The TOFU signing-key pin lived only in the in-memory peerRegistry. When
a previously seen peer was no longer in the registry (app restart, or
reconcileConnectivity pruning an offline peer), the announce trust check
saw no pinned key, treated the announce as first contact, and
persistIdentity overwrote the cached signing key/nickname — so an
attacker could replay a victim's noiseKey/peerID with their own signing
key and bypass the spoofing protection for returning/offline peers.
Fixes:
- BLEAnnounceHandler now falls back to the persisted cryptographic
identity (via a new persistedSigningPublicKey environment closure)
when the registry has no signing key for the peer, so the pin remains
effective across registry eviction and app restarts. BLEService wires
it to SecureIdentityStateManager.getCryptoIdentitiesByPeerIDPrefix,
the same synchronous identity-manager read already used on the packet
path by signedSenderDisplayName.
- SecureIdentityStateManager.upsertCryptographicIdentity refuses to
replace a persisted signing key with a different one (security-logged,
nickname update included in the refusal), mirroring the registry
policy. First-writer-wins persistence also removes any race where a
concurrent announce could poison the stored identity.
- CryptographicIdentity entries (incl. the signing-key pin) are now part
of the encrypted IdentityCache, so they actually persist across app
restarts; previously they were in-memory only. Old caches without the
new field still decode (decodeIfPresent), and clearAllIdentityData /
panic wipe clears the pins as before.
Legitimate re-keying: presenting a different signing key for the same
noise key is exactly the attack being blocked, so refusal is correct
and permanent until the peer adopts a new noise identity (new peerID)
or the user explicitly clears identity data. Repeated rejected announces
follow the existing unverified-announce path (log + ignore); no retry
loops or crashes.
Tests: handler-level persisted-pin mismatch/match/precedence cases, an
end-to-end restart+eviction test with real Ed25519 keys and a real
SecureIdentityStateManager showing the attacker replay is rejected and
the persisted identity is untouched while the victim re-announce is
accepted, and identity-manager tests for the pinned-key refusal and the
keychain round-trip of the pin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Refactor BLE transport event handling
* Make image output paths unique
* Keep queued Nostr read receipts alive
* Refine BLE ingress fanout
* Rediscover BLE service after invalidation
* Extract BLE notification retry buffer
* Extract BLE inbound write buffer
* Extract BLE fragment assembly buffer
* Tidy secure log handling from device run
* Allow self-authored RSR ingress replies
* Harden read receipt queue test timing
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
* Expand coverage for relay, identity, and location flows
* Fix macOS SwiftPM CI failures
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
