) == ble.myPeerID
&& $0.payload.count
!= NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize
}
},
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
try #require(responseReady)
let forgedMessage2 = try #require(
outbound.snapshot().first {
$0.type == MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue
&& PeerID(hexData: $0.senderID) == ble.myPeerID
&& $0.payload.count
!= NoiseSecurityConstants.xxInitialMessageSize
}?.payload
)
#expect(!ble.canDeliverSecurely(to: alicePeerID))
// Typed control traffic must queue behind the ordinary responder,
// rather than attempting encryption and disappearing.
let privateMessageID = "quarantine-pm-\(UUID().uuidString)"
ble.sendPrivateMessage(
"queued private message",
to: alicePeerID,
recipientNickname: "Alice",
messageID: privateMessageID
)
ble.sendGroupInvite(Data("queued-during-quarantine".utf8), to: alicePeerID)
await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
#expect(outbound.count(ofType: .noiseEncrypted) == 0)
let forgedMessage3 = try #require(
try mallory.processHandshakeMessage(
from: ble.myPeerID,
message: forgedMessage2
)
)
let thirdPacket = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.noiseHandshake.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: alicePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: ble.myPeerID.id),
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1_000) + 1,
payload: forgedMessage3,
signature: nil,
ttl: 7
)
ble._test_handlePacket(thirdPacket, fromPeerID: alicePeerID)
// Restore re-enters the generation-bound authentication transition:
// authenticated state and both outbound queues drain exactly once.
let drained = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .noiseEncrypted) >= 3 },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
try #require(drained)
await ble._test_drainNoiseMessagePipeline()
let plaintexts = try outbound.snapshot()
.filter { $0.type == MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue }
.map { try alice.decrypt($0.payload, from: ble.myPeerID) }
#expect(plaintexts.count == 3)
#expect(
plaintexts.filter {
$0.first == NoisePayloadType.authenticatedPeerState.rawValue
}.count == 1
)
#expect(
plaintexts.filter {
$0.first == NoisePayloadType.privateMessage.rawValue
}.count == 1
)
#expect(
plaintexts.filter {
$0.first == NoisePayloadType.groupInvite.rawValue
}.count == 1
)
}
/// A legitimate rotation announce necessarily arrives on a link still /// A legitimate rotation announce necessarily arrives on a link still
/// bound to the OLD ID, so its registry upsert stores the new peer /// bound to the OLD ID, so its registry upsert stores the new peer
/// disconnected. The successful rebind must promote it: a healed /// disconnected. The successful rebind must promote it: a healed
@@ -797,107 +572,6 @@ struct BLEServiceCoreTests {
#expect(ble.myPeerID == PeerID(str: newFingerprint.prefix(16))) #expect(ble.myPeerID == PeerID(str: newFingerprint.prefix(16)))
} }
@Test
func panicSuspension_dropsLateOutboundWorkUntilCommit() async {
let ble = makeService()
let outbound = OutboundPacketTap()
ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
let packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "late callback",
sender: ble.myPeerID,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
ble.suspendForPanicReset()
ble.sendPacket(packet)
#expect(outbound.count(ofType: .message) == 0)
ble.completePanicReset(restartServices: false)
ble.sendPacket(packet)
#expect(outbound.count(ofType: .message) == 1)
}
@Test @MainActor
func panicSuspension_invalidatesQueuedMainActorIngress() async {
let ble = makeService()
let delegate = TransportEventCaptureDelegate()
ble.eventDelegate = delegate
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: "pre-panic-ingress",
sender: "Peer",
content: "must not survive panic",
timestamp: Date(),
isRelay: false,
isPrivate: true,
recipientNickname: "Me",
senderPeerID: PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
)
// The test already owns MainActor, so this task cannot run until the
// synchronous panic boundary below has invalidated its generation.
ble._test_emitTransportEvent(.messageReceived(message))
ble.suspendForPanicReset()
await Task.yield()
#expect(delegate.messageIDs.isEmpty)
ble.completePanicReset(restartServices: false)
ble._test_emitTransportEvent(.messageReceived(message))
await Task.yield()
#expect(delegate.messageIDs == [message.id])
}
@Test @MainActor
func panicSuspension_rejectsPausedBLEReceiveBeforeMessageQueueHandoff() async {
let ble = makeService()
let gate = ReceivePacketHandoffGate()
ble._test_beforeReceivePacketHandoff = gate.pause
ble._test_onReceivePacketHandoff = gate.recordHandoff
defer {
gate.release()
ble._test_beforeReceivePacketHandoff = nil
ble._test_onReceivePacketHandoff = nil
}
let sender = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let packet = makePublicPacket(
content: "must not cross panic",
sender: sender,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
)
ble._test_handlePacketFromBLEQueue(packet, fromPeerID: sender)
#expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ gate.hasPaused },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
))
// Panic closes the lifecycle before waiting for the paused bleQueue
// callback. Releasing it afterward lets the callback enqueue its
// messageQueue handoff, where the captured generation must be rejected
// before packet processing starts.
let releaseAfterPanicCloses = Task.detached {
while ble._test_isPanicIngressOpen {
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_000_000)
}
gate.release()
}
let panic = Task { @MainActor in
ble.suspendForPanicReset()
}
await panic.value
await releaseAfterPanicCloses.value
#expect(gate.handoffCount == 0)
// A packet captured under the reopened lifecycle still crosses the
// same handoff, proving the test did not merely disable the hook.
ble.completePanicReset(restartServices: false)
ble._test_handlePacketFromBLEQueue(packet, fromPeerID: sender)
#expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ gate.handoffCount == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
))
}
@Test @Test
func modifiedServices_rediscoverWhenBitChatServiceIsInvalidated() async throws { func modifiedServices_rediscoverWhenBitChatServiceIsInvalidated() async throws {
let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB") let otherService = CBUUID(string: "0000180F-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB")
@@ -990,82 +664,6 @@ private final class OutboundPacketTap {
lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() } lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
return packets.filter { $0.type == type.rawValue }.count return packets.filter { $0.type == type.rawValue }.count
} }
func snapshot() -> [BitchatPacket] {
lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
return packets
}
}
private final class VerifiedDirectRebindGate: @unchecked Sendable {
private let condition = NSCondition()
private var paused = false
private var released = false
var hasPaused: Bool {
condition.lock()
defer { condition.unlock() }
return paused
}
func pause() {
condition.lock()
paused = true
condition.broadcast()
while !released {
condition.wait()
}
condition.unlock()
}
func release() {
condition.lock()
released = true
condition.broadcast()
condition.unlock()
}
}
private final class ReceivePacketHandoffGate: @unchecked Sendable {
private let condition = NSCondition()
private var paused = false
private var released = false
private var recordedHandoffCount = 0
var hasPaused: Bool {
condition.lock()
defer { condition.unlock() }
return paused
}
var handoffCount: Int {
condition.lock()
defer { condition.unlock() }
return recordedHandoffCount
}
func pause() {
condition.lock()
paused = true
condition.broadcast()
while !released {
condition.wait()
}
condition.unlock()
}
func release() {
condition.lock()
released = true
condition.broadcast()
condition.unlock()
}
func recordHandoff() {
condition.lock()
recordedHandoffCount += 1
condition.unlock()
}
} }
private func makeService() -> BLEService { private func makeService() -> BLEService {
@@ -1092,18 +690,6 @@ private func makePublicPacket(content: String, sender: PeerID, timestamp: UInt64
) )
} }
private func makeLeavePacket(sender: PeerID, marker: String) -> BitchatPacket {
BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.leave.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: sender.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: Data(marker.utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
)
}
private final class PublicCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate { private final class PublicCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
private let lock = NSLock() private let lock = NSLock()
private(set) var publicMessages: [BitchatMessage] = [] private(set) var publicMessages: [BitchatMessage] = []
@@ -1138,13 +724,3 @@ private final class PublicCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
return publicMessages return publicMessages
} }
} }
@MainActor
private final class TransportEventCaptureDelegate: TransportEventDelegate {
private(set) var messageIDs: [String] = []
func didReceiveTransportEvent(_ event: TransportEvent) {
guard case .messageReceived(let message) = event else { return }
messageIDs.append(message.id)
}
}
@@ -7,9 +7,10 @@
// `ChatViewModel`, following the `ChatDeliveryCoordinatorContextTests` / // `ChatViewModel`, following the `ChatDeliveryCoordinatorContextTests` /
// `ChatPrivateConversationCoordinatorContextTests` exemplars. // `ChatPrivateConversationCoordinatorContextTests` exemplars.
// //
// Real file/codec work remains covered by `ChatMediaPreparationTests`. These // Scope note: the async media-preparation pipelines (`ImageUtils`,
// tests inject a paused voice-note preparer to exercise cancellation ownership // `ChatMediaPreparation`) run real file/codec work and remain covered by
// across the detached-preparation/MainActor boundary deterministically. // `ChatMediaPreparationTests`; here we cover message enqueueing, transfer
// bookkeeping, and the blocked-context guards.
// //
import Testing import Testing
@@ -85,72 +86,11 @@ private final class MockChatMediaTransferContext: ChatMediaTransferContext {
// Mesh file transfer // Mesh file transfer
private(set) var privateFileSends: [(peerID: PeerID, transferId: String)] = [] private(set) var privateFileSends: [(peerID: PeerID, transferId: String)] = []
private(set) var privateFileLegacyAllowances: [Bool] = []
private(set) var broadcastFileSends: [String] = [] private(set) var broadcastFileSends: [String] = []
private(set) var cancelledTransfers: [String] = [] private(set) var cancelledTransfers: [String] = []
var privateMediaPolicy: PrivateMediaSendPolicy = .encrypted
var resolvedPrivateMediaPolicy: PrivateMediaSendPolicy?
private(set) var legacyConsentRequests: [(
id: UUID,
peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
messageID: String
)] = []
private(set) var invalidatedLegacyConsents: [(transferId: String, messageID: String)] = []
private var pendingLegacyConsentIDs: [UUID] = []
private var legacyConsentCompletions: [UUID: @MainActor (Bool) -> Void] = [:]
func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy { func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String) {
privateMediaPolicy
}
func resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(
to peerID: PeerID,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
) {
completion(resolvedPrivateMediaPolicy ?? privateMediaPolicy)
}
func requestLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
messageID: String,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (Bool) -> Void
) {
let id = UUID()
legacyConsentRequests.append((id, peerID, transferId, messageID))
pendingLegacyConsentIDs.append(id)
legacyConsentCompletions[id] = completion
}
func cancelLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(transferId: String, messageID: String) {
invalidatedLegacyConsents.append((transferId, messageID))
let matchingIDs = Set(legacyConsentRequests.compactMap { request in
request.transferId == transferId && request.messageID == messageID
? request.id
: nil
})
pendingLegacyConsentIDs.removeAll { matchingIDs.contains($0) }
}
func resolveNextLegacyConsent(_ approved: Bool) {
guard !pendingLegacyConsentIDs.isEmpty else { return }
let id = pendingLegacyConsentIDs.removeFirst()
legacyConsentCompletions[id]?(approved)
}
func invokeLegacyConsentEvenIfInvalidated(id: UUID, approved: Bool) {
legacyConsentCompletions[id]?(approved)
}
func sendFilePrivate(
_ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
to peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
allowLegacyFallback: Bool
) {
privateFileSends.append((peerID, transferId)) privateFileSends.append((peerID, transferId))
privateFileLegacyAllowances.append(allowLegacyFallback)
} }
func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) { func sendFileBroadcast(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferId: String) {
@@ -162,56 +102,6 @@ private final class MockChatMediaTransferContext: ChatMediaTransferContext {
} }
} }
private final class PausedVoiceNotePreparer: @unchecked Sendable {
private let condition = NSCondition()
private var started = false
private var released = false
private var finished = false
private let packet: BitchatFilePacket
init() {
let content = Data("voice".utf8)
packet = BitchatFilePacket(
fileName: "paused.m4a",
fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
mimeType: "audio/mp4",
content: content
)
}
func prepare(_: URL) throws -> BitchatFilePacket {
condition.lock()
started = true
condition.broadcast()
while !released {
condition.wait()
}
finished = true
condition.broadcast()
condition.unlock()
return packet
}
var hasStarted: Bool {
condition.lock()
defer { condition.unlock() }
return started
}
var hasFinished: Bool {
condition.lock()
defer { condition.unlock() }
return finished
}
func release() {
condition.lock()
released = true
condition.broadcast()
condition.unlock()
}
}
// MARK: - Coordinator Tests Against Mock Context // MARK: - Coordinator Tests Against Mock Context
/// Exercises `ChatMediaTransferCoordinator` against /// Exercises `ChatMediaTransferCoordinator` against
@@ -276,14 +166,6 @@ struct ChatMediaTransferCoordinatorContextTests {
#expect(context.removedMessages.count == 1) #expect(context.removedMessages.count == 1)
#expect(context.removedMessages.first?.messageID == "m2") #expect(context.removedMessages.first?.messageID == "m2")
#expect(context.removedMessages.first?.cleanupFile == true) #expect(context.removedMessages.first?.cleanupFile == true)
// A pre-start rejection keeps the placeholder visible and failed,
// including queued post-handshake encryption failures.
coordinator.registerTransfer(transferId: "t3", messageID: "m3")
coordinator.handleTransferEvent(.rejected(id: "t3", reason: "encryption failed"))
#expect(context.deliveryStatusUpdates.last?.messageID == "m3")
#expect(context.deliveryStatusUpdates.last?.status == .failed(reason: "encryption failed"))
#expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId["m3"] == nil)
} }
@Test @MainActor @Test @MainActor
@@ -306,35 +188,6 @@ struct ChatMediaTransferCoordinatorContextTests {
#expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId.isEmpty) #expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId.isEmpty)
} }
@Test @MainActor
func resetForPanic_cancelsEveryTransportTransferAndClearsMappings() {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
coordinator.registerTransfer(transferId: "t1", messageID: "m1")
coordinator.registerTransfer(transferId: "t1", messageID: "m2")
coordinator.registerTransfer(transferId: "t2", messageID: "m3")
coordinator.resetForPanic()
#expect(Set(context.cancelledTransfers) == Set(["t1", "t2"]))
#expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs.isEmpty)
#expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId.isEmpty)
}
@Test @MainActor
func deleteMediaMessage_cancelsApprovedTransferBeforeRemovingMapping() {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
coordinator.registerTransfer(transferId: "approved-delete", messageID: "message-delete")
coordinator.deleteMediaMessage(messageID: "message-delete")
#expect(context.cancelledTransfers == ["approved-delete"])
#expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId["message-delete"] == nil)
#expect(context.removedMessages.map(\.messageID) == ["message-delete"])
#expect(context.removedMessages.first?.cleanupFile == true)
}
@Test @MainActor @Test @MainActor
func sendVoiceNote_blockedContextRemovesFileAndExplains() async throws { func sendVoiceNote_blockedContextRemovesFileAndExplains() async throws {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext() let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
@@ -353,249 +206,4 @@ struct ChatMediaTransferCoordinatorContextTests {
#expect(context.appendedPublicMessages.isEmpty) #expect(context.appendedPublicMessages.isEmpty)
#expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs.isEmpty) #expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs.isEmpty)
} }
@Test @MainActor
func cancelVoiceNoteDuringDetachedPreparationCannotSendOrRestoreMapping() async throws {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "5566778899aabbcc")
context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
let preparer = PausedVoiceNotePreparer()
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
context: context,
prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in try preparer.prepare(url) }
)
let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("paused-private-\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
try Data("voice".utf8).write(to: url)
defer {
preparer.release()
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url)
}
coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
#expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ preparer.hasStarted }, timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout))
let messageID = try #require(context.privateChats[peerID]?.first?.id)
let transferId = try #require(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId[messageID])
coordinator.cancelMediaSend(messageID: messageID)
preparer.release()
#expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ preparer.hasFinished }, timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout))
for _ in 0..<10 { await Task.yield() }
#expect(context.cancelledTransfers == [transferId])
#expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
#expect(context.broadcastFileSends.isEmpty)
#expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId[messageID] == nil)
#expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs[transferId] == nil)
#expect(context.removedMessages.map(\.messageID) == [messageID])
}
@Test @MainActor
func deletePublicVoiceNoteDuringDetachedPreparationCannotBroadcastOrRestoreMapping() async throws {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let preparer = PausedVoiceNotePreparer()
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
context: context,
prepareVoiceNotePacket: { url in try preparer.prepare(url) }
)
let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("paused-public-\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
try Data("voice".utf8).write(to: url)
defer {
preparer.release()
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url)
}
coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
#expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ preparer.hasStarted }, timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout))
let messageID = try #require(context.appendedPublicMessages.first?.message.id)
let transferId = try #require(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId[messageID])
coordinator.deleteMediaMessage(messageID: messageID)
preparer.release()
#expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil({ preparer.hasFinished }, timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout))
for _ in 0..<10 { await Task.yield() }
#expect(context.cancelledTransfers == [transferId])
#expect(context.broadcastFileSends.isEmpty)
#expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
#expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId[messageID] == nil)
#expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs[transferId] == nil)
#expect(context.removedMessages.map(\.messageID) == [messageID])
}
@Test @MainActor
func voicePreparationFailureMarksPlaceholderFailedAndClearsEarlyMapping() async throws {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let peerID = PeerID(str: "66778899aabbccdd")
context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(
context: context,
prepareVoiceNotePacket: { _ in
throw ChatMediaPreparationError.voiceNoteTooLarge(bytes: 999_999)
}
)
let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("failing-private-\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
try Data("voice".utf8).write(to: url)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) }
coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
#expect(await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{
context.deliveryStatusUpdates.contains { update in
if case .failed = update.status { return true }
return false
}
},
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
))
let messageID = try #require(context.privateChats[peerID]?.first?.id)
#expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId[messageID] == nil)
#expect(coordinator.transferIdToMessageIDs.isEmpty)
#expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
#expect(context.broadcastFileSends.isEmpty)
}
@Test @MainActor
func legacyPrivateVoiceNoteWaitsForPerSendConsent() async throws {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
context.privateMediaPolicy = .legacyRequiresConsent
let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("legacy-consent-\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
try (Data([0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18]) + Data("ftypM4A voice".utf8)).write(to: url)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) }
coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
let prompted = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ context.legacyConsentRequests.count == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
#expect(prompted)
#expect(context.legacyConsentRequests.map { $0.peerID } == [peerID])
#expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
context.resolveNextLegacyConsent(true)
#expect(context.privateFileSends.count == 1)
#expect(context.privateFileLegacyAllowances == [true])
}
@Test @MainActor
func capabilityProofTimeoutTransitionsToConsentWithoutAutomaticRawSend() async throws {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
let peerID = PeerID(str: "1020304050607080")
context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
context.privateMediaPolicy = .awaitingCapabilityProof
context.resolvedPrivateMediaPolicy = .legacyRequiresConsent
let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("proof-timeout-consent-\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
try Data("voice".utf8).write(to: url)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) }
coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
let prompted = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ context.legacyConsentRequests.count == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
#expect(prompted)
#expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
context.resolveNextLegacyConsent(false)
#expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
}
@Test @MainActor
func legacyConsentApprovalAfterCancelCannotSend() async throws {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
let peerID = PeerID(str: "2233445566778899")
context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
context.privateMediaPolicy = .legacyRequiresConsent
let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("legacy-cancel-\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
try Data("voice".utf8).write(to: url)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) }
coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
let prompted = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ context.legacyConsentRequests.count == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
#expect(prompted)
let request = try #require(context.legacyConsentRequests.first)
coordinator.cancelMediaSend(messageID: request.messageID)
#expect(context.invalidatedLegacyConsents.contains {
$0.transferId == request.transferId && $0.messageID == request.messageID
})
// Model a stale framework callback that escaped active invalidation.
// The coordinator's transfer/message binding check is the final gate.
context.invokeLegacyConsentEvenIfInvalidated(id: request.id, approved: true)
#expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
#expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId[request.messageID] == nil)
}
@Test @MainActor
func legacyConsentApprovalAfterDeleteCannotSend() async throws {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
let peerID = PeerID(str: "33445566778899aa")
context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
context.privateMediaPolicy = .legacyRequiresConsent
let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("legacy-delete-\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
try Data("voice".utf8).write(to: url)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) }
coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
let prompted = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ context.legacyConsentRequests.count == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
#expect(prompted)
let request = try #require(context.legacyConsentRequests.first)
coordinator.deleteMediaMessage(messageID: request.messageID)
context.invokeLegacyConsentEvenIfInvalidated(id: request.id, approved: true)
#expect(context.invalidatedLegacyConsents.contains {
$0.transferId == request.transferId && $0.messageID == request.messageID
})
#expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
#expect(coordinator.messageIDToTransferId[request.messageID] == nil)
}
@Test @MainActor
func pinnedPrivateMediaDowngradeNeverPromptsOrSends() async throws {
let context = MockChatMediaTransferContext()
let coordinator = ChatMediaTransferCoordinator(context: context)
let peerID = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
context.selectedPrivateChatPeer = peerID
context.privateMediaPolicy = .blockedDowngrade
let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("blocked-downgrade-\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
try Data("voice".utf8).write(to: url)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: url) }
coordinator.sendVoiceNote(at: url)
let failed = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ context.deliveryStatusUpdates.contains { update in
if case .failed = update.status { return true }
return false
} },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
#expect(failed)
#expect(context.legacyConsentRequests.isEmpty)
#expect(context.privateFileSends.isEmpty)
}
} }
@@ -1048,89 +1048,6 @@ struct ChatViewModelMediaTransferTests {
#expect(viewModel.transferIdToMessageIDs.count == 1) #expect(viewModel.transferIdToMessageIDs.count == 1)
} }
@Test @MainActor
func legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequestsArePerSendAndQueued() async throws {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let firstPeer = PeerID(str: "1111111111111111")
let secondPeer = PeerID(str: "2222222222222222")
var decisions: [Bool] = []
viewModel.enqueueLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for: firstPeer,
transferId: "transfer-1",
messageID: "message-1"
) { decisions.append($0) }
viewModel.enqueueLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for: secondPeer,
transferId: "transfer-2",
messageID: "message-2"
) { decisions.append($0) }
#expect(viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.peerID == firstPeer)
let firstRequestID = try #require(viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.id)
viewModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(requestID: firstRequestID, approved: true)
let showedSecond = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.peerID == secondPeer },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
#expect(showedSecond)
let secondRequestID = try #require(viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.id)
// A button action and the dialog binding may both resolve the first
// ID. The stale second callback must not consume the queued request.
viewModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(requestID: firstRequestID, approved: false)
#expect(decisions == [true])
#expect(viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.id == secondRequestID)
viewModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(requestID: secondRequestID, approved: false)
#expect(decisions == [true, false])
#expect(viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest == nil)
}
@Test @MainActor
func invalidatingPresentedLegacyConsentAdvancesQueueAndStaleResolutionNoops() async throws {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let firstPeer = PeerID(str: "3333333333333333")
let secondPeer = PeerID(str: "4444444444444444")
var decisions: [String] = []
viewModel.enqueueLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for: firstPeer,
transferId: "transfer-cancelled",
messageID: "message-cancelled"
) { decisions.append("first:\($0)") }
viewModel.enqueueLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
for: secondPeer,
transferId: "transfer-kept",
messageID: "message-kept"
) { decisions.append("second:\($0)") }
let cancelledRequestID = try #require(viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.id)
viewModel.invalidateLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
transferId: "transfer-cancelled",
messageID: "message-cancelled"
)
let advanced = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.peerID == secondPeer },
timeout: TestConstants.longTimeout
)
#expect(advanced)
#expect(decisions.isEmpty, "Invalidation drops the request rather than resolving its send")
viewModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(
requestID: cancelledRequestID,
approved: true
)
#expect(viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.peerID == secondPeer)
#expect(decisions.isEmpty)
let keptRequestID = try #require(viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest?.id)
viewModel.resolveLegacyPrivateMediaConsent(requestID: keptRequestID, approved: true)
#expect(decisions == ["second:true"])
#expect(viewModel.legacyPrivateMediaConsentRequest == nil)
}
@Test @MainActor @Test @MainActor
func sendVoiceNote_oversizedFileFailsAndDeletesTempFile() async throws { func sendVoiceNote_oversizedFileFailsAndDeletesTempFile() async throws {
let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel() let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()
+2 -114
View File
@@ -15,11 +15,7 @@ import BitFoundation
/// Creates a ChatViewModel with mock dependencies for testing /// Creates a ChatViewModel with mock dependencies for testing
@MainActor @MainActor
private func makeTestableViewModel( private func makeTestableViewModel() -> (viewModel: ChatViewModel, transport: MockTransport) {
panicMediaWipe: (() throws -> Void)? = nil,
panicRecoveryOperations: PanicRecoveryOperations? = nil,
panicNetworkLifecycle: PanicNetworkLifecycle = .noop
) -> (viewModel: ChatViewModel, transport: MockTransport) {
let keychain = MockKeychain() let keychain = MockKeychain()
let keychainHelper = MockKeychainHelper() let keychainHelper = MockKeychainHelper()
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychainHelper) let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: keychainHelper)
@@ -30,10 +26,7 @@ private func makeTestableViewModel(
keychain: keychain, keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge, idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: identityManager, identityManager: identityManager,
transport: transport, transport: transport
panicMediaWipe: panicMediaWipe,
panicRecoveryOperations: panicRecoveryOperations,
panicNetworkLifecycle: panicNetworkLifecycle
) )
return (viewModel, transport) return (viewModel, transport)
@@ -653,25 +646,6 @@ struct ChatViewModelFormattingTests {
#expect(String(formatted.characters) == "<@Alice#a1b2> hello #mesh [\(message.formattedTimestamp)]") #expect(String(formatted.characters) == "<@Alice#a1b2> hello #mesh [\(message.formattedTimestamp)]")
} }
@Test @MainActor
func formatMessageAsText_longCashuFallsBackToPlain() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
let cashu = "cashuA" + String(repeating: "a", count: 40)
let longContent = "hi @bob " + cashu + " " + String(repeating: "x", count: 4_100)
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: "fmt-long-cashu",
sender: "Alice#a1b2",
content: longContent,
timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_700_010_123),
isRelay: false,
senderPeerID: PeerID(str: "00000000000000b3")
)
let formatted = viewModel.formatMessageAsText(message, colorScheme: .light)
#expect(String(formatted.characters) == "<@Alice#a1b2> \(longContent) [\(message.formattedTimestamp)]")
}
@Test @MainActor @Test @MainActor
func formatMessageHeader_formatsSenderHeader() async { func formatMessageHeader_formatsSenderHeader() async {
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel() let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel()
@@ -1123,92 +1097,6 @@ struct ChatViewModelBluetoothTests {
struct ChatViewModelPanicTests { struct ChatViewModelPanicTests {
@Test @MainActor
func panicClearAllData_finishesMediaWipeBeforeReturning() {
var wipeFinished = false
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel(panicMediaWipe: {
wipeFinished = true
})
viewModel.panicClearAllData()
#expect(wipeFinished)
}
@Test @MainActor
func panicClearAllData_stopsNetworkBeforeWipeAndRestartsAfterCommit() {
var events: [String] = []
let lifecycle = PanicNetworkLifecycle(
stop: { events.append("stop") },
restart: { events.append("restart") }
)
let (viewModel, _) = makeTestableViewModel(
panicMediaWipe: { events.append("wipe") },
panicNetworkLifecycle: lifecycle
)
let completed = viewModel.panicClearAllData()
#expect(completed)
#expect(events == ["stop", "wipe", "restart"])
#expect(viewModel.networkActivationAllowed)
}
@Test @MainActor
func pendingPanicRecoveryCompletesBeforeTransportBootstrap() {
var events: [String] = []
let operations = PanicRecoveryOperations(
isPending: {
events.append("read")
return true
},
begin: {
events.append("begin")
return PanicRecoveryIntent(
fileMarkerEstablished: true,
externalMarkerEstablished: false
)
},
wipeMedia: { _ in events.append("wipe") },
complete: { events.append("complete") }
)
let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel(
panicRecoveryOperations: operations
)
#expect(events == ["read", "begin", "wipe", "complete"])
#expect(transport.emergencyDisconnectCallCount == 1)
#expect(transport.startServicesCallCount == 1)
#expect(viewModel.networkActivationAllowed)
}
@Test @MainActor
func failedStartupRecoveryLeavesTransportAndNetworkBlocked() {
enum WipeFailure: Error { case failed }
var completedMarker = false
let operations = PanicRecoveryOperations(
isPending: { true },
begin: {
PanicRecoveryIntent(
fileMarkerEstablished: true,
externalMarkerEstablished: false
)
},
wipeMedia: { _ in throw WipeFailure.failed },
complete: { completedMarker = true }
)
let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel(
panicRecoveryOperations: operations
)
#expect(!completedMarker)
#expect(transport.emergencyDisconnectCallCount == 1)
#expect(transport.startServicesCallCount == 0)
#expect(!viewModel.networkActivationAllowed)
}
@Test @MainActor @Test @MainActor
func panicClearAllData_delegatesToTransport() async { func panicClearAllData_delegatesToTransport() async {
let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel() let (viewModel, transport) = makeTestableViewModel()
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import Testing
@testable import BitFoundation // to avoid unnecessary public's @testable import BitFoundation // to avoid unnecessary public's
@testable import bitchat @testable import bitchat
@Suite("Integration Tests", .serialized)
struct IntegrationTests { struct IntegrationTests {
private var helper = TestNetworkHelper() private var helper = TestNetworkHelper()
@@ -273,18 +272,8 @@ struct IntegrationTests {
// Re-establish Noise handshake explicitly via managers // Re-establish Noise handshake explicitly via managers
do { do {
let m1 = try helper.noiseManagers["Bob"]!.initiateHandshake(with: helper.nodes["Alice"]!.peerID) let m1 = try helper.noiseManagers["Bob"]!.initiateHandshake(with: helper.nodes["Alice"]!.peerID)
let m2 = try #require( let m2 = try helper.noiseManagers["Alice"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(from: helper.nodes["Bob"]!.peerID, message: m1)!
try helper.noiseManagers["Alice"]!.handleIncomingHandshake( let m3 = try helper.noiseManagers["Bob"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(from: helper.nodes["Alice"]!.peerID, message: m2)!
from: helper.nodes["Bob"]!.peerID,
message: m1
)
)
let m3 = try #require(
try helper.noiseManagers["Bob"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(
from: helper.nodes["Alice"]!.peerID,
message: m2
)
)
_ = try helper.noiseManagers["Alice"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(from: helper.nodes["Bob"]!.peerID, message: m3) _ = try helper.noiseManagers["Alice"]!.handleIncomingHandshake(from: helper.nodes["Bob"]!.peerID, message: m3)
} catch { } catch {
Issue.record("Failed to re-establish Noise session after restart: \(error)") Issue.record("Failed to re-establish Noise session after restart: \(error)")
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
import Foundation import Foundation
import CryptoKit import CryptoKit
import Testing
@testable import BitFoundation // to avoid unnecessary public's @testable import BitFoundation // to avoid unnecessary public's
@testable import bitchat @testable import bitchat
@@ -28,14 +27,9 @@ final class TestNetworkHelper {
node.mockNickname = name node.mockNickname = name
nodes[name] = node nodes[name] = node
// This synchronous helper directly drives all three XX messages and // Create/replace Noise manager for this node
// has no transport callback loop for delayed collision recovery.
let key = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey() let key = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
noiseManagers[name] = NoiseSessionManager( noiseManagers[name] = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: key, keychain: mockKeychain)
localStaticKey: key,
keychain: mockKeychain,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
)
return node return node
} }
@@ -114,18 +108,8 @@ final class TestNetworkHelper {
let peer2ID = nodes[node2]?.peerID else { return } let peer2ID = nodes[node2]?.peerID else { return }
let msg1 = try manager1.initiateHandshake(with: peer2ID) let msg1 = try manager1.initiateHandshake(with: peer2ID)
let msg2 = try #require( let msg2 = try manager2.handleIncomingHandshake(from: peer1ID, message: msg1)!
try manager2.handleIncomingHandshake( let msg3 = try manager1.handleIncomingHandshake(from: peer2ID, message: msg2)!
from: peer1ID,
message: msg1
)
)
let msg3 = try #require(
try manager1.handleIncomingHandshake(
from: peer2ID,
message: msg2
)
)
_ = try manager2.handleIncomingHandshake(from: peer1ID, message: msg3) _ = try manager2.handleIncomingHandshake(from: peer1ID, message: msg3)
} }
} }
@@ -323,32 +323,6 @@ struct MessageFormattingEngineTests {
// Exactly at threshold DOES trigger (uses >= comparison) // Exactly at threshold DOES trigger (uses >= comparison)
#expect(content.hasVeryLongToken(threshold: 50)) #expect(content.hasVeryLongToken(threshold: 50))
} }
@Test func isLongForDisplay_doesNotIgnoreCashuLinks() {
let cashu = "cashuA" + String(repeating: "a", count: 40)
let content = String(repeating: "a", count: TransportConfig.uiLongMessageLengthThreshold + 1) + " " + cashu
#expect(content.extractCashuLinks().count == 1)
#expect(content.isLongForDisplay())
}
@MainActor
@Test func formatMessage_longCashuMessageFallsBackToPlainContentPath() {
let context = MockMessageFormattingContext(nickname: "carol")
let cashu = "cashuA" + String(repeating: "a", count: 40)
let longContent = "hi @bob " + cashu + " " + String(repeating: "x", count: 4_100)
let message = BitchatMessage(
id: "long-cashu",
sender: "alice",
content: longContent,
timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_700_000_999),
isRelay: false
)
let formatted = MessageFormattingEngine.formatMessage(message, context: context, colorScheme: .light)
#expect(String(formatted.characters) == "<@alice> \(longContent) [\(message.formattedTimestamp)]")
}
} }
@MainActor @MainActor
@@ -116,87 +116,4 @@ struct MessageRateLimiterTests {
#expect(plain) #expect(plain)
#expect(!plainExhausted) #expect(!plainExhausted)
} }
@Test("Content buckets do not grow when sender is rate limited")
func contentBucketsDoNotGrowAfterSenderLimit() {
var limiter = MessageRateLimiter(
senderCapacity: 1,
senderRefillPerSec: 0,
contentCapacity: 1,
contentRefillPerSec: 0,
maxSenderBuckets: 10,
maxContentBuckets: 10,
bucketIdleTTL: 60
)
let now = Date()
let first = limiter.allow(senderKey: "sender", contentKey: "content-0", now: now)
var rejected = true
for index in 1...100 {
if limiter.allow(senderKey: "sender", contentKey: "content-\(index)", now: now) {
rejected = false
}
}
#expect(first)
#expect(rejected)
#expect(limiter.bucketCountsForTesting.sender == 1)
#expect(limiter.bucketCountsForTesting.content == 1)
}
@Test("Bucket maps evict entries at configured caps")
func bucketMapsEvictAtConfiguredCaps() {
let maxEntries = 3
var limiter = MessageRateLimiter(
senderCapacity: 1,
senderRefillPerSec: 0,
contentCapacity: 1,
contentRefillPerSec: 0,
maxSenderBuckets: maxEntries,
maxContentBuckets: maxEntries,
bucketIdleTTL: 60
)
let now = Date()
for index in 0..<25 {
_ = limiter.allow(
senderKey: "sender-\(index)",
contentKey: "content-\(index)",
now: now.addingTimeInterval(TimeInterval(index))
)
}
#expect(limiter.bucketCountsForTesting.sender == maxEntries)
#expect(limiter.bucketCountsForTesting.content == maxEntries)
}
@Test("PoW bypass still creates content buckets under the cap")
func powBypassCreatesBoundedContentBuckets() {
let maxEntries = 3
var limiter = MessageRateLimiter(
senderCapacity: 1,
senderRefillPerSec: 0,
contentCapacity: 100,
contentRefillPerSec: 0,
maxSenderBuckets: maxEntries,
maxContentBuckets: maxEntries,
bucketIdleTTL: 60
)
let now = Date()
var allAllowed = true
for index in 0..<10 {
let allowed = limiter.allow(
senderKey: "sender",
contentKey: "content-\(index)",
powBits: NostrPoW.rateLimitBypassBits,
now: now.addingTimeInterval(TimeInterval(index))
)
if !allowed { allAllowed = false }
}
#expect(allAllowed)
#expect(limiter.bucketCountsForTesting.sender == 0)
#expect(limiter.bucketCountsForTesting.content == maxEntries)
}
} }
+1 -22
View File
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ final class MockIdentityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
private var blockedFingerprints: Set<String> = [] private var blockedFingerprints: Set<String> = []
private var blockedNostrPubkeys: Set<String> = [] private var blockedNostrPubkeys: Set<String> = []
private var socialIdentities: [String: SocialIdentity] = [:] private var socialIdentities: [String: SocialIdentity] = [:]
private var privateMediaCapableFingerprints: Set<String> = []
private var authenticatedSigningKeys: [String: Data] = [:]
init(_: KeychainManagerProtocol) {} init(_: KeychainManagerProtocol) {}
@@ -89,10 +87,7 @@ final class MockIdentityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState) {} func registerEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID, handshakeState: HandshakeState) {}
func clearAllIdentityData() { func clearAllIdentityData() {}
privateMediaCapableFingerprints.removeAll()
authenticatedSigningKeys.removeAll()
}
func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID) {} func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID) {}
@@ -106,22 +101,6 @@ final class MockIdentityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
Set() Set()
} }
func markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: String) {
privateMediaCapableFingerprints.insert(fingerprint)
}
func hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: String) -> Bool {
privateMediaCapableFingerprints.contains(fingerprint)
}
func bindAuthenticatedSigningPublicKey(_ signingPublicKey: Data, fingerprint: String) {
authenticatedSigningKeys[fingerprint] = signingPublicKey
}
func authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data? {
authenticatedSigningKeys[fingerprint]
}
// MARK: Vouching (transitive verification) // MARK: Vouching (transitive verification)
private var vouchesByVouchee: [String: [VouchRecord]] = [:] private var vouchesByVouchee: [String: [VouchRecord]] = [:]
-25
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ final class MockTransport: Transport {
private(set) var sentFavoriteNotifications: [(peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool)] = [] private(set) var sentFavoriteNotifications: [(peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool)] = []
private(set) var sentBroadcastFiles: [(packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferID: String)] = [] private(set) var sentBroadcastFiles: [(packet: BitchatFilePacket, transferID: String)] = []
private(set) var sentPrivateFiles: [(packet: BitchatFilePacket, peerID: PeerID, transferID: String)] = [] private(set) var sentPrivateFiles: [(packet: BitchatFilePacket, peerID: PeerID, transferID: String)] = []
private(set) var sentPrivateFileLegacyAllowances: [Bool] = []
private(set) var cancelledTransfers: [String] = [] private(set) var cancelledTransfers: [String] = []
private(set) var sentVerifyChallenges: [(peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)] = [] private(set) var sentVerifyChallenges: [(peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)] = []
private(set) var sentVerifyResponses: [(peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)] = [] private(set) var sentVerifyResponses: [(peerID: PeerID, noiseKeyHex: String, nonceA: Data)] = []
@@ -59,7 +58,6 @@ final class MockTransport: Transport {
var peerNicknames: [PeerID: String] = [:] var peerNicknames: [PeerID: String] = [:]
var peerFingerprints: [PeerID: String] = [:] var peerFingerprints: [PeerID: String] = [:]
var peerNoiseStates: [PeerID: LazyHandshakeState] = [:] var peerNoiseStates: [PeerID: LazyHandshakeState] = [:]
var privateMediaPolicies: [PeerID: PrivateMediaSendPolicy] = [:]
private let mockKeychain = MockKeychain() private let mockKeychain = MockKeychain()
// MARK: - Transport Protocol Implementation // MARK: - Transport Protocol Implementation
@@ -188,29 +186,6 @@ final class MockTransport: Transport {
func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String) { func sendFilePrivate(_ packet: BitchatFilePacket, to peerID: PeerID, transferId: String) {
sentPrivateFiles.append((packet, peerID, transferId)) sentPrivateFiles.append((packet, peerID, transferId))
sentPrivateFileLegacyAllowances.append(false)
}
func sendFilePrivate(
_ packet: BitchatFilePacket,
to peerID: PeerID,
transferId: String,
allowLegacyFallback: Bool
) {
sentPrivateFiles.append((packet, peerID, transferId))
sentPrivateFileLegacyAllowances.append(allowLegacyFallback)
}
func privateMediaSendPolicy(to peerID: PeerID) -> PrivateMediaSendPolicy {
privateMediaPolicies[peerID] ?? .encrypted
}
func resolvePrivateMediaSendPolicy(
to peerID: PeerID,
completion: @escaping @MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void
) {
let policy = privateMediaPolicies[peerID] ?? .encrypted
Task { @MainActor in completion(policy) }
} }
func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String) { func cancelTransfer(_ transferId: String) {
+9 -206
View File
@@ -5,22 +5,15 @@ import BitFoundation
@testable import bitchat @testable import bitchat
@Suite("Noise Coverage Tests", .serialized) @Suite("Noise Coverage Tests")
struct NoiseCoverageTests { struct NoiseCoverageTests {
private let keychain = MockKeychain() private let keychain = MockKeychain()
private let aliceStaticKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey() private let aliceStaticKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
private let bobStaticKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey() private let bobStaticKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
private let charlieStaticKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey() private let charlieStaticKey = Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PrivateKey()
// Manager test dictionaries are keyed by the remote peer. Keep the private let alicePeerID = PeerID(str: "0011223344556677")
// historical names, but derive each wire ID from the static key that the private let bobPeerID = PeerID(str: "8899aabbccddeeff")
// corresponding manager authenticates during the handshake.
private var alicePeerID: PeerID {
PeerID(publicKey: bobStaticKey.publicKey.rawRepresentation)
}
private var bobPeerID: PeerID {
PeerID(publicKey: aliceStaticKey.publicKey.rawRepresentation)
}
private let charliePeerID = PeerID(str: "fedcba9876543210") private let charliePeerID = PeerID(str: "fedcba9876543210")
@Test("Protocol metadata and handshake patterns expose expected values") @Test("Protocol metadata and handshake patterns expose expected values")
@@ -542,12 +535,8 @@ struct NoiseCoverageTests {
let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: aliceStaticKey, keychain: keychain) let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: aliceStaticKey, keychain: keychain)
let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobStaticKey, keychain: keychain) let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobStaticKey, keychain: keychain)
aliceManager.onSessionEstablished = establishedRecorder.recordEstablished( aliceManager.onSessionEstablished = establishedRecorder.recordEstablished(peerID:remoteKey:)
peerID:remoteKey:sessionGeneration: bobManager.onSessionEstablished = establishedRecorder.recordEstablished(peerID:remoteKey:)
)
bobManager.onSessionEstablished = establishedRecorder.recordEstablished(
peerID:remoteKey:sessionGeneration:
)
try establishManagerSessions(aliceManager: aliceManager, bobManager: bobManager) try establishManagerSessions(aliceManager: aliceManager, bobManager: bobManager)
@@ -633,16 +622,8 @@ struct NoiseCoverageTests {
) )
let replacementSession = try #require(manager.getSession(for: alicePeerID)) let replacementSession = try #require(manager.getSession(for: alicePeerID))
let localPeerID = PeerID( #expect(replacementResponse != nil)
publicKey: aliceStaticKey.publicKey.rawRepresentation #expect(replacementSession !== restartedSession)
)
if localPeerID < alicePeerID {
#expect(replacementResponse == nil)
#expect(replacementSession === restartedSession)
} else {
#expect(replacementResponse != nil)
#expect(replacementSession !== restartedSession)
}
let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: aliceStaticKey, keychain: keychain) let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: aliceStaticKey, keychain: keychain)
let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobStaticKey, keychain: keychain) let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobStaticKey, keychain: keychain)
@@ -662,128 +643,13 @@ struct NoiseCoverageTests {
try aliceManager.initiateHandshake(with: alicePeerID) try aliceManager.initiateHandshake(with: alicePeerID)
} }
let rekeyInitiation = try aliceManager.initiateRekey(for: alicePeerID) try aliceManager.initiateRekey(for: alicePeerID)
let rekeyHandshake = try #require(
aliceManager.claimHandshakeInitiation(
rekeyInitiation,
for: alicePeerID
)
)
#expect(!rekeyHandshake.isEmpty)
let rekeyedSession = try #require(aliceManager.getSession(for: alicePeerID)) let rekeyedSession = try #require(aliceManager.getSession(for: alicePeerID))
#expect(rekeyedSession !== establishedSession) #expect(rekeyedSession !== establishedSession)
#expect(rekeyedSession.getState() == .handshaking) #expect(rekeyedSession.getState() == .handshaking)
} }
@Test("A stale decrypt generation cannot commit across session promotion")
func staleDecryptGenerationCannotCommitAcrossPromotion() throws {
let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(
localStaticKey: aliceStaticKey,
keychain: keychain,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0,
sessionFactory: { peerID, role in
BlockingDecryptNoiseSession(
peerID: peerID,
role: role,
keychain: self.keychain,
localStaticKey: self.aliceStaticKey
)
}
)
let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobStaticKey, keychain: keychain)
try establishManagerSessions(aliceManager: aliceManager, bobManager: bobManager)
let oldSession = try #require(
aliceManager.getSession(for: alicePeerID) as? BlockingDecryptNoiseSession
)
let oldGeneration = try #require(aliceManager.sessionGeneration(for: alicePeerID))
// Prepare a fully authenticated responder candidate without promoting
// it yet. Its final XX message is the exact operation that replaces
// the old `sessions[peerID]` entry.
let replacementInitiator = NoiseSession(
peerID: bobPeerID,
role: .initiator,
keychain: keychain,
localStaticKey: bobStaticKey
)
let message1 = try replacementInitiator.startHandshake()
let message2 = try #require(
try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(from: alicePeerID, message: message1)
)
let message3 = try #require(try replacementInitiator.processHandshakeMessage(message2))
let ciphertext = try bobManager.encrypt(Data("old session".utf8), for: bobPeerID)
oldSession.pauseNextDecrypt()
let decryptResult = ConcurrentTestResult<(plaintext: Data, sessionGeneration: UUID)>()
var promotionResultForCleanup: ConcurrentTestResult<Data?>?
defer {
// A failed startup requirement must not strand a late thread in
// the blocking test double after the test has returned.
oldSession.resumeDecrypt()
_ = decryptResult.wait(timeout: 5)
if let promotionResultForCleanup {
_ = promotionResultForCleanup.wait(timeout: 5)
}
}
let decryptThread = Thread {
decryptResult.capture {
try aliceManager.decryptWithSessionGeneration(ciphertext, from: self.alicePeerID)
}
}
decryptThread.name = "NoiseCoverageTests.staleDecrypt.decrypt"
decryptThread.qualityOfService = .userInitiated
decryptThread.start()
try #require(oldSession.waitForDecryptStart(timeout: 5))
let promotionStarted = DispatchSemaphore(value: 0)
let promotionResult = ConcurrentTestResult<Data?>()
promotionResultForCleanup = promotionResult
let promotionThread = Thread {
promotionStarted.signal()
promotionResult.capture {
try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(from: self.alicePeerID, message: message3)
}
}
promotionThread.name = "NoiseCoverageTests.staleDecrypt.promote"
promotionThread.qualityOfService = .userInitiated
promotionThread.start()
try #require(promotionStarted.wait(timeout: .now() + 5) == .success)
#expect(
promotionResult.wait(timeout: 0.05) == nil,
"Promotion must wait for the exact decrypting-session lease"
)
oldSession.resumeDecrypt()
let decrypted = try #require(decryptResult.wait(timeout: 5)).get()
_ = try #require(promotionResult.wait(timeout: 5)).get()
#expect(decrypted.plaintext == Data("old session".utf8))
#expect(decrypted.sessionGeneration == oldGeneration)
#expect(aliceManager.sessionGeneration(for: alicePeerID) != oldGeneration)
#expect(throws: NoiseEncryptionError.sessionNotEstablished) {
try aliceManager.encrypt(
Data("stale send".utf8),
for: alicePeerID,
expectedSessionGeneration: oldGeneration
)
}
var staleCommitRan = false
let staleCommit = aliceManager.withCurrentSessionGeneration(
for: alicePeerID,
expected: decrypted.sessionGeneration
) {
staleCommitRan = true
return true
}
#expect(staleCommit == nil)
#expect(!staleCommitRan)
}
@Test("Secure noise sessions enforce limits and renegotiation thresholds") @Test("Secure noise sessions enforce limits and renegotiation thresholds")
func secureNoiseSessionsEnforceLimitsAndThresholds() throws { func secureNoiseSessionsEnforceLimitsAndThresholds() throws {
let initiator = SecureNoiseSession( let initiator = SecureNoiseSession(
@@ -978,11 +844,7 @@ private final class SessionCallbackRecorder: @unchecked Sendable {
return establishedEntries.map(\.0) return establishedEntries.map(\.0)
} }
func recordEstablished( func recordEstablished(peerID: PeerID, remoteKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey) {
peerID: PeerID,
remoteKey: Curve25519.KeyAgreement.PublicKey,
sessionGeneration _: UUID
) {
lock.lock() lock.lock()
establishedEntries.append((peerID, remoteKey.rawRepresentation)) establishedEntries.append((peerID, remoteKey.rawRepresentation))
lock.unlock() lock.unlock()
@@ -1004,62 +866,3 @@ private final class FailingNoiseSession: NoiseSession {
throw Error.synthetic throw Error.synthetic
} }
} }
private final class BlockingDecryptNoiseSession: NoiseSession, @unchecked Sendable {
private let controlLock = NSLock()
private var shouldPauseNextDecrypt = false
private let decryptStarted = DispatchSemaphore(value: 0)
private let resumeDecryptSemaphore = DispatchSemaphore(value: 0)
func pauseNextDecrypt() {
controlLock.lock()
shouldPauseNextDecrypt = true
controlLock.unlock()
}
func waitForDecryptStart(timeout: TimeInterval) -> Bool {
decryptStarted.wait(timeout: .now() + timeout) == .success
}
func resumeDecrypt() {
resumeDecryptSemaphore.signal()
}
override func decrypt(_ ciphertext: Data) throws -> Data {
controlLock.lock()
let shouldPause = shouldPauseNextDecrypt
shouldPauseNextDecrypt = false
controlLock.unlock()
if shouldPause {
decryptStarted.signal()
resumeDecryptSemaphore.wait()
}
return try super.decrypt(ciphertext)
}
}
private final class ConcurrentTestResult<Value>: @unchecked Sendable {
private let lock = NSLock()
private let completed = DispatchGroup()
private var storedResult: Result<Value, Error>?
init() {
completed.enter()
}
func capture(_ operation: () throws -> Value) {
let result = Result(catching: operation)
lock.lock()
storedResult = result
lock.unlock()
completed.leave()
}
func wait(timeout: TimeInterval) -> Result<Value, Error>? {
guard completed.wait(timeout: .now() + timeout) == .success else { return nil }
lock.lock()
defer { lock.unlock() }
return storedResult
}
}
+18 -57
View File
@@ -357,18 +357,8 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
@Test func peerRestartDetection() throws { @Test func peerRestartDetection() throws {
// Establish initial sessions // Establish initial sessions
// This test explicitly drives the three synchronous XX messages and let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: aliceKey, keychain: mockKeychain)
// does not exercise the transport's delayed collision recovery. let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobKey, keychain: mockKeychain)
let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(
localStaticKey: aliceKey,
keychain: mockKeychain,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
)
let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(
localStaticKey: bobKey,
keychain: mockKeychain,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
)
try establishManagerSessions(aliceManager: aliceManager, bobManager: bobManager) try establishManagerSessions(aliceManager: aliceManager, bobManager: bobManager)
@@ -387,24 +377,15 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
let newHandshake1 = try bobManagerRestarted.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID) let newHandshake1 = try bobManagerRestarted.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
// Alice should accept the new handshake (clearing old session) // Alice should accept the new handshake (clearing old session)
let newHandshake2 = try #require( let newHandshake2 = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake( from: alicePeerID, message: newHandshake1)
from: alicePeerID, #expect(newHandshake2 != nil)
message: newHandshake1
)
)
// Complete the new handshake // Complete the new handshake
let newHandshake3 = try #require( let newHandshake3 = try bobManagerRestarted.handleIncomingHandshake(
try bobManagerRestarted.handleIncomingHandshake( from: bobPeerID, message: newHandshake2!)
from: bobPeerID, #expect(newHandshake3 != nil)
message: newHandshake2 _ = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(from: alicePeerID, message: newHandshake3!)
)
)
_ = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
from: alicePeerID,
message: newHandshake3
)
// Should be able to exchange messages with new sessions // Should be able to exchange messages with new sessions
let testMessage = Data("After restart".utf8) let testMessage = Data("After restart".utf8)
@@ -562,18 +543,8 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
@Test func nonceDesynchronizationCausesRehandshake() throws { @Test func nonceDesynchronizationCausesRehandshake() throws {
// Test that nonce desynchronization leads to proper re-handshake // Test that nonce desynchronization leads to proper re-handshake
// This test explicitly drives the three synchronous XX messages and let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: aliceKey, keychain: mockKeychain)
// does not exercise the transport's delayed collision recovery. let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(localStaticKey: bobKey, keychain: mockKeychain)
let aliceManager = NoiseSessionManager(
localStaticKey: aliceKey,
keychain: mockKeychain,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
)
let bobManager = NoiseSessionManager(
localStaticKey: bobKey,
keychain: mockKeychain,
recentInitiatorCompletionGracePeriod: 0
)
// Establish sessions // Establish sessions
try establishManagerSessions(aliceManager: aliceManager, bobManager: bobManager) try establishManagerSessions(aliceManager: aliceManager, bobManager: bobManager)
@@ -601,25 +572,15 @@ struct NoiseProtocolTests {
let rehandshake1 = try bobManager.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID) let rehandshake1 = try bobManager.initiateHandshake(with: bobPeerID)
// Alice should accept despite having a "valid" (but desynced) session // Alice should accept despite having a "valid" (but desynced) session
let rehandshake2 = try #require( let rehandshake2 = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake( from: alicePeerID, message: rehandshake1)
from: alicePeerID, #expect(rehandshake2 != nil, "Alice should accept handshake to fix desync")
message: rehandshake1
),
"Alice should accept handshake to fix desync"
)
// Complete handshake // Complete handshake
let rehandshake3 = try #require( let rehandshake3 = try bobManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
try bobManager.handleIncomingHandshake( from: bobPeerID, message: rehandshake2!)
from: bobPeerID, #expect(rehandshake3 != nil)
message: rehandshake2 _ = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(from: alicePeerID, message: rehandshake3!)
)
)
_ = try aliceManager.handleIncomingHandshake(
from: alicePeerID,
message: rehandshake3
)
// Verify communication works again // Verify communication works again
let testResynced = Data("Resynced".utf8) let testResynced = Data("Resynced".utf8)
-58
View File
@@ -290,65 +290,7 @@ struct NostrProtocolTests {
#expect(object["limit"] as? Int == 42) #expect(object["limit"] as? Int == 42)
} }
@Test func inboundNostrEventRejectsTooManyTags() throws {
var eventDict = Self.validInboundEventDict()
eventDict["tags"] = Array(
repeating: ["g", "u4pruyd"],
count: TransportConfig.nostrMaxEventTags + 1
)
#expect(throws: NostrError.invalidEvent) {
_ = try NostrEvent(from: eventDict)
}
}
@Test func inboundNostrEventRejectsTooManyTagValues() throws {
var eventDict = Self.validInboundEventDict()
eventDict["tags"] = [Array(
repeating: "value",
count: TransportConfig.nostrMaxEventTagValues + 1
)]
#expect(throws: NostrError.invalidEvent) {
_ = try NostrEvent(from: eventDict)
}
}
@Test func inboundNostrEventRejectsOversizedTagValues() throws {
var eventDict = Self.validInboundEventDict()
eventDict["tags"] = [[
"g",
String(repeating: "a", count: TransportConfig.nostrMaxEventTagValueBytes + 1)
]]
#expect(throws: NostrError.invalidEvent) {
_ = try NostrEvent(from: eventDict)
}
}
@Test func inboundNostrEventAcceptsTagsWithinLimits() throws {
var eventDict = Self.validInboundEventDict()
eventDict["tags"] = [["g", "u4pruyd"], ["t", "teleport"]]
let event = try NostrEvent(from: eventDict)
#expect(event.tags.count == 2)
}
// MARK: - Helpers // MARK: - Helpers
private static func validInboundEventDict() -> [String: Any] {
[
"id": String(repeating: "0", count: 64),
"pubkey": String(repeating: "1", count: 64),
"created_at": 1_234_567,
"kind": NostrProtocol.EventKind.ephemeralEvent.rawValue,
"tags": [["g", "u4pruyd"]],
"content": "hello",
"sig": String(repeating: "2", count: 128)
]
}
private static func base64URLDecode(_ s: String) -> Data? { private static func base64URLDecode(_ s: String) -> Data? {
var str = s.replacingOccurrences(of: "-", with: "+").replacingOccurrences(of: "_", with: "/") var str = s.replacingOccurrences(of: "-", with: "+").replacingOccurrences(of: "_", with: "/")
let rem = str.count % 4 let rem = str.count % 4
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@
import Foundation import Foundation
import Testing import Testing
import BitFoundation
@testable import bitchat @testable import bitchat
@Suite("PreviewKeychainManager Tests") @Suite("PreviewKeychainManager Tests")
struct PreviewKeychainManagerTests { struct PreviewKeychainManagerTests {
@Test("Install lifecycle distinguishes upgrade, reinstall, bootstrap, and unreadable keychain")
func installLifecycleDecision() {
#expect(KeychainManager.installLifecycleAction(
containerKnowsMarker: true,
markerRead: .success(Data([1]))
) == .markerPresent)
#expect(KeychainManager.installLifecycleAction(
containerKnowsMarker: false,
markerRead: .success(Data([1]))
) == .clearStaleKeys)
#expect(KeychainManager.installLifecycleAction(
containerKnowsMarker: false,
markerRead: .itemNotFound
) == .bootstrapMarker)
#expect(KeychainManager.installLifecycleAction(
containerKnowsMarker: false,
markerRead: .deviceLocked
) == .retryLater)
}
@Test("Preview keychain manager stores identity and service-scoped data in memory") @Test("Preview keychain manager stores identity and service-scoped data in memory")
func previewKeychainManagerRoundTripsData() { func previewKeychainManagerRoundTripsData() {
let manager = PreviewKeychainManager() let manager = PreviewKeychainManager()
-33
View File
@@ -145,39 +145,6 @@ struct PacketsTests {
#expect(decoded.capabilities?.rawValue == 0x0180) #expect(decoded.capabilities?.rawValue == 0x0180)
} }
@Test
func authenticatedPeerStateUsesVersionedCanonicalTLVs() throws {
let signingKey = Data(repeating: 0xA5, count: 32)
let packet = AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket(
capabilities: [.privateMedia, .vouch],
signingPublicKey: signingKey
)
var encoded = try #require(packet.encode())
#expect(encoded.prefix(5) == Data([0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x20, 0x01]))
// Unknown TLVs are forward-compatible and do not alter v1 state.
encoded.append(makeTLV(type: 0x7F, value: Data([0xCA, 0xFE])))
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: encoded) == packet)
}
@Test
func authenticatedPeerStateRejectsMalformedAmbiguousOrUnknownVersion() {
let key = Data(repeating: 0x44, count: 32)
let capabilities = makeTLV(type: 0x01, value: Data([0x00, 0x01]))
let signing = makeTLV(type: 0x02, value: key)
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: Data([0x02]) + capabilities + signing) == nil)
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: Data([0x01]) + signing) == nil)
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: Data([0x01]) + capabilities + capabilities + signing) == nil)
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: Data([0x01, 0x01, 0x00]) + signing) == nil)
// 0x0001 is non-minimal little endian; the canonical form is [0x01].
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: Data([0x01]) + makeTLV(type: 0x01, value: Data([0x01, 0x00])) + signing) == nil)
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: Data([0x01]) + capabilities + makeTLV(type: 0x02, value: Data(key.dropLast()))) == nil)
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: Data([0x01]) + capabilities + Data(signing.dropLast())) == nil)
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: Data([0x01]) + makeTLV(type: 0x01, value: Data(repeating: 0x01, count: 9)) + signing) == nil)
}
@Test @Test
func privateMessagePacketRejectsUnknownTypeAndTruncation() { func privateMessagePacketRejectsUnknownTypeAndTruncation() {
let unknownTLV = Data([0x7F, 0x01, 0x41]) let unknownTLV = Data([0x7F, 0x01, 0x41])
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import Testing
struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests { struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
private final class Recorder { private final class Recorder {
var existingNoisePublicKey: Data? var existingNoisePublicKey: Data?
var authenticatedSigningPublicKey: Data?
var signatureValid = true var signatureValid = true
var linkState: (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool) = (false, false) var linkState: (hasPeripheral: Bool, hasCentral: Bool) = (false, false)
var linkBoundToOtherPeer = false var linkBoundToOtherPeer = false
@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlerTests {
messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault, messageTTL: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
now: { now }, now: { now },
existingNoisePublicKey: { _ in recorder.existingNoisePublicKey }, existingNoisePublicKey: { _ in recorder.existingNoisePublicKey },
authenticatedSigningPublicKey: { _ in recorder.authenticatedSigningPublicKey },
verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in verifySignature: { packet, signingPublicKey in
recorder.verifySignatureCalls.append((packet, signingPublicKey)) recorder.verifySignatureCalls.append((packet, signingPublicKey))
return recorder.signatureValid return recorder.signatureValid
@@ -169,23 +169,6 @@ struct BLEAnnounceHandlingPolicyTests {
#expect(decision.isVerified) #expect(decision.isVerified)
} }
@Test
func trustPolicyRejectsSigningKeyReplacementAfterNoiseBinding() {
let noiseKey = Data(repeating: 0xCC, count: 32)
let boundSigningKey = Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32)
let decision = BLEAnnounceTrustPolicy.evaluate(
hasSignature: true,
signatureValid: true,
existingNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
announcedNoisePublicKey: noiseKey,
authenticatedSigningPublicKey: boundSigningKey,
announcedSigningPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x22, count: 32)
)
#expect(decision == .reject(.authenticatedSigningKeyMismatch))
}
@Test @Test
func responsePolicyConnectsOnlyForDirectNewOrReconnectedPeers() { func responsePolicyConnectsOnlyForDirectNewOrReconnectedPeers() {
let directNew = BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy.plan( let directNew = BLEAnnounceResponsePolicy.plan(
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
recorder.signatureVerifyCount += 1 recorder.signatureVerifyCount += 1
return recorder.signatureVerifies return recorder.signatureVerifies
}, },
localSigningPublicKey: { [sampleSigningKey] in sampleSigningKey },
signedSenderDisplayName: { _, peerID in signedSenderDisplayName: { _, peerID in
recorder.signedNameQueries.append(peerID) recorder.signedNameQueries.append(peerID)
return recorder.signedName return recorder.signedName
@@ -93,11 +92,12 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
@Test @Test
func selfEchoIsDropped() throws { func selfEchoIsDropped() throws {
let recorder = Recorder() let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.signatureVerifies = true
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder) let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket(sender: localPeerID, mimeType: "application/pdf", content: Data("%PDF-1.7".utf8), ttl: 3) let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket(sender: localPeerID, mimeType: "application/pdf", content: Data("%PDF-1.7".utf8), ttl: 3)
#expect(!handler.handle(packet, from: localPeerID)) // The relay pipeline already suppresses self-originated packets, so the
// handler reports "relayable" rather than treating the echo as forged.
#expect(handler.handle(packet, from: localPeerID))
expectNoSideEffects(recorder) expectNoSideEffects(recorder)
} }
@@ -120,12 +120,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
let recorder = Recorder() let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Bob", isVerified: false, isConnected: true)] recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Bob", isVerified: false, isConnected: true)]
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder) let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket( let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket(sender: remotePeerID, mimeType: "application/pdf", content: Data("%PDF-1.7".utf8))
sender: remotePeerID,
mimeType: "application/pdf",
content: Data("%PDF-1.7".utf8),
hasSignature: false
)
// Failed sender authentication must also stop the packet from being // Failed sender authentication must also stop the packet from being
// relayed to downstream nodes. // relayed to downstream nodes.
@@ -134,7 +129,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
// Broadcast files carry an attacker-controllable senderID, so like // Broadcast files carry an attacker-controllable senderID, so like
// public messages a connected-but-unverified peer must present a valid // public messages a connected-but-unverified peer must present a valid
// packet signature. No signing key + no signed identity means dropped. // packet signature. No signing key + no signed identity means dropped.
#expect(recorder.signedNameQueries.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.signedNameQueries == [remotePeerID])
#expect(recorder.trackedPackets.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.trackedPackets.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
} }
@@ -158,11 +153,12 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
} }
@Test @Test
func signedSelfBroadcastReplayIsDelivered() throws { func selfBroadcastReplayIsDeliveredWithoutSignatureCheck() throws {
// Our own broadcast file replayed via gossip sync arrives with ttl==0; // Our own broadcast file replayed via gossip sync arrives with ttl==0
// it is verified against our local signing key before delivery. // (so it is not treated as a self-echo) and cannot be verified against
// the peer registry it must still be accepted, matching
// BLEPublicMessageHandler's self exemption.
let recorder = Recorder() let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.signatureVerifies = true
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder) let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket( let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket(
sender: localPeerID, sender: localPeerID,
@@ -173,7 +169,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
#expect(handler.handle(packet, from: localPeerID)) #expect(handler.handle(packet, from: localPeerID))
#expect(recorder.signatureVerifyCount == 1) #expect(recorder.signatureVerifyCount == 0)
#expect(recorder.signedNameQueries.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.signedNameQueries.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1) #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.sender == "Me") #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.sender == "Me")
@@ -209,8 +205,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
sender: remotePeerID, sender: remotePeerID,
mimeType: "audio/mp4", mimeType: "audio/mp4",
content: m4a, content: m4a,
fileName: "voice_1122334455667788", fileName: "voice_1122334455667788"
hasSignature: false
) )
// The spoofed note must be dropped locally AND not relayed onward. // The spoofed note must be dropped locally AND not relayed onward.
@@ -220,7 +215,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
} }
@Test @Test
func rawDirectedFileWithoutVerifiableSignatureIsDroppedWithoutWriteOrRelay() throws { func privateFileFromConnectedUnverifiedPeerIsAccepted() throws {
let recorder = Recorder() let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Bob", isVerified: false, isConnected: true)] recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Bob", isVerified: false, isConnected: true)]
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder) let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
@@ -228,25 +223,23 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
sender: remotePeerID, sender: remotePeerID,
mimeType: "application/pdf", mimeType: "application/pdf",
content: Data("%PDF-1.7".utf8), content: Data("%PDF-1.7".utf8),
recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id), recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
hasSignature: false
) )
#expect(!handler.handle(packet, from: remotePeerID)) #expect(handler.handle(packet, from: remotePeerID))
// Directed transfers keep the lenient connected-peer path (no broadcast
// exposure); no signature check is required.
#expect(recorder.signatureVerifyCount == 0) #expect(recorder.signatureVerifyCount == 0)
#expect(recorder.signedNameQueries.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.signedNameQueries.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.trackedPackets.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.quotaReservations.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.isPrivate == true)
#expect(recorder.saveCalls.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
} }
@Test @Test
func fileDirectedToAnotherPeerIsIgnored() throws { func fileDirectedToAnotherPeerIsIgnored() throws {
let recorder = Recorder() let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true, signingPublicKey: sampleSigningKey)] recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
recorder.signatureVerifies = true
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder) let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket( let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket(
sender: remotePeerID, sender: remotePeerID,
@@ -267,8 +260,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
@Test @Test
func privateFileUpdatesLastSeenAndDeliversPrivateMessage() throws { func privateFileUpdatesLastSeenAndDeliversPrivateMessage() throws {
let recorder = Recorder() let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true, signingPublicKey: sampleSigningKey)] recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
recorder.signatureVerifies = true
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder) let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket( let packet = try makeFileTransferPacket(
sender: remotePeerID, sender: remotePeerID,
@@ -290,56 +282,6 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
#expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.deliveryStatus == .delivered(to: "Me", at: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 900))) #expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.deliveryStatus == .delivered(to: "Me", at: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 900)))
} }
@Test
func decryptedPrivateFileUsesValidationQuotaAndPrivateDeliveryWithoutRawSignature() throws {
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.peers = [remotePeerID: makePeerInfo(remotePeerID, nickname: "Alice", isVerified: true)]
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let content = Data([0xFF, 0xD8, 0xFF]) + Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 128)
let file = BitchatFilePacket(
fileName: "secret.jpg",
fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
content: content
)
let payload = try #require(file.encode())
let timestamp = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
#expect(handler.handlePrivatePayload(payload, from: remotePeerID, timestamp: timestamp))
#expect(recorder.signatureVerifyCount == 0)
#expect(recorder.signedNameQueries.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.trackedPackets.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.quotaReservations == [content.count])
#expect(recorder.saveCalls.first?.data == content)
#expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates == [remotePeerID])
#expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.isPrivate == true)
#expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.first?.timestamp == timestamp)
}
@Test
func decryptedPrivateFileOverPayloadCapIsRejectedBeforeQuotaOrDiskWrite() {
let recorder = Recorder()
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let oversizedCount = FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes + 1
var length = UInt32(oversizedCount).bigEndian
var payload = Data([0x04]) // BitchatFilePacket CONTENT TLV
withUnsafeBytes(of: &length) { payload.append(contentsOf: $0) }
payload.append(Data(repeating: 0x41, count: oversizedCount))
#expect(!handler.handlePrivatePayload(
payload,
from: remotePeerID,
timestamp: Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_234)
))
#expect(recorder.quotaReservations.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.saveCalls.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.lastSeenUpdates.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.deliveredMessages.isEmpty)
}
@Test @Test
func malformedPayloadIsTrackedForSyncButDropped() { func malformedPayloadIsTrackedForSyncButDropped() {
let recorder = Recorder() let recorder = Recorder()
@@ -352,7 +294,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
recipientID: nil, recipientID: nil,
timestamp: 900_000, timestamp: 900_000,
payload: Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03]), payload: Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03]),
signature: Data(repeating: 0x5A, count: 64), signature: nil,
ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
) )
@@ -428,132 +370,6 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
#expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: evictable.path)) #expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: evictable.path))
} }
@Test
func panicWipeDeletesEveryManagedMediaFileAndRecreatesEmptyDirectories() throws {
let base = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("panic-media-wipe-\(UUID().uuidString)", isDirectory: true)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: base) }
let store = BLEIncomingFileStore(baseDirectory: base)
let subdirectories = [
"voicenotes/incoming",
"voicenotes/outgoing",
"images/incoming",
"images/outgoing",
"files/incoming",
"files/outgoing"
]
for subdirectory in subdirectories {
let directory = base
.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
.appendingPathComponent(subdirectory, isDirectory: true)
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: directory, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
try Data("secret".utf8).write(to: directory.appendingPathComponent("artifact.bin"))
}
let unmanaged = base.appendingPathComponent("files/legacy/secret.bin")
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(at: unmanaged.deletingLastPathComponent(), withIntermediateDirectories: true)
try Data("legacy".utf8).write(to: unmanaged)
try store.panicWipe()
#expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: unmanaged.path))
for subdirectory in subdirectories {
let directory = base
.appendingPathComponent("files", isDirectory: true)
.appendingPathComponent(subdirectory, isDirectory: true)
var isDirectory: ObjCBool = false
#expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: directory.path, isDirectory: &isDirectory))
#expect(isDirectory.boolValue)
#expect(try FileManager.default.contentsOfDirectory(atPath: directory.path).isEmpty)
}
}
@Test
func panicWipeAttemptsDeletionWhenMarkerPersistenceFails() throws {
enum MarkerFailure: Error { case unavailable }
let base = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent(
"panic-marker-failure-\(UUID().uuidString)",
isDirectory: true
)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: base) }
let secret = base
.appendingPathComponent("files/images/outgoing", isDirectory: true)
.appendingPathComponent("secret.jpg")
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
at: secret.deletingLastPathComponent(),
withIntermediateDirectories: true
)
try Data("secret".utf8).write(to: secret)
let store = BLEIncomingFileStore(
baseDirectory: base,
panicMarkerWriter: { _, _ in throw MarkerFailure.unavailable }
)
do {
try store.panicWipe(hasDurablePendingMarker: false)
Issue.record("Expected the missing durable marker to fail closed")
} catch {
// The marker error is reported only after the deletion attempt.
}
#expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: secret.path))
#expect(
FileManager.default.fileExists(
atPath: secret.deletingLastPathComponent().path
)
)
}
@Test
func externalMarkerAllowsDeletionToCommitWhenFileMarkerFails() throws {
enum MarkerFailure: Error { case unavailable }
let base = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent(
"panic-external-marker-\(UUID().uuidString)",
isDirectory: true
)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: base) }
let secret = base
.appendingPathComponent("files/voicenotes/incoming", isDirectory: true)
.appendingPathComponent("secret.m4a")
try FileManager.default.createDirectory(
at: secret.deletingLastPathComponent(),
withIntermediateDirectories: true
)
try Data("secret".utf8).write(to: secret)
let store = BLEIncomingFileStore(
baseDirectory: base,
panicMarkerWriter: { _, _ in throw MarkerFailure.unavailable }
)
try store.panicWipe(hasDurablePendingMarker: true)
#expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: secret.path))
}
@Test
func panicRecoveryMarkerPersistsUntilExplicitCommit() throws {
let base = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent(
"panic-recovery-marker-\(UUID().uuidString)",
isDirectory: true
)
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: base) }
let store = BLEIncomingFileStore(baseDirectory: base)
try store.markPanicRecoveryPending()
#expect(try store.isPanicRecoveryPending())
try store.panicWipe(hasDurablePendingMarker: true)
#expect(try store.isPanicRecoveryPending())
try store.completePanicRecovery()
#expect(try !store.isPanicRecoveryPending())
}
private func expectNoSideEffects(_ recorder: Recorder) { private func expectNoSideEffects(_ recorder: Recorder) {
#expect(recorder.signedNameQueries.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.signedNameQueries.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.trackedPackets.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.trackedPackets.isEmpty)
@@ -587,8 +403,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
content: Data, content: Data,
ttl: UInt8 = TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault, ttl: UInt8 = TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault,
recipientID: Data? = nil, recipientID: Data? = nil,
fileName: String = "sample", fileName: String = "sample"
hasSignature: Bool = true
) throws -> BitchatPacket { ) throws -> BitchatPacket {
let filePacket = BitchatFilePacket( let filePacket = BitchatFilePacket(
fileName: fileName, fileName: fileName,
@@ -603,7 +418,7 @@ struct BLEFileTransferHandlerTests {
recipientID: recipientID, recipientID: recipientID,
timestamp: 900_000, timestamp: 900_000,
payload: payload, payload: payload,
signature: hasSignature ? Data(repeating: 0x5A, count: 64) : nil, signature: nil,
ttl: ttl ttl: ttl
) )
} }
@@ -117,35 +117,6 @@ struct BLEFragmentAssemblyBufferTests {
} }
} }
@Test
func encryptedPrivateFileAssemblyGetsFramedFileHeadroom() throws {
var buffer = BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer()
let fragmentID = Data(repeating: 0x15, count: 8)
let first = try #require(BLEFragmentHeader(packet: makeFragmentPacket(
fragmentID: fragmentID,
index: 0,
total: 2,
originalType: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
fragmentData: Data(repeating: 0x01, count: FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes)
)))
let second = try #require(BLEFragmentHeader(packet: makeFragmentPacket(
fragmentID: fragmentID,
index: 1,
total: 2,
originalType: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
fragmentData: Data([0x02])
)))
_ = buffer.append(first, maxInFlightAssemblies: 8)
let result = buffer.append(second, maxInFlightAssemblies: 8)
if case let .complete(_, data, _) = result {
#expect(data.count == FileTransferLimits.maxPayloadBytes + 1)
} else {
Issue.record("Expected encrypted private-file assembly to use framed-file limit")
}
}
@Test @Test
func removeExpiredDropsOldAssemblies() throws { func removeExpiredDropsOldAssemblies() throws {
var buffer = BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer() var buffer = BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer()
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
private final class Recorder { private final class Recorder {
var handshakeResult: Result<Data?, Error> = .success(nil) var handshakeResult: Result<Data?, Error> = .success(nil)
var hasSession = false var hasSession = false
let sessionGeneration = UUID()
var decryptResult: Result<Data, Error> = .success(Data()) var decryptResult: Result<Data, Error> = .success(Data())
var processedHandshakes: [(peerID: PeerID, message: Data)] = [] var processedHandshakes: [(peerID: PeerID, message: Data)] = []
@@ -19,7 +18,6 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
var lastSeenUpdates: [PeerID] = [] var lastSeenUpdates: [PeerID] = []
var decryptCalls: [(payload: Data, peerID: PeerID)] = [] var decryptCalls: [(payload: Data, peerID: PeerID)] = []
var clearedSessions: [PeerID] = [] var clearedSessions: [PeerID] = []
var authenticatedPeerStates: [(peerID: PeerID, payload: Data, generation: UUID)] = []
var deliveries: [(peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date)] = [] var deliveries: [(peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date)] = []
/// Ordered side-effect log to assert recovery sequencing. /// Ordered side-effect log to assert recovery sequencing.
var events: [String] = [] var events: [String] = []
@@ -58,18 +56,12 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
}, },
decrypt: { payload, peerID in decrypt: { payload, peerID in
recorder.decryptCalls.append((payload, peerID)) recorder.decryptCalls.append((payload, peerID))
return BLENoiseDecryptionResult( return try recorder.decryptResult.get()
plaintext: try recorder.decryptResult.get(),
sessionGeneration: recorder.sessionGeneration
)
}, },
clearSession: { peerID in clearSession: { peerID in
recorder.clearedSessions.append(peerID) recorder.clearedSessions.append(peerID)
recorder.events.append("clearSession") recorder.events.append("clearSession")
}, },
handleAuthenticatedPeerState: { peerID, payload, generation in
recorder.authenticatedPeerStates.append((peerID, payload, generation))
},
deliverNoisePayload: { peerID, type, payload, timestamp in deliverNoisePayload: { peerID, type, payload, timestamp in
recorder.deliveries.append((peerID, type, payload, timestamp)) recorder.deliveries.append((peerID, type, payload, timestamp))
} }
@@ -160,39 +152,6 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
#expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
} }
@Test
func peerIdentityMismatchDoesNotRecreateHandshakeState() {
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.handshakeResult = .failure(NoiseSessionError.peerIdentityMismatch)
recorder.hasSession = false
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let packet = makeHandshakePacket(recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id))
#expect(!handler.handleHandshake(packet, from: remotePeerID))
#expect(recorder.hasSessionQueries.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.broadcastPackets.isEmpty)
}
@Test
func managedHandshakeFailureDoesNotStartASecondRecovery() {
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.handshakeResult = .failure(
NoiseManagedHandshakeFailure(underlying: TestError())
)
recorder.hasSession = false
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let packet = makeHandshakePacket(
recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id)
)
#expect(!handler.handleHandshake(packet, from: remotePeerID))
#expect(recorder.hasSessionQueries.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
#expect(recorder.broadcastPackets.isEmpty)
}
// MARK: Encrypted // MARK: Encrypted
@Test @Test
@@ -247,25 +206,6 @@ struct BLENoisePacketHandlerTests {
#expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty) #expect(recorder.initiatedHandshakes.isEmpty)
} }
@Test
func authenticatedPeerStateIsConsumedByTransportNotDeliveredToUI() {
let recorder = Recorder()
recorder.decryptResult = .success(Data([
NoisePayloadType.authenticatedPeerState.rawValue,
0x01, 0x02, 0x03
]))
let handler = makeHandler(recorder: recorder)
let packet = makeEncryptedPacket(recipientID: Data(hexString: localPeerID.id))
handler.handleEncrypted(packet, from: remotePeerID)
#expect(recorder.authenticatedPeerStates.count == 1)
#expect(recorder.authenticatedPeerStates.first?.peerID == remotePeerID)
#expect(recorder.authenticatedPeerStates.first?.payload == Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03]))
#expect(recorder.authenticatedPeerStates.first?.generation == recorder.sessionGeneration)
#expect(recorder.deliveries.isEmpty)
}
@Test @Test
func emptyDecryptedPayloadIsIgnored() { func emptyDecryptedPayloadIsIgnored() {
let recorder = Recorder() let recorder = Recorder()
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
import Foundation import Foundation
import Testing import Testing
import BitFoundation
@testable import bitchat @testable import bitchat
struct BLENoisePayloadFactoryTests { struct BLENoisePayloadFactoryTests {
@@ -32,63 +31,4 @@ struct BLENoisePayloadFactoryTests {
#expect(payload == Data([NoisePayloadType.verifyChallenge.rawValue, 0xCA, 0xFE])) #expect(payload == Data([NoisePayloadType.verifyChallenge.rawValue, 0xCA, 0xFE]))
} }
@Test
func privateFilePayloadPrefixesCanonicalFilePacket() throws {
let content = Data("%PDF-secret".utf8)
let file = BitchatFilePacket(
fileName: "secret.pdf",
fileSize: UInt64(content.count),
mimeType: "application/pdf",
content: content
)
let payload = try #require(BLENoisePayloadFactory.privateFile(file))
#expect(payload.first == 0x20, "Encrypted files must use Android's deployed wire value")
let decoded = try #require(BitchatFilePacket.decode(Data(payload.dropFirst())))
#expect(decoded.fileName == "secret.pdf")
#expect(decoded.mimeType == "application/pdf")
#expect(decoded.content == content)
}
@Test
func androidB7f0b33PrivateFilePlaintextFixtureIsByteCompatible() throws {
// Runtime-emitted by Android commit b7f0b33d from
// BitchatFilePacket("a.txt", 3, "text/plain", [01, 02, 03]) and
// NoisePayload(type = FILE_TRANSFER, data = file.encode()).encode().
let fixtureHex = "20010005612e7478740200040000000303000a746578742f706c61696e0400000003010203"
let fixture = try #require(Data(hexString: fixtureHex))
let typed = try #require(NoisePayload.decode(fixture))
#expect(typed.type == .privateFile)
let file = try #require(BitchatFilePacket.decode(typed.data))
#expect(file.fileName == "a.txt")
#expect(file.fileSize == 3)
#expect(file.mimeType == "text/plain")
#expect(file.content == Data([0x01, 0x02, 0x03]))
#expect(BLENoisePayloadFactory.privateFile(file) == fixture)
}
@Test
func prereleasePrivateFileTypeCanonicalizesOnDecode() throws {
let encoded = Data([NoisePayloadType.prereleasePrivateFileRawValue, 0xCA, 0xFE])
let decoded = try #require(NoisePayload.decode(encoded))
#expect(decoded.type == .privateFile)
#expect(decoded.data == Data([0xCA, 0xFE]))
#expect(decoded.encode().first == 0x20)
}
@Test
func authenticatedPeerStateUsesPermanent0x21Type() throws {
let state = AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket(
capabilities: .privateMedia,
signingPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x77, count: 32)
)
let encoded = try #require(BLENoisePayloadFactory.authenticatedPeerState(state))
#expect(encoded.first == 0x21)
#expect(AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket.decode(from: Data(encoded.dropFirst())) == state)
}
} }
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
import BitFoundation
import Foundation
import Testing
@testable import bitchat
@Suite("BLE Noise reconnect policy")
struct BLENoiseReconnectPolicyTests {
@Test("Revalidation requires a cached session and no authenticated link")
func revalidationPreconditions() {
var policy = BLENoiseReconnectPolicy()
let link = BLEIngressLinkID.peripheral("peripheral-a")
let now = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 1_000)
let withoutSession = policy.shouldRevalidate(
on: link,
hasEstablishedSession: false,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
now: now
)
#expect(!withoutSession)
let authenticated = policy.shouldRevalidate(
on: link,
hasEstablishedSession: true,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: true,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: true,
now: now
)
#expect(!authenticated)
let eligible = policy.shouldRevalidate(
on: link,
hasEstablishedSession: true,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
now: now
)
#expect(eligible)
}
@Test("Revalidation is once per link epoch or after sixty seconds")
func revalidationIsBoundPerLinkEpoch() {
var policy = BLENoiseReconnectPolicy()
let link = BLEIngressLinkID.central("central-a")
let start = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 2_000)
let initial = policy.shouldRevalidate(
on: link,
hasEstablishedSession: true,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
now: start
)
#expect(initial)
let duringCooldown = policy.shouldRevalidate(
on: link,
hasEstablishedSession: true,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
now: start.addingTimeInterval(59.999)
)
#expect(!duringCooldown)
let afterCooldown = policy.shouldRevalidate(
on: link,
hasEstablishedSession: true,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
now: start.addingTimeInterval(60)
)
#expect(afterCooldown)
policy.endLinkEpoch(link)
let nextEpoch = policy.shouldRevalidate(
on: link,
hasEstablishedSession: true,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
now: start.addingTimeInterval(60.001)
)
#expect(nextEpoch)
}
@Test("An authenticated sibling suppresses redundant reconnect")
func authenticatedSiblingSuppressesReconnect() {
var policy = BLENoiseReconnectPolicy()
let link = BLEIngressLinkID.peripheral("unproven-sibling")
let start = Date(timeIntervalSince1970: 3_000)
let suppressed = policy.shouldRevalidate(
on: link,
hasEstablishedSession: true,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: true,
now: start
)
#expect(!suppressed)
let eligible = policy.shouldRevalidate(
on: link,
hasEstablishedSession: true,
isNoiseAuthenticatedLink: false,
hasAuthenticatedPeerLink: false,
now: start
)
#expect(eligible)
}
@Test("Reserved replacement bit is not advertised")
func reservedReplacementBitIsNotAdvertised() {
#expect(
!PeerCapabilities.localSupported.contains(
.nonDestructiveNoiseReplacement
)
)
#expect(PeerCapabilities.localSupported.contains(.privateMedia))
}
}
@@ -48,10 +48,7 @@ struct BLENoiseSessionQueuesTests {
queues.appendTypedPayload(Data([0x01]), for: peerID) queues.appendTypedPayload(Data([0x01]), for: peerID)
queues.appendTypedPayload(Data([0x02]), for: peerID) queues.appendTypedPayload(Data([0x02]), for: peerID)
#expect(queues.takeTypedPayloads(for: peerID) == [ #expect(queues.takeTypedPayloads(for: peerID) == [Data([0x01]), Data([0x02])])
BLEPendingTypedPayload(payload: Data([0x01]), transferId: nil),
BLEPendingTypedPayload(payload: Data([0x02]), transferId: nil)
])
#expect(queues.takeTypedPayloads(for: peerID).isEmpty) #expect(queues.takeTypedPayloads(for: peerID).isEmpty)
#expect(queues.takePrivateMessages(for: peerID).map(\.messageID) == ["m1"]) #expect(queues.takePrivateMessages(for: peerID).map(\.messageID) == ["m1"])
} }
@@ -67,21 +64,4 @@ struct BLENoiseSessionQueuesTests {
#expect(queues.isEmpty) #expect(queues.isEmpty)
} }
@Test
func transferIDSurvivesHandshakeQueueAndCanBeCancelledBeforeDrain() {
let peerID = PeerID(str: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa")
var queues = BLENoiseSessionQueues()
queues.appendTypedPayload(Data([0x20, 0xAA]), transferId: "media-1", for: peerID)
queues.appendTypedPayload(Data([0x01, 0xBB]), for: peerID)
let removed = queues.removeTypedPayload(transferId: "media-1")
let removedAgain = queues.removeTypedPayload(transferId: "media-1")
#expect(removed)
#expect(!removedAgain)
#expect(queues.takeTypedPayloads(for: peerID) == [
BLEPendingTypedPayload(payload: Data([0x01, 0xBB]), transferId: nil)
])
}
} }
@@ -108,58 +108,6 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentPlannerTests {
) == nil) ) == nil)
} }
@Test("private media v1 accepts exactly 256 fragments and rejects 257")
func privateMediaCrossPlatformFragmentBoundary() throws {
let maxPayload = makePayload(count: 160 * 1024, seed: 0xFACE_CAFE)
func plan(payloadCount: Int) throws -> BLEOutboundFragmentPlan {
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: "0011223344556677") ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: "8877665544332211"),
timestamp: 0x0102030405,
payload: Data(maxPayload.prefix(payloadCount)),
signature: nil,
ttl: 3,
version: 2
)
return try #require(BLEOutboundFragmentPlanner.makePlan(
for: BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest(
packet: packet,
pad: false,
maxChunk: nil,
directedPeer: PeerID(str: "8877665544332211"),
transferId: "boundary"
),
defaultChunkSize: TransportConfig.bleDefaultFragmentSize,
bleMaxMTU: 512,
fragmentID: Data(repeating: 0xD4, count: 8)
))
}
func firstPlan(withAtLeast target: Int) throws -> BLEOutboundFragmentPlan {
var low = 1
var high = maxPayload.count
while low < high {
let mid = low + (high - low) / 2
if try plan(payloadCount: mid).totalFragments >= target {
high = mid
} else {
low = mid + 1
}
}
return try plan(payloadCount: low)
}
let at256 = try firstPlan(withAtLeast: 256)
let at257 = try firstPlan(withAtLeast: 257)
#expect(at256.totalFragments == 256)
#expect(BLEOutboundFragmentPlanner.isPrivateMediaV1Compatible(at256))
#expect(at257.totalFragments == 257)
#expect(!BLEOutboundFragmentPlanner.isPrivateMediaV1Compatible(at257))
}
private func makePacket( private func makePacket(
payload: Data, payload: Data,
route: [Data]? = nil, route: [Data]? = nil,
@@ -20,24 +20,6 @@ struct BLEOutboundFragmentTransferSchedulerTests {
} }
} }
@Test
func explicitTransferIDReservesEncryptedPrivateFileFragments() {
var scheduler = BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler()
let request = makeRequest(
type: MessageType.noiseEncrypted.rawValue,
transferId: "private-media"
)
let result = scheduler.submit(request, maxConcurrentTransfers: 1)
if case let .start(_, reservedTransferId) = result {
#expect(reservedTransferId == "private-media")
#expect(scheduler.activeCount == 1)
} else {
Issue.record("Expected encrypted private media to reserve its progress slot")
}
}
@Test @Test
func submitQueuesFileTransferWhenSlotsAreFull() { func submitQueuesFileTransferWhenSlotsAreFull() {
var scheduler = BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler() var scheduler = BLEOutboundFragmentTransferScheduler()
@@ -42,37 +42,6 @@ struct BLEPeerRegistryTests {
#expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "alice-renamed") #expect(registry.info(for: peerID)?.nickname == "alice-renamed")
} }
@Test("registry preserves absent versus explicit empty capabilities")
func capabilitiesPresenceIsPreserved() {
var registry = BLEPeerRegistry()
let oldPeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
let modernPeer = PeerID(str: "8877665544332211")
_ = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: oldPeer,
nickname: "old",
noisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x11, count: 32),
signingPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x12, count: 32),
isConnected: true,
now: Date(),
capabilities: nil
)
_ = registry.upsertVerifiedAnnounce(
peerID: modernPeer,
nickname: "modern",
noisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x21, count: 32),
signingPublicKey: Data(repeating: 0x22, count: 32),
isConnected: true,
now: Date(),
capabilities: []
)
#expect(registry.capabilities(for: oldPeer).isEmpty)
#expect(!registry.capabilitiesWereExplicitlyAdvertised(for: oldPeer))
#expect(registry.capabilities(for: modernPeer).isEmpty)
#expect(registry.capabilitiesWereExplicitlyAdvertised(for: modernPeer))
}
@Test("reachability keeps recent verified offline peers only when mesh is attached") @Test("reachability keeps recent verified offline peers only when mesh is attached")
func reachabilityRequiresMeshAttachmentForOfflinePeers() { func reachabilityRequiresMeshAttachmentForOfflinePeers() {
let offlinePeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788") let offlinePeer = PeerID(str: "1122334455667788")
@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ final class GeohashPresenceServiceTests: XCTestCase {
burstMaxDelay: 0 burstMaxDelay: 0
) )
service.start()
service.performHeartbeat() service.performHeartbeat()
let sentAllAllowedChannels = await waitUntil { sentGeohashes.count == 3 } let sentAllAllowedChannels = await waitUntil { sentGeohashes.count == 3 }
@@ -84,7 +83,7 @@ final class GeohashPresenceServiceTests: XCTestCase {
XCTAssertEqual(Set(sentGeohashes), Set(["9q", "9q8y", "9q8yy"])) XCTAssertEqual(Set(sentGeohashes), Set(["9q", "9q8y", "9q8yy"]))
XCTAssertEqual(Set(lookedUpGeohashes), Set(["9q", "9q8y", "9q8yy"])) XCTAssertEqual(Set(lookedUpGeohashes), Set(["9q", "9q8y", "9q8yy"]))
XCTAssertEqual(sleptNanoseconds.count, 3) XCTAssertEqual(sleptNanoseconds.count, 3)
XCTAssertEqual(scheduler.intervals, [17, 17]) XCTAssertEqual(scheduler.intervals, [17])
} }
func test_performHeartbeat_skipsBroadcastWhenTorIsNotReady() async { func test_performHeartbeat_skipsBroadcastWhenTorIsNotReady() async {
@@ -98,12 +97,11 @@ final class GeohashPresenceServiceTests: XCTestCase {
loopMaxInterval: 21 loopMaxInterval: 21
) )
service.start()
service.performHeartbeat() service.performHeartbeat()
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 20_000_000) try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 20_000_000)
XCTAssertEqual(sendCount, 0) XCTAssertEqual(sendCount, 0)
XCTAssertEqual(scheduler.intervals, [21, 21]) XCTAssertEqual(scheduler.intervals, [21])
} }
func test_performHeartbeat_skipsBroadcastWhenAppIsBackgrounded() async { func test_performHeartbeat_skipsBroadcastWhenAppIsBackgrounded() async {
@@ -117,45 +115,11 @@ final class GeohashPresenceServiceTests: XCTestCase {
loopMaxInterval: 22 loopMaxInterval: 22
) )
service.start()
service.performHeartbeat() service.performHeartbeat()
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 20_000_000) try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 20_000_000)
XCTAssertEqual(sendCount, 0) XCTAssertEqual(sendCount, 0)
XCTAssertEqual(scheduler.intervals, [22, 22]) XCTAssertEqual(scheduler.intervals, [22])
}
func test_stopForPanic_cancelsTimerAndSuppressesDelayedBroadcast() async throws {
let identity = try NostrIdentity.generate()
let scheduler = MockGeohashPresenceScheduler()
var sleeperContinuation: CheckedContinuation<Void, Never>?
var sendCount = 0
let service = makeService(
scheduler: scheduler,
deriveIdentity: { _ in identity },
relaySender: { _, _ in sendCount += 1 },
sleeper: { _ in
await withCheckedContinuation { continuation in
sleeperContinuation = continuation
}
},
burstMinDelay: 1,
burstMaxDelay: 1
)
service.start()
service.performHeartbeat()
let delayStarted = await waitUntil {
sleeperContinuation != nil
}
XCTAssertTrue(delayStarted)
service.stopForPanic()
sleeperContinuation?.resume()
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 20_000_000)
XCTAssertEqual(sendCount, 0)
XCTAssertEqual(scheduler.timers.first?.invalidateCallCount, 1)
} }
func test_broadcastPresence_skipsSendWhenNoRelaysAreAvailable() async throws { func test_broadcastPresence_skipsSendWhenNoRelaysAreAvailable() async throws {
@@ -91,53 +91,6 @@ final class NetworkActivationServiceTests: XCTestCase {
XCTAssertGreaterThanOrEqual(context.relayController.connectCallCount, 1) XCTAssertGreaterThanOrEqual(context.relayController.connectCallCount, 1)
} }
func test_stopForPanic_synchronouslyStopsAndIgnoresPublisherUpdates() async {
let context = makeService(permission: .authorized, favorites: [])
context.service.start()
context.service.stopForPanic()
let connectCountAfterStop = context.relayController.connectCallCount
let startCountAfterStop = context.torController.startIfNeededCallCount
context.favoritesSubject.send([Data([0x01])])
context.reachability.set(false)
context.reachability.set(true)
try? await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 30_000_000)
XCTAssertFalse(context.service.activationAllowed)
XCTAssertEqual(context.reachability.stopCallCount, 1)
XCTAssertEqual(context.torController.autoStartAllowedValues.last, false)
XCTAssertEqual(context.proxyController.proxyModes.last, false)
XCTAssertGreaterThanOrEqual(
context.torController.shutdownCompletelyCallCount,
1
)
XCTAssertGreaterThanOrEqual(
context.relayController.disconnectCallCount,
1
)
XCTAssertEqual(
context.relayController.connectCallCount,
connectCountAfterStop
)
XCTAssertEqual(
context.torController.startIfNeededCallCount,
startCountAfterStop
)
}
func test_start_afterPanicStop_reestablishesSubscriptions() {
let context = makeService(permission: .authorized, favorites: [])
context.service.start()
context.service.stopForPanic()
context.service.start()
XCTAssertTrue(context.service.activationAllowed)
XCTAssertEqual(context.reachability.startCallCount, 2)
XCTAssertEqual(context.relayController.connectCallCount, 2)
}
private func makeService( private func makeService(
permission: LocationChannelManager.PermissionState, permission: LocationChannelManager.PermissionState,
favorites: Set<Data> favorites: Set<Data>
@@ -151,7 +104,6 @@ final class NetworkActivationServiceTests: XCTestCase {
let torController = MockNetworkActivationTorController() let torController = MockNetworkActivationTorController()
let relayController = MockNetworkActivationRelayController() let relayController = MockNetworkActivationRelayController()
let proxyController = MockNetworkActivationProxyController() let proxyController = MockNetworkActivationProxyController()
let reachability = MockNetworkActivationReachability()
let notificationCenter = NotificationCenter() let notificationCenter = NotificationCenter()
let service = NetworkActivationService( let service = NetworkActivationService(
storage: storage, storage: storage,
@@ -159,7 +111,7 @@ final class NetworkActivationServiceTests: XCTestCase {
mutualFavoritesPublisher: favoritesSubject.eraseToAnyPublisher(), mutualFavoritesPublisher: favoritesSubject.eraseToAnyPublisher(),
permissionProvider: { permissionSubject.value }, permissionProvider: { permissionSubject.value },
mutualFavoritesProvider: { favoritesSubject.value }, mutualFavoritesProvider: { favoritesSubject.value },
reachabilityMonitor: reachability, reachabilityMonitor: AlwaysReachableMonitor(),
torController: torController, torController: torController,
relayController: relayController, relayController: relayController,
proxyController: proxyController, proxyController: proxyController,
@@ -169,7 +121,6 @@ final class NetworkActivationServiceTests: XCTestCase {
service: service, service: service,
storage: storage, storage: storage,
favoritesSubject: favoritesSubject, favoritesSubject: favoritesSubject,
reachability: reachability,
torController: torController, torController: torController,
relayController: relayController, relayController: relayController,
proxyController: proxyController, proxyController: proxyController,
@@ -197,38 +148,12 @@ private struct NetworkActivationTestContext {
let service: NetworkActivationService let service: NetworkActivationService
let storage: UserDefaults let storage: UserDefaults
let favoritesSubject: CurrentValueSubject<Set<Data>, Never> let favoritesSubject: CurrentValueSubject<Set<Data>, Never>
let reachability: MockNetworkActivationReachability
let torController: MockNetworkActivationTorController let torController: MockNetworkActivationTorController
let relayController: MockNetworkActivationRelayController let relayController: MockNetworkActivationRelayController
let proxyController: MockNetworkActivationProxyController let proxyController: MockNetworkActivationProxyController
let notificationCenter: NotificationCenter let notificationCenter: NotificationCenter
} }
@MainActor
private final class MockNetworkActivationReachability:
NetworkReachabilityMonitoring {
private let subject = CurrentValueSubject<Bool, Never>(true)
private(set) var startCallCount = 0
private(set) var stopCallCount = 0
var isReachable: Bool { subject.value }
var reachabilityPublisher: AnyPublisher<Bool, Never> {
subject.removeDuplicates().dropFirst().eraseToAnyPublisher()
}
func start() {
startCallCount += 1
}
func stop() {
stopCallCount += 1
}
func set(_ reachable: Bool) {
subject.send(reachable)
}
}
@MainActor @MainActor
private final class MockNetworkActivationTorController: NetworkActivationTorControlling { private final class MockNetworkActivationTorController: NetworkActivationTorControlling {
private(set) var autoStartAllowedValues: [Bool] = [] private(set) var autoStartAllowedValues: [Bool] = []
@@ -213,7 +213,6 @@ private final class ControllableReachabilityMonitor: NetworkReachabilityMonitori
subject.removeDuplicates().dropFirst().eraseToAnyPublisher() subject.removeDuplicates().dropFirst().eraseToAnyPublisher()
} }
func start() { startCalled = true } func start() { startCalled = true }
func stop() { startCalled = false }
func set(_ reachable: Bool) { subject.send(reachable) } func set(_ reachable: Bool) { subject.send(reachable) }
} }
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -399,59 +399,6 @@ final class SecureIdentityStateManagerTests: XCTestCase {
XCTAssertTrue(cleared) XCTAssertTrue(cleared)
} }
func test_privateMediaCapabilityPinPersistsMonotonicallyAndPanicClearRemovesIt() async {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let fingerprint = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32).sha256Fingerprint()
let manager = SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain)
XCTAssertFalse(manager.hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: fingerprint))
manager.markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: fingerprint)
XCTAssertTrue(
manager.hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: fingerprint),
"pin insertion must be synchronously visible to the next downgrade decision"
)
// Re-marking is idempotent, and the encrypted cache carries the pin
// across launches.
manager.markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: fingerprint)
manager.forceSave()
let reloaded = SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain)
XCTAssertTrue(reloaded.hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: fingerprint))
// ChatViewModel's panic path calls this same wipe after deleting
// keychain data; the in-memory pin must disappear immediately too.
reloaded.clearAllIdentityData()
let cleared = await waitUntil {
!reloaded.hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: fingerprint)
}
XCTAssertTrue(cleared)
}
func test_noiseAuthenticatedSigningKeyBindingPersistsAndPanicClearRemovesIt() async {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let fingerprint = Data(repeating: 0x31, count: 32).sha256Fingerprint()
let firstKey = Data(repeating: 0x41, count: 32)
let rotatedKey = Data(repeating: 0x42, count: 32)
let manager = SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain)
manager.bindAuthenticatedSigningPublicKey(firstKey, fingerprint: fingerprint)
XCTAssertEqual(manager.authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint: fingerprint), firstKey)
// A later authenticated Noise session may legitimately rotate the
// announcement signing key.
manager.bindAuthenticatedSigningPublicKey(rotatedKey, fingerprint: fingerprint)
XCTAssertEqual(manager.authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint: fingerprint), rotatedKey)
manager.forceSave()
let reloaded = SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain)
XCTAssertEqual(reloaded.authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint: fingerprint), rotatedKey)
reloaded.clearAllIdentityData()
let cleared = await waitUntil {
reloaded.authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint: fingerprint) == nil
}
XCTAssertTrue(cleared)
}
func test_forceSave_withFailingCacheWriteDoesNotPersistCache() async { func test_forceSave_withFailingCacheWriteDoesNotPersistCache() async {
let keychain = FailingCacheSaveKeychain() let keychain = FailingCacheSaveKeychain()
let manager = SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain) let manager = SecureIdentityStateManager(keychain)
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct TransferProgressManagerTests {
recorder.append("updated:\(id):\(sent):\(total)") recorder.append("updated:\(id):\(sent):\(total)")
case .completed(let id, let total): case .completed(let id, let total):
recorder.append("completed:\(id):\(total)") recorder.append("completed:\(id):\(total)")
case .cancelled, .rejected: case .cancelled:
break break
} }
} }
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct TransferProgressManagerTests {
recorder.append("started:\(id):\(total)") recorder.append("started:\(id):\(total)")
case .cancelled(let id, let sent, let total): case .cancelled(let id, let sent, let total):
recorder.append("cancelled:\(id):\(sent):\(total)") recorder.append("cancelled:\(id):\(sent):\(total)")
case .updated, .completed, .rejected: case .updated, .completed:
break break
} }
} }
@@ -105,28 +105,6 @@ struct TransferProgressManagerTests {
#expect(manager.snapshot(id: transferID) == nil) #expect(manager.snapshot(id: transferID) == nil)
_ = cancellable _ = cancellable
} }
@Test("Preflight policy rejection publishes a visible failure reason")
@MainActor
func rejectBeforeStartPublishesReason() async {
let manager = TransferProgressManager()
let transferID = "transfer-visible-reject"
let recorder = EventRecorder()
let cancellable = manager.publisher.sink { event in
if case .rejected(let id, let reason) = event {
recorder.append("rejected:\(id):\(reason)")
}
}
manager.rejectBeforeStart(id: transferID, reason: "upgrade required")
let didReceive = await TestHelpers.waitUntil({
recorder.values == ["rejected:\(transferID):upgrade required"]
}, timeout: 5.0)
#expect(didReceive)
#expect(manager.snapshot(id: transferID) == nil)
_ = cancellable
}
} }
private final class EventRecorder: @unchecked Sendable { private final class EventRecorder: @unchecked Sendable {
@@ -266,11 +266,6 @@ private final class TestIdentityManager: SecureIdentityStateManagerProtocol {
verified.removeAll() verified.removeAll()
} }
func markPrivateMediaCapable(fingerprint: String) {}
func hasObservedPrivateMediaCapability(fingerprint: String) -> Bool { false }
func bindAuthenticatedSigningPublicKey(_ signingPublicKey: Data, fingerprint: String) {}
func authenticatedSigningPublicKey(forFingerprint fingerprint: String) -> Data? { nil }
func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID) {} func removeEphemeralSession(peerID: PeerID) {}
func setVerified(fingerprint: String, verified: Bool) { func setVerified(fingerprint: String, verified: Bool) {
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ private final class GatedVoiceCaptureSession: VoiceCaptureSession {
private let startError: Error? private let startError: Error?
private(set) var finishStarted = false private(set) var finishStarted = false
private(set) var cancelCount = 0 private(set) var cancelCount = 0
private(set) var panicCancelCount = 0
private var finishContinuation: CheckedContinuation<URL?, Never>? private var finishContinuation: CheckedContinuation<URL?, Never>?
init(startError: Error? = nil) { init(startError: Error? = nil) {
@@ -84,10 +83,6 @@ private final class GatedVoiceCaptureSession: VoiceCaptureSession {
cancelCount += 1 cancelCount += 1
} }
func panicCancelSynchronously() {
panicCancelCount += 1
}
func resolveFinish(with url: URL?) { func resolveFinish(with url: URL?) {
let continuation = finishContinuation let continuation = finishContinuation
finishContinuation = nil finishContinuation = nil
@@ -209,57 +204,4 @@ struct VoiceCaptureSessionTests {
} }
#expect(viewModel.state == .idle) #expect(viewModel.state == .idle)
} }
@Test func panicSynchronouslyCancelsActiveCaptureAndResetsUI() async {
let session = GatedVoiceCaptureSession()
let viewModel = VoiceRecordingViewModel()
viewModel.sessionProvider = { session }
viewModel.start(shouldShow: true)
await waitUntil { self.isRecording(viewModel.state) }
viewModel.panicWipe()
#expect(session.panicCancelCount == 1)
#expect(viewModel.state == .idle)
#expect(!viewModel.isLiveStreaming)
}
@Test func panicInvalidatesARecordingAlreadyFinalizing() async throws {
let session = GatedVoiceCaptureSession()
let viewModel = VoiceRecordingViewModel()
viewModel.sessionProvider = { session }
let url = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
.appendingPathComponent("voice-panic-\(UUID().uuidString).m4a")
try Data([0x01]).write(to: url)
var delivered = false
viewModel.start(shouldShow: true)
await waitUntil { self.isRecording(viewModel.state) }
viewModel.finish { _ in delivered = true }
await waitUntil { session.finishStarted }
viewModel.panicWipe()
session.resolveFinish(with: url)
await waitUntil {
!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: url.path)
}
#expect(!delivered)
#expect(viewModel.state == .idle)
}
@Test func liveSessionPanicStopsCaptureWithoutSendingControl() {
let capture = StubPTTCapture(stopResult: (nil, 0))
var sentPackets: [Data] = []
let session = PTTLiveVoiceSession(
sendPacket: { sentPackets.append($0) },
capture: capture
)
session.panicCancelSynchronously()
#expect(capture.cancelCount == 1)
#expect(sentPackets.isEmpty)
}
} }
-29
View File
@@ -360,35 +360,6 @@ struct VoiceRecorderTests {
#expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: secondURL.path)) #expect(FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: secondURL.path))
} }
@Test func classicSessionPanicStopsRecorderAndDeletesFileBeforeReturning() async throws {
let directory = try makeTemporaryDirectory()
defer { try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: directory) }
let rawSession = VoiceRecorderTestSession()
let coordinator = AudioSessionCoordinator(session: rawSession)
let factory = TestVoiceAudioRecorderFactory(plans: [.success])
let voiceRecorder = VoiceRecorder(
sessionCoordinator: coordinator,
recorderFactory: factory,
permissionGranted: { true },
paddingInterval: 0,
outputDirectory: directory
)
let capture = VoiceNoteCaptureSession(recorder: voiceRecorder)
try await capture.start()
let url = try #require(factory.urls.first)
let recorder = try #require(factory.recorders.first)
capture.panicCancelSynchronously()
#expect(recorder.stopCallCount == 1)
#expect(!recorder.isRecording)
#expect(!FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: url.path))
await coordinator.drain()
#expect(rawSession.activationCalls == [true, false])
}
private func verifyFailedStart( private func verifyFailedStart(
firstPlan: TestVoiceAudioRecorderFactory.Plan, firstPlan: TestVoiceAudioRecorderFactory.Plan,
expectedPrepareCalls: Int, expectedPrepareCalls: Int,
-107
View File
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
# Private-media wire migration
Private files use the `BitchatFilePacket` TLV shared by iOS and Android. The
preferred direct-message wire form encrypts that complete TLV inside the
peer's Noise session before BLE fragmentation.
## Wire values and capability
- `NoisePayloadType.privateFile` is `0x20`, the value already deployed by the
Android client. New sends must use this value.
- iOS temporarily accepts `0x09`, which appeared in prerelease builds of the
private-media change. Decoders canonicalize it to `privateFile`; they never
emit it.
- `NoisePayloadType.authenticatedPeerState` is permanently assigned `0x21`.
It is emitted after every completed/rekeyed Noise XX session and echoed at
most once when the remote state arrives, so message-3/proof reordering over
different mesh links converges. This type is part of the protocol security
boundary and is not removed when the media migration ends.
- The `0x21` payload starts with version `0x01`, followed by one-byte
type/length/value fields. Version 1 requires canonical TLV `0x01` (the
minimal little-endian `PeerCapabilities` bitfield, 1-8 bytes) and TLV `0x02`
(the 32-byte Ed25519 announcement signing key). Duplicate required fields,
non-minimal capabilities, malformed lengths, missing fields, and unknown
versions are ignored without changing state. Unknown TLVs are skipped.
- The public `PeerCapabilities.privateMedia` announce bit is a discovery hint:
it starts a Noise handshake, but never selects encrypted sending or creates
a pin. A private transfer waits boundedly for the exact session's encrypted
`0x21`. A valid bit-8 proof selects Noise `0x20`; a valid no-bit proof or a
no-proof timeout reaches the explicit legacy-consent path for an unpinned
peer. No timeout automatically sends raw bytes.
- An unpinned peer with a stable Noise key but without that capability is
eligible for one signed, directed
`fileTransfer`, matching the pre-migration wire form used by older iOS and
accepted by current Android clients, only after the sender confirms a
per-send warning that the file is not end-to-end encrypted and mesh relays
can see it. The
consent is consumed by that invocation and is never remembered.
- A signed announce never creates a pin by itself: an attacker can copy a
victim's public Noise key, supply its own Ed25519 key and capability bits,
and self-sign an internally consistent announce. Only successfully
decrypted `0x21` state pins the authenticated Noise fingerprint and binds
the Ed25519 key used by later announces/public messages. A later valid
no-bit `0x21` is treated as a downgrade, and raw fallback is blocked even if
a caller presents legacy consent. Public no-bit announces cannot overwrite
current session-authenticated state.
- During migration, both an absent capabilities TLV and an explicit TLV
without `privateMedia` are legacy-eligible when that stable fingerprint is
not pinned. This supports clients that added capability advertisement before
encrypted media. Neither shape bypasses a previously authenticated pin.
Older clients decrypt and ignore unknown inner type `0x21`; they do not need to
understand it to continue using text or the warned legacy media path. They are
never inferred capable merely because the handshake succeeded.
Removal gates are independent and must not share an arbitrary calendar date:
- Remove the `0x09` receive alias only after every TestFlight/internal build
that emitted it has expired and minimum-supported-client policy excludes it.
- Remove the signed directed raw `0x22` fallback only after minimum-supported
iOS and Android clients emit authenticated bit-8 `0x21` state and the legacy
population has aged out.
- Nostr kind `1059` compatibility is a separate envelope migration. Its dual
publish/removal gate is not evidence that either BLE compatibility shape can
be removed.
## Security boundary
The encrypted form provides Noise confidentiality and peer authentication.
The fallback is signed and its signature is required on receive, so relays
cannot forge its sender or contents. It is not confidential: relays can see
the raw file TLV. The UI says this explicitly and asks on every send. A peer
without a stable Noise key from a verified registry entry cannot use the
fallback. Keep it only for the mixed-version migration, and remove it only
after minimum-supported Android and iOS releases emit authenticated bit-8
`0x21` state and the legacy population has aged out. Never replace it with an
unsigned fallback, persist blanket consent, or send both forms.
Incoming clients accept all three migration-era shapes:
| Sender | Inbound form | Result |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Current Android | Noise `0x20` | Decrypt and deliver |
| Prerelease iOS | Noise `0x09` | Decrypt, canonicalize, and deliver |
| Older client | Signed directed `fileTransfer` | Verify signature and deliver |
| Forged/unsigned raw sender | Directed `fileTransfer` | Reject |
Panic wipe clears the persistent capability pins together with the rest of
the encrypted identity cache.
This migration path is mesh-Noise-only (BLE and compatible direct mesh links).
Nostr private-media transport is unchanged and remains a follow-up. Nostr
inbound paths explicitly ignore `0x21`; do not infer the mesh consent fallback
or capability-pin semantics for Nostr delivery.
## Size interoperability
iOS bounds inbound file content at 1 MiB and applies the expanded allocation
budget only after a large Noise ciphertext authenticates to `0x20` or the
temporary `0x09` alias. Ordinary Noise messages retain their 64 KiB limit.
Current Android builds cap each reassembly at 256 fragments. Depending on the
negotiated BLE packet size and routing overhead, that is roughly 110-120 KiB,
well below iOS's absolute inbound ceiling. Private-media v1 therefore runs the
actual route-aware BLE fragment planner before both encrypted and consented
legacy sends and rejects any plan above 256 fragments with a visible failure.
This fragment-count contract, rather than a guessed byte threshold, stays
correct as route overhead changes.

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